Kontraspionage och hybridkrigföring

En fallstudie av kuppförsöket i Montenegro 2016

Abstract

In hybrid warfare, the intelligence component is a key asset for the initiating party. This opens up a new role for counterintelligence, which in addition to its traditional tasks now also has to be prepared to counter hybrid warfare, in particular during the initial stages of a conflict. Drawing on a case study of the failed coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016, four different conclusions are presented: the initiative to operations of this kind may originate from circles outside of the regular decision-making apparatus of the aggressor; the time frame from recruitment of local assets to implementation of the operation may be very short; the intelligence and security services of the target country may need to prioritize prevention over the securing of evidence; the organizational culture of the local intelligence and security services may prove to be an obstacle to taking appropriate measures to counter this type of operation.