Sense and Sensibility. En synpunkt på David Hume

Abstract

Sense and sensiblity. A view on David Hume. The author is reading David Hume with the intention to pick up components of a reformistic approach to social change. The well-known formulation about 'reason as the slave of passions' poses the first problem. I maintain that, in spite of this, reason plays a decisive role in Hume's theory of knowledge as in his practice as a political philosopher. Connected with this problem is Hume's skepticism, which is based on the discovery of the logical impossibility of inductive inference. However, this theoretical scepticism does not lead to defaitism regarding the possibility of improving knowledge and society; it just leads to modesty and, paradoxically, to an even more important role for reason. A parallel to Hume's criticism of induction is his demonstration of the impossibility of deducing values from facts. Again, it is necessary to notice the difference between his theoretical position and his Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 2002, årg 105 nr 2 192 Abstracts recommendations for politics. The task of the historian is to give a causal explanation of social institutions and, on the basis of this, point out values inherent in the institutions. This gives the instrument for a rational discussion of maintaining or reforming the institutions. Obviously, Hume is a relativist, but not in the usual and careless meaning of individual or collective subjectivism. Values are produced by men in a historical process, but as they stand before the historian and the politician, they are as objective as facts. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Hume with his view of the importance of an informed and critical discussion of social problems comes close to critical-rationalism.