Patterns of Federalism in EU Macroeconomic Policy

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to discern the pattern of federalism in EU macroeconomic governance and seek explanations for the strengthening of the framework in this regard. The article operates in a constitutional perspective, adopting a multidimensional approach in order to fulfil the purpose. These approaches have in common that they regard issues of legal power, resulting in a structure of five criticalaxes related to the nature of the Union’s competence in macroeconomic governance. More precisely, withinthese dimensions, the nature of the exercise of legal power, its constitutionality and its implications for the allocation of power between the Union and the Member States are explicated. This thematized presentation is sought to make effective the unearthing of a pattern of federalism. Lastly follows a discussion on the direction of the EU institutional practices in macroeconomic governance and the underlying causes for this development. In addition to drawing on the conclusions on the questions basing the article, this discussion will also feature thoughts on the recent battle between the Commission and theItalian government as regards the latter’s national budget.