Riksdagspartierna och finansmakten

Informella institutioner i budgetprocessen

Abstract

Political parties and financial power: Informal institutions in the budget process

While formal rules regarding the Swedish budget process are scarce, informal rules have, with varying success, stabilized this crucial dimension of government. This article analyses how the Swedish political parties have applied the latter type of rules since the 1990’s. Two types of informal rules are at the centre of the budget process and have caused both debate and conflict. The first concerns whether opposition parties should abstain, or not, from pushing proposals that will effectively counter the government’s budget. The second concerns voting behaviour, namely that parties abstain from voting on other budget proposals than their own. Both types of rules support minority government and the overall fiscal policy aim of expenditure control. Using Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) definition, this article also finds that the political parties treat the informal rules of the budget process as informal institutions. The parties adjust their behaviour and rhetorical strategies to their current parliamentary positions but continuously make the institutional dimension of the informal rules explicit. Moreover, situations where the rules are broken or perceived as challenged trigger blame games and accusations of irresponsible behaviour.