Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift

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Ny redaktionsledning

Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift fick 1 januari 2012 ny redaktionsledning. Mats Sjölin, framgångsrik redaktionssekreterare tillika ansvarig utgivare, avgick vid årsskiftet och efterträddes av Magnus Jerneck, som tillsammans med Björn Badersten och litteraturredaktören Rickard Andersson bildar det nya arbetsteamet. Bengt Lundell kvarstår som teknisk redaktör.

Det har varit praxis att en redaktionssekreterare för Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift sitter länge. Mats Sjölin tjänstgjorde en kortare period än sina företrädare – 7 år – men hann under sin tid genomdriva för tidskriften helt avgörande förändringar. Han gjorde den tillgänglig elektroniskt, skapade på nytt regelmässighet i utgivningen och införde ett system med "peer review"-granskning, allt för att garantera kvaliteten och stärka inslaget av professionalism i verksamheten. Under Sjölins ledning satsade man också medvetet på specialnummer. Den uppmärksammade volymen om partier, som lanserades i Almedalen sommaren 2010 (2010/2), liksom den om den svenska grundlagen (2011/3) är några belysande exempel.

Den nya redaktionsledningen har ingen strävan att bryta med Mats Sjölins arv, tvärtom. Vi vill fortsätta arbetet med att göra tidskriften till ett attraktivt och självklart svenskspråkigt forum, även för nya generationer statsvetare. Vi vill slå ett slag för gränsöverskridande teman där en dialog med andra ämnen uppfattas som väsentligt. Vi vill säkra en hög kvalitet och en jämn utgivningstakt och kommer att fortsätta att ge ut specialnummer av olika slag; vi ser därför gärna att både äldre och yngre forskare engagerar sig som gästredaktörer. Tänkbara teman är förvaltning som business, partier i förändring, teknik och sociala medier och statsvetenskapens didaktik; en tvärläsning av det stora statsministerprojektet och ett specialnummer om idéanalys och idéers betydelse står också på programmet. Först ut är en specialvolym om litteratur i politiken, skriven och redigerad av litteratur- och språkvetare i Lund. Förutom de klassiska avhandlingsanmälningarna kommer vår recensionsavdelning att fortsätta uppmärksamma nyutkommen stats- och samhällsvetenskaplig litteratur; vi tycker också det är viktigt att läroböckerna i vårt ämne diskuteras och granskas.

Med årets första nummer har vi glädjen att offentliggöra tidskriftens nya elektroniska arkiv. I ett samarbete med universitetsbiblioteket i Lund har samtliga årgångar av tidskriften digitaliserats och finns nu tillgängliga och sökbara i fulltext. Arkivet når man via tidskriftens hemsida. Framöver kommer tidskriften att publiceras elektroniskt med ett nummers fördröjning.

Sist, men inte minst, förnyar vi tidskriftens layout. Senast tidskriften fick ett nytt utseende var 2005. Varje layout speglar i någon mån sin tid, men också

traditioner och redaktörernas tycke och smak. Vi hoppas att läsarna skall finna den nya formgivningen, inspirerad av 1960-talets avskalade stil, både attraktiv och tillgänglig. Vi behåller den blå grundtonen på omslaget, men trycker innehållet på ett nytt och, hoppas vi, mer läsvänligt papper. Läs och njut!

Magnus Jerneck Björn Badersten Rickard Andersson
Redaktionssekreterare Bitr. redaktionssekr. Litteraturredaktör

Folksuveränitet och parlamentets suveränitet i tidigare brittiska kolonier

Kartläggning och reflexioner

Dag Anckar

Popular sovereignty and parliamentary sovereignty in former british colonies
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a center-piece of the Westminster system. However, the doctrine stands challenged by several institutional arrangements, among which are direct democracy applications. Taking a point of departure in this incompatibility of parliamentary and popular sovereignty, this study investigates to what extent former British colonies have really, by relinquishing the popular vote, internalized the metropolitan Westminster doctrine. Drawing on several pieces of research and data collections, the study shows that the referendum institute has indeed come to little use in the former colonies, the average number for a time period running from independence through 2010 being one referendum per country, and New Zealand standing among 54 cases out as the only former colony that has repeatedly applied the institute. Interestingly, an increase in the use of the popular vote in the former colonies is discernible during recent years, coincident with signs of erosion of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the metropolitan power herself.

Under det adertonde och särskilt det nittonde århundradet blev England en majestätisk nation, en dominerande imperialistisk makt, som från olika bevekelsegrunder, varvid ekonomi, prestige och militärt intresse är några nyckelord, lade under sig stora områden och resurser. I dag, som är allom bekant, återstår av Brittiska imperiet blott små och enstaka fragment – Bermuda, Brittiska Jungfruöarna, Falklandsöarna och Gibraltar kan vara exempel. I en viss politisk mening, vill betraktare hävda, lever det brittiska väldet dock vidare: det Westminster system som England företrätt och företräder, har slagit rot i de forna brittiska områdena. "The sun had set on the British Empire but not on Westminster-style government", lyder en välfunnen och ganska ofta citerad ordvändning i litteraturen (Wilson 1994: 189); författaren i fråga gör till yttermera visso om Westminster-modellen gällande att inget annat politiskt system "has been copied so extensively in such a wide variety of societies and continents" (Wilson 1994: 189).

Dag Anckar är förutvarande professor (emeritus) i statskunskap, Åbo Akademi.
E-post: dag.anckar@abo.fi

Vill man testa riktigheten i sådana föreställningar, och denna studie har en sådan ambition, måste en utgångspunkt givetvis vara en bestämning av själva Westminster-begreppet, den företeelse som sägs leva kvar. De tänkbara infalls-vinklarna är i och för sig flera – frågan om Westminster-doktrinens rotfasthet och överlevnad kan undersökas och testas på olika sätt, av vilka några är mer centrala än andra. Denna studie hör tveklöst hemma i den centrala kategorin. Den handlar nämligen om en grundbult i Westminster-doktrinen, läran om parlamentets suveränitet. En gammal men berömd och fortfarande i doktrinen giltig formulering är att parlamentet har och skall ha "sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws", och att parlamentet "can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible" (Blackstone 1765); en annan, inte fullt så gammal men väl så berömd formulering säger att det engelska parlamentet "has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament" (Dicey 1915: 37-38; citerad enligt Lijphart 1999: 19-20). Formuleringarna uttrycker alltså läran därom, att parlamentet står över alla andra styrande institutioner, exekutiva eller juridiska, att ingen myndighet får återkalla eller ifrågasätta giltigheten i en lag som har antagits av parlamentet, och att, och här talar vi i en mycket konkret mening om ett undantag som bekräftar regeln, att inget parlament kan fatta beslut som framtida parlament inte kan ompröva, när och om de så vill. Frågan blir, med denna utgångspunkt, i vilken utsträckning doktrinen om parlamentets suveränitet har slagit rot i och blivit en verklighet i tidigare brittiska besittningar. Innan vi här driver temat vidare, måste emellertid ett särskilt påpekande inskjutas.

Dess innebörd är att doktriner givetvis inte kvarstår i evigheter oförändrade. Läran om parlamentets suveränitet har i dag onekligen naggats en del i kanten. Det engelska parlamentet har sålunda skapat självstyrande församlingar med lagstiftningskompetens i Skottland, Wales och Nordirland och har därmed avhändat sig makt; vidare, enär Europeiska Unionen har befogenhet att stifta lagar som är giltiga i varje medlemsland, har parlamentets makt begränsats av Storbritanniens medlemskap i unionen. Alarmerade av händelser som dessa har observatörer t.o.m. ställt frågan om Westminster-doktrinen är på en eventuell vandring in i ett dunkelland (Norris 2001). En giltig motreplik måste förvisso vara att det fortfarande, formellt om än kanske inte realiter, ligger helt inom det brittiska parlamentets makt att avskaffa självstyrelsen i Skottland, Wales och Nordirland eller att lämna EU. Hur som helst, vi kan inte här och nu fördjupa oss i denna fråga. Vad vi bör notera är att den utveckling till vilken här hänvisats har tagit egentlig fart först efter det dekolonialiseringen i huvudsak avslutats – när England lämnade sina kolonier gav de sig iväg på sina vandringar som självständiga stater i en förvissning därom, att metropolmakten

fortfarande, på det hela taget, upprätthöll läran om parlamentets suveränitet och att de därmed var anvisade ett riktmärke om än inte ett obligatorium.

Alltnog, den egentliga avstampen för denna uppsats levereras i en gammal lärobok om politik, där man kan läsa att "The supremacy of parliament is really weakened by a device … the referendum and initiative" (Soltau 1951: 193-194). Den direkta demokratin, detta är avstampens kärnpunkt, hotar och utmanar principen om parlamentets suveränitet; den som vill hålla principen i helgd måste därför tillbakavisa den direkta demokratin i dess olika former. "Parliamentary sovereignty and popular sovereignty are incompatible, and British democracy is therefore an exclusively representative democracy", skriver t.ex. Lijphart (1984: 9) – när Westminster är en måttstock, skall det politiska och konstitutionella systemet sakna inslag av direkt demokrati. Om folkomröstningsinstitutet heter det, kategoriskt, i en litet äldre statsrättslig framställning, att "it has never been used in Great Britain" (Strong 1958: 147) – även denna skrivning är numera i så måtto antikverad att England år 1975 lät föranstalta ett nationellt referendum om landets eventuella inträde i vad som då kallades "the European Economic Community". Undantaget kullkastar dock inte heller här regeln – för ett Westminster-styre måste en förlitan på direkta demokratiformer vara om inte en styggelse så i varje fall ett främmande element, ett undantag. Om doktrinen om parlamentets suveränitet har slagit rot, bör, i de tidigare besittningarna, den direkta demokratins idé framstå som närmast en förflugen tanke.

Den logik som strukturerar framställningen blir härmed följande: a) tesen om parlamentets suveränitet är en central aspekt av ett Westminster-styre; b) olika institutionella ordningar kan utmana och ifrågasätta den nyssagda tesen; direkt demokrati är en sådan institutionell ordning; c) om Westminstermodellen fortfarande har styrkraft, borde, därför, tidigare brittiska kolonier i särskild mån ha varit och vara avståndstagande vad den direkta demokratin och dess uttrycksformer beträffar. Forskningsuppgiften blir, följaktligen, att undersöka de direktdemokratiska inslagen i de tidigare brittiska kolonier som numera framträder som självständiga stater. Är inslagen få och försumbara, finns en grund att säga att ett av Westminster-lärans fundament fortfarande är ett fundament, starkt, rotfäst och förankrat. Är å andra sidan inslagen många och tydliga, har fundamentet på denna punkt eroderat. Tre relevanta frågor skall följaktligen besvaras på ett rimligt sätt: (1) om vilka kolonier är fråga; vilken är, annorlunda uttryckt, undersökningens population?; (2) i vilken mån är i denna population ett främlingskap inför en direkt demokrati verkligen för handen och vilken variation finns i detta avseende mellan de länder som undersöks ?; (3) vilket omdöme kan i ljuset av svaren på dessa frågor fällas om den initiala och den fortsatta livskraften i doktrinen om parlamentets suveränitet? Sedan några ytterligare utgångspunkter för analysen preciserats i ett följande andra avsnitt, följer uppsatsens struktur i övrigt det ovan angivna

frågebatteriet, vars frågor följaktligen besvaras i ett tredje, ett fjärde och ett femte särskilt avsnitt.

Några särskilda utgångspunkter

Direkt demokrati definieras vanligen som en styrelseform i vilken medborgarna själva, utan representativa institutioner, fattar de auktoritativa besluten (t.ex. Hague & Harrop 2004: 35). Likaså vanligt är att skilja mellan tre former av direkt demokrati, nämligen folkinitiativ, folkomröstningar, och "recall", d.v.s. en procedur som tillåter ett bestämt antal väljare att kräva att mandatet för en vald representant skall återkallas (t.ex. Donovan & Bowler 1998: 2). Alla dessa former utmanar principen om parlamentets suveränitet; ändå skall den kommande framställningen befatta sig med blott och enbart folkomröstningsinstitutet. Orsaken är, helt enkelt, att mycket annat inte finns att befatta sig med. Återkallandeförfaranden är på nationell nivå sällsynta i världens länder – en sammanställning visar att förfarandet finns i blott 11 stater (Withanachachi 2010). Av dem är två, nämligen Kiribati och Nigeria, tidigare brittiska kolonier – en tillgänglig utredning av förfarandets nyttjande i Nigeria anger snarast att nyttjandet varit oövervägt och t.o.m. destruktivt (Dike 2001). Folkinitiativförfarandet finns i världen på en bredare men fortfarande tämligen smal front, inbegripande en bukett länder som konstitutionellt bejakat men aldrig nyttjat institutet – det stora undantaget är givetvis Schweiz, där referendum-och initiativordningar utgör grundbultar i det politiska systemet (t.ex. Trechsel & Kriesi 1996). Ånyo gäller dock att Englands tidigare kolonier är mycket sparsamt företrädda. En specialstudie av världens mikrostater ger sålunda vid handen att institutet finns i sju länder, av vilka inget land, det faktum obetaget att det kryllar av tidigare brittiska kolonier i mikrovärlden, är av brittiskt ursprung (Anckar 2004: 383).

Ett särskilt påpekande har att göra med en tidsdimension. Fråga är ju i diffusionsstudier inte bara därom, huruvida en innovation eller en institution anammas eller inte; fråga är jämväl därom, huruvida det övertagande varom eventuellt är fråga är någorlunda permanent eller inte. Ett exempel kan illustrera problematiken. Efter förvecklingar erhöll Kenya självständighet år 1963; den regim man då antog efter påtryckningar från brittiskt håll var parlamentarisk, legislaturen var bikameral, den territoriella organisationen var federal. Nästan omedelbart efter självständighetsförklaringen, redan år 1964, genomdrevs emellertid i landet författningsändringar, innebärande en övergång till en unitär statsform och en presidentiell regim, vartill kom att landet snabbt förföll till att vara en de facto enpartistat (D. Hartmann 1999: 475-476). Eventuella slutsatser om Westminster-regimens allmänna attraktion och genomslagskraft blir alltså i detta fall starkt beroende därav, om man har självständighetsåret

1963 eller det påföljande året 1964 i ögonsikte. I syfte att hantera detta allmänna problem anläggs i denna studie ett särskilt tidsperspektiv, i det referenduminstitutets nyttjande följs och kartläggs under en tid som i princip löper från koloniernas självständighetsblivande fram till och med år 2010. Greppet möjliggör en jakt på mönster av permanens och dynamik: studien kan besvara frågan i vilken mån en eventuell ursprunglig positiv eller negativ attityd har bestått och i vilken mån den tvärtom har övergivits.

Ett annat särskilt påpekande har att göra med institutets identifiering. Studier av institutioner och den utsträckning i vilken sådana diffusionerats kan i regel lämpligen utgå från om institutionerna i fråga finns eller inte. Vill man, med utgångspunkt i en Westminster-doktrin eller någon annan referensram veta hur och om principer för en territoriell organisation sprids, hur och om ett sådant arrangemang som asymmetrisk bikameralism sprids, eller hur och om ett särskilt valsystem sprids, är det naturligt och i regel tillräckligt att efterfråga institutionernas förekomst – finner man då att ett bestämt land har organiserat sig unitärt, har inrättat en asymmetrisk bikameralism, och bejakar ett pluralt system i nationella val, finns en grund för att konkludera att landet i fråga, då det anpassat sig till viktiga komponenter i en Westminsterdoktrin (Lijphart 1984: 4-9; 1999: 9-21), är en anhängare av sagda doktrin. Folkomröstningsinstitutet är dock i ett viktigt avseende en annorlunda institution. Det finns inte, för det första, även om det finns – i författningar eller liknande regelverk har utrymme banats för omröstningar, men sådana verkställs inte. Länder som Antigua-Barbuda, Indien, Dominica, Kiribati, och Vanuatu, för att nämna några tidigare brittiska kolonier, har i sina författningar bestämmelser om referendumförfaranden i vissa särskilt preciserade fall av författningsreform (Anckar & Karvonen 2002: 30); då sådana särskilda reformer inte har varit aktuella, har dessa länder, som den följande framställningen ger vid handen, ingen referendumpraxis. De har institutet och har det inte. Folkomröstningsinstitutet finns, för det andra, även om det inte finns – omröstningar kan utlysas och verkställas även om existerande regelverk inte känner till sådana, varvid ånyo, de aktuella länderna har institutet och har det inte. Givet dessa omständigheter, blir det rimligt att här ta fasta på praxis snarare än teori – att veta och säga något om institutets existens och utbredning blir m.a.o. att uttala sig på basen av användning, inte formell existens. Det är, för att uttrycka detta annorlunda, rimligt att ta fasta på empiriska snarare än normativa egenskaper (Anckar 2002 a: 155-158).

Kolonier och länder

Under perioden 1920-1998 frigjordes i allt 125 territorier i världen från kolonial överhöghet; i vidpass hälften av fallen var denna överhöghet brittisk

(Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1999: 810). Sedan andra världskriget har i allt 54 stater vunnit självständighet från en ställning som brittisk koloni (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1999: 810); dessa stater utgör undersökningspopulationen i denna studie. Staterna är förtecknade i Tabell 1; förteckningen beledsagas här av tre kompletterande påpekanden:

(1) För det första gäller att några territorier har frigjorts från ett kolonialt styre som blott till en del varit brittiskt – sådana territorier betraktas här blott om den brittiska andelen når upp till 50%. Detta betyder, t.ex., att Kamerun, självständigt år 1960 från en åttioprocentig fransk och en tjugoprocentig engelsk kontroll, och Togo, självständigt samma år från en sextiosexprocentig fransk och trettiofyraprocentig engelsk kontroll, inte ingår i undersökningspopulationen (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1999: 811-813). Det gör däremot Libyen, självständigt år 1951 från en sjuttioprocentig engelsk och trettioprocentig fransk kontroll (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1999: 811-813), och Vanuatu, självständigbliven år 1980 från en ställning av ett brittiskt-franskt kondominium (van Trease 1995).

(2) För det andra skall noteras att länderna är förtecknade under sina nuvarande namn, vilka i några fall är andra än de ursprungliga namnen. Ceylon, självständigt år 1948, antog sålunda år 1972 såväl en ny författning som namnet Sri Lanka. Burma, likaså självständigt år 1948, förtecknas under namnet Myanmar, som infördes år 1989 av den styrande militärjuntan. Rhodesia förklarade sig självständigt år 1965, men förklaringen vann icke brittiskt godkännande, och först efter förvecklingar, inbegripande gerillakrig och ekonomiska sanktioner, kunde, år 1980, den nya staten Zimbabwe etableras (Hargreaves 1999: 235-244). I sammanhanget skall noteras att en av de 54 staterna inte längre existerar – Syd-Jemen, självständigt år 1967, förenades efter krigshändelser med Nord-Jemen år 1990.

(3) Ännu, för det tredje: två stater som varit kolonier till tidigare brittiska kolonier har utelämnats. Fråga är om Papua Nya Guinea, som efter att sedan 1901 ha administrerats av Australien vann självständighet år 1975 (t.ex. Moore 1998), samt Samoa (tidigare Västra Samoa), självständigbliven redan år 1962, efter att ha förvaltats av Nya Zeeland under mandat från Nationernas Förbund (t.ex. Meleisa 1987). På liknande grunder har yttermera Pakistan, självständigt sedan delningen år 1947 av Brittiska Indien, och Bangladesh, tillkommet via en utbrytning ur Pakistan år 1971, utelämnats. Däremot har den lilla östaten Nauru, i och för sig ett ganska liknande fall, medtagits. Motivet härför är, helt enkelt, att bandet till England ändå var något fastare, åtminstone i en formell mening. När Nauru vann självständighet år 1968, var området i likhet med Samoa ett NF-mandat, men det var underställt Australien, England och Nya Zeeland (Duursma 1994: 469).

Tabell 1 anger yttermera för varje koloni: det år då kolonin i fråga vunnit

*T*abell 1. 54 tidigare britttiska kolonier: självständighetsår och demokratistatus.

	Självständighet	Demokrati	Regim 2010
Antigua-Barbuda	1981	53	Demokratisk
Bahamas	1973	100	Demokratisk
Bahrain	1972	0	Autoritär
Barbados	1966	100	Demokratisk
Belize	1981	100	Demokratisk
Botswana	1966	97	Demokratisk
Brunei	1984	0	Autoritär
Cypern	1960	81	Demokratisk
Dominica	1978	100	Demokratisk
Fiji	1970	41	Militärstyre
Förenade Arabemiraten	1971	0	Autoritär
Gambia	1965	38	Semi-demokratisk
Ghana	1957	30	Demokratisk
Grenada	1974	77	Demokratisk
Guyana	1966	46	Demokratisk
Indien	1947	76	Demokratisk
Israel	1948	100	Demokratisk
Jamaica	1962	100	Demokratisk
Jordanien	1946	0	Autoritär
Kenya	1963	0	Semi-demokratisk
Kiribati	1979	100	Demokratisk
Kuwait	1961	0	Autoritär
Lesotho	1966	19	Semi-demokratisk
Libyen	1951	0	Autoritär
Malawi	1964	14	Semi-demokratisk
Maldiverna	1965	3	Semi-demokratisk
Malesien	1957	5	Semi-demokratisk
Malta	1964	86	Demokratisk
Mauritius	1968	100	Demokratisk
Myanmar	1948	0	Militärstyre
Nauru	1968	100	Demokratisk
Nigeria	1960	11	Semi-demokratisk
Nya Zeeland	1947	100	Demokratisk
Oman	1951	0	Autoritär
Qatar	1971	0	Autoritär
St Kitts-Nevis	1983	100	Demokratisk
St Lucia	1978	100	Demokratisk
St Vincent	1979	100	Demokratisk

Salomonöarna	1978	70	Semi-demokratisk
Seychellerna	1976	3	Semi-demokratisk
Sierra Leone	1961	0	Semi-demokratisk
Singapore	1957	0	Semi-demokratisk
Somalia	1960	0	Anarkistisk
Sri Lanka	1948	22	Semi-demokratisk
Sudan	1956	0	Autoritär
Swaziland	1968	0	Autoritär
Syd-Jemen	1967	0	Autoritär
Tanzania	1961	0	Semi-demokratisk
Trinidad och Tobago	1962	97	Demokratisk
Tuvalu	1978	100	Demokratisk
Uganda	1962	0	Semi-demokratisk
Vanuatu	1980	76	Demokratisk
Zambia	1964	5	Semi-demokratisk
Zimbabwe	1980	0	Autoritär

Anmärkning. Sifferuppgifterna vid karaktäristiken "Demokrati", förklarad i texten, avser hur stor del av tiden från självständighet till år 2010 som landet i fråga enligt bedömningar av Freedom House varit en demokrati. Regimkaraktäristikerna för år 2010 härstammar ur författarens fatabur – i huvudsak vägledande har varit de bedömningar Freedom House gjort.

självständighet; den grad av demokrati som kolonin kunnat upprätthålla under sin självständighetstid fram till år 2010; och den regimform i vilken kolonin i fråga framträder år 2010. Tabellen meddelar alltså en snabbinformation om den demokratiska halten i den jordmån i vilken referenduminstitutet kunde eller inte kunde rotfästa sig vid tiden för självständighetsblivandet eller senare. Den demokratigrad som återges i tabellen uttrycks i form av en procentberäkning. Den anger under hur många år under självständighetstiden fram till år 2010 landet i fråga klassificerats som en demokrati av Freedom House i de årliga och av demokratiforskningen mycket anlitade bedömningar som denna organisation sedan 1973 föranstaltat. Härvid har länder som av Freedom House klassificerats som "fria" bedömts vara demokratier, detta i enlighet inte minst med Larry Diamonds bekanta utsaga därom, att den ifrågavarande betygsättningen tillhandahåller den bästa empiriska indikatorn på företeelsen "liberal demokrati" (Diamond 1996: 24). Det är att notera att materialtillgången, av ovan nämnt skäl, inte tillåtit klassificeringar av skeenden innan år 1973.

Som redan en hastig blick på tabellen ger vid handen, kan staterna indelas i tre huvudsakliga grupper. Den första gruppen utgörs av 17 stater som alltid eller nästan alltid framträder som demokratier i Freedom House-klassificeringarna – kärnan i denna grupp utgörs av ett tiotal små stater i Karibien-området. En diametralt annorlunda grupp utgörs av 23 stater som alltid eller nästan alltid klassificerats som odemokratier – gruppen är i viss mån heterogen, men präglas ändå i huvudsak av tidigare besittningar i Afrika och i Mellanöstern. Till en

mellangrupp kan föras 14 stater, som med stora interna variationer står utanför de två extremgrupperna – några av dessa stater, som t.ex. Grenada och Vanuatu, företräder en tydlig demokratilutning; andra, som t.ex. Fiji och Nigeria, lutar åt ett annat håll. Gruppens karaktär av mellanstation framgår också därav, att hälften av gruppens medlemmar i dag tillmötesgår ett demokratikrav, medan den resterande hälften inte gör det.

Empiriska nedslag

Undersökningens empiriska resultat återges i koncentrerad form i Tabell 2, som anger antalet nationella folkomröstningar som föranstaltats i de tidigare kolonierna under deras självständighetstid fram till år 2010. Tabellen bygger på olika källor, av vilka främst skall nämnas de relevanta länderkapitlen i de handböcker om politiska val i världens olika delar som under åren 1999-2010 publicerats av Dieter Nohlen med medhjälpare (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999; Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001; Nohlen 2005; Nohlen & Stöver 2010), de olika sammanställningar på global- och världsdelsnivå som ingår i det av Bruno Kaufmann och Dane Waters redigerade arbetet *Direct Democracy in Europe* (2004: 139-145), de motsvarande sammanställningar som ingår i ett av Zóltan Pállinger och medarbetare redigerat arbete, likaså med titeln *Direct Democracy in Europe* (Pállinger, Kaufmann, Marxer & Schiller 2007), samt en på nätet tillgänglig databank (*Referendum by Country*). Olika empiriska specialstudier på området och på närområden har kommit till nytta (t.ex. Butler & Ranney 1994; Cronin 1989; Zimmerman 2001; LeDuc 2003; Anckar & Karvonen 2002; Anckar 2004). Två noteringar gällande materialets nyttjande bör göras. För det första har omröstningar i vilka väljarna fått sig förelagda flera än en fråga betraktats som en omröstning, inte flera. Dessa omröstningar är i och för sig mycket få, men ett annorlunda förfarande hade ändå, då det totala antalet omröstningar är begränsat, varit ägnat att förmedla en skev bild av institutets utbredning. Sålunda ställdes i en folkomröstning år 2002 i Bahamas inte mindre än nio frågor till medborgarna, huvudsakligen om inrättandet av med valförrättningar sammanhängande institutioner – hade detta omröstningstillfälle registrerats som nio i stället för ett, skulle, som framgår av Tabell 2, Bahamas i de forna koloniernas krets på basen av ett mycket bräckligt underlag framstå som en utpräglad referendumriddare. För det andra har ett par omröstningar i den lilla östaten Maldiverna utelämnats, då de har en speciell karaktär – utfallet av presidentval i Maldiverna skall enligt nu gällande regelverk bekräftas av folket i referendum, varvid bekräftelse föreligger om kandidaten i fråga har ett stöd som uppgår till 51% av de avgivna rösterna (Lehr 2001: 590).

De allmänna och särskilda kommentarer som Tabell 2 ger anledning till, kan lämpligen ordnas i sju nedanstående punkter:

Tabell 2. Folkomröstningar i 54 tidigare brittiska kolonier under koloniernas själv-ständighetstid fram till och med år 2010. Antal omröstningar per land.

0	Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Brunei, Dominica, Fiji, Förenade Arabemiraten, Grenada, Indien, Israel, Jamaica, Jordanien, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, Salomonöarna, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad och Tobago, Vanuatu
1	Bahrain, Belize, Cypern, Guyana, Libyen, Malawi, Maldiverna, Malta, Nauru, St Vincent, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syd-Jemen, Tuvalu, Zambia, Zimbabwe
2	Bahamas, Kenya, Myanmar, Seychellerna, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda
3	Botswana, Gambia
4	Ghana
11	Nya Zeeland
0	N = 26 (48 %)
1	N = 17 (31 %)
0-1	N = 43 (79 %)
> 1	N = 11 (21 %)

(1) I denna undersökning är i allt fråga om 52 omröstningar fördelade på 54 länder. Snittvärdet blir alltså 0,96 omröstningar. Intrycket blir därför att referenduminstitutet inte i någon anmärkningsvärd utsträckning har kommit till användning i de forna brittiska kolonierna. Andra tillgängliga uppgifter styrker detta intryck. Sålunda framkommer i en undersökning att av 58 sådana nationer som har ett befolkningsunderlag av minst tre miljoner och som är i åtminstone en elementär mening demokratier, lät under perioden 1975-2000 inte mindre än 39 föranstalta åtminstone en nationell folkomröstning (Le Duc 2003, 29). Av länderna i denna på olika sätt avskärmade grupp tillgrep alltså vidpass två tredjedelar åtminstone en gång referenduminstitutet – proportionen är med marginal större än i denna undersökning, där, som framgår ur Tabell 2, blott vidpass hälften av länderna kan hänföras till samma skara. Det har också sitt givna intresse att notera att 49 regeringsinitierade omröstningar föranstaltades i tolv presidentiella regimer i Latinamerika under åren 1980-2005 (Breuer 2009) – en relativt liten och avskärmad grupp av länder har alltså, varvid för deras del blott en särskild typ av omröstningar beaktats, svarat för vidpass lika många omröstningar som de 54 kolonierna sammantagna. Tillgängliga data erbjuder därutöver en möjlighet att mer systematiskt kontrollera iakttagelsen att de forna brittiska kolonierna i lägre grad än andra grupper av stater har varit benägna att tillgripa folkomröstningsinstitutet. Isärtagandet av det brittiska imperiet var s.g.s. avslutat vid 1990-talets inbrott; en sammanställning från den tiden visar att 85 stater, av vilka 22 var forna brittiska kolonier, i sina författningar hade bestämmelser om referendum (Suksi 1993: 137 n 1). I de 63 stater som inte var tidigare brittiska kolonier har enligt den här tidigare åberopade databanken Referendum by Country föranstaltats sammanlagt 228

omröstningar; snittvärdet är därmed 3,6 omröstningar. I de 22 tidigare brittiska kolonierna är, enligt samma källa, snittvärdet 0,9 omröstningar. Skillnaden är m.a.o. mycket tydlig.

(2) Bilden av referenduminstitutet som en främmande och undanskymd metod förstärks vid en granskning av de enskilda ländernas beteende. Närapå hälften av kolonierna har inte föranstaltat omröstningar överhuvudtaget; vidpass en tredjedel har under de decennier varom är fråga haft endast en omröstning. I allt, följaktligen, har nästan fyra femtedelar av kolonierna upplevt på sin höjd en omröstning – i deras politiska liv och kultur har referenduminstitutet spelat en mycket undanskymd roll. Den kvarstående femtedelen har ej heller utmärkt sig som tillskyndare av institutet – av de elva länder som bildar denna grupp har sju registrerat blott två omröstningar. Det enda markanta undantaget från regeln att inte alls eller i blott liten utsträckning anordna omröstningar är Nya Zeeland, som ensam svarar för gott och väl en femtedel av alla omröstningar. Flera av dessa har f.ö. tillkommit som resultat av folkinitiativ – iakttagelsen styrker, enär initiativordningen i övrigt är ett främmande inslag i de tidigare koloniernas referendumpraktik, bilden av Nya Zeeland som ett annorlunda land, en Westminster-renegat. Det har sitt intresse att notera att Nya Zeeland under 1990-talet, i det landet då övergick från ett pluralt till ett blandat valsystem (Lundell 2005: 252), även på en annan central punkt har gjort avsteg från Westminster-lärans bud. Avsteget har i litteraturen föranlett kommentaren att Nya Zeeland vid utgången av det tjugonde århundradet var "surprisingly far away from Britain and the Westminster system it had originally engendered" (Roberts 2001: 708).

(3) Referenduminstitutets karaktär av engångs-och undantagsmetod förstärks ytterligare av att ganska många omröstningar har gällt enskilda frågor av en särskild storleksklass, övergripande frågor som länder blott sällan ställs inför och som har eller kan tänkas ha långtgående konsekvenser för landets framtid och politiska organisation. Sådana frågor har bl.a. gällt ifrågavarande lands långsiktiga relationer till andra länder och ländergrupper. Exempel härpå kan vara den enda omröstning som föranstaltats i Libyen, där folket år 1971 hade att ta ställning till det eventuella grundandet av en federation av arabrepubliker mellan Egypten, Libyen och Syrien (Mattes 1999: 526), den enda omröstning som föranstaltats på Cypern och som år 2004 gällde ett FN-initiativ för ett återförenande av det delade öriket (Schober 2010: 441), den enda omröstning som ägt rum i Singapore och som år 1962 avsåg ett samgående med Malaysia (Rieger 2001: 253), samt omröstningen år 1991 i Syd-Jemen angående samgången med Nord-Jemen (Glosemeyer 2001: 300-301). Nära denna grupp av frågor kommer frågor som har gällt övergripande institutionella aspekter av det egna landets politiska organisation och apparatur – exempel härpå kan vara den enda omröstning som ägt rum i Malawi, år 1993, och som avsåg frågan huruvida ett mångpartisystem skulle införas (Meinhart 1999: 555), samt den

enda omröstning som ägt rum i Bahrain och som avsåg, år 2001, införandet av ett folkvalt parlament och ett oberoende domstolsväsen (C. Hartmann 2001: 54). Om vardagliga och rutinmässiga inslag i koloniernas politiska liv och kultur har definitivt inte varit fråga.

(4) En bedömning i litteraturen är att bruket av folkomröstningar inte tenderade öka i den stora majoriteten av länder under tiden fram till 1980-talet (Butler & Ranney 1994: 1-10); en annan är att folkomröstningar är i tämligen allmänt bruk i demokratier och har dessutom ökat i antal under de senaste decennierna, även i länder som tidigare inte gjort bruk av detta politikinstrument (Le Doc 2003, 29-30). Denna tillväxt är synlig även i det material som här intresserar. Tabell 3 visar sålunda hur de 52 omröstningarna fördelar sig över tid – tidsnedslagen träffar tiden före 1960 och därefter varje decennium fram till år 2010. Materialet klumpar sig till en liten våg av omröstningar, uppgående till sammanlagt 15 omröstningar under 1960-och 1970-talen, och därefter en betydligt mäktigare våg av sammanlagt 33 omröstningar under 1990-och 2000-talen. En dryg tredjedel av alla omröstningar har ägt rum t.o.m. utgången av 1980-talet; knappa två tredjedelar under tiden därefter. Avvikelserna från Westminster-doktrinen och dess betonande av parlamentets oinskränkta suveränitet har m.a.o. blivit flera ju närmare man kommit nutid, och det kan ha sitt intresse att här ånyo notera att diffusionens källa, d.v.s. England, i någon mån själv har backat från den doktrin landet tidigare med envishet och framgång har företrätt. Den ökning över tid som kolonierna redovisar är hur som helst, ehuru noterbar i sig, marginell i komparativ belysning. Som en jämförelse kan noteras en beräkning som anger att 385 omröstningar förrättades i världen under åren 1991-2000 och 168 under åren 2001-2006 (Kaufmann 2007: 151) – mot 553 omröstningar i världen under åren 1991-2006 svarar alltså 33 omröstningar i de forna kolonierna under åren 1990-2010. Proportionerna är ganska talande, och visar, som sagt, att även om omröstningarna blivit fler i de forna brittiska kolonierna under senare tid, är de ändå försvinnande få i ett globalt perspektiv. Givetvis skall noteras att de globala siffrorna tydligt färgas av ett stort antal omröstningar på ett fåtal platser, främst Schweiz och Italien.

(5) Tillväxten i antalet omröstningar under senare år har även haft den konsekvensen att uppsättningen länder som överhuvudtaget föranstaltat omröstningar har blivit märkbart brokigare – många länder har efter årtionden av främlingskap inför den direkta demokratins metoder först under det senaste årtiondet i särskilda fall tillgripit referenduminstrumentet. Sådana länder är Bahamas (2002, 2008), Bahrain (2001), Cypern (2004), Belize (2008), Kenya (2005, 2010), Malta (2003), Nauru (2010), St Vincent (2009), Tuvalu (2008), Uganda (2000, 2005), och Zimbabwe (2000). I allt är alltså fråga om 11 länder, d.v.s. snudd på 40% av de länder i vilka omröstningar förekommit. Eller m.a.o.: fram till år 2000 hade omröstningar ägt rum i endast 17 av de forna 54 kolonierna, d.v.s. i en knapp tredjedel av länderna; tio år senare var andelen redan

Tabell 3. 52 folkomröstningar i 54 tidigare brittiska kolonier. Fördelningar över tid.

Tidsperiod:	N	%
Före 1960	2	4
1960–1969	8	15
1970–1979	7	13
1980–1989	2	4
1990–1999	16	31
2000–2010	17	33
– 1989	19	37
1990–2010	33	63

drygt hälften. De nytillkomna omröstningarnas tematiska profil är tämligen brokig, med en tydlig lutning, dock, mot konstitutionella frågor eller mot frågor av en konstitutionell natur. Som exempel kan nämnas att den enda omröstning som ägt rum i Belize avsåg frågan om parlamentets överhus i framtiden borde utses genom valförfaranden i stället för tillsättningsförfaranden; att den enda omröstning som ägt rum på Malta avsåg frågan om landets inträde i Europeiska Unionen, samt att de enda omröstningar som ägt rum i St Vincent och Tuvalu avsåg frågan om en eventull övergång från monarki till republik. Iakttagelsen är i god samklang med vad som här tidigare har sagts om omröstningarnas hemmahörande i enskilda och samtidigt övergripande och principiellt viktiga sammanhang.

(6) "Any attempt to identify referendums by type and subject matter is bound to lead to overlapping categories", heter det i litteraturen på området (LeDuc 2003: 52). Generellt taget är det anförda påståendet säkert riktigt, och riktigt är väl även att referendumforskningen, som det har sagts, ofta försummar viktiga distinktioner i avseende å frågan vem som egentligen formulerar omröstningsalternativ och vem som egentligen initierar och verkställer omröstningar (Hug & Tsebelis 2002). Det sammanhang som här granskats tillhandahåller dock inte mycken variation, och materialet är därför på denna punkt mindre intressant. Allmänt taget gäller, vi lånar här terminologin från David Eastons berömda analysschema för ett studium av politiska system, att omröstningarna är att karaktärisera som withinputs snarare än inputs (Easton 1965: 54-55), varvid, alltså, initieringen sker inifrån, så att myndigheterna fattar beslut om föranstaltande av referendum. Ett exempel på withinputarrangemang kan vara bestämmelserna i Ghana därom, att landets president på framställning eller på eget initiativ kan utlysa referendum i frågor som avser landets politiskt-territoriella indelning (Norman & Kwadwo 2009: 1); ibland föreskriver gällande normsystem helt enkelt att myndigheterna måste utskriva referendum när och om vissa tematiska eller annars särskilt bestämda villkor är uppfyllda.

Ofta är härvid fråga om författningsändringar eller författningsfrågor; talrika exempel härpå har lämnats i det föregående. S.k. policy-omröstningar, d.v.s. ad-hoc-omröstningar om politiskt känsliga eller annars svårhanterliga spörsmål (Suksi 1993: 7), har blott sällan förekommit. Konstitutionella förutsättningar för sådana ges nog här och där, som i de små örikena Maldiverna och Seychellerna (Anckar 2004: 382), eller i Uganda.

(7) Frågan vilket eller vilka bidrag folkomröstningar kan lämna till främjandet av demokrati och ett gott styrelseskick är kontroversiell, och mot varandra står två huvudsakliga läger. Det ena hävdar gärna att referenduminstitutet ökar det politiska deltagandet och det politiska intresset, ökar den allmänna kunskapen om politikens sakfrågor, och främjar medborgarnas tilltro till den egna politiska kompetensen och det politiska systemet i stort; det andra hävdar gärna att referenduminstitutet har en konservativ karaktär, att det handlägger sakfrågor i isolering med försummande av de sammanhang i vilka frågorna ingår, och att institutet lätt blir ett instrument i de makthavandes hand som tillgrips när det är lämpligt och när för regimen fördelaktiga utfall kan emotses (t.ex. Smith 1976; Cronin 1989: 196-222; Zimmerman 2001: 227-261; *Folket som rådgivare och beslutsfattare* 1997: 129-157). De två lägren kan uppbåda i varje fall ett visst empiriskt stöd för de åsikter de företräder; de omröstningar som här passerat revy är dock så få till antalet och så spridda att de inte kan lägga mycket, i någon riktning, till detta stöd. Något kan dock sägas. Egentligen, beaktande omröstningarnas kontext, kunde man i det föreliggande materialet kanske förvänta sig en försvarlig andel omröstningar som bör bedömas med negativa förtecken – drygt hälften (56%) av omröstningarna har nämligen ägt rum i länder som vid omröstningstillfället, enligt det material som här legat till grund för Tabell 1, inte kan betecknas som demokratier. Ändå är sådana omröstningar sällsynta som tillgrips av eliter i syfte att undergräva den demokratiska styrelseformen och i stället förstärka sin egen hegemoni. Omdömet träffar förvisso den enda folkomröstning som, år 1978, föranstaltats i Guyana – omröstningen som avlyste de då förestående parlamentetsvalen och uppdrog åt det parlament som valts år 1973 att fungera som en konstituerande församling var starkt manipulerad av regeringen (Trefs 2005: 365). Tre omröstningar i Ghana under 1960-och 1970-talen betecknas i litteraturen som "rigged" (Krennerich 1999 a: 423); resultatet av omröstningen i Somalia år 1979 "should not be regarded as reliable" (Krennerich 1999 b: 810); omröstningen i Uganda år 2005 om en eventuell övergång till mångpartisystem har karaktäriserats som "an exercise in regime refurbishment" (Onyango-Obbo 2005). Men på det hela taget förmedlar materialet, förvisso smalbent, ett intryck av att institutet nyttjats med omdöme och när ett i varje fall rimligt behov därav förelegat.

Sammanfattning och diskussion

För att repetera: de omröstningar om vilka ovan varit tal är förhållandevis få, och de fördelar sig till yttermera visso på ett ganska stort antal länder, som därmed framstår som tillfälliga snarare än regelbundna referendumnyttjare. Iakttagelsen inramar undersökningens huvudresultat: folkomröstningsinstitutet är, på det hela taget, ett relativt främmande inslag i de tidigare brittiska besittningarna, och tesen om Westminster-systemets kvarlevande är på denna punkt relativt välgrundad. Över resultatet vilar dock en skugga, ett tvivel som gäller resultatets egentliga hemmahörande i den referensram inom vilket det här framvaskats. Referensramen är uppbyggd kring föreställningen att de forna kolonierna, därför att de är kolonier, har haft särskilda förutsättningar att tillägna sig ett Westminster-tänkesätt; denna föreställning är inte nödvändigtvis riktig. I en spetsformulering: om och när tidigare brittiska kolonier, tagna som helhet, är annorlunda än andra stater, tagna som helhet, kan den skillnad varom är fråga, ha framsprungit ur någon annan referendummotverkande faktor än diffusion, en faktor som är gemensam för många kolonier, men ändå inte nödvändigtvis har att göra med deras kolonistatus. Eller annorlunda uttryckt: kolonierna har en restriktiv hållning till bruket av referendum inte därför att de är kolonier, utan därför att de annars, i särskild mån, besitter egenskaper som begränsar bruket av referendum eller saknar egenskaper som främjar bruket av referendum.

Ett försök till kontroll härav rapporteras nedan. Försöket jämför de tidigare brittiska kolonierna med världens återstående stater, och jämförelsen av dessa två populationer tar fasta på fyra bakgrundsfaktorer som kan tänkas determinera en referendumbenägenhet. Faktorerna är varandra olika. För det första kontrolleras en regimfaktor, och den skillnad som observeras går mellan demokratiska och icke-demokratiska länder. Förväntningen är, föga överraskande, att demokratiska sammanhang är mer tillåtande än icke-demokratiska i referendumhänseende. Sorteringen av länder i de två kategorierna sker beträffande kolonierna med utgångspunkt i den information som lagts fram tidigare i Tabell 1, och beträffande andra stater med utgångspunkt i på nätet tillgängliga sammanställningar av Freedom House-materialet (*Freedom House: Freedom in the World. Tables and Charts*). Den andra och jämväl den tredje faktorn beskriver potentiellt relevanta drag i staternas fysiska profiler. För det andra kontrolleras sålunda en skillnad mellan små och större länder, varvid mikrostater, d.v.s. enheter med ett befolkningsunderlag som understiger en miljon, hänförs till en grupp och andra stater till en annan. Utgångsantagandet är härvid att de små staterna i särskild mån tillvaratar en direktdemokratisk potential. Denna förväntan går tillbaka på den i forskning upprepade gånger belagda iakttagelsen att små stater överhuvudtaget är mer benägna än stora att härbärgera ett demokratiskt klimat och en demokratisk förmåga (t.ex. Hadenius 1992: 122-127,

Anckar 2002 b, Ott 2000, Srebrnik 2004); förväntningen går även tillbaka på föreställningen att direktdemokratin är särskilt lämpad för och inbyggd i det lilla sammanhanget. För det tredje, i nära anslutning till ovanstående, kontrolleras en insularitetsfaktor – antagandet är att den isolering och beledsagande intimitet som inneligger i en insulär geografi kan ha referendumbefrämjande effekter (Anckar 2004: 385). Slutligen, för det fjärde, introduceras ett på en indexkonstruktion baserat etnicitetsmått som är tillgängligt i en kartläggning från år 2002 av graden av fragmentering i världens länder (Anckar, Eriksson & Leskinen 2002). Från denna kartläggning nyttjas här ett indexmått på etnisk fragmentering som löper mellan värdena 0 och 1, och snittpunkten blir indexvärdet .50: kolonier och andra stater som har högre värden är heterogena, kolonier och andra stater som har lägre värden är homogena. Tanken är här att folkomröstningar är mindre lämpliga verktyg i länder som ter sig splittrade och fragmenterade och därmed inte gärna kan underställas ett okvalificerat majoritetsstyre – förväntningen är alltså att folkomröstningar förekommer i homogena sammanhang i större utsträckning än i heterogena. Westminster-föreställningen utmanas därmed av resultat som anger att de tidigare kolonierna i särskild mån är icke-demokratier, är större än små, saknar en insulär geografi, och är heterogena.

Kontrollens resultat framgår ur tabell 4, som utvisar två varandra till synes diametralt motsatta mönster. Å ena sidan finns beträffande demokratigraden och graden av homogenitet inga nämnvärda skillnader mellan de forna kolonierna och de övriga staterna – att kolonierna har visat en mindre referendumbenägenhet kan därför inte sägas vara en konsekvens av att de innehaft mindre reservoarer av referendumframtagande material. Föreställningen om Westminster-klimatets återhållande effekt överlever därför till denna del den ovanstående kontrollen. Det mönster som framkommer vid en granskning av de två fysiska faktorerna är definitivt annorlunda och ändå likadant. Skillnaderna mellan de två grupperna av stater är nu iögonenfallande – inslaget mikrostater och östater är med marginal större i de forna kolonierna än i de andra staterna. Resultatet går m.a.o. stick i stäv med förväntningarna, som var att litenhet och insularitet fungerar i referendumbejakande riktning. Precis denna avvikelse kan dock i själva verket tas som en intäkt för att Westminster-komponenten även här finns med i bilden. Tolkningen utgår från det på basen av Tabell 4 snabbt framräknade faktum att brittiskt kolonistatus tenderar hänga ihop med liten storlek och med insularitet: 54 procent av världens mikrostater är forna brittiska kolonier; jämväl 54 procent av världens östater är forna brittiska kolonier. Detta innebär, förutom noteringen att östater i regel är små (t.ex. Anckar 2006; Lowenthal 1992: 18-19), att faktorerna litenhet och insularitet på ett särskilt sätt har utmanats och dämpats av en faktor som står för det brittiska arvet: som framgår av Tabell 4 är bortåt hälften av kolonierna mikrostater, medan likaså bortåt hälften är östater.

*Tabell 4. Jämförande tablå över förekomsten av särskilda referendumrelaterade egen-
skaper i tidigare brittiska kolonier och i övriga stater.*

	Tidigare brittiska kolonier	Övriga stater
Demokratier	45 % (24/53)	46% (65/141)
Mikrostater	43% (23/53)	15% (21/141)
Östater	49% (26/53)	15% (21/141)
Homogena stater	55% (29/53)	58% (80/138)

Anmärkning: Karaktäristiken "homogena stater", förklarad i texten, avser stater som i en till-
gänglig förteckning av etniska fragmenteringsmått (Anckar, Eriksson & Leskinen 2002) erhåller
indexvärden som understiger .50.

Tolkningens validitet kan yttermera testas: brittiska mikrostater kan jäm-
föras med andra mikrostater; brittiska östater kan jämföras med andra östa-
ter. När så sker, styrker resultaten föreställningen om en Westminster-effekt.
Nämligen: när 23 brittiska mikrostater jämförs med de i världen återstående 21
icke-brittiska mikrostaterna, är knappt hälften av staterna i den förra gruppen
i den meningen aktiva att de åtminstone någon gång gjort bruk av referendum-
institutet; av staterna i den senare gruppen uppvisar drygt tre fjärdedelar (78 %)
en åtminstone lika stor aktivitet. Mikrostatsstatus aktiverar alltså tydligt mindre
i kolonigruppen; den potential som i och för sig inneligger i mikrostatsegen-
skapen dämpas av den koloniala tillhörigheten. Samma mönster återkommer
när 26 brittiska östater jämförs med de i världen återstående 21 icke-brittiska
östaterna: av staterna i den förra gruppen är 46% aktiva, medan motsvarande
andel i den senare gruppen är 62%. Ånyo alltså: medan en förväntad aktivi-
tetshöjande effekt är skönjbar, är den tydligt mindre när den neutraliseras av
den koloniala tillhörigheten. Westminster finns i bilden, med ett restriktivt
förtecken.

Denna studie utmynnar härmed i konstaterandet att Westminster-
doktrinen fortfarande är giltig och livskraftig vad inställningen till den direkta
demokratin beträffar. I de områden som berörs av doktrinen har inställningen
varit restriktiv, och har varit detta i särskild mån. Detta betyder även att dok-
trinen om parlamentets suveränitet på denna punkt har stöd och livskraft – det
hot mot doktrinen som den direkta demokratin reser har inte varit tydligt och
överhängande. Detta måste dock sägas med en uttalad reservation. I en viss
mening är nämligen de två centrala komponenterna, folksuveränitet och par-
lamentets suveränitet, sammanvävda i aktuell brittisk konstitutionell debatt på
ett konfunderande sätt, där referendum plötsligt uppfattas vara en förutsätt-
ning för snarare än ett hinder för parlamentets suveränitet. Om detta bör här,
som avslutning, några ord inflikas.

Ett sedan november månad år 2010 i det brittiska parlamentet anhäng-
iggjort lagstiftningsärende syftar till att tydliggöra och förstärka det brittiska
parlamentets möjligheter att på ett självständigt sätt hantera relationerna till

den Europeiska Unionen. I skrivande stund (april 2011) är initiativet uppe till behandling i parlamentets överhus. Initiativets innebörd är att betydande nya EU-avtal likväl som betydande ändringar i existerande avtal skall träda i kraft för Englands del blott om de accepterats i en nationell och bindande folkom-röstning; vidare ingår i initiativet en bestämmelse därom, att EU-lagstiftningen i fortsättningen penetrerar brittisk lagstiftning blott om och när det brittiska parlamentet medverkar härtill med särskilt beslut (*The European Union Bill*). Särskilt den sistnämnda bestämmelsen motiveras uttryckligen under hänvis-ning till ett behov att värna om parlamentets suveränitet. Initiativet har väckt oliklydande reaktioner, och en grupp av inlägg har helt sonika funnit för gott att vifta bort tesen om parlamentets suveränitet. Fråga är här om inlägg, där det om parlamentets suveränitet heter att "It is of course a myth, fraud, and part of the folklore which makes up how the British constitution has evolved over time", och där det vidare heter att "It is time for Britain to enter the modern age, become a fully-fledged democracy, and dispense with the idea that par-liamentary sovereignty protects us" (Hassan 2011). Andra och mer balanserade inlägg pekar på särskilda besvärligheter och inkongruenser (t.ex. Gardner 2011). I sådana inlägg har man frågat vad bestämningen "betydande" ("significant") egentligen innebär, och vem som egentligen skall avgöra, i konkreta fall, om den tröskel som bestämningen anger verkligen har passerats och referendum därmed måste utlysas. Vidare har man frågat, och detta är egentligen vikti-gare, om inte den föreslagna reformen egentligen innebär att man hamnar ur askan i elden. Meningen med reformen är att värna om parlamentets suverä-nitet genom att resa ett i det engelska folket förankrat hinder för en maktö-vergång från Westminster till Bryssel; detta mål eftersträvas nu med ett medel, nämligen referendum, som i sig strider mot det mål, nämligen parlamentets suveränitet, som medlet är tänkt att säkerställa. Dessutom, kan man ytterli-gare invända, innebär referendumkravet att senare tillkomna parlament blir klavbundna på ett helt annat sätt än om det arv de övertar formas av beslut av tidigare parlament. Ett intryck måste nog bli att försöken att värna om ett tra-ditionellt brittiskt oberoende och en traditionsrik brittisk doktrin är på marsch ut i en såväl oländig som oprövad terräng som ställer konstitutionellt-logiska samband inför svåra prov.

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En försumbar arena?

Organisationerna och remissväsendet 1964 – 2009

Erik Lundberg

A neglected area? Voluntary orgaisations and the remiss procedure 1964 - 2009
This article investigates how the participation of voluntary organisations in the remiss-procedure has changed between 1964 and 2009 and how to interpret this. Drawing on evidence from 33 remiss-directories in nine different policy fields, the results conclude that the proportional level of voluntary organisations has declined and more organisations have chosen to abstain from participating in the remiss-procedure. In addition, the number of conflict-oriented organisations has declined while the number of consensus-oriented organisations active in the output side of the political system has increased. It is argued that the result can be understood in relation to the changing mode of governance, new challenges presented by the welfare state and the rise of transnational organisations that seek influence in less formal arenas for policy making.

Inledning[1]

> A particularly celebrated yet strangely undersudied aspect of the government commission is the so called remiss system, often described as both the most uniquely Swedish and the most democratic aspect of the commission process (Trägårdh, 2007:264).

Ett utmärkande drag för den svenska förvaltningsmodellen är en betydande grad av formell och informell närhet till organisationslivet.[2] Det offentliga

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2 I artikeln används begreppen organisationer och organisationsliv som en beskrivning av den samhällssfär som inte kan betraktas tillhöra staten och inte heller marknaden. Fyra egenskaper är utmärkande för organisationerna/organisationslivet. För det första kännetecknas organisationer av att baseras på frivillighet, det vill säga, det är frivilligt för en medlem eller en sympatisör att gå in eller ut ur organisationen och delta i dess aktiviteter. Frivilligheten skiljer organisationslivet från staten där frivillighet inte är en övergripande norm. För det andra utmärks organisationer av viss formalitet och är till viss del institutionaliserade till sin natur med formella eller informella regler, möten eller regelbundna aktiviteter av något slag. För det tredje utmärks organisationer av att de är privata och, i institutionell mening, separerade från staten. För det fjärde kännetecknas

Erik Lundberg är doktorand i statsvetenskap, Institutionen för humaniora, utbildnings- och samhällsvetenskap, Örebro universitet. E-post: erik.lundberg@oru.se

beslutsfattandet har skett i nära förbindelse med organisationerna som har haft en avgörande betydelse för utformandet av politiken (Micheletti, 1994; Olsen, 1990:106f; Rothstein, 1992). Organisationernas deltagande i det statliga beslutsfattandet kan sägas spegla kärnan i den svenska demokratiska traditionen där staten tillsammans med organisationerna har format politiken och kompromissat fram en gemensam ståndpunkt. Vid sidan av de politiska partierna har organisationslivet varit en av den främsta länken mellan stat och medborgare och har tillfört kunskap, idéer och perspektiv i frågor där staten själv inte har förfogat över adekvat eller tillräckligt detaljerad kännedom. Deltagandet har bidragit till pluralism, möjliggjort en bredare och kritisk belysning av beslutsunderlag och skänkt legitimitet till såväl beslutet som processen som sådan. Det har dessutom inneburit att den representativa demokratin har försätts med deliberativa kvalitéer (Anton, 1969; Castles, 1976; Hadenius, 1978; Premfors, 2000).

Den arena som kanske har spelat störst roll i detta avseende är det statliga remissväsendet (Anton, 1969; Elvander, 1966:173; Premfors, 1983; Trägårdh, 2007:264). Nästan samtliga statliga utredningar skickas på remiss och strävan att låta berörda organisationer yttra sig är inskrivet i grundlagen.[3] I mitten av 1900-talet beskrev Gunnar Heckscher (1952:28, 386) remissväsendet som en hörnsten för medborgarkontakten och Nils Elvander (1966) har i sin undersökning Intresseorganisationerna i dagens Sverige visat att organisationerna skattar möjligheten att svara på remiss mycket högt. Remissväsendet utgör i själva verket ett av de viktigaste leden i organisationernas politiska påverkansarbete (Elvander, 1966:173).

Men sedan mitten av 1900-talet har förutsättningarna för organisationernas deltagande i det statliga beslutsfattandet förändrats. För det första märks en förskjutning från en korporativ ordning mot mer pluralism (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Rothstein & Bergström, 1999) liksom en ökad betydelse av mer horisontella arenor för politiskt beslutsfattande såsom nätverk och tillfälliga beredningsgrupper (Pierre & Sundström, 2009; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). För det andra har informella påverkansmetoder såsom opinionsbildning, lobbying och direkta aktioner ökat samtidigt som organisationerna har blivit allt mer globaliserade och söker inflytande på andra och fler internationella arenor (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Melin, 2000). För det tredje finns tecken på att organisationerna har rört sig från input till output i det politiska systemet som en följd av välfärdsstatens förändring (Amnå, 2006b; Lundström & Wijkström, 1995).

Trots omvälvande förändringar av det statliga beslutsfattandet och utsagor

organisationslivet av att gemensamma intressen och normer förenar medlemmarna i organisationen (Ahrne, Boström, et.al. 2004).

3   Se Regeringsformen 7:2. Grundlagen anger inte särskilt remissväsendet men skrivningen har betraktats som ett stöd för remissväsendets funktion.

om remissväsendets betydelse för utformandet av politiken är kunskapen om organisationslivets deltagande i remissväsendet högst begränsad (Trägårdh, 2007:264). För att öka den kunskapen krävs ytterligare empirisk forskning, vilket också är avsikten med den här artikeln. Närmare bestämt är syftet att undersöka hur organisationernas deltagande i remissväsendet har förändrats mellan åren 1964-2009 och att ge tänkbara förslag till hur förändringen kan förstås. Tre frågor besvaras i artikeln: 1) I vilken utsträckning har organisationerna deltagit i remissväsendet mellan åren 1964-2009? 2) Hur har sammansättningen av organisationer förändrats mellan åren 1964-2009? 3) Vilka typer av organisationer har efterfrågats av staten som remissinstanser mellan åren 1964-2009?

Artikeln är strukturerad enligt följande. I nästkommande del ges en översikt av den statsvetenskapliga forskningen om remissväsendet med fokus på organisationernas deltagande. I artikelns tredje del redogörs för hur förutsättningarna för organisationernas deltagande i det offentliga beslutsfattandet har förändrats från andra halvan av 1900-talet fram till idag. I artikelns fjärde del beskrivs den metod och det material som ligger till grund för undersökningen. I den följande delen presenteras resultatet och i artikelns sjätte del analyseras resultatet i ljuset av de förändrade förutsättningarna för organisationernas deltagande i det offentliga beslutsfattandet. I den sjunde och sista delen redovisas artikelns slutsatser.

Forskningen om remissväsendet

Den statsvetenskapliga forskningen om remissväsendet hänför sig till ett fåtal mer eller mindre begränsade studier. Dessa har dels tagit sin utgångspunkt från organisationernas deltagande i det offentliga beslutsfattandet (Ekstam, 1998; Elvander, 1966; Swahn 1980 i Lewin, 1992; Nilsson-Stjernquist, 1947) dels de korporativa dragen i den svenska demokratin (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Hermansson, Svensson et al., 1997; Lewin, 1992). Remissväsendet uppmärksammades också i en av Demokratiutredningens rapporter som från ett statligt perspektiv undersökte remissväsendets omfattning, effekt och betydelse för beredningsprocessen (Eriksson, Lemne et al., 1999). Tillsammans tecknar forskningen en bild av ett remissväsende som har växt i omfattning under större delen av 1900-talet. Den första och hittills mest omfattande undersökningen gjordes av Urban Swahn som visade att antalet remissinstanser dubblerades mellan åren 1922 och 1978. Till en början utgjordes remissinstanserna främst av statliga myndigheter men i takt med att remissinstanserna ökade tilltog också antalet organisationer och närmade sig de statliga mot slutet av 1970-talet (Swahn (1980) i Lewin, 1992:64f). Ökningen av antalet organisationer under den här perioden bekräftas av Nilsson-Stjernquists (1947) undersökning över perioden 1930-1946. Hermansson, Lund, et.al. (1999:32) har förklarat

ökningen av antalet organisationer under den här tiden med utvecklingen av demokratin och kraven på en "folkligt förankrad stat". En annan närliggande förklaring är att välfärdsstatens utveckling innebar ett ökat behov av organisationernas kunskap och information (Rothstein, 1992). Ökningen kan också vara ett resultat av att antalet organisationer tilltog under denna tid (Micheletti, 1994) och att fler organisationer därmed drogs in i och sökte inflytande i det offentliga beslutsfattandet.

Under andra halvan av 1900-talet tyder forskning på att antalet remissinstanser har fortsatt att öka (Ekstam, 1998:28; Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Hermansson, Svensson et al., 1997; Melin, 2000:252). Ökningen har satts i samband med den korporativa modellens tillbakagång där det inte är ett mindre antal, och särskilt utvalda organisationer, som erhåller status som remissinstans. Remissväsendet har "urholkats inifrån" genom sin expansion (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999:43). Enligt en studie baserad på remissförteckningar från kommunikationsdepartementet mellan åren 1971-1997 utgjorde organisationerna mellan 35 och 40 procent av remissinstanserna (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Hermansson, Svensson et al., 1997). Samma studie visade också en svag tendens att andelen organisationer minskade under 1990-talet. Om förändringen är giltig för remissväsendet som helhet skulle det innebära att staten har stärkt sin position gentemot organisationslivet. Därtill finns tecken på att organisationer som representerar marknadskrafterna fick en mer framskjuten plats i remissväsendet under 1990-talet, då andelen arbetstagarorganisationer ökade i förhållande till arbetsgivarorganisationer (Hermansson, Svensson et al., 1997:33f).

Tecken på en förändring av organisationernas deltagande i remissväsendet kan också skönjas i Demokratiutredningens rapport (Eriksson, Lemne et al., 1999). Författarna framhöll remissväsendet som en betydelsefull arena i beredningen av den offentliga politiken men efterlyste samtidigt en reformering av den.[4] En grund för kritiken var andelen uteblivna svar. Studien, som omfattade 125 remissförteckningar mellan 1997-1998, visade att drygt 28 procent av organisationerna som fått remisser tillsänt till sig valde att inte svara. Motsvarande siffra för de statliga och kommunala myndigheterna var 10 procent.[5] Myndigheternas svarsbortfall ansågs särskilt problematiskt då de, till skillnad från organisationerna, är skyldiga att svara. En förklaring till svarsbortfallet som framfördes av författarna var en sämre ärendeberedning på departementen. Det skulle således indikera att remissväsendet, från statsmaktens perspektiv, har minskat i betydelse eventuellt till förmån för andra

4   Författarna lyfte särskilt fram ett behov av att förbättra effektiviteten genom en starkare styrning men också att öka kvaliteten på och tillgängligheten till remissvaren.

5   Uppgifterna bygger på en egen beräkning av uppgifter från tabell 3.1, (Eriksson, Lemne, et.al. 1998:48).

beslutsfattande arenor. En ytterligare förklaring som diskuterades av författarna var en kortare svarstid än tre månader, som förekommer i normalfall.[6]

Sammantaget kan konstateras att befintlig forskning indikerar att organisationerna utgör en betydande andel av remissinstanserna. Det finns också en tendens till att organisationerna har minskat och att staten har ökat sin närvaro i remissväsendet. Däremot saknas en bred översikt av förändringen över tid, en mer djupgående beskrivning av vilka organisationer som deltar i remissväsendet och vilka som efterfrågas av staten.

Förändrade förutsättningar för politiskt deltagande

FRÅN GOVERMENT MOT GOVERNANCE

I ett jämförande perspektiv har Sverige ofta beskrivits som ett land med starka intresseorganisationerna som under institutionaliserade former har deltagit i politiken (Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991:239; Schmitter, 1981:294). Arbetsgivar-, och arbetstagarorganisationer samt de större folkrörelserna deltog i olika former av korporativa arrangemang som representanter i myndigheter, statliga styrelser, och utredningar och fanns med under hela den statliga beslutsprocessen, från initiativ till beredning, beslut och implementering i förvaltningsledet (Hadenius, 1978; Rothstein, 1992). Elvander (1966) har konstaterat att organisationerna under denna tid betraktade regeringen som "maktens centrum" och skattade möjligheten till direkt inflytande i den statliga politiken mycket högt (Elvander, 1966:277ff). Symbiosen mellan staten och organisationerna bröts formellt i samband med att flera intresseorganisationer och folkrörelser trädde ut som representanter i statliga myndigheter och styrelser i början på 1990-talet. Den korporativa ordningen kom därmed formellt att upphöra och den svenska förvaltningsmodellen att gå i riktning mot mer pluralism (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999:239; Lewin, 1992; Rothstein & Bergström, 1999:150-153). Den korporativa modellens nedgång märks även inom kommittéväsendet som successivt har kommit att användas på ett annat sätt än tidigare. De mer omfattande parlamentariska utredningarna med en representation från organisationsföreträdare har minskat i antal och istället leds allt fler utredningar av enmansutredare. Därutöver har utredningarna reducerats i antal, blivit mer styrda och genomförs allt snabbare (Gunnarsson & Lemne, 1998; Johansson, 1992; Lundell, 1994). Detta tyder på att kommittéväsendets funktion som arena för politisk påverkan har minskat i betydelse och att organisationernas ställning i kommittéväsendet har försvagats (Hermansson, 1993). Vad den korporativa modellens

6   Författarna konstaterade att för en tredjedel av de studerade remisserna var svarstiden kortare än tre månader, för 12 procent av remisserna understeg remisstiden två månader och för 16 procent av remisserna fyra månader eller längre.

nedgång och kommittéväsendets förändring har fått för konsekvenser för organisationernas deltagande i remissväsendet är däremot mer oklart.

Samtidigt som de mer institutionaliserade arenorna för politisk påverkan har fått träda tillbaka pekar styrningslitteraturen inom statskunskap och förvaltningsforskning på hur nya arenor och relationer mellan stat och organisationer har vuxit fram. Forskningen refererar till en gradvis förändring av det kollektiva styret i riktning bort från det traditionella hierarkiska beslutsfattandet mot mer horisontella styrmodeller där politik bedrivs i olika former av nätverk (Montin & Hedlund, 2009; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). I allmänna ordalag handlar det om en anpassning till en ny tillvaro där politik, förhandling om strategier, prioriteringar och beslut formas på mer tillfälliga och mer informella arenor. Denna förändringstes har beskrivits som en förskjutning från "government till governance" (Pierre & Peters, 2000) eller från "centralstyrning till interaktiv styrning" (Montin & Hedlund, 2009) och har satts i samband med ett antal mer genomgripande samhällsförändringar såsom internationaliseringen, den globala ekonomins sammansvetsning och medborgarnas ökade krav på delaktighet i politiken. Även om det inte är tal om ett regelrätt skifte så märks en ökad betydelse av alternativa och mer tillfälliga påverkanskanaler såsom policynätverk, berednings- och referensgrupper. (Hysing, 2010; Jacobsson & Sundström, 2006; Pierre & Sundström, 2009). Förskjutning av det kollektiva styret där formella arenor för politiskt deltagande tycks träda tillbaka och informella arenor ökar i betydelse kan således ha konsekvenser för i vilken utsträckning organisationerna deltar i remissväsendet.

FRÅN FORMELLA TILL MER INFORMELLA PÅVERKANSMETODER
Styrelseskickets förändrade karaktär har också påverkat organisationernas metoder för politisk påverkan. Över tid har informella påverkansmetoder som lobbying och mediekampanjer ökat i omfattning (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Lundgaard, 1998; Möller, 2009; Naurin, 2000). I en studie av 1998-års transportpolitiska beslut har Melin (2000:255-272) visat hur organisationerna i högre utsträckning än tidigare använder sig av direkta och informella påverkansförsök som lobbying och opinionsbildning och att de också lägger större vikt vid dessa. Det politiska påverkansarbetet tycks även ha blivit mer professionaliserat genom att organisationer anlitar konsulter, professionella opinionsbildare och strateger för att sköta research och mediekontakter. (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999). Detta gäller särskilt resursstarka organisationer som på ett mer systematiskt och yrkesmässigt sätt söker inflytande i politiken (Melin, 2000:262). Det handlar alltså inte om att de formella påverkansmetoderna helt har ersatts utan att organisationerna i större utsträckning än tidigare använder sig av en bredare palett av påverkansmetoder (jämför Elvander, 1966).

En omfattande svensk och internationell forskning om nya sociala rörelser

har också pekat på en förskjutning mot mer lösligare och mindre hierarkiskt sammansatta organisationer såsom nätverk och rörelser (se exempelvis della Porta & Kriesi, 1999; Tarrow, 2001; Thörn, 1997). De sociala rörelserna tendrar att reagera på andra samhällsproblem där alternativa åskådningar och mer icke-materiella värden såsom miljö, jämställdhet och fred står i fokus (Melucci, 1992; Micheletti, 1994). Till skillnad från de mer etablerade organisationerna såsom intresseorganisationer använder sociala rörelser mindre konventionella metoder för politisk påverkan såsom direkta aktioner, protester och civil olydnad (Herbert & Jacobsson, 1999; Thörn, 1998) vilket har lett till att staten är mindre mottaglig för dessa rörelser (Imig, 1998). Social rörelser agerar således ofta utanför de institutionaliserade och etablerade kanalerna för politisk påverkan och mottar sällan ekonomiskt stöd från statsmakten (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). I en svensk kontext finns det emellertid tecken som tyder på att de sociala rörelserna är djupt inbäddade i den svenska politiska kulturen med en stor tilltro till offentliga institutioner och önskan om att komma till tals i utformningen av politiken (Amnå, 2006a). I vilken utsträckning sociala rörelser deltar på formella arenor för politiskt beslutsfattande som remissväsendet är emellertid oklart.

ETT "EUROPEISERAT" ORGANISATIONSLIV

I takt med nationalstatens integrering i EU och att statens mer direkta inflytande över den offentliga politiken har förändrats har organisationerna blivit allt mer gränsöverskridande (Imig & Tarrow, 1999; Karlsson, 2002; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). EU har kommit att utgöra en ytterligare möjlighetsstruktur för organisationerna att söka inflytande. Organisationerna verkar fortfarande inom ramarna för nationalstaten men har utvecklat internationella samarbetsformer och ingår i transnationella nätverk för att påverka politiken. Som en följd av ett mer internationaliserat samhälle har organisationerna utvecklat både vertikala förbindelser till nationella och internationella beslutsfattande arenor och horisontella kontakter till beslutsfattare och nätverk av andra rörelser och organisationer (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Maloney & van Deth, 2008). De hävdar sina intressen på flera nivåer samtidigt, direkt mot EU och/eller parallellt med att en fråga behandlas på nationell politisk nivå (Beyers, 2002; Wessels, 1999). Utvecklingen mot ett mer "europeiserat" organisationsväsende har också främjats av Europakommissionen som sedan början av 2000-talet har vidtagit politiska och ekonomiska åtgärder för att inkludera organisationerna i den europeiska beslutsprocessen (Freise, 2008; Sánchez-Salgado, 2007). De nationella arenorna såsom remissväsendet kan därmed sägas ha fått konkurrens av internationella arenor för politiskt beslutsfattande.

FRÅN INPUT TILL OUTPUT

En tredje omständighet för att förstå organisationernas deltagande i det

offentliga beslutsfattandet är välfärdsstatens förändrade karaktär (jämför exempelvis Kuhnle & Selle, 1992). Sedan början av 1980-talet har välfärdsstaten pressats att anpassa sina institutionella arrangemang. Finansiella problem, minskad sysselsättning och lägre offentliga inkomster bidrog till införandet av nya styrsystem, marknadslösningar och privatiseringar (Blomqvist & Rothstein, 2000). Därutöver har den demografiska utvecklingen och en allt mer kulturellt heterogen befolkning ställt andra krav på välfärdsstaten. För att möta dessa förändringar har staten valt åtgärder av olika slag där en ökad samverkan med organisationslivet har blivit en viktig del (Amnå, 2006b:9f; Kendall & Anheier, 2001b).

Forskare har talat om att organisationerna har rört sig från input till output i det politiska systemet och kopplat samman detta med förändringen av den svenska välfärdsstaten (Amnå, 2006b; Lundström & Wijkström, 1995; Wijkström, 2004). En första ansats i den riktningen märktes i mitten av 1980-talet när en statlig utredning gjorde det möjligt för organisationer att driva verksamhet inom förskola och skola (SOU, 1986:33-35) Knappt tio år senare tillsattes den ideella beredningen som framhöll organisationslivets betydelse som ett komplement till den verksamhet som drivs i offentlig regi och inte enbart för demokrati och mobilisering av medborgare som varit fallet tidigare (Ds 1994:122). Under 2000-talet har utvecklingen mot att ge organisationerna utökade möjligheter att verka på välfärdsstatens område utvecklats ytterligare.[7] Mest påtagligt är de överenskommelser som sedan år 2008 slutits mellan staten och ett flertal organisationer inom det sociala området och integrationsområdet och som syftar till att utveckla relationen och att "erkänna" organisationslivets roll som välfärdsproducent (Prop.2009/10:55; Regeringen, 2008). Statens förändrade hållning till organisationerna ska också förstås mot bakgrund av EU:s politik där organisationslivet har lanserats som en viktig aktör för att främja sysselsättning, välfärd och demokrati (Kendall & Anheier, 2001a:127). Liknande överenskommelser som de svenska återfinns även i andra europeiska länder som inslag i en politisk omprövning gentemot organisationslivet (se exempelvis Kendall, 2000).

En central aspekt i sammanhanget är också de ekonomiska bidrag som ges av staten till organisationerna.[8] I takt med att politiken gentemot organisationslivet har förändrats tycks även statens bidragsgivning ha omprövats. För det första har de generella bidragen som organisationer kan använda relativt fritt tenderat att minska medan mer riktade bidrag som ges för specifika ändamål

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7   En tydlig omsvängning märktes i den borgerliga regeringsförklaringen från år 2006 där "civilsamhället" tillkännagavs som ett alternativ till den verksamhet som erbjuds av den offentliga sektorn.

8   Statens samlade bidrag till organisationerna är omfattande och har sedan början av 1990-talet ökat och uppgick år 2004 till omkring 6,5 miljarder kronor (Amnå 2008). En undersökning från början av 1990-talet visade att olika former av offentliga bidrag, stöd, ersättningar och entreprenader står för ungefär 30 procent av organisationernas ekonomiska intäkter (Wijkström, Einnarsson, et.al., 2004).

och verksamheter har ökat (Johansson, 2005:151; Lundström & Wijkström, 1995:48f). För det andra har delvis en annan typ av organisationer satts i fokus. Bidragen till kultur- och fritidsorganisationer samt traditionella rörelser har minskat samtidigt som bidragen har tenderat att öka till organisationer inom välfärdsstatens kärnområden, exempelvis inom social omsorg samt på utbildnings- och integrationsområdet (Wijkström, 2010:38). Det är också för den typen av organisationer där det statliga och kommunala bidragen utgör en stor majoritet av intäkterna (Wijkström & Lundström, 2002:170). Sammantaget kan således konstateras att parallellt med välfärdsstatens förändring har staten sökt ett delvis nytt förhållningssätt till organisationslivet och där organisationer som är verksamma på det politiska systemets outputsida tycks ha knutits närmare staten.

Material och design

För att undersöka remissväsendets utveckling har remissförteckningar från 33 slutbetänkanden[9] mellan åren 1964[10] och 2009 analyserats. Artikeln tar därmed utgångspunkt i en tid då den korporativa samverkansformen präglade relationen mellan staten och organisationerna och inbegriper också dess nedgång, Sveriges medlemskap i EU samt välfärdsstatens förändring. Slutbetänkandena gäller nio politikområden; alkoholpolitik, bostadspolitik, fiskepolitik, integrationspolitik, jaktpolitik, kärnkraftspolitik, kulturpolitik, socialpolitik och utbildningspolitik. Från varje politikområde har tre till fem utredningar valts vilka inbördes behandlar en liknande problematik eller politisk fråga som har varit återkommande under perioden. Utredningarnas uppdrag, eller direktiv inom respektive politikområde har naturligtvis inte varit identiska men de har bedömts vara tillräckligt likartade för att möjliggöra en jämförelse över tid.

Politikområdena har valts ut för att få en bred representation av de frågor som har varit föremål för politisk behandling under perioden. Ett ytterligare kriterium har varit att det är politikområden, där det kan antas finnas organisationer representerade. Alkoholpolitik, bostadspolitik, jakt- och fiskepolitik m.fl. är alla exempel frågor som har samlat mer eller mindre specifika intressen under 1900-talets andra hälft (se exempelvis Elvander, 1966; Micheletti, 1994). Det är också politikområden där det från statens sida kan antas finnas ett intresse eller behov av organisationslivets kunskap och idéer (exempelvis socialpolitik) eller där det har varit viktigt att bemöta starka åsikter och intressen (exempelvis kärnkraftspolitik). Vissa politikområden kan tyckas smala såsom

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9   De slutbetänkanden av statliga utredningar som har varit föremål för intresse finns angivna i bilagan..

10 Att år 1964 utgör utgångspunkten för analysen förklaras av att det är den äldsta utredningen inom ett av de valda politikområdena.

jakt- och fiskepolitik medan andra kan uppfattas bredare såsom social- och utbildningspolitik. Det kan också förefalla som att vissa politikområden griper in i varandra. Här bör emellertid noteras att respektive politikområde behandlar förhållandevis avgränsade frågeställningar som har varit återkommande över tid. Alkoholpolitiken berör exempelvis förändringar av den svenska alkohollagstiftningen, bostadspolitiken om boendefrågor för framförallt äldre och socialpolitiken om statens politik gentemot personer med funktionsnedsättning. Därmed möjliggörs en förhållandevis bred representation av organisationer aktiva på olika områden.[11]

En ytterligare omständighet som kan tänkas påverka utfallet är under vilket departement som respektive politikområde/utredning har tillägnats, exempelvis sorterar tre av de valda politikområdena i dagsläget under socialdepartementet. Eftersom departementen ansvarar för remissförfarandet skulle man kunna tänka sig att vissa organisationer anlitas som remissinstanser i större utsträckning än andra vilket möjligen kan påverka resultatet i någon riktning. Här bör emellertid noteras att departementsstrukturen, och därmed ansvaret för respektive politikområde, har växlat under den studerade perioden. Vidare har varje kommitté eller utredning ett visst mått av inflytande över vilka organisationer som utredningen ska remitteras till vilket torde begränsa en sådan eventuell effekt. Materialet kan emellertid inte betraktas som representativt för alla remitterade slutbetänkanden genomförda under perioden eller politiska frågor som har behandlats. Däremot spänner urvalet över ett flertal olika politikområden under en längre period och kan därmed antas ge en förhållandevis rättvisande bild av de organisationer som deltar i remissväsendet.

Remissförteckningarna har analyserats och kategoriserats på basis av typ av remissinstans, typ av organisation och typ av svar. Totalt har 1873 olika aktörer, vid ett eller flera tillfällen, fungerat som remisstanser under perioden. Av dessa utgörs 728 av organisationslivet, 888 av staten[12], 108 av marknaden[13], 129 av privatpersoner och 20 av övriga, det vill säga, remissinstanser som av olika skäl inte går att kategorisera.[14] En remissinstans kan lämna in tre typer av remisssvar: "svar", "ej svar" respektive "spontant svar" (se tabell 1). "Förtecknade svar"

11 Här bör noteras att representationen av fack- och arbetsgivarorganisationer inte utesluts för att politikområden som exempelvis "arbetsmarknadspolitik" inte ingår i studien. Såväl Elvander (1966) som Hadenius (1978) har pekat på att fack- och arbetsgivarorganisationerna ofta fanns representerade i nästan samtliga politiska frågor som var föremål för mer omfattande politisk behandling.

12 Med staten eller den offentliga sektorn menas kommunala och statliga myndigheter, organisationer, domstolsväsendet samt bolag som mer än till hälften ägs av offentliga aktörer.

13 Med marknad avses alla organisationer som inte utgörs av staten eller organisationslivet och som till mer än hälften ägs av enskilda. Dessa präglas av marknaden som styrform där det främsta motivet är utbyte av varor och tjänster och där prismekanismen, utbud och efterfrågan, är styrande princip.

14 Det kan till exempel handla om att det i remissförteckningen inte går att utläsa vad det är för instans som utredningen remitterades till eller att den, på grund av brist på information, inte är möjlig att placera in i någon av kategorierna.

Tabell 1. Former av deltagande i remissväsendet.

	Förtecknade	Faktiska svar
Svar	X	X
Ej svar	X	
Spontant svar		X

är de remissinstanser som upptas i remissförteckningarna, det vill säga, de som staten har önskat svar från.[15] "Faktiska svar" utgörs av de förtecknade remissinstanser som har inkommit med svar samt de utanför denna förteckning som har inkommit med spontana svar.[16]

Organisationerna har kategoriserats utifrån en typologi med fem typer av organisationer som svarar mot skilda beskrivningar av dess respektive samhällsfunktioner (Wollebæck & Selle, 2002; Wollebæk & Selle, 2008:48-50). Typologiseringen ska ses som en teoretisk typologi och fungerar därmed som en förenkling av en komplex verklighet.[17] De fem typerna av organisationer har delats in utifrån två dimensioner (se tabell 2). I den första dimensionen skiljs mellan konflikt- och konsensusorienterade organisationer. Konfliktorienterade organisationer kännetecknas av att fungera som en demokratisk infrastruktur i samhället och som förmedlare av intressen medan konsensusorienterade organisationer utmärks av att fungera som uttryck för gemenskap och produktion av välfärdstjänster. Den andra dimensionen tar hänsyn till om organisationerna är internt eller externt orienterade. Internt orienterade organisationer strävar framförallt efter att maximera den individuella nyttan för den enskilda medlemmen medan externt orienterade organisationer söker en mer kollektiv nytta i sin verksamhet.

I den första kategorin återfinns *intresseorganisationer* som kännetecknas av att vara konflikt- och internt orienterade. De strävar framförallt efter att representera och föra vidare de individuella medlemmarnas preferenser

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15 Formellt sett står remissförfarandet öppet för alla typer instanser att lämna synpunkter på en utredning. I praktiken görs urvalet av remissinstanser av berört departement där praxis har varit att tillfråga organisationer i ärenden som anses falla inom dess respektive intresseområden (Elvander, 1966:169).

16 Eftersom studien utgår från en analys av remissteckningar tas ingen hänsyn till remissvarets innehåll. I det här sammanhanget behöver "svar" således inte innebära att remissinstansen har inkommit med något substantiellt svar. Det räcker med att svaret har registrerats som ett svar från departementens sida.

17 Kategoriseringen baseras på information från respektive organisations hemsida. I de fall det inte har funnits någon hemsida har sekundärkällor används, exempelvis andra organisationers hemsidor, utredningar eller rapporter. I några enstaka fall har en kategorisering därför inte varit möjlig. Vidare har det förekommit att organisationer har flera syften med sin verksamhet och har bäring på flera kategorier. Detta har hanterats genom att studera hur organisationerna har rangordnat sina syften i stadgarna. Här har antagits att rangordningen av organisationernas syften spelar en roll för dess "identitet" i respektive kategori. I de fall stadgarna inte har varit tillräckliga för att avgöra detta har hänsyn tagits till information om vilken verksamhet och aktivitet som de facto bedrivs.

Tabell 2. Typer av organisationer.

	Internt orienterad	Externt orienterad	
Konflikt-orienterad	Intresseorganisationer	Gamla sociala rörelser	Nya sociala rörelser
Konsensus-orienterad	Gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationer	Serviceorganisationer	

Källa: (Delvis omarbetad från Wollebæck & Selle, 2002; Wollebæk & Selle, 2008)

gentemot staten och tenderar att konkurrera med andra organisationer om statens uppmärksamhet. Intresseorganisationer har tillskrivits stor demokratisk nytta av forskare inom det pluralistiska fältet. Organisationerna erbjuder staten olika handlingsalternativ och påverkar politiska beslut (Dahl, 1982). I den här kategorin återfinns exempelvis Svenska Jägareförbundet, Svenskt näringsliv, Svensk handel, Landsorganisationen, Pensionärernas Riksorganisation, Handikappförbundet, Unionen, Tidningsutgivarna, Teaterförbundet, Sveriges socionomförbund, Sveriges reklamförbund, Sveriges fiskares riksförbund – Yrkesfiskarna, Sveriges dövas riksförbund och Skogsindustrierna.

I den andra kategorin finner vi *gamla sociala rörelser*. I likhet med intresseorganisationerna kännetecknas de gamla sociala rörelserna av att vara konfliktorienterade. Till skillnad från intresseorganisationerna är de emellertid mer externt orienterade och fungerar snarare som en demokratisk infrastruktur eller arena för deliberation i samhället än som en representant för medlemmarna gentemot staten. Gamla sociala rörelser fungerar därmed som en plats där idéer och värden skapas, utvecklas och vid behov artikuleras offentligt (Cohen & Arato, 1995). De gamla sociala rörelserna strävar ofta efter att ifrågasätta konsensus i samhället, är rutindrivna och knyter ofta samman lokala organisationer. I den här kategorin hittar vi exempelvis Fredrika-Bremer-förbundet, Verdandi, Sensus studieförbund, IOGT-NTO, Iranska riksförbundet, Älvsborgs läns nykterhetsförbund, Unga Örnars Riksförbund, Svenska Djurskyddsföreningen, Studiefrämjandet och Lärare mot tobak.

I den tredje kategorin återfinns *nya sociala rörelser* som i likhet med de gamla sociala rörelserna är konflikt- och externt orienterade men skiljer sig från dessa genom att vara baserade på sympatisörer snarare än medlemmar. De är också mindre rutinberoende, mer informella och använder ibland civil olydnad som ett inslag för att påverka politiken (Tarrow & Meyer, 1998; Thörn, 1998). I den här kategorin samlas exempelvis Greenpeace, Demokratisk aktion Jönköping, Föreningen stoppa gatuvåldet och Nygatans föräldragrupp.

Gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationer utgör den fjärde kategorin och kännetecknas av att vara konsensusorienterade och internt orienterade. I förhållande till intresseorganisationer och de sociala rörelserna är de mer "opolitiska" till sin karaktär i meningen att de inte har något politiskt program som primärt rättesnöre. Det är snarare den direkta interaktionen mellan

medlemmarna och nätverken dem emellan som är centrala för organisationerna. Värdet av deras verksamhet ligger således främst i resultatet av individernas aktivitet såsom gemenskap, rekreation, kunskap, personliga nätverk, socialt kapital och socialisation (Putnam, 2000). Organisationerna fungerar således som viktiga mötesplatser och arenor för aktiviteter. Här samlas organisationer som exempelvis Svenska kyrkan, Pingstkyrkan, Historielärarnas riksförening, Sveriges Ornitologiska Förening, Friluftsfrämjandet, Svenska Kennelklubben, Umeå jaktvårdskrets, Sveriges vägledarförening, Svenska hembryggareföreningen, Svenska förbundet för stomiopererade och Kroatiska riksförbundet.

Den femte kategorin utgörs av *serviceorganisationer* som i likhet med gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationerna är konsensusorienterade. Serviceorganisationerna är framförallt externt orienterade men kan också vara internt orienterade. De kan ses som motsatsen till intresseorganisationer eftersom de inte enbart verkar för sina egna medlemmar utan tar stort ansvar för samhället där ideal och moraliska ställningstaganden utgör ett viktigt rättesnöre (Etzioni, 1988). Serviceorganisationerna strävar efter att lösa gemensamma samhällsrelaterade problem som den offentliga välfärden och skapa solidaritet i samhället. I den här gruppen återfinns exempelvis Röda korset, Sociala missionen, Demensförbundet, Riksförbundet för sexuell upplysning, Riksförbundet för frivilliga samhällsarbetare, Stiftelsen allmänna barnhuset, Rikskooperativet, Riksföreningen för sjuksköterskan inom äldrevård och Föreningen Jämlikhet Assistans och Gemenskap.

Organisationernas deltagande i remissväsendet 1964–2009

I den här delen presenteras resultatet av den empiriska undersökningen. Här beskrivs hur organisationernas deltagande i remissväsendet har förändrats mellan åren 1964–2009. Först redogörs för i vilken utsträckning organisationerna har deltagit i remissväsendet och därefter hur sammansättningen av organisationer har förändrats och vilka organisationer som har efterfrågats av staten. Slutligen beskrivs i vilken utsträckning organisationerna har svarat på remiss.

ANTALET REMISSINSTANSER HAR ÖKAT

Innan vi går närmare in på organisationernas deltagande ska vi titta närmare på utvecklingen av antalet remissinstanser. Som illustreras i tabell 3 nedan har antalet förtecknade remissinstanser ökat från 732 under den första perioden (1964–1979) till 1135 under den sista perioden (2000–2009). Motsvarande utveckling för antalet faktiska svar är 786 respektive 1193. Här tas således hänsyn till spontana svar samt uteblivna svar. Även om undersökningen baseras

Tabell 3. Antal förtecknade remissinstanser respektive faktiska remissvar mellan åren 1964–2009.

	1964–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	Skillnad
Antal förtecknade remissinstanser	732	483	877	1135	+403
Antal faktiska svar	786	528	848	1193	+407

på ett urval av utredningar under tidsperioden och inte kan sägas vara helt representativ är trenden mot ett ökat antal remissinstanser tydlig (jämför Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Hermansson, Svensson et al., 1997).

Tabell 3 visar också att det har skett en nedgång i antalet remissinstanser under den andra perioden (1980–1989). En möjlig förklaring skulle kunna vara att antalet kommittéer under denna tid minskade till följd av besparingar inom regeringskansliet (Zetterberg, 1990:305f) och att detta fick efterverkningar på remissväsendet. Då remissväsendet betraktats som en naturlig förlängning av kommittéväsendet (se exempelvis Heckscher, 1952:211; Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999 s. 31) är det möjligt att förändringar i kommittéväsendet på det sättet "spiller över" i senare delar av beslutsprocessen.

ANDELEN ORGANISATIONER MINSKAR

Parallellt med att antalet remissinstanser har tilltagit under hela den studerade perioden har också antalet organisationer ökat något, från 258 under den första perioden (1964-1979) till 316 under den sista perioden (2000-2009) (se tabell 4). Ökningen är emellertid blygsam jämfört med staten där antalet förtecknade remissinstanser har ökat med nästan 300, från 458 till 757. Marknaden har ökat något från 16 till 62.

Organisationerna är näst efter staten den vanligaste kategorin av remiss-instans och utgör i genomsnitt strax över 30 procent av andelen förtecknade remissinstanser under hela den studerade perioden (jämför Eriksson, Lemne et al., 1999:39). Däremot har organisationerna försvagats i relation till stat och marknad vilket styrker resultaten av Hermansson, Lund, et.al. (1999:33), som noterade en sådan begynnande tendens i studien av remissförteckningar från kommunikationsdepartementet mellan åren 1971-1997. Som tabell 4 visar har

Tabell 4. Antal respektive andel förtecknade remissinstanser från organisationslivet, stat och marknad mellan åren 1964-2009.

	1964–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	Skillnad
Organisationer	258/38.1	142/32.3	202/25.5	316/25.8	+58
Stat	458/60.7	322/66.1	655/73.3	757/68.8	+299
Marknad	16/1.2	9/1.6	20/1.3	62/1.5	+46
Totalt	732	483	877	1135	+403

organisationernas relativa deltagande i remissförfarandet minskat betydligt. Under den första perioden (1964-1979) utgjorde organisationerna 38 procent av de förtecknade remissinstanserna. Fram till och med den sista perioden (2000-2009) har denna siffra sjunkit till knappt 26 procent. Samtidigt har staten och marknaden ökat sitt relativa deltagande. Organisationernas successiva tillbaka-gång är både ett resultat av att färre organisationer väljer att svara på remiss (se nedan) och på en lägre andel förtecknade organisationer, det vill säga, en mins-kad statlig efterfrågan. Andelen spontana svar har legat förhållandevis konstant under hela den studerade perioden.

SAMMANSÄTTNINGEN OCH EFTERFRÅGAN AV ORGANISATIONER HAR FÖRÄNDRATS

Hur har sammansättningen av organisationer förändrats och vilka typer av organisationer har efterfrågats av staten? Den kategori av organisation som står för den högsta andelen faktiska svar, och som har efterfrågas mest under hela den studerade perioden, är intresseorganisationerna. Därefter följer gemen-skaps- och rekreationsorganisationer, gamla sociala rörelser, serviceorganisa-tioner och nya sociala rörelser. Sistnämnda saknas nästan helt i remissväsendet, de varken söker sig till eller tillfrågas som remissinstans (se figur 1).

Den traditionella bilden av "organisationssverige" med starka intresseor-ganisationer och folkrörelser men också med en betydande andel organisatio-ner inom kultur- och rekreationsområdet avspeglas således i remissväsendet (jämför Wijkström & Lundström, 2002:129). Detta gäller i synnerhet under den

Figur 1. Andelen faktiska svar på remiss mellan åren 1964-2009 fördelat på typ av organisation.

Not. Förändringen av gamla sociala rörelser mellan 1964-2009 är signifikant på 90 % nivå.

Tabell 5. Andelen faktiska remissvar mellan åren 1964-2009 fördelat på konflikt- och konsensusorienterade organisationer.

	1964–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	Skillnad
Konflikt-orienterade	28.5	21	17.6	18.2	− 10.3
Konsensus-orienterade	9.6	11.3	7.8	7.6	− 2
Stat	60.7	66.1	73.3	68.8	+8.1
Marknad	1.2	1.6	1.3	5.4	+4.2
%	100	100	100	100	

första perioden (1964-1979) då dessa tre typer av organisationer stod för nästan hela representationen av organisationslivet.

Som illustreras i figur 1 har sammansättningen av organisationslivet emellertid förändrats. Intresseorganisationerna har minskat från över 21 procent av de faktiska remissvaren under den första perioden (1964-1979) till omkring 15 procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009). Motsvarande utveckling för de gamla sociala rörelserna är från drygt sju respektive till knappt tre procent och för gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationerna från drygt åtta till knappt fem procent av de faktiska remissvaren. Serviceorganisationerna är den enda typ av organisation som har ökat sin närvaro från drygt en procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) till nästan tre procent av de faktiska svaren under den sista perioden (2000-2009).

Ser vi till andelen förtecknade organisationer är utvecklingen likartad inom alla typer av organisationer. Samtidigt som intresseorganisationerna, de gamla sociala rörelserna och gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationerna efterfrågas allt mindre av staten har serviceorganisationerna kommit att bli en allt mer anlitad remissinstans. Sett till samtliga förtecknade remissinstanser har serviceorganisationerna ökat från cirka två procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) till nästan fem procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009). Ökningen är inte dramatisk men visar på en successiv förändring. I relation till alla organisationer utgjorde serviceorganisationerna drygt två procent under den första perioden och 17 procent under den sista perioden.[18] En förklaring till serviceorganisationernas ökade närvaro i remissförfarandet är en ökad andel spontana svar men framförallt en större statlig efterfrågan. Detta är märkbart inom nästan samtliga politikområden men framförallt inom integrationspolitiken, socialpolitiken och bostadspolitiken där serviceorganisationerna har ökat mest av alla typer av organisationer.

Den förändrade sammansättningen av organisationer i remissväsendet kan också förstås utifrån om organisationerna är konfliktorienterade eller

18   Förändringen av serviceorganisationer mellan 1964-2009 är signifikant på 90 % nivå.

Tabell 6. Andelen faktiska remissvar mellan åren 1964-2009 fördelat på internt res-
pektive externt orienterade organisationer.

	1964–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	Skillnad
Internt orienterade	29.8	24.5	18.0	19.8	− 10
Externt orienterade	8.3	7.8	7.4	6.0	− 2.3
Stat	60.7	66.1	73.3	68.8	+8.1
Marknad	1.2	1.6	1.3	5.4	+4.2
%	100	100	100	100	

konsensusorienterade respektive internt eller externt orienterade. Som tabell 5 visar har andelen faktiska remissvar från konfliktorienterade organisationer minskat stadigt under hela perioden från drygt 28 procent av de totala remiss-svaren under den första perioden (1964-1979) till cirka 18 procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009).

De konsensusorienterade organisationerna däremot har ökat något från knappt tio procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) till drygt elva pro-cent under den andra perioden (1980-1989). Sett till hela den studerade perio-den har de emellertid minskat med två procentenheter. Minskningen har också skett från en lägre nivå och är inte lika kraftig som för de konfliktorienterade organisationerna. En jämförelse mellan förtecknade och faktiska svar visar att minskningen framförallt kan förklaras av ett minskat statligt intresse för de konfliktorienterade organisationerna snarare än ett minskat (spontant) intresse bland dessa organisationer att svara på remiss. Därutöver märks också en något större statlig efterfrågan av konsensusorienterade organisationer. Det innebär att organisationer som främst fungerar som en demokratisk infrastruktur och som förmedlare av intressen har trätt tillbaka till förmån för organisationer som fungerar som uttryck för gemenskap och som producent av välfärd.

På motsvarande sätt har andelen internt orienterade organisationer minskat (se tabell 6). De utgjorde nästan 30 procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) och knappt 20 procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009). Även bland de externt orienterade organisationerna märks en minskning från drygt åtta procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) till sex procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009). Jämfört med de internt orienterade organisatio-nerna är minskningen emellertid betydligt mindre. Även här noteras en svag ökning av andelen förtecknade och externt orienterade organisationer och en minskning av de internt orienterade organisationerna. Organisationer som framförallt verkar till förmån för sina egna medlemmar har således minskat till förmån för organisationer som tar ett större ansvar för att skapa mötesplat-ser och lösa gemensamma samhällsrelaterade problem.

FÄRRE ORGANISATIONER SVARAR PÅ REMISS

Vid sidan av att organisationernas relativa deltagande i remissförfarandet har minskat och sammansättningen av organisationer har förändrats visar undersökningen på en successivt avtagande svarsfrekvens (se tabell 7). Av samtliga förtecknade remissinstanser har andelen ej svarande remissinstanser ökat med över 12 procentenheter, från drygt sju procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) till närmare 20 procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009).

Resultatet ligger i linje med undersökningen av Eriksson, Lemne, et.al. (1999:46) som visade att 18 procent av de tillfrågade remissinstanserna valde att inte svara. Andelen ej svarande remissinstanser har ökat inom såväl organisationer, stat som marknad men ökningen är kraftigast bland organisationerna som har ökat med nästan sex procentenheter, från omkring fyra procent under den första perioden (1964-1979) till nästan tio procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009). Samtidigt har andelen spontana remissvar varit förhållandevis konstant vilket således inte kompenserar för svarsbortfallet bland de förtecknade organisationerna.

Jämför vi vilka organisationer som har tillfrågats som remissinstanser med vilka av dessa som väljer att svara på remiss ser vi att intresseorganisationerna har den högsta svarsfrekvensen. Som tabell 8 visar valde 17 procent av de förtecknade intresseorganisationerna att inte svara under den första perioden (1964-1979) och 29 procent under den sista perioden (2000-2009). Av de gamla sociala rörelserna valde 25 procent att inte svara under första perioden och 54 procent under den sista perioden. Motsvarande siffror för gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationerna är sju respektive 47 procent och för serviceorganisationerna tio respektive 60 procent. Att nästan en tredjedel av intresseorganisationerna, hälften av de gamla sociala rörelserna och gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationerna samt över hälften av serviceorganisationerna väljer att avstå från att svara under den sista perioden (2000-2009) får betraktas som anmärkningsvärt och en indikation på att organisationslivet delvis vänder sig bort från remissväsendet som kanal för politisk påverkan.

Sammantaget kan konstateras att antalet remissinstanser har ökat under andra halvan av 1900-talet, men att andelen organisationer successivt har blivit

Tabell 7. Andelen ej svarande remissinstanser mellan åren 1964-2009 fördelat på organisationer, stat och marknad.

	1964–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	Skillnad
Organisationer	4.2	7.5	4.4	9.9	+5.7
Stat	2.7	3.9	9.3	7.5	+4.8
Marknad	0.3	2	0.6	2.2	+1.9
Total andel	7.2	13.4	14.3	19.6	+12.4

Not. Förändringen för organisationer mellan åren 1964-2009 är signifikant på 90 % nivå.

Tabell 8. Andel av de förtecknade organisationerna som har valt att inte svara på remiss mellan 1964–2009.

	1964–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	Skillnad
Intresseorganisationer	17	23	18	29	+12
Gamla sociala rörelser	25	43	21	54	+29
Nya sociala rörelser	0	0	0	0	0
Gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisa-tioner	7	39	52	47	+40
Serviceorganisationer	10	25	18	60	+50

färre i takt med att stat och marknad har ökat sin närvaro. Därtill har andelen ej svarande organisationer ökat och andelen spontana remissvar legat förhållandevis konstant. Intresseorganisationer, gamla sociala rörelser och gemenskaps- och rekreationsorganisationer är de vanligaste typerna av organisationer och de har successivt minskat. Serviceorganisationerna däremot är den enda typ av organisation som har ökat under perioden vilket i första hand har skett till följd av en ökad statlig efterfrågan inom social-, bostads-, och integrationspolitiken. Med ytterst få undantag saknas anmärkningsvärt nog nya sociala rörelser i remissväsendet. Vi kan således se att relativt färre konfliktorienterade och internt orienterade organisationer deltar i remissförfarandet vilket framförallt avspeglar en minskad statlig efterfrågan. Det betyder att organisationer som främst fungerar som en demokratisk infrastruktur och som verkar till förmån för sina egna medlemmar har trätt tillbaka något till förmån för organisationer som mest strävar efter att lösa gemensamma samhällsrelaterade problem som den offentliga välfärden.

Analys

Organisationernas relativa tillbakagång i remissväsendet kan förstås på flera sätt. En förklaring är att det är ett utslag av den korporativa modellens försvagning och en förskjutning av det traditionella hierarkiska beslutsfattandet mot mer horisontella styrmodeller. I takt med att formella arenor för politiskt beslutsfattande som det statliga kommittéväsendet tycks ha förlorat i betydelse (Johansson, 1992) och fler politiska beslut tenderar att fattas på andra arenor såsom nätverk och tillfälliga beredningsgrupper (Pierre & Sundström, 2009) är det möjligt att organisationernas kunskaper och kritik kanaliseras på andra, måhända mer effektiva sätt än via remissväsendet. Empiriska bevis för en sådan förskjutning har inte presenterats i denna studie men det är trots allt en möjlig förklaring. En sådan utveckling skulle därmed utmana den öppenhet som sägs känneteckna remissväsendet och öka risken för att beslut tas i mindre transparenta sammanhang där möjligheten till insyn och kontroll riskerar

att gå förlorad.[19]

En ytterligare förklaring till varför organisationerna allt mer tycks ha negligerat remissväsendet kan vara en förskjutning av den beslutsfattande makten uppåt till EU. Sveriges successiva integrering i EU och Europakommissionens arbete att inkludera organisationslivet i europeiska beslutsprocesser har inneburit att allt fler organisationer riktar uppmärksamheten mot EU (Amnå, 2006b:13; Karlsson, 2002). När den beslutsfattande makten på detta sätt förflyttas till andra arenor kan det också finnas svagare incitament att svara på remiss. Det behöver inte innebära att remissväsendet är en helt ointressant arena utan kan snarare ses som en följd av ett mer gränsöverskridande organisationsliv som söker sig till fler och delvis andra politiska arenor, ibland samtidigt (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Beyers, 2002; della Porta & Kriesi, 1999). Resultaten av den här studien bör även sättas i samband med en ökad betydelse av informella metoder för politisk påverkan (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Naurin, 2000). Opinionsbildning, lobbying och mediekampanjer har successivt blivit en allt mer betydelsefull del av organisationslivets påverkansmetoder (Melin, 2000:255–272). En sådan förskjutning kan därmed medföra att mer traditionella kanaler som remissväsendet minskar i betydelse som kanal för politisk påverkan. Därmed är det möjligt att remissvaren fortfarande kan spela en viktig roll för organisationerna när det gäller att utforma ett ställningstagande i en specifik fråga (jmf. Elvander 1966: 173) men även som ett instrument i organisationernas lobbyarbete.

Alla typer av organisationer har emellertid inte minskat sitt deltagande i remissväsendet. I takt med att välfärdsstaten har ställts inför andra utmaningar har en delvis ny typ av organisation inkorporerats i remissväsendet. Serviceorganisationerna har ökat sin närvaro, främst som ett resultat av en ökad statlig efterfrågan. Samtidigt har intresseorganisationer och gamla sociala rörelser efterfrågats allt mindre. Organisationer som är verksamma i det politiska systemets outputsida har således ökat något under perioden medan organisationer som är verksamma i dess inputsida har minskat (Amnå, 2006b:9; Wijkström, 2004:36f). Förändringen infaller parallellt med att organisationslivet har tillkännagivits som ett alternativ och inte ett komplement till den offentliga välfärden (se exempelvis Prop.2009/10:55; SOU, 1986:33–35) och serviceorganisationernas beroende av statliga bidrag ökar och visar ansatser till att bli allt mer styrda (Johansson, 2005). Remissväsendets förändring kan därmed ses som en följd av en politisk omprövning och "kontraktering" av organisationslivet där staten söker nya "system" för att mobilisera frivilligkrafter på

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19 Även om remissväsendet i ett jämförande perspektiv är en öppen och transparent process bör också nämnas att möjligheten för staten att styra beslutsprocessen innan och underhand är påtaglig. Staten har kontroll över vilka organisationer som utredningen ska remitteras till och gör också den sammantagna värderingen av de inkomna svaren.

välfärdens områden (Amnå, 2008:147). Konsensusorienterade organisationer med kunskap och resurser att upprätthålla de välfärdssystem som de konflik-torienterade organisationerna en gång var med och byggde upp har i sådana fall blivit mer åtråvärda.

Den nästan totala frånvaron av sociala rörelser är intressant och bekräf-tar tidigare rön att sociala rörelser generellt sett har svaga förbindelser till mer formella arenor för politisk påverkan (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Thörn, 1998). Staten efterfrågar inte sociala rörelser i utformningen av politiken vilket kan tyda på ett avståndstagande från statens sida mot mer radikala och icke-eta-blerade organisationer som ideologiskt står långt ifrån det politiska etablisse-manget (Imig, 1998). Samtidigt kan konstateras att dessa rörelser inte söker sig själva till remissväsendet utan tycks välja att stå utanför de formella kanalerna för politiskt deltagande. Att dessa rörelser söker delaktighet och deliberation med staten, som har visats i tidigare forskning (Amnå, 2006a), kan således inte bekräftas i den här undersökningen. Snarare tyder resultaten på ett bestå-ende och ömsesidigt avståndstagande mellan staten och de sociala rörelserna som därmed torde hävda sina intressen på mindre formella arenor för politiskt deltagande.

I detta sammanhang bör även andra potentiella förklaringar till organisa-tionernas förändrade deltagande kommenteras. Tidigare forskning har nämnt en kortare svarstid och en sämre ärendeberedning på departementen som möj-liga orsaker till att remissinstanser avstår från att svara (Eriksson, Lemne et al., 1999). Även om något klart samband mellan remisstid och minskad svarsfrek-vens inte kunde bekräftas av Eriksson, Lemne, et al. (1999) är remissarbetet resurskrävande och måste vägas mot den effekt som ett deltagande ger i för-hållande till andra påverkanskanaler. Det är också möjligt att staten, medvetet eller omedvetet, har nedprioriterat remissväsendet som helhet möjligen som ett resultat av att andra beslutsfattande arenor såsom de europeiska har vunnit mark och/eller att andra nationella arenor har ökat i betydelse. Mot bakgrund av en sådan utveckling kan såväl remisstid som kvaliteten i ärendeberedningen påverkas. Utvecklingen av remissväsendet kan också förstås som ett resultat av kommittéväsendets utveckling som trots sina skilda beredningsprocesser är intimt förbundna med varandra. Nedgången av kommittéväsendet märks där-med även i remissväsendet.

Slutsatser

Tidigare forskning har i flera sammanhang framhållit det statliga remissväsendet som en av den mest betydelsefulla arenan för utformningen av den statliga politiken och för organisationernas politiska påverkansarbete (Elvander, 1966:173; Heckscher, 1952:28, 386). Resultatet av den här undersökningen utmanar den bilden. Jag har visat hur organisationerna successivt har sökt sig bort från remissväsendet och hur detta kan förstås som en följd av en förskjutning av den beslutsfattande makten till EU (Bache & Flinders, 2004; della Porta & Kriesi, 1999), en utveckling mot mer horisontella styrmodeller (Pierre & Sundström, 2009; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007) och mer informella metoder för politisk påverkan (Hermansson, Lund et al., 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Melin, 2000). Jag har också påvisat en begynnande tendens till att staten successivt har inkluderat organisationer aktiva på outputsidan av det politiska systemet parallellt med att statens politik för organisationslivet har förändrats (Amnå, 2008; Johansson, 2005; Lundström & Wijkström, 1995; Prop.2009/10:55; Wijkström, 2004).

Resultaten reser ett flertal frågor och problem för framtida forskning. Ett värde med remissväsendet är dess institutionaliserade form där organisationer i relativt öppna och transparenta sammanhang kan förmedla, kritiskt granska och debattera politiska frågor och problem. Remissväsendets tillbakagång aktualiserar därför frågor om den svenska demokratimodellens deliberativa element (Anton, 1969; Premfors, 2000) i synnerhet i relation till mer horisontella styrmodeller. Hur ser förutsättningarna för deltagande, deliberation och debatt ut på mer governance-orienterade arenor såsom tillfälliga berednings- och referensgrupper (se exempelvis Jacobsson & Sundström, 2006:131)? Vilka funktioner spelar dessa nätverk i relation till andra mer institutionaliserade arenor som det statliga remiss- och kommittéväsendet? På vilka sätt motsvarar de kraven på öppenhet och transparens? I vilken mån är de berättigade utifrån pluralistisk synpunkt (jämför Hadenius, 1978)?

Statens till synes avtagande intresse för konfliktorienterade organisationer och nyvunna intresse för konsensusorienterade organisationer reser, för det andra, frågan om hur relationen mellan staten och organisationerna ska förstås i den "nya" välfärdsstaten. Även om forskning på senare år har haft svårt att belägga någon korporativ relation (se exempelvis Feltenius, 2004; Lindvall & Sebring, 2005) aktualiseras frågan om hur maktfördelningen ser ut mellan staten och serviceorganisationerna. Är de politiska, ekonomiska och strukturella förändringarna som vi ser även i andra europeiska länder (Kendall & Anheier, 2001b) ett led i en formativ period mellan staten och serviceorganisationerna? Får staten, i utbyte mot ekonomiskt stöd och legitimitet, del av organisationernas resurser, kunskap, effektivitet och förtroende för att upprätthålla eller omforma välfärdssystemen med ett större mått av frivillighet?

För det tredje reser resultaten frågan om organisationslivets autonomi.

Kendall (2000) menar att staten, i sin iver att hantera de utmaningar som de europeiska välfärdsstaterna står inför, riskerar att likrikta organisationslivet. Möjliggör eller begränsar den nya statliga "civilsamhällepolitiken" (Prop.2009/10:55; Regeringen, 2008) organisationslivets autonomi, pluralism och roll som kritisk granskare av politiken? Är organisationerna kapabla att stå emot dessa förändringar, hävda sin självständighet och agera både "vakthund" och serviceleverantör (jämför Opedal, Rommetvedt et al., 2011).

Slutligen, kan konstateras att kunskapen om det svenska organisationslivets deltagande på EU-nivå är tämligen begränsad (se emellertid Karlsson, 2002; Scaramuzzino, Heule et al., 2011). Vilka typer av organisationer förmår att agera på flera arenor samtidigt (se exempelvis Beyers, 2002; Wessels, 1999) och i vilken utsträckning? Hur ser det svenska organisationslivets deltagande ut i jämförelse med organisationer från andra EU länder? Forskningen bör också problematisera organisationslivets orientering mot EU i ljuset av relationen till staten, exempelvis huruvida organisationslivets "inbäddning" i statsapparaten (Amnå, 2008) möjliggör eller begränsar en orientering mot EU?

Bilaga

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Översikter och meddelanden

Nya forskningsanslag från Vetenskapsrådet och Riksbankens jubileumsfond

Den statsvetenskapliga forskningen i Sverige är starkt beroende av extern finansiering. Sedan länge har två institutioner haft en särställning när det gäller finansiering av forskning inom statsvetenskapens traditionella kärnområden, nämligen Vetenskapsrådet och Riksbankens jubileumsfond. Konkurrensen om forsknings-anslag är i dag mycket hård och de projekt som ges anslag får därmed i någon mening anses representera forskningsfronten inom svensk statsvetenskap.

Det är av allmänt intresse att delge hela "statsvetarsverige" information om innehållet i denna nya forskning. I stort sett alla de forskare som erhållit nya projektbidrag i stats-vetenskap för år 2011 från Riksbankens jubi-leumsfond och Vetenskapsrådet publicerar därför en redigerad version av sin forsknings-ansökan i tidskriften. (Av utrymmesskäl har vi begränsat redovisningen till bidragsfor-merna projekt och program i den ordinarie utlysningen.)

Tabell 1. Nya projektbidrag i statsvetenskap för 2011 från Vetenskapsrådet och Riksban-kens jubileumsfond i den ordinarie utlysningen.

Huvudsökande	Projekttitel
Douglas Brommes-son & Ann-Marie Ekengren	Mediatisation of European foreign policy – a cross-time, cross-natio-nal comparison
Hanna Bäck	The Ideological Cohesion of Parliamentary Parties and Its Implications for Decision-Making in Modern Democracies
Andreas Duit	Stakeholder participation, learning and ecosystem management - A global study of 146 Biosphere Reserves in 55 countries.
Göran Duus-Otterström	Fair Play Retributivism and the Problem of Punishment
Daniel Naurin – Frida Boräng	Who are the lobbyists? A population study of interest groups in Sweden.
Elin Naurin	Democratic representation through the eyes of parliamentarians
Magnus Reitberger	Fairness in Global Trade – What is at Stake?
Mats Sjölin	Party Government in Flux: Changing Conditions for Party Groups in the Swedish Riksdag
Helena Olofsdotter Stensöta	Why are gender differences in the Swedish parliament diminishing? Inter-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary causes

Huvudsökande	Projekttitel
Lena Wängnerud	The politics of anxiety: vulnerability and gender inequality in politics
Lena Wängnerud	Testing the Politics of Presence. A Comparative Study on the Importance of Gender, Class, and Ethnicity in the Swedish Parliament

Mediatisation of European foreign policy
– a cross-time, cross-national comparison

Douglas Brommesson & Ann-Marie Ekengren

According to Media Studies research, the mediatisation (Asp 1986, 1990) of society has occurred at an accelerating pace since the early 1990s (Krotz 2007, 2009; Mazzoleni 2008; Hjarvard 2008, 2009; Schulz 2004; Strömbäck 2008, 2011; Strömbäck & Esser 2009). The theory of mediatisation argues that one result of this development is that politics increasingly operates according to media logic. The purpose of the research project *The Mediatisation of European foreign policy – a cross-time, cross-national comparison* is to investigate the degree to which, and in what way, the premise that politics has adopted a media logic is supported by comparative, empirical analysis of European states' foreign policies.

The possibility of mediatisation implies a dramatic development for foreign policy, which historically has been a secretive policy area. Decisions are made by small, closed groups of experts working outside the public eye (Hudson 2005: 65-ff). In the interest of promoting an image of predictability vis-à-vis foreign powers, farsightedness and stability have been core values of multifaceted foreign policy (Brommesson & Ekengren 2011: chapter 2; cf. Alison 2008: 207). If the mediatisation of politics theory also applies to foreign policy, then this means that foreign policy has adapted to media logic and its narrative technique, which emphasises "simplification, polarization, intensification, personalization, visualization and stereotypization, and the framing of politics as a strategic game or 'horse race'" (Strömbäck 2008: 233; cf. Nord & Strömbäck 2005). A possible consequence

of mediatisation is the individualisation of the substance of foreign policy, i.e. increased attention to the rights, security and fate of individuals. This comes at the expense of the interests of states, which are traditionally at the core of foreign policy. Thus, if the theory of mediatisation is correct, then we are facing a process of change that has the power to alter the most fundamental aspects of states' foreign policies.

Media logic and foreign policy differ from one another in a number of respects. Foreign policy has traditionally been characterized by farsightedness and deliberation of principles. Media logic focuses on that which is sensational and unique about a particular event or person. It willingly exaggerates differences of opinions, turning them into polarised conflicts between two simplified alternatives. It would seem, therefore, that media logic and traditional foreign policy, the latter with its demand for long-term national unity and responsibility in the face of complex processes, are polar opposites.

We believe that a more nuanced view is appropriate. Given the polarising and conflictual nature of media logic, it seems reasonable to expect that it is more likely to flourish in political cultures where conflict is the norm. This insight strongly suggests that political culture ought to influence mediatisation and the extent to which media logic impacts on foreign policy. Furthermore, in a pilot study for this project, we have been able to confirm that degree of change in foreign policy ideology after a change in government co-varies with a state's position on the political culture

Douglas Brommessson är verksam vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Lunds universitet och Ann-Marie Ekengren vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet.
E-post: douglas.brommesson@svet.lu.se, ann-marie.ekengren@pol.gu.se.

conflict-consensus dimension (Brommesson & Ekengren forthcoming; cf. Elder, Alastair & Arter 1982; Bjereld & Demker 2000). This co-variation also suggests that it is reasonable to assume that the impact of mediatisation and degree of media logic in foreign policy varies with a state's position on the conflict-consensus dimension. This is because media logic and ideology are related. In particular, they both concern non-material conditions for politics.

Such co-variation can manifest itself in different ways. First and foremost we expect that a conflict-oriented political culture creates a breeding ground for sensationalist media logic that promotes disagreement and polarisation. However, it is also possible that a strong consensus culture in foreign policy promotes a homogenous media logic that is shared by all parties. More specifically, media logic in foreign policy can be manifest both as a change in form and as a change in content. As noted in the introductory discussion, a change in form involves simplifying, stereotyping, dramatising and conflict. Change in content involves an individualised foreign policy. This leads to a stronger emphasis on human security and the rights and fate of individuals, as well as to a change in the roll of territoriality due to the rise of trans boundary reporting. We discuss both types of change in greater detail below.

To summarize, we believe that media logic can manifest itself in foreign policy in different ways, and that the way in which it is expressed varies with political culture. A homogenous media logic is promoted in consensus-oriented cultures and a sensationalist-oriented media logic is promoted in conflict-oriented ones. In this project, we study these assumptions at a general level using a multi-case design as well as in-depth case studies using process tracing. This will enable us to contribute empirical knowledge to a field with few empirical case studies (cf. Dettebeck 2005; Strömbäck 2008).

Purpose and research questions

The purpose of the project is to use a comparative approach to study the degree to which and in what ways European states' foreign policies have assumed media logic. We study whether degree of media logic in foreign policy co-varies with degree of consensus and conflict in foreign policy, and whether media logic in foreign policy is manifest in different ways in different political cultures – both as regards form and content. The project will answer the following research questions:

- To what degree does the impact of media logic vary with different positions on the conflict-consensus dimension?
- In what ways, if any, does media logic impact on the form of European states' foreign policies?
- In what ways, if any, does media logic impact on the content of European states' foreign policies?

The project's theoretical points of departure

While previous research has emphasized that foreign policy is less politicised, more institutionalised and more dependent on confidence-building measures than other policy areas, there are reasons to question whether this is still true today (Bjereld & Demker 1995; Andrén 1996). If we assume that foreign policy has become increasingly similar to other policy areas, then we should also expect that it is receptive to mediatisation and increasingly follows a media logic (Louw 2005: 252-ff). The lively research being conducted at the intersection of foreign policy analysis and social constructivism supports such an assumption (Houghton 2007). It has shown the influence of ideas, norms, identities and discourses have on foreign policy (ibid; Demker 2007). Based on this research, mediatisation can be seen as a non-material process with the potential to influence foreign policy.

Mediatisation has come to refer to *a process in which media develops into an*

independent institution with significant power that permeates other social sectors (Asp 1986, 1990; Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; Strömbäck 2008; 2011). According to the literature, the media has traditionally been used to simply transmit the message of the elite. Today it has transformed into an actor in its own right. It influences society because other institutions, not least political, consciously or unconsciously adapt their behaviour to media logic and even internalise media forms (Hjarvard 2004: 48; Strömbäck 2008: 239). This implies that political decision making adapts to the media's demands as regards form, norms and rhythm (Strömbäck 2008). In this process, the growth of social media should not be underestimated. It has a destabilising effect on traditional media and makes it difficult for decision makers to control the flow of information. When decision makers lose influence over information it can be assumed that power over foreign policy also changes fundamentally. The example of Wikileaks is revealing. Foreign policy has been forced to adapt to demands raised as a result of the spread of information through a process where new and old channels cooperate and challenge the information prerogative of decision makers. At the same time, decision makers themselves take on the role of media producer, for example foreign ministers that blog and tweet.

The literature on mediatisation has increasingly focused on describing the process of mediatisation (Kepplinger 2002; Hjarvard 2004; Strömbäck 2008; Joyce 2010). The concept has often been used at a meta-level in previous research, which makes it difficult to use in empirical research. This has begun to change due to an increasingly intense discussion of different phases of the mediatisation process. A prominent example of work aimed at describing the process is Jesper Strömbäck's four phases of mediatisation (Strömbäck 2008), which has inspired our analytical framework.

According to Strömbäck, in the first phase of mediatisation the media surpasses experience and interpersonal communication to become the most important source of information. In phase two, the media, which was previously dependent on political institutions, becomes independent from them. In phase three the content of the media begins to be controlled by media logic rather than political logic, as was previously the case. In phase four, not only the media, but also political actors start to be guided by media logic rather than political logic. The first three phases emphasize the mediatisation of the media. The fourth focuses attention on the mediatisation of politics, but not simply in the sense that the media influences politics – that has already occurred by phase three. Rather, in phase four politics internalises media logic, more or less unconsciously. The media and its logic colonise politics (Strömbäck 2008: 240).

It is largely unproblematic to argue that mediatisation has passed through the first three phases. The important question is whether we also find empirical evidence for phase four. We argue that foreign policy is a critical case. If we can find mediatisation that corresponds to phase four in foreign policy, which has traditionally been a separate and secretive policy area, then we can assume that other policy areas are also mediatised.

As noted above, mediatisation and its media logic have changed the conditions for politics, both form and content. We have already defined what is meant by change in form, and this has also been discussed most comprehensively in the literature. However, mediatisation is not simply a question of form. We believe that the content of politics also changes when it adapts to media logic. We have already mentioned two possible effects: that politics is individualised and that the role of territory changes. We now develop these ideas further.

As noted above, the impact of media logic on politics is to personify, intensify and visualise it (Strömbäck 2008). These are changes in form, but they also impact on content by

individualising politics (cf. Beck 1994; Giddens 1991; Bjereld, Demker & Ekengren 2005). Focusing intensively on particular individuals and particular life stories can promote a complete individualisation of politics. The form adapts to media logic, but content also shifts in the direction of stronger support for the rights and security of the individual (Brommesson and Friberg Fernros 2009; cf. Bjereld, Demker and Ekengren 2005). We link this development to the increasingly prominent human-security approach to security studies. This school of thought emphasises the individual, both as the object of security threats and as the actor who defines what constitutes a threat to security (Hough 2008: chapter 1).

Turning to the changing role of territory, an initial observation is that new communications technology has decreased the importance of distance. Media reports directly from troubled spots around the world. Humanitarian crises mobilise people who are geographically very far away from the crisis itself. Politics can therefore increasingly be expected to deal with questions that are geographically far removed from one's own state. In other words, global politics that transcends territorial boundaries develops (Joyce 2010: 517). If the recipient of the mediatised politics is located in his/her own state, questions about developments "far away" can be expected to be portrayed in ways that focus on local or national aspects of the conflict or crisis. The literature refers to this as the domestication of global politics (Clausen 2004; *Olausson 2009)*.

We conceptualise political logic as the opposite to the media logic adopted by foreign policy as a result of mediatisation. This allows us to study the degree of mediatisation that has occurred by comparing the two logics. Jesper Strömbäck discusses political logic in terms of:

> the fact that politics ultimately is about collective and authoritative decision making as well as the implementation of political decisions. This includes the process of distributing political power, through elections or other venues; the processes of decision making; and the question of power as it relates to "who gets what, when and how" (Strömbäck 2008: 233).

In other words, political logic includes both a policy and process dimension. The former is about the content of politics, while the latter refers to what we have been calling the form dimension of politics.

Meyer develops the concept of political logic and defines the policy dimension as "the effort to find solutions for politically defined problems by means of programs for action". The programs are often rooted in ideological beliefs or shared principles. Meyer defines the process dimension as "the effort to gain official acceptance of one's chosen program of action" (Meyer 2002: 12; Strömbäck 2008: 233). When politics is driven by a political logic, political institutions define the problem, find solutions and garner support for them. This can be compared to politics driven by media logic, which is characterised by the subordination of politics to the demands of that logic, both as regards form and content. Instead of the winner being chosen in elections or parliamentary negotiations, media logic rewards those who adapt to the demands of the media and win acceptance for their policies in that way.

Analytic framework

Returning to our discussion about political culture, our previous research leads us to believe that a consensus-oriented political culture is more resistant to changes in form caused by the media (cf. Brommesson and Ekengren forthcoming). This is because we believe that the form characteristics of media logic – simplification, polarisation, stereotyping and the framing of politics as a strategic game – are contradictory to consensus-oriented, farsighted foreign policy. Conflict-oriented political cultures, on the other hand, seem to be in harmony with media

Figure 1. Analytical framework for political logic and media logic in conflict and consensus cultures.

	Political logic		Media logic	
	Conflict culture	Consensus culture	Conflict culture	Consensus culture
Process dimension (form)	Politics is formed in an ideological struggle characterised by clearly polarised principles. The majority wins acceptance for its policies in elections.	Politics is formed in a spirit of pragmatic understanding in which common principles are agreed upon. Policies win acceptance based on their ability to maintain national consensus.	Politics is formed in an intensive, polarised, sensationalist game. Policies win acceptance by meeting media demands that are regarded as the view of the majority.	Media logic's process dimension has difficulty gaining a foothold because of consensus culture's diametrically opposed character.
Policy dimension (content)	The content of politics expresses the majority's ideology and the point of departure is one's own state. Policies can be expected to give rise to antagonisms.	The content of politics expresses a national principle of agreement about the needs of one's own state. The content of policy is expected to be based on farsighted thinking.	The content of politics expresses the demands that, for the moment, dominate the polarised debate. Policy is characterised by a global focus on the wellbeing of individuals.	The content of politics is individualised and globalised and thus responds to the demands of the media. The content of policy emphasises continued national unity.

logic's form characteristics. Thus, we suspect that the form characteristics of conflict culture and media logic reinforce and strengthen their manifestation in politics.

As regards media logic's expected effects on the content of politics, it is not obvious that in this case consensus culture stands in opposition to media logic. Even in consensus cultures the media presents a personified, intensified and visualised view of foreign policy, which we believe can impact on the content of foreign policy. However, when this occurs, consensus cultures ought to provide greater opportunities to reach national consensus about the new foreign policy than conflict cultures do. This is because the former have an institutionalised praxis of getting along and agreeing on a shared view on matters of foreign policy.

Whether a political culture is characterised by conflict or consensus also has relevance for political logic. Looking first at

process, we assume that the political logic in a consensus culture is based on cooperative solutions. The parties involved engage in discussions in order to develop farsighted policy that everyone agrees upon. In a conflict culture the process takes the form of an ideological struggle, most often between two equally strong competitors. The side that wins the majority also wins the right to make policy. As regards the policy dimension, we expect outcomes to vary depending on policy culture. In consensus cultures, both problems and solutions are developed in a spirit of cooperation. In conflict cultures, solutions are deeply ideological and can therefore be expected to lead to a higher degree of antagonism.

Taken together, the literature, our theoretical points of departure and our own previous research findings enable us to specify two dimensions and two logics. The latter are expected to manifest themselves in different ways in consensus and conflict cultures. We

describe these different outcomes in the project's analytical framework. We develop an operationalisation of the different outcomes in the methods discussion below.

Project design – plan for conducting the research

The proposed research project is a cross-national comparison. The first step is a quantitative study of all 27 members of the EU to determine to what extent media logic has impacted foreign policy rhetoric. This will give us an indication of the extent of mediatisation in foreign policy. We will look selectively at foreign policy over the past 20 years in order to make it possible to identify changes over time. We look at EU member states because they operate in a relatively similar context, but manifest significant variation as regards the conflict-consensus dimension (Lijphart 1991, 1999). In addition, a comparison among EU states allows us to test for the possibility of a Europeanisation effect over time. If one exists, differences among member states should decrease over time (Börzel & Risse 2006; Brommesson 2010).

In order to hold contextual factors constant we will analyse the speeches of the 27 states in the UN General Assembly's yearly General Debate, material we have already used in our previously mentioned pilot study (Brommesson & Ekengren forthcoming). The material will be analysed using a quantitative content analysis. The analysis is guided by an operationalised version of the theoretical framework presented above. By operationalising mediatisation theory we also contribute to a field which suffers from a lack of empirical research (Strömbäck 2008: 242). Concretely, we will first look for mediatised logic manifest in the form of personalised, sensationalised, simplified and polarised policy and manifest in content focused on the rights and security of individuals from a border-transgressing perspective. The latter includes, for example, an emphasis on human rights, individuals'

capabilities or individuals as the recipients of various measures. Second, we look for changes in the importance of territory in a geographical sense; in particular we expect a wider geographical focus where politics is mediatised. In contrast to this, political logic emphasises farsighted reasoning on principles, primarily from the point of view of the state. In concrete terms, this can include alliance policy, geopolitics or international law. The point is not that political logic excludes questions about human rights, rather that they are considered in terms of a farsighted, strategic perspective.

This first step provides us with an overview of the extent to which media logic has impacted on policy. In order to determine how mediatisation operates and answer questions about how it is manifest in form and content we need to study the mediatisation process more closely using process tracing. This is what we do in the second, more in-depth part of the project. We focus on three states with different political cultures. Great Britain has a conflict-oriented political culture. Finland has a pronounced consensus political culture. Sweden's political culture is between these two, although somewhat closer to consensus (Lijphart 1991, 1999). This variation makes it possible for us to test the importance of the conflict-consensus dimension for the impact of media logic and its manifestation in policy.

The in-depth part of the study will be conducted in four arenas (cf. Sjöblom 1968 for a similar approach). We start with the media arena, in particular the way in which the mass media reports and portrays specific questions of foreign and security policy. We identify the demands directed at political decision makers, explicitly or implicitly, by the mass media. We pay particular attention to the origins of the reporting, that is, whether the media or the political sphere was responsible for the content of demands, the form in which the process unfolded and the rhythm of the reporting. This will allow us to study whether the media, in keeping with mediatisation

theory, increasingly acts as an independent actor and agenda-setter on the basis of media logic, rather than as a transmitter of the messages of political decision makers operating on the basis of political logic. Of course, it is possible that a media other than the one we examine might be the origin of the reporting and portraying of policy (e.g. consider the fact that "old media" often picks up news from social media). In the three other arenas, the parliamentary, government and diplomatic, we study impact and adaptability in questions where media has previously acted on the basis of an independent media logic. The analysis of these arenas is also guided by the analytical framework presented above and focuses on both form and content.

Expressed methodologically, we use process tracing to study the impact of the media arena on the other three. We draw on an understanding of mediatisation as a process in which the media agenda, as formulated by media logic, also shapes the political agenda. Given that the causal mechanisms behind this process of influence are not well specified in the literature, or are at best somewhat fuzzy, the broad approach of process tracing is an appropriate method that allows us to capture and specify various possible mechanisms (George & Bennet 2004: 206).

More concretely, we use several analytical techniques to capture the mediatisation process. In the parliamentary arena we study foreign policy debate using quantitative content analysis and qualitative analysis of ideas. In the government arena we study declarations, decisions and policy documents using the same methods. We also use elite interviews, for example with previous foreign ministers. Finally, we study actual foreign policy actions, beyond policy statements, in the diplomatic arena by conducting a policy analysis based on a combination of structured interviews with bureaucrats and analysis of policy documents. The theoretical purpose of focusing on these three arenas is that we can subject the theory of mediatisation to increasingly

difficult tests. We expect that it is easier for mediatisation to impact on the public, parliamentary arena; more difficult for it to penetrate the governmental arena, and most difficult for it to impact on the strongly institutionalised diplomatic arena (cf. Strömbäck 2008: 241). The different analytical techniques used in the three arenas should enable us to capture a mediatisation process if one is actually occurring. As with the analysis of all 27 EU states, the three-state, in-depth study will also include a comparison of developments over the past 20 years.

As regards cases to be studied using process tracing, we will study policy questions that have traditionally been seen as strongly rooted in principles, but where the potential for mediatisation is good. An example of such a question is the discussion of military action in Libya in the spring of 2011. The intervention was based on the emerging UN norm of the responsibility to protect civilian populations from genocide or ethnic cleansing. It was the first time that the UN Security Council referred to the norm (Brommesson and Friberg Fernros 2011). Furthermore, the intervention touched upon matters of geopolitics and the creation of alliances among Western and Arab states. The Security Council's decision portrayed the revolution in international legal terms and associated it with several important principles. At the same time, media reporting before and after the decision focused on the safety of individuals, possible military actions of different states and individual rebels as liberation heroes. This reporting also had an impact on the political discussion. The case of Libya might be a case of mediatisation in which decision makers abandoned the political logic, with its farsighted considerations about non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, geopolitics and alliance politics, in favour of a media logic focused on the security and fate of individuals. The case of Libya is one example of several possible cases to be studied.

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The ideological cohesion of parliamentary parties
and its implications for decision-making in modern democracies

Hanna Bäck

Abstract

Political scientists often treat parties as "unitary actors". In most cases, however, parties represent divergent interests of various members in several regional and organizational units. This project aims at measuring the ideological cohesion of political parties, that is, the general agreement within a party in terms of policy positions. In addition, the project aims at exploring the causes and consequences of ideological cohesion. We explain varying levels of intra-party cohesion taking individual characteristics of MPs and ministers as well as country- and party-specific institutional factors into account. Moreover, the project explores the manifold implications of intra-party cohesion on legislative decision-making, government formation, and policy-making in general. It is argued that intra-party cohesion or its opposite, heterogeneity has consequences for the power and behavior of political actors, for example when forming governments and allocating ministerial portfolios. Furthermore, intra-party cohesion should have wider consequences on political outputs. Focusing on nine Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), we analyze parliamentary speeches of members of Parliament (MPs) and cabinet members by applying computerized methods of content analysis. Understanding the causes and consequences of intra-party cohesion is important for the performance of political parties, governments, ministers and MPs, and democratic systems as a whole.

Project description

STATE OF THE ART

The concepts of party "unity" and "cohesion" have been used in a sometimes confusing manner in the literature on political parties. To make a clear distinction, unity refers to the behavioral phenomenon of MPs in a party or other group voting together, or as a bloc in parliament. In contrast, programmatic cohesion relates to the "homogeneity of policy preferences", or the general agreement within a group in terms of policy positions (Giannetti and Benoit 2009: 5). This latter concept, that is, ideological cohesion or

programmatic homogeneity, is the focus of this research project.

To measure policy preferences of MPs, previous research mainly concentrates on their behavior in parliament. Because voting is the most consequential activity of MPs, roll call votes are extensively used to analyze the cohesion of political parties. Most prominently, these legislatures are the US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, McCarthy et al. 2006; Krehbiel 2000), the European Parliament (Hix et al. 2006) and the German Bundestag (Saalfeld 1995). However, this type of analysis is associated with some problems. First, in many parliaments and periods the

number of roll-call votes is very small. Second, even when roll-call votes amount to figures that can be meaningfully analyzed statistically, it is not clear that they are representative for acts of parliamentary voting. Rather they may be endogenous to precisely the characteristics of voting behavior – party cohesion – that we want to study (Carruba et al. 2006, 2008). On the one hand party leaders are likely to employ roll-calls as a means to enforce party discipline upon MPs when the agreement among them is low (as roll-call votes can be better observed by party leaders – Saalfeld 1995). On the other hand, parties that are united on an issue may demand roll-call votes to expose the fact that other parties are split. Both would lead to a biased sample, as votes on those issues will be overrepresented where at least one of the parties has a potential for cohesion problems. Thus, MPs may not behave sincerely when their voting decision is known, for example since they are influenced by party discipline, which implies that an analysis of roll call or recorded votes is not likely to reflect the real ideological or policy positions of political actors.

Analyzing parliamentary speeches instead of voting behavior avoids most of the problems mentioned above. First, speeches occur more often than roll call votes thus allowing for statistical analysis. Second, there are more parliamentary speeches than roll call votes thus reducing the selection bias problem. Third, speeches are more fine-grained measures than vote choices. While the votes are not likely to reveal policy differences, parliamentary speeches may do so. In addition, MPs with preferences deviating from the party line are more likely to express those in parliamentary speeches than in deviant voting behavior. Thus, the policy positions derived from speeches should be more accurate than positions derived from roll call analyses. The project will therefore collect and analyze parliamentary speeches to create a new data base for further research. The speeches are analyzed using methods of computerized content analysis.

Some previous studies, focusing on specific countries or cases, have analyzed parliamentary speeches using this type of approach. For example, Giannetti and Laver (2005), who study the impact of Italian ministers' policy positions on the spending in the policy area for which they are responsible, make use of a dataset that covers the policy positions of each minister estimated on the basis of their speeches in parliament. They apply the Word-scores technique developed by Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) to get information on the policy positions of the cabinet members of the Italian coalition government that formed in 1996. Laver et al. (2006) apply the Word-scores technique to the speeches of French presidential candidates in 2002 and their programs. Laver and Benoit (2002) use computerized content analysis to estimate positions of Irish MPs on the basis of their speeches held during one single debate. The results show that MPs belonging to one party group share similar preferences, but also that differences inside parties and thus policy conflict inside parties exist. Bernauer and Bräuninger (2009) apply the Wordscores technique to the German case and estimate the policy positions of Bundestag MPs 2002–2005. Likewise to Laver and Benoit (2002), the results of the Bernauer and Bräuninger (2009) study show that Wordscores delivers plausible results when estimating the preferences of political actors on the basis of their speeches instead of party programs or election manifestos. Also, studies on members of the European Parliament reveal plausible policy positions derived from parliamentary speeches, regardless of whether estimated by Wordscores or the more recent technique, "Wordfish" (see e.g. Slapin and Proksch 2008).

Several previous studies have tried to identify the factors causing intra-party cohesion or unity. Bernauer and Bräuninger (2009), for instance, show that faction membership has an effect on MPs' policy positioning. The degree of intra-party cohesion may also have

to do with the number of "relevant parties" (Sartori 1976: 123) in the respective party system, which depends on the electoral system or on a country's cleavage structure (Duverger 1959; Cox 1997; Owens 2004). Research also shows that the degree of party organization, which varies across party families, positively affects the chance that internal groups with different programmatic viewpoints can arise (see e.g. Sieberer 2006). Scholars who have focused on the organizational features of parties when explaining party cohesion have highlighted the role of candidate selection procedures (Pennings and Hazan 2001). The hypothesis is that programmatic cohesion is expected to be higher when party leaders control candidate selection. Turning to features of individual actors, the literature on political socialization suggests that the more acquainted MPs get with their parliamentary roles the more they will tend to support established patterns of power (Dawson et al. 1977: 16). This leads to the expectation that MPs with longer parliamentary careers are more likely to vote and speak "in line" with their party.

Heterogeneity or policy conflict within parties has far-reaching consequences for the power and behavior of political actors and political decision-making. The importance of relaxing the unitary-actor-assumption has for example been stressed in the literature on government formation (see e.g. Giannetti and Benoit 2009). Laver and Schofield (1998: 16) draw on the work of Luebbert (1986) and argue that intraparty tensions systematically influence bargaining, more specifically, tensions should negatively affect parties' ability to enter government (see also Bäck 2003; 2008). Laver and Shepsle (1996) theoretically illustrate the importance of intra-party politics for the allocation of ministerial portfolios among the coalition parties. Extending the hypothesis presented by Gamson (1961) that parties should receive portfolio shares in proportion to their seat contribution, Mershon (2001) studies how the size of factions within

the Italian Christian Democrats determines the portfolio allocation within the party. Intra-party conflict is also likely to affect parties' electoral success. Parties not speaking with one voice should suffer at the polls because they do not send clear signals to their electorate. In their study on European integration, Gabel and Scheve (2007) show that intra-party dissent indeed reduces the party's electoral support. In addition to the political consequences, intra-party heterogeneity is likely to influence policy outputs. For example, Giannetti and Laver (2005) show that there is substantial variation in the economic policy positions of ministers of the same party in the 1996 Italian Prodi government, and that the more leftist the policy position of a minister is, the more the share of his department on the state budget has increased over time.

Project goals and data collection

The project aims at narrowing several gaps in the literature regarding the role of ideological cohesion. First, it aims at measuring intra-party cohesion in a comparative way. Second, the project explains the varying levels of intra-party cohesion. Finally, the third goal is to study the implications of intra-party cohesion for individual MPs as well as effects on coalition bargaining and policy outcomes. We analyze the causes and implications of intra-party cohesion in nine Western European democracies (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s. The selected countries vary in their institutional setup (e.g. electoral systems, presidential powers, bicameralism) allowing for testing hypotheses describing how institutional factors impact on intra-party cohesion. Moreover, the sample reflects the diversity of party ideologies and patterns of party competition to be found in West European countries (see Benoit and Laver 2006). The selected countries also allow for combining data on intra-party cohesion with

already existing datasets on party positions (Klingemann et al. 2006), legislative outputs (Bräuninger and Debus 2009, Jenny and Müller 2010), and policy outcomes (e.g. Cusack 1999). Here follows a more detailed description of the project goals.

PROJECT GOAL 1: MEASURING INTRA-PARTY COHESION

When it comes to measuring intra-party cohesion, the project improves on previous research in two ways. First, it establishes a new dataset that covers information on the ideological and policy-area specific positions of parliamentary parties in Western Europe. Up to now, a number of country studies exist analyzing the programmatic party cohesion of British and Canadian parliamentary party groups (Kam 2008), of Swedish political parties (Bäck 2003; 2008), of parties in the US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; McCarthy et al. 2006), and the Austrian and Swiss parliaments (Müller et al. 2001: Lanfranchi and Lüthi 1999), but these studies do not take a cross-national comparative perspective. The project aims to fill this gap within comparative political research on parties and legislatures.

Second, the research team aims at improving the measurement of policy preferences. Instead of relying on a relatively small and potentially biased sample of roll call votes providing limited information on policy preferences, the project team uses a recently developed computer-aided method of content analysis, "Wordscores", to analyze parliamentary speeches. Previous research has shown that this method provides estimates with high face validity. Furthermore, potential problems (e.g. reliability problems) associated with other methods of content analysis like MRG/CMP-style hand coding (see Volkens 2001) or the "dictionary procedure" (Laver and Garry 2000) do not arise (see, e.g., Benoit, Mikhaylov and Laver 2009). In addition, the estimation is completely based on computer algorithms, which is less time-consuming once one has downloaded all parliamentary debates and separated them by policy areas and by MPs. Of course, speeches are also part of the "behavior" of MPs, which suggest that a study of parliamentary speeches may be plagued by similar problems as a study of roll call votes, for example, parliamentary speeches may also be influenced by factors such as party discipline (see Bäck, Debus and Müller 2010 for a discussion). We still believe that analyzing speeches should fill important gaps that remain after the analysis of voting behavior. And the analysis of speeches should reveal information that is qualitatively different from what can be extracted even under the best circumstances from the analysis of roll-call votes. Analyzing speeches thus brings us closer to understanding party cohesion in terms of preferences rather than behavior.

Computer-aided content analysis has mainly been used in previous research estimating policy positions of political parties (Laver et al. 2003) and individual actors like MPs (Laver and Benoit 2002) and presidents (Laver et al. 2006). For the proposed project, the research team applies the method to parliamentary speeches. Previous research (Laver and Benoit 2002) shows that this is a feasible approach and the research project aims at generalizing these findings for a cross-national sample. To cross-validate the estimated policy positions, available survey material (in some of the countries) measuring MPs' self-reported policy preferences is used. Showing that computer-aided content analysis and survey responses yield the same empirical patterns, the research project proves the feasibility of an easily applicable and reliable method for measuring policy preferences simplifying concept measurement for future research.

PROJECT GOAL 2: INVESTIGATING THE CAUSES OF INTRA-PARTY COHESION

The project also aims at explaining the observed empirical patterns in ideological cohesion. Which MPs are most likely to

represent policies deviating from the party core? And how can differences in party cohesion across and within countries be explained? The research team aims at providing a comprehensive theoretical framework predicting intra-party cohesion. Here we can for example draw on the work by Carey (2007) on voting unity. Carey (2007: 93) distinguishes between three distinct sources of voting unity within legislative parties: cohesiveness, discipline, and agenda control. Thus, one reason why members of parliament belonging to the same party vote as a bloc is that the members have similar preferences. Another reason why MPs of the same party vote together is that party leaders use a "combination of carrots and sticks [...] to reward voting loyalty and deter or punish breaches in discipline". Lastly, party leaders may use their ability to steer the agenda, in order to avoid that proposals that would divide the party come to a vote in the legislature. Hence, a highly unified voting record may or may not signal a high level of ideological cohesion within the party. Carey (2007) has presented a number of hypotheses explaining voting unity across parties and systems, drawing on the so called "competing principals theory", based on the more general principal-agent framework. The main idea is that members of parliament can be seen as agents facing several different principals, and since these principals are likely to control resources to influence the voting behavior of MPs, divergence in the demands of "competing" principals is likely to reduce voting unity within parties.

According to Giannetti and Benoit (2009), scholars who have tried to explain cohesion and unity have mainly focused on the variation across different political systems by introducing three main sets of explanatory variables: institutional features, party system features and parties' internal structure. Giannetti and Benoit (2009: 5) mention three main institutional features that have been stressed in the literature as explanations to voting unity: federalism, legislative-executive

relations, and electoral rules. For example, Carey (2007) argues that in systems where candidates compete with other MPs within their party for electoral support (e.g. in single member plurality systems), voting unity should be lower since such electoral systems encourage personal vote-seeking. Hence, unity and cohesion can be expected to be higher in proportional systems (especially with closed lists) than in single-member plurality systems.

We should also see variation in the behavior of individual MPs, where some MPs are more likely to stick to the party line, whereas others are more likely to deviate from it. The party-internal hierarchy, as reflected in MPs holding party and parliamentary leadership positions, may for example influence MPs' behavior (e.g. Müller et al. 2001), and one hypothesis is that MPs holding leadership positions are more likely to stick to the party line, when voting or holding speeches in parliament. All else equal, MPs holding leading positions should stick to the party line for the reason that it is likely to represent their own preferences, since they are more likely to be able to influence the party line. Also, the rule of reciprocity (Fenno 1973: 95; Weingast 1987; see also Mayntz and Neidhardt 1989) should work better at higher levels of hierarchy. In contrast to a backbencher, a committee chair, for instance, has his/her own turf to defend. MPs in leadership positions thus may gain more practical use from reciprocity than other MPs. Finally, MPs in leading positions tend to have more to lose from potential punishment as they may be withdrawn from such positions, or their term may not be renewed (Damgaard 1995; Saalfeld 1995).

PROJECT GOAL 3: INVESTIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTRA-PARTY COHESION

The third goal of the project is to study the consequences of intra-party cohesion. Intra-party heterogeneity is likely to have a direct effect on individual MPs and their career ambitions within the parties. Policy

preferences deviating from the party core may also motivate MPs to collaborate with MPs of other parties. On the macro level, intra-party cohesion affects the bargaining power of political parties, their legislative behavior, and – as a consequence – political decision-making in general. Policy preferences of individual MPs may for example be used to explain patterns of legislative behavior. Party affiliation and the government-opposition divide explain the introduction of law proposals as well as decision-making on bills. However, recent research on the legislative activity shows that a small but significant share of bills exists that have been inserted by the parliamentary opposition and won a majority in parliament. Also, MPs sometimes work together across the government–opposition divide in introducing law proposals (see Bräuninger and Debus 2009). This raises the question whether the individual programmatic position of MPs differ in a way from the party core that produces incentives to work with other parties, regardless of whether the MPs belong to the government or the opposition. As mentioned above, the variety of intra-party preferences may also affect a party's bargaining power and hence government formation processes. In addition, tensions within parties could also affect government stability because coalition governments involving heterogeneous parties suffer from a policy deadlock. As a consequence, governments are less likely to deal with political crises and hence government instability increases. Intra-party cohesion may also affect policy outcomes due to that parties suffering from low intra-party cohesion are likely to lose bargaining power. This in turn may lead to that their impact on legislative output and the implementation stage decreases, and as a result, heterogeneous parties should be less likely to shape policy outcomes.

A concrete example of an important research question that we aim to answer in this project is the question of whether intra-party politics matter when determining how portfolios are allocated. We thus aim to improve our understanding of why specific politicians are appointed to specific ministerial posts (see Bäck et al. 2011). To make this contribution, we draw on the previous literature on ministerial selection and de-selection or turnover (see e.g. Dowding & Dumont 2008). This literature relies heavily on principal-agent theory and takes its starting point in the so called 'parliamentary chain of delegation', which suggests that power-relationships in a parliamentary democracy can be described as a chain, where citizens are in a first step delegating power to representatives, who in turn delegate power to a cabinet and a PM, who delegates power to cabinet line ministers (see e.g. Strøm 2003). The focus here lies on the third step in this chain, where the PM is seen as the principal delegating power to the individual ministers as department heads. One way of minimizing problems of "moral hazard" – that line ministers act in a way that do not coincide with the wishes of the principal – is to try to appoint ministers whose interests do not clash with the principal's interest (Kam et al. 2010: 2). A main hypothesis draws on this idea and says that politicians are more likely to be appointed to ministerial office the closer their own policy position is to that of the principal. What complicates matters is that politicians may have several, competing principals (Carey 2007), and we suggest that who is the "dominant" principal depends on the institutional setting where portfolio allocation takes place. In settings where the PM has strong agenda-setting powers, he or she is likely to be the dominant principal, whereas other actors are likely to take this part in settings where the PM has few competencies. A problem when evaluating the role of intra-party politics for portfolio allocation is that we often do not have access to information on individual politicians' policy positions – this project solves this problem by analyzing the speeches of individual MPs and ministers, thereby giving us such information in a large number of countries,

allowing us to evaluate the importance of various institutional features.

DATA COLLECTION

The main data collection task of the project is to collect parliamentary speeches and prepare the collected text documents for the empirical analysis. Collecting parliamentary speeches and their preparation for data analysis requires large resources. This hinges on the huge amount of data which has to be collected since a large number of speeches are made during one legislative period (the project will focus on the 2–4 most recent periods in each country). Research assistants are instructed to download the speeches from the parliaments' web pages grouping speeches by MPs and parliamentary party groups. The documents are then prepared for the data analysis. To reduce the amount of hand coding, the project will employ a computer scientist programming routines for downloading and pre-filtering parliamentary speeches. The data collected will be made available to other researchers, thereby giving the research community a systematic source for evaluating parties' ideological cohesion in a large sample of Western European countries.

In order to explain the variation in ideological cohesion across countries, parties and individuals, the research team collects data for the various explanatory variables including institutions (e.g. electoral systems, federalism), party-specific data (e.g. organization, size, ideology), and individual characteristics of MPs (e.g. leadership positions, parliamentary career), using various available sources (e.g. for German MPs, we can use the Bundestag data handbook, which includes short biographies of all MPs that name their functions inside the party, the parliamentary party group and inside the government). To evaluate the predictions aimed at investigating the effects of ideological cohesion, the project combines the collected data on intra-party cohesion with already existing datasets on coalition governments (e.g. Constitutional

Change and Parliamentary Democracies; see Müller et al. 2000; Strøm et al. 2008), political parties (e.g. the Comparative Manifestos Project; see Budge et al. 2001), legislative behavior (Bräuninger and Debus 2009, Jenny and Müller 2010), and datasets including variables measuring policy outcomes (e.g. Cusack 1999).

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Stakeholder participation, learning and ecosystem management

A global study of 146 Biosphere Reserves in 55 countries

Andreas Duit

Abstract

Theories of natural resource management and conservation, such as adaptive management and adaptive co-management, are based on strong but mostly untested assumptions about the importance of engaging local stakeholders in conservation and management efforts. The aim of this project is to analyse the effect *of stakeholder participation* in natural resource management programs on 1) outcomes in ecosystems, and 2) learning processes. Through a powerful combination of a transdisciplinary research team, a cross-national panel survey of 144 BR-areas in 55 countries, longitudinal biodiversity mapping using satellite imagery, and context-sensitive field work in 10 strategically selected cases studies, the contested role of stakeholder participation in natural resource management will be examined in with a much higher degree of precision and generalizability than previously possible. The significance of the proposed project consists in its unique ability to subject key theoretical assumptions to rigours testing against several different types of empirical data. In addition, the proposed project will compile and make publicly available a data set consisting of estimates of interlinked social and ecological systems situated in 55 different political contexts. This will enable researchers to analyze long term interaction patterns between social and ecological systems, as well as generate new research questions that go beyond current theories of environmental management.

Purpose and aim

Does stakeholder participation and learning processes lead to better management of ecosystems? During the last few decades there has been a strong trend towards increasing stakeholder participation in biodiversity conservation and protected area management (Dearden et al. 2002). A parallel shift is occurring among the objectives of conservation programs, from a focus on protecting red listed species, towards a focus on managing ecosystem services for human wellbeing and supporting learning about ecological systems. The combined effects of these trends are to a large extent unknown and heavily debated

(eg. Wilshusen et al. 2002), but a key assumption in the scientific literature is that stakeholder involvement and processes of learning are essential components in achieving better management of ecosystems.

The purpose of this project is to analyze the interactions between stakeholder participation, learning processes and outcomes in management of ecosystems with regards to three main research questions:

1. Does stakeholder participation lead to better management of ecosystems?
2. Does stakeholder participation lead to processes of learning among stakeholders about ecosystems?

Andreas Duit är verksam vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Stockholms universitet.
E-post: andreas.duit@statsvet.su.se

3. What types of learning processes are effective for improving management of ecosystems?

Through a novel combination of survey data, remote sensing analysis, and strategically selected case studies, the project is in a unique position to assess the validity of fundamental theoretical assertions about the effects of local stakeholder participation on management outcomes in natural systems, with regards to biodiversity as well as to other management goals. Serving this overall purpose, the project rests on three aims:

1. Creating a longitudinal cross-national panel data set of management practices and patterns of stakeholder participation in 146 UNESCO Biosphere Reserves (BRs) in 55 countries. An initial survey was conducted in 2008 and an important aim of the project is to conduct a follow-up survey in 2013 of those BRs that were surveyed in 2008. The resulting panel data set will enable in-depth analyses of how changes in management practices and patterns of stakeholder participation and learning processes affect management outcomes over time.

2. Characterize BR-areas from satellite remote sensing regarding variability in different vegetation indices to ground based or map based measures of biodiversity and develop change trajectories from multi-temporal satellite data. This will create high-quality and extensive measures of management outcomes in the sample of BR ecosystems and landscapes. Field work validating remote sensing data interpretation will be conducted (see below).

3. Conducting field work in 10 selected BRs to 1) calibrate and triangulate the data captured in the survey and through remote sensing, 2) capture micro-level mechanisms of how the design and framing of participation affects management outcomes, and 3) study learning processes around ecosystem in local settings. Based on information from survey data and UNESCO archives, we will select five 'conventional BRs' (managed by National Park agencies etc), and five 'multi-stakeholder' BRs (managed in collaboration between officials and stakeholder groups from civil society). Through interviews with management bodies and stakeholders, document analysis and observation, we will map the various approaches to stakeholder participation (including who is participating, in what processes, for what purpose and with what kind of facilitation), as well as the results in relation to management goals, including effects on biodiversity.

Survey of the field

Over the last few decades, the participation-paradigm has grown in research, policy and practice of natural resource management, biodiversity conservation and stewardship of ecosystem services (Dearden et al. 2005, Reed 2008, Chapin et al. 2009). In short, the arguments put forward for involvement of stakeholders include increased efficiency (as people are more likely to support and implement decisions they have participated in making), improved accuracy (as a more diverse and broader knowledge base is utilized), and strengthened legitimacy (as people affected by decisions are invited into the process of making them) of management and conservation efforts (McCool and Guthrie 2001, Beierle and Konisky 2001, Colfer 2005). The focus on continuous learning as key to successful management of ecosystems is also increasing, both in terms of environmental education as a means to enhance support for ecosystem management among the public, and in terms of learning-based management as a means to enhance the accuracy of management practices (e.g. Schultz and Lundholm 2010).

The pragmatic reasons for stakeholder participation and learning have gained importance with the growing perception that ecosystems and societies are interdependent, forming social-ecological systems that are complex, adaptive and nested across

scales (e.g. Berkes and Folke 1998, Holling 2001). The interdependence between ecosystems and society implies that people-oriented management and conservation of ecosystems is more likely to succeed than "strict protectionism based on government-led, authoritarian practices" (Wilshusen et al. 2002). For example, many conservation values in cultural landscapes result from a long history of human use and management (Nabhan 1997). The complexity and the cross-scale interactions of social-ecological systems imply that any management body is dependent on collaboration with others in order to detect, interpret and respond accurately to feedback from dynamic ecosystems (Folke et al. 2005). Adaptive co-management has been put forward as a way of dealing with this complexity in social-ecological systems (Olsson et al. 2004a, Armitage et al. 2007), as it combines the learning-by-doing approach of adaptive management with the collaborative approach of co-management. Adaptive co-management emphasizes two types of stakeholders: actors with different types of ecosystem knowledge (both scientific knowledge and experiential, e.g. local, traditional and indigenous knowledge) and actors working at different ecological scales and levels of decision-making (e.g. managers of certain habitats and policy-makers at local and national levels) (Olsson et al 2004a, Charles 2007). Recent studies on adaptive co-management have highlighted the need for bridging organizations that can coordinate and facilitate such adaptive collaboration across organizational levels and knowledge systems (Hahn et al. 2006, Berkes 2009).

Several studies suggest that participation of stakeholders has the positive effects suggested above (e.g. Sandersen and Koester 2000, Mugisha and Jacobson 2004, Stringer et al. 2006, Sudtongkong and Webb 2008). Participation of key stakeholders was found to be the single most important factor in determining project outcomes in a survey of ecosystem management in the United States

(Yaffee et al. 1996). In a synthesis of four case studies, Lebel et al. (2006) found support for the proposition that participation and deliberation in decision-making around natural resource management enhances society's ability to innovate and respond to crises, suggesting that involvement of non-state actors is a fruitful approach for dealing with complexity. In a case study of Kristianstads Vattenrike Biosphere Reserve, Hahn et al. (2006) showed how a bridging organization was able to identify win-win situations between biodiversity conservation and societal development through adaptive co-management processes focused on strengthening the generation of ecosystem services. Positive side-effects of participatory and collaborative approaches have also been described, such as empowerment and increased social capital, which in turn can lubricate future collaboration (Pretty and Ward 2001, Ansell and Gash 2006, Duit et al. 2009).

However, critique against the participation-paradigm has increased. Brody (2003) discusses the risk that the participation of conflicting interests slows down decision-making and results in unfortunate compromises between biodiversity conservation and economic development. Galaz (2005) shows how decision-making in a Swedish water common-pool-resource institution was blocked by strategic behavior among participating resource users that wanted to avoid costly measures. Such outcomes might erode social capital rather than building it (Conley and Moote 2003). Several scholars have argued that in a human dominated world, the goals of biodiversity conservation and economic development are competing, and therefore the participation of economic interests in decision-making on biodiversity conservation will have negative consequences for biodiversity (Kramer et al. 1997, Brandon et al. 1998, Terborgh 1999, Oates 1999 [cited and discussed in Wilshusen et al 2002]). In addition, local participation might decrease accuracy of management because it dilutes

the impact of scientific knowledge on conservation decisions (du Toit et al. 2004). Similarly, it has been questioned whether local and traditional knowledge really has a role to play in today's rapidly changing world (Briggs and Sharp 2004). The assumption that local participation automatically improves legitimacy of decisions has also been questioned Powerless and poor people may lack the capacity to participate fully, and so the decisions made in participatory processes might become more biased towards enforcing existing power structures than would decisions made by democratically elected and representative bodies. This process, labeled 'elite capture', has been described several times in the development literature (e.g. Platteau and Abraham 2002).

Studies that evaluate the effects of stakeholder participation on conservation outcomes and sustainable use of ecosystem services empirically are rare (Kleiman et al 2000, Conley and Moote 2003). The ambiguity in the results from case studies calls for larger studies where hypotheses on the effects of participation in general and adaptive co-management in particular can be tested systematically in different settings (Carpenter et al. 2009). The data-sets available to perform such tests are few (e.g. Poteete and Ostrom 2007), but the World Network of Biosphere Reserves as part of UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program provides a potentially useful example.

Project description

UNITS OF ANALYSIS: THE WORLD NETWORK OF BIOSPHERE RESERVES

Biosphere Reserves are sites designated by UNESCO with the mission of "maintaining and developing ecological and cultural diversity and securing ecosystem services for human wellbeing" (UNESCO, 2008, p. 8) in collaboration with a suitable range of actors, often including local communities and scientists. They are promoted as "sites of excellence" and "learning sites" in this regard (UNESCO, 1996). The legal status varies between countries, but all biosphere reserves include core zones where biodiversity is protected and buffer zones, where activities that foster development without deteriorating biodiversity are promoted.

Since the program was initiated in 1976, 564 Biosphere Reserves have been designated in 109 countries (UNESCO Official Website, 2011). In the 1970s and 1980s the sites were mainly designated based on their biodiversity values and their capacity to support research and monitoring (Ishwaran, Persic, & Tri, 2008), but since 1995, all Biosphere Reserves are expected to fulfill three functions, stated in the Statutory Framework and the Seville Strategy (UNESCO, 1996): (1) conserving biodiversity, (2) fostering sustainable social and economic development, and (3) supporting research, monitoring, and education. As many of the older Biosphere Reserves have not yet transformed, the network now includes examples of "conventional" biodiversity conservation as well as sites with an integrated approach to conservation and development. Management bodies range from national park authorities to communities and networks of multiple state and non-state actors.

The three functions and several of the criteria of Biosphere Reserves correspond to features of adaptive co-management: there is a focus on monitoring, an integrated approach to conservation and development, and recommendations of adaptive management and participation of a suitable range of actors (Schultz & Lundholm, 2010; UNESCO, 1996). Based on the mission, functions, and criteria of Biosphere Reserves, and the results of a case study in one Biosphere Reserve (Hahn et al., 2006; Olsson et al. 2004; Schultz et al. 2007), we propose that Biosphere Reserves constitute potential sites for testing the effectiveness of participation in general and adaptive co-management in particular.

REMOTE SENSING TO ASSESS CHANGES IN BR ECOSYSTEMS AND LANDSCAPES

In order to assess to what extent the different BR areas have been able to affect ecological processes on the ground, we will gather and analyze remote sensing data (satellite imagery, aerial photos, etc) in a GIS framework. In order to explicitly assess changes in land uses we will collect (when available) and analyze temporal remote sensing data gathered in a consecutive manner. We will use a two-stage process in analyzing the data. First we will use the NVDI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) indicator to assess significant changes in the vegetation cover within the different zones of all the MAB areas. This analysis will help us to reveal general trends in terms of overall level of vegetation both within and among the different MAB areas. These analysis will be accompanied for a carefully selected set of MAB areas where either: (1) the changes in vegetation covers measured through the NVDI seems to be significant, or (2) where we would expect ongoing management activities to have resulted in land use changes. These more in-depth analyses will elaborate what types of vegetation (e.g. tree species) that are present in the landscape, and it will also elaborate how the spatial configuration of these different types of vegetation covers might affect possibilities for species persistence. Here, both the amount of suitable cover/habitat and the level of connectivity (Taylor et al 1993) will be taken into account; both variables being of crucial for any species long-term persistence in a landscape (e.g. Hanski & Ovaskainen 2000). For the connectivity analyses we will apply the recently developed graph-theoretical framework (Urban et al 2009, Bodin and Saura 2010)

CASE STUDIES AND FIELD WORK: STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION "ON THE GROUND".

A core component of the project is a set of case studies based on field work in a total of 10 different BR-areas. Information from survey data and UNESCO archives enables us to choose cases strategically based on the level of stakeholder participation.1 We will select five 'conventional BRs' (typically managed by National Park agencies) with low degree of stakeholder participation, and five 'co-management' BRs (managed in collaboration between officials, NGOs, volunteers, local inhabitants and resource users, and interest organisations) with high levels of stakeholder participation. In addition, case selection can also be made with controls for background variables such as resource characteristic, landscape varieties, and ecosystem types.

The purpose of the case studies is to validate satellite imagery interpretations as well as survey estimates of participatory processes and management regimes, and to gain a better understanding of how stakeholder participation and learning processes play out "on the ground". The case studies will provide an opportunity for identifying micro-level causal mechanisms that are underlying macro-level patterns of correlations that can be found in the in the large-N analysis of survey and remote sensing data.

A set of key questions will be addressed,

1　Due to a lack of a widely accepted definition of stakeholders, it is not uncommon in studies of eosystem management for stakeholders to be identified on an ad hoc basis (Reed et al. 2009), often by simply defining a stakeholder as an individual or group that visibly is interacting with the resource or the resource governance system. This approach to identifying stakeholder runs the obvious risk of biasing the analysis to place uneven emphasis on salient and resourceful groups that are highly visible in the interaction with the resource, while underestimating less resourceful actor groups. In designing our survey we therefore opted for a strategy which focused on determining the presence of a larger number (10) of predetermined categories of stakeholders in different functions within the BR. This approach does not eliminate the problem with identifying stakeholders mentioned above, but by using a relative detailed (and therefore reasonably exhaustive) list of stakeholder categories the problem is nevertheless brought under a degree of control

as in the 'who, what, where, and how' (cf. Krasny, Lundholm and Plummer, 2011; Lundholm & Plummer, 2011; Rickinson, Lundholm and Hopwood, 2009; Schultz & Lundholm, 2010). Does it matter *who* possesses knowledge of biodiversity and ecosystems in the BRs? Is there a positive influence on learning depending on *content*, i.e. is understanding systems and complexity important? Does *place-based* education on biodiversity and ecosystems improve management? What is the influence of *different means* of communication and *cognitive tools* on learning (i.e. dialogues vs. scenario planning, vs. one-way communication)? Participatory processes and patterns of management regimes will be mapped through interviews with key informants among managers and stakeholders, direct observation of management practices, and analysis of policy documents and performance reviews.

SURVEY: GENERAL PATTERNS OF STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND MANAGEMENT REGIMES.

In a previous research effort a survey questionnaire was distributed to all 531 BR areas. The first BR-survey was carried out using an online questionnaire, which proved to be a highly effective way of distributing and collecting surveys in a population consisting to a large part of respondents situated in remote areas. In order to get comparable information from a large set of cases a self-administered questionnaire was developed, targeting coordinators, directors and managers of Biosphere Reserves. The questionnaire was tested, revised, and uploaded for on-line access in English, French, Spanish and Chinese. In addition, hard copies were distributed extensively at the 3rd World Congress of Biosphere Reserves held in Madrid in February 2008 to compensate for the fact that 124 of the 531 Biosphere Reserves could not be reached via e-mail. We therefore plan to use the same approach of a combined internet survey and directly distributed questionnaires

for the repeated survey which is to be carried out in 2013, five years after the first survey and also the year for the next World Congress of Biosphere Reserves. The questionnaire was designed to gather information about three main aspects of the Biospheres. The first aspect is patterns of stakeholder involvement, defined as the number of different stakeholder categories (e.g. local famers, indigenous people, resource users) participating in various Biosphere functions (e.g. decision making, monitoring, implementation). The second aspect is management regimes, and this section of the survey sought to estimate the extent to which the BR employed a style of management that could be classified as either adaptive management or conventional conservation, as well as whether the BR was pursuing local development objectives in parallel with conservation efforts or not. The third aspect measured by the survey was self-assessed effectiveness in reaching development and biodiversity conservation goals, as well at its perceived readiness for dealing with surprises and external shocks. The survey worked well for assessing participation patterns and management regimes, but using self-assessments as the chief tool for measuring performance effectiveness in biodiversity conservation is likely to generate a certain extent of bias. Combining the survey approach with remotes sensing data on changes in habitats and biodiversity is an attempt at overcoming this bias, while still retaining a large-N cross-national research design. In addition, the survey panel will enable us to address crucial questions about changes over time, including the effect of external shocks and surprises.

TIMELINE

Due to its longitudinal approach, the proposed project is scheduled to run over a period of five years. This extended time is partly motivated by the need for sufficient amount of time to elapse between measurements using surveys and satellite data, but

also by the ambitious but time-consuming plan for conducting field work in 10 different BRs. The overall project timeline is planned as follows: In 2012-2016, field work in about three BRs per year will be conducted. Satellite data processing and interpretation will begin in 2012, and a preliminary round of publications based on survey and satellite data is planned for early 2013 and 2014. A follow up survey is to be issued in 2013, and some early results from combined panel survey and longitudinal satellite data is scheduled for publication in late 2013 and early 2014. The remainder of 2015 and 2016 will be used to summarize and disseminate the results from case studies and large-N data in leading journals, a co-authored monograph, and a dissertation, bringing the project to completion.

Preliminary findings

Results and analysis from the first round of BR-surveys have been reported in papers Duit and Hall 2011, Schultz and Lundholm 2010, Schultz et al 2010. Preliminary findings indicate that participation of local stakeholders neither improves nor deteriorates conservation of biodiversity per se, but rather expands the focus of BR management so that local development is stimulated as well. It seems that win-win situations can indeed be identified between conservation and local development when local stakeholders are involved. Another finding is that the extent of stakeholder participation is influenced by the institutional context of the BR, especially protection of political rights (Duit and Hall 2011).

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Fair play retributivism and the problem of punishment

Göran Duus-Otterström

1. Purpose and aims

The purpose of this project is to assess the strength of so called *fair play retributivism* (FPR) as a solution to the problem of punishment, i.e. the problem concerning on what grounds, if any, punishment of lawbreakers by the state is justified. FPR holds that punishment is permissible, and normally required, as a means of restoring the fairness between the lawbreaker and the law-abiding. The lawbreaker, this theory holds, is free riding on the social scheme of cooperation; she accepts the benefits of the scheme without accepting the behavioral restrictions upon which it depends. The lawbreaker thus takes unfair advantage over the law-abiding. Punishment is justified in that it removes that advantage.

FPR holds out a lot of promise as an approach to punishment, not least as it might overcome the problems associated with standard consequentialist and retributivist approaches to punishment. Yet it is confronted by a set of powerful objections. The project aims to assess the merits of FPR in light of these objections, and to arrive at a reasoned conclusion as to whether the theory is a plausible answer to the problem of punishment. Part of the work needed to meet this evaluative aim, however, is conceptual and constructive, for the fact is that FPR, while promising, is insufficiently fleshed out and understood. So the project aims to do two things:

1. To construct, based on previous accounts of FPR and relevant branches of political theory, the best (in the sense most plausible) statement of fair play retributivism.
2. To assess the strength of that theory as an answer to the problem of punishment by

way of analyzing a set of objections to it. Thus, the project belongs to the field of normative political theory. It seeks to evaluate, through conceptual and normative analysis, a promising if underappreciated theory of punishment. As becomes evident below, I am positively predisposed to FPR. Yet I am genuinely unsure as to whether it can sustain the critique to which it is subjected. A likely outcome of the project is that FPR provides an important part of the correct theory of punishment, but that it needs to be qualified and complemented in various ways.

2. Survey of the field

Punishment is the "imposition of something which is intended to be burdensome or painful, on a supposed offender for a supposed crime, by a person or body who claims to have authority to do so" (Duff 2008b). In its familiar *legal* form, punishment is the state's imposition of pain or deprivation (e.g. imprisonment) on a person for transgressing the laws of the jurisdiction. Thus understood, punishment is by its very nature controversial (although perhaps not subject to fundamental controversy).[1] It involves intentional harm to persons, and intentional harm is normally forbidden. Punishment thereby raises stringent demands on justification – we need to think hard about on what grounds, if any, such treatment is justified (Berman 2006; Boonin 2008). This is important not least considering how *widespread* the practice is.

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[1] As Rawls (2001) once noted, surprisingly few believe that punishment is unjustifiable. For the contrary abolitionist view, see e.g. Boonin (2008) and Hanna (2009).

Göran Duus-Otterström är verksam som forskare och lärare vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet. E-post: goran.duus-otterstrom@pol.gu.se

Punishment is endemic to our societies. For example, in 2009 courts in Sweden meted out 13 600 prison sentences. Furthermore, fines were the main punishment in 32 800 court rulings (Brå 2010). This staggering amount of interference with people's liberty and property adds up to what is probably the most significant and intrusive of state practices, at least in peace time. We have a duty to think seriously about this practice.

The "problem of punishment", as I use that term, refers to the problem concerning precisely on what grounds, if any, punishment is justified. It is a classic problem within political theory and moral philosophy that over the years has sparked considerable debate. The debate can be partitioned into three broad camps. *Consequentialist* theories hold that punishment is justified since it contributes to societies' overall utility or welfare, for example in virtue of deterring future crime or incarcerating dangerous individuals. *Retributivist* theories argue that punishment is justified, on backward-looking grounds, by being an instance of paying back to the offender what he or she deserves. Finally, there are *hybrid* theories that seek to combine consequentialist and retributivist views into a supposedly more appealing mix. Each camp is associated with significant problems. Consequentialism is criticized for in principle allowing whichever disproportionate or otherwise undeserved punishment that contributes to overall welfare. Retributivism, in supporting punishment on grounds separate from its consequences, is charged with supporting pointless or even counterproductive infliction of suffering. Finally, hybrid theories, while until recently very popular, have been criticized for either collapsing back into simple consequentialism or else suffering from incoherence. In short, the debate is in flux and no alternative enjoys anything even approximating universal consent among theorists (Duus-Otterström 2007).

Getting into a bit more detail, the rival of consequentialism is usually taken to be

intrinsic-good retributivism (Honderich 2006). This is the view that criminal wrong-doing deserves punishment, and that punishment, when in proportion to what the offender deserves, is intrinsically good or just (see e.g. Moore 1998). This view can explain many of the convictions most people have when they think about punishment: that punishment must be (likely to be) deserved if it is to be justified; that its severity must "fit" the crime; and that punishments should not be distributed with an eye to overall consequences. Yet intrinsic-good retributivism also suffers many problems. For example, in supporting even punishment that is good for no one, it seems to support the imposition of pain for pain's sake (Dolinko 1991, Shafer-Landau 1996). Many simply do not buy this way of looking at punishment, preferring instead to side with Bentham's classic remark that "all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil /.../ it ought only to be admitted as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil" (1988, p. 170). Still, consequentialist or hybrid theories seem unable to account for many of the desert-based convictions that most support when it comes to punishment, or at least unable to account for them *in the right way*.[1] Hence, scholars have sought to describe a form of retributivism that neither relies on the simple intrinsic goodness of deserved punishment, nor collapses into consequentialism.

In *Punishment and Personal Responsibility* (2007) I made such an attempt. I there outlined a contractualist argument to the effect that a retributive penal regime, when

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1   Consequentialists often advocate retributive considerations indirectly, deeming them to be essential to the maximization of welfare. Bentham (1988) for example spent a great deal of time working out a conception of proportionality in the context of his wider utilitarian theory of punishment. Yet such moves are unconvincing to many as they do not seem to value justice or fairness in the right way. As Kymlicka (2002) notes, what is wrong about unfair treatment is not so much its disutility, but its unfairness.

compared to its alternatives, is reasonably preferable to all. This is so, I argued, for two reasons. On the one hand, a retributive penal regime seems better able to secure legal security, which is something which we all can and should value. On the other hand, retributive punishment, which is administered with an eye to holding the offender responsible in a fundamental, blame-entailing sense, treats offenders with more respect than sanctions that aim to produce deterrence or rehabilitation. I referred to these reasons, respectively, as the *institutional* and *symbolic* reason. While this analysis, I now believe, got some things right and pointed out values I am still committed to, it was also significantly flawed in other respects. What my argument justified was not so much *punishment* as a particular "penal regime", and while I argued that we can support such a regime on retributivist grounds, it can just as well be supported on consequentialist ones. Moreover, the analysis only argued the supremacy of a retributive penal regime when compared to two salient alternatives, namely one that seeks deterrence and one that seeks rehabilitation. I did not address the more fundamental question whether the retributive penal regime I favored is preferable by all *to no penal regime at all*. The theory which promises to right these wrongs, while keeping with the contractualist-retributivist outlook, is FPR.

FAIR PLAY RETRIBUTIVISM

FPR can be defined as the view that punishment is justified on account of it being required to promote *fairness* in a society. The starting point is that offenders violate the social contract that underpins society. They choose to violate the mutually advantageous rules that bind us all, thus enjoying the benefits of those rules without accepting their costs. In that sense they gain an unfair advantage over the law-abiding. Fairness then requires that the offender be punished, thus restoring the fundamental "legal equality" of society. This view is distinctively retributivist

in that it justifies punishment on backward-looking grounds. Punishment is justified simply because it is required to remove the already acquired unfair advantage of the offender. Moreover, proportionality is entailed by FPR as greater punishment is reserved for greater unfairness. Yet FPR is not dependent on the seemingly mysterious or vengeful "bite back" impulses that intrinsic-good retributivism seems to rely on (Mackie 1982). It is dependent on the value of fairness, the fundamental commitment to which is not mysterious. For example, we often support policies that improve equality of opportunity among children simply because it is *fair*, irrespective of further consequences. If punishment could be portrayed as a matter of fairness, much would be gained in terms of retributivism's plausibility. This is the promise held out by FPR.

There is by now a decent-sized literature on FPR. The origins of the broad idea of thinking about (retributive) punishment in terms of fairness is usually credited the seminal papers of Morris (1968) and Murphy (1973). The approach was crystallized by Dagger (1993). It is now subject to growing attention, attracting defenders (Davis 1993, Dagger 2008, Hoskins 2010, Stichter 2010) as well as critics (Dolinko 1991, Boonin 2008, Duff 2008b).

FPR fits nicely with many of the standard theories in liberal political theory. Rawls famously characterized society as a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage" which "makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts" (Rawls 1999, p. 4). The terms of social cooperation, however, is undergirded by binding rules of conduct, and it is essential to the functioning of society that those rules are recognized as binding by all. It is from the benefits of social cooperation that the basis of each citizen's obligation to follow the rules is derived. Rawls and others argue that we have *obligations of fair play*: to honor the terms of cooperation from which we benefit

by respecting those very terms. As Hart put the point: "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefitted from their submission" (1955, p. 185). This fair play-view represents a distinctive and compelling view on political obligation, i.e. the duty of citizens to accept the authority of the state and its commands (Klosko 1992, McDermott 2004).

While the fair play view can be extended to cover many cases of political obligation, it is particularly apt in the case of law and punishment. The system of law and order can easily be said to be a common good (Bird 2006, p. 162). In promoting security, safeguarding rights, and establishing predictable terms of social existence, it is to the benefit of all – *including* those who desire to break the laws. For even an offender is better off under a system of law and order. As Dennett has put it in another context, "even the rational psychopath will have an internal justification for supporting laws that punish psychopaths, since they protect him from other psychopaths" (Dennett 2003, p. 298). So when a person breaks the laws, she free rides: she enjoys the *benefits* of the system of law without accepting the fair share of the burdens needed for that system to prevail. She casts off the burdens of compliance with the laws and is thereby in a position superior to the law-abiding. This is unfair. The key claim of FPR is that punishment should aim to restore the fairness between offenders and the law-abiding and that it is justified to the extent it serves this end.

In being rooted in a plausible account of fairness and political obligation, FPR offers a compelling potential solution to the problem of punishment. This is not least so since it can easily accommodate the Rawlsian claim that principles of justice must respect the "separateness" of persons (1999, p. 163). A perennial weakness of consequentialist theories is that they seem unable to account for that individual have rights. Their focus on beneficial overall consequences can blind them to other factors that seem relevant to the permissibility of punishment, such as the idea that the offender has a right not to be treated (merely) as a means to social utility (Murphy 1973). FPR is readily compatible with the idea of people having rights, including the offender. Indeed, a plausible contractualist case can be made that fairness-restoring punishment is something which even the offender can in principle accept (cf. Scanlon 1998; Brettschneider 2007). This does not involve the *actual* attitudes of the person suffering punishment, of course. When we are evaluating a punishment, we instead ask whether it is called for by a rule that the offender, like everyone else, would have wanted in place if he or she had a prior say in the matter. In other words, we seek not what people actually want *ex post*, but what they would have been reasonable to want *ex ante* (Duus-Otterström 2010). Murphy's pioneering defense of FPR proceeds along these contractualist lines:

> On this theory, a man may be said to rationally will X if, and only if, X is called for by a rule that the man would necessarily have adopted in the original position of choice – i.e., in a position of coming together with others to pick rules for the regulation of their mutual affairs. [...] Thus I can be said to will my own punishment if, in an antecedent position of choice, I and my fellows would have chosen institutions of punishment as the most rational means of dealing with those who might break the other generally beneficial social rules that had been adopted. (1973, p. 230)

According to FPR, everyone could be said to endorse punishment as a way of promoting the fairness of the social venture. Punishment thus passes the contractualist criterion of following from principles which no one could reject *ex ante*.

3. Project description

FPR represents a distinctively retributivist,

backward-looking theory that is located snuggly within a wider politico-theoretical literature, and which, while it retains the characteristic focus on desert, explains in plausible terms why we are justified in acting on desert. FPR holds out a lot of promise as a solution to the problem of punishment.

Yet, for all its promise, FPR is insufficiently understood. More work is needed to flesh out and assess the theory. In particular, the relation between fair play obligations and punishment needs tight scrutiny. The theory must also meet a set of challenges laid down by its critics. Since I believe that defending the theory against its main objections is equivalent to understanding its positive claims, I here choose to focus on the objections that the theory needs to address:

OBJECTION 1: IRRELEVANCE

FPR holds that unfairness explains criminal desert: it is the fact that an offender takes unfair advantage of others that grounds that he or she is deserving of a punishment. The unfairness explains both why it is *permissible* to punish an offender, and why we normally *ought* to do so. Critics have held that FPR misrepresents the nature of criminal desert, arguing that while FPR can account for criminal desert when it comes to *mala prohibita* crimes, it cannot account for *mala in se* crimes (Duff 2001). The worrying thing about particularly heinous *mala in se* crimes seems to be that they are very harmful, not that they are unfair. The wrongness of murder, for example, seems to have more to do with the harm it causes the murdered and his or her loved ones than with it being unfair to the law-abiding (Dolinko 1991). This charge is thus mainly conceptual: the argument is that FPR cannot properly account for criminal desert. This is significant since FPR, as a species of retributivism, needs to get desert right, in particular because it would otherwise not get the ranking right between crimes and punishments, which is key for proportionality (von Hirsch et. al. 2009).

OBJECTION 2: FALSE EQUIVALENCE

Proponents of FPR have responded to the irrelevance objection by saying that while crimes can differ in terms of other moral characteristics, they all *also* include casting off the general burden of self restraint and hence involve unfairness (Boonin 2008, p. 124-126). The worrying thing about this so called *general compliance response*, however, is that it seems unable to *differentiate* between crimes. The general compliance response holds that all crime equally involve the same (general) unfairness of free riding. Yet this seems unable to capture some of our considered intuitions – for example, that murder is deserving of a much harsher punishment than tax evasion.

A related worry is that FPR, in saying that punishment is right because it removes the advantage the criminal has taken over the law-abiding, will say that the wrongness of a crime depends on whether the offender takes liberties that also tempt the law-abiding (Dolinko 1991). FPR says that the wrongness of crime stems from the offender's casting off the burdens of self-restraint that are shouldered by the law-abiding. But most people simply are not tempted to commit severe crimes. Hence, it is no burden for them to refrain from committing them. The conclusion seems to be that FPR will treat crimes as worse the more people are tempted to commit them. This has absurd implications for the way we rank crimes. A crime that tempts many (tax evasion) will be deemed worse than a crime that tempts very few (like murder). The upshot seems to be that FPR can at best only handle a subset of crimes, at worst is irredeemably flawed.

OBJECTION 3: THE UNEQUAL PLAYING FIELD RESPONSE

FPR locates the nature of our obligation to obey the laws in fairness: it is because people benefit from a law that they have a fair play duty to respect it. This stance, however, invites the objection that FPR seems to presuppose

just societies, i.e. societies where there is a level playing field in terms of access to advantage and where rules are to the benefit of all. Since actual societies arguably fail to meet this requirement, one can question whether FPR has any purchase as a solution to the problem of punishment. Some retributivists have argued that retributivism should not be wedded to contractualist reasoning precisely because actual societies are not fair (Anderson 1997).

There are two versions of this objection. First, it might be argued that some individuals do not benefit, on aggregate, from the system of law. For these individuals it seems that the contractualist test at the heart of the fair play account cannot be met (cf. Hoskins 2010). Second, it might also be argued that while everyone does benefit from the system of law, they benefit to vastly different degrees depending on their position in society. If the "cooperative venture" benefits some more than others – people with a certain ethnic or socioeconomic background, for example – then one might wonder whether the disadvantaged have a lesser obligation to obey the law.

It might be responded that FPR is an ideal theory and that we should not assume that actual societies have a right to punish (Murphy 1973; Dagger 2008). Yet if FPR is to handle real-world jurisdictions, the unequal playing field objection is clearly worrying. It serves to remind us that punishment should not be discussed without paying attention to the background conditions of the society which it is tasked to protect. As Honderich (2006) has noted this is a lacuna of the literature of punishment in general (but see Heffernan & Kleinig 2000). However, the lacuna is particularly troubling in the case of FPR in that this theory places fundamental importance in the fairness of the society.

Outline of the project

These are not the only objections to FPR, but they seem to me the most troubling ones. I have no settled view as to whether they can be overcome, and, if they cannot, whether this should make us on balance reject FPR. Recall that the project aims to answer two broad questions:

1. To construct, based on previous accounts of FPR and relevant branches of political theory, the best (in the sense most plausible) statement of fair play retributivism.
2. To assess the strength of that theory as an answer to the problem of punishment by way of analyzing a set of objections to it.

The objections point out the need to specify the most plausible version of FPR, as mentioned in (1). More specifically, this task can be broken down into a set of sub-questions:

1.1 What is the most plausible account of benefits and burdens with regard to the system of law?

1.2 What are the conditions that make punishment permissible?

1.3 What are the conditions that make punishment desirable or required?

The answer to 1.1 will in all likelihood turn out to be that the *benefits* of the system of law are primarily associated with providing individuals a sphere of autonomy and non-interference that allows them to pursue their conception of the good in relative security, while the *burdens* stem from having to refrain from doing things one would otherwise like to do. This opens up for the charge that the benefits of the system of law is "forced" – people by and large cannot exit the system(s) and hence cannot be said to freely accept its benefits (Simmons 1996). However, I follow Klosko in arguing that if benefits are open – they amount to public goods that benefit all regardless of whether one wants them – and exit is impossible, then there is a duty to reciprocate compliance with compliance (Klosko 1992). This response admittedly presupposes the plausibility of the fair play account of political obligations, and indeed the project will assume that this account is by and large correct.

Next, the project needs to analyze the

particular idea of a criminal's unfair advantage as paving the way for punishment. As is evident from 1.2 and 1.3, it is desirable to split this question into one involving the *permissibility* of punishment and one involving the *positive reason* to punish. Some construe FPR as a species of negative retributivism (Mackie 1982) that says that while criminal desert establishes the permissibility of punishing a particular lawbreaker, other considerations establishes both the reason to punish and the particular mode of punishment (Stichter 2010). It is thus not obvious that the notion of unfair advantage does work across the board, on all major questions of punishment (cf. Hart 2008). This idea is potentially very significant as it could overcome the irrelevance and false equivalence objections. The state might be justified in punishing murderers harder than people who cheat on their taxes not because they are unfair to a different extent, but because of the greater interest people have in having would-be murderers deterred. Thus, the project will investigate whether a partial reliance on social protection and overall welfare might serve to make FPR more attractive. This of course makes FPR belong to the set of "hybrid" theories.

Once the best statement of FPR is in place, the second overarching aim (2) is to assess the strength of that theory as an overall answer to the problem of punishment. This aim will require careful analysis of the attractions and flaws of that theory when compared with rival theories. The rival theories that seem most relevant here is a deterrence-based theory, intrinsic-good retributivism, and a communicative model of the kind currently defended by Duff (2001). The method used to assess the theories is *wide reflective equilibrium*-style normative analysis (Daniels 1979). This method, which is heavily favored by contemporary theorists, consists in seeking "fit" between one's considered ethical judgments in particular cases and general principles or theories. This is predominantly achieved by way of testing principles or theories against

examples (some real-world, other hypothetical) in order to see how they fare relative each other (McDermott 2010). The analytical work tends to attach priority to firmly held particular judgments: if a theory is shown to imply a highly counterintuitive action, this is usually taken as a reason to abandon or modify the theory. Yet the possibility also remains that the most attractive way of achieving fit is to bite the bullet and accept the implication, as per standard Rawlsian reflective equilibrium methodology (Rawls 1999: 40-46).

4. Significance

Punishment is arguably the most intrusive of domestic exercises of state power. The problem of punishment therefore deserves close and serious attention. Not least for the members of our communities that suffer punishment it is important to think about how their treatment can be justified to them, and how we need to modify the practice of punishment to make it cohere with the nature of that justification. For these reasons, the non-academic relevance of the issues pursued in this project is significant.

In terms of the significance for the academic field it is safe to say that the project's results will interest scholars working on punishment. While the fair play account continues to generate supporters and detractors, it is also insufficiently understood. Working out the issues (conceptual as well as normative) of the theory in a systematic fashion would interest not only those involved specifically in the debate over FPR, but also the wider community working on punishment in general. In particular, there are as of yet no book-length treatments of FPR. The project also aims to contribute to the literature on political obligations and the state responsibility to handle non-compliance. It is one of the merits of FPR that it so coherently analyses the practice of punishment as a *political* practice. Political theorists in general will benefit from the close attention the project pays to

fair play obligations and their connection to punishment.

5. Preliminary results

As stated above, in my Ph.D. thesis I defended a version of retributivism on contractual-ist grounds. While I am now convinced I got some things wrong, I am still convinced that a plausible theory of punishment will have significant retributive elements and must pass an *ex ante* contractualist test, i.e. be the object of reasonable consent even among the very people who suffer punishment. More specifically, I hold that a plausible theory of punishment must (a) explain why punishment is permissible on backward-looking grounds, (b) entail a reasonable proportionality between the seriousness of crimes and the harshness of punishment, and (c) pass a contractualist test. Whether FPR can deliver a coherent and compelling answer that ticks all three dimensions is an open question whose answer naturally must await the actual analysis. But it is fair to say that I am positively predisposed to FPR. I regard it as the most promising way of achieving these desiderata, with the focus on fairness yielding what seems like attractive answers on (a) and (c) in particular.

However, it is clear that the three objections mentioned above raise serious doubts about FPR. This holds in particular for the irrelevance and false equivalence objections.[1] What FPR gets right is no doubt that crime violates the social contract. Yet the general compliance argument is not a convincing answer to these worries, and the coherence of a mixed view such as the one recently espoused by Dagger (2008) is in doubt. I currently believe that the best way forward is to rethink the very role of fairness of the theory. The thing that critics and advocates alike

1   The unequal playing field objection does raise significant worries about FPR too, but as it concerns the viability of the theory "only" under non-ideal circumstances it is less fundamental

have overlooked is that people might fare better than others *simply by making others fare worse.* Fairness is an essentially comparative notion. In Temkin's classic phrasing, commitment to fairness (or equality, in his wording) is to hold that "it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own" (Temkin 2003: 767). A lawbreaker no doubt often leaves her victims worse off through no fault of their own. It also stands to reason that the intuitively worst crimes – acts of physical or sexual violence, for example – leave the victims the worst off. One could thus say that while the violent criminal has not necessarily benefitted in an absolute sense from her crime, she most definitely stands in a relation of *unfair advantage* to her victims who are now faring much worse. The upshot seems to be that fairness can provide reasons to punish that are similar to compensatory or corrective justice. Punishment is simply the most natural way to restore basic fairness between persons, and the reason why the worst crimes merit the most severe penalties is that their victims are made the worst off.

This account is sketchy and raises several questions. First, we might wonder if it strays too far from the notion of free riding as an instance of unfair play. Second, like all comparative accounts it is susceptible to leveling down and that might seem a problem (see e.g. Knight 2009). I believe, however, that punishment is the best example of a situation where we *can* accept leveling down as appropriate. Third, it seems to offer counterintuitive results when it comes to victimless crimes such as tax evasion and cases of deadly violence (in the latter case we might feel that the victim simply ceases to exist and cannot be said to be "worse off" than others). Still, I believe that a distinctive and attractive account on FPR potentially could be constructed by mining the impressive general literature on egalitarianism and fairness. If not, and if no other account can offer compelling answers to the irrelevance and false equivalence questions, the project will simply argue against FPR

– a result as instructive and worthwhile as its opposite. Only time will tell which way the argument goes.

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Who are the lobbyists?
A population study of interest groups in Sweden

Daniel Naurin & Frida Boräng

Purpose and aims

The purpose of this project is to define and study the population of organised interests in Swedish national politics.[1] Organised interests constitute a dilemma in democratic systems of governance. On the one hand, it is a fundamental democratic right for any group of citizens to organise and petition the government. Only authoritarian regimes would put a ban on lobbying. Furthermore, governments are dependent on input from that society which they are set to regulate, both for the quality and the legitimacy of their policy. On the other hand, a central finding in interest group research is that interest group populations tend to be biased (Schattschneider 1960, Olsen 1965). Some groups have better opportunities than others to mobilise resources to pursue their case, thus distorting the democratic principle of equal effective participation (Dahl 1989). Schattschneider concluded, in critique of defenders of a pluralist "laissez-faire" interest group system, that "the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (Schattschneider 1960:35).

Sweden, along with many other European countries, for a long time had a system of corporatism structuring the relations between organised interests and the state. Corporatism may partly offset the pluralist mobilisation of bias, described by Schattschneider and Olsen, but may on the other hand create new biases. In a corporatist system the state/government selects which interest groups to consult with, and gives privileged access to these in return for legitimacy and grass-root control (Schmitter 1979, Öberg 1994). Corporatist institutions have often included representatives from competing camps (such as employers and employees), but the government may also choose to give privileged access to ideologically close groups – which may or may not have the ability to mobilise strong resources on their own – and shut the door for other groups whose policies or ideologies contrast with the government's. The type of bias produced by corporatist systems thus partly depends on the preferences of the government.

Studies of interest group populations give information on which type of bias – if any – that exists in which voices that are heard by the government between elections. To analyse this crucial democratic issue we propose to conduct the first bottom-up census of active interest groups in Sweden. The project will use a combined top-down and bottom-up research strategy, and include variation in both space (different policy areas, different political systems) and time (before and after the decline of corporatism). We will make comparisons along several lines. First, we will compare the population of organised interests that are invited to give their input

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[1] We use the terms interest groups, organised interests and (somewhat carelessly) lobbyists/lobby groups interchangeably, referring to non-governmental organisations that act with the purpose of influencing public policy (cf., for instance, Baumgartner and Leech 1998, Naurin 2001).

Daniel Naurin och Frida Boräng är verksamma vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet.
E-post: daniel.naurin@pol.gu.se, frida.borang@pol.gu.se

to the political decision-making (top-down) with the population of organised interests that seek to influence political decision-making (bottom-up). Second, we will compare interest group populations between different policy areas. It is well known that corporatist institutions have been stronger in some policy areas (labor market policy, social policy, agricultural policy) than in others (environmental policy, foreign policy, judicial policy) (Hermansson 1993). Third, we will study the development over time in the population and behaviour of interest groups. Whereas the "decline of corporatism" has been thoroughly studied, the question of the eventual "rise of pluralism" remains to be addressed. Forth, we are doing this in close collaboration with similar population studies in Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK, thus making system level comparisons possible. Moreover, an important output from the project will be a published dataset of the population of organized interests in Sweden that will be highly valuable for future interest group research.

Survey of the field

The 1990s saw a strong interest among Swedish political scientists in studying the development of de-corporativisation of Swedish politics (Hermansson et al. 1999, Johansson 2000, Rothstein & Bergström 1999, SOU 1990:44). The old corporatist institutions were crumbling and a sharp increase in lobby organisations was found, indicating a shift towards more pluralist relations. A government commission on the state of democracy in Sweden noted that the previous corporatist system had been "undemocratic" (SOU 2000:1). Predictions of the character of the state-society relations that would replace the corporatist system were common. Some observers were more prone to emphasise the risk for pluralist bias (Hermansson et al. 1999) while others underlined the chance for less of corporatist bias (SOU 1990:44) – in practice,

two sides of the same coin. Similar developments have been observed in the other Scandinavian countries (Christiansen et al. 2010).

But what actually came after corporatism has been less well studied. A recent summary of the research field in Scandinavia, clearly documenting the decline of corporatism, concluded that:

> Finally, in line with the interest group perspective one may ask how strong organized interests have reacted to the decline in preparation corporatism and the privileged positions they enjoyed in the 1970s and before. Have they devised new lobbying strategies (cf. Binderkrantz 2005; Rommetvedt 2000)? Are new types of interaction between government, parliament and interest organizations evolving (cf. Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999)? Is pluralism supplanting corporatism (cf. Rommetvedt 2005; Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003)? And what are the consequences of the decline in preparation corporatism for the equality of interest group representation and the legitimacy of interest group representation in the democratic process? Is the interest group system in Scandinavia becoming a flawed pluralist heaven in which ''the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent'' (Schattschneider 1960, p. 35)? (Christiansen et al. 2010:37)

Our project is a response to this call for more studies of how the interest group system works twenty years after de-corporativisation in Sweden was first acknowledged. With what accent does the chorus sing today?

We will also connect to another theme in contemporary research on interest groups, namely population research. An early and influential study of interest group populations is that of Gray and Lowery, building on data from a large number of American states (Lowery and Gray 1995, Gray and Lowery 1996). Apart from the issue of mobilisation of bias, one of the dependent variables in this research theme is the density of the interest system, i.e. how heavily populated with organised interests a particular political system or policy area is (Messer et al. 2010, Gray and Lowery 1996). Other recent studies

of interest group populations include Berkhout et al. (2010a, 2010b), Halpin and Jordan (2009), and Poppelaars (2009).

One important finding here is that the higher the density of the population, the more interest groups tend to specialise. A fundamental aspect of any organisation's political strategy concerns issue prioritisation. Interest groups are confronted with a large number of potential issues in which they can invest resources. For long, a common expectation from the (in particular American) interest group research was that interest groups generally tend to specialise, that is being involved in a relatively narrow issue agenda ("niche-seeking") (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). More recently, scholars have begun to address the existing variation in issue specialisation in order to identify factors that affect degrees of niche-seeking. Such factors include both individual organisational characteristics, such as resources (larger staff numbers imply a more generalised engagement) and group type (citizen groups and groups where members can influence the agenda to a larger degree tend to engage more broadly), but also contextual and institutional factors. For example, according to Halpin and Bindekrantz, interest groups with a privileged position (as in a corporatist institution) can be expected to be more generalist in the policy issues they choose (Halpin and Bindekrantz 2011).

Just as the level of bias in the interest group population is of fundamental democratic importance, so is the degree to which interest groups behave in a niche-seeking manner. In this respect, Sweden has previously been described as an anomaly in the international interest group research, having unprecedentedly generalist interest organisations (Olsen 1982). The fact that the large centralised Swedish organisations during the hay-days of corporatism were involved in a broad variety of policy areas, representing large parts of society, contributed to their tendency to take responsibility for broader cross-cutting public interests. Specialisation and

niche-seeking may have detrimental effects both from a pluralist competitive perspective, and from a more deliberative democratic perspective. With reference to the first, Halpin and Bindekrantz conclude that:

> A well-populated and diverse system of organized interests is deemed important to ensure that public policy is made in an inclusive manner (Schlozman 2009). It follows, therefore, that group specialization – sticking to narrow policy areas and avoiding conflict – is likely to undermine the pluralistic competition that scholars see as crucial to the democratic contribution of groups. Moreover, the existence of generalists is viewed as important in linking policy communities (Browne 1990). (Halpin and Binderkrantz 2011:201)

A forthcoming research project, supported by Vetenskapsrådet 2010, contains the second perspective (Öberg and Svensson 2010). Interest organisations may contribute to democratic deliberation by bringing ideas, arguments and perspectives to the public debate. However, in order to contribute to public deliberation a sense of general responsibility for public interests is important. Narrowly focused special interests may lack arguments that speak to others, and will therefore not contribute in the same way to deliberation.

In sum, an important question is to what extent de-corporativisation has led to more of specialisation and niche-seeking. If the Swedish interest group population displays a high degree of density, this is potentially both good and bad news for democracy. Good, since an increase in the population of interest groups implies that more voices are heard. Bad, since these voices are likely to be less valuable from a public deliberation point of view.

Project description

Following the discussion so far, the project addresses four general research questions:
- *What does the Swedish interest group population look like today (2011)?* Who are the lobbyists, i.e. how many interest

groups are active, and what characterises those groups that are active? The crucial characteristics addressed, relating to the issue of bias, are types of interest being represented (business, social group interests, ideas and values) and access to resources (financial and membership). Furthermore, to what extent do the groups display a niche-seeking behaviour in their choice of policy issues?

- *How does that compare with the days of corporatism?* A different type of bias? More of upper-class accent? More of niche-seeking among the organisations?
- *How does it vary between different policy areas?*
- *How does Sweden compare to other European countries?*

The data collection proceeds in two steps; identifying and characterising the organised interests that are active in Swedish national politics. We will collect data at two points in time, before and after the decline of corporatism – 1977 and 2011. The years are chosen to control for the electoral cycle, both being the-year-after a general election.

IDENTIFYING ACTIVE ORGANISED INTERESTS
In the first step, we identify the population of organised interests and the degree of specialisation.

In contrast to studies of corporatism we are interested in all interest groups that try to influence policy-making, not only the privileged ones. Therefore, our most important data collection uses a bottom-up approach, in that the interest groups themselves signal their existence by being active. Our measure of activity is that there is at least one incoming letter in the public government archives during the time period studied. In Sweden all incoming mail to the government ministries is made public.

This indication of activity is chosen to make the population as inclusive as possible, while still limiting it to groups that are actively trying to influence the government.

Obviously, sending letters is not the only way to lobby the government, and direct (formal or informal) contacts are likely to be more important in terms of influence (Dur 2008). However, this is not a study of influence (which is very difficult to measure) *per se* but of presence (which is a prerequisite for influence), and it is very unlikely that groups that are active informally do not also leave traces in the form of documents in the government archives. The most confrontational activist groups that have no interest in contacting the Government directly will be missed. However, many groups – probably most of the groups active on national level – that use activist methods, such as protest or civil disobedience, usually combine these methods with more conventional channels for contact with politicians.

Writing letters to the Government Offices is arguably the strategy with the lowest threshold, why studying incoming letters should give the most inclusive list of groups. The senders that fit our definition of organised interests (excluding, for example, communications from individuals, public authorities and local government authorities) will be included in our population.

Complementing this bottom-up census we also use a top-down approach, based on the proposals referred for consideration by the government (*remisser*). The government archive includes lists of institutions and organisations (*remissförteckning*) that the government has selected as "interested parties", which have been approached and asked for their views on particular policy issues. The sample of organisations that are included in the referrals will be more inclusive than what is normally referred to as the privileged interests in a corporatist context, but that nevertheless represents the government's view (the "view from above") of what constitutes the relevant population of interest groups for various political issues. The combination of a top-down and a bottom-up approach will make it possible to compare directly the

population of interest groups that in the government's view is relevant for the issue at hand, with the population of interest groups that in fact wish to make themselves heard on the matter.

For both the bottom-up and the top-down samples, we will also register how many times each organisation send a letter/is consulted during the selected time period, which types of political issues it comments on/is invited to comment on, as well as the responsible ministry for the issue at hand. The breadth of engagement – in how many different policy areas do one lobby – will be our measure of specialisation.

We will collect data for 2011 and 1977, i.e. before and after de-corporativisation. Both years are the-year-after elections, which controls for the electoral cycle. The data collection described so far is fairly straightforward for the year 2011. Today all communications (letters as well as e-mails) are stored electronically, which makes it possible to narrow the search among the incoming communications to the category "organisations and companies" (thus excluding the categories "individuals" and "other authorities"). We have conducted a search for 2010, which yielded 4142 incoming letters to all the government ministries. When the project starts we will do a similar search for 2011, and study all these communications to define the population as described above. It is possible that we will be able to program a code (for example in the software program Python) to do some (or all) of the categorisation automatically, but in the present budget we plan for the event that we will have to code the lists manually.

The period before the decline of corporatism is methodologically more challenging. The incoming letters for 1977 are stored at the National Archives (*Riksarkivet*) in paper form only, and there is no way to neatly separate organisations and companies from other senders. Moreover, both incoming and outgoing letters are stored together, which further increases the number of letters that need

to be searched. Again, we have made a preliminary search in the archives for the year 1978. Incoming and outgoing letters, from all sorts of senders, together amount to roughly 45000. To go through all these letters would be too comprehensive a task for the project.

Instead, we will focus on a few, strategically selected, ministries. We will choose ministries that have a similar counterpart in 2011 to make possible comparisons over time. We also want the chosen ministries to differ in the extent to which their issues according to previous research have been handled within corporatist structures. A preliminary selection of ministries include the Ministry of Employment, the Ministry of Agriculture (today the Ministry for Rural Affairs), the Ministry of Industry (today the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), the Ministries of Budget and of Economic Affairs (today the Ministry of Finance) and the Ministry of Justice. Of these, the first three handle issues that traditionally have a high degree of corporatist involvement, whereas the remaining ministries, while being powerful and important ministries, never had as much corporatist arrangements around its issues of responsibility.

In the 1970:s, for each year, a register has been set up by the ministry where senders are listed in alphabetic order (*ingivareregister*). For several of the ministries, the registers also contain a short description of the matter at hand. For our selected ministries, we will use these registers, and when necessary, the actual letters, to obtain the same information as for 2011. For each ministry, we will thus have information about approximately 4000 letters (according to estimation from staff at the National Archives). This is still a lot of information to handle, but it will be fairly easy to, as a first step, exclude outgoing letters (around 50 percent of all the letters, according to estimations) and letters from individuals or other authorities (the majority of the remaining letters), which leaves us with a much smaller number to handle.

CHARACTERISING THE ORGANISED INTERESTS FOUND

The second step in our data collection concerns characterising the interest organisations in the population. Two characteristics are especially important when assessing the degree of bias; the types of interests represented and the resources mobilised. We distinguish between four types of interest groups: companies, business organizations (for example employers' federations and trade associations), interest organizations with individual membership (such as trade unions and pensioner's groups) and idea-based groups (such as environmental groups and religious groups). Two types of resources are commonly mentioned as the most important in interest group research; financial resources that are spent on lobbying, and membership resources in the form of number of individual members (Dur 2008, Baumgartner et al 2009).

To obtain information on these variables, we will have to use different sources of information. For joint-stock companies we can obtain annual reports from the Swedish Companies Registration Office (*Bolagsverket*). From the Swedish Tax Agency (*Skatteverket*) we will obtain information about whether a group has any employees at all, and, if so, the annual amount of payroll tax paid by the organisation, which gives us an estimate of resources spent on employees. For organisations other than individual companies, this will be our estimate of financial resources. To get information about for example membership, we will first survey web-pages. If none of the above sources gives us the information we need, we will contact the organisations directly. If an organisation or a company no longer exists, we will see if a contact person can be identified from the letter sent to the government, and, if so, try to get in touch with that person. If that strategy fails, we will search for information in the National Archival Database (NAD). NAD assembles information from a large number of archives, among them archives over popular movements (*Folkrörelsearkivet*). There is still a risk that we end up with missing data for some of the organisations in 1977 (namely those that do no longer exist *and* can not be found in the archives *and* where it is impossible to find a contact person), but this is likely to be a small part of the population.

It should also be noted that although our characterisation of interest groups in this project is limited to these distinctions, there is every possibility to make more nuanced descriptions in future projects. In the published database, each organisation will be identified by its name, so it will be easy to keep collecting information and add variables of interest.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

In order to address the fourth research question listed above – to compare our findings of the Swedish interest group population with other political systems – we will collaborate with researchers conducting population studies in various national contexts. Our research network includes Rasmussen (studying the Netherlands and the UK), Halpin (Scotland), Poppelaars (Netherlands), Beyers (Belgium) and Bindekrantz (Denmark). All these projects have partly different profiles and research strategies. The types of registers and data that are accessible differ between the countries, which means that some use top-down and other bottom-up approaches when collecting the data. However, all projects broadly have the same aim of assembling a population of interest groups. All researchers involved in these projects also appreciate the need to make research on interest groups more comparable across political systems, and coordination of research strategies in order to facilitate comparisons between countries are discussed within the network.

Significance

The project will be an important contribution

both to the international research field on interest group populations, and for our understanding of Swedish democracy. We know that corporatism has been in decline – in Sweden as in other countries – but not what has replaced it. We know that the number of lobbyists has increased, but we lack a systematic overview of who these groups really are and what type of bias we have now compared to before. The project contains the first bottom-up census of interest groups in Sweden, and the first systematic comparison of interest group populations over time and – in cooperation with the international research team – across countries.

Apart from the significance of the research questions addressed the population data that this project assembles will be of tremendous value for future research. Research on interest groups has traditionally been dominated by case studies, with a few exceptions (Hermansson et al 1999, Baumgartner et al 2009). Our database may be used for large-N studies based on random samples of groups, which will dramatically increase the possibilities for drawing general conclusions on issues such as lobbying strategies and tactics, networking, argumentation and lobbying success. We will make the data publicly available after the project is finished, and we also plan to continue to work with the data in the future.

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Democratic representation through the eyes of parliamentarians

Elin Naurin

Introduction and purpose

Representative democracy is dependent on the idea that politicians are willing and able to fulfill the promises about policy change that they are elected to carry out. However, citizens in democratic states strikingly often refer to their political representatives as being untrustworthy. The image of the promise-breaking politician is common in all states where questions about election promises have been asked in national surveys. For example, in the latest Swedish National Election Study from the election 2010, as many as 66 percent of the respondents agreed with the harsh statement that "one can never trust any of the political parties to keep their promises" (Naurin 2011). Interestingly however, scholars in political science show that this negative expectation on parties' willingness to fulfill election promises is exaggerated. When election manifestos are compared to what actual actions parties take, the opposite image emerges. In fact, scholars draw the conclusion that parties fulfill much more promises than the conventional wisdom leads us to expect (Thomson, Royed & Naurin 2011; Naurin 2011; Thomson 2001; Royed 1996).

Research on this "Pledge Puzzle" between scholars' and citizens' views on election promises shows that citizens and scholars do not talk about the same thing when they evaluate election promises. While scholars use parties' pre-election programs to identify election promises, citizens seem to find election promises in any situation where interaction with politicians is at hand. Furthermore,

scholars evaluate parties' actions, while citizens put emphasis on their own personal situation when they judge election promises. If the individual herself/himself does not feel a difference, the promise is not defined as fulfilled (Naurin 2011).

Since both theories of, and actual, democratic representation gives crucial weight to citizens' perceptions of politics, this difference in definitions needs to be taken seriously. It leaves us with the important question of where in the process of representation politicians' responsibility actually ends. The empirical research on parties' election promises give us one normative standpoint: fulfilled election promise is something that is clearly stated by the political party before election and thereafter followed up by relevant political action. But, we get other normative standpoints from the citizenry.

The aim with the project *Representation through the eyes of parliamentarians* is to contribute to the theoretical question of when politicians' responsibility actually ends by enlarging our empirical knowledge about how fulfilled election promises are defined by the individual representatives themselves. It is a striking fact that the so called election pledge research has not discussed definitions of election promises and fulfilled election promises with the actors who are actually giving the promises that are under investigation. We know far too little about how fulfilled election promises, and thereby political accountability in a more general sense, are defined in the eyes of the representatives.

Fil. dr Elin Naurin är projektledare för forskargruppen Multidisciplinär forskning om opinion och demokrati (MOD), Göteborgs universitet och lektor vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet.
E-post: elin.naurin@pol.gu.se

Why is it important to investigate representatives' views on election promises?

Election promises have important roles in most debates of democratic representation. The importance of investigating representatives' views on election promises can be described in both theoretical, normative and practical terms. The theoretical importance comes from the fact that election promises are given important roles in the relationship between citizens and representatives in commonly used theoretical models of representative democracy. Election promises specify parties' intentions for the future, they guide parties' actions between elections, and they serve as benchmarks at the end of the election period in the evaluations of how well parties are able to implement their decisions.1

The difference between citizens' and scholars' definitions of election promise suggests that when these theoretical demands are empirically investigated, one can come to completely different conclusions. This indicates that notions like mandates and political accountability are differently defined in real life representation than they are in commonly used theoretical models. As scholars, we tend to agree that a good theory is also a useful theory in the sense that it is comparable to real life. A difference in definitions of fulfilled election promises between scholars and the actors of representative democracy should therefore be seen as an interesting critic of the theoretical models.

1   Put simply, the literature can be divided into theories of the mandate and theories of accountability. For literature focusing on mandates, see APSA 1950; Ranney 1954; Ranney 1975; Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge 1994; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Pierce 1999; Budge et al 2001 and all the pledge studies that are described in the text. A focus on democratic accountability is found in Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Manin 1997; Przeworski, Stokes & Manin 1999. An interesting summary and interpretation of the relationship between mandates and accountability is found for ex. in Stokes 2001: Chapter 6; see also Erikson, Mackuen & Stimson 2002.

The practical importance comes from the fact that election promises are central in actual political representation. Empirical evaluations of the fulfilment of election promises performed systematically by the so called Comparative Party Pledges Group (CPPG) show that election promises have an important role in democratic states. These scholars conclude that both the workings of parliament and the efficiency of government is effected by what promises parties make before election (see for example Thomson, Royed & Naurin 2011; Artes 2011; Artés & Bustos 2008; Mansergh & Thomson 2007; Thomson 2001; Royed 1996). Research also indicates that media give attention to election promises when they report on election campaigns (Krukones 1984; Costello & Thomson 2008). The Pulitzer Prize winning web site Politifact.com is one clear such example. Their "Obameter" lists president Barak Obama's election promises and investigates them one by one as the election period is progressing. Interestingly, there is research that indicates a disagreement between scholars' descriptions of how parties act and the individual representatives own descriptions of election promises. For example, politicians tend to accuse each other for breaking election promise. A study of Swedish political communication shows that the most used invective in political debates among parties in televised media during the 2000th century was that other parties are not trustworthy and do not honour their words (Esaiasson & Håkansson 2002; see also Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1995; Lau & Pomper 2004). It is also interesting that as many as 81 percent of the Swedish MPs in the Riksdag Survey of 1996 answered that "Excessive promises from politicians" were "very important" or "some what important" as a factor that has had "a negative impact on voter trust in politicians and parties during the last 15 – 20 years". These investigations indicate that politicians themselves might have a role in creating the image of the promise- breaking politician. All in all, election promises and fulfilled election promises

are notions of importance in public debates, making investigations of what is actually meant by the same highly relevant.

The normative arguments for why we should investigate the definitions of election promises used by representatives have to do with scholars' responsibility to facilitate communication between citizens and representatives. Undoubtedly, voters face a difficult task on Election Day if they want to find out what has been done and what will be done by their political representatives. One important normative argument for investigating what representatives mean with election promises is therefore that political scientists should communicate the information that actually exists (i.e. what promises do politicians themselves perceive that they give?) so that citizens' votes stand the best chance of being as rational and efficient as possible. Inspiration comes from American political scientist Richard Fenno who expresses commonsensical ambitions to have people (including himself) understand how politicians work and think. One of his points is the importance of filling up the "knowledge gap" among citizens. If people do not know how politics works, it is difficult to improve the relationship between citizens and representatives, Fenno says (Fenno 1990:2).

In sum, election promises have a potential to facilitate the communication between citizens and representatives. However, to be able to push forward election promises as tools that can help citizens and representatives to a more comprehensible representative process, it is important to find out how the notion is interpreted by both actors.

Specific research questions and research design

The project studies three more specific questions: 1. What definitions of election promises and fulfilled election promises are found within the group of representatives? 2. What are the normative and practical arguments

behind the definitions of election promises and fulfilled election promises among representatives? 3. What are the main differences between representatives', citizens' and scholars' views of politicians' fulfillment of election promises?

To answer these questions, the project has access to, and gathers, both quantitative and qualitative data. The generosity of data comes from the fact that election pledge research has been an integrated part of the Swedish National Election Study Program for more than a decade now. Also, the newly initiated research network Multidisciplinary Opinion and Democracy Research (MOD) group at the University of Gothenburg presents great opportunities for innovative data collections through their Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORe). In this way, I have been able to add new survey questions about election promises in several of the latest surveys to politicians and citizens that are performed at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Thanks to these newly asked survey questions, Sweden is without question the most interesting case to dig deeper into when it comes to the views that representatives have of election promises.

The project collaborates with scholars in the research network "the Comparative Party Pledge Group" (CPPG). In CPPG, scholars from different countries compare election promises that are found in election manifestos to parties' actual actions (see for ex. Thomson, Royed & Naurin 2011; 2010; Naurin 2009; 2011; Artés 2011; Artés & Bustos 2008; Costello & Thomson 2008; Mansergh & Thomson 2007; Thomson 2001; Royed 1996).

SOURCES OF DATA

The following sources of data are used in the project:

The Comparative Candidates Survey 2010 turning to all Swedish MP Candidates (a total of 4000). In this survey the candidates are asked to react to the same statement as citizens are in earlier SOM surveys ("Swedish

parties usually keep their election promises", compare Naurin 2011). This question helps us to get estimates of degrees of criticism, and enables us to perform multivariate analyses of explanations of different opinions. However, the most interesting information in the Candidate Survey comes from an innovative survey question where the candidates are asked to judge actual election pledges for fulfillment. Seven promises are chosen from the manifesto of Alliansen in 2006 and the candidates are asked to state whether or not the promises are fully fulfilled, partially fulfilled or broken. The same question is asked to all Swedes in the Swedish National Election Study (SNES) of 2010. The promises have been evaluated for fulfillment by me and my colleagues Henrik Oscarsson and Nicklas Håkansson in the project "Att hålla ord" (financed by the Swedish Research Council). All in all, there are unique possibilities to compare actual definitions of fulfillment between scholars, politicians and voters thanks to this question. The first analyses of these questions are presented at the Midwestern Political Science Association in April 2012 (Naurin & Öhberg 2012).

The Riksdag Survey 2010, turning to all Swedish MPs. In this survey, the harsh statement presented in the beginning of this text is asked also to the representatives, i.e. "One can never trust any of the political parties to keep their promises". Also this question opens up for comparisons between representatives and citizens since it is asked also in the SNES 2010. It helps us to get estimates of degrees of criticism, and enables us to perform multivariate analyses of explanations of different opinions.

Dataset on Swedish parties' fulfillment of election promise. During the last three years, the project "Att hålla ord" financed by the Swedish Research Council has gathered data on Swedish parties' giving and fulfillment of election promises for the purpose of including the case of Sweden in international comparison. The dataset contains all promises given in Swedish parliamentary parties' election manifestos between 1991 and 2010, as well as data on fulfillment of promises during four governments. During 2012, the Swedish data will be included in a large dataset with as many as ten other countries and presented in a comparative publication (Naurin, Royed & Thomson ed. forthcoming 2013).

Transcripts of already gathered interviews with 55 Swedish representatives and officials of government and parliament. The original purpose of these interviews was to gather information on how the Social Democrats had acted to fulfill their election promises during the period 1998-2002 (Naurin 2009). The original project searched for information from sources with different tendencies to lift forward positive vs negative information, and therefore interviewed both Social Democrats and Conservatives. The material includes elaborated discussions that enable me to analyze normative arguments that are used when defining promises as fulfilled or not.

In-depth research interviews with all party secretaries and group leaders for the parliamentary parties during the election period 2010 to 2014. The interviews described above (that were gathered for Naurin 2009) are combined with in-depth research interviews with all party secretaries and group leaders for the parliamentary parties during the election period 2010 to 2014. The field period for these interviews occurs when this is written (between December 2011-February 2012). These research interviews are hoped to shed light on both what normative definitions the representatives have of election promises and fulfilled election promises, and on what main practical obstacles that face someone who try to give or fulfill an election promise.

There is a large literature on the practical obstacles decision makers face when they create policy. Political parties in parliament or government do not have all the power to themselves. Democratic systems are instead designed to balance different sources of power against each other so that none of them can rule completely independent of the others.

Governing parties therefore share their power with other parties (in coalition governments and/or with the opposition in the parliament) and with other institutions (a president, a second chamber, a constitutional court, administrations, international organisations and nations-state cooperations). Furthermore, individual actors (street level bureaucrats, lobbyists) and force majeure (earthquakes, hurricanes, terrorism, economic recessions) have the power to alter policies. In the literature on political decision making processes, some of these obstacles to decision making are referred to as veto players or veto points, indicating that there are players (actors, institutions and sometimes events) that can stop or delay the decision making process (Tsebelis 2002; see also for example Royed 1996:47-49).

Other more country specific examples of practical obstacles that are relevant to discuss in the interviews with Swedish MPs are: our frequent minority governments, the force of EU legislation, the delegation of power to strong local municipalities, and changing relationships between the individual representative and the political party now that the rules for personal votes have been changed in the constitution.

Regarding the normative arguments behind the definition of election promises and fulfilled election promises, the project takes as its point of departure citizens' views. In my book Election Promises, Party Behaviour and Voter Perceptions (Palgrave Macmillan 2011), I investigate how citizens define the notions of broken and fulfilled election promises. The conclusion is that citizens do not define mandates and accountability in the same way as scholars do. Instead, I find a broader approach to mandates and accountability among citizens.

I draw several conclusions that are important in a comparison with representatives' views. Firstly, it is suggested that there is a story, or a narrative, about the promise-breaking politician that needs to be taken into consideration when citizens' criticism is to be explained. It is obvious that all rejections of election promises are not based on actual evaluations of politicians "said" and "done". It seems like it is a demanding task to make evaluations of parties' intentions and actions. The narrative is used as a shortcut when citizens form their judgment of election promises. It seems as though the image of politicians as promise-breakers prevents people from making actual comparisons, even when they have the capacity to do so. As I see it, the tough tone in political debates (Esaiasson & Håkansson 2002) indicates that politicians are a part of this narrative.

Secondly, in my discussions with citizens, the notion of election promises does not have to represent specific statements made by specified senders in exact situations in the way that they do in scholars' evaluations. Instead, unspoken promises, where citizens assume what has been promised, are also important when politicians' abilities to fulfill election promises are dismissed. I therefore claim that the notion of election promise can be used to denote a broader kind of responsibility of the representatives. Common visions or goals of society can also be defined as election promises. In these evaluations, the respondents base their judgment on what they expect representatives to promise rather than on exact formulations actually uttered by the representatives. What should have been promised has an important role in this way of arguing. These expectations are high and come either from the respondents' normative reasoning about the responsibility of representatives or from what I call the respondents own "policy wishes". In the same way that representatives sometimes base their perceptions of the will of the people on their own wishful thinking about what citizens want rather than on actual dialogue, citizens can obviously use similar wishful thinking when they decide what parties actually promise.

"The done" is also widely defined in these comparisons. The respondents describe how they look around and see that society is not

as good as it ought to be, and draw the conclusion that promises must have been broken. In this way, it seems that, when they accept being a representative, politicians somehow also accept carrying the unrealized wishes and hopes for all society, and that these unrealized wishes and hopes can be summarized under the expression "broken election promises" when citizens give words to them.

Thirdly, citizens are also found to make comparisons that follow the same logic as scholars' comparisons follow. Even though there is a narrative of the promise-breaking politician, and even though unspoken promises have a role in citizens' views of election promises, I also find clearly specified comparisons of politicians' said and done in citizens' definitions. In these comparisons, both the sender of the promise and the situation in which it is given are specified. However, the respondents refer to considerably more senders than scholars do, and they find election promises in completely other situations than scholars do. Scholars' focus on written pre-election messages made by the whole party should therefore be compared to citizens' definitions of election promises as something that can also be given by individual party spokesmen in situations that have little to do with elections.

Fourthly, citizens generally emphasize the outcome of politics when they evaluate election promises. It is obvious that scholars' focus on action is narrow in citizens' perceptions. However, it is interesting to note that the importance of reaching all the way down to the individual is motivated both by normative and practical arguments in the interviews. The normative arguments focus on the representative process as something that is incomplete unless citizens feel the effect of decisions. The practical reasoning focuses on the fact that the only thing citizens are experts on is the immediate state of things around themselves. When they make enlightened evaluations of parties' election promises, citizens use the information found closest to

them. In this way, the practical reasoning that scholars use when they focus on action and easily calculated output can be compared to citizens' practical arguments about why they use outcome as source of information in their evaluation of election promises. To some extent, both use the information that they can most easily come across.

All in all, I see two tendencies in the data that give interesting clues about a possible citizen's views of representation that should compared to a possible understanding as expressed by the representatives. Firstly, the analyses indicate that citizens see democratic representation as a continuous process rather than as separate election periods linked together in a chain. Secondly, when my respondents describe broken election promises, the process of political representation reaches all the way down to the individual. Parties are held accountable for outcomes in individuals' personal situations rather than for specific actions. Both these tendencies can be put in contrast to the theories that are developed by scholars who are interested in the relationship between voters and elected. Those theories tend to be both election focused and focused on the first part of the policy process. Mandates are given and accountability is demanded in elections. Notions like "issue congruence" (Holmberg 1999; 1997) and "program-to-policy-linkage" (Thomson, Royed & Naurin 2011) illustrate that scholars stop high up the chain or representation when they evaluate how well democracy works (compare Winter 2003).

Summing up, we should be humble about the fact that it is not obvious how we decide if democracy has had its intended effects. In the project I here describe, I wish to take a straight forward approach to the task and I ask: What views on the "end" of politicians' responsibility are expressed within the group of representatives?

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Fairness in global trade – What is at stake?

Magnus Reitberger

Specific objectives

A tendency in contemporary global governance in general and the governance of international trade in particular is a deepening concern for *fairness*. That fairness matters in trade negotiations, and especially in the multilateral framework, is well-established in current research. This is the point of departure for this study. The more pressing research-question is how to make sense of claims about justice and fairness and what to think about them from a philosophical and normative point of view. Accusations about lack of fairness seem to frequently contradict each other. It is important to scrutinize the rational and moral basis for these claims. This project is a contribution towards that objective

In the *first* part of the project, *the concept of fairness* and its multitude of meanings in contemporary discourse are analyzed. What can it mean for trade to be fair? Fair to whom? What are the morally and philosophically relevant considerations we need to take into account when thinking about justice and fairness in trade? What is it that people (or states) are supposed to be fairly entitled to in the global trading economy, and why?

The *second* part is *normative,* seeking to develop the insights into what trade policies can be said to be fair or unfair, just or unjust. What policies and institutional designs would follow if we were more clear and rigorous about the meaning of justice and fairness in trade?

In the third part of the project consists of three case-studies that focus on fairness in trade: *agricultural subsidies*, the *rules of multilateral institutional trade-framework* (WTO), and *fair trade labeling.* These cases are chosen based on their controversy and because they constitute particularly difficult cases to think about in terms of fairness.

Overview – previous and current research

There has been an increasing interest among political scientists and some economists in recent years in the role played by justice and fairness in international negotiations. More broadly, an expanding body of empirical work indicates that states are influenced by fairness-considerations in their strategic interactions, contradicting traditional approaches to multilateral negotiations which emphasize the role of power and bargaining between self-interested parties. It is assumed that outcomes will reflect the relative distribution of power, on one hand, and the relative utility of reaching an agreement, on the other.

Cecilia Albin has persuasively argued that norms of fairness enable and shape negotiations on a wide assortment of issues, ranging from disarmament to trade-negotiations (Albin 2001). As pointed out by Albin, issues of fairness lie at the heart of a number of contemporary international policy areas such as climate change, environmental policy, economic integration, development and national self-determination (Albin 2001:2). Illuminating the role of fairness in multilateral policy-making is thus relevant to a broad range of issues in international politics. Great powers

Magnus Reitberger är verksam vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Stockholms universitet.
E-post: magnus.reitberger@statsvet.su.se

do, as a matter of empirical fact, adopt fairness considerations in international trade agreements, and in particular the norm that trade should work to the benefit of the poor. Fairness operates to *constrain* bargaining aimed at mutual advantage. Albin observes that "[e]conomic interests go a long way to explain the endorsement and influence of many conceptions of fairness in the Uruguay Round." Negotiators sought to emphasize norms and interpretations of norms that would serve their own interest, and this was reflected in the final agreements reached. (Albin 2001:138) However, in the early stages negotiators tended to emphasize narrow interests but as the process continued these interests were modified and expanded by notions of fairness and addressing and balancing the concerns of all parties involved (Albin 2001:228).

In economic game theory, experiments with so called Ultimatum Games indicate that adoption of fairness-considerations may be crucial to achieve and maintain cooperative schemes, modifying the explanatory power of traditional game theory and liberal institutionalism which tends to rely on iterated Prisoners' Dilemma as its basic model (Kapstein 2008:7) or variants of hegemonic stability theories. This indicates that co-operation is feasible without iteration or hegemonic dominance, and that dominance may not be sufficient to assure stability of agreements that have been reached if they are perceived to be unfair. Instead, perceived fairness may be a necessary attribute of robust co-operative systems (Ostrom 2006).

Indeed, the WTO Doha-round ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 demonstrates the salience of fairness-related issues. In previous negotiation-rounds positions had primarily been justified by reference to economic factors such as growth. The Uruguay-round, on the other hand, involved many more references to fairness in order to justify claims (Albin 2001:139). The current debate on fairness in the WTO seems to focus on the following issues:

- What should trade agreements regulate? Particularly controversial are regulation of investments and trade in direct investments and essential services. The TRIPS-agreement, WTO's agreement on intellectual property, is particularly controversial since it clashes with the public-goods-preferences for many countries, especially in the area of health care (cf Brown/Stern 2007).

- An exchange of goods must not involve one party receiving less than the "fair value" for the goods that they provide. Prices should not be exploitative or deny producers a fair standard of living. This appears to be a crucial factor for the "Fair Trade"-movement.

- It is frequently argued that traded goods must be produced under fair conditions, not involving slavery, (the worst forms of) child labor, severe environmental damage and so on. There is an effort by developed countries to enforce ILO labor standards as part of the WTO framework, while the developing countries strongly reject this idea as it would allow developed countries to impose barriers on goods in which the labor-abundant developing countries enjoy comparative advantage (Baldwin 2006:687).

- Should countries be permitted to protect their own industries when doing so might "harm" workers in other countries, and if so, under what circumstances? All states engage in extensive policies that strengthen the competitiveness of their industries by providing infrastructure, education, research etc, so the conflict is about what actually qualifies as "protection" and not.

Further complicating these issues is the difficulty of ascertaining what the impact of different trade policies actually are. For example, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton have proposed a "fairness constraint" on trade negotiations in the WTO: a larger share of

benefits should accrue to the poorer countries, and benefits can be measured by net gains as percentage of GDP (Charlton/Stiglitz 2005). Such constraints, however, make it impossible to say that a trade arrangement is fair unless we can assess the *results* of such trade in both the short and long perspective, which may be a difficult thing to do. The research on how trade interacts with growth and economic development, for example, suffers from many empirical and theoretical problems (cf Rodriguez/Rodrik 1999). Another example of this difficulty is the critique against agricultural subsidies by wealthy countries, such as the CAP in the European Union. Some argue that the net impact of agricultural subsidies is highly detrimental for developing states, constituting a major injustice inflicted by the wealthy on the poor (Pogge 2001, Anderson/Martin 2006). In contrast, others have argued that the impact of agricultural subsidies on world poverty is highly exaggerated (Tokarick 2003, Birdsall et al 2005).

In the field of political theory there is a rapidly growing literature on *global economic justice*, but trade itself as a phenomenon has received surprisingly little attention from political philosophers. Political theory has usually focused on distributive issues within societies viewed as more or less isolated from the surrounding world, with trade as a secondary concern at best. Only quite recently has principles of distributive justice been "extended" to the global arena. In this field there appears to be a stalemate between cosmopolitan-egalitarians who see "global interdependence" as sufficient to generate distributive effects that should be governed by global principles of justice (for versions of these arguments, see Beitz 1999, Pogge 2001, Caney 2005) and a range of views that may be labeled nationalist or institutionalist who see international trade as insufficient to warrant concerns for distributive justice, except in purely humanitarian terms (c.f. Rawls 1999 and Nagel 2005). The latter category of

theorists argue that justice only applies within a coercive institutional framework and that trade should be seen as voluntary "pure contracts" for mutual advantage, not triggering concerns for redistribution of the gains from co-operation. Hence they pay very little attention to trade fairness, presumably regarding it as a legal issue (or more charitably an issue of procedural fairness). Cosmopolitans like Beitz on the other hand seem to regard *all* trade, fair or not, as grounds for distributive justice as long as it affects the distribution of burdens and benefits. As a consequence these theories provide scarce guidance when it comes to institutional design and don't contribute much to our understanding of trade fairness as such (with only a few exceptions, c.f. Risse 2005 and Suranovic 1999). Even worse, were such views to be implemented as policy it might give an incentive to dramatically restrict trade. For others (cf Pogge 2001), unfair trade constitutes harmful behavior that violates negative duties not to harm the global poor and to compensate them for this harm. In this kind of argument fairness plays a more pivotal role but it is simplistically taken for granted that restrictions on trade constitute harm.

Fairness in global trade has also received surprisingly meager analysis by academic economists. Economists emphasize the link between trade and well-being, poverty reduction and (perhaps more controversially) growth while proclaiming the innocence of trade with regard to environmental, social and political problems (c.f. Bhagwati 2002). Such economists tend to be dismissive of fairness-claims in trade politics, seeing fairness-based policies as rationalization of selective protectionism that is harmful to global welfare. The study of trade and tariff policy by political economists has tended to focus heavily on special interest groups from a public-choice perspective. Accordingly, political economists often dismiss fairness-talk as neo-mercantilist thinking where the objective of states is to maximize net exports while keeping imports

in check (hence trade liberalization is thought of as "concessions") (Odell 2000). Fairness is also an elusive concept that is difficult to quantify and measure, hence often regarded as "unscientific" by economists, as opposed to concepts like efficiency and growth. Given the emerging research on the importance of fairness, this could be seen as a major shortcoming of international economic theory.

Project description

This project proceeds from the assumption that fairness in trade is a multidimensional and highly complex phenomenon that requires analysis at many different levels. Indeed, the very complexity of trade and its impact on individuals, society, global development and poverty perhaps helps explain why political theorists have paid so little attention to this phenomenon, preferring to remain in the domain of "ideal" theory by either pretending that states are isolated from each other except at the margins, or by using catch-all terms such as interdependence instead.

In the projects first part, a conceptual framework will be developed for making sense of the various claims of fairness in the contemporary debate. This step is necessary in order to clarify the various dilemmas and trade-offs that are necessary when thinking about what constitutes fair trade-practices. A draft for this framework is presented below.

In the second part, the project moves from conceptual analysis to normative theory. Instead of departing from a single normative framework such as liberal egalitarianism, the project will use a pluralistic, problem-oriented approach seeking to anchor its analysis in several different, reasonable normative perspectives. The method used will hence be *eclectic*, aiming for conclusions that can be normatively appealing to proponents of different theories of global justice. The important normative questions that will be discussed are:

- Do states have a right to regulate and restrict trade, and if there is such a right, what does it entail for just and fair trade practices?
- Is "market access" a moral obligation, and if so under what circumstances?
- What does it mean for an exchange to be fair? Can unfair and unjust circumstances arise from fair exchanges?
- Is there a "fair price" for a product?
- Are states (individuals) entitled to an equal opportunity to trade? If so, what should be done to enable states (individuals) to trade?

The relevant points of reference for addressing these questions are the theoretical literature on global justice and national self-determination, on one hand, and the empirical economic literature on the impacts of various trade-policies on the other. The primary aim is *to clarify what is at stake* from a moral point of view and to distinguish between strong and weak, poorly supported arguments in the fairness-debate, not necessarily to arrive at a definite solution to all fairness-problems in trade – due to the complexity of trade-related issues I don't believe that such general solutions can be found and that fairness must be considered contextually on a case-by-case basis.

This brings the project to the third part, where I apply the conceptual and normative framework in three case-studies, chosen because of their controversy and because of the frequent claims about fairness and unfairness made The case-studies will be based on critical engagement with frequently advanced claims and arguments about fairness in both the popular and the academic debates about the issues, as well as arguments advanced by various interest groups and NGO:s such as Oxfam and International Fair Trade Association as well as IGO:s such as the World Bank. These arguments will constitute the material for the studies. The method employed might be labeled "critical argumentation analysis".

The three cases will be:

- Agricultural subsidies and various forms of protection used by wealthy countries to reduce competition for domestic farmers, such as the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. What are the consequences of such protectionism, and how should these consequences be analyzed in terms of fairness?
- The rules of the multilateral trade-framework, the World Trade Organization. Focus will be on the most controversial aspects of the trade-rules, such as what constitutes "unfair" competition-practices by states and the struggle over regulations of child labor. Particular focus will be placed on the widespread claims that the framework is unfair to developing countries. Is this true and in that case what should be done to reform it?
- Fair-trade labeling of products and fair-price guarantees offered to producers provided they meet particular labor and production standards. In what sense are such systems fair? What are the impacts of fair-trade labeling and consumption in improving the fairness of trade?

Significance

There has been a lot of research into the role played by conceptions of fairness in the international trade and public policy literature, mainly because the concept is so common in trade debates – indeed, unavoidable. But strikingly, there are few discussions of what it *means* for trade to be fair in the literature, and little analysis of how different fairness-claims relate to each other. Given the salience of the idea that trade should be fair, this is a significant shortcoming of contemporary political theory and it also contributes to confusion about how trade fits into the more overarching concern for global justice.

The project is relevant both for the wider research area of global governance as such and the role that norms play in governance, and for the rapidly expanding normative/philosophical field of global justice. The project seeks to move beyond existing research by bridging a divide between political theory and the debate on global justice, on one hand, and the political-economic literature on trade liberalization and regulation, on the other. This divide creates a theoretical gap that causes trade fairness to be a very undertheorized and underexplored concept.

Membership in GATT/WTO is "voluntary" and decisions are made by mutual consent, usually respecting the consensus rule. Thus, if there is not a consensus about fairness of the rules and procedures of the trade regime, states will not willingly abide by them for long. Fairness must therefore be seen as integral to the functioning of the system as such. Although co-operation with the global trade regime is hardly as "voluntary" in reality as it is on paper, and although powerful states are certainly more influential and less forced to accept compromises than weak ones, it is likely that the co-operative nature of the global trade regime would collapse if the norms of fairness and reciprocity were continuously violated. Arguably, the lack of progress in the current round of trade negotiations is largely due to deep disagreements about fairness. There is a distinct possibility that the multilateral trade regime will be largely replaced by a complex set of regional and bilateral trade agreements due to the increasing difficulties in reaching multilateral consensus. This makes fairness an intriguing and important field of study.

Furthermore, many products that we today buy as consumers are labeled as "fair trade", but it is rarely explained what this label stands for, why buying such products is conducive to fairness and if so, fairness in what way. The project can help clarify and illuminate some of these issues.

Preliminary results

Here, I briefly sketch the preliminary outline

for the conceptual analysis-part of the project. In the debate about fairness in trade, I think that five different and only partly overlapping conceptions of fairness can be identified. These are:

- Fairness as impartiality – the norms and rules of trade should be applied in a neutral, non-biased way
- Fairness as reciprocity – partners in trade should reciprocate and treat each other as they are treated, and vice versa (e.g. tit-for tat or Golden Rule-reciprocity)
- Fairness as equity – partners in trade should benefit equally from trade
- Fairness as equal opportunity – trade should be a "level playing field" by removal of obstacles to pursue wealth, development etc.
- Fairness as priority – trade should be organized in such a way as to primarily benefit those in need.

These fairness-concerns can be analyzed at three different levels (cf. Kapstein 2004, 2007). The first focuses the impact of trade, investments and financial transactions on *domestic distributive justice*, the main concern being changes in income distribution and economic power within the political community. It is well-known that trade creates "winners" and "losers" in domestic society, and the crucial question from this perspective is how fair and just these changes are to the "losers" and how they can be protected and/or compensated. From this perspective, critics of trade liberalization often argue that it has contributed to increased wage-gaps. Furthermore, there is a concern that economic openness will undermine the ability of the state to protect and compensate the economically disadvantaged by "rolling back" the welfare-state. Crucial notions of fairness at the domestic level appear to be *fairness as equity* and *fairness as priority.*

The second level focuses on fairness in the *"society of states"* and the rules for governing the global order. This perspective is on one hand concerned with *procedural* fairness (or

fairness as impartiality) – are the rules of multilateral international trade and exchange fair and equally acceptable for all states? Also crucial is *fairness as equal opportunity* – is multilateral trade a "level playing field" or are the rules "rigged" in favor of some (powerful/wealthy) states? That member countries should refrain from "unfair" trading practices is an integral part of the GATT/WTO-process. A narrow interpretation of *fairness as impartiality* was adopted in articles I and III of the GATT in the form of non-discrimination (Most-Favored-Nation-status) and national treatment on a quid-pro-quo basis. Other examples of fairness-based rules are the anti-dumping rules in Article VI or Article XX allowing countries to make exceptions for prison labor, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. But there is also a concern for *fairness as equity* in the GATT/WTO, the idea that trade should promote economic development. This is most visible in allowances for preferential trade agreements, the so-called General System of Preferences. The "Enabling Clause" of 1979 permits preferential tariff and non-tariff treatment that allowed privileged market access for developing countries. Declarations during both the Uruguay- and the Doha-rounds have continually urged "special and differential" treatment for developing countries, especially the least developed ones, and developed countries are usually given extra time to conform to GATT/WTO-rules. However, it has frequently been pointed out that there are important biases in the trade barriers of developed countries against imports from developing countries, most obviously in the area of agriculture (Narlikar 2006).

The third level is *cosmopolitan-individualist* and focuses how the *well-being and human rights* of individuals are affected by the forces of economic globalization (in particular the most vulnerable individuals, i.e. the global poor). To the extent that patterns of trade and exchange foreseeably and avoidably engenders poverty and harms the

life-prospects of the poor, the policies and institutional arrangements that support such patterns must be regarded as unfair and unjust. From this development-perspective, it could be argued that a trade regime shouldn't harmonize national policies (as perhaps indicated by *fairness as impartiality*) but allow for national autonomy in order to allow flexible and diverse development strategies, as suggested by *fairness as priority*. This applies to the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity as well. Special provisions are needed to ensure food security and basic social services for the global poor, for example, and trade arrangements must be instrumental towards these objectives.

A difficult question here seems to be what fairness requires in terms of *enabling* countries to gain from trade, even when they currently are not doing so. This illustrates an important distinction between narrow conceptualizations of fairness and wider conceptualizations. On a narrow definition, fairness applies to those who participate in trade and the regulatory regimes themselves. On a wider definition, fairness is concerned with the conditions under which nations (and individuals) can gain from trade in the first place. In terms of the "level playing field"-metaphor, the narrow definition applies to *current* players whereas the wide definition applies to *potential* players as well, bringing them "into the game" in order to allow them to gain from trade on equitable terms.

A further dimension has to do with *procedural* fairness vs *outcome* fairness. In an ideal world, a fair procedure would result in fair outcomes. But equal and non-discriminatory treatment on the "playing field" may of course yield quite different outcomes for different players depending on their initial starting points – some may gain a lot while others may gain very little. In contrast to procedural fairness, outcome-based conceptualizations assume that regulations of trade are fair if they promote worthwhile objectives, in particular promoting economic development. In such cases, discriminatory policies may promote fairness.

These concerns yield a highly complex structure of fairness-concerns, in terms of i) what fairness *means*, ii) at what *level* fairness is applied and iii) whether fairness is thought of in *procedural/outcome-, wide- or narrow terms*. This complicated structure helps explain why genuine concerns about fairness in trade frequently clash, e.g. in the WTO-negotiations wealthier and more powerful states frequently use to term to signify impartiality at the state-level, in narrow, procedural terms. Developing countries, on the other hand, frequently advocate a notion of fairness that is based on equity, priority or equal opportunity, at both the state- and the cosmopolitan level, in wider, outcome-based terms. It is easy to see why such different conceptualizations of fairness can lead to drastically different policy-recommendations and rules.

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Party government in flux
Changing conditions for party groups in the Swedish Riksdag
Mats Sjölin

Purpose and Research Questions

Party groups are the main actors in the Swedish parliament (*Riksdag*). Numerous studies have confirmed that the importance and independence of parliamentary party groups, party leaderships and party leaders have increased, and that this has come at the expense of the parties' rank-and-file membership organisations (Sjölin 1993; Pierre & Widfeldt 1994; Hagevi & Jahn 1999; Isberg 1999; Hagevi 2000; Davidsson 2006; see also Katz & Mair 2002). As The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, among others, has observed, the increased importance of and changing circumstances for parliamentary party groups is occurring at a time when research about the Riksdag has declined. We would argue that the same can be said about research on Swedish political parties (Erlingsson & Brommesson 2010). Our project addresses both of these shortcomings by analysing the changing conditions for party groups in the Swedish Riksdag.

Leading party researchers argue that political parties are undergoing a dramatic transformation. Traditional mass parties with a strong membership base transform into vote-maximising catch-all parties, and these develop into cartel parties – i.e. professional administrators of state power (Katz & Mair 1995). The theory of cartel parties is composed of two interrelated hypotheses. The first is that, in effect, cartelisation makes party members superfluous (Pierre & Widfeldt 1994; Mair 1997; Katz 2001). The other is that the differences among political parties as regards the substance of politics declines (Heidar & Koole 2000; Blyth & Katz 2005). Researchers argue that the driving forces behind party transformation are their increased dependence on the state for financial resources to conduct politics (Pierre et al 2000; Gidlund & Koole 2001; Koß 2010), reliance on the mass media for political communication (Strömbäck 2009) and societal changes that reduce the degrees of freedom that parties have to conduct politics (Blyth & Katz 2005; Katz & Mair 2009).

Although the idea of cartel parties is not without its critics, it dominates modern theorising about political parties (Koole 1996; Widfeldt 1997; Kitschelt 2000; Detterbeck 2005; Scarrow 2006). At the same time, the empirical evidence in support of the central thesis of cartel party theory – that parties become more and more similar to each other – is strongly limited. This is true, not least, for empirical research on parliamentary party groups.

Thus, the *overall purpose of this research project* is to analyse whether the party groups in the Riksdag have in fact become increasingly similar to one another over the period from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 2010s. Only by studying developments over a long period of time is it possible to identify clear changes in the parliamentary party groups. The research design of the project is based on collaboration. Using a common theory, i.e. cartel party theory, a group of researchers with different areas of expert knowledge will examine the thesis of

Mats Sjölin är verksam som professor vid Linnéuniversitet, Växjö.
E-post: mats.sjolin@lnu.se

increased similarity by conducting empirical studies of party groups. In particular the researchers will analyse party group change in a number of respects. The project is organised as six distinct sub-studies, each of which focuses on clearly specified research questions. Together the sub-studies will provide a comprehensive view of the changes that have taken place in the party groups of the Riksdag over the past 25 years. Thus, the approach of the project is theory-testing.

Four of the project's questions and analyses are direct offshoots of the cartel party theory's assumption of uniformity (i.e. increased similarity):

- Have the social composition of the party groups and the pre-parliamentary political experience of members of the Riksdag become more homogeneous?
- Has there been a homogenisation of parliamentary party groups due to a decline in gender differences as regards the substance and form of politics?
- Do the party groups in the Riksdag de-politicise central policy areas by systematically excluding them from conflict in favour of seeking consensus?
- Do the parliamentary party groups adapt their policies to media logic at the expense of ideology logic?

Thus, in these sub-studies, cartel party theory's theses about the consequences of the professionalisation of politics, de-politicisation and the power of the mass media are scrutinised. However, cartel party theory has also been criticised from several different perspectives. One line of criticism is directed against the idea that transformational pressures influence all parties in exactly the same way. On the contrary, it is argued that there are contextual factors, for example party culture, that influence parties in distinctly different ways (Koole 1996). In light of this, the project therefore also explicitly addresses a fifth question:

- Have the internal cultures of the party groups become more similar?

Another type of criticism is directed against the narrow, rationalistic perspective of cartel party theory and the theory's assumption that parties are exclusively strategic actors. The theory neglects the normative side of politics, that members of party groups also act on the basis of, and are dependent on, theoretical norms of representation, or democratic-theoretical prerequisites (Sjölin 2005; 2008). At the same time, it is clear that in theories of representation, the ideal-type conceptualisation of the role of the politician has changed from largely loyal party representative to independent political entrepreneur (Manin 2002). The question to be addressed in the sixth sub-study is therefore:

- Has there been a homogenisation of representation norms in the parliamentary party groups, and, if so, what are the normative implications of this for political representation and democracy?

These two questions give the project theory-critical and theory-development ambitions. The questions serve as "critical" tests for cartel party theory. Decisive evidence that party groups in the Riksdag are influenced by different contextual factors and different normative ideas about the role of representation undermines empirical support for the fundamental assumptions of cartel party theory. In this case, questions about the importance of contextual factors and norms for understanding the actions of parties will be essential for further development of a party theory framework.

Theory, the state of research and the project's contribution

In this section we further elaborate the research questions in the six sub-studies, their connection to cartel party theory, the current state of relevant empirical research and the specific contribution each sub-study is expected to produce.

THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF POLITICS AND THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE RIKSDAG

Researcher: Magnus Hagevi

The first sub-study examines whether or not the social composition of the party groups and the pre-parliamentary political experience of the members of the Riksdag has become more homogeneous since the late 1980s. According to the ideal of mass parties, political parties are open to all members. The rise of state-financed party funding enables cartel parties to increasingly employ professional politicians (Borchert 2003). As a result, the norm of self-selection is increasingly replaced by the norm of employment: to be recruited, hired and paid by an employer. Compared to self-selection, it is presumably more common that a person who is hired will be similar to, and have similar characteristics as, the person responsible for recruiting/hiring (Hensvik et al 2009). Since professionalisation itself implies that an individual can devote more time to his/her political career, it might also mean that those party members who are elected to the Riksdag will display greater uniformity.

In this sub-study we examine whether state-financed party funding for party groups increases more than funding for rank-and-file membership organisations. The professionalisation of politics is also analysed: among those newly elected to the Riksdag, are there more professional politicians than in the past? If so, what is the political background of these politically experienced newcomers – party employment, other elected positions for a political party or some other professional political role? Finally, we examine whether the social characteristics and pre-parliamentary political experience of members of party groups have become more similar, as well as whether these similarities are greater among those who were professional politicians when first elected to parliament compared with those who were not.

The sub-study will increase our knowledge about several social characteristics of members of the Riksdag. It complements previous research about the social composition of the Riksdag, which has shown that the share of members of the Riksdag who were professional politicians when first elected to parliament has increased since the 1930s (Brusewitz 1936; Sköld & Halvarsson 1966; Holmberg & Esaiasson 1988, Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; Hagevi 2003). In addition, it relates the social composition of the party groups and pre-parliamentary political experience to the professionalisation of politics by examining, with the help of existing research, the development of publicly-financed party funding at the national, regional and local levels (Gidlund 1983, 1985; Wiberg 1991; Pierre et al 2000; Gidlund & Koole 2001; Koß 2010).

DE-POLITICISED PARTY GROUPS?

Researcher: Karl Loxbo

Research on cartel parties has become increasingly interested in a process referred to as de-politicisation: whether establish parties have become more ideologically similar and have gradually developed a shared, closed policy agenda (Katz & Mair 2009). In the same spirit, Blyth and Katz (2005) argue that parties that were once ideological opponents now work together to dampen the expectations of the electorate. Literature on de-politicisation has pointed to EU policy (as well as economic internationalisation) as a core area for the cartelisation of European party systems. Questions which, in practice, are decided within the framework of EU institutions are assumed to be de-politicised and exempt from inter-party conflict, and this is seen as the most important explanation for cartelisation (Mair 2007; Katz & Mair 2009:754; cf. Bartolini 2005). A consequence of this is that established parties develop an incentive to downplay the importance of questions that were once at the heart of political conflict. Another phenomenon that is seen as neutralising political conflict is when parties

cooperate over political blocs to change comprehensive welfare programmes, for example Swedish pension reform (Loxbo 2007; 2009a). At present we do not know how common this method of closed cooperation is. It is still unclear how cartelisation – if it exists – functions in practice, in the everyday work of parties in parliament. Previous research has provided contradictory and anecdotal evidence about the relationship between cartelisation and de-politicisation. This sub-study aims to remedy these shortcomings.

GENDER CONVERGENCE IN THE RIKSDAG'S PARTY GROUPS

Researcher: Helena Stensöta

According to the mass party model, different social groups have varying interests, and this is manifest in the values they represent in the Riksdag. Research on gender in parliaments have shown that women prioritise social and family policy more than men do, and that, to a greater degree than men, they see themselves as representatives of their gender (Norris, Vallance & Lovenduski 1992; Skjeie 1992; Wängnerud 1998; Heidar & Pedersen 2006). Research has also shown that women and men practice politics in different ways (Mackay 2001). However, according to cartel party theory, members of party groups are not primarily representatives for different interests; rather they act as profession politicians whose interests increasingly coincide. New research also shows that the political priorities of female and male members of parliament increasingly converge (Wängnerud 2010), which can be seen as an effect of the processes that cartel party theory calls attention to. The third sub-study is aimed at looking deeper into the question of whether gender differences in the Riksdag, and in particular in party groups, have decreased over time. Can a homogenisation of party groups be observed in the form of fewer gender differences as regards political priorities and political practice?

Previous research on gender issues in parliament has examined whether women as politicians have had an impact on the parliament and its party groups (Skjeie 1992; Wängnerud 1998, 2010; Lovenduski 2005; Beckwith 2007). Our sub-study analyses the declining difference between women's and men's political priorities in the Riksdag. Rather than explaining change in terms of gender, we look at cartelisation and party culture as possible explanations.

MEDIATISATION OF THE PARTY GROUPS' FOREIGN POLICIES

Researchers: Douglas Brommesson and Ann-Marie Ekengren

The fifth sub-study examines whether party groups adapt to a homogenising media logic at the expense of a differentiating ideology logic. The impact of media logic is studied by comparing the foreign policies of Swedish party groups (where there is consensus foreign policy) with those of party groups in Great Britain (where foreign policy is conflictual). Foreign policy is studied as a critical case insofar as it has long been sheltered from publicity and heated debate in the media.

Cartel parties increasingly use the mass media for political communication (Katz & Mair 2002). The parties' media activities are based on expensive communication strategies, which contributes to their need for financial support. This is an example of mediatisation – a process in which fundamental aspects of politics assume media forms (Hjarvard 2007) – which, in accordance with media logic, implies that the communication of party groups becomes homogenised. Media logic includes a narrator technique and valuation of newsworthiness suitable for capturing the attention of a media audience. It is based on, among other things, simplification, sharp debate, personalisation and stereotyping (Nord & Strömblad 2005). When party groups adapt the substance of their politics to a common media logic, it reduces

their opportunities to adopt ideological stand-points. Whether this has occurred is tested in a comparative analysis across time (1988-2010) and space.

We study mediatisation as an important aspect of cartel party theory, one which is rarely tested empirically (cf. Strömbäck 2009). We provide new knowledge about how a consensus culture mediates the effects of mediatisation (cf. Dettebeck 2005).

CHANGED PARTY CULTURE?
Researcher: Katarina Barrling Hermansson

Cartel party theory and theories that emphasize the importance of party culture – i.e. self-image and social norms about how parliamentary work should be conducted – are competing theoretical approaches. Cartel party theory expects party culture to collapse when faced with crass reality. Thus, as a result of increased cartelisation, party cultures should become more similar. Since cultural norms are relatively stable (Chabal & Daloz 2006), it is particularly interesting to investigate whether these changes have also had repercussions at a deeper cultural level. On the other hand, if party cultures have resisted cartelisation and still seem to diverge from one another, then this contradicts the idea of cartelisation and poses a challenge for it. Party cultures can then obstruct the ends-means rationality that cartel party theory presupposes.

According to culture theories, party groups do not behave as profit-maximising firms, but rather as a sort of micro-society in which social norms can operate to block actions that are means-ends rational from a strictly political perspective. Thus, in this fourth sub-study we analyse four dimensions of party culture: views about the relationship between the individual and the group, sense of political responsibility and knowledge about and importance of social community within the group. Using these dimensions we compare party cultures in the Riksdag in 2010 with corresponding cultures that were studied in research conducted between 1998 and 2002. Have party cultures in the Riksdag become more similar?

The sub-study is related to previous research that argues that party cultures have deep historical roots (Barrling Hermansson 2004; cf. Jensen 1993; Kitschelt 1994; Isberg 1999; Abélès 2000; Esaiasson & Heidar 2000; Chabal & Daloz 2006). This implies that these cultures might be capable of resisting the cartelisation of party groups. On the other hand, growing cartelisation might have changed party cultures, which is something that will be examined in this sub-study.

POLITICAL ROLE FOR A NEW ERA
Researchers: Mats Sjölin and Henrik Enroth

The sixth sub-study analyses and interprets the normative implications of cartel party theory from the perspective of democratic theory. One question of interest is whether the role of politicians in party groups has changed as regards how they represent voters when making decisions. The point of departure is a classic problem of normative representation theory, the mandate-independence controversy – the ethics of organisation vs. the ethic of individualism (Pitkin 1967; Sjölin 2005). The modern theory of representation has identified a shift in the ideal political representative from loyal party representative to political entrepreneur (Ahlbäck et al 2007; Manin 1997; Wägnerud 2006; Karvonen 2010). In the cartel party, however, politicians are agents of the state rather than entrepreneurs. This discrepancy clearly shows that normative representation theory needs to be developed in light of the findings of empirical research (Mansbridge 2003; Urbinati 2006; Sjölin 2008). In this sub-study we interview both veterans of the Riksdag and new-comers in order to study changes in normative role conception (cf. Isberg 1999, Brothén & Gilljam 2006).

In addition, it is also important to examine

the consequences of cartel party theory for representative democracy more broadly. We use the results of the other five sub-studies to do this. In general there is a divide between empirical research on representative democracy and normative democratic theory. By conducting a normative analysis on a broad empirical foundation this project enables us to study the possibilities for political representation in contemporary democracy as it functions today, rather than referring to participatory or deliberative democracy as ideal types (cf. Plotke 1997).

Method and material

The strategy of the project is to collect several different types of empirical material and to use both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. This increases our ability to draw general conclusions about the changed role of the party groups in the Riksdag and to test the validity of cartel party theory in several different respects.

Diachronic analysis, and especially analyses of change over a period of time as long as from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 2010s, creates particular methodological challenges. In particular, we need to collect a large quantity of data that is comparable over time. We tackle this problem in a variety of ways:

- In several cases we can use data from directories to conduct time series analyses.

An example of this is mapping the social characteristics of party groups and using members' pre-parliamentary experience to analyse professionalisation. Here we can take advantage of both previous compilations of data and earlier analyses (Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; Hagevi 2003). It is also easy to complement these sources with information from biographical directories that cover recent years. Another example is de-politicisation in the Riksdag. Previous research has examined reservations in parliamentary committees (Sannerstedt & Sjölin 1992, Sjölin 1993), and this can be expanded by collecting additional data on reservations, thus bringing the research up to the present.

- We have received preliminary approval to use survey data from previous studies of the Riksdag.
- In some cases project members will develop completely new types of data that are comparable over time. One example is the mediatisation of politics, in which foreign policy debates in the Riksdag over the past 20 years will be analysed.
- In other cases, we will develop data on today's party groups and compare it with older, similar studies. For example, this will be done in the sub-study on party cultures (Barrling Hermansson 2004) and the sub-study on the role of politicians (Isberg 1999; Davidsson 2006).

Quantitative data and analysis of documents

Table 1. Project interviews with members of party groups.

Sub-study	Interviews	Selection focus for elite interviews
Professionalisation	No	----
Gender	Yes	Gender, Cohort
De-politicisation	Yes	EU committee, Group leader
Mediatisation	Yes	Foreign policy politicians
Culture	Yes	Party affiliation, Veteran
Political role	Yes	Veteran/new-comer Back-/frontbenchers

are nonetheless insufficient to achieve the purposes of the project. An important part of the empirical material will therefore come from interviews with members of the Riksdag's party groups. Elite interviews are needed to capture the more complex dimensions of the conditions for the party groups (Berry 2002). As part of this, in keeping with the goals of the project, we will conduct retrospective interviews with veterans of the Riksdag in order to increase our knowledge about changes over time.

The structure of the project makes it possible to use some of the data in several of the sub-studies. Interviews are one such example. We expect to conduct some 75 interviews. They will be coordinated by the project's leadership group and will be used in five of the six sub-studies (see the overview in table 1). Another example is that the sub-study on gender issues will also analyse data from the sub-study on professionalisation, party culture and the role of politicians from a gender perspective.

The theses of the cartel party theory contend that societal developments influence all parties in the same way, not just in Sweden but in all mature democracies. It is therefore important to compare our analyses of changed circumstances for party groups in the Swedish parliament with developments in other European countries. To accomplish this, the British parliament will be used as a reference case in some of the sub-studies. Using Britain enables us to compare Sweden with a case that differs in terms of election system (proportional/majority) and political culture (consensus/conflict).

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Why are gender differences in the Swedish parliament diminishing?

Inter-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary causes

Helena Olofsdotter Stensöta

Abstract

During last decades, gender differences in representative bodies have diminished in a variety of areas, descriptively but also substantially. For example, in Sweden, social issues are still a typical female issue among older representatives, although this is no longer the case among younger representatives. A similar trend can be noticed inter-nationally, although Sweden appears to be at the forefront, which defends choosing the case. The project aims at explaining these diminishing substantial gender diffe-rences among parliamentarians, thereby paying attention both to intra-parliamen-tarian and extra-parliamentarian causes. With intra-parliamentarian causes we refer to party strategies, professionalization of parties and the cyclical life of policy issues. With extra-parliamentarian causes we refer to changing living patterns including changing models for care-services (New Public Mangagement), which might have led to a stronger involvement of men in care responsibilities. If causal factors interact, which is probable, the project will strive to show more in detail how this interaction proceeds. We will use available data from SNES (Riksdags Surveys) and collect original data from longer interviews with parliamentarians.

The problem and aim of the project

Research on the representation of gender has been dominated by the problem of what determines the numerical share of women in representative bodies, as well as the question on whether or not these women make a polit-ical difference (Beckwith, 2007; Celis, Childs, Kantola and Krook, 2008; Dahlerup, 2006; Grey, 2006; Kittilson, 2006; Mackay, 2004; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Norris, 1996; Wängnerud, 2000; 2009). In short, empirical research has generally concluded that women in parliament express more concern for social and family issues, i.e., "care-and-career poli-cies" than men and that women more often think of themselves as representative of women and being in close contact with wom-en's grassroots organizations (Lovenduski and Norris, 19933; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Recent empirical developments, how-ever, suggest that substantial changes in what women and men represent are currently hap-pening, more precisely, we see that substan-tial differences between women and men are diminishing. This process has hardly been examined in research, but it opens the field to issues of whether gender equality gives rise to new orientations among both women and men, for example with increased attention to issues of care (Engster and Stensöta, 2011; Stensöta 2004; Williams, 2000; Young, 2000).

Diminishing substantial gender differ-ences among politicians can be seen in a variety of areas. In Sweden, for, which has had a longer history of larger women repre-sentation, a clear trend toward diminishing

Helena Olofsdotter Stensöta är verksam vid Linnéuniversitetet, Växjö.
E-post: helena.stensota@lnu.se

gender differences between women and men can be seen in over a period of twenty years (1985–2006). There is almost complete gender equality in the proportion of women and men on Riksdag committees since about a decade. Further, there are diminishing gender differences of the representative mandate captured, for example, as the percentage of women and men MPs who say it is crucial to promote women's interests and concerns. Last but not least we see diminishing gender differences between the top ten issues that women and men MPs say are their main political priorities in open-ended answers (Riksdag Surveys); the ranking correlations have increased from 0.42 in 1985 to 0.74 in 2006. This trend is seen across parties, although it is stronger among the left and green representatives (Wängnerud, 2010). Traces of the trend can be found internationally, which is mirrored by the increased critique on a definition of "women´s issues" and the expressed need to update research on this area (Tronto, 1996; Young, 2000).

The project *Why are gender differences in the Swedish parliament diminishing? Inter-political and extra-political causes* aims to explain these diminishing differences. The project is lead by Helena Stensöta and also includes Lena Wägnerud. The aim of the project is to determine whether the change is mainly attributable to factors within parliament, here called inter-political forces, or whether they are mainly attributable to factors outside parliament, here called extra-political forces. In the likely case that explanatory factors are interrelated the project will describe how processes interact to produce the empirical phenomena of diminishing substantial gender differences. At large, the project is situated in research on substantive representation, which focuses primarily on the content of representation rather than on the numerical issue, as research on descriptive representation does.

The Swedish case is an optimal case for examining the process of diminishing gender differences. Sweden is generally regarded as being at the front line of establishing gender equality both in terms of political efforts and outcomes, as its high rankings on indices such as the Gender Empowerment Index and Gender Development Index (GEM and GDI, respectively; Human Development Reports) clearly indicate. Thus, one could argue that by examining Sweden and gender equality, we might get a "glimpse ahead" of more general processes. Sweden is further well chosen for discussing especially decreasing differences between women and men priorities and preferences as Swedish gender policy generally is characterized as an "equality route" aiming at shared responsibilities of women and men both at work and at home (Florin, 1998; Lindvert, 2006). Sweden is further generally regarded as a country where the processes of party professionalization have proceeded far (Hagevi and Jahn, 1999). Last, in regard of more formal equality tools such as quotas, Sweden lies far ahead through the voluntary assignment of most parties to this strategy since the beginning of the 1990s (Freidenvall, 2006).

Two broad hypotheses are examined, interpolitical and extrapolitical causes behind diminishing gender differences. The hypothesis of *inter-political* causes is in turn derived from two strands of research; party-theory, which predicts a professionalization of parties, involving increasing similarities between parliamentarians accompanied by an expanding cleavage towards the general population (Katz and Mair, 2009). From feminist theory, we derive the idea that conscious equality measures such as quotas can be one important cause behind diminishing gender differences (Dahlerup, 2006; Freidenvall, 2006). In previous research interpolitical factors have been discussed on a general level in the previous work of Wängnerud (2010), but no more thorough studies on the problem has been performed. The hypothesis of *extra-political* causes is derived from more structural oriented feminist theory where changing

living patterns in regard of care responsibility are seen as transforming forces in society (Hernes, 1987; Rosenbluth, Salmon and Thies, 2006; Stensöta, 2004). Because living patterns of men and women are becoming more similar in regard of combining work-and-family responsibilities in the private sphere, and because of an increasing share of men in welfare state entrepreneurship, a trend of diminishing differences can be predicted. This idea is widespread in feminist theory generally, however existing theories lack in theoretical precision on how these processes of change take place more precisely, as well as empirical assessment of these more precise theoretical ideas.

Empirically, we will use several datasources. First, we will use available time series data from the Riksdag Survey where attitudes of parliamentarians have been collected during over twenty-five years (1985-2010). The last wave will be freshly available to us in the beginning of the project as Lena Wängnerud is the head investigator of this wave. The total dataset will further be expanded by contextual data in order to test some of the hypotheses. Second, we will collect data from about 20-25 longer interviews with strategically chosen parliamentarians to elaborate on the causal mechanisms involved. Third, we will collect information about actual initiatives of women and men in parliament in the form of private member bills. This last study touches upon the question on whether diminishing differences are seen also when actual policy is made, that is as real substantial differences. This last study will more have the character of a pilot-study as the main focus of the project is the focus on already identified diminishing substantial differences between women and men in parliament.

The study is relevant from both political and theoretical perspectives. *Politically*, if the diminishing gender differences have mainly inter-political causes, they could be a sign of a widening gap between MPs and voters, which forms a democratic problem

(Katz and Mair, 2009). If, on the other hand, the reasons for the diminishing gender differences are mainly found within extra-political causes, they could be seen as an effect of a more equal society (Phillips, 1994; Young, 2000). *Theoretically*, the project contributes to party-theory, especially ideas on professionalization of parties, which has not yet been examined from a gender perspective. To theories on gender representation, we contribute by focusing on a new and relevant empirical problem – diminishing gender differences in substantive representation – as discussed in the introduction.

Previous research

The research field on women representation can be divided into two broad strands: One is focusing on descriptive representation, i.e. the numerical distribution of seats between women and men in representative bodies on different levels as well as the reasons behind variations of representation of the sexes. The other strand is focusing on substantive representation, that is, the difference that a more equal share of women make substantially, as well as what conditions enable/constrain them/us to exert such impact (Beckwith, 2007; Kittilson, 2006; Lovenduski, 2005; Mackay, 2004; Skjeje, 1992; Thomas, 1994; Wängnerud, 2009).

The field of descriptive representation has the longest history. Previous research has shown that numerical representation of women is favored by factors at the system level, such as; proportional representation (Lovenduski and Norris, 2003); mechanisms of policy diffusion as when one party increases women's representation, other are likely to follow (Norris, 1996) and the importance of "equality cultures" (Pfau-Effinger, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Differences between parties can also be found, the representation of women tends to be higher within left parties (Kittelson, 2006) and quotas are effective tools (Freidenvall

2006; Kittelson, 2006; Dahlerup 2006). Newer research in the field emphasizes also actors and their strategies (Wängnerud 2000; Childs and Krook 2006).

The field of substantial representation has been described as a generally less mature but quickly growing field (Wängnerud, 2009). The basis issue is the difference that women make in politics, but it is a contested issue in regard of what women are expected to represent and how such a definition should be grounded. In practice, however, rather similar lists of "women issues" (Fox and Oaxley, 2003) are applied. Empirical research has generally concluded that women in parliaments express more concern for social and family issues, i.e., "care-and-career policies," (Skjeie, 1992) than men and further that women more often think of themselves as representative of women and cultivate close contact with women's grassroots organizations (Beckwith, 2007; Chaney, 2002; Childs and Krook 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Mackay, 2006; Norris and Lovenduski, 2003; Wängnerud, 2000).

Theoretically, a definition of "women´s issues" has been regarded as problematic because of its inherent essentialism (Jonasdottir, 1994; Stensöta, 2004) Moreover, at least since the beginning of the 1990s the "difference-turn" in feminism has problematized that women share some experiences, but also are divided along several other experiences such as socio-economic conditions, ethnicity, motherhood et cetera (Young, 1996; Dietz, 2003; Diaz, 2005). Additionally, women have now entered almost all policy areas, which also complicates the picture.

The trend of diminishing gender differences has only been focused indirectly in previous research. For example, the issue of whether, and if so how, men are affected by increasing women representation has been touched upon but framed in this way, the problem is limited to how women exert influence men and leave out external factors that might influence men´s behavior

independently, such as an increasing involvement in care-oriented tasks. Another approach is ideas on cyclical mechanisms of policy, which suggests that the significance of politicians' gender peaks in the innovation phase of a policy, because actors feel a pressure to polarize to other actors from strategic considerations (Bratton and Ray, 2002).

In regard of independent factors behind the exertion of substantial representation, a number of suggestions are found in previous literature. A considerable part of the literature focuses on hindrances to female politicians to exert substantial influence such as the well-used hypothesis of a "critical mass" of about 20-30 percent being necessary in order for women to affect influence, before which they are mostly "tokens" of existing institutions and common behavior (Kanter, 1977; Dahlerup 2006; Childs and Krook 2006). When substantial representation is focused more positively, research increasingly uses actor-oriented approaches focusing on strategies (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Childs and Withey 2004). Further, Beckwith, (2007) points at the importance of both numbers and "newness" for the possibilities to exert influence. Grey (2006) points at the importance of institutional position of women as well as the number of years in office. It has also been shown that is important to exert influence, a research relating to studies on social movements (Banaszak, Beckwith and Rucht, 2003).

More explicit extra-political causes behind differences in substantive representation are also discussed in previous literature, for example through the general idea that gender differences arise from structurally different experiences of responsibilities for care for children in the family as well as the private/public divide, which both are fundamental to feminism (Jonasdottir, 1994; Pateman, 1989; Tronto, 1994). Such hypotheses are sometimes understood as cultural explanations (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) and sometimes discussed in a more policy oriented way (Engster & Stensöta, 2011; Hernes, 1987). A deficit

in this previous literature is that the hypotheses most often describe broad processes and that theoretical precision of the actual mechanisms involved are lacking which can lead to tautology (Rosenbluth, Salmon and Thies, 2006; Stensöta, 2004).

In relation to the general field of party studies, the field of women´s representation is still a rather separate field. One proposition in party theory is that, over time, parties turn into more professionalized organizations as they develop from mass parties, through catchall parties, and finally into cartel parties (Katz and Mair, 1997). This development is seen as triggered by increased competition between parties (Borchert and Zeiss, 2003) and also entails a new role for parties from representing organized interests (Duverger, 1954) to becoming increasingly professionalized. If we assume that parties consist of various parts; the party-on-the-ground; the party in the central office; and sometimes also the party in public office (Katz and Mair, 2002) this development can have democratic consequences. According to the theory of cartel parties, the declining importance of the grassroots lead to increasing importance of the party itself and of the party caucus (Hagevi and Jahn, 1999). This general hypothesis of a professionalization of parties, involving a separation between parliamentarians and ordinary people, has not yet been examined from a gender perspective (Katz and Mair, 2009). To test this idea on the field of gender representation would also serve to bring these to subfields of research closer to one another.

The project, data and method

The project will primarily use three data sources, two of which will consist of original data collected within the project.

First, we will use data from Swedish National Election Study Program (SNES), the Riksdag Surveys. They have been conducted eight times, in 1969, 1985, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010; the last and eighth

wave, of which Lena Wängnerud is the principal investigator, will be made available to us in the spring of 2011. The questions cover a broad range of priorities, interests, and views on political issues as well as background data on sex, age and party affiliation. This data set will be supplemented by contextual background register data, which let us examine the strength of external political factors on individual preferences of MPs. If possible we will also derive data on care-responsibilities at home from individual MPs.

Second, the project will collect original data in the form of longer interviews that explore the underlying mechanisms behind change in a more explorative way, as this method will let us grasp the reasoning of individual MPs regarding priorities and strategies. This data will also have a reference point in the past, as Lena Wängnerud collected original data from longer interviews with MPs as part of her dissertation in the mid 1990s. We will choose interviewees strategically and interview about 20 to 30 persons in total.

Third, as the focus of the project is the diminishing gender difference on substantial representation, it is also interesting to explore the impact of these diminishing differences on actual political output. We will therefore collect data on governmental bills including private members bills from a selection of the years that the SNES Riksdags survey has been conducted, and distinguish women-women collaborations, men-men collaborations and women-men collaborations as well as the content of the bill. As the focus of the project is to explain diminishing differences that already are identified, this part of the project will rather have the form of a pilot-study that explores the ground for future research.

In addition, we will collect information about changing official internal party strategies, such as amendment of the label "feminist", but also other internal strategic party-decisions on internal concordance et cetera to examine hypotheses related to inter-parliamentary causes.

Hypotheses

Drawing from a broad range of theories related to developments both inside and outside the political system, a set of hypotheses has been developed. Schematically, the project proposes two divergent hypotheses as to why gender differences in parliament are diminishing, each including several sub-hypotheses. Notably, there are two empirical trends that we wish to explain: the general diminishing gender differences that can be seen in several arenas in parliament, and the increased involvement of men in social issues. The hypotheses are:

1. *Inter-political causes*: a) Feminist commitment of parties, b) Increased professionalization of parties, c) The cyclical life of political issues
2. *Extra-political causes related to gender:* a) Changing living patterns of women and men related to family care responsibilities, b) Increasing professional involvement of men in welfare-state-related entrepreneurship.

Below, the hypotheses are described more in detail, which material will be used to examine them as well as the criteria for conclusion. A concluding section discusses how different theoretical propositions can be distinguished from one another.

1. INTER-POLITICAL FORCES

a) Feminist engagement of parties
A feminist engagement of parties can be one reason for more men to engage in previously typical "women-issues" as well as for women to engage in opposite fields. For example, the committee assignments to women and men can partly be influenced by strategic choices of parties. Wängnerud (1998) has, for example, attributed the diminishing gender differences in committee assignments to changing party strategies as a reaction to the Party Support-Stockings (in Swedish Stödstrumporna), in the early 1990s. Although Sweden now has a feminist party, Feminist Initiative

(Feministiskt Initiativ), we do not know if there is a similar threat that makes parties feel obliged to act that has influenced more recent developments.

We will systematically collect information on formal party-internal strategies in relation to gender equality ambitions during the examined period (1985-2012) and we will use the longer interviews to explore informal strategies. For a change to be interpreted as an effect of strategic thinking within parties, we need to detect explicit references to such strategic thinking on the area of gender, such as explicit statements from party headquarters, and/or individual MPs.

b) Increased professionalization of parties
In a professionalized party setting, we would expect the caucuses of parties to exercise increasing control over all issues and not only gender related issues, for example on which issues are put on the political agenda, in which form, and at what time. Hence, the professionalization of parties arguably involves general diminishing room for individual MPs to have divergent preferences and views.

We will systematically collect information on general internal party strategies. A key indication of support for this hypothesis would be if we found diminishing differences between the priorities of women and men MPs in <u>all</u> areas of politics, not just in relation to gender-related issues, can be found. If the process of professionalization were a socializing process, we would further expect to find cohort differences, where younger MPs are more affected.

c) The cyclical life of policy issues
This third sub hypothesis points at gender differences as strategic choices for a "new" group in parliament as a vehicle for defending their presence and exercise influence. When an issue is no longer considered new, or the related problems have more or less been solved, the special identification of the

particular group with the particular issue will fade away.

We will partly rely on explicit references from individual MPs that we interview, and how they describe their engagement. It might also be possible to trace such a cycle in separate parties, as women have entered later into right oriented parties. If we detect a gender polarization within each party related to women becoming a critical mass within this party.

2. EXTRA-POLITICAL CAUSES:

a) Changing living patterns of gender

This sub hypothesis refers to changes in living patterns of gender in the private sphere. The hypothesis states that involvement in care-responsibilities in the private sphere, gives rise to more care-oriented attitudes and behaviors, both by women and men, and as living patters in relation to care-and-career have become increasingly similar, this can account for diminishing differences between women and men MPs. (Stensöta, 2004). This hypothesis is especially interesting in relation to men´s changing priorities in politics.

We will examine this hypothesis on contextual level, treating the experiences on care-responsibilities as an experience attached to the local community. We will collect data on "equality" with the constituencies of the MPs. Data are available through the Statistics Sweden (SCB) and Swedish Social Insurance Agency (SSIA). There is also an expectation of cohort differences inherent in the hypothesis, that younger men are more care-oriented. We might be able to retrieve information about whether MPs have children at home, especially for the last Riksdags survey, but this might be difficult for previous waves. It might also be the case that MPs generally are living more gender equal than people in general, which can be examined on a general level.

b) Changing involvement of men in welfare state-related entrepreneurship

During last decades new public management forms has been introduced into welfare state services (Pollit and Bouckhart, 2004). According to the proposition of Helga Maria Hernes (1987), women's involvement in social policy had its roots in women's work in the public sector (Rosenbluth, Salmon and Thies, 2006). If men are increasingly involved in such work, this might be the cause of their changed interest in this area. This hypothesis draws on changes in men's living patterns, as the previous, but in relation to the professional sphere.

As in the previous hypothesis, we examine the hypothesis on the contextual level, deciding whether MPs constituencies can explain the diminishing gender differences.

HOW DISTINGUISH THE THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS EMPIRICALLY?

The empirical indications described above are not mutually exclusive, but rather likely to interact in which case the project aims to elaborate more precisely on how the described processes interact to produce the empirical phenomena of diminishing substantial gender differences. How we will distinguish this interaction empirically will be elaborated more in detail in course of the analysis, but we can already now point at some possible problems and how they can be handled.

Several of the hypotheses include expectations of cohort differences. We expect professionalization to affect diminishing gender differences among younger MPs, but we also expect this group to have more similar living experiences of personal care-responsibilities. The idea to operationalize the impact of living experiences through the contextual level of constituencies is one way to distinguish these hypotheses from each other. In the same sense, the two external hypotheses can be difficult to disentangle. It can well be the case that the same constituencies are in the forefront both in regard of equality in personal

living experiences and in regard of professional living experiences. If the longer interviews do not let us distinguish between the two, we will probably choose to discuss the mechanisms in an interconnected way and choose other types of methods to distinguish them in a future project. In general, the longer interviews serve to highlight mechanisms. All hypotheses can be supported through the interviews through manifest statements of strategic thinking within parties or through manifest motivations for why specific priorities or solutions are chosen.

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The politics of anxiety: vulnerability and gender inequality in politics

Lena Wängnerud & Monika Djerf-Pierre

What interests us is how emotions such as fear and worry affect political life, and more specifically how anxiety may serve as explanation for gender differences – in attitudes and behavior – in politics. In doing this we draw from and integrate findings from at least three fields of research: research on gender and risk perceptions; research on gender differences in political life and how these can be related to structural inequalities in society; and research on the role of emotions in politics. This integrative approach opens up for theoretical developments in several ways: regarding anxiety as a causal mechanism in democratic developments, but also regarding sex/gender at the cross-road between 'real-world' inequalities and the social construction of feminity/masculinity.

Purpose and aims

Negative emotions such as fear, worry and anxiety may affect the everyday lives of women and men in many different ways. Worries may relate to the individual's personal situation – fear of violence and crime, unemployment or illness – or to society at large – fear of social unrest, poverty, terrorism, war, environmental degradation and pandemics. Numerous studies have shown that women, generally speaking, tend to be more anxious than men, and studies in risk psychology suggest that this anxiousness stems from feelings of being vulnerable (O'Connor & Bord, 1997). However, the link to the political sphere is still largely unexplored. Yet, feminist researchers have argued that women's anxiety, and specifically their fear of violence and crime, acts

as a form of social control, keeping women from achieving political and economic equality. Hollander (2001, 2002) suggests that vulnerability is deeply associated with gender and argues that it is the key mechanism that keeps women in subordinated positions, not only in the private sphere but also in public life (c.f. Wendt Höjer, 2002). The problem is that this hypothesis has not yet been conclusively tested in large scale survey research using representative samples. Is vulnerability a factor that contributes to gender inequality in political life?

The aim of this project is to explore to what extent and in which ways gender differences concerning anxiety have consequences for political equality between women and men. We pursue our investigation by conducting a large scale survey of the Swedish population, aimed at testing the association, but also at further exploring the mechanisms that provide the casual link between anxiety, gender and political attitudes/behavior.

Survey of the field

In previous research, explanations to gender differences in political attitudes/behavior typically focuses on structural inequalities in everyday life situations such as differences in education, responsibilities in the private sphere, and in labor market integration. Much attention is also devoted to gender differences regarding the "content" of politics; for example, it is a persistent pattern that women are concerned with social policy issues and issues of gender-equality when making political judgments. This is explained by women's

Lena Wängnerud är professor vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet och Monika Djerf-Pierre är professor vid Institutionenför journalistik, medier och kommunikation, Göteborgs universitet.
E-post: lena.wagnerud@pol.gu.se, monika.djerf-pierre@jmg.gu.se.

position in society; for example, as the adult person most often responsible for combining working-life with family-life (Burns & Gallagher, 2010; Wängnerud, 2009).

There are, however, still gender differences in political life that cannot be accounted for by social position and structural factors. We suggest that an investigation of the role of anxiety may contribute to our understanding of how gender influences and structures political life. This is a new approach that also entails probing deeper into the role of emotions in politics. To be sure, political science research has often regarded politics as a purely cognitive and rational phenomenon. However, there is a burgeoning field of research that challenges this cognitive-rational approach and argues that emotions play a significant role in political life. The claim is that political attitudes and behavior are based on a combination of emotional and cognitive judgments, and not only on rational reasoning. In psychology the "risk-as-feelings" hypothesis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001) provides a similar argument: that risk perceptions are related to both emotional and cognitive assessments and that the two components are both directly linked to behavior (see Sundblad 2008 for an overview).

To specify the nature, extent and influence of emotions in politics is an important line of inquiry for social science research. Some of the most important studies in the field have been conducted by George E. Marcus and colleagues (Marcus 1991, 2000, 2002; Marcus & Mackuen 1993; Marcus, Neuman & Mackuen 2000; Neuman, Marcus, Grigler & Mackuen 2007). Marcus (2000) argues that, in political science, the research on emotions has been divided between, on the one hand, those who use emotion to explain how early experiences in life influence people's contemporary political judgments and, on the other hand, those who use emotions to explain how people respond to immediate contemporary circumstances around them. A key example in the first strand of research is the study

of party-identification. In the latter vein of research, studies have typically focused emotional reactions generated by "policy threats"; that is changes in political issues and positions that might threaten one's own ideological beliefs or position in society, or emotional reactions to features like "negative campaigning". Up to this point, the most consistent finding is that threats trigger anxiety, which then heightens the attention to current information, breaks people out of habitual behaviors and mindsets, and facilitates for learning. Negative emotions such as worry and fear may consequently have some positive effects when it comes to promoting democratic participation among citizens.

On the other hand, a main criticism of Marcus and colleagues is that their studies do not take individual differences regarding efficacy into consideration. A growing strand of research focuses on the role of internal efficacy, claiming that people make different judgments of their capacity to execute the courses of actions required to deal with undesirable life events. Empirical studies suggest that efficacy and negative emotions interact to affect political outcomes, such as learning and participation. Anxiety among the highly efficacious seems to drive involvement, while anxiety among those with low internal efficacy is of little consequence. In a similar line of reasoning, other scholars have argued for the necessity to distinguish between anger and other negative emotions such as anxiety and fear. Anger seems to mobilize action, while the political consequences of fear and anxiety are potentially more variable. A hypothesis is that anxiety, when coupled with the belief that one is incapable of successful political action, may have a demobilizing effect that discourages involvement (Rudolph *et.al.*, 2000; Valentino *et. al.*, 2009).

There is, however, a surprising lack of gender studies in this growing field of research. In contrast, if we again turn to the field of risk analysis, we do find a few attempts of connecting risk perceptions, gender and political

involvement. O'Connor and Bord (1997) make the argument that differences in perceived vulnerability explain most gender gaps in risk perceptions. In a follow-up study O´Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999) demonstrate that women tend to support voluntary actions when it comes to mitigating risks in society – in this case environmental risks – while men tend to support political measures. Thus, there is support for the idea that men are more inclined to channel worries and anxieties into the political sphere. In a related vein, Slovic and colleagues (Slovic, 1999; Slovic *et.al.*, 2004) identify white males as a special subgroup who perceives risks in society as quite low. Slovic and colleagues also point out that the subgroup of white males is characterized by a high level of trust in institutions and suggest that women and non-white men (the context for their studies is the United States) see the world as more dangerous because in many ways they are more vulnerable, they benefit less from current institutions and policies, and generally speaking have less power and control over what happens in their communities and their personal life. It has even been suggested that "numbing" is a reasonable response to an oppressive situation (Mills & Kleinman, 1988). The other side of the same coin is the finding that internal efficacy is enhanced by successful participation in politics. There are important feedback loops that help explain political attitudes and behavior (Kumlin, 2004; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005).

In this context, it is clear that it is the anxiety that comes from the subjective feeling of being vulnerable to risks (which may or may not be anchored in objective conditions) that interests us. It is a well known fact, proven by substantial research, that there is a discrepancy between perceived and actual vulnerability (Hollander, 2001). Perceived vulnerability represents beliefs regarding one's own situation. Actual vulnerability represents the real risk of exposure to undesirable life events. The somewhat counter-intuitive finding is that when it comes to

actual vulnerability most studies report that men, especially young men, are the group facing the greatest risks. At least this is true for most forms of violence and crime. It is only the "perceived vulnerability" that has the potential of influencing people's political attitudes and behavior. This stresses the need for further investigations of how perceptions of social risks that cause anxieties are created. There is a strand of feminist research arguing that vulnerability is nothing but a social construction of femininity; a construction however with the potential of being an obstacle for democratic developments (Kimmel, 2004). Anxieties relating to the subjective feeling of vulnerability are then, not the least, cultivated by the proliferation of media representations of women in subordinate positions and as victims of violence, crime, and war.

The role of the media is indeed an important factor that may contribute to explaining gender differences in both political attitudes and risk perceptions. The individual's attitudes and perceptions of social phenomena can – in fact – only originate from three sources: personal experiences (of events, situations, and institutions), interpersonal/social experiences (sharing other peoples experiences, through social interaction) and mediated experiences (media exposure). Here we know from previous research that news media exposure is positively associated with a range of indicators of political integration, such as trust, interest and activity (Norris, 2000). We also know from previous research that the media exposure of certain (mostly crime) social risks seem to increase anxiety (see Sandstig 2008, for an overview). The links between civic engagement, media exposure and risk perceptions are, however, largely unexplored. Nonetheless in one recent study, Miller (2007), it is demonstrated that anxiety mediates the impact of news exposure on political judgments. The finding is that when news exposure causes people to feel fearful about an issue, they will be likely to view this issue as nationally important.

Still, how anxiety and media exposure inter-act and affect political attitudes need to be more fully investigated.

In sum, the situation we have at hand is a true paradox. Following Marcus and col-leagues, anxiety is supposed to increase polit-ical learning and attention. How come then, that the most anxious group – women – is less interested in, and knowledgeable about political matters? We see two potential strat-egies to answer the question: (i) the paradox may be dissolved if we take a closer look at subgroups and the interaction between sex/gender and other variables, or (ii) we need to develop the theoretical framework on nega-tive emotions further in order to understand the casual links. This project aims at pursuing both strategies.

Project description

Anxiety is the theoretical core concept for this study and the focus of the investigation is anxiety that is related to various forms of risks in society. Our theoretical point of departure is that anxiety comes from perceived vulner-ability caused by the individuals' personal or indirect experience of undesirable life events. This anxiety may in turn influence political attitudes and behavior in various ways. The focus on the concepts of anxiety/vulnerabil-ity is useful because it allows for studies that are wider in scope than investigating fear and worries resulting from specific policy threats or other situations triggered by immediate contemporary circumstances. We are aiming at developing a framework for studies that go beyond the "political effects of being affected" by certain critical events. Obviously, anxie-ties may come from other sources than direct exposure to negative situations. Indeed, peo-ple might be influenced by the mere threat of being exposed to risks. Worries may also stem from the human capacity feeling empa-thy with others that may be affected. There may consequently also be other targets for an individual's worries than the self; people

may be concerned about the welfare of their children or worry about future generations when considering long-term risks, such as climate change and nuclear hazards. Empa-thy, seen as the capacity to react emotionally to the situation of others (cf. Sautter, 2007), are also an area were significant gender differ-ences can be recognized (women being more empathic than men, but results do depend on how empathy is measured, see Eisenberg & Strayer 1990).

The model chosen as a point of departure for empirical investigation is, schematically, as follows:

1. Structural position in society, primary gender but also intersectional influences relating to class, ethnicity and age, affec-ting →
2. Personal or indirect (through interperso-nal communication or media exposure) experiences of undesirable life events, affecting →
3. Perceived vulnerability in different areas causing anxiety, affecting →
4. Political attitudes and behavior, i.e. factors related to involvement and engagement.

However, a key aim of the project is to explore and test the causal mechanisms that relate anxiety to political attitudes and behaviors, which means exploring a wide range of fac-tors, as well as leaving it open for investiga-tion of the casual link that may prove to run in a different direction than suggested in the model.

I. The first step of the analysis is to explore the gender gap when it comes to how men and women experience anxiety in relation to specific risks in society. This initial step is per-formed to examine the type and scope of the gender differences. Previous research high-lighting anxiety as a form of social control has to a large extent focused on gender differ-ences in fear and anxiety related to violence and crime. We are interested in investigating anxiety also in other areas, such as the risk of unemployment or the risk of serious illness. The main question concerns how pervasive

the gender differences are; do they apply to most spheres of everyday life or just a few? Related to the question of scope is whether gender differences in anxiety are mostly visible in judgments about one's own situation or as evident in judgments about society at large. In this first step we will compare women and men across different risks, and across judgments about one's own life situation versus the situation in society. The idea is to explore whether women "always and everywhere" are more anxious than men.

II. The second step is focused on exploring the causes of anxiety. Here we want to capture the dynamic process where different factors come into play. Personal experiences of undesirable life events (to be the victim of violence and crime, to actually be unemployed or in financial difficulty), interpersonal experiences (such as having friends and relatives experiencing difficult situations) and mediated experiences (exposure to various forms of media reporting on these issues) are important to investigate here.

III. The novelty of this study is, however, to explore the link to the political sphere, which is the third step of the study. Since there are few previous studies in the area, it is reasonable to explore the link in several ways. We will use a variety of indicators on political involvement and engagement as dependent variables; e.g. voting, membership in political parties, political interest, but also membership and activity in other politically oriented civic organizations than parties.

After having investigated the basic associations we will proceed to explore factors that may influence the relationship as moderating or intervening variables. Thus, we develop the understanding of the causal mechanisms but also the understanding of the sex/gender category.

As indicated by previous research, individual efficacies influence the ways and extent to which men and women "channel" their anxiety into the political sphere. To begin, a series of variables that serve as indicators of efficacy will be explored in detail, starting with subjectively perceived self-confidence, and then moving on to the role of education and employment status. It might be the case that anxiety has an effect on citizens that are less self-confident, less educated, have weaker ties to the employment sector, and hence are less integrated in public life, but not on other citizens. A major finding in research on gender and stress (Shih & Eberhart, 2010; Zlomke & Hahn, 2010) is that women experience higher levels of stress than men, but that cognitive strategies play an important role in dealing with the problem. The ability to put problems into perspective and blame others, instead of oneself, lowers the level of stress. Arguably, higher education and integration into public life, enables for cognitive strategies of this kind (see also McLeod & Kessler, 1990).

The individuals' expectations and trust in political actors and institutions, may furthermore influence the effects of anxiety. The first factor to be tested is to what extent individuals indeed have expectations on the political institutions to actually solve particular problems that are the cause of concern/worries. The belief that politics should and could solve individual and social problems is highly ideological, and the individuals' ideological outlooks (left-right dimension) are also included in the analysis. Furthermore, the relationship to the level of trust in the political institutions will be explored. Here, a set of indicators of trust in the democratic system, but also in key actors and institutions such as political parties and the parliament, will be utilized. Finally, we will investigate the role of social trust as an intermediate variable. It is well known that fear of violence and crime lowers the levels of trust, while social trust is positively associated with many indicators of political integration (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2002).

The dataset to be used in the analysis is already prepared and available. The data at hand is a survey from the well-established SOM (Society Opinion Media) institute at the University of Gothenburg. For the 2010

survey, we constructed a number of questions that measure the degree of anxiety among citizens when it comes to undesirable life events (such as the risk of being unemployed, becoming seriously ill, being a victim of crime, but also the risk of experiencing financial difficulties – lacking money when confronted with unexpected expenses). There are also questions measuring the level of anxiety when it comes to developments in society at large. Respondents were asked to indicate their personal anxiety in relation to general social problems/risks such as economic crises, mass-unemployment, organized crime, environmental risks, global epidemics, and some other areas. Moreover, we ask for evaluations about how the news media reports on these topics and additionally for evaluations regarding the responsibility of politicians to solve the problems. A series of variables measuring political attitudes and beliefs, political activity and participation, political and social trust, as well as socio-economic status and position are also included in the dataset.

Significance

Studies on the effects of vulnerability on political attitudes/behavior are rare, and our study clearly has the potential to provide a significant contribution to this new field of research. More importantly however, the study of the role of anxiety and vulnerability may contribute to the general understanding of how men and women behave in political life. The data allows for sophisticated analyses, as we can introduce a series of intermediate variables in the analysis, such as self-confidence, social trust (trust in other people) and exposure to different forms of media. A comprehensive set of variables concerning socioeconomic status will also allow for a wide-ranging and potentially innovative analysis of intersectionality (the mutually constitutive relationship among social identities, see Shields 2008), which is a central tenet in modern feminist thinking which so far has mainly been used

in qualitative research. Here, we have an opportunity to appropriately measure intersectionality as interaction effects of various categories of social stratification: gender, age, ethnicity, and social class. The data-set also includes a measurement of self-perceived "feminity" versus "masculinity" which have the potential to enrich our understanding of sex/gender as a socially constructed category. There are also possibilities to initiate comparative research in the field. Round 4 of ESS, the European Social Survey from 2008/09, facilitates for cross-country comparisons on some of the associations explored in the Swedish study. However, key results from the Swedish study will guide this research.

Most studies in the area have been conducted in the U.S. In their seminal book, *Stealth Democracy*, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) show that U.S. citizens clearly ask for an invisible government; a government that keeps out of everyday life except when the country is faced by an immediate crisis. Then people expect the state (politics) to be highly visible, capable and ready to act. Their work stresses the importance of studying crises and critical events when understanding citizens' perceptions of politics, and the importance of investigating citizens' personal worries and anxieties when explaining differences in political perceptions. However, it also highlights the need for studies of other countries with different welfare regimes and political cultures, and where people have more far-reaching expectations of the state (and politics). Our research has the potential of being interesting to a wide range of scholars in many countries since the field is dominated by studies in the U.S. context.

Sweden, as a country, is used as a strategic case since gender equality politics, at least in an international perspective, has come a long way here (Wängnerud, 2009). At the same time, there are still gender differences when it comes to involvement or engagement in the political sphere. Since the mid 1970's women in Sweden participate in elections

to the same extent than men (Oskarson & Wängnerud, 1995; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2008), but data obtained from the Swedish National Election Studies Program also shows persistent gender differences when it comes to aspects like political knowledge and political interest (women are less knowledgeable and interested than men) and that the gender gap has remained rather constant during the past 25-30 years. This gender gap remains while the level of education has sky-rocketed among Swedish women and the visibility of women in the public sphere, including the representation of women in politics, has increased in so many ways.

The comparatively extensive and 'women-friendly' welfare state in Sweden (and other Scandinavian countries), makes Sweden a particularly relevant case for exploring and testing relationships. It might be the case that in the Swedish/Scandinavian context the political sphere – and specifically the welfare state – has served as a vehicle for women's room to maneuver, thus leveling out the effects of vulnerability (Hernes, 1987; Bergqvist *et al.*, 2000). Thus, Sweden can be perceived as a critical case in the sense that if there is a gendered pattern linking anxiety to political attitudes and behavior in this country, it should be present in other democracies as well. However, in a second step, we perform cross-country comparative research testing the generalizability of some of the results across various institutional settings as well as different welfare-state regimes.

Preliminary findings

So far, our preliminary findings from the above mentioned SOM-dataset confirm that women in Sweden, generally speaking, are more anxious than men. The biggest gender gaps appear in judgments of the risk of becoming seriously ill and being a victim of crime. Our preliminary analyses indicate that there may be a difference between what can be labeled "events-induced anxiety" versus "static anxiety" in society. The risk of being unemployed is an example that fits into the first category. For this indicator, our data shows that judgments follow an expected route e.g., with young people – the group most likely to be hit by policy changes or other immediate events, like the closure of a work place – expose highest levels of anxiety. The risks of becoming seriously ill or being a victim of crime are examples in the second, static, category. For these indicators there are no similar expected or "rational" patterns explaining the levels of anxiety. Our preliminary finding is that the paradox presented earlier in this text is not dissolved when the analysis is extended to include different subgroups, but needs to be handled at the theoretical level.

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Testing the politics of presence
A comparative study on the importance of gender, class, and ethnicity in the Swedish parliament

Lena Wängnerud

Anne Phillips's book "The Politics of Presence" was published in 1995. The impact on research and public debate was immediate and strong. This theory posits that women politicians are best equipped to represent women's interests. From its basis in sociology, what the theory actually says is that everyday life experiences are significant to the formation of political views and behaviours. And it is because women politicians, to a greater extent than male politicians, share life experiences with women voters that they are presumed to be better representatives of women's interests.

The theory of the politics of presence has gained reasonable support in more recent empirical research (Bratton & Ray 2002; Diaz 2005; Lovenduski & Norris 2003; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 2000, 2009). There are studies which show that the political views and priorities of women representatives are closely aligned with those of women voters. Typical examples are that women award higher priority to gender equality and social/family policy than men do. This does not mean that women, across all party lines, advocate the same types of solutions; the common denominator is that women politicians put particular problem areas on the agenda. Hege Skjeie, who was early to perform empirical analyses of the significance of gender to the parliamentary process, uses the term "care and career politics" for the areas on which women politicians put particular emphasis. Skjeie's (1992) studies of the Norwegian Storting show that when the proportion of women MPs rises,

questions pertaining to how people can successfully combine work and family become more central.

The description above, that the theory of the politics of presence says that women politicians are best equipped to represent women's interests, is a simplification. But the basis of the theory is a belief that shared life experiences are a mechanism that will lead to changes of the political agenda and by extension the conditions of people's everyday lives. Phillips describes gender parity among policymakers as essential if women's interests are to be adequately addressed; there "must" be equality among those elected to office:

> There are particular needs, interests, and concerns that arise from women's experience, and these will be inadequately addressed in a politics that is dominated by men. Equal rights to a vote have not proved strong enough to deal with this problem; there must also be equality among those elected to office. (Phillips 1995, 66)

However, Phillips writes nowhere that women politicians must be feminists or otherwise see themselves as the particular representatives of women; the idea is rather that if more people (women) come into the political assemblies who share the life experiences of women voters, it will affect which issues are addressed in policy. Whether or not representatives themselves think about their actions in this way, they act upon social experiences and not only on ideological standpoints. The mechanism is to be likened to an invisible hand.

One of the most interesting challenges to the theory of the politics of presence is

Lena Wängnerud är professor vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet.
E-post: .lena.wangnerud@pol.gu.se

formulated by Iris Marion Young in her book "Inclusion and Democracy" (2000). This alternative approach may be called the theory of the politics of awareness. The central idea in Young's book is that politicians need to consciously relate to a particular group's social experience in order to represent that group's interests. This theory does not rely on women politicians per se, but rather on politicians with a change-oriented agenda. The following quotation shows how Young formulates this alternative point of view. The emphasis in the citation is on giving a voice to and expressing certain experiences:

> First, I feel represented when someone is looking after the interests I take as mine and share with some others. Secondly, it is important to me that the principles, values and priorities that I think should guide political decisions are voiced in discussion. Finally, I feel represented when at least some of those discussing and voting on policies understand and express the kind of social experience I have because of my social group position and the history of social group relations. (Young 2000, 134)

The theory of the politics of presence and the theory of the politics of awareness should probably not be regarded as competing theories. Instead, what I want to bring to the fore is that the theory of the politics of presence needs to be developed. Empirical research shows that not all women politicians promote gender equality or particularly represent the situations of women citizens. Obviously, some male politicians are also active in these areas.

The focus of this project is on the tension between the theory of the politics of presence, emphasizing background characteristics, and the theory of the politics of awareness, emphasizing explicit recognition of group experiences. The core idea is that useful insights could be gained from a comparison of gender, class, and ethnicity. Anne Phillips (1995) herself discusses all three categories but is rather vague when it comes to class and ethnicity. For instance, she argues that ethnicity is an even more heterogeneous

category than gender and that the party-structure in most liberal democracies is built on class cleavages. However, there are few empirical studies that simultaneously try to measure the importance of gender, class, and ethnicity in the parliamentary process. The answer could be that, yes, gender is a special category; but the answer could also be that the mechanisms at work are quite similar across several different categories.

The questions triggered by the preceding discussion are multilayered. The question is not only which politicians are best equipped to represent the interests of certain groups; intense discussion is ongoing in international research on the conditions that would enable "new" groups to have particular impact in parliamentary processes. From a feminist perspective Joni Lovenduski (2005, 48-52) discusses a culture of masculinity, deeply embedded in political institutions, as an obstacle faced by women politicians. This culture is manifest in things like which employees are hired at the parliament, but also in the unspoken rules governing how politics will be run. Other scholars, such as Karen Beckwith (2007), emphasize that there are more women among newly elected representatives and that this ratio affects what kind of impact they can have. As a rule, it takes a certain amount of time for representatives to attain the most influential posts in a parliament. Discussions in feminist-oriented research also deal with the dynamic that may arise when women politicians influence their male colleagues. Skjeie (1992) has described the occurrence of a spill over effect in the Norwegian Storting: the high number of women elected has also helped bring greater attention to women's situations among male representatives.

Thus, research in this field needs to be sensitive to power-relations and seek after interactions between back-ground characteristics such as gender, class, and ethnicity and other characteristics, such as seniority, that might influence the pre-conditions for individual politicians in their parliamentary work. More

specifically, this project will address three related but slightly different research themes:

[1] Who gets elected to the Swedish Parliament? This question implies a comparison of dimensions such as party-affiliation, age, and previous political experience, across gender, class, and ethnicity. The research question is if there is a "double-burden" facing certain groups; that is, as "young newcomers belonging to a party in opposition" and woman/working-class/from a minority group.

[2] Who has power in the Swedish Parliament? This question implies a comparison of the distribution of powerful positions across gender, class, and ethnicity. The focus will be on internal arenas, such as the standing committees in the parliament, but the research question is not only about formal positions; also self-perceived experiences of power and informal possibilities for influencing the parliamentary process will be highlighted.

[3] Who is transforming the political agenda in the Swedish Parliament? This question implies a comparison of political priorities, political standpoints, and the promotion of certain policies across gender, class, and ethnicity. What is particularly under-researched in previous work on parliaments is the importance of certain background characteristics in relation to the content of the parliamentary process. We know more about the other two themes presented above. And yet, this is what the theory of the politics of presence is all about. Phillips (1995, 47) state that "It is…representation with a purpose; it aims to subvert or add or transform."

Arguments for a case-study on the parliamentary process in Sweden

Intersectionality is something of a buzz-word in contemporary debates on political representation. Most researchers recognize the importance of background characteristics such as gender, class, and ethnicity; however few are able to do in-depth studies taking into account more than one category at a time. The advantage with studying the parliamentary process in Sweden is to a large extent pragmatic; here we have a unique set of parliamentary questionnaires, making it possible to shed light on all research themes presented above.

Parliamentary questionnaires have been conducted in 1969, 1985, 1988, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010 (response rates ˜90%). The parliamentary questionnaires are conducted in ways that makes it possible to compare the political views and priorities among parliamentarians with those among voters (the Swedish National Election Study Program). Important to note is that an Internet-based survey will be conducted among all candidates in the 2010 national election in Sweden which enables far-reaching investigations into the theme "Who gets elected."

One possible disadvantage with studying Sweden is that the ideological left-right dimension is strong and that party-discipline is almost taken for granted when it comes to voting in the parliament. However, one could argue that this makes the Swedish case even more interesting. If background characteristics such as gender, class, and ethnicity are able to make an imprint here, then the theory of the politics of presence has gained reasonably strong support. Besides, previous research has shown that gender is an important category in the parliamentary process in Sweden – key here is to use indicators that capture impacts in earlier stages of the parliamentary process than the final vote in the chamber.

What also needs to be discussed in connection to the choice to study Sweden is the long period with a comparatively high number of women elected. Already in the 1980's the proportion of women in the Swedish parliament corresponded to what is commonly defined as a "critical mass." The concept of a critical mass implies that there is a threshold number or a "tipping point" at which the impact of a certain group, like women, becomes apparent in an institution like the parliament; a figure of ˜30% is often

mentioned. Added to this picture should be that recent studies show that the effect of gender is not constant over time; in the Swedish parliament gender differences was most obvious in the 1980's and 1990's (Wängnerud 2010). However, the only solution here is to pay attention to potential thresholds and possible changes over time when drawing conclusions. In a similar vein, I also need to pay attention to contextual factors such as the party-composition in the parliament. In 2010 an anti-immigrant party, the Swedish Democrats, gained seats in the Swedish parliament. This is a new situation which might influence the mechanisms at work, especially in relation to ethnicity but arguably also for other dimensions. The Swedish Democratic Party is heavily male-dominated.

A note on methodology

It goes without saying that parliaments are complex institutions and that it is a methodological challenge to empirically test theories like the politics of presence and the politics of awareness. One suggestion is that studies in this field ought to be longitudinal in design; we should follow what happens "from the start" when representatives from a certain group are few, up to the point when they are present in large numbers (Beckwith 2007). Longitudinal designs of this kind are hard to conduct. An alternative is to use a wide range of indicators in cross-section analysis and include control variables in order to isolate effects of the selected back-ground characteristics.

For the Parliamentary Study 2010 (Riksdagsenkät 2010) I was able to craft questions that enable comparisons across gender, class, and ethnicity in new ways. We have included measurements on the representatives' view of their task like whether it is important to them, personally, to represent the interests of women, workers and/or immigrants (this is an important indicator for the politics of awareness perspective). The questionnaire

also includes a large number of items concerning political priorities, political standpoints, and policy promotion. Furthermore, we emphasize working-conditions and power-relations within the parliament. We have also included a set of questions making it possible to capture representatives "objective" social background (this is an important indicator for the politics of presence perspective). Some of the background characteristics will also be measured through the official information available from the Swedish parliament.

The question of methodology also concern whether it is at all reasonable to focus the political agenda at the elite level of society, when trying to test theories of representation that deal with rather far-reaching transformations. I see this project as an early step in a larger research agenda where, in the long run, the ambition is to capture also transformations regarding actual conditions in the everyday lives of citizens. So far, what I have at hand is the possibility to compare voters and elected representatives across gender, class, and ethnicity, through a number of surveys that, in international comparison, are of outstanding high quality.

I am fully aware of that, even with the restrictions mentioned above, this is an ambitious project. My background is as a specialist studying the importance of gender in the parliamentary process in Sweden. This means that I have generated experience on how to do analyses on categories that are (sometimes) cross-cutting the established party-system. I am also aware of that scholars of intersectionality argue that social structures of gender, class, and ethnicity mutually modify one another and that relationships among these categories can be studied in a number of different ways (Weldon 2006). A qualitative approach is sometimes necessary in order to understand the complexities at work. However, the way I want to push this field forward is through theoretically fine-tuned understandings in combination with

methodological tools firmly established in well-recognized studies on representative democracy (cf. Esaiasson & Heidar 2000).

One part of the process towards fine-tuned understandings is the theoretical reasoning on the concept of "interests". The debate on what constitutes "women's interests" is, for example, intense within feminist-oriented research. Contemporary debates concern features of elitism in gender research – that is, a tendency to ascribe interests to women in a top-down fashion – and also features of essentialism: the tendency to view women and men as fixed, rather than changeable, categories. Debates also concern – as previously touched upon – how gender is related to categories such as ethnicity, age, and class (Dietz 2003).

I have no clear answer to the question of the precise definitions that will be used in this project; however, what should be noted is the notion from Hanna Pitkin (1967) that the concept of interests is "ubiquitous" in debates on representation. To differentiate interests is a matter of concretizing that which various groups can expect to gain through political inclusion. Even though the definitions used will end up a bit simplified, I judge this as a risk worth taking. Gender, class, and ethnicity are categories that can serve as a lens that makes important issues in the field of representation visible: Whom do elected politicians represent? What is at stake in the parliamentary process? What do we know about the interplay between parliaments and the everyday lives of citizens? I hope that this project can add new fuel to all these classic debates.

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Statsvetenskapliga förbundet

Förbundsredaktör: Magnus Erlandsson

Förbundsredaktören har ordet

När det här skrivs återstår ännu några veckor innan Högskoleverkets beslut och tregradiga betygssättning på landets statsvetenskapliga utbildningar – när det här läses vet vi (förmodligen) vilka lärosäten som firar, andas ut eller krishanterar.

Nervositeten har säkert varit olika stark i olika delar av landet. Men kanske har man på alla universitet, högskolor, fakulteter och institutioner på förhand prövat beskan i utlåtandet "bristande kvalitet" och därför förberett sig på det värsta (det som oljeföretaget BP:s styrelse och ledning missade).

Jag gissar att den generella uppmaningen från akademiernas kommunikationsavdelningar, i händelse av ett negativt besked, har varit att "centralisera" dialogen med journalister. Och då med orden "vi tar till oss kritiken och här är vår ambitiösa plan för att rätta till problemen". Att istället börja ifrågasätta granskning, bedömning och beslut är ju att be om ett mer ihållande intresse från medierna.

Men om Högskoleverket hävdar att "utbildningen har *allvarliga* brister" som det heter i kriterierna för underkänt, och om hotet om indraget examenstillstånd därför är reellt, då är det nog snarare mot alla nuvarande (och eventuellt kommande) studenter som krishanteringen ska riktas.

I dessa förbundssidor finner du dels en krönika av statsvetenskapliga förbundets nye ordförande, Jonas Hinnfors, dels en text om statsvetenskaplig undervisning, byggd på råd och tips från några av våra mest uppskattade lärare.

Förbundsordföranden om S-krisen: Samlade statsvetarinsatsen gav allsidighet och analytiskt djup

av Jonas Hinnfors

Förmodligen har statsvetare aldrig förr varit så synliga i den allmänna debatten som under turerna kring Håkan Juholts korta partiledarskap. Knappast en dag gick utan att en eller flera – oftast flera – statsvetare i olika medier kommenterade och analyserade socialdemokraternas kris. Alla uppskattar dock inte statsvetarnärvaron. Bland annat skrev Björn Elmbrant den 25 januari i *Dagens Arena* att så kallade "experter" – ofta med statsvetartillhörighet – alltför ofta seglar under falsk sakkunskapsflagg när de i själva verket inte kan sina områden. Men eftersom de är "billiga" är de populära bland medierna, hävdade Elmbrant.

VÄLUNDERBYGGDA KOMMENTARER

Säkert uttalar sig vi statsvetare ibland om saker vi inte självklart är experter på och jag kan ju inte gå i god för att alla i detalj kan det de kommenterar. Jag vill ändå påstå att Björn Elmbrant inte riktigt förstått vad som menas med "expert". I fallet med socialdemokratins kris var det, menar jag, fullt möjligt att ge välunderbyggda kommentarer från en mängd centrala statsvetenskapliga synvinklar. Naturligtvis är forskning om svensk och/eller internationell "socialdemokrati" – vad det nu mer exakt är – relevant. Men lika självklart är forskning om politiskt ledarskap, om partibeteende, om väljarbeteende, om partiorganisation, om partikultur och om ideologi utmärkta underlag för att med stor pondus och legitimitet kunna göra kloka analyser av den kris vårt största riksdagsparti genomgick. Snarare än att vara ett exempel på lånta fjädrar och falska flaggor visade floden av

statsvetarkommentarer den bredd i expertisen som finns inom vårt ämne. Den samlade statsvetenskapliga insatsen gav tidningsläsare och radiolyssnare/tevetittare – vågar jag påstå – precis den allsidighet och det distanserade analytiska djup som debatten kring social-demokratins kris behövde. Elmbrants eget förslag, att medierna själva skall stå för analyserna och kommentarerna, ser jag däremot som problematisk. Vari skulle själva "expertisen" bestå med en sådan ordning?

TYST REVOLUTION I STATSVETARKÅREN

Framförallt tror jag vi statsvetare drillas i något som är en särskilt viktig expertegenskap: analytisk förmåga grundad på ett kritiskt förhållningssätt. Att förmå vrida och vända på en problematik, att urskilja logiska felgrepp lika väl som att kunna systematisera skeenden, är något som präglar vårt alltmer professionaliserade ämne.

Under de senaste tio åren har vi som ämneskollektiv egentligen genomgått ett slags tyst revolution. Från att skriva monografier på svenska skriver vi nu en och annan monografi men i övrigt artiklar i internationella tidskrifter. Från att ha vänt oss inåt vänder vi oss nu utåt – och framförallt utsätter vi oss för en tuff och ibland ganska jobbig kritik som peer reviewer levererar.

Visst finns det risker med tidskriftsutvecklingen. Tendenser till likriktning skall inte underskattas – och det faktum att vi måste skriva på ett främmande språk ger oss en konkurrensnackdel gentemot britter och amerikaner (men knappast gentemot alla andra icke-engelsktalande). Men den skärpning vi tvingas till när vi får de hårda kommentarerna kan i det långa loppet enbart vara av godo. Plötsligt har kretsen av kunniga bedömare som kan ge kritisk och konstruktiv kritik på våra manus vidgats från enbart svenska stats-vetare till i princip alla världens. Framförallt – det är min egen dyrköpta erfarenhet – är det grundläggande analytiskt förhållningssätt som får sig en duvning av peer reviewer. Utan det analytiska grundhandlaget hjälper det inte

om ämnet är spännande, metoden rimlig eller materialet lämpligt.

SLAGKRAFTIG FÖRBUNDSKONFERENS

Ett institutionaliserat tillfälle när vi tvingas försvara oss och öppna oss för kritik är förstås även konferenser/workshops. Utan något annat än intuition är jag ändå säker på att antalet konferenser medelstatsvetaren åker på per år har ökat enormt det senaste decenniet och utbytet i form av analytisk skärpa hos oss alla kan nog inte överskattas. Att kunna erbjuda en slagkraftig svensk förbundskonferens är därför viktigare än någonsin. De senaste årens förbundskonferenser visar också hur en kritiskt analytisk grundhållning verkligen har tagit plats i vårt gemensamma statsvetenskapliga akademiska samtal – från doktorander upp till professorer.

Viktigt för diskussionernas bredd och djup är förstås att alla faktiskt kommer till konferensen. De senaste årens deltagarsiffror bådar gott för framtiden och av det jag hittills fått veta av årets statsvetarmöte i Växjö, på Linnéuniversitet 26-28 september, har vi att se fram emot ett mycket spännande program med ovanligt stor bredd i arbetsgrupper, med mycket spännande paneler vid sidan av arbetsgrupperna och med utmärkt organisation. Alla statsvetare bör beställa biljett till Växjö – det är ett sätt att bidra till den analytiska skärpa och det samtal som bär upp vårt ämne.

KONSEKVENSER AV NYA INCITAMENT

Mitt i allt detta förmodligen lätt smetiga självberöm över vårt ämnes förträfflighet finns ändå anledning fundera en liten stund över vilka incitamentsstrukturer som vårt artikelskrivande och forskningsfokus har fört med sig? Utan att göra anspråk på total överblick över landet tycker jag mig ändå se att det vid tjänstetillsättningar i statsvetenskap i princip är så att när det gäller pedagogiska meriter är det en viss hyfsad mininivå sökande skall uppnå. Den slutliga rangordningen sker därefter mest på grundval av vetenskaplig

kompetens.

För att kunna undervisa på ett bra sätt måste man naturligtvis ha en solid vetenskaplig grund att stå på, men i det långa loppet är det nog kontraproduktivt om de vetenskapliga toppkrafterna i vårt ämne i första hand satsar på just sin forskning. Vi brukar som ett mantra hävda att goda statsvetenskapliga institutioner mår bäst av om alla är lärare och forskare med ungefär 50/50 av undervisning och forskning. Jag känner till ganska få exempel på där det verkligen är så. Varken forskarhotell eller undervisningsövertunga institutioner gynnar långsiktigt den återväxt av studenter, doktorander och lärare/forskare som analytiskt spänstig statsvetenskap behöver. Jag hoppas sådana här aspekter kommer att utgöra en viktig ingrediens i de diskussioner som följer på HSV:s snart avslutade utvärdering av undervisningsämnet statsvetenskap.

STATSVETARE GRANSKAR STATSVETARE

Att vårt undervisningsämne just nu utvärderas via peer review, dvs. av statsvetare, ser jag som mycket positivt. Formerna för utvärderingen kan diskuteras – och diskussionerna kommer säkert att bli ganska omfattande framöver – men grunden att statsvetare utvärderar statsvetare är sund. Om än i liten skala har även HSV:s utvärderargrupp ett viktigt internationellt inslag. På samma sätt som att vi öppnar oss för internationell kritik av vår forskning är det bra att göra det om vår utbildning.

Sammantaget gynnar det sådant som gör att vi står på stabil mark som experter – både inom ämnet och genom att bidra i den allmänna debatten.

Jonas Hinnfors är professor i statsvetenskap, Göteborgs universitet och ordförande i Statsvetenskapliga förbundet. E-post: jonas.hinnfors@pol.gu.se

Om statsvetenskaplig undervisning

av Magnus Erlandsson

Det finns få genvägar att ta på resan mot att bli en bra och uppskattad lärare i statsvetenskap. Även om man likt en skådespelare ibland kan skylla på publiken, har man som lärare det mesta i sin egen hand. Den både breda och djupa kunskap som krävs för att få studenternas förtroende tar tid att bygga upp, liksom vanan att möta, tala inför och hantera små, stora och ibland splittrade grupper av studenter.[1]

Men låt säga att vi (lite förmätet, kanske) kan det mesta om vårt ämne och att spänningen inför kursstarten är på lagom nivå – vilka råd och tips kan några av våra prisbelönta lärare ge till oss andra? Följ med på ett samtal[2] mellan sju lärare från skilda subdiscipliner och lärosäten.

OM UNDERVISNINGENS FORMER OCH METODER

Det kan tyckas lite märkligt att institutionen "föreläsning" finns kvar, långt efter att det ursprungliga syftet fallit undan – att låta boklösa, medeltida studenter få lyssna till uppläsningar direkt från den kanske i ett enda exemplar tryckta källan. Men få kurser, åtminstone på grundnivå, genomförs idag utan några inslag av föreläsningar.

– Studenterna vill ha föreläsningar för att känna att de får valuta för pengarna. Men det är viktigt med ett aktivt deltagande för att få studenterna att "luta sig framåt istället för bakåt". Så jag ser till att det finns seminarieinslag i alla lektioner och föreläsningar, säger

1   Före mitt eget allra första undervisningstillfälle ringde studierektorn och frågade om han fick sitta med. Den förhöjda nervositeten sjönk när studierektorn tog rollen som diskussionsglad student.

2   Texten bygger på en enkät med frågor om undervisning till de i texten citerade lärarna, sänd via e-post (så "samtal" är möjligen en något missvisande etikett).

Alexa Robertson[3], docent vid Stockholms universitet.

Så här säger Linda Berg[4], vikarierande lektor vid Göteborgs universitet.

– Jag gillar blandningen av olika former av undervisning, men allra bäst är när man som lärare får chansen att följa studenters utveckling genom handledning, uppsatskursledning och seminarieserier.

Anders Uhlin[5], professor vid Lunds universitet, trivs allra bäst i rollen som seminarieledare för en mindre seminariegrupp eller som handledare, individuellt och i grupp.

– Det är då det finns goda möjligheter att få i gång en kreativ dialog och utgå från studenternas individuella lärandeprocess, men också utnyttja gruppdynamiken för att skapa en god lärandemiljö.

Många studenter uppfattar studentaktiva undervisningsformer som väldigt krävande och föredrar traditionella föreläsningar som inte kräver så mycket egen aktivitet, menar Anders Uhlin.

– Välstrukturerade föreläsningar som sätter in kurslitteraturen i ett bredare sammanhang och hjälper studenterna att relatera olika delar av litteraturen till varandra, och skapar entusiasm för ämnet, kan i och för sig vara en viktig del av en kurs. Det är dock viktigt att mer studentaktiva undervisningsformer som skapar bättre förutsättningar för djupinlärning inte väljs bort även om de initialt kan möta motstånd från flera av studenterna, säger Anders Uhlin.

Rollspel är en alltmer utnyttjad form för praktisk undervisning. Särskild uppmärksamhet har kursen "Grundlagskonventet" vid statsvetenskapliga institutionen i Göteborg fått, med inslag av just rollspel. Henrik

Ekengren Oscarsson[6], professor i statsvetenskap vid Göteborgs universitet, menar att samarbete i lärarlag är en utmärkt väg för att skapa bra kurser och rollspelsövningar.

– Om studenterna ser att lärarna har kul ihop och tar uppgiften på allvar och har hög ambitionsnivå så smittar det direkt av sig på studenterna – och det märks direkt på deras prestationer, säger Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson.

LÄRARLAG OCH ALTERNATIV TILL LÄRARLAG

Alexa Robertson har inte så många erfarenheter av att jobba i lärarlag, och tror att institutionernas ekonomi är förklaringen: fler än en lärare i klassrummet kostar pengar.

– Men det jag har haft har varit mycket viktigt och utvecklande och jag längtar ständigt tillbaka till dessa stunder av samarbete och gemenskap. Jobbar man i lärarlag är det någon annan än studenterna som ser vad man gör; det finns någon annan att prata igenom lyckade och misslyckade lektioner med.

Alexa Robertson hade under en termin som så kallad STINT Fellow i USA förmånen att undervisa i samband med ett särskilt program, Excellence in Teaching, på Bryn Mawr College, där hon tilldelades en avlönad student, som inte var statsvetare, men som följde hela kursen och hade en "debriefing" med Alexa efter varje lektion.

– Istället för att bara oroa sig för vad som skulle finnas på tentan fokuserade hon studentperspektivet och delade med sig av snacket hon hörde, om det som funkade och det som inte funkade. Varannan vecka hade hon och jag konstruktiva möten med föreståndaren för högskolans pedagogiska centrum. Det var en fantastiskt bra förmån.

Karl Magnus Johansson[7], professor vid

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3   Mottagare av Stockholms universitets individuella pedagogiska pris 2004.

4   Belönad 2011 (som lärare på Europaprogrammen) med Göta Studentkårs individuella pedagogiska pris.

5   Anders Uhlin utsågs 2011 till Excellent Teaching Practitioner av Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten på Lunds universitet.

6   Belönad 2006 (tillsammans med Andreas Bågenholm och Elin Naurin) med Göteborgs universitets pedagogiska lagpris för kursen "Grundlagskonventet".

7   Mottagare 2011 av "Gullegripen", Södertörns högskolas studentkårs pedagogiska pris.

Södertörns högskola, har mest positiva erfarenheter av lärarlagssamarbeten.

– Men samtidigt, på sätt och vis är det enklare på egen hand, för överblick och konsekvens – och rent administrativt.

VAD ÄR EGENTLIGEN "GOD UNDERVISNING"?

God undervisning, menar flera, är sådan undervisning som ger studenter redskap att ifrågasätta och redskap som hjälper dem att göra egna, självständiga analyser av olika fenomen. Det är något annat än att bara "ta emot och återge information".

– God undervisning innebär att studenter lämnar mitt klassrum med fler frågor än de kom in med – men med idéer om hur de skall kunna besvara dessa frågor! säger Alexa Robertson.

Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson menar att ett kriterium på god undervisning är när en grupp samlas för att lösa en gemensam uppgift som leder fram till något konkret som kan presenteras i slutet av kurserna.

– Som till exempel våra forskarrapporter som blir en kursbok i slutet på kursen i Avancerad tillämpad statistik eller de "kommittebetänkanden" som blir slutprodukten från vårt grundlagskonvent.

För Karl Magnus Johansson är kontakten med studenterna det avgörande:

– God undervisning är att "truly connect" med studenterna. Det kräver att man är väl förberedd, att man kommunicerar på "rätt sätt" och att man bemöter studenterna med intresse och respekt.

FÖRBEREDELSER OCH ENGAGEMANG

Förberedelser tycks ingen mena att man klarar sig utan. Eller ett eget starkt intresse för det man undervisar om.

– Om jag själv inte har ett engagemang för de saker som jag undervisar om så är det osannolikt att jag ska kunna uppbåda engagemang för dessa saker bland studenterna,

säger Karl-Oskar Lindgren[8], lektor vid Uppsala universitet.

– God undervisning kräver en engagerad lärare, kunnig och väl förberedd, som lyckas förmedla en egen passion och ett eget intresse för de frågor som behandlas i kursen, säger Linda Berg. Men saker måste också fungera vid sidan och runt om mötet med studenter i lektionssalen. Bra undervisning förutsätter naturligtvis goda institutionella ramar med rimliga villkor och bra samspel med annan viktig personal som till exempel kursadministratörer och med utbildningens helhet.

UNDERVISNINGENS KRAV PÅ LÄRARE OCH STUDENTER

God undervisning gör studenternas lärande möjligt, hävdar Anders Uhlin, som menar att det förutsätter att läraren reflekterar över hur studenterna uppfattar kurssinnehåll och undervisningsformer och att läraren strävar efter att förändra studenternas förståelse av olika fenomen.

– Den goda undervisningen utmärks av att lärare och studenter tillsammans skapar en lärandemiljö som uppmuntrar studenterna till att ta en djupinriktning till lärande och utveckla ett holistiskt tänkande. Därmed präglas den goda undervisningen mer av studenternas egen aktivitet än passivt lyssnande till en föreläsare, säger Anders Uhlin.

Hans recept är att planera och genomföra undervisning och examination på ett sådant sätt att det blir möjligt för studenterna att nå högt ställda lärandemål – som till exempel förmågan att analysera, teoretisera, generalisera och reflektera. Utifrån denna pedagogiska filosofi är läraren snarast en mentor som ska inspirera och vägleda studenterna i deras sökande efter kunskap och färdigheter.

– Den goda undervisningen präglas av att den förmedlar ett kritiskt förhållningssätt till samhällsvetenskaplig litteratur och övar studenternas analytiska förmåga. Det innebär att det är viktigt att kritiskt

8   Mottagare av Uppsala universitets ped. pris.

diskutera kurslitteraturen utifrån vetenskapliga kriterier.

SVÅRT ATT SKRIVA UT ALLTID LYCKADE RECEPT

Flera av lärarna återkommer till att det är svårt att luta sig tillbaka efter en lyckad kurs, i ett slags förvissning om att kursen nu inte behöver utvecklas och förändras. För kursen blir annorlunda nästa gång, eftersom klassen inte kommer att vara densamma, eftersom några böcker måste bytas ut, eftersom lärarlaget förändras, eftersom kursen flyttas till en annan del av utbildningen etc.

– Och varje gång jag förbereder mig för nästa föreläsning, seminarium eller kurs undrar jag om det kommer att lyckas eller inte – vilket säger mig att jag aldrig har hittat "Receptet med stort R". Det innebär ett stressmoment men också något som gör att jag aldrig blir uttråkad av mitt jobb, säger Alexa Robertson.

– Något som fungerar bra är när vi tar ett lite banalt exempel och "packar upp det", och gör vetenskap av det, säger Alexa Robertson. Medier och politik som jag undervisar i är ett tacksamt ämne – alla är "experter" eftersom vi alla är mediekonsumenter. Nästan vilken nyhet eller artikel som helst kan bli inkörsport till en diskussion om saker som annars kan upplevas som abstrakta för vissa studenter. Medieforskning är kanske inte riktigt "mainstream" inom svensk statsvetenskap, men den innehåller allt som statsvetarna intresserar sig för – frågor om makt, demokrati, representation, identitet, globalisering, den offentliga sfären, ansvar osv.

Alexa Robertson möter ofta många utbytesstudenter i sitt klassrum.

– Och mångfalden blir en pedagogisk resurs. Studenterna jämför sina erfarenheter av olika politiska kulturer och mediekulturer – och genom grupparbeten får de konfronteras med de många saker de annars tagit för givna.

KURSUTVECKLING GENOM TVÄRVETENSKAP

Enligt Linda Berg är samarbete över disciplinerna den mest utmanande och stimulerande vägen till bättre kurser och program.

– Det är på samma gång det svåraste men också den mest spännande formen av kursutveckling att skapa genuint tvärvetenskapliga kurser, där förståelsen för komplexa samband ofta förutsätter att vi ser på samma fenomen från olika håll, med olika glasögon. En riktigt bra kurs, menar Linda Berg, gynnas därför av att lärare från olika ämnen bidrar med sina ämneskunskaper och traditioner och av att alla lärare behöver sätta sig in i varandras forskning och undervisningstraditioner. Tillsammans skapar lärarna något som är större än de olika delarna, det vill säga genuin tvärvetenskap och inte olika delkurser staplade på varandra.

– Det är utmanande och tidskrävande men otroligt givande när det fungerar!

Fördelarna, menar Linda Berg, är kvaliteten och studenternas ökade förståelse för komplexa samband när samma fenomen studeras från olika håll.

Nackdelarna är att det tar längre tid och kräver mer fingertoppskänsla och samarbetsförmåga att överbrygga olika traditioner och forskningsbredd.

– Dessutom är ofta de institutionella strukturerna – i alla fall på de större universiteten – uppbyggda kring ämnestillhörighet, vilket kan försvåra för tvärvetenskaplig utbildning när inte alla institutioner stödjer ett sådant arbete och inte släpper till tillräckliga lärarresurser, säger Linda Berg.

Det är också så att incitamentsstrukturer i form av meriteringsvärde ofta gynnar det renodlat ämnesdisciplinära och de ensamt kursansvariga.

– Det senare är märkligt på många sätt eftersom de flesta som sysslat med både och, vet att det är enklare att utveckla en kurs ensam, liksom att det går tvärs emot den uppmuntran till tvärvetenskap som finns från centralt håll, säger Linda Berg.

OM EXAMINATIONSFORMER

Salstentor (som ett verktyg att mäta och betygsätta studenternas prestationer) har fört en tynande tillvaro på våra lärosäten. Men salstentor fångar något som andra examinationsformer missar.

– Salstenta är inte populärt bland studenterna men när vi avskaffat det på nästan hela grundutbildningen ställde vi oss frågan om det inte någonstans vid något tillfälle borde vara en regelrätt salstenta. Pluralism i examensformer är mer rättvist, säger Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson.

Alexa Robertson har i många år använt case som examinationsform, vilket varit uppskattat av studenterna (även om dessa examinationer krävt mycket av studenternas tid – och av läraren).

– Det kan hänga ihop med stigande ålder, men jag har också oroat mig på senare år vad gäller kunskapen som studenterna tar med sig när de lämnar klassrummet. Jag tror att de flesta har fått träna på sin analytiska förmåga, men jag undrar ofta om de verkligen kan det som de borde kunna? Jag måste erkänna att jag ibland funderat på att införa tenta, för att vara säker på att studenterna förstått ämnets centrala debatter och begrepp, säger Alexa Robertson.

UNDERVISNING OCH FORSKNING

Ibland förs idén fram om en renodlad lärarroll på våra samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteter. Och några av statsvetenskapliga universitets – och högskolelärare är just det, lärare, med bara blygsam andel egen forskning. Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson uttrycker sig frankt om betydelsen av lärarnas närhet till forskning.

– Tappar du kontakten med forskningsfronten är du körd som lärare i statsvetenskap. Alla skall vara forskande lärare. Studenterna skall förvänta sig att läraren framför dem också bedriver egen forskning. Ingen kunskap kan berättas om utan att berätta om hur den kommit till!

– Det är mycket viktigt att undervisningen är forskningsanknuten och forskningsbaserad, säger Karl Magnus Johansson.

– Jag tycker att undervisning, särskilt på mastersnivå, förutsätter närhet till den egna forskningen för att underlätta den fördjupning och forskningsanknytning som eftersträvas, säger Linda Berg.

OM NIVÅSKILLNADER OCH STUDIEOVANA STUDENTER

Flera lärare använder sig av e-post som ett komplement till undervisningen i lektionssal. E-posten blir bland annat ett verktyg för att möta och föra dialog med de studenter som inte vill eller vågar ta plats i klassrummet, trots att de sitter på många frågor, och som känner sig osäkra.

I Göteborg är det inför avancerade kurser vanligt med så kallade recap-föreläsningar.

– Det gör vi för att samla ihop gruppen inför de olika kursmomenten och där ger vi tydliga instruktioner om vad som krävs för att tillgodogöra sig undervisningen. Det är viktigt, särskilt när vi som lärosäten "lånar" studenter av varandra, säger Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson.

Karl-Oskar Lindgren menar att nivåskillnader är ett problem som inte har någon direkt lösning.

– Man får väl helt enkelt försöka hitta en nivå som är rätt för de flesta. Risken med detta är dock att ingen blir riktigt nöjd.

De möten som Alexa Robertson har haft mest extra arbete med är inte dem med studenter från det vi kallar studieovana grupper, utan med studenter från andra vetenskapliga kulturer.

– I många länder lär man studenterna att plikttroget skriva ned vartenda ord som professorn säger och rabbla upp dem igen på tentan eller i uppsatsen. Det är väldigt svårt att lära sådana studenter att göra en självständig analys. Man kan inte säga att de är studieovana, men de är ovana inför studier som bedrivs på svenska lärosäten. För dem gäller det att vara supertydlig med det som efterfrågas, samt att hitta på uppgifter som gör att de

tvingas träna på självständiga analyser, säger Alexa Robertson.

STUDENTERNAS RÄDSLA ATT TALA INFÖR GRUPP

Det finns säkert många lärare i statsvetenskap som idag föreläser obehindrat inför fullsatta auditorium – men som studenter en gång våndades inför uppgiften att presentera en uppgift inför en handfull klasskamrater.

Vägen till att få fler studenter att våga tala kan vara att låta större grupper delas in i mindre för samtal utanför klassrummet. Ibland kan det räcka med några lyckade försök för att låsa upp knutarna.

– Jag hade nyligen en student som hade läkarintyg på att hon inte kunde prata inför grupp. Efter två veckor där lektionsarbetet förbereddes i mindre grupper utanför klassrummet deltog hon aktivt framför alla oss andra. Jag blev jätteglad när hon valde att försvara C-uppsatsen med alla andra, och inte i enrum som hon hade rätt till. Man skall känna uppmuntran, inte tvång, säger Alexa Robertson.

– Det brukar hjälpa att säga att det inte är talang som styr det där, säger Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson. Endast hårt arbete och noggranna förberedelser. Jag uppmanar alla att öva på sina framträdanden framför spegeln och klocka dem. I det här sammanhanget är det okej att lyckas; värre är om de kommer ut på arbetsmarknaden utan att kunna hålla en begriplig femminuters presentation.

– Jag ger dem direkta men inledningsvis enkla frågor för att övervinna sin rädsla, säger Karl-Oskar Lindgren.

PRAKTISKA TIPS FÖR DELTAGANDE

Linda Berg säger att hon med sin undervisning vill väcka tankar, utmana föreställningar och diskutera svåra frågor.

– I seminarieform är det där enklare, men under föreläsningar lägger jag ibland in bikupediskussioner, eller låter studenterna med hjälp av röda och gröna lappar få svara på frågor eller gissa om till exempel statistik för att undvika för mycket passivitet och göra även

de mer tystlåtna deltagande.

Anders Uhlin lägger ner ganska mycket tid i början av en ny kurs på att diskutera det gemensamma ansvaret för att skapa en så god lärandemiljö som möjligt. Det handlar om att skapa en öppen och tillåtande seminariekultur där alla känner att de kan bidra och uppmuntrar varandras inlägg.

– Jag talar om att jag själv fortfarande kan känna ett obehag inför att tala i en grupp och att det är något naturligt. Genom att vara väl förberedd och ha tänkt igenom vad man vill säga innan seminariet blir det lättare att faktiskt begära ordet. Samtidigt uppmanar jag dem som vet med sig att de talar mycket och gärna att vara något återhållsamma och ge utrymme åt dem som inte finner det lika naturligt att ta plats.

Anders Uhlin försöker också skapa ett avslappnat diskussionsklimat där det är tillåtet att säga konstiga saker och staka sig utan rädsla att det ska påverka betyget. Förberedande diskussioner i små grupper om 2-3 studenter är ett annat klassiskt sätt att få med samtliga studenter i diskussionen.

– Genom att markera att muntliga presentationer inte är en del av examinationen på kursen kan man avdramatisera situationen och förhoppningsvis göra det lättare för alla att tala inför gruppen, säger Anders Uhlin.

LÄRARYRKETS BEKYMMER...

Linda Berg uttrycker viss oro över att incitamentsstrukturerna så tydligt premierar forskning över utbildning.

– På sikt riskerar det att undergräva den goda utbildning som i sig är en förutsättning för att få fram framtidens goda forskare. Det handlar om allt från resurstilldelning, meritvärderingar och anställningsförhållanden, till mer kulturella aspekter som synen på undervisning hos enskilda och kollektivt på institutioner. Undervisningens förutsättningar och status behöver stärkas, säger Linda Berg, som menar att hårt slit med att utveckla framgångsrika program och kurser borde löna sig meritmässigt.

– Mycket har hänt när det gäller kraven på

oss som lärare, i form av nya förväntningar på genomströmning, nya regelverk med lärandemål och betygskriterier, och det är positivt, tycker jag, säger Alexa Robertson.

– Men det som är tämligen oförändrat är att ingen verkar bry sig om hur eller vad jag gör i klassrummet – utöver studenterna. Jag har aldrig haft en genomgång med en studierektor om alla kursvärderingar som jag plikttroget har lämnat in – och jag har avverkat minst fyra studierektorer över åren. Och prefekterna har intresserat sig ännu mindre. Alla säger att jag är bra pedagog utan att ha kunnat bilda sig en egen uppfattning. Det är mycket tråkigt, tycker jag, säger Alexa Robertson.

– Jag tycker det är tufft när studenterna inte "håller måttet", när man då blir demoraliserad, så att säga, av studenter som inte har den rätta attityden till studier på denna nivå, säger Karl Magnus Johansson.

... OCH LÄRARYRKETS GLÄDJEÄMNEN

– Roligast är när man flera år efteråt träffar på studenter som berättar att de i efterhand har insett vilken nytta de hade av en kurs de kanske uppfattade som lite jobbig när det begav sig, eller att man var den lärare som gjorde störst intryck på dem under hela utbildningen, eller den omedelbara reaktionen i ett klassrum när man märker att ett komplicerat samband går hem, eller att en student som haft svårt att förstå något plötsligt fattar, eller att något de trott varit enkelt/tråkigt visade

sig vara mycket mer intressant än de trott och de vill stanna kvar efteråt och diskutera mer, säger Linda Berg.

– Och när man får e-mail mitt i natten, eller en månad eller ett år efter kursen slutat, från en student som skriver "jag har funderat på vad du sade och...", säger Alexa Robertson.

– Att i slutet av en kurs kunna läsa i en 150 sidor lång kursbok med forskarrapporter som håller mycket hög klass gör mig mycket stolt, säger Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson.

– Roligast, det är att uppleva studenter som utvecklas, som vill lära och verkligen vill utvecklas, och gör det, säger Karl Magnus Johansson.

– De kursvärderingar jag värderar högst, säger Alexa Robertson, är de som pågår länge och som jag får från de duktiga studenterna som inte fått ett särskilt bra betyg när vi möttes i klassrummet – men som skriver till mig flera år senare och berättar att de har grubblat på feedbacken som de fick av mig, och kommit fram till att det var helt rätt att de inte fick spets den där gången. Flera av mina "besvikna studenter" har hållit kontakt med mig i många år och det har varit givande att följa deras utveckling – även om deras löneutveckling gör mig som universitetslektor grön av avund.

Magnus Erlandsson är förbundsredaktör.
E-post: Magnus.Erlandsson@mah.se

Litteraturgranskningar

Litteraturredaktör: Rickard Andersson

Lilliefeldt, Emelie, 2011. *European Party Politics and Gender: Configuring Gender-Balanced Parliamentary Presence.* **Stockholm Studies in Politics 141. Stockholm: Stockholms universitet.**

Anmälan av Richard E. Matland

Emelie Lilliefeldt's dissertation, *European Political Parties and Gender: Configuring Gender-Balanced Parliamentary Presence* looks at a much studied question, women's representation in parliament, and extends the literature in two important ways.[1] First, she takes a multiple methods approach and, most importantly, applies Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to the question of representation. Second, she is particularly interested in representation in Eastern Europe and whether our understanding of parties based in the West actually applies in the East.

Relying on the existing literature and her own analysis, she gets to the nub of the problem which is how do parties act when determining which candidates to nominate, especially in winnable positions. She reviews the literature looking at the impact of party organizational structure: centralized versus decentralized structures and bureaucratic versus informal structures, party beliefs both in terms of party ideology and the willingness to adopt quotas. She notes the institutional structure will have an impact as the electoral system, through party magnitude, is likely to impact women's ability to win office. The political culture is going to also impact women's willingness to run for and win

office. Finally, the supply of female candidates will be impacted via educational equality and women's labor force participation levels, especially access to the professions from which candidates are typically promoted.

To determine how these factors come together and produce levels of representation Lilliefeldt uses three separate analyses. First, she analyzes Western European data using Fuzzy Set QCA. Second, she uses a comparative case analysis of Eastern European party data. Third, she does an in depth case study of one specific outlier, the New Era party in Latvia, which has high levels of women's representation, despite not having any of the characteristics we normally would expect to occur in parties where women are especially well represented. The pieces fit well together in emphasizing her concerns and presenting an interesting case.

For her initial analysis, Lilliefeldt reanalyzes data used by Miki Caul Kittelson in her article on the adoption of gender quotas across political parties in Western Europe (Caul 2001). Professor Caul Kittelson used multivariate statistical analyses to evaluate the impact of a series of variables on quota adoption. Lilliefeldt evaluates the same set of political parties, but from a distinctly different angle. She is interested in the degree to which political parties are gender balanced and she uses QCA to evaluate this. QCA is a tool that has been used primarily by sociologists, but has increasingly been picked up by political scientists. Introduced by Charles Ragin (1987) and refined several times in his later work, QCA is a tool used for rigorously analyzing a group of cases using Boolean algebra and set theory.

On the one hand, QCA can be seen as introducing greater methodological rigor into qualitative work. QCA takes a group of cases

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[1]   This discussion builds upon my work as the opponent on Emelie Lilliefeldt's doctoral dissertation defense at Stockholm University, December 9th, 2011.

and sets out to rigorously identify which conditions are necessary for an identified outcome and which conditions are sufficient for that outcome. QCA requires the researcher to outline a specific outcome (effectively defining a minimum level of the dependent variable as a success). It then requires the researcher to identify conditions (effectively independent variables). Each case is described in terms of either meeting or not meeting the conditions laid out. Crisp Set QCA requires identifying each case as either having or not having an independent condition (0,1). Fuzzy Set QCA includes an intermediate measure to identify cases in between the two clear ends (0, $1/2$, 1). After defining these conditions you look for the minimum number of conditions that combined insure ALL cases are correctly identified as being in the appropriate outcome category (i.e. success or failure).

While there has been an enormous movement in research methods to increase rigor in qualitative research (King, Keohane & Verba 1994; Brady & Collier 2010), Ragin's goal goes beyond this. He is not only interested in increasing the rigor of qualitative methods, he also openly questions the explained variance methods of traditional quantitative tools, arguing QCA is a superior tool to standard statistical methods in many cases. In making this argument QCA supporters emphasize a belief in equifinality and interactive effects. Equifinality is the belief that it is possible to get to the same outcome in several different ways. Rather than expecting there to be one unique manner in which to reach an outcome, equifinality suggests it is possible to reach an outcome in a number of ways. Furthermore, QCA analysts are skeptical to the idea that individual independent variables have consistent independent effects on a dependent variable, regardless of the values of other variables in the relevant context. QCA is interested in identifying the cluster of variables which together will lead to an expected outcome. Ragin asserts that outcomes are far more likely to be the results of a combination of factors all being present than uniform effects of a set of variables working independently. He posits social science is often an attempt to find the correct recipe that leads to a desired outcome rather than assuming homogeneity of impact.

To visualize this distinction we can look at Figure 1 which shows a hypothetical mapping of the expected impacts of Party ideology (degree of leftness), Party Magnitude (a measure of the electoral system), and Socio-Economic Standing of Women (levels of education and labor force participation). The independent effects line shows that for each variable, as it increases (i.e. as a party becomes more ideologically leftist, as party magnitude increases, and as socio-economic standing of women increases), each has an independent effect that increases women's representation. The interaction effects line, however, shows that even when parties become more leftist and party magnitude increases there is likely to be little impact unless the socio-economic standing of women also increases. In effect all three factors are necessary. If only one or two of these factors exists there is likely to be little impact; all three factors are needed to complete the recipe.

A statistically inclined researcher might quickly respond that it would be entirely possible to test the theory outlined by the interactive effect. All one need do is include two-way and three-way interaction effects in the model. While formally true, the reality is that statistical modelers rarely if ever test for three-way interactions and rarely if ever describe their theories in terms of complex interactions that must occur before actions proceed. The QCA approach consciously looks for a "recipe" or formula where several variables combined lead to the desired outcome. Ragin argues that to the degree these complex interactions are more likely to describe social phenomena, the more likely QCA is to be better at identifying such phenomena.

Lilliefeldt looks at data from 57 Western European political parties from the late 1980s

Figure 1. Independent vs. interactive effects.

so that she can compare her results with those of Caul. Her outcome variable of interest is a gender balanced party. This is defined as parties that have greater than a 20 percent proportion of women in their parliamentary delegation (in the late 1980s). After running the QCA model she finds a variety of factors which, when combined, always lead to the desired outcome of a gender balanced party. In total there are eight different paths to equal parties. For example small parties with a strong leftist ideology in countries with closed lists and local candidate selection processes are uniformly gender balanced. Large parties which operate in countries with a strong egalitarian social structure, local candidate selection, and closed list selection processes also are uniformly gender balanced.

While at first glance finding a variety of different paths to equality appears to provide a strong endorsement of Fuzzy Set QCA methodology, on closer inspection I am less convinced. Ragin's model at an abstract theory level makes a compelling case for analyzing data in the manner he proposes. When we see how it works in practice, however, I believe there are reasons to be concerned

about this tool. In particular, the dichotomous or trichotomous nature of the coding of the independent variables makes for a very difficult set of decisions which are not always easily defensible. Gender balanced parties in 1989 in Western Europe are defined as parties with greater than 20 percent women's representation. In 2009 in Eastern Europe it is defined as parties with greater than 25 percent representation, even though the average proportion of women in parliamentary delegations was lower in Eastern Europe in 2009 than in Western Europe in 1989. For each of the independent variables: party size, decentralization of candidate selection, women's socio-economic standing, the researcher must decide whether a condition exists or not (0, 1) or falls into a fuzzy middle category (0, $\frac{1}{2}$, 1). Lilliefeldt is aware this is not unproblematic, but argues that by explicitly defining these conditions the researcher brings out in the open their definitions in a way that is left vague and undefined in other research.

I am more skeptical. If a researcher is clear on how she or he measures a variable then it can be left up to the reader whether they perceive an effect as large or small. My preference

is to NOT define a party as gender balanced, but estimate the impact of a set of independent variables that influence the level of female representation within the party. A researcher has to make many more decisions that may be contentious and may change the outcome of the analysis when using QCA. Defining what is high or low party magnitude, what is high or low levels of socio-economic status for women, and when a party is a halfway fuzzy party in terms of ideology and when it is clearly a leftist or rightist party are all difficult. If the underlying variable is continuous it seems defining a specific cut point and concentrating on whether you are above or below that point is making our work unnecessarily difficult. The standard refrain of statistical analysts is that "you should never throw away data", but at a 20 percent cut point a 22 percent female delegation is defined as the equivalent of a 44 percent female delegation. Perhaps if a compelling case can be made that there are sharp discontinuities so that parties above 20 percent act in a materially different manner than parties below 20 percent it would be easier to accept the use of QCA. Alternatively, it should be possible to run several iterations of QCA with different cut points. These sensitivity analyses would make it possible to determine whether the outcomes are fairly robust and not dependent on the specific definitions used in the research.

While Lilliefeldt lays out the case for QCA well, my concern is that women's proportion of a parliamentary delegation is not a dependent variable that is appropriately evaluated with this tool. Far more likely are dependent variables that are either clearly dichotomous or represent a broad amalgam of theoretical concepts where the underlying conditions are not continuous. For example Amenta and Halfmann (2000) do a QCA analysis where they distinguish between party systems that are program-oriented and those that are patronage-oriented. They also distinguish between states on whether citizens enjoy extensive or restricted political rights. For variables of these types it seems far more likely that QCA is an effective tool.

Nevertheless, applying QCA to the present case is a useful exercise as it both introduces the use of QCA to political science and it sharpens the understanding of the development of women friendly parties. The concept of equifinality is shown clearly as the results reveal there are a variety of manners in which to arrive at gender equal parties.

The replication of the study by Kittelson is only one part of the Lilliefeldt's work. She also collected data from Eastern Europe parties and does an in depth case study of one of them. The data collected from Eastern European parties is used to describe in detail the various manners in which women gain access across a variety of political parties. Some of those cases are similar to parties in Western Europe, but others take a distinctly unique and Eastern pattern.

In the third analysis Lilliefeldt considers one of those distinctly unique and Eastern European patterns when looking at the Latvian Party New Era. This is an interesting party for a number of reasons. First, Latvia is not a country where women have done particularly well. Only 15 percent of the average parliamentary delegation is female. Yet for New Era their parliamentary delegations averaged fully 41 percent female. How does this come about? Lilliefeldt makes clear that some of the usual expectations do not cover the New Era party. The party is not a party that can be placed on the left side of the political spectrum, nor is it a party that has strong ties to the women's movement. The party is a market oriented center-right party that was likely to find quotas principally unattractive as policy. For all of these reasons one might have expected the party to have a very modest level of women's representation. Yet it has one of the very highest in Eastern Europe.

Why does this occur? Lilliefeldt suggests a number of factors come together to create what becomes an opening for women. First,

New Era was not a party that was started at the time of the reintroduction of democracy. Rather it is a party that was started slightly more than a decade later. The party was built around a previous director of the National Bank who at the time of the creation of the party had not been active in any political party. His image was that of an uncorrupt well-qualified technocrat. The party emphasized precisely this message emphasizing an anti-corruption program and the need for qualified technocrats to help run the government. Furthermore, the party emphasized an open recruitment of possible members and possible candidates. These candidates were vetted in a highly centralized process, but one that was less concerned with previous political experience and more concerned about policy experience. In no way was there an attempt to develop an actively feminist platform. Nevertheless, women had been largely shunned by the other parties. When this interacted with an Eastern European education system that had produced large numbers of well trained women who could answer the call, there was a surge of possible women candidates. One of the other crucial elements was that as a new party there were no existing male candidates who would have to be replaced if women were to become prominent candidates. Finally, women generally are seen as less easily corruptible than men and therefore were a good set of candidates for New Era to strategically emphasize their policy message.

While the issue is not raised, I suspect the strong showing of women for New Era in 2006 and 2010 is due to incumbency effects. Once women were elected in strong numbers in the initial New Era election in 2002, they maintained their floor of support through the next two elections.

The case study chapter is a striking example of the concept of equifinality. While much of the emphasis in the West has been on women's organizations within the parties and women's movements strength, those factors are of little relevance in explaining women's rise in the New Era party. Rather, there was quite a different route that was taken to the improved position of women in the party and in Latvian politics. Unfortunately, the limited data available across all political parties in Eastern Europe made it difficult to test whether this outcome is a completely unique Latvian occurrence or whether this represents a pathway to political power for women in Eastern Europe that did not exist in the West in several countries.

Lilliefeldt's dissertation produces a number of intriguing outcomes and makes several concrete contributions to the literature. While I am not convinced that using QCA as a tool when the dependent variable is a ratio measure, as women's level of representation is, I am quite confident that the use of Fuzzy Set QCA for nominal and ordinal dependent variables is not only appropriate, but will provide distinct answers from those traditional statistical modeling will provide. By applying this new methodology, Lilliefeldt has shown how we can use this tool in political science. I anticipate seeing QCA being increasingly used and as such this represents an exciting study. Furthermore, the case study of New Era and the qualitative comparative analyses of Eastern European parties are useful as descriptions of how the processes in Eastern Europe may differ from those we have seen in the West. I anticipate additional interesting and important work from this talented researcher.

Richard E. Matland is the Rigali Chair in Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago.

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Anmälan av Johan Eriksson

Den 24 mars 1999 inledde NATO flygbombningar mot serbiska mål med hänvisning till att serbiska förband begick grova brott mot civilbefolkningen i Kosovo. I och med att de mänskliga rättigheterna ansågs stå på spel hävdade NATO att Förbundsrepubliken Jugoslaviens integritet och okränkbarhet var av underordnat värde. NATO benämnde angreppen "humanitär intervention", ett språkbruk som var särskilt viktigt för legitimeringen eftersom insatserna genomfördes utan FN-mandat, då Ryssland hade lagt in veto i Säkerhetsrådet.

Kanada var ett av de länder som allra tydligast försvarade interventionen. Kanadensiska regeringen klargjorde att mänskliga rättigheter inte bara i detta fall, utan generellt sett, skulle prioriteras framför staters okränkbarhet. Idén om "responsibility to protect", ofta uttryckt som akronymen R2P ("skyldighet att skydda"), blev därmed en ledstjärna för kanadensisk utrikespolitik. Samtidigt tog Kanada initiativ till en från FN fristående internationell kommission – ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) – som fick i uppdrag att utreda frågan om hur suveränitet och humanitära interventioner förhåller sig till varandra. 2001 levererade ICISS en rapport där R2P-idén diskuterades på längden och bredden (ICISS, 2001). Kofi Annan fångade snabbt upp idén och gjorde den till rättesnöre i sin politik och samma entusiasm visades av efterträdaren Ban Ki-Moon. Detta uppfattades av experter, politiker, forskare och journalister som en omfattande strukturell förändring av inte bara FNs policy, utan av hela normsystemet som världssamfundet vilar på. Plötsligt var staters integritet inte självklart okränkbar. Debatten som följde inom såväl politik som inom forskningen blev ofta polariserad: staten ställdes mot individen, nationell säkerhet mot "human security" och suveränitet mot demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter. I sin avhandling *United Nations Reformed: Responsibility, Protection and the Standing of States* citerar Peter Håkansson en utbredd uppfattning om att R2P "is nothing short of a sea change with enormous implications" (s. 2). Håkansson ställer här den grundläggande frågan: "*how* is this a change?" (s. 2-3). Författaren hävdar också att "the acceptance of R2P [...] has constitutive implications that go to the heart of the international order that was instituted in 1945" (s. 3) . Jag tolkar detta som att avhandlingen handlar om två relaterade frågor och jag väljer för tydlighets skull att lyfta fram dessa mer explicit:

– På vilket sätt innebär FNs satsning på R2P och skydd av civilbefolkning en förändring?

– Vad har idén om R2P för konsekvenser för det normsystem som världssamfundet vilar på?

Frågorna kan tolkas som att författaren utgår ifrån att en förändring av FNs hantering av interna konflikter faktiskt skett och att detta ofrånkomligen har konsekvenser för det internationella normsystemet. Det som ska undersökas är inte *om* en betydelsefull förändring skett, utan *vilken sorts* förändring det handlar om och mer exakt vilken betydelse

detta har. Jag tolkar detta som att det hand-lar om något mer än enbart symboliska eller retoriska förändringar – att det handlar om en reell förändring i FNs policy och agerande – på samma sätt som studier av demokrati-sering handlar om reella förändringar av poli-tiska villkor och inte om partier eller stater kallar sig demokratiska. Däremot tar författa-ren inte upp motiv eller intressen bakom de olika idéerna, eller varför idéernas politiska betydelse skiftat över tid – det är endast idéer-nas innebörd och konsekvenser som studeras.

Problemställningen bottnar i motsätt-ningen mellan två perspektiv på staters okränkbarhet. Håkansson kallar dessa per-spektiv "pluralismen" respektive "anti-plura-lismen". Utgångspunkten är, i min tolkning, att maktbalansen mellan dessa perspektiv avgör svaren på forskningsfrågorna. I kort-het står "pluralismen" för idén om staters okränkbarhet oavsett politiskt system och hantering av den egna befolkningen, medan "anti-pluralismen" utgår ifrån att det finns vissa värden (ofta men inte nödvändigtvis for-mulerade som mänskliga rättigheter) som är överordnade staters okränkbarhet. Eftersom hela avhandlingen handlar om spänningsför-hållandet mellan dessa perspektiv finns det anledning att gå lite djupare in på deras inne-börd och förändring över tid.

"Pluralismen" står alltså, enligt Håkans-son, för idén om staters okränkbarhet. Inom studiet av Internationella Relationer brukar westfaliska freden 1648 betraktas som start-punkten för etablerandet av ett internationellt system av suveräna stater. Idén om staters okränkbarhet blev också grundläggande för FN, som bildades 1945. De besläktade begrep-pen territoriell integritet och icke-inbland-ning handlar om att stater har rätt att sköta sina inre angelägenheter helt utan inbland-ning vare sig från andra stater eller ifrån världssamfundet. Det finns i detta perspek-tiv endast en situation där yttre inblandning (inklusive militära interventioner) kan accep-teras: då *internationell* fred och säkerhet står på spel, dvs. då mellanstatliga konflikter

uppstår. Inre oroligheter, tyranni och grym-heter gentemot den egna befolkningen är inre angelägenheter som andra stater och världs-samfundet inte har rätt att ingripa mot. Detta synsätt kan ses som en sorts låt-gå-liberalism, eller alternativt som uttryck för en pessimis-tisk realpolitisk isolationism. I mer vardagliga termer kan tanken uttryckas som att "så länge diktatorerna inte startar krig med andra sta-ter låter vi dem vara i fred". Det Håkansson kallar "pluralism" handlar alltså om tolerans inför att stater internt är olika, att man inte lägger sig i om det politiska systemet utgörs av demokrati, diktatur eller något mellanläge. Idag finner man "pluralismens" tillskyndare inom vitt skilda läger, från postkolonialis-mens kritik mot västmakters inblandning i inre angelägenheter i "Syd", till den ameri-kanska konservatismens förespråkande av isolationism och avståndstagande från tan-ken att USA har ett världspolitiskt ansvar. "Pluralismens" försvar av staters okränkbar-het utnyttjas också av en lång rad diktaturer som vill undandra sig kritik mot kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter i det egna landet.

"Anti-pluralismen", som Håkansson kallar detta alternativa perspektiv, står för normativ universalism, dvs. att vissa grund-läggande värden bör gälla för alla människor på hela jordklotet. Sedan FNs bildande är det framförallt mänskliga rättigheter som lyfts fram som sådana universella värden. "Anti-pluralismen" betonar att alla stater är skyldiga att garantera dessa rättigheter, annars förlo-rar de kränkande staterna sin okränkbarhet. Idén om R2P är enligt Håkansson ett exempel på denna "anti-pluralism". Här finns också en värdeobjektivism som sätter vissa värden framför andra. Exakt vilka värden det handlat om har emellertid skiftat en del över tid. Från 1800-talet och fram till debatten inför FNs bildande gällde det civilisation, modernitet, fredlighet, kristna värderingar, västerländsk kultur, ja till och med att säkra västerlan-dets överhöghet. Sådana värden ansågs över-ordnade allt annat: om de uppfattades vara hotade kunde interventioner legitimeras.

Håkansson menar att det för Roosevelt och Churchill inte gällde västerlandets överhöghet generellt, utan mer specifikt USAs respektive Storbritanniens dominans i världspolitiken. Detta kunde dock inte reduceras till ren och skär maktfullkomlighet, utan handlade snarare om föreställningen att de värdesystem som USA respektive Storbritannien vilade på ansågs överlägsna och mer fredskapande än alla andra. I denna läsning var det alltså idéer och normer snarare än intressen som låg bakom tankarna om anglosaxisk hegemoni i världspolitiken.

Inom "anti-pluralismen" finns alltså dels en diskriminerande föreställning om att vissa stater är bättre än andra – de kan enligt en traditionell syn delas in i mogna, barbariska och förslavade samhällen. Dels finns tanken att de mogna, upplysta staterna inte bara har rätt utan också skyldighet att agera världspolis – att vara moralens väktare och hela världens förbättrare. Tyranni mot den egna befolkningen kan helt enkelt inte tolereras – och någon eller några – som sätter mänskliga rättigheter och demokrati i främsta rummet – måste då reagera. Inte nödvändigtvis med våld – det är en sista åtgärd – men inledningsvis genom protester, hjälpa flyktingar och ge annat "humanitärt stöd", iscensätta blockader och bojkotter samt bistå internt motstånd. Som en allra sista utväg kan militära interventioner genomföras.

"Anti-pluralismen" hade många tillskyndare under 1800-talet och det tidigare 1900-talet. Den framträder också inom delar av den moderna liberalismen, framförallt inom kosmopolitanismen och inom John Rawls politiska filosofi. Francis Fukuyamas omdebatterade tes om historiens slut, som publicerades i samband med att kalla kriget tog slut, är ett uttryck för denna tanke – att den liberala demokratin är överlägsen alla andra system, och att den är på väg att segra över hela världen.

Jag menar dock att "pluralismen" respektive "anti-pluralismen" är termer som inte träffar helt rätt i detta sammanhang – därav

mitt användande av citationstecken. "Pluralism" är en term som vanligen förknippas med liberalism och eftersom idén om R2P och föreställningen om universella mänskliga rättigheter rätteligen måste betecknas som liberala idéer menar jag att termen "anti-pluralism" är missvisande. Jag kan förstå logiken i Håkanssons resonemang – att det är "pluralistiskt" att acceptera olikheter i nationella politiska system och att det således är "anti-pluralistiskt" att lyfta fram *universella* mänskliga rättigheter. Men jag hävdar ändå att beteckningarna är olyckliga och missvisande: "anti-pluralism" förknippar åtminstone inte jag med värden som demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter, utan snarare med autokrati och enpartisystem. Det blir också märkligt om icke-demokratier som Kina och Saudiarabien, som benhårt hävdar principen om icke-inblandning, således anses företräda en "pluralistisk" syn. Man kan också hävda att den idé Håkansson kallar "pluralistisk" i själva verket är "anti-pluralistisk", eftersom idén om staters okränkbarhet anses gälla universellt och dessutom vara överordnad alla andra värden. Jag misstänker också att begreppen "pluralism" och "anti-pluralism" döljer såväl skillnader inom de respektive perspektiven som likheter mellan dem. Att såväl postkolonialister som konservativa realister kan dölja sig bakom "pluralism" är ett exempel, liksom att såväl kulturimperialism som förespråkande av demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter kan dölja sig bakom "anti-pluralism".

Jag tror att analysen av R2P skulle vinna på att problematisera snarare än att kategorisera synen på staters okränkbarhet. Detta skulle göra det lättare att diskutera variationer och nyanser i den politiska debatten – variationer och nyanser som tydligt framkommer i denna avhandling. Håkanssons gedigna analys av det historiska materialet får mig att vilja pröva tanken att det finns ett tredje perspektiv – vilket också innebär en omtolkning av Roosevelts och Churchills syn. Håkansson hävdar att dessa statsmän gav uttryck för "anti-pluralism" när de framförde att staters

territoriella integritet inte alltid är okränkbar. Jag menar att Roosevelt och Churchill snarare gav uttryck för en syn på världen som uppdelad i å ena sidan "mogna" stater, vars suveränitet är okränkbar, och å andra sidan "förslavade" respektive "barbariska" stater, vars suveränitet inte bara kan utan bör kränkas snarast möjligt. För Roosevelt och Churchill gällde alltså en princip för vissa stater, och en helt annan för resten av världen: en global diskriminering och uppdelning i A- och B-lag.

Detta tredje perspektiv har också, skulle jag vilja föreslå, en förankring i den politiska idéhistorien, nämligen i den politiska realismens kontraktsteori. Thomas Hobbes menade att i naturtillståndet rådde ett allas krig mot alla, där människornas liv var kort och brutalt. Lösningen på detta eländiga tillstånd var, enligt Hobbes, bildandet av nattväktarstaten (Leviathan). När staten bildas överlåter individerna sin personliga suveränitet till staten, som i gengäld erbjuder skydd mot såväl yttre som inre hot. Men om staten försummar att skydda folket, eller till och med utövar våld mot de människor staten är satt att skydda, är kontraktet brutet och statens suveränitet inte längre okränkbar. Kanske har Hobbes 1600-talssyn på suveräniteten som villkorad makt något att säga om dagens komplicerade världspolitik, där "humanitära interventioner" genomförs samtidigt som statens okränkbarhet alltjämt försvaras?

Håkanssons avhandling hör hemma i skärningspunkten mellan politisk teori och internationella relationer. Detta visar han på tre sätt: genom själva frågeställningarna – om de normativa grunderna för världssystemet, genom sin imponerande insikt i alltifrån Grotius till Kofi Annans politiska tänkande och dessutom genom tillämpningen av en idéhistorisk metod. Förankringen i en teoretisk kontext är dock inte alldeles glasklar. Vad är egentligen "pluralismen" och "anti-pluralismen" fall av? Här kunde man tänka sig en tydligare förankring i litteraturen om exempelvis idémakt, normer och institutioner i internationell politik, eller varför inte litteraturen om diskursiv makt och paradigmskiften. Av relevans är också den omfattande litteraturen om globalisering och utmaningarna för statens suveränitet i den så kallade post-westfaliska världen. Jag kan också tänka mig att postkolonial teori skulle kunnat bidra en del, inte minst till fördjupning och kontextualisering av det så kallade "pluralistiska" perspektivet. Med en tydligare förankring i någon av dessa teoribildningar hade avhandlingens bidrag måhända blivit än tydligare.

Efter att ha redogjort för "pluralismens" och "anti-pluralismens" bakgrund går Håkansson över till att diskutera den internationella debatt som föregick FNs bildande. Här ger Håkansson ett tydligt och viktigt empiriskt bidrag. Den tidigare forskningen har nästan helt fokuserat på de idéer om statens okränkbarhet som gick segrande ur debatten från kollapsen av Nationernas Förbund fram till bildandet av Förenta Nationerna. Håkansson går tillbaks till ursprungskällorna och visar på ett övertygande sätt att principen om staters okränkbarhet var betydligt mer omstridd än vad som tidigare framkommit. I IR-litteraturen är det snarare regel än undantag att peka på suveränitetsprincipens dominans under de mer än 350 år som förflutit sedan westfaliska freden. Håkansson visar att detta är en sanning med behov av tydlig modifikation. Håkansson visar dessutom att de tankar som framförts av exempelvis Grotius, Wilson och andra som diskuterade de normativa grunderna för det internationella systemet är mer komplexa och mångtydiga än vad andra har påstått.

Efter denna gedigna historiska analys går Håkansson noggrant igenom de två relaterade idéerna om R2P samt POC (Protection of Civilians, "skydd av civilbefolkning"). Han visar att idéerna finns i olika varianter som är mer eller mindre långtgående. I den mest långtgående versionen innebär R2P att staters suveränitet kan kränkas redan vid en misstanke att den inhemska regimen eventuellt kan innebära ett hot mot mänskliga rättigheter, även

om några grymheter ännu inte begåtts. De icke-militära insatserna betonas dock starkt; militära medel ses som sagt som en sista utväg. Här finns emellertid vad Gareth Evans kallar ett konceptuellt problem, eller vad jag skulle beteckna som en fråga om legitimitet: "it is to ensure that R2P is seen not as a Trojan Horse for bad old imperial, colonial and militarist habits, but rather the best starting point the international community has, and is maybe ever likely to have, in preventing and responding to genocide and other mass atrocity crimes" (Evans, 2008: 289).

Trots uppenbara skillnader (den tidigare betoningen av kristna värden har i det närmaste försvunnit) finns tydliga likheter med hur idéerna om skydd av civilbefolkning formulerades från 1800-talet till 1940-talet: i universalismen, i tron på behovet av "moralens väktare", i den ibland explicita och ibland implicita uppdelningen mellan "mogna" och "omogna" stater samt i den optimistiska tron på att förändring både är möjlig och önskvärd. Håkansson vederlägger därmed den idag dominerande uppfattningen att R2P och POC är helt nya idéer. Tvärtom har de tydliga och betydelsefulla rötter i den internationella politiska debatten och teoribildningen. Kanske har nutidens FN, regeringar och IR-forskare att lära av att begrunda de argument som framfördes redan under 1800-talet och senare i samband med FNs bildande. Historien upprepar sig som bekant inte, men idéer och argument återkommer ofta i nya läglar.

Hittills har jag uppehållit mig vid den första frågeställningen, om och på vilket sätt R2P innebär en förändring. Låt mig nu kort kommentera den andra frågeställningen, om konsekvenserna av införandet av R2P som princip inom världspolitiken. Håkansson låter oss veta att normsystemet har förändrats, att själva fundamentet för världspolitiken är reviderat – i och för sig utifrån en nygammal idé. Hur kan man då studera konsekvenserna av denna förändring? Håkansson skriver: "My ambition is to account for the wider implications of protection" (s. 14). Han talar även om "konstitutiva" implikationer och om "signifikans" (det sistnämnda med hänvisning till Ricoeur). Gott så kan man tycka, men det saknas emellertid en tydligare vägledning, eller operationalisering om man så vill. Den närmaste preciseringen är att undersökningen av konsekvenser handlar om hur den politiska uppmärksamheten kring R2P och skydd av civilbefolkningen påverkar suveränitetsprincipen och det internationella samfundets karaktär och syfte. Det är en början, men nog saknas här en mer klargörande diskussion.

Avslutningsvis vill jag betona att Håkansson ger ett klart bidrag till forskningen och debatten om FN och de normer som det internationella samfundet vilar på. Håkansson visar, till skillnad från tidigare forskning, att idéerna om R2P och skydd av civilbefolkningen har en betydligt äldre historia än vad nutida debattörer och forskare hävdar. Författaren visar dessutom att idén om statens okränkbarhet – fundamentet i den westfaliska världsordningen – har varit betydligt mer omstritt än vad som tidigare hävdats, även under tiden för FNs bildande. Avhandlingen är också mycket lättläst, systematisk och har en klar röd tråd i framställningen. Håkansson förhåller sig självständigt till tidigare forskning. Figuren som sammanfattar "pluralismen" och "anti-pluralismen" är pedagogisk (s. 43). Håkansson landar också i intressant slutsats som ligger nära vad jag ovan benämnde ett tredje perspektiv: att suveränitetsprincipen håller på att begränsas till en villkorad funktion för skydd av civilbefolkning. Jag tolkar detta som en slags återgång till statens ursprungliga nattväktarfunktion, framförallt vad gäller intern säkerhet. Jag ser här också en koppling dels till Hobbes kontraktsteori, dels till en socialkonstruktivistisk syn på staten: den är vad vi gör den till.

Johan Eriksson är från och med januari 2012 forskningschef vid Utrikespolitiska institutet. Han är även docent i statsvetenskap vid Södertörns högskola. E-post: johan.eriksson@ui.se

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Anmälan av Jörgen Johansson

I Johanna Jormfeldts doktorsavhandling, Skoldemokratins fördolda jämställdhetsproblem – Eleverfarenheter i en könssegregerad gymnasieskola (Linnaeus University Dissertations nr 32/2011) uppmärksammas skolans demokratiuppdrag och vilka erfarenheter gymnasielever har av skoldemokrati. Avhandlingen präglas av ett jämställdhetsperspektiv och utgångspunkten tas i det faktum att den svenska gymnasieskolan är starkt könssegregerad. Syftet med avhandlingen är att analysera eleverfarenheter av skolans demokratiuppdrag ur ett jämställdhetsperspektiv. Det är tre frågeställningar som vägleder studien:

1. Vilken betydelse har könskontexten (dvs. andelen kvinnor respektive män i en klass/grupp) för manliga och kvinnliga elevers skoldemokratierfarenheter?

2. Vilken betydelse har programkaraktären (typ av gymnasieprogram) för manliga och kvinnliga elevers skoldemokratierfarenheter?

3. Hur ser relationen ut mellan manliga och kvinnliga elevers skoldemokratierfarenheter?

Till den tredje frågeställningen fogas även en kompletterande frågeställning som

behandlar frågan om vilken betydelse elevernas skoldemokratierfarenheter har för deras medborgarfostran (röstningsambition i kommande riksdagsval) respektive lärande (kunskapsnivå mätt i betyg)?

Centralt i avhandlingen står begreppet skoldemokratierfarenheter som Jormfeldt definierar som vardagliga erfarenheter av det relationella samspelet mellan eleverna samt mellan eleverna och deras lärare. Jormfeldt gör en poäng av att begreppet avser att fånga in i vilken mån eleverna "erfar demokrati" under sina skoldagar i allmänhet och det är inte frågan om i vilken grad det pågår en explicit undervisning om eller i demokrati i skolan eller ens om graden av elevengagemang i formella institutioner som t.ex. klassråd eller elevråd. Det är alltså vardagsdemokratiska erfarenheter som fokuseras och i denna bemärkelse representerar Jormfeldts avhandling något tämligen unikt i forskningen om skolans demokratiska uppdrag. Begreppet skoldemokratierfarenheter operationaliseras i undersökning med hjälp av tre olika dimensioner som samtliga är kopplade till tre skilda demokratiteoretiska modeller. Den första dimensionen benämns inflytande och utgår från deltagardemokratiska ideal och omfattar frågor om hur eleverna kan utöva direkt påverkan på sin vardagstillvaro i skolan (inflytande över ordningsreglerna i skolan, inflytande över skolans matsedel, inflytande över innehållet och arbetsformerna i skolarbetet). Den andra dimensionen, som bygger på deliberativt grundade demokratiideal, benämns diskussion och omfattar frågor om kommunikationen i skolmiljön (både mellan elever och mellan lärare och elever). Den tredje dimensionen benämner Jormfeldt rättssäkerhet och grundas i ett konstitutionalistiskt demokratiideal och mäter elevernas upplevelser av att få en rättssäker examination och betyg i skolan.

Det analytiska grepp som dominerar avhandlingen utgörs av att begreppet skoldemokratierfarenheter är den beroende variabeln som analyseras i förhållande till

tre oberoende variabler; kön, könskontext och programkaraktär. Det innebär att Jormfeldt vill pröva om skoldemokratierfarenheterna skiljer sig mellan män och kvinnor, om skoldemokratierfarenheterna påverkas av andelen män i en klass och om skoldemokratierfarenheterna påverkas av om den aktuella programkaraktären har ett manligt eller kvinnligt kodat innehåll (där program som fordonsteknik exempelvis har ett manligt kodat innehåll medan vård- och omsorgsprogrammet kan sägas ha ett kvinnligt kodat innehåll). Jormfeldt utvecklar ett par hypoteser i detta sammanhang:

H1: Skoldemokratierfarenheterna blir sämre ju fler män det finns i undervisningsgruppen.

H2: Skoldemokratierfarenheterna blir sämre i manligt kodade programkaraktärer än i kvinnligt kodade programkaraktärer.

Den analytiska ansatsen kompletteras dock också av att Jormfeldt även vill belysa ett antal sekundära effekter av elevernas skoldemokratierfarenheter. Då vänds det på steken och skoldemokratierfarenheter blir till en oberoende variabel som sekundärt tänkes påverka elevernas lärande (i undersökningen mätt som betygsnivå) respektive elevernas uttryckta röstningsambition (dvs. om man i framtiden har för avsikt att deltaga i allmänna val). I denna del ställs en tredje hypotes:

H3: Det finns ett positivt samband mellan elevers skoldemokratierfarenheter och deras röstningsambition respektive deras betyg.

Metodmässigt använder sig Jormfeldt av en enkätstudie där samtliga elever i avgångsklasserna på gymnasiet i Kronobergs län under läsåret 2008/09 tillfrågades. Svarsfrekvensen var 61 % och sammanlagt besvarades enkäterna av cirka 1.500 elever. Med hjälp av enkätfrågorna konstrueras tre index, ett för varje dimension av skoldemokratierfarenheter (inflytandeindex, diskussionsindex och rättssäkerhetsindex). I avhandlingen görs ingen kvalitativ analys (exempelvis för att komplettera resultaten av enkätstudien) utan avhandlingen baseras på en enda enkätundersökning.

Svensk gymnasieskola problematiseras ofta i termer av att eleverna gör socialt skiktade programval. Det finns exempelvis en mycket tydlig könssegregering i valet av gymnasieutbildning där det i flera fall existerar program som antingen är starkt manligt eller starkt kvinnligt dominerade. Gymnasieskolan har också ofta beskrivits som en socialt segregerad institution där olikheter i elevernas studieförutsättningar, studietraditioner och social position har ett starkt genomslag. Jormfeldts studie visar i denna del på delvis förbluffande resultat. För det första framgår det av studien att det råder totalt sett små skillnader mellan män och kvinnor när det gäller deras erfarenheter av skoldemokrati. Både män och kvinnor upplever sina skoldemokratierfarenheter på ett likartat sätt. För det andra, vilket kanske är än mer överraskande, kan inte Jormfeldt hitta några större skillnader rörande elevernas skoldemokratierfarenheter om man jämför olika programkategorier. Eleverna på yrkesförberedande program upplever sina demokratierfarenheter på ungefär samma sätt som man gör i de studieförberedande programmen. Jormfeldt karakteriserar sin studie i dessa avseenden som en solskenshistoria. Gymnasieskolan är, gällande vardagliga erfarenheter av demokrati, inte bara jämställd utan även mer jämlik än vad man skulle kunna förvänta sig (utifrån den rådande förförståelse som finns representerad i både skoldebatt och i annan skolforskning).

Man skulle dock kunna tro att allt därmed är frid och fröjd gällande jämställdhets- och jämlikhetsaspekterna i svensk gymnasieskola. Jormfeldt fördjupar analysen ytterligare och kan, trots allt, hitta ett mer fördolt jämställdhetsproblem i den svenska gymnasieskolan. Jormfeldt noterar nämligen att elever i mansdominerade könskontexter har sämre erfarenheter av diskussion i sin skolvardag än vad de skulle kunnat ha. Klasser med stor andel män har alltså relativt sett dåliga erfarenheter av demokratisk diskussion. Men, vilket

är intressant, i studieprogram som är manligt kodade (alltså i program där man studerar "manligt" kodade kunskapsområden) är diskussionsklimatet att beteckna som mycket gott. Eller annorlunda uttryckt: i manligt kodade studieprogram är det demokratiska diskussionsklimatet mycket bra, men påverkas negativt av att det faktum att det finns många män i just dessa klasser.

Man skulle kunna uttrycka detta som att Jormfeldts analytiska grepp att isolera den oberoende variabeln könskontext (dvs. könssammansättningen i en klass) från programkategorin (dvs. det gymnasieprogram man studerar på) var ett fruktbart grepp. Om analysen enbart stannat vid att analysera programkategorin (som det ligger naturligt till att göra) hade man inte kunnat upptäcka det intressanta förhållande som ligger i att manligt kodade program har mer positiva effekter på det demokratiska diskussionsklimatet än vad som gäller i andra typer av program. Det demokratiska samtalsklimatet i exempelvis ett verkstadsprogram är i sig positivt, men till följd av att dessa program domineras av män blir diskussionsklimatet lidande. Man kan här tänka sig att det i yrkesprogram med ett manligt kodat innehåll sker tämligen raka, tydliga och konkreta diskussioner om olika problem som behandlas i kurserna vilket av eleverna upplevs som ett positivt demokrativärde. Man upplever att ens synpunkter beaktas på ett konkret sätt och kommunikationen mellan lärare och elev är överlag uppriktig och präglad av att hitta praktiska lösningar. Tyvärr är då mansdominansen i dessa program ett problem då just denna faktor tenderar att leda till ett sämre diskussionsklimat. Ett viktigt resultat av Jormfeldts studie är att just könskontext är en högst väsentlig aspekt att beakta för den som ska analysera skoldemokrati.

När det gäller resultaten av de s.k. sekundära effekterna, dvs. att skoldemokratierfarenheter under gymnasietiden skulle leda till dels positiva effekter gällande elevernas framtida röstningsbenägenhet i allmänna val och dels positiva effekter gällande lärande (vilket skolforskare ofta hävdar) lämnar Jormfeldt ett par iakttagelser. För det första, gällande det demokratiska medborgarskapet, kan sägas att erfarenheter av skoldemokrati inte synes påverka elevernas framtida röstningsbenägenhet. För det andra noterar Jormfeldt gällande lärandeeffekterna, att inflytandeerfarenheter synes varierar negativt med mäns betyg (ökat inflytande i skoldemokratin leder alltså till sämre lärande för män), diskussionserfarenheter samvarierar positivt med kvinnors betyg och erfarenheter av rättssäkerhet (dvs. upplevelserna av att ha blivit bedömda/betygssatta på ett rättvist sätt) samvarierar positivt med betygen för både män och kvinnor. I övrigt är det svårt att ur materialet dra några andra slutsatser rörande dessa sekundära effekter av skoldemokratierfarenheter.

Avhandlingen kretsar kring gymnasielevers erfarenheter av skoldemokrati. Centralt i hela arbetet står begreppet 'skoldemokratierfarenheter'. Jormfeldt definierar detta begrepp tämligen smalt till att omfatta endast mer vardagliga erfarenheter av demokrati i gymnasieskolan. Begreppet bestäms, som nämnts ovan, med hjälp av tre dimensioner (inflytande, diskussion, rättssäkerhet). En grundläggande metodologisk problematik i detta angreppssätt är att kunna operationalisera dessa dimensioner och att utveckla enkätfrågor som kan fånga in gymnasieelevernas erfarenheter av inflytandemöjligheter, diskussionsaspekter och upplevelser av att ha fått en rättssäker behandling. Inflytandedimensionen mäts, för att ge ett exempel, med hjälp av fem enkätfrågor som behandlar elevernas inflytande över sådant som (1) ordningsregler, (2) matsedel, (3) inredning av lokaler, (4) innehållet i olika kurser samt (5) inflytande över arbetsformer i det vardagliga skolarbetet.

Man kan alltid diskutera och kritisera om dessa enkätfrågor verkligen bidrar till att skapa valida mått på det som ska mätas (skoldemokratierfarenheter). Jormfeldt viktar exempelvis inte de olika enkätfrågorna och inflytande över matsedeln betraktas som lika

viktigt som inflytande över kursernas innehåll osv. På samma sätt byggs diskussionsdimensionen upp med hjälp av fem olika enkätfrågor och samtliga behandlar kommunikationen mellan dels eleverna själva och dels mellan eleverna och deras lärare. Vad som då kanske saknas är enkätfrågor som på något sätt försöker mäta kommunikationen i en mer rumslig och meningsskapande kontext, t.ex. umgänget och kommunikationen i ett klassrum. Diskussionsdimensionen ska spegla ett deliberativt demokratiideal och det kan då bli tämligen torftigt att enbart försöka fånga in kommunikation i skolmiljön som huvudsakligen överföring av information mellan elever och mellan elever och lärare. Jag vill dock understryka att detta inte på avgörande sätt påverkar avhandlingens kvalitet. Det handlar om nyansskillnader och det är oerhört svårt att kalibrera och göra olika avvägningar för att få fram ett idealiskt mätinstrument. Jormfeldt argumenterar hela tiden utförligt och med goda argument för olika vägval i dessa avseenden.

Jag menar alltså, trots en del invändningar, att Jormfeldts studie tämligen väl fångar in det som är gymnasieelevernas erfarenheter av skoldemokrati i den vardagliga bemärkelse som författaren vill lyfta in i forskningen om skoldemokrati. Jormfeldt argumenterar nämligen för att det finns en särskild poäng att tala om skoldemokrati i termer av vardagserfarenheter. Jormfeldts analys innefattar en tämligen smal avgränsning av det som utgör skolans demokratiska uppdrag. Jormfeldt definierar skoldemokratierfarenheter med följande avgränsningar:

- Skoldemokratierfarenheter berör makten över vardagstillvaron i skolan och avser inte mer allmänpolitiska diskussioner
- Skoldemokratierfarenheter berör konkret beteende i skolan och inte aktiviteter inom ramen för demokratiska institutioner (inte ens institutioner kopplade till klassråd, skolkonferenser eller elevråd)
- Skoldemokratierfarenheter berör enskilda skolenheter och inte den demokratiska

styrningen av skolan (inte ens i den egna kommunen)
- Skoldemokratierfarenheter är fixerade vid reellt beslutsfattande och inte till möjligheter att påverka det omgivande samhällets beslut
- Skoldemokratierfarenheter berör relationen individ och kollektiv i elevens anspråk på en rättvis behandling och inte eleven som medborgare i allmänhet (t.ex. i kunskaper om de mänskliga rättigheterna eller i förmågan att delta i utformningen av politiska beslut eller att kunna överklaga politiska beslut etc.).

Jag kan mycket väl förstå Jormfeldts poäng att göra denna strikta avgränsning. Demokratins innehåll och betydelse för individerna visar sig allra mest tydligt och påtagligt i hur det fungerar i konkreta och vardagliga sammanhang. Det ibland något högstämda talet om demokratins idéer och hyllningarna av demokratins institutioner, som ofta präglar skolans arbete med sitt demokratiska uppdrag, är kanske inte så mycket värt om eleverna inte kan påverka de mer vardagliga sidorna i skolarbetet. Likväl vill jag hävda att Jormfeldts avhandling hade vunnit mycket på att visserligen behålla den snäva definitionen men att även komplettera analysen med enkätfrågor som hade täckt in skoldemokrati utifrån ett något bredare perspektiv. Det hade funnits utrymme att i enkätformuläret även ställa frågor om exempelvis elevernas erfarenheter av hur man upplever skolans demokratiuppdrag rörande sådant som politiskt deltagande, mänskliga rättigheter samt kunskaper om demokratins historia, teorier och institutioner.

Den solskenshistoria (om än med en del mörka moln) som Jormfeldt tecknar rörande jämlikhet och jämställdhet i svensk gymnasieskola hade då möjligtvis blivit en annan. Skolforskningen har, som Jormfeldt själv är starkt medveten om, kunnat visa på relativt stora kunskapsskillnader mellan exempelvis studieförberedande och yrkesförberedande program. Jormfeldts poäng att

betona vardagserfarenheter i skolans demo-
kratiuppdrag ger hennes studie en intres-
sant och unik dimension i forskningen om
skolans demokratiska uppdrag. Kompletterat
med en kontrasterande analys med hjälp av
ett något bredare anlagt begrepp för skolde-
mokratierfarenheter hade denna analytiska
poäng sannolikt blivit än mer tankeväck-
ande. Jormfeldt hade kunnat skapa utrymme
både i enkätformuläret och i avhandlingstex-
ten för detta genom att lyfta bort analysen av
de s.k. sekundära effekterna (dvs. analysen
av i vilken mån elevernas demokratierfaren-
heter leder till ett bättre lärande och till en
starkare röstningsbenägenhet). Med detta då
också sagt att analysen av de sekundära effek-
terna inte passar in i Jormfeldts annars så väl
genomtänkta forskningsdesign.

Jormfeldts avhandling är välskriven och
väl strukturerad. Det är lätt att följa fram-
ställningen och genomgående präglas arbetet
av ett gott metodologiskt hantverk. Avhand-
lingen är till detta väl förankrad i den forsk-
ningstradition som behandlas. Jormfeldt rör
sig i ett gränsland mellan statsvetenskaplig
och utbildningsvetenskaplig forskning och
avhandlingen utgör därmed ett bidrag även
till samhällsvetenskapens didaktik. Avhand-
lingsresultaten bör få stor betydelse, inte bara
för skolforskningen som sådan, utan även
för praktiker i skolans värld. Jormfeldt anty-
der själv på flera ställen i avhandlingen att
det skulle behöva göras fördjupade analyser i
olika avseenden. Studier av skolans demokra-
tiuppdrag utifrån ett jämställdhetsperspektiv
synes ännu vara i sin linda och det finns flera
olika uppslag i avhandlingen som rimligtvis
bör leda till fler projekt inom området. Beho-
vet av kvalitativa studier inom detta område
må betecknas som mycket stort.

Docent Jörgen Johansson är universitetslektor i stats-
vetenskap vid Högskolan i Halmstad.
E-post: jorgen.johansson@hh.se

Scuzzarello, Sarah, 2010. *Caring Mul-ticulturalism: Local Immigrant Poli-cies and Narratives of Integration in Malmö, Birmingham and Bologna.* Lund Political Studies 159. Lund: Department of Political Science

Anmälan av Paul Nesbitt-Larking

Sarah Scuzzarello's thesis is grounded in a set
of now-familiar challenges that have occu-
pied thousands of policymakers and academ-
ics as well as the broader public over the past
few decades: How to integrate an increasingly
diverse immigrant population into the polit-
ical, economic, social, and cultural fabric of
existing European nation-states.

The thesis brings together a theoretical
elaboration of the concept of multicultural-
ism with an empirical study of institutional
dynamics and policy narratives related to
integration in three European cities, Malmö,
Birmingham, and Bologna.

Scuzzarello's argument unfolds in four
principal sections: The Theory of Multicultur-
alism; Research Design; The Broader Setting
of the Study at the Level of the Nation-state;
and the Empirical Findings

THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM

In her introduction, Scuzzarello notes the rise
and recent fall of multicultural approaches
toward integration of immigrant minorities in
Europe. Her research puzzle is to explain why
multiculturalism has not worked very effec-
tively as a set of policies designed to integrate
immigrants into European nation-states.

In order to open up this question, Scuzza-
rello returns to the theoretical bases of mul-
ticulturalism and articulates a contradiction
at the heart of the theory: that between rec-
ognition and validation of cultural differences
among the communities, on the one hand,
and the quest for common citizenship and
shared national identity, on the other hand.

Her response to this challenge is to pro-
pose what she calls "Caring Multicultural-
ism". Bringing together the feminist critique

of multiculturalism with the tradition of caring ethics and a narrative-based version of social psychology, she identifies the key challenge as breaking through overgeneralizations, stereotypes and attributions by actually paying attention to what women and men living their immigrant lives in specific setting actually want to say about their experiences and their aspirations.

With the feminist critics of multiculturalism, she shares the perspective that it is men who characteristically become cultural entrepreneurs and that women's capacity to express themselves within cultural communities or if necessary to exit from them is compromised to the extent that Western states grant traditional male leaders the authority to speak on behalf of their communities. This is what she refers to as "the power of problem setting": who gets to define the needs and aspirations of a community?

Given Scuzzarello's determination to reject overgeneralizations and to insist on deep scrutiny, her chosen ontology is relationist rather than substantialist. In other words, she is concerned to explore deeply how people actually make sense of their lives rather than assuming that it necessarily corresponds to whatever group or community that may be attributed to them.

Scuzzarello develops three key characteristics of the practice of Caring Multiculturalism: attentiveness to context and circumstance; responsiveness to others in their own terms; and responsibility toward the actual outcome of policies on the lives of those targeted by them.

When it comes to attentiveness, Scuzzarello stresses the need to pay attention to multiple strands of experience, not just cultural, but those related to class, gender, ethnicity and other social relations. In the end, attentiveness means talking to people about their actual needs.

Responsiveness allows for feedback and evaluation of policies in close detail. A dialogical and interactive setting is critical to the development of policies and programmes that people really need.

Responsibility means moving away from the "one size fits all" detached approach of public bureaucracies and zeroing in on the actual consequences of policy choices and implementation.

While Scuzzarello is aware that a policy of Caring Multiculturalism can become paternalistic, especially in asymmetrical power relationships, she argues that it has the potential to be a transformative force overcoming intransigent conflict through the construction of shared narratives, of positive reciprocity, dialogue, and humanization of the Other.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The setting of the study consists of an examination of both institutional practices and policy narratives around integration in Malmö, Birmingham and Bologna between 1997 and 2007: "This dissertation's empirical aim is to understand to what extent three local contexts, Malmö, Birmingham, and Bologna, hold the potential for adopting caring multiculturalism." (p. 79)

Scuzzarello divides her questions up into three broad enquiries:

Firstly, at the institutional level, how do the public officials in Malmö, Birmingham, and Bologna address the challenges of voice and participation among the immigrant populations of their cities?

Second, how do public narratives in immigrant policies and programmes define integration?

Third, how do the public officials in Malmö, Birmingham, and Bologna conceive of immigrants?

While her research design pays attention to individuals and to the micro-level of political analysis and is relationist, Scuzzarello adopts a view of the self as already constituted in social relations. In other words, her approach deliberately avoids an individualistic or psychologically reductionistic approach. Reflecting a research design that brings

together both structure and agency, and the social with the individual, Scuzzarello distinguishes between discourses and narratives.

Discourses are systems of meaning that both explain and justify the world in certain ways. Narratives are coherent and plausible stories about particular aspects of individuals and communities that have been derived from the broader assumptions of available discourses.

THE BROADER SETTING OF THE STUDY AT THE LEVEL OF THE NATION-STATE

In order to understand the dominant narratives and policy options exercised in each city, Scuzzarello situates each one in its national context. Here, her methodology is structural, institutional, and macrological. Among the factors affecting attitudes toward immigrants and therefore their capacity to integrate, she lists the following:

> ...citizenship regulation, legal frameworks for community and institutional organization, the nature of a country's political system, the degree of centralization of institutional power, as well as its national self-understanding. (p. 107)

Scuzzarello identifies three distinct national contexts when it comes to immigration and citizenship regimes:

Britain has the longest-standing experience of postcolonial immigration and has developed both multiculturalism and a race relations apparatus.

Sweden's reception of immigrants, more recent and with proportionately more refugees and asylum seekers, is grounded in a strong social-democratic welfare state and corporatist tradition. As in Britain, multiculturalism has been a dominant approach, but since the late 1980s it has diminished in emphasis, giving way to a more integrationist approach.

Italy's experience of immigration is relatively new – only becoming salient since the 1990s. On the basis of a decentralized regime, regions have been able to develop their own institutions for integration. But the Italian reality is also characterized by both strong narratives of criminalization of the immigrant and a familial welfare system that has encouraged the immigration of relatively large numbers of single female workers. While immigrants in Sweden and Britain have the right to vote in local elections and to stand for office, in Italy, they are denizens, with certain socio-economic rights, but no easy passage to citizenship.

THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Corresponding to Scuzzarello's three broad enquiries are three chapters that present and discuss the empirical findings.

The first of these concerns the degree to which each of the cities has developed institutional opportunities that promote Caring Multiculturalism.

Malmö's institutional support for integration and liaison with immigrant groups is ad hoc and much of it works through contact with immigrant associations. While many immigrants have the right to vote, there has been a sharp decline in voter turnout among immigrants. Scuzzarello points to a pervasive lack of attention to this challenge of civic engagement on the part of the city council. The corporatist tradition in Sweden has led to a de-emphasis on immigrant representation in the policy process.

There is a reticence on the part of Malmö's council to grant formal representation to immigrant associations because they are skeptical about the legitimacy of their leaders to speak on behalf of those they supposedly represent. Despite this, the council encourages membership in voluntary organizations as places to learn how to be good citizens.

Birmingham recognizes and works with BME (black and minority ethnic) communities. Over the decades, BME communities have become active as candidates, activists, and voters for the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties. There is a formal apparatus of city consultation. In the 1990s, a range of BME

and faith-based umbrella groups were organized into a Standing Consultative Forum that met with the council. As in Malmö, however, there was increased skepticism at the fidelity with which the leaders of these BME groups actually spoke for their communities. Despite this, a more recent Community Cohesion Forum, established in 2005, has repeated the problems. Again, in a similar manner to Malmö, there is a range of semi-formal opportunities for citizens to consult with elected officials at the ward and neighbourhood level.

Bologna has created a series of local and regional opportunities for immigrants to express their viewpoint, including the Forum and the Consulte. Despite the absence of legal rights of citizenship, there is a Migrants' Provincial Council at the regional level. This is a kind of parallel assembly and through it immigrants are able to exert more power than they can through the Forum and the Consulte.

The second empirical chapter investigates policy narratives on integration in each city. When it comes to the construction of narratives in each city's policies and programmes, Scuzzarello identifies three or four dominant ones for each locale.

The central problematic according to Malmö's policy statements has to do with the lack of integration. Four narratives express this in further detail:

Firstly, the Employment Narrative that regards paid employment as a solution to the social, economic, and cultural ills of immigrant isolation through reliance on assistance;

Second, the Community Engagement Narrative that stresses the importance to the development of civic and democratic skills of engagement in voluntary associations;

Third, the Council's Responsibility Narrative that promotes employment equity for immigrants within the public sector, but also models hiring immigrants to the private sector; and

Finally, the Meeting Spaces Narrative promotes the creation of common meeting spaces where immigrants and majority Swedes can mix.

In Birmingham, three policy narratives predominate:

Firstly, the Community Cohesion Narrative attempts to foster a post-multicultural integration, bringing diverse people and communities together through encouraging greater equality in health, education, social care, employment and housing, enhanced community engagement, dialogue, and active citizenship;

Second, the Community Engagement Narrative is an attempt to go beyond the top-down approach of Community Cohesion and to get people to develop their own initiatives; and

Finally, the Anti-discrimination Narrative promotes anti-racist measures through employment equity and through measures to confront discrimination in housing, education, social care, health, and community safety.

Finally, in Bologna, there are four dominant policy narratives on integration:

Firstly, the Narrative of Security stresses the links between immigration, crime, and welfare fraud and proposes greater policing and surveillance;

Second, the Narrative of Housing seeks to address the challenges of providing housing beyond the hostel-type for immigrants and to address problems of crime and illegality related to the existing accommodation centres;

Third, the Narrative of Cultural Diversity under the left promotes cultural integration and exchange and under the right demands that immigrants assimilate to Italy's existing culture and values; and

Finally, the Participation Narrative promotes integration, responsibility for the political community and civic participation.

In her final empirical chapter Scuzzarello explores policy narratives on the constructions of immigrants: How are migrants thought of and what characteristics are attributed to them?

In Malmö there are three principal constructions of immigrants:

Firstly, the Employed Migrant Narrative stresses the socio-economic and cultural importance of work for integration;

Second, the Narrative of Competitiveness regards immigrants as significant economic resources because of their human capital skills; and

Finally, the Migrants as Strangers Narrative delineates two major cultures, one Swedish and one immigrant, requiring "link-workers" to bridge the division.

In Birmingham, Scuzzarello identifies a concentration on two dominant constructions of immigrants:

Firstly, the Community Cohesion narrative is grounded in the race relations model of bringing ethno-racial and religious communities into contact; and

Second, the Working Asylum Seeker Narrative constructs the asylum seeker as eager to work.

Bologna's dominant policy narratives construct immigrants according to three principal characteristics:

Firstly, the Criminal Alien Narrative constructs immigrants as mainly deviant and a threat to core cultural values;

Second, the Economic Resources narrative considers immigrants to be a strong source of labour for routine occupations; and

Third, the Participating Migrant Narrative promotes the perspective of the immigrant as full and engaged member of the political society.

When it comes to institutional opportunities, Scuzzarello concludes that both Malmö and Bologna exhibit top-down and paternalistic modes of consultation. Immigrants are seen as ignorant of democratic policies and practices. She concludes that: "In Malmö and Bologna these kinds of institutional opportunity structures are not likely to support the adoption of caring multiculturalism." (p. 181)

In Sweden – as in Britain – immigrants can vote and run for office. Despite this, the Migrant's Provincial Council in Bologna exhibits elements of the attentiveness that cuts across cultural narratives and thereby offers forms of representation that better approximate caring multiculturalism than the Standing Consultative Forum and Community Cohesion Forums of Birmingham.

In general, when it comes to institutional structures, Scuzzarello finds those that cut through to the real needs and desires of citizens living in their fullness, those that are attentive, responsive, and responsible, work best. She highlights the Birmingham ward system in this regard as well as the Bologna Migrant Provincial Council. She also praises the individualized approach to immigrants' needs that is practiced in Malmö.

With regard to policy narratives on integration, Scuzzarello points out that no city goes far enough in facilitating truly transformative models of integration, grounded in attentiveness, responsiveness, and responsibility that would inform caring multiculturalism. She says:

> The relegation of the activities of cultural preservation to the private sphere, as in Malmö and Bologna, risks maintaining interpretations of culture and religion that oppress some segments of a group. (p. 237)

Even in Birmingham, despite its ward system and full integration of BMEs into the civic electoral process, Scuzzarello argues: "The race relations framework is still an important determinant for the management of community cohesion policies." (p. 238) This means that despite talk of post-multiculturalism, there is still too little attempt to integrate on the basis of deep enquiry into the multiplicity of experiences of those identified as immigrant.

Policy narratives that construct the immigrant tend to essentialize and overgeneralize in each of the three cities. In Bologna and Malmö, the economic resources approaches superimpose models of independence instead of enquiring into how immigrants, notably women, regard their own needs,

dependencies, and contributions. In all three cities there are tendencies to present immigrants as a homogeneous group, defined solely by their ethno-racial characteristics. In Bologna, these stereotypes include a great many negative references, but in Malmö they are paternalistic and in Birmingham trapped in a decreasingly relevant race relations model.

COMMENTS ON THE THESIS

This is an outstanding thesis in many ways and it contributes at least two major innovations and advances toward the academic discipline of political science:

Firstly, the deepening of theories of multiculturalism through Scuzzarello's innovative development of Caring Multiculturalism. This is grounded in the creative bringing together of feminist critiques of multiculturalism with research traditions in the ethics of care, and discursive and narrative social psychology.

Second, a genuinely comparative study of patterns of integration across three distinct European settings, grounded in a thick-descriptive anthropological approach, made possible by Scuzzarello's mastery of three languages and three political cultures.

Integrating advanced theoretical analysis with a critical and detailed macrological investigation into three states/cities as well as a sophisticated qualitative analysis of narratives and discourses, incorporating a range of methodologies is a major achievement. To accomplish this with apparent seamlessness and the demonstrable capacity to integrate levels of analysis is outstanding. Scuzzarello's thesis is excellent throughout, it is very well-organized, packed with relevant and insightful material, and a pleasure to read.

Paul Nesbitt-Larking är verksam vid Department of Political Science, Huron University College, London, Ontario, Canada. E-post: pnesbitt@uwo.ca

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