Att filosofera om religion. Mot en fördjupad debatt kring filosofiska religionsförståelser

Abstract

The article comprises a critique of the debate between different philosophical conceptions of religion, that is, ways of understanding religion philosophically. Quite often, Wittgensteinian conceptions of religion, for example, are dismissed by appeals to adequacy, the notion that adequate conceptions of religion must give a fair representation of the ways in which ordinary religious believers think and act. I argue that such appeals, taken by themselves, are insufficient to settle the matter, and that philosophers also need to engage in questions of philosophical soundness and, more controversially, questions of fruitfulness. The main benefit of extending the debate in these directions is that it forces us to problematize hitherto unquestioned philosophical and metaphilosophical presuppositions about philosophy of religion and its tasks.

This paper discusses competing conceptions of religion along three lines: (1) adequacy in relation to religious practice and believers’ conception of religious practice, (2) philosophical soundness (consistency, coherence, etc.), and (3) fruitfulness in relation to the problematic situations which triggered philosophical reflection over religion in the first place. It is also important to be aware of how the ensuing debates influence one another, e.g., how the question of adequacy is conceived differently depending on our philosophical presuppositions.