Authoritarianism and Elections during the Third Wave

Merete Bech Seeberg

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"Electoral authoritarianism" has become the buzzword of the last decade of regime studies. But how did various types of authoritarian elections spread across time and how are they distributed between different regime types? I combine and update datasets on elections, authoritarianism, and democracy to analyze the development in authoritarian elections during the third wave of democratization. The analysis reveals that elections are not randomly distributed across authoritarian regimes. The results suggest that the liberal world order post-1989 most likely accounts for the marked increase in multi-party elections in authoritarian contexts. At the same time, the presence of, in particular, one- and no-party authoritarian elections during the Cold War, when there was no international pressure for democratization, indicates that dictators may institute elections with a view to entrenching themselves in power. The fact that elections are more common in civilian regimes that – in contrast with monarchies and military regimes – lack a ready-made institution through which to govern, also supports this notion. The patterns revealed suggest that the causes of authoritarian elections merit further study.

Introduction

"Electoral authoritarianism" has become the buzzword of the last decade of regime studies (Morse, 2012). An unprecedented spread of elections nested in authoritarian contexts has caused many closed autocracies to transform into forms of electoral authoritarianism in which multiple parties coexist with classical authoritarian practices of coercion and manipulation (Schedler, 2006: 1–4; 2002: 48; Levitsky and Way, 2010: 3; Magaloni, 2008: 716; Howard and Roessler, 2006: 365).

The literature abounds in highly qualified observations of the spread of electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Roessler & Howard, 2009), and one study compares the prevalence of classical forms of military and monarchic dictatorships to that of one- and multi-party authoritarian

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regimes in a pioneering attempt to understand the effects of past regime type on prospects for democratization (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). But we know little about how elections are distributed across different authoritarian settings or how different types of elections have spread in authoritarian regimes over time. Meeting Geddes' call to acknowledge the great variation between different types of authoritarian regimes (Geddes, 1999), this paper takes a first step towards understanding the spread of authoritarian elections by exploring the development in electoral institutions and their links to different types of authoritarian regimes throughout the third wave of democratization. Did authoritarian elections rise with the global liberal hegemony emerging after the Soviet collapse that initiated a pressure for democratization world-wide? Were elections in authoritarian settings also common during the Cold War testifying to the argument that authoritarian regimes may expect to derive some benefit from holding elections? Are authoritarian elections mere institutional legacies from a past regime or do different types of autocracies show different propensities to hold elections?

To answer these questions, I first discuss the factors driving the spread of elections across authoritarian regime types and over time. Second, I sketch a typology of authoritarian regimes comprising both the organizational roots of the regime elites and the type of election held. Third, I combine and update datasets on elections, authoritarianism, and democracy and tap into each of the conceptual attributes of the typology of authoritarian regimes and elections. Finally, a descriptive analysis of all regimes from 1978 to 2008 is conducted. The goal of the analysis is not to explain the existence of authoritarian elections as such, but to take a first step in explaining the development of authoritarian elections by carefully mapping their spread throughout the third wave.

The analysis reveals that although the end of the Cold War had a marked effect on the propensity for authoritarian regimes to hold elections, more than three decades ago 65 percent of authoritarian regimes already conducted elections. However, the great majority held one- or no-party elections, whereas the Cold War era saw a substantial increase in the spread of multi-party elections. These developments over time hold across various types of authoritarian regimes but the propensity to hold elections differs significantly among regime types. Whereas civilian regimes are more likely to conduct elections than are military regimes and monarchies, military regimes are still more likely to be electoral than their monarchic counterparts. This may be explained both by a greater need for the electoral institutions in civilian regimes that have no other ready-made organization through which to rule and by the tendency for oil rich monarchies in the Middle East to be less susceptible to international pressure for democratization. Either way, the results support the notion that authoritarian elections are not merely an inheritance from a past regime but develop in response to both international pressure and attempts by ruling groups to

entrench themselves in power. The clear patterns found indicate that further research on the drivers behind authoritarian elections would be fruitful.

Why Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?

Authoritarian regimes have conducted elections throughout the third wave of democratization. But why do some authoritarian regimes feature the formally democratic institution of elections?

The liberal world order that came to dominate following the end of the Cold War is commonly recognised not only as a catalyst for democratization but also for hybrid regimes or pseudo-democracies. While Western foreign policy and pressure from international financial institutions sparked liberalizations across the globe (Joseph, 1997: 368–369; Levitsky and Way, 2010: 17–18), the West's support for democracy was grounded in a belief in the importance of elections and thus often based on the presence of this formally democratic institution (Carothers, 2002: 7–8). This has fostered an increase in regimes mixing democratic traits (typically elections) with authoritarian politics (Diamond, 2002: 25–27; Brownlee, 2009: 517; Schedler, 2006: 1; Howard and Roessler, 2006: 365; Levitsky and Way, 2010: 3).

But whereas some researchers see the post-1989 world order as the catalyst that spreads elections globally, others stress that formally democratic institutions are not merely a response to international pressure but may serve the dictator's interests: whilst supermajority victories signal regime invincibility and deter elites from defecting (Magaloni, 2006: 4-10), they are also an effective way of dividing and co-opting the opposition (Malesky and Schuler, 2010: 482; Linz, 1978: 62), and create a veil of public and international legitimacy (Schedler, 2002: 36). In some autocracies, the electoral institution is inherited from the previous regime or forced upon an autocracy dependent on foreign powers. In others, elections are instituted by a rational dictator attempting (not necessarily successfully) to secure his rule. The different understandings of what causes authoritarian elections affect our expectations as to when and where an increase in electoral authoritarianism should set in.

First, if the post-Cold War world order drives the rise in elections in authoritarian regimes, the proliferation of elections should kick in after 1989. On the other hand, the view that dictators choose elections as a tool to hold on to power in an internal regime struggle supports the notion that authoritarian elections, although perhaps spreading rapidly in the early 1990s, had been common for decades prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall (Hermet, 1978: 1; Diamond, 2002: 23–24).

Second, despite Geddes' 1999 article calling in question the conclusions of 20 years of studying democracy while neglecting the internal differences between various types of authoritarianism (Geddes, 1999) and the increase

in studies of authoritarian regimes, we do not know how authoritarian elections have spread across different types of authoritarian regimes. Hadenius and Teorell, in a pioneering study of the democratization potential of various authoritarian regime types, compare the development of no-, one-, and multi-party autocracies to that of military and monarchic dictatorships. But they do not discuss the spread of multi-party or single-party elections within military regimes and monarchies (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). However, if elections are neither merely an institutional legacy from a past regime nor a response to an intensified pressure for democratization but form part of an autocratic toolbox, they should not be randomly distributed across regime types. Rather, they should appear in regimes that are in need of institutions to generate stability.

I would thus expect elections to be least prominent in monarchic autocracies. First, legitimacy in monarchies is derived not from popular elections but mainly from the historic roots of the dynasty. Thus, in Morocco, the monarchy refers to its genealogical descent from the Prophet Muhammad and "an unbroken dynastic history stretching back to the seventeenth century" (Joffe, 1988: 201). In contrast, in party-regimes, here included in the group of civilian regimes, the right to rule is based on a claim of serving "on behalf of 'the people'" (Ulfelder, 2005: 217), a claim that – unlike the historical source of legitimacy in monarchies – can be underpinned by constructing elections (or rather, election victories). Second, succession in monarchies is determined by the dynasty's family tree thus downplaying the potential for a succession crisis (Olson, 1993: 572). Where the number of potential successors is great, succession issues are still solved within the royal family (Gandhi, 2008: 23-25), as in Saudi Arabia where King Abdullah in 2006 formed the Allegiance Council consisting of princes of the Al Saud to advise the king on the question of succession and to conduct the process on the death of the king (Henderson, 2009: 13-15), thus making obsolete elections as a means for solving elite crises.

This contrasts with a classic case of electoral authoritarianism in a civilian autocracy such as Mexico under its first period of PRI-rule in the 20th century. Here, elections are known to have been an effective means of solving internal elite crises, rotating the presidency, and tying in voters to the regime (Magaloni, 2006). This indicates that elections should be most prominent in civilian regimes where leaders, in contrast to military leaders and monarchs, "do not have a ready-made organization on which to rely" (Gandhi, 2008: 29). These regimes instead build ruling parties and use elections in an attempt to share power amongst the ruling elite, deter defectors, co-opt potential opposition, and create a veil of legitimacy (Magaloni, 2006; Malesky and Schuler, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Military regimes, unlike civilian regimes, typically govern through a junta and are thus not in lack of an institutional basis, a factor which makes them less dependent on elections than their civilian counterparts. But their greater sensitivity to external shocks that may turn the people

against the regime and thus jeopardize the military's existence (Geddes, 1999: 138), would lead us to expect military regimes to be more likely than monarchies to hold elections and to remain attuned to the wishes of the people.

Finally, when exploring why authoritarian regimes hold elections, one must note the difficulty of completely circumventing existing institutions. Neither a utility argument nor an account of foreign pressure can fully explain the prevalence of elections, as many autocracies inherited the electoral institution from the previous regime whether that was a democracy that turned authoritarian or a colonial power that left. Thus, when President Marcos was ousted following massive protests over the 1986 Philippine elections and his dictatorship fell, elections were not completely new to the regime. Although Marcos had abandoned multi-party elections during the martial law period, he had himself gained the presidency in democratic elections in 1965. He thus restored rather than introduced the electoral institution in 1978 (Slater, 2010: 176). Similarly, elections in neighbouring Malaysia, which have continuously sustained the rule of the dominant party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), were not invented by the party regime but initiated under British colonial rule and continued by the new authoritarian regime (Crouch, 1996: 13-27).

Yet, in spite of these institutional legacies, other factors did influence the existence of elections in Malaysia and the Philippines. Marcos' decision to reinstate elections in the Philippines in 1978 and to call early presidential elections in 1986, were argued to be both an attempt to legitimize his rule and consolidate his power and a response to pressure from the former colonial power, the US (Thompson, 1995: 141; Bonner, 1987: 388; Brownlee, 2007: 190-191). In Malaysia, although elections would undoubtedly be hard to circumvent today, the dominant-party regime did not hesitate in 1969 to temporarily abandon elections, shut down parliament and declare a state of emergency, in response to ethnic tensions (and to election results that were unacceptable to the regime) (Jomo, 1996: 93-94). An army official revealed that even at the time of the 1999 election, a state of emergency and the closure of parliament would not have been an unlikely reaction in the event that the ruling coalition did not attain a two thirds majority (Pepinsky, 2009: 193).

It is thus to be expected that elections are to some extent inherited from the previous regime but that both the international order and power calculations by individual rulers may also affect the prevalence of authoritarian elections. If this is the case, elections in authoritarian regimes should prevail throughout the third wave but spread markedly in the post-1989 period. Furthermore, although present in all types of regimes, elections should be most common in civilian regimes and least common in monarchies.

To test whether this pattern can be shown, I track the development in authoritarian elections throughout the third wave. The following section will pay close attention to defining the core concepts and distinguishing between

different types of authoritarian elections and different types of organizational roots of regime leadership (corresponding to what is commonly referred to as different types of authoritarian regimes).

Ordering Authoritarian Regimes

A first step towards exploring the spread of elections in authoritarian regimes is to categorize different regime types and various types of elections. In this paper, a regime is defined as the set of formal and informal institutions that structure the access to political power (see Mazzuca, 2010: 342). An authoritarian regime is defined as any regime that does not live up to Schumpeter's minimalist definition of democracy as an 'institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (Schumpeter, 1979: 269). That is, regimes in which leaders are not chosen through elections in which the outcome is uncertain are by definition authoritarian.

This definition contrasts with the Dahlian view that reserves the term "democratic" (or "polyarchic") for those regimes that hold free and fair elections upheld by certain political rights, namely freedom of expression, association, and the right to seek alternative information (Dahl, 1989: 220–222). For Dahl, competition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. The consequence of Schumpeter's very minimalist definition of democracy, on the contrary, is that competitive electoral regimes are considered democratic even if the elections are not fully free and fair (Schumpeter, 1979: 271). This minimalist definition is chosen to enable us to talk of truly *authoritarian* elections. Much work on authoritarian elections and their effects on democratization rests on a Dahlian definition of democracy (see for instance Brownlee, 2009; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Donno, 2013), leading us to question whether these competitive elections lead to democracy or if democracy was already in place – partly in the form of competitive elections – having been spurred by a completely different process than the one promoted by the authors. A minimalist definition absolves us from such speculations as it leaves us with elections that are truly uncompetitive and thus non-democratic in any event.

Authoritarian regimes are here classified along two dimensions commonly used (though rarely combined) in the literature on authoritarianism: one is electoral and follows the literature on electoral authoritarianism and its subtypes. The other concerns the organizational roots of the regime as spelled out first by Geddes (1999) and later by Gandhi (2008).

The electoral dimension is set out in the literature on electoral authoritarianism. A plethora of regime labels have been suggested and often combined into a classification of authoritarian regimes. The goal in this section is to carve out clear defining attributes unambiguously distinguishing each electoral

authoritarian regime type from its immediate neighbours so as to enable precise measurement of the various types of electoral regimes.

Schedler introduces the term electoral authoritarianism to cover regimes that 'violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than "instruments of democracy"' (Schedler, 2006: 3). The notion of electoral authoritarianism covers wide variations especially as regards the competitiveness of elections. Diamond divides electoral authoritarianism into two subgroups (Diamond, 2002: 25). The non-competitive group, hegemonic authoritarianism, was originally described by Sartori as 'A two-level system in which one party tolerates and discretionally allocates a fraction of its power to subordinate political groups ... The hegemonic party formula may afford the appearance but surely does not afford the substance of competitive politics.' (Sartori, 2005: 205). Thus, hegemonic regimes are non-democratic not only according to a Dahlian but also to a Schumpeterian definition of democracy: there is no uncertainty over who will hold power after the election. The conceptualization of the competitive subgroup, competitive electoral authoritarianism, is developed by Levitsky and Way. These regimes are characterized by the lack of free and fair elections (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 53). But they stress that 'arenas of contestation exist through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents' (Ibid.: 54). In contrast to their hegemonic counterpart, their level of competition qualifies at least some competitive autocracies as democratic when a Schumpeterian notion of democracy is applied.

Hadenius and Teorell develop a typology that distinguishes between electoral, monarchic, and military authoritarian regimes. Among the electoral regimes, they first identify the no-party and one-party categories, both of which would fall within Howard and Roessler's category of closed authoritarianism, as hegemonic and competitive authoritarianism requires more than one party. Second, Hadenius and Teorell introduce the limited multiparty type corresponding largely to the concepts of competitive authoritarianism (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007: 147).

Here, I combine the electoral authoritarian subtypes into one classification and spell out the defining attributes. The result is portrayed in Table 1 and is an expanded version of Howard and Roessler's 2006 classification (2006: 367). To allow for more fine-grained distinctions, I add Hadenius and Teorell's category of one- and no-party regimes and pay close attention to precise identification of the defining attributes for each regime class. Starting from the left of Table 1, I have divided the category normally labelled 'closed authoritarianism' into two. Non-electoral authoritarianism is distinguished from one- and no-party electoral authoritarianism by the lack of national elections. I characterize one- and no-party authoritarianism as regimes holding direct national elections, yet

Table 1. Categorizing Electoral Autocracies.

ATTRIBUTES	REGIME TYPES		
	Non-electoral autocracy	**One- and no-party autocracy**	**Hegemonic autocracy**
Elections	-	+	+
Multi-party elections	-	-	+
Uncertainty in elections	-	-	-

without any opposition to the rulers. The candidates that run are either independents or from the ruling front. The third type, hegemonic authoritarianism, holds multi-party elections or elections in which parties outside the ruling front compete. Therefore, this group contains those of Levitsky and Way's competitive autocracies in which the outcome of the elections is certain. Those regimes that have an unlevel electoral playing field but sufficient levels of competition to allow for uncertainty over outcomes are for the purpose here classified as minimalist democracies and are not included on the authoritarian side of the border. [1]

The other dimension of interest concerns the organizational roots or origins of the elite. Here, following Geddes, the defining feature of a military regime is the fact that leaders are recruited from a group of military officers (Geddes, 1999: 121). In ordering the remaining regimes, a few modifications are made. First, as in the updates of Geddes' original typology, monarchy is included as a type of authoritarian regime and defined as a regime in which the leading group is a royal family (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2012: 7). Second, as proposed by Hadenius and Teorell (2007: 149) personalism is understood as a continuous dimension rather than a class in itself (that is, a civilian, monarchic or military dictatorship can be more or less personalistic) and is not considered for the purpose of this analysis. Finally, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's term civilian regime is adopted to capture those regimes in which leaders are neither drawn from the military nor via hereditary succession (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010: 86-87) regardless of whether they rule through a party or

1 For the purpose of tracing elections and authoritarian regime developments throughout the third wave, I have also employed a distinction between minimalist democracies and polyarchies, in which the defining attribute of polyarchy is the protection of the citizenry's freedom of speech and association and the right to alternative information (Dahl, 1989: 220-222). Minimalist democracy and polyarchy are not included in the typology of authoritarian regimes. But if one wishes to expand the electoral dimension to reflect also democracies, this can be done by adding the categories of minimalist democracy and polyarchy to the right of the classification of table 1. The two classes of democratic regimes are included in the analysis as reference categories for their electoral authoritarian neighbours and are operationalized in the section below.

Table 2. Authoritarian Regime Typology with Illustrative Examples.

	Military	**Monarchy**	**Civilian**
Non-electoral	Chile, 1978-1988 Rwanda, 1994-2002	Nepal, 2002-2007 Saudi Arabia, 1978-2008	China, 1998-2008 Cuba, 1978-1992 Eritrea, 1993-2008
One- and no-party electoral	Laos, 1992-2008 Sudan, 1978-2004 Syria, 1978-2008	Kuwait, 1978-2008 Swaziland, 1993-2008	DDR, 1978-1989 Tanzania, 1978-1994 Turkmenistan, 1992-2005
Hegemonic electoral	Algeria, 1995-1998 Brazil, 1978-1984 Burkina Faso, 1978-2008	Jordan, 1993-2008 Morocco, 1978-2008	Azerbaijan, 1993-2008 Mexico, 1978-1999 Zimbabwe, 1978-2008

whether they hold elections (this information is instead provided by the electoral dimension). The very simple regime typology resulting from the combinations of the electoral and the leadership dimensions is presented in Table 2.

Operationalization of Regime Types

To allow for a trend analysis of the spread of authoritarian elections across various authoritarian regimes, the following section presents a complete operationalization of the above authoritarian regime typology. [2] Although Hadenius and Teorell's dataset also allows for hybrids that are for instance both monarchic and electoral (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013: 27-28), this dataset does not fully match the typology developed here, amongst other things because it does not employ a Schumpeterian definition of democracy. Instead, I combine alternative data sources to tap into each of the defining attributes of both the electoral and the leadership dimension of authoritarian regimes. The

2 Note that the unit of analysis here is country-years rather than regimes as such. The CGV data, on which the operationalization is based, identify authoritarian spells, the continuous number of years under which a regime was autocratic, and do not capture the downfall of one authoritarian regime immediately followed by a new authoritarian regime (see Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2012: 17-19). This approach fits analyses on number or proportions of different regime types in any given year or period. However, if one is interested in the duration of regimes or the beginning or downfall of a regime, a more appropriate measure for identifying the duration of any given authoritarian regime would be the Autocratic Regimes Data (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2012). But if one is interested in distinguishing regimes on the electoral dimension, the GWF data would need to be combined with data on elections such as in the operationalization presented here. For the purpose of this analysis, however, the CGV data are most appropriate to distinguish between democracies and autocracies, as the CGV data most precisely reflect the core concept of uncertainty in elections that distinguishes minimalist democracy from authoritarianism. The CGV data may then be combined with data from the Archigos Dataset on Leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009) to account for transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next as I also do in this analysis when distinguishing between electoral and non-electoral authoritarian spells within the same country over time (see below).

data cover the period 1978-2008, in relation to nearly all member states of the UN as of 1 July 2011 as well as to some countries now no longer in existence.[3] [4]

First of all, when applying the classical Schumpeterian definition of democracy, the variable separating democracies from authoritarian regimes should capture the element of uncertainty in elections. Building on Przeworski and collaborator's original dataset, Cheibub et al.'s Democracy-Dictatorship (CGV) dataset offers such a variable (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010: 69). On top of the feature of *ex ante* uncertainty, the authors add criteria of *ex post* irreversibility and repeatability, meaning that regimes are coded as democratic if the legislature is popularly elected, the chief executive is either popularly elected or appointed by a popularly elected body, more than one party competes in elections, and finally, an alternation in power has occurred under electoral rules similar to those under which the incumbent won in the first place (Ibid.). In other words, regimes are democratic if more than one party competes in an election in which there is uncertainty over the outcome but certainty that the winner of the election will take office (Przeworski, 1986: 56–61). I use this measure (from here on referred to as the *democracy variable*) to separate democratic from authoritarian regimes.

One main objection to Przeworski's classical measure must be confronted. By looking at whether an alternation in power has occurred, the measure captures competitiveness (Bogaards, 2007: 1231–1232). However, what I seek to measure is not competitiveness or alternation as such but simply the potential for competitiveness, that is, competition or uncertainty in elections (Sartori, 1970: 218–221). Whereas cases in which an alternation has occurred are clear cases of competition, other cases in which competition exists may be overlooked if competition has not yet manifested itself in an actual transfer of power. Thus, there is a risk of misclassification of cases such as Botswana and South Africa where no alternation has been seen under the current regime, but it is perceivable that one would occur if the majority of the population wished for it. However, a significant number of the disputed cases in which an alternation has not occurred in the observed period are regimes such as Egypt (before 2011), Singapore, and Yemen. These are cases in which it is indeed very unlikely

3 Excepted are countries on which data are not available (Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Tonga, and Tuvalu). One entity still in existence today, yet not a member of the UN, has been added to the dataset, namely Taiwan. Included countries that are no longer in existence: Czechoslovakia, Germany (East), Germany (West), Serbia and Montenegro, USSR, Vietnam (South), Yemen (North), Yemen (South), and Yugoslavia.

4 Countries are included from 1978 or from year of independence if independence was declared after 1978. Data pertain to Dec 31st. Thus, as Germany East and West were united in October 1990, I register Germany East and Germany West until 1989 and Germany from 1990 onwards. And even though the Soviet Union did not cease to exist until late December 1991, I record the USSR until 1990 and Russia from 1991 onwards.

that rulers would have handed over power had they lost an election. To confirm that the problem is of very small magnitude, two robustness checks have been carried out. [5]

Next, I separated the authoritarian subcategories from their immediate neighbours on the electoral dimension by indicators reflecting each of the conceptual attributes listed in Table 1. At one end of the spectrum, non-electoral authoritarian regimes are defined as regimes that do not hold national elections. I developed a set of indicators to capture every direct legislative and executive election in the world from 1978 to 2008 regardless of the quality of that election. As data on elections, especially of the authoritarian kind and before election monitoring started blossoming in the late 1980s (Bjornlund, 2004: 7–8), are often unreliable, I have constructed these variables by comparing two datasets – the DPI and Kelley's Quality of Elections Database (QED) (Beck et al., 2001; Kelley and Kolev, 2010) – and gathering additional information (see Appendix 1).

Non-electoral authoritarian regimes are operationalized as regimes that score 0 on the democracy variable, indicating the lack of competitive elections, and 0 on both the variables on the occurrence of executive and of legislative elections throughout the past seven years.[6] Thus, if no national elections were held during the past seven years, the regime is coded as non-electoral.[7] An example would be Saudi Arabia, a monarchy that holds local but no national elections. If an authoritarian regime held a direct election for either the executive or the legislature within the last seven years, it is categorized either as one- and no-party or hegemonic.

5 60 countries are classified as authoritarian at some point between 1978 and 2008 solely because they have not witnessed an alternation in power under the given regime. I have categorized these potential error countries with Polity data employed as recommended by Doorenspleet (2005: 25) (however, I do not use the variable on executive constraints) as well as with FH's listings of electoral democracies for every year since 1989. The alternative measures agree with the democracy variable in 66 percent and 73 percent of the disputed country-years, respectively. Given that Doorenspleet's measure is a particularly minimalist measure of democracy and that the robustness check with FH data could only be carried out in the latter part of the period in which disagreement over regime classifications is greater, both tests must be considered conservative, and the results should boost our confidence in the democracy variable.

6 Seven years were chosen as this is a rather large interval, yet it is still the norm in quite a few democratic regimes. This ensures that autocracies holding regular elections, yet with intervals larger than what is most common in democracies, are still classified as having elections (e.g., Mexico held presidential elections every six years during the 20th century). Furthermore, for countries that transitioned from democracy to authoritarianism within the past seven years, only elections held during the current authoritarian spell count. That is, elections held within the past seven years but during a democratic phase or held under a previous authoritarian regime spell separated from the current by a period of democratic rule do not qualify the regime as electoral authoritarian.

7 I have checked the record of elections in all regimes that I coded as non-electoral when the analyses begin in 1978 (additional election data were drawn from the volumes edited by Nohlen with various co-editors). If these regimes did in fact hold an election in the prior seven years and did not experience coups or the like in the meantime, I have recoded them as having elections.

However, one qualifier must be added: if an irregular change in the effective head of government occurs, the regime is classified as non-electoral authoritarian (regardless of whether it held an election within the last seven years) from the year of the irregular leadership change and until the next election is held. For instance, when long-serving president Jawara of Gambia was deposed in a coup in 1994, the regime is coded as non-electoral (in spite of the 1992 elections preceding the coup) from 1994 and until the new president Jammeh conducted elections in 1996. On the other hand, in 1999, when Muhammad VI was instated as the new king of Morocco upon the death of his father and reigning king, the regime continues to be coded as having elections since the power transfer follows existing rules and traditions and there is no reason to believe that elections should not continue to take place. I coded irregular leadership changes by identifying all cases of leadership change in one- and no-party and hegemonic autocracies (a variable on leadership change is available in the CGV dataset). For these cases, I obtained additional information on leaders' exit and entry. For the years 1978 to 2004, data were drawn from the Archigos Data Set on Political Leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009). All cases in which at least one leader came to power in an irregular fashion or by foreign imposition were coded non-electoral until the next election. Where the new leader came to power according to the existing rules and traditions, the regime remains in the category of either one- and no-party electoral authoritarianism or hegemonic authoritarianism, regardless of whether the old leader exited power in an irregular manner. For instance, the previous leader may have been murdered, but the new leader is appointed according to existing rules: the vice president may assume the post of president or the party may appoint a new prime minister. From 2005 to 2008, I coded the variable myself using multiple sources (Keesing's Record of World Events; LexisNexis; U.S. Department of State, Freedom House).

I then split authoritarian regimes with elections into two groups: one with only one party or candidate participating and one with some element of competition despite the lack of uncertainty. This is captured by two variables from the CGV dataset. 'Defacto2' registers whether parties outside the ruling front exist and 'lparty' records whether non-ruling front parties are represented in the legislature (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2009: 5). One- and no-party regimes fail to live up to at least one of these criteria. This category includes cases such as Syria before the civil war, which held regular legislative and executive elections, yet tolerated no opposition to the incumbent president; or Uzbekistan, formally a four-party system but with all parties belonging to President Karimov's ruling front. Hegemonic regimes score 2 on both of these variables, indicating that even though the winner of the elections is known *a priori*, opposition candidates run and win votes. An example would be Singapore since 1984 or Egypt from 1979 and until the ousting of Mubarak

in 2011. Although the opposition ran and won seats in parliament in both cases, there was never uncertainty over the overall election results.[8]

I operationalize the leadership dimension through Cheibub et al's distinction between military (regimes in which the leader is a previous or current member of the armed forces), monarchic (regimes in which the ruler is titled king and has a hereditary successor and/or predecessor), and civilian (the residual category) dictatorships (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010: 88-89).

Finally, country-years in which no government controlled the majority of the territory, the regime was foreign-occupied, or a provisional government was in place to oversee a transition to democracy cannot meaningfully be classified as democratic or authoritarian and have been excluded from the analysis (a total of 110 out of 5098 country-years).[9] Data were drawn from the Authoritarian Regimes Data's variable 'nonautocracy' (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2012).[10] Appendix 3 offers an overview of the classification of all regimes from 1978 to 2008.

Authoritarianism and elections from 1978 to 2008

The data presented above make it possible to explore the development in various types of authoritarian elections throughout a thirty year period and to assess their spread across different types of authoritarian regimes. Figure 1 pre-

8 To fully grasp the developments of the third wave, I also trace the democratic categories of minimalist democracy and polyarchy. They are operationalized as follows: Minimalist democracies have an element of electoral uncertainty (measured through a score of 1 on the democracy variable). But in contrast to polyarchies, minimalist democracies do not fully respect the political rights of the citizenry accentuated by Dahl in his definition of polyarchy: freedom of speech and association and the right to alternative information. Two out of these three political rights are captured in Møller and Skaaning's Civil Liberty Dataset (CLD) (Møller and Skaaning, 2013). Based on systematic coding of the US Department of State's Human Rights Reports, the variable 'freexp' gauges the freedom of opinion and expression of citizens and the media, while freedom of association and assembly is captured in the variable 'freass'. If a regime is to be scored as a polyarchy, it must attain a score of 3 or higher on both variables as this score indicates only no or minor restrictions of the rights to expression and association. A regime that has severe restrictions (a score of 1–2) on either of the variables is classified as a minimalist democracy as it does not protect the basic political rights of its citizenry. Minimalist democracy in 2008 encompasses countries such as Kenya, Peru, and Albania. For 14 countries, data are not available for their first year following independence, and their score in the given year equals their score in the succeeding year. As the CLD does not cover the US, two variables covering the same two political rights, namely 'assn' and 'speech' from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI), are used to score the US. A score of 2, indicating no limitations on both dimensions, qualifies the US as a polyarchy.

9 All analyses have been run a second time with the inclusion of these country-years based on the original coding scheme. The exclusion of transitional regimes, foreign-occupied regimes, and regimes without a functioning government does not alter the conclusions.

10 Geddes et al. (2012) code country-years based on the regime in place on January 1st whereas I follow the convention of coding regimes as of December 31st. Thus, when Geddes et al. code Georgia as a transitional regime in 2004 based on Shevardnadze's resignation in November 2003 and the transitional elections in January 2004, I exclude it from the analysis in 2003 and code it as democratic in 2004.

Figure 1. Development in regime types, percent, 1978–2008.



Note: Total number of regimes in the analysis is 146 in 1978 and 170 in 2008.

sents developments across all regime types from 1978 to 2008 in percent, while Figure 2 illustrates the prevalence of elections in authoritarian regimes in the same period.

The data illustrate the main trends of the last half century of regime developments: a rise in the number of democracies throughout the third wave of democratization, a corresponding decline in authoritarian regimes, and an increase in the number of electoral autocracies in the 1990s. Indeed, the end of the Cold War had a profound effect on authoritarian rule. But the effect is even more striking when focusing on the developments in electoral authoritarianism. Whereas autocracies (including electoral autocracies) as a proportion of world regimes decreased by 10 percentage points from 1989 to 1997, within this group, hegemonic electoral autocracy, the type corresponding to hybrid regimes in this analysis, expanded significantly after the termination of the Cold War. Regimes mixing authoritarian rule with multi-party elections were at their lowest in 1989 when they comprised 10 percent of all regimes. In the eight years following the termination of the Cold War, hegemonic authoritarianism expanded by no less than 17 percentage points comprising 27 percent of world regimes in 1997. These findings lend credence to the common notion that the liberal world order has caused an increase in hybrid regimes.

Figure 2 tunes in on elections in autocracies. It reveals that in spite of the marked increase in authoritarian elections in the post-Cold War era, authoritarian elections are not a new phenomenon. Even 30 years ago, the majority of autocracies held some form of elections. Taken together, the groups of hegemonic and one- and no-party regimes in 1978 comprised 65 percent of all authoritarian regimes. In this light, it seems plausible that elections are of some

Figure 2. Development in authoritarian regimes, percent, 1978–2008.



Note: Total number of authoritarian regimes in the analysis is 107 in 1978 and 67 in 2008.

instrumental value to autocrats, as they were common long before the liberal world order entrenched itself.

How did the end of the Cold War affect the tendency for autocracies to hold elections if these elections were common even by the onset of the third wave of democratization? A pattern emerges if we contrast the development in different types of authoritarian elections. While authoritarian elections as a whole did not increase in the 1990s, this was because one- and no-party elections actually declined from 1983 onwards, with the steepest drop setting in from 1989. In contrast, multi-party elections exploded over precisely the same period. Hegemonic authoritarian regimes as a share of all autocracies expanded by only one percentage point in the eleven-year period before the end of the Cold War. However, in the following eleven years, from 1989 to 2000, hegemonic autocracy as a share of authoritarian regimes rose by 31 percentage points.

We have not witnessed an increase in authoritarian elections as a whole but an increase in multi-party elections. Thus, while the new world order may not have affected the tendency for authoritarian regimes to hold elections, it most likely played a role in the great increase in authoritarian multi-party elections that set in during the 1990s. In fact, whereas Howard and Roessler state that hegemonic authoritarianism became the modal form of autocracy by 2005 (2009: 112), Figure 2 illustrates that even if we collapse non-electoral authoritarian and one- and no-party authoritarian regimes into one group, as Howard and Roessler do, hegemonic authoritarianism was the modal form of autocracy already by 1995, comprising 55 percent of all authoritarian regimes.

The trend of authoritarian multi-party elections has continued until today. Whereas hegemonic authoritarianism as a share of all regimes did not increase

Figure 3. Elections in civilian autocracies, count, 1978-2008.



Note: Total number of civilian autocracies in the analysis is 50 in 1978 and 33 in 2008..

in the new millennium, its proportion of authoritarian regimes rose with seven percentage points. The group of autocracies as a whole may have contracted in the new millennium, but among the existing autocracies, more and more regimes hold multi-party elections.

Figure 4. Elections in military autocracies, percent, 1978-2008.



Note: Total number of civilian autocracies in the analysis is 50 in 1978 and 33 in 2008.

Figure 5. Elections in monarchic autocracies, count, 1978-2008.



Note: Total number of monarchic autocracies in the analysis is 13 in 1978 and 11 in 2008.

It thus seems that the post-Cold War era can account for an increase in multi-party elections in authoritarian settings but not for a general tendency for the majority of authoritarian regimes to hold some form of national elections. Figures 3 through 5 examine the development in authoritarian elections over time in each of the three authoritarian subtypes (military, civilian and monarchic). Each of the three types of authoritarian regimes largely follows the electoral trends described above. While the prevalence of non-electoral regimes has decreased within all subgroups, multi-party elections have expanded.

Although the different types of elections follow largely the same trend over time in the various subtypes, Figures 3-5 reveal that the civilian, military, and monarchic autocracies have different propensities to hold elections. Monarchic regimes form a curious sub-group in which one- and no-party elections are still the most common and the proportion of non-electoral regimes equal that of hegemonic electoral. This may be seen as a confirmation of the expectation that monarchies are least likely to hold elections as they have a ready-made network, the royal family, to govern through and derive their legitimacy from the historical roots of the monarchy. But the limited expansion of hegemonic elections within this subgroup may also confirm the fact that international pressure has driven the spread of multi-party elections. Most of the monarchies are resistant, oil-rich, states in the Middle East that may be less susceptible to international pressure for democratization and thus less likely to implement elections. In all, the group of monarchies covers a limited number of

Table 3. Elections across Authoritarian Regime Types.

COLD WAR ERA, 1978-1989

	Military	Monarchy	Civilian
Non-electoral	38,3% (184)	68,9% (104)	18,4% (109)
One- and no-party electoral	47,1% (226)	15,9% (24)	61,1% (362)
Hegemonic electoral	14,6% (70)	15,2% (23)	20,4% (121)
Total	100,0% (480)	100,0% (151)	100,0% (592)

Note: Observations are country years.

POST-COLD WAR ERA, 1990-2008

	Military	Monarchy	Civilian
Non-electoral	27,5% (127)	56,0% (130)	16,4% (137)
One- and no-party electoral	27,9% (226)	22,4% (52)	29,1% (243)
Hegemonic electoral	44,6% (206)	21,6% (50)	54,5% (455)
Total	100,0% (462)	100,0% (232)	100,0% (835)

Note: Observations are country years.

regimes and the change of electoral competition in one country has a considerable effect on the overall development so any conclusion must be only tentative. The differences among the subtypes in the propensity to hold various types of elections are explored further in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3 reveals that both during the Cold War and after 1989, civilian autocracies were the group most likely to hold elections regardless of degree of competition and most likely to hold multi-party elections, while monarchies were least likely to do so. Comparing all country-years before 1990, 82 percent of those in which a civilian autocracy governed held some form of elections, compared to 62 percent of military country-years and 31 percent of monarchic country-years. Similarly, in 20 percent of the civilian country-years in this period multiple parties were allowed to compete in elections, five percentage points more than in monarchies and military regimes respectively. The differences are exacerbated after 1989, since the increase in hegemonic autocracies is more prominent among civilian regimes than the other subtypes. After the Cold War, 84 percent of civilian country-years were in regimes that held elections and 55 percent were in regimes that held multi-party elections (Table 3).

Table 4 presents the same differences in terms of the odds ratios of having

Table 4. Odds of Elections across Authoritarian Regime Types.

COLD WAR ERA, 1978-1989

A. Multiparty Elections

	Military	Monarchy
Civilian	1.50*	1.43
Military		0.95

B .Elections

	Military	Monarchy
Civilian	2.75*	9.81*
Military		3.56*

POST-COLD WAR ERA, 1990-2008

C. Multiparty Elections

	Military	Monarchy
Civilian	1.49*	4.36*
Military		2.93*

D. Elections

	Military	Monarchy
Civilian	1.93*	6.49*
Military		3.36*

Note: Logistic regression, odds ratios. Observations are country years. Odds ratios denote odds of elections in row group (numerator) relative to odds of elections in column group (denominator), where odds equal probability of having election divided by probability of not having elections. No controls. *p<0.01.

elections for various group comparisons. Where the odds ratio is above zero, the odds of elections are greater in the row group than in the column group and vice versa when the odds ratio is below zero. Whereas the difference in propensity to hold multiparty elections is not statistically significant for most group comparisons before 1990 (panel A), the differences are significant when looking at the propensity to hold any type of election (panel B). The odds of a regime being electoral in any given country-year during the Cold War in which a civilian regime ruled was 2.75 times greater than the odds of seeing an electoral military regime and almost 10 times greater than those of finding a royal family conducting regular elections. Furthermore, a county-year had three and a half times greater odds of being electoral if a military junta was in power, as compared to a royal family. Though the magnitudes of the odds ratios vary, the pattern holds and all differences are statistically significant for the post-Cold War period (Panels C and D). Civilian regimes were significantly more likely to hold elections than were both military and monarchic regimes.

The findings support the notion that dictators may choose to boost their rule by holding elections. It is a story that has been told of mostly civilian regimes as diverse as 20th century Mexico's party-regime, the personalist rule of Marcos in the Philippines, and the dominant-party regime of Malaysia today. In Mexico, multi-party elections were introduced with the end of the revolution in 1917, but sustained by the PRI after 1928 as part of a conscious and effective power-sharing pact between ruling elites (Magaloni, 2006: 7-8). In the following decades, the regular multi-party elections served to rotate the presidency without

creating elite rivalries, convey an image of invincibility that would discourage elite defections, co-opt the opposition, and gather valuable information about regime supporters and opponents (Magaloni, 2006). In the Philippines, Marcos, as noted earlier, had replaced multi-party elections with plebiscites during the martial law era but, convinced that he would win elections, he was driven by his need for legitimacy – along with pressure from the US – to reintroduce elections in the late 1970s (Brownlee, 2007: 190-191; Thompson, 1995: 141). Curiously, he was ousted from power following protests over exactly such an election in 1986, lending credence to the fact that although dictators may hope that elections will entrench their rule, this is not necessarily the case. Finally, in Malaysia, elections in the latter half of the 20th century formed part of a strategy by UMNO to legitimate its rule (Hing and Ong, 1987: 141; Jomo, 1996: 90); to co-opt rivals such as current opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim who was lured into the party from 1982 to 1998 (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 85-86); and to deter elite defection by winning with effective supermajorities (Crouch, 1996: 12; Brownlee, 2007: 144). The strategy may prove to be less secure today in the face of a modernizing society but could nonetheless be viewed as an important reason why the regime chose to uphold rather than abandon the electoral institution in the years following independence.

The findings indicate that elections spread unevenly across different types of autocracies. In view of the fact that the spread corresponds to what we would expect if civilian regimes were seen as those most dependent on elections for stability, and monarchies as those least dependent on elections, these results lend credence to the argument that elections, as an institution, are installed or upheld by rational dictators who seek to prolong their rule. However, as discussed above, while this cannot fully explain why civilian regimes are significantly more likely to conduct elections than are military regimes, the relative lack of elections in monarchic autocracies may also be explained by the fact that these regimes were less dependent on Western powers and thus withstood the pressure to install democratic institutions.

Conclusion

Following up on an increased focus on the formally democratic institution of elections in authoritarian regimes, this paper has traced the development in authoritarian elections throughout the third wave. The analysis has revealed that authoritarian elections are not a new phenomenon. Even in 1978, 65 percent of autocracies held elections and 16 percent held multi-party elections. What is new is the significant increase in multi-party elections that followed the end of the Cold War.

Whereas the trends are apparent in all types of regimes, monarchies stand out by virtue of the relative absence of hegemonic autocracies amongst them.

This may be explained by the resilience towards pressures for democratization amongst the oil-rich monarchies of the Middle East. However, a utility view – that dictators implement the electoral institution in an attempt to govern more effectively and cling to power longer – better accounts for the difference across all authoritarian regime types. Civilian regimes may be more prone to hold elections – and allow competitors in these elections – than their military and monarchic counterparts, because they are in need of an institution through which to govern and derive legitimacy. Military regimes, though less dependent on elections than civilian regimes, may still be more likely to install an electoral channel through which to receive societal inputs than monarchies, simply because military regimes are more vulnerable to public dissatisfaction with the regime and the elite defections and military splits that such popular dissent may cause.

All in all, the differences in the propensities to hold elections across different types of authoritarian regimes, and the marked increase in multi-party elections with the introduction of a liberal world order post-1989, document that elections are not randomly distributed across authoritarian regimes, but rather thrive in those countries where former colonial powers or democratic regimes had already installed them in earlier years. While institutional legacy is a valid explanation for the prevalence of elections in some authoritarian regimes, this institution may be altered, abandoned, or brought back to life either as a response to international pressure or in an attempt to secure authoritarian rule. Further studies should explore exactly when and where elections are likely to emerge and to be entrenched in the authoritarian system.

Furthermore, regardless of whether dictators implement and uphold elections as a regime-sustaining tool, it is still unclear whether and when this attempt is successful. The effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability is contested and this question merits further study (see, for instance, Lindberg, 2006; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Hadenius and Teorell, 2009; Lust, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Brownlee, 2009). Combined with data on regime duration and stability, the data used in this paper allow for such nuanced causal analyses of both the causes and the long-term effects of different types of authoritarian elections in various authoritarian contexts.

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APPENDIX 1: DATA AND CODING OF THE ELECTION VARIABLES

Two variables have been created to account for elections in all types of regimes on a cross-national basis from 1975 to 2010. LegElec records legislative elections, and ExElec registers executive elections. The variable scores 1 if one or more national elections were held in that year and 0 if no national election was held.

The variables were created by first comparing the variables 'legelec' and 'exelec' ranging from 1978 to 2004 from Kelley's Database on the Quality of Elections (QED) (Kelley and Kolev, 2010) with similar variables from the World Bank's Database on Political Institutions (DPI), LEGELEC and EXELEC, ranging from 1975 to 2010 (Beck et al., 2001). All cases in which the two sets of variables were not in accordance were recorded. This applies to 3.5 per cent of legislative elections (155 cases) and 1.6 per cent of executive elections (72 cases). Part of the disagreement was not due to diverging information on whether an election was held or mistakes in one of the datasets, but owed to the fact that the DPI records the second round of two-round elections whereas the QED records the first, and that the QED registers elections for constitutional assemblies as legislative elections. As these numbers were not worryingly high, only the cases in which the datasets disagreed were recoded. Additional information on whether an election was held was first gathered from Nohlen's edited volumes on elections across the world (Nohlen with various co-editors, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2005a, 2005b, 2010). Where these did not give sufficient information or did not cover the time period in question, I have also referred to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Adam Carr's Elections Archive, African Elections Database, Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), Freedom House, and various national sources. Data on the years 2005–2008 that are not covered by the QED are taken from DPI. Throughout the process, the following coding rules were applied:

1. The variables are independent of the quality and competitiveness of the given election. Elections with only one candidate are recorded as long as the elec-

tions did take place. For example, the Cuban elections from 1993 onwards are recorded, as the number of candidates equalled the number of posts but polling did take place (Nohlen, 2005a: 197–198). In contrast, the 1999 Singaporean presidential election, where the only candidate was declared the winner in a walk-over without a ballot, is not recorded (Nohlen, 2001b: 249).

2. The variables record only direct elections. Cases such as South Africa, where the president is appointed by the legislature, are not recorded as having presidential elections, and neither are indirect elections such as the provincial elections of electoral colleges to select members of the Angolan legislature in 1980 and 1986. However, indirect executive elections that are in effect direct are recorded. The American presidential elections, where the popularly elected electors always vote for the presidential candidate of their affiliated party, are recorded as elections (in accordance with Nohlen, 2005a: 675–676).

3. Elections for constitutional assemblies are not recorded.

4. For two-round elections, the election is recorded in the year of the first round.

5. Annulled elections are recorded as long as a ballot took place before the annulment. This applies to Bolivia in 1978 when the presidential and legislative elections were held and then annulled due to fraud (Nohlen, 2005b: 133).

6. By-elections are not recorded.

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APPENDIX 2: COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION

COUNTRIES	REGIME CLASSES (ELECTORAL DIMENSION)					
	Non-electoral autocracy	**One- and no-party autocracy**	**Hegemonic autocracy**	**Minimalist democracy**	**Polyarchy**	**Other***
Afghanistan	1978-1987; 1996-2000	1988-1991				1992-1995; 2001-2008
Albania		1978-1990		1991-1996; 2001-2008	1997-2000	
Algeria	1992-1994	1978-1991	1995-2008			
Angola	1978-1991; 1999-2007		1992-1998; 2008			
Argentina	1978-1982			1983; 1993	1984-1992; 1994-2008	
Armenia				1994-2008	1991-1993	
Australia					1978-2008	
Austria					1978-2008	
Azerbaijan	1992	1991	1993-2008			
Bahamas					1978-2008	
Bahrain	1978-2001	2002-2008				
Bangladesh	1982-1985; 2007	1978-1981; 2008		1986-2006		
Barbados					1978-2008	
Belarus	1991-1993		1994-2008			
Belgium					1978-2008	
Belize					1978-2008	
Benin	1978	1979-1989		2001-2008	1991-2000	1990
Bhutan	1978-2006			2007-2008		
Bolivia	1978; 1980-1981			2008	1982-2007	1979
Bosnia-Herzegovina						1992-2008
Botswana			1978-2008			
Brazil			1978-1984		1985-2008	
Brunei	1984-2008					
Bulgaria		1978-1989		2008	1990-2007	
Burkina Faso	1980-1990	1991	1978-1979; 1992-2008			
Burundi	1978-1981; 1987-1992; 1996-2002	1982-1986		2005-2008	1993-1995	2003-2004
Cambodia	1988-1992; 1997	1978-1987	1993-1996; 1998-2008			
Cameroon		1978-1991	1992-2008			
Canada					1978-2008	

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party autocracy	Hegemonic autocracy	Minimalist democracy	Polyarchy	Other*
Cape Verde	1978-1979	1980-1989		1998	1990-1997; 1999-2008	
Central African Republic	1978-1986; 2003-2004	1987-1992	2005-2008	1993; 1995-1997; 1999-2002	1994; 1998;	
Chad	1978; 1982-1995	1996	1997-2008			1979-1981
Chile	1978-1988		1989		1990-2008	
China	1978-2008					
Colombia				1978; 2004-2005; 2007-2008	1979-2003; 2006	
Comoros	1995; 1999-2001	1978-1989; 2002	1996-1998; 2003	1994; 2005-2007	1990-1993; 2004; 2008	
Congo	1997-2001	1978-1990	2002-2008	1992-1996		1991
Congo, Democratic Republic	1994-2005	1978-1993	2006-2008			
Costa Rica					1978-2008	
Cote d'Ivoire	1999; 2007-2008	1978-1989	1990-1998; 2000-2006			
Croatia				1991-1999	2000-2008	
Cuba	1978-1992	1993-2008				
Cyprus			1978-1982		1983-2008	
Czech Republic					1993-2008	
Czecho-slovakia		1978-1988		1989	1990-1992	
Denmark					1978-2008	
Djibouti		1978-2008				
Dominican Republic				1990-1995	1978-1989; 1996-2008	
Ecuador	1978; 2000-2001			1979; 2005	1980-1999; 2002-2004; 2006-2008	
Egypt		1978	1979-2008			
El Salvador	1979-1981	1982-1983	1978	1984	1985-2008	
Equatorial Guinea	1978-1982	1983-1992	1993-2008			
Eritrea	1993-2008					
Estonia					1991-2008	
Ethiopia	1980-1986; 1991-1994	1978-1979; 1987-1990; 1995-2008				

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party autocracy	Hegemonic autocracy	Minimalist democracy	Polyarchy	Other*
Fiji	1987-1991; 2000; 2006-2008		1978-1986; 2001-2005		1992-1999	
Finland					1978-2008	
France					1978-2008	
Gabon		1978-1989	1990-2008			
Gambia	1994-1995	1996	1978-1993; 1997-2008			
Georgia			1991-2002	2004-2008		2003
Germany, East		1978-1989				
Germany, West					1990-2008	
Ghana	1978; 1981-1991		1992	1979-1980; 1994-2001; 2005-2006	1993; 2002-2004; 2007-2008	
Greece				1992-1993; 1998-1999; 2004	1978-1991; 1994-1997; 2000-2003; 2005-2008	
Grenada	1983	1979-1982			1984-2008	
Guatemala		1982-1984	1985	1978-1981; 1993; 1995-2002	1986-1992; 1994; 2003-2008	
Guinea	1984-1992; 2008	1978-1983; 1993-1994	1995-2007			
Guinea-Bissau	1980-1983;	1978-1979; 1984-1993	1994-1998	2000-2002; 2005-2008		1999; 2003-2004
Guyana			1978-2008			
Haiti	1986-1989; 1991-1994	1978-1985; 1990; 2006	1995-2003; 2007-2008			2004-2005
Honduras	1978-1980		1981	2004-2008	1982-2003	
Hungary		1978-1989			1990-2008	
Iceland					1978-2008	
India				1980; 1984-1985; 1987-1995; 1997-2008	1978-1979; 1981-1983; 1986; 1996	
Indonesia			1978-1998	1999-2008		
Iran	1979	1978; 1980-2008				
Iraq	1978-1979	1980-2002				2003-2008
Ireland					1978-2008	

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party autocracy	Hegemonic autocracy	Minimalist democracy	Polyarchy	Other*
Israel				1984; 1987; 1989-1995; 2000-2007	1978-1983; 1985-1986; 1988; 1996-1999; 2008	
Italy					1978-2008	
Jamaica				1983-1988; 1993-1996	1978-1982; 1989-1992; 1997-2008	
Japan					1978-2008	
Jordan	1978-1988	1989-1992; 2001-2002	1993-2000; 2003-2008			
Kazakhstan		1998	1991-1997; 1999-2008			
Kenya		1978-1991	1992-1997	1998-2008		
Korea, North	1997	1978-1996; 1998-2008				
Korea, South		1980	1978-1979; 1981-1987	1988-1992	1993-2008	
Kuwait		1978-2008				
Kyrgyzstan		1991-1994	1995-2004	2005-2008		
Laos	1978-1988	1989-2008				
Latvia					1991-2008	
Lebanon		2005-2008				1978-2004
Lesotho	1978-1992 1994-1997	1993; 1998-2001	2002-2008			
Liberia	1980-1984	1978-1979; 2001-2002	1985-1989; 1997-2000; 2005	2006-2008		1990-1996; 2003-2004
Libya	1978-2008					
Lithuania					1991-2008	
Luxembourg					1978-2008	
Macedonia				1995; 2001-2002	1991-1994; 1996-2000; 2003-2008	
Madagascar		1978-1992		2002-2006; 2008	1993-2001; 2007	
Malawi		1978-1993		1994-2008		
Malaysia		1978-2008				
Maldives		1978-2004	2005-2007	2008		
Mali	1978	1979-1990		1997-2001; 2007	1992-1996; 2002-2006; 2008	1991

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party autocracy	Hegemonic autocracy	Minimalist democracy	Polyarchy	Other*
Malta				1982-1986	1978-1981; 1987-2008	
Mauritania	1978-1991; 2008	2005-2006	1992-2004	2007		
Mauritius				1979	1978; 1980-2008	
Mexico			1978-1999		2000-2008	
Moldova				1991-1993; 1996; 2002-2008	1994-1995; 1997-2001	
Mongolia		1978-1989		1990; 2004-2008	1991-2003	
Morocco	1991-1992		1978-1990; 1993-2008			
Mozambique	1984-1985; 1993	1978-1983; 1986-1992	1994-2008			
Myanmar	1988-1989; 1997-2008	1978-1987; 1990-1996				
Namibia			1990-2008			
Nepal	1978-1980; 2002-2007	1981-1989;		1990; 1993-1994; 1998-2001; 2008	1991-1992; 1995-1997	
Netherlands					1978-2008	
New Zealand					1978-2008	
Nicaragua	1979-1983		1978	1984-1989; 2008	1990-2007	
Niger	1978-1988	1989-1990	1996-1999	1993-1995; 2000-2008		1991-1992
Nigeria	1978; 1983-1991; 1993-1997	1998	1992	1979-1982; 1999-2008		
Norway					1978-2008	
Oman	1978-2006	2007-2008				
Pakistan	1984; 1999-2001	1978-1983; 1985	1986-1987; 2002-2007	1991-1998; 2008	1988-1990	
Panama	1981-1983	1978-1980	1984-1988	1989-1990; 2004; 2008	1991-2003; 2005-2007	
Papua New Guinea				1990; 1996-1997; 2001-2008	1978-1989; 1991-1995; 1998-2000	
Paraguay			1978-1988	2004-2008	1989-2003	
Peru		1978-1979; 1992-1994	1990-1991; 1995-1999	1980; 1987; 2004-2008	1981-1986; 1988-1989; 2001-2003	2000

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party autocracy	Hegemonic autocracy	Minimalist democracy	Polyarchy	Other*
Philippines		1978-1980	1981-1985	1986; 1990; 1995-1997	1987-1989; 1991-1994; 1998-2008	
Poland		1978-1988		1989	1990-2008	
Portugal					1978-2008	
Qatar	1978-2008					
Romania		1978-1988		1990-1991; 2004-2007	1992-2003; 2008	1989
Russia	1992		1991; 1993-2008			
Rwanda	1994-2002	1978-1993	2003-2008			
Samoa		1978	1979-2008			
Saudi Arabia	1978-2008					
Senegal			1978-1999	2000-2008		
Serbia and Montenegro			1992-1999	2000-2002; 2004-2005	2003	
Sierra Leone	1993-1995; 1997	1978-1992		1996; 1998-2001; 2004-2008	2002-2003	
Singapore		1978-1983	1984-2008			
Slovakia				1996-1998	1992-1995; 1999-2008	
Slovenia					1991-2008	
Solomon Islands					1978-2008	
Somalia	1978	1979-1990				1991-2008
South Africa			1978-2008			
Spain					1978-2008	
Sri Lanka			1978-1988	1989-2002; 2004; 2007-2008	2003; 2005-2006	
St. Lucia				1997	1979-1996; 1998-2008	
Sudan	1985; 1989-1995; 2007-2008	1978-1984; 1996-2004	2005-2006	1986-1988		
Suriname	1980-1986; 1990		1987	1988; 1991-1994; 1997-1998; 2000	1989; 1995-1996; 1999; 2001-2008	
Swaziland	1978-1992	1993-2008				
Sweden					1978-2008	
Switzerland					1978-2008	
Syria		1978-2008				

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party autocracy	Hegemonic autocracy	Minimalist democracy	Polyarchy	Other*
Taiwan		1978-1988	1989-1995		1996-2008	
Tajikistan		1991	1992-2008			
Tanzania		1978-1994	1995-2008			
Thailand	1991; 2006	1978; 2007		1979-1990; 1992-2005; 2008		
Timor-Leste					2002-2008	
Togo	1978	1979-1993	1994-2008			
Trinidad and Tobago					1978-2008	
Tunisia	1987-1988	1978-1986; 1989-1993	1994-2008			
Turkey	1980-1982			1983-1984; 1986-2008	1978-1979; 1985	
Turkmenistan	1991; 2006-2008	1992-2005				
Uganda	1978; 1986-1988	1989-2005	2006-2008	1981-1984	1980	1979; 1985
Ukraine				1991-1993; 1996-2005; 2008	1994-1995; 2006-2007	
United Arab Emirates	1978-2005	2006-2008				
United Kingdom					1978-2008	
United States					1978-2008	
Uruguay	1978-1983	1984			1985-2008	
USSR		1978-1990				
Uzbekistan		1991-2008				
Vanuatu				1983-1997; 2001; 2004	1980-1982; 1998-2000; 2002-2003; 2005-2008	
Venezuela				2002-2008	1978-2001	
Vietnam		1978-2008				
Yemen	1990-1992		1993-2008			
Yemen, North	1978-1987					
Yemen, South	1985	1978-1984; 1986-1989				
Yugoslavia		1978-1990	1991			
Zambia		1978-1990	1991-2008			
Zimbabwe			1980-2008			

* Other: Not independent, foreign-occupied, provisional government, or does not control own territory.