Individuell autonomi och den aktiva staten

Abstract

Individual Autonomy and State Perfectionism. The liberal state, it has been argued, must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. Honouring individual autonomy and embodying deals such as fairness and impartiality, the doctrine of state neutrality is intuitively appealing. Working as a restraint for state actions it is however problematic. In this paper, a possible solution to this predicament is outlined. Drawing on the distinction between liberty and what gives worth to liberty, it is argued that we must never accept non-neutral restrictions of liberty itself, but may pursue on-neutral policies affecting the distribution of what gives worth to liberty and may impose taxes funding non-neutral state actions, although such taxation inevitable limits the worth of our liberty. It is suggested that we, by adopting such a policy of limited state erfectionism, can recognize the right to individual autonomy without having to restrain the state from doing the good it can.