Några tankelinjer i Anders Nygrens metafysikkritik

Abstract

This essay is based on a lecture given at the delivery of the Anders Nygren Prize in Lund on 27 September 2001. It deals with Nygren’s well-known criticism of metaphysics, especially his refusal to see world-views as theoretically meaningful and religiously relevant theories. It is argued that Nygren formulates many interesting arguments which could have been used as a defence of a reasonable world view. He recognises a hypothetic-deductive way of reasoning that could be applied to world-views and he comes close to a fruitful criterion of integration. However, his very strict view of science and his sharp dividing-lines between the different contexts of meaning hinders him from using his interesting observations and arguments as a path to a more positive philosophy of metaphysics. The author does not agree with Nygren’s total refusal of metaphysics but he also argues that many parts of his criticism are relevant in the present day discussions on scientism and on religious language.