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   Hall, Patrik, 2004. Autonoma krafter och anpassade människor: diskursiv makt inom svensk IT-politik, *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 106, s 97-124.

   Hegeland, Hans, 2004. ”Europeiska unionen I nationella parlament - inrikespolitik eller utrikespolitik?”. Paper, Statsvetenskapliga Förbundet, arbetsgrupp Europaforskning, Stockholm.

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   Katarina Barrling Hermansson: *Partikulturer. Kollektiva självbilder och normer i Sveriges riksdag*. Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala 159. Uppsala 2004: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

# Studies in Cosmopolitanism

”Cosmopolitan” can stand, or has stood, for a number of things, at different times and in different places, in the vocabularies of different people – it may refer to an individual with many varied stamps in his or her passport; or a city or a neighborhood with a mixed population; or, with a capital-C, a woman´s magazine (originally American, now with editions in many countries and languages), at least at one time seen as a bit daring in its attitudes; or a person of uncertain patriotic reliability, quite possibly a Jew; or someone who likes weird, exotic cuisines; or an advocate of world government; or, again with a capital-C, a mixed drink combining vodka, cranberry juice, a dash of Cointreau, and perhaps other ingredients. To offer some examples.

A word of such protean quality may not seem to hold out much promise as a term for scholarly use. Yet sometimes words become keywords not through the precision and consistency of their deployment but rather through appealing to our imagination by way of ranges of somewhat opaquely interconnected uses. ”Cosmopolitan”, and related forms such as ”cosmopolis”, ”cosmopolite”, ”cosmopolitics” and ”cosmopolitanism”, would seem to have been among such terms, serving as foci of attention for many kinds of thinkers, and as rhetorical equipment for others, over the years and centuries. It is a word with a history, and for that matter a geography. The history has been one of ups and downs.

Especially during the past fifteen years or so, ideas of the cosmopolitan have been on an upswing in many contexts, and not least in academic scholarship. This has been noticeable in a range of disciplines: anthropology, sociology, philosophy, political science, international relations… The reasons are not so difficult to find. The general increase in diverse kinds of global interconnectedness invests it with new relevance. In particular, the end of the Cold War, with its great divide running through the world, seemed to make it possible to think anew, on both large and small scales, about the unity and diversity of humanity, about cosmopolis, and about global citizenship and responsibility.

This issue of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* exemplifies some such thinking, and its manifestation in research. It draws on ongoing work in the project ”KOSMOPOLIT: Culture and Politics in Global Society”, supported since 2003 by The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, with participating scholars from the universities of Stockholm, Lund, and Malmö (four more senior scholars, three PhD students). The disciplines involved are political science and social anthropology, but within that combination, there are a number of orientations and overlapping interests, including media studies and peace and conflict research. The aim of the project has not been to rush toward a single understanding of cosmopolitanism, but rather to serve – in the general spirit of the concept itself – as a meeting ground for a certain variety of schol-

arly orientations, engaging with varied materials. While the contributions to this issue do not at all offer an exhaustive picture of research within the project, they illustrate some of its concerns.

One of these concerns is surely, as the subtitle of the project indicates, the relationship between the culture and the politics of cosmopolitanism. Ulf Hannerz, who first took an interests in the ideas and practices of cosmopolitanism in the 1980s and who initiated the current project, had focused his early interest on cultural aspects: experiences of cultural diversity, skills in handling it, appreciation of the variety of cultural forms, cosmopolitanism as a stance in cultural consumption. This was a facet of his research interest in cultural dimensions of globalization, but at the time the political aspects of cosmopolitanism were not so much on his agenda, or of that of too many other scholars.

Again, the end of the Cold War changed all that. As the academic scrutiny of cosmopolitan ideas gathered new force, however, in a transformed political situation, the question whether there is anything but a fortuitous connection between the cultural and political senses of cosmopolitanism could itself stand out as central. Hannerz dwells particularly on that question in his article.

Certainly that question relates to the more general question of the uses of the culture concept. This is a concept with rather different histories in the disciplines centrally involved here. In anthropology, it has been continuously and elaboratedly at the intellectual core of the discipline, although often contested, and even occasionally (also recently) rejected. In political science, it has been rather more peripheral, and drawing uneven attention over time. Ronald Stade takes a critical look at some of its uses in his article.

Although his point of departure is that of an anthropologist, Stade's particular emphasis within the larger research project is otherwise rather more on the political side, in that he is concerned with the ideas of institutions of "global governance" which became increasingly prominent in the late twentieth century. If we adopt a somewhat facile distinction between "top-down" and "bottom-up" cosmopolitanisms, global governance, with its commissions of international leaders and its think tanks, is clearly primarily a top-down form – a matter of policies and practices developed in macro-level, central, more or less powerful structures and institutions with a wide reach into society, even global society. Not least as it appears in the theoretical and practical fields of conflict and conflict resolution, cosmopolitanism is also in large part top-down. In this issue, Annika Björkdahl's article on the peace operations of the European Union and the United Nations in Macedonia analyzes one instance. The "conflict preventionism" which has emerged in recent times in the organizational shape of cooperation between the military and agencies of civil society, and discussed here by Mattias Viktorin, is also in large part a top-down cosmopolitanism.

Bottom-up cosmopolitanisms, in contrast, tend to have a starting point at a micro-level of personal or group experience and orientation, although possibly, through aggregation, they can reach up through existing structures, or bring into being new and wider structures and processes. We may discern that in scholarship concerned with cosmopolitanism, different disciplines tend to focus on top-down or bottom-up phenomena. Political scientists, political philosophers and legal scholars tend to focus

variously on issues of global governance and the construction of a cosmopolitan democratic order. Anthropologists, ethnologists, and sociologists at least in their more empirical work, on the other hand, tend to find bottom-up orientations to cosmopolitanism more in line with their established research interests. Yet such a division of research labor does not work out altogether neatly – again, Stade, and also Viktorin, have their main discipline backgrounds in social anthropology.

Hannerz discusses some of the more typical recent ethnographic work on bottom-up cosmopolitanism in his article. Within the current project, such research is best exemplified through a study by Katja Sarajeva, who unfortunately could not contribute to this journal issue because at the time of its preparation she was engaged in anthropological field work in Moscow, on the subculture of Russian gays and lesbians. The background assumption here is that people with a not-so-mainstream life style may be inclined to generalize their own experience into a more favorable overall stance toward cultural diversity. Moreover, subcultures of this kind nowadays tend in themselves to transcend national borders in different ways, leading to wider horizons and loyalties. Sarajeva's study is also among those which now suggest that there can be gender aspects to cosmopolitanism.

The contrast between top-down and bottom-up cosmopolitanisms may be practical in some ways, but it can also oversimplify matters. For one thing, the two may meet and intermesh. A strong, widespread manifestation of bottom-up cosmopolitanism may (although need not always) result in the emergence of top-down cosmopolitan institutions. Top-down cosmopolitanism may also entail a kind of cultural engineering, by which individuals are recruited into situations where they are likely to have personal experiences leading to cosmopolitan orientations. Ioannis Tsoukalas, whose research within the project deals with student exchanges within the EU Erasmus Programme, considers the possibility that while the purpose of the programme may be to promote a somewhat limited European identity, it results at least at times in a more generalized cosmopolitan stance among the participants. Tsoukalas' work is represented here by a review essay.

Whatever may be its uses and its limitations, the top-down/bottom-up distinction should not be confused with the issue of the social distribution of cosmopolitan personal orientations in human populations. There has been a strong tendency in discussions of cosmopolitanism as a phenomenon in history and into the present to claim, or implicitly assume, that it is a more or less elite (and male) phenomenon. Clearly there have been some reasons for such an expectation. Cosmopolitan orientations, in culture and in politics, may have tended to go with more education, the opportunity to travel, and the prosperity, security and leisure which allow one to cultivate a wider range of interests and experiences. The point of much recent research, however, has been that cosmopolitanism of one kind or other may in fact be more widespread than has been customarily assumed. A wider involvement in travel and migration is generally seen as one fact of contemporary life which sometimes, although not always, contributes to cosmopolitan skills and sentiments. Another major fact, however multifaceted and debated, is that of media growth. Less than ever do people now need to travel to be in touch with a wider world, if it comes into one's living-room anyway. Alexa Robertson's comparative study of involvements with television news

shows the attention of the KOSMOPOLIT project to such issues – how do viewers respond to stories about, and pictures of, people and human conditions elsewhere? Here again, we might note that one can see such responses in terms of a largely bottom-up, more or less cosmopolitan involvement. Yet it is certainly also a possibility that central institutions could actively and deliberately use media in top-down ways which do or do not foster cosmopolitanism in audiences – or, for that matter, that media formats are somehow chosen which less intentionally tend to have one such top-down effect or another.

The contributions to this issue of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, then, point to some of the issues currently involved in one can come to confront as one engages with matters cosmopolitan in some, but far from all, of their polymorphous, changing variety. In reaching out across the borders of disciplines, they may also, to a degree, evince a particular kind of academic cosmopolitanism. They are offered to readers who may choose to sit down and taste them together with a glass containing a certain mixture of vodka, cranberry juice, and Cointreau.

**ULF HANNERZ**

# Two Faces of Cosmopolitanism: Culture and Politics

ULF HANNERZ[1]

**ABSTRACT**

This overview article discusses recent developments in the study of cosmopolitanism, with an emphasis on the two major dimensions of culture and politics. It is pointed out that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a surge of interest in the political aspects of cosmopolitanism, but that the relationship between the cultural and political senses of the notion of cosmopolitanism has mostly been given little attention. A comparison is suggested between cosmopolitanism and nationalism – the latter is widely understood to occur in forms of varied cultural density. The article also raises the problem of the social distribution of cosmopolitanism. It is pointed out that while cosmopolitanism has often been understood to be in large part an elite (and male) orientation, more recent studies point to more diverse loci in the social structure.

I first became involved with notions of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitans in the mid-1980s.[2] After that I mostly stayed away from them for some time. Recently, I have returned to them, although not finding them where I left them. As I dwell in what follows on two main tendencies in conceptions of cosmopolitanism, let me begin by briefly sketching some of this personal involvement.

## Exploring cosmopolitanism in world culture

It started with a colloquium at Berkeley, where I had sketched some of my interests in the cultural aspects of globalization, and one of my local anthropologist colleagues asked if in this connection I had given any thought to cosmopolitanism.[3] Essentially, my answer at the time had to be ”no,” but the question remained in my mind as one I ought to do something about. A couple of years later an opportunity presented itself, as I was invited to participate in a rather unusual event, the ”First International Conference on the Olympics and East/West and South/North Cultural Exchanges in the World System,” in Seoul, Korea, in 1987. (I do not know whether there was ever a ”Second.”) I presented there a paper titled ”Cosmopolitans and Locals in

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2 In large part the article draws on two previous statements (Hannerz 2004a, b).

3 As it later turned out that he had been doing himself (Rabinow 1986: 258).

World Culture," where, in an explorative mode, I drew together some ideas on cosmopolitanism.

It was, as the title indeed suggests, a piece on cosmopolitanism in culture – more specifically, on the cosmopolitan as a type in the management of meaning in an interconnected but culturally diverse world. The most general background of the paper was that I was critical of the widespread tendency to assume that globalization necessarily implied cultural homogenization – my emphasis was on the handling of diversity, as well as on new cultural forms emerging through cultural blending. In this particular case, I argued to begin with that in an increasingly mobile world, mobility in itself was hardly a sufficient condition for the development of what I thought of as the core of cosmopolitanism: an intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, and an ability to make one's way into other cultures. Drawing for examples rather insouciantly on an essay on travel by Paul Theroux, the novel *The Accidental Tourist* by Anne Tyler, an *International Herald Tribune* feature story on Nigerian market women trading between Lagos and London, and reflections on exile by Edward Said, I argued that going abroad and encountering otherness might involve rejection or narrow, controlled selection, rather than openness. The tourist often seeks out quite particular qualities of a distant place (such as sunshine) rather than embracing it as a whole; in other ways, the place should perhaps be as much like home as possible. The exile, having a foreign sanctuary more or less forced on him, might prefer to encapsulate himself as much as possible with others, possibly also from home, and in similar straits. The business traveler may find it convenient and comforting if all the hotels in major chains stretching across the world look and feel much the same. Not that people of such categories *could* not turn into cosmopolitans, then, but it was not really to be expected, or assumed.

What I thought was characteristic of the cosmopolitan management of meaning was a certain combination of surrender and mastery. Cosmopolitans, ideally, would seek to immerse themselves in other cultures, participating in them, accepting them as wholes. Yet in not only embracing these cultures but also displaying their skills in handling them, there is at the same time a sense of mastery, not infrequently with a streak of narcissism. Moreover, the surrender of cosmopolitans to otherness is usually situational. There is no real commitment to any particular other culture, I suggested, as one always knows where the exit is.

In my paper I then went on to suggest a certain resemblance between cosmopolitanism, as I understood it, with the conception of intellectuals developed particularly be the Hungarian writer George Konrad and the American sociologist Alvin Gouldner – especially relating to the latter´s notion of "cultures of critical discourse". The latter could be described as an overall orientation to structures of meaning which would be reflexive, problematizing, and generally expansive, pushing on and on in its analysis. People who are habituated to working actively with such explorations of orders of meaning – hoping eventually to master them – it seemed to me, might also be inclined toward cosmopolitanism.

I had done nothing more about publishing the paper when Mike Featherstone, as editor of the journal *Theory, Culture and Society*, asked me if I could contribute something to a special issue on "global culture" that he was planning. Since I had my Seoul

conference paper at hand, it appeared in the issue, and then that issue was also published as a book, which has thus been the publication reference for my paper (Hannerz 1990). Riding on a wave of growing interest in the sociocultural characteristics of globalization, the book *Global Culture* evidently did extremely well in the market, and thus probably more people may have read that essay of mine than certain other of my writings which I consider more central, and actually more weighty. Occasional later commentators seem even to have come to assume that it summarized my understanding of what globalization in culture is about, which it surely never did.

Anyway, that was where I left my interest in cosmopolitanism for some time. But let me reminisce briefly about the context in which that first paper was presented, for in a way it is significant. At that conference in Seoul in 1987 there were a few participants from Eastern Europe, including even a sport sociologist from the Soviet Union; and that was obviously something remarkable, since contacts between the Soviet Union and South Korea at that time were quite minimal. Consequently our Soviet colleague, and due to his presence our entire group, were closely guarded. As we toured the country by bus after the conference, a police car with a flashing blue roof light preceded us, and when our colleague went for a walk on a side road, he was watched by plainclothes detectives with walkie talkies.

## After the Cold War: cosmopolitics

My point here is simply that my first paper on cosmopolitanism was still from the Cold War era, and if that probably was not very noticeable in what was in it, it may have had some influence on what was not in it.

Varied as the referents for cosmopolitan terms now and in the past may have been, many of them tend to cluster in two areas. Or in other words, cosmopolitanism has two faces. Putting things perhaps a little too simply, one is more cultural, the other more political. The emphasis in my Seoul conference paper had clearly been of the former kind; predictably enough in the context of that conference, and perhaps for a paper by an anthropologist anyway. The more politically oriented notions relating to cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, have to do with global government and governance, with world citizenship and responsibilities toward humanity.

The balance between these two main clusters of ideas about cosmopolitanism has changed greatly in the period after the Cold War. Most of the recent scholarly activity has been on the political side of cosmopolitanism – on the side of cosmopolitics, to adopt a shorthand term. Clearly these developments had much to do with the perception that the era which was now seen to begin might allow new ways of organizing both power and responsibility across borders. The idea of some kind of cosmopolis could a little more credibly be there as a potentiality. But the new and unfolding cosmopolitics was really animated by a more extended series of conditions and experiences, not all equally welcome. Most generally, there was the continuing growth of global interconnectedness, and the increasing consciousness of this fact. Furthermore, if the term ”globalization” had to a remarkable extent been apropriated to refer to the deregulation of markets and the triumphant march of capitalism, ”cosmopolitanism” suggested that human beings could relate to the world not only as consum-

ers, or members of a labor force, but also as citizens. Cosmopolitanism thus tended to carry with it a critique of at least certain qualities of global capitalism, as well as a search for ways of constraining it.

Soon there was also the fact that the passage of the Cold War order did not go altogether smoothly. New wars and other conflagrations such as those of the Balkans had involved atrocities of which the media now made more people aware, and which contributed to placing "human rights" prominently on a cosmopolitan agenda. Furthermore, environmental changes were seen as matters requiring active handling at a level beyond the nation-state, as they could not be contained within its boundaries. "Risk" became a key word here; it could cover more gradually evolving dangers as well as the threat of disasters of an apparently more sudden nature, such as nuclear power accidents – the explosion at Chernobyl was an event of great symbolic power especially in Europe. And as much as ever, cosmopolitics could also stand opposed to nationalism, nativism, and xenophobia.[4] In large part these latter were adversary responses to global interconnectedness which could be reactions to the influx of migrant labor forces as well as refugees, but sometimes also to other social and cultural traffic across borders.

In all the instances just identified, the cosmopolitan impulse has tended to be one of favoring more inclusive arrangements of compassion, solidarity, and peacefulness – again, then, extending shared moral principles to all humanity, as "a community of citizens of the world", as one dictionary definition of cosmopolis would have it.The organizational forms of cosmopolitan practice have varied: from the various kinds of top-down cosmopolitics involving statesmen and think tanks in working out ideas and institutions of global governance, to more bottom-up variants, in which numerous social movements, networks and other groupings contribute cumulatively to the growing realization of a transnational civil society, or a global public sphere. And all of this has been reflected in new preoccupations among many academic disciplines.

## The relationship between culture and politics

Yet all this seems mostly to leave the cultural face of cosmopolitanism out. Consequently, when I have recently returned to thinking about cosmopolitanism, this stands out as one central question: is there a relationship between these two faces of cosmopolitanism, culture and politics? Or are these two clusters of meaning which could seem just accidentally to share one set of labels, a space in the dictionary? Indeed, in Western history the concept as it is may go back a long way. But when I recently spent a research period in Japan, I found it interesting that Japanese colleagues told me that the word "cosmopolitan" has had no immediate indigenous counterpart in the Japanese language, while terms such as *sekai shimin*, "world citizen", and *chikyu shimin*, "global citizen", would seem, at least to me, to involve ideas rather more over on the cosmopolitical side. Of course, the word "cosmopolitan" itself, and related

4 This means that cosmopolitanism also belongs in a wider field of debate involving notions of multiculturalism, transnationalism, identity politics, diaspora, or even political correctness. I am grateful to Koichi Iwabuchi for emphasizing the strong connection to this cluster of terms, in a colloquium at Waseda University.

terms, can travel, and so they have been imported and assimilated into Japanese. You even find *Cosmopolitan*, the glossy women´s magazine, appearing under the same name but in a Japanese-language edition. Perhaps we should ask, still, whether with the two sets of meaning sharing a term we are dealing with (originally at least) a characteristically western confusion?

My inclination is to think that there is, after all, a connection between these two cosmopolitanisms, a sort of elective affinity. To throw more light on this, I find it illuminating to turn for comparative purposes to another set of ideas with which cosmopolitanism is frequently contrasted: that of nationalism, or patriotism. During the period of intensive inquiries into nationalism which took off in the 1980s, a decade earlier than those into cosmopolitics, we learned to distinguish between two main varieties, which could be given various labels, but which have often been described as on the one hand "ethnic" or "primordial", and on the other hand "civic" or "constitutional" (see e g Kohn 1945; Ignatieff 1994: 3ff; Goldmann, Hannerz, Westin 2000: 12ff.).

The "ethnic" variety is indeed based on ethnicity, or something much like it. Belonging to the nation here thus tends to be based on a criterion of ascription, and an assumption of cultural homogeneity and great historical depth. Consequently, this is a kind of nationalism based on great symbolic density, a major asset in contexts where solidarity has to be mobilized. The other side of the coin is that it is often rigid and exclusionist when it comes to membership, and for such reasons not seldom conflict-generating. Civic nationalism is a more strictly political entity. What is needed for membership is above all a commitment to to an overarching political order. In principle, regardless of culture and history, you too can join. But then admirable as such openness and flexibility may be, some would argue that there is in civic nationalism a certain cultural deficit. It may be too symbolically narrow, too culturally thin to gain full commitments.

To that fairly simple contrast – where certainly some number of in-between variations must also be possible – we can now add another kind of nationalism, identified somewhat more recently. The political psychologist Michael Billig (1995) has argued that not all the cultural density accumulated in senses of national identity and nationhood need be of a narrowly ethnic, conflict-oriented character. Not least in stable, affluent contemporary societies there is often a strong but probably largely benign "banal nationalism," based on the recurrent routines and experiences of daily life; little everyday rules and rituals and consumption habits which in their ubiquity and more or less all-encompassing character come to define much of what it means to belong to a given nation-state.

In nationalism there are thus two or three major possibilities, clearly recognized in scholarship. In considerations of cosmopolitanism, the view appears to me to have been rather different. Among political theorists and philosophers, not least, the tendency has been to point to a certain weakness in cosmopolitanism as a political and moral notion.[5] The philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1996: 15), a major commentator

5 I draw here especially on the debate between Nussbaum and several critical interlocutors in Cohen 1996; a debate ignited by Nussbaum's response to a plea for patriotism by Richard Rorty.

on issues of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, is strongly cosmopolitan in her own preferences (yet at the same time seeing no necessary conflict between the two), but notes that cosmopolitanism "offers only reason and the love of humanity, which may seem at times less colorful than other sources of belonging." "Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business," she admits. "It is...a kind of exile – from the comfort of local truths, from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one´s own." A number of other thinkers agree with her.

It seems that the sort of cosmopolitanism identified by Nussbaum and others bears a strong resemblance to civic nationalism. In terms of symbolic load, however, we appear to have both thick and thin nationalisms – but only a thin cosmopolitanism. Why should there be no thick cosmopolitanism?

Again, the argument with regard to nationalism has been that a strong sense of national culture and identity feeds into nationalist political action – in brief, culture can be a resource for politics. The parallel argument would be that what I identified before – and already in that first paper of mine on the topic – as the core of cultural cosmopolitanism, the ability to make one's way into other cultures, and the appreciative openness toward divergent cultural experiences, could be a resource for cosmopolitical commitments. To come back to the formulation about the two faces of cosmopolitanism again: political cosmopolitanism is often a cosmopolitanism with a worried face, trying to come to grips with very large problems. But cosmopolitanism in its cultural dimension may be a cosmopolitanism with a happy face, enjoying new sights, sounds and tastes, new people. And in combination, and merging with one another, they may be that thick form of cosmopolitanism, where experience and symbolism can motivate identification and a will to action.

Especially in the present era, it is hardly self-evident that nationalisms have a monopoly on central formative experiences, with enduring consequences for personal orientations. For a probably growing number of people, border-crossing involvements with different places, cultures and nations may well also have such qualities. These people may have central work experiences, new links of friendship and kinship, memorable pleasures and challenges, in sites involving encounters with what is initially culturally alien. As such encounters become a part of many people´s life course and of everyday experience, there may grow what (in line with Billig´s terminology) one might describe as "banal cosmopolitanism".[6] To use a somewhat paradoxical but now recurrent formulation, it is a matter of being, or becoming, at home in the world.

Now perhaps it cannot be taken for granted that thick cosmopolitanism comes about quite in the same way as thick nationalism. Perhaps there is something in a lack of steady commitment to particular cultural alterities that makes cosmopolitan identifications somehow less apparently fateful and forceful than national identifications. And people can conceivably be pleased with their experiences and their personal levels of connoisseurship with regard to cultural diversity without proceeding much be-

6 Notions of "banal cosmopolitanism" or "banal globalism" are apparently such obvious analogies to Billig's "banal nationalism" that several writers seem to have arrived at them independently – see also Beck (2002) and Szerszynski and Urry (2002).

yond self-indulgent consumption habits, without having any strong sense of civic and humanitarian responsibility transcending national borders. Yet to repeat, if these two senses of cosmopolitanism must not simply be conflated, there could be at least a kind of elective affinity between cosmopolitan culture and cosmopolitics. No doubt, the intertwining of the two can proceed along different lines and take many shapes. But then why should there not be as much scope for variation and complexity here as there has been in the case of nationalism? It may simply be time for the political philosophers of cosmopolitanism to let more ethnographers in.

## Mapping cosmopolitanisms

Indeed it has been a part of the renewed interest in these matters in recent years to broaden the view of cosmopolitanism, and to draw a new map of its distribution. In part this has been a preoccupation of anthropologists, although other scholars and thinkers have contributed as well.

To begin with one might consider the report by Charles Piot (1999: 23), anthropologist staying with the Kabre, cereal cultivators in the heart of the West African savanna (in Togo), and arguing that they are "as cosmopolitan as the metropole itself, if by cosmopolitanism we mean that people partake in a social life characterized by flux, uncertainty, encounters with difference, and the experience of processes of transculturation." That may be a striking argument simply because it seems so often to be taken for granted that cosmopolitanism belongs in the center, in the affluent urban North of the world. In a field of debate largely populated by scholars and intellectuals from Europe and North America, there is sometimes, not least in generalizing theoretical statements about cosmopolitanism, a rather uncosmopolitan disregard for other parts of the world. An alternative view is set forth even more sharply by Ashis Nandy, the Indian commentator and cultural critic, who suggests that:

> Europe and North America have increasingly lost their cosmopolitanism, paradoxically because of a concept of cosmopolitanism that considers Western culture to be definitionally universal and therefore automatically cosmopolitan. Believe it or not, there *is* a cost of dominance, and that cost can sometimes be heavy. (Nandy 1998: 146)

That point is in fact not so different from one that I made, rather in passing, in my first cosmopolitanism paper, where I noted that westerners can encapsulate themselves rather easily in their own transnational cultural enclaves even when they move about. It has been the others, the people from the peripheries of the world, who often really have had to learn to handle a culture other than their own. Ashis Nandy makes his comment in the context of an argument for a more direct dialogue between Asian civilizations, a dialogue not so dominated by the West. The argument for a global broadening of the base of cosmopolitan thought has recently also been made forcefully by Mandaville (2003).

Yet mostly the new mapping of cosmopolitanism has concerned not where in the world you find the cosmopolitans, but where in the social structure. It has been a longstanding assumption, whether implicit or explicit, that cosmopolitanism has

been a privilege that often goes with other privileges; more or less an elite characteristic. Certainly this is not to say that all elites are cosmopolitans. Historically at least, however, a cosmopolitan cultural orientation in this view has gone with more formal education, more travel, more leisure as well as material resources to allow the acquisition of knowledge of the diversity of cultural forms. Moreover, taking a Bourdieuan perspective, we could find cosmopolitan tastes and knowledge serving as symbolic capital in elite competitive games of distinction.

If at one time, this privileged cosmopolitanism may have been in large part aristocratic, it would more recently seem to have gone with professionalism. In my first article, I argued mostly along such lines, linking it with the growing transnationalism of many occupations, and with the "cultures of critical discourse" of intelligentsias. More recently, we can find related points of view toward the social bases of cosmopolitanism for example with the sociologist Craig Calhoun (2002), as he discusses contemporary cosmopolitanism as "the class consciousness of frequent travellers"; or the anthropologist Richard Shweder (2000: 170), who provocatively portrays an emergent, two-tiered world order of two "castes". There will be the cosmopolitan liberals, writes Shweder, who are trained to appreciate value neutrality and cultural diversity and who run the global institutions, and the local non-liberals, who are dedicated to some form of thick ethnicity and are inclined to separate themselves from "others", thereby guaranteeing that there is enough diversity remaining in the world for the cosmopolitan liberals to appreciate.

The point of a fair number of recent ethnographic studies, however, is that cosmopolitanism, of one kind or other, perhaps never was, but in any case is no longer, only an elite phenomenon. For one thing, this has not for a long time, or perhaps ever, really been a world divided between "haves" who move and "havenots" who stay put. One term which we have from a well-known essay on travel by James Clifford (1992), an American intellectual historian with a close connection to anthropology, is "discrepant cosmopolitanisms"; but since the specific conclusion is often that cosmopolitanism also thrives in lower social strata, we could perhaps as well call them subaltern cosmopolitanisms. The British anthropologist Huon Wardle (2000) thus develops the theme by combining personalized ethnography from among his neighbors and associates in working-class urban Jamaica with philosophical notions from Immanuel Kant, and from Georg Simmel. He notes the enduring harshness of Caribbean living conditions and the historical and continued openness of the region to influences from the outside world, and he notes the mobility and the transnational networks, not least of kinship, in which ordinary Jamaicans are engaged. But proceeding beyond material circumstances and practical adaptations, Wardle finds a cosmopolitan philosophy and a shared community esthetic emerging in sociality, out of the uncertainty and flux of life: recognizable for example in playfulness and in narratives of adventure.

Then as James Ferguson (1999), Stanford anthropologist, finds cosmopolitans in the classic anthropological territory of urban Zambian Copperbelt, we are among people who are not likely to have traveled much outside Zambia. But Ferguson finds a distinct cleavage of cultural styles between cosmopolitans and localists. He emphasizes that "style" here is a matter of accomplished, cultivated performance capacity, a

matter of seeking worldliness and at the same time distancing oneself from more parochial ties and traditions. But there are different varieties of cosmopolitanism here – some "high" and some "low". Not so few of the more conspicuous Copperbelt cosmopolitans are in fact hoodlums and prostitutes.

There would seem to be good reason to believe that in the contemporary period, the social bases of cosmopolitanism are expanding. A larger and more varied set of people in the world have important cross-border involvements and experiences of cultural diversity. Even though mobility, again, is perhaps not a sufficient condition for cosmopolitan attitudes, it may matter that labor migration, tourism, backpacking, pilgrimages and student exchanges take people out of their local habitats. Wardle's Jamaicans are only one example. Ferguson's Zambian townspeople may have been less transnationally mobile in physical terms, but they would be among those whose horizons and imagined worlds have been affected by new media engagements, and new consumption patterns.

What media, and especially world-wide news reporting, does to cosmopolitan sentiments is probably a complicated issue. How do people respond to views of disaster, war and suffering? Í have suggested elsewhere that a kind of "electronic empathy" may grow when you see starving children, or emaciated bodies behind barbed wire in some newly discovered concentration camp, on the television screen (Hannerz 1996: 121). But then we cannot be quite sure that empathy and even activism are what necessarily follows from the experience, by way of the media, of other human beings suffering violence, hunger or disaster somewhere in the world. Perhaps many shared a cosmopolitan moment, a moment of electronic empathy with the victims, on September 11, 2001, when they could see a crew of fanatics wilfully crashing a passenger plane into a crowded skyscraper, but then much of what has followed has been fear and loathing. The journalism scholar Susan Moeller has devoted a book to the phenomenon of *Compassion Fatigue* (1999). Presumably reactions to news in the media depend a great deal on how the news are framed, and on the wider social and cultural contexts of particular media experiences. (In this issue, Alexa Robertson has more to say about such matters.)

To return to Wardle and Ferguson, however, finding cosmopolitans among proletarians, and even lumpenproletarians, could give us some kind of satisfaction, and lead us toward a broader and in some ways less loaded view of cosmopolitan phenomena. Looking for the points and areas in the social structure where some kind of cosmopolitanism may grow should not, however, be a matter only of looking up or down in the social strata as conventionally understood. We should rather seek out, along more varied dimensions, the loci where experiences and interests may come together, in individuals and groups, to expand horizons and shape wider sets of relationships.

Surely there are age and generational differences here: young people are often most likely to avail themselves of new technologies which cut across distances and make wider cultural inventories accessible, and new opportunities for mobility. (Ioannis Tsoukalas' study of the Erasmus student exchange scheme in Europe offers an instance of this.) There is also the issue of gender. That classic image of the elite cosmopolitan, to the extent that it was not gender neutral, no doubt had a male bias, if only

because it was assumed that men were more likely to have such advantages as the requisite education, and the freedom of movement, to cultivate a cosmopolitan orientation. But then the point has been made recently for example by the British sociologist Mica Nava (2002) that groups with reason to be dissatisfied with their positions and experiences in the established local order of things may seek alternatives elsewhere, and may therefore be open to other cultures and their expressions; furthermore that women have often been in such situation. Nava's research has been on early and mid-twentieth century women in Britain, whose cosmopolitanism, and revolt against mainstream Englishness, showed up in the pleasure they would take in American-style department stores, the orientalist Russian Ballet, tango, and immigrant men from the distant reaches of the empire. Quite similarly, the American anthropologist Karen Kelsky (2001) describes the more recent attraction of Japanese women to foreign language study, study abroad, work abroad and in international organizations, and involvements with foreign men as a reaction to the constraints of womanhood in Japanese society.

I suspect that a subcultural approach to the variety of cosmopolitanisms may frequently be useful. For one thing, one may wonder whether a strong involvement in one more or less divergent cultural orientation could possibly lead to greater tolerance, curiosity or appreciation vis-á-vis cultural diversity more generally. But probably equally importantly, contemporary subcultures, far from being only local, small-scale, face-to-face entities, are often transnational phenomena, with their own patterns of mobility and media use, and their own frequently transnational center-periphery relationships. Within the framework of the KOSMOPOLIT project on which this issue of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* draws, the anthropologist Katja Sarajeva is exploring such a cosmopolitan dimension in the urban communities and networks of Russian gays and lesbians. As a social category with a long history of discrimination extending into the present at home, these evidently find some of their most appealing current centers, and their strongest organized support, in western Europe and North America.

## Rootless and rooted

In connection with Sarajeva's project I think it may also be useful to touch on a couple of other points relating to concepts of cosmopolitanism. Our ethnographer in Russia may not use the label cosmopolitanism all that much in her field research, where it carries a fairly heavy load. In history, there have been periods and places where ”cosmopolitans” has served as a term of denunciation, of more or less vicious othering. These, it is implied, are people of doubtful loyalty to the ”fatherland” – possibly parasites, and potential traitors and renegades. It is typically in such usage, although not only there, that cosmopolitans are taken to be ”rootless”. In Russia, under the Czars as well as during the Soviet period, the term was applied, in a somewhat off-and-on way, particularly to Jews, and being thus recognized was not advantageous, and could be dangerous.

The idea of “rootless” cosmopolitans has a long history. “Deterritorialization”, in contrast, is a more recent keyword, summarizing notions that large-scale migration

and the proliferation of media now combine to loosen people's ties to particular limited spaces. But does it follow that rootlessness and cosmopolitanism more than ever belong together, and spread together?

It seems entirely possible that some people are less rooted, or more complexly rooted, than others. The experiences of migrancy and diaspora may relativize and circumscribe rootedness. If few people are entirely deterritorialized, many may well have the sense of being more or less at home in more than one place. Having "roots" is not necessarily a matter of being forever rooted, but can be one of putting down roots, acting to become rooted. There seems to be no single relationship, however, between cosmopolitanism and degrees of rootedness. Writing about late twentieth century nationalist conflicts, and identifying himself as a cosmopolitan, the well-known scholar-journalist Michael Ignatieff (1994: 7-9) suggests that this is the privilege only of someone who can take a secure nation-state for granted. And the African-born, American-based philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah indeed argues that a ”rooted cosmopolitanism” or, alternatively phrased, a ”cosmopolitan patriotism,” is entirely possible. His father, a well-known Ghanaian politician, identifed firmly with his home region of Ashanti throughout his involvement in the struggle for Ghanaian independence. Yet in an unfinished note found after his death, he reminded his children that they should be citizens of the world. Wherever they chose to live they should make sure they left that place better than they had found it. ”The cosmopolitan patriot," his son writes (Appiah 1996: 22), ”can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different, people."

If we can overcome the sense that "the rooted cosmopolitan" is somehow a paradox, it allows us to get away from some of the doubts that theorists have nourished with regard to the viability of cosmopolitan politics. When Bhikhu Parekh (2003), for example, argues for a "globally oriented citizenship", he appears to recognize that levels of commitment which have often been seen as conflicting can also be complementary, allowing for situational selections of relevance.

## Native term and analytical concept

What the Russian case, and the instance of the field researcher in Russia, might moreover make clear to us is that we need to distinguish between cosmopolitanism as a native, "emic", term and as an analytical concept – even as we should keep in mind that it is one characteristic of the contemporary reflexive society that concepts can move quickly between these two spheres. The more or less privileged cosmopolitans, past or present, may have been quite likely to identify themselves self-consciously as cosmopolitans – which would be one reason why the term has come to be associated primarily with them. Piot's Togolese villagers, Ferguson's Copperbelt street sophisticates and Wardle's Jamaican proletarian city dwellers are not likely to be labeled cosmopolitans by anybody in their ordinary environment, nor do they probably think of themselves as such – at least insofar as the term itself, or any immediate counterpart, may well be unknown to them. Members of a stigmatized Russian minority, in con-

trast, may be conscious of the term and its connotations, and feel that they do not need that additional burden.

Trying to use cosmopolitanism as an analytical category, then, we will apparently need to include some people who are not aware that they are cosmopolitans, or who even deny it, and it may be, too, that we will find reason to exclude some who claim to belong. Meanwhile, we also had better take note of local, historical uses of this and related terms, and understand their contemporary implications.

Yet a more comprensive ethnographic mapping of the actually existing varieties of cosmopolitanism should also allow us, even prompt us, to be more precise in the use of cosmopolitan concept, and perhaps not least to make some further distinctions. Starting out more or less with the understanding of cosmopolitan culture that I sketched in my first essay, I now wonder if it may be illuminating to draw a couple of contrasts. One may think of the cosmopolitan as possessing an internally diverse, but basically finite, set of cultural skills drawn from some number of sources; a cultural repertoire developed out of particular experiences, equipping this person to deal with a corresponding set of situations. Yet at a somewhat different level, what could be involved might perhaps be a more general orientation toward cultural diversity, a ”culture of cultures”, a metaculture. Perhaps it entails a kind of optimism about learning, as a general possibility and as a personal capacity; some insight into more overarching modes of organizing experience and knowledge; some inclination to intellectual and emotional risk-taking; a readiness to find pleasure in the new. This looks most like an individual-level cultural psychology, but it may be possible to move beyond that to see if one can find it also as a more collective property of particular groups. In any case, there seems to be room for more conceptual work here, and further investigation.

More concretely again, we should perhaps be aware that not every cultural stance that we may feel deserves to be recognized as cosmopolitan goes, as it were, all the way. Reflecting particularly on some of those ethnographic glimpses of subaltern cosmopolitanisms which we have recently been allowed, it seems we also need to identify a more instrumental cosmopolitanism, involving skills and some self-confidence in dealing with a heterogeneous, more or less alien and sometimes harsh environment. Perhaps such adaptive skills may in time lead to more consummatory cultural values, but in itself this cosmopolitanism is not necessarily of that most conspicuously happy-face variety, of encountering diversity and really enjoying it.

## At home in the world

Here I return to the relationship between the culture and the politics of cosmopolitanism. A point I have occasionally made about globalization in cultural terms is that it may mean that you have access to a larger proportion of the total global cultural inventory – but it may also mean that a larger part of that inventory somehow has access to you. The former view seems more positive, even enthusiastic: you have more to choose from, more to work with or play with. The latter view is more sombre: a number of modes of thought or action which you would rather not be bothered with

somehow insist on your attention, as they come in your way in the neighborhood, in your work place, or wherever.

These views show up in different current versions of culturespeak, and they may relate to the social bases of cosmopolitanism I have referred to – and not least to public understandings of such distributions. The view of cosmopolitanism as an elite preoccupation comes in here. We can recognize, to begin with, that the linkage between cosmopolitanism and older or more recent elites is open to at least a couple of unfavorable interpretations, in more political terms. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism may be understood as engaged in creating another burden for ordinary people. "The theory or advocacy of the formation of a world society or cosmopolis", as one dictionary definition has it, may lead to a mode of domination even less accessible to influence from below than any earlier social order. On the other hand, cosmopolitans, rootless, footloose, carrying their assets with them, may be suspected of escaping from local or national contexts, avoiding responsibility, not sharing in a common burden.[7] Such an understanding of elite cosmopolitanism adds an element of its own to any climate of distrust found between upper and lower strata in many societies: if things go very wrong, is your elite even going to be there to face the music?

Beyond that, however, it appears that elites tend to become identified with that more positive view of cultural diversity, of improved access to the global cultural inventory, which I just identified. There is some of that in Shweder' s formulation as referred to above. At times we may find that this carries the cultural dimension of cosmopolitanism to a certain extreme, seeing cultural diversity in terms of differing performances – to be enjoyed at a certain distance, from a good seat in the audience, as it were.[8]

That may seem like an enlightened, laudable point of view, but it may also entail a certain danger. It is a danger which has been fairly visible not least in Europe in recent years. One may sense that the dramatic, if only relative, success of various anti-immigrant political groupings – in France, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and elsewhere – in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been a reaction not simply against an influx of migrants and refugees. It may also be fueled when complaints about those minor or major everyday nuisances and irritations which too much involuntary cultural access may indeed bring about are met, as a habitual, more or less privileged cosmopolitan response on the part of politicians, officials and others, by a particular kind of celebration of the esthetic and intellectual pleasures of diversity. To those dealing on a daily basis with the big or small nuisances of that diversity, cosmopolitanism with just too happy a face may seem impractical, and a little hypocritical. And so especially across a certain social divide, in a recognizably schismogenetic format, enthusiasms of this kind on one side may just possibly contribute to generating its resentful opposite on the other.

In terms of combining culture and politics, consequently, that may be a somewhat counterproductive kind of thick cosmopolitanism. Coming back to the notion of a

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7 The American scholar-politician Robert Reich's (1991) well-known conception of "symbolic analysts" points in this direction; see also Hannerz (1996: 81ff.).

8 I have developed and further contextualized the point in Hannerz (1999); see Gingrich and Banks, forthcoming, for an anthropological view of European neonationalist, anti-immigration politics.

banal cosmopolitanism, however, and the idea of being "at home in the world", we may in the end be better off thinking about that thick cosmopolitanism somewhat differently. To be "at home in the world" may be as much a question of breadth as of warmth – it may entail having a similar range of experiences out there, of others and of oneself, personally or vicariously, as one has closer at hand, in a local community or in a nation. Its characteristic cosmopolitan openness may be esthetic and intellectual, but it is certainly also pragmatic and instrumental, and some of the satisfaction derived from it is that of a reasonable confidence that one can manage. Encounters with cultural diversity, entanglements with alterity, may not always be a sheer pleasure, but one has come to a habitual readiness to cope with them such as they are.

Some of the work on the kinds of urban sites described as cosmopolitan suggests this kind of practical dispositions and relationships. The veteran American urban sociologist Elijah Anderson (2004: 25) has recently used the notion of "cosmopolitan canopies" to denote the kinds of public spaces which "allow people of different backgrounds the chance to slow down and indulge themselves, observing, pondering, and in effect, doing their own folk ethnography". They foster a kind of confidence, and a code of civility.

At this point in time, perhaps such a stance, expanding out of the neighborhood to take in more of the world, is not to be underestimated. A kind of modest bottom-up cosmopolitics may at least be a matter of maintaining a certain immunity to extreme antagonisms, of hatred or of fear, and to their more or less organized expressions. If the decade and a half since the Cold War has been a period of renewed interest in cosmopolitanism among the theorists, the headlines and the storylines in these times have often been of another kind: of new wars, human wrongs, things falling apart. Yet that may again be the kinds of things that go most readily precisely into headlines and storylines. It may be worth looking more closely for the small signs of banal, or quotidian, or vernacular, or low-intensity cosmopolitanism.

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# Peace Operations and the Promotion of Cosmopolitanism

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**ABSTRACT**

The article explores the possibility for peace operations to function as a channel for diffusion of norms and values, and it attempts to identify conditions and circumstances conducive to the diffusion of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is here regarded as a political alternative to nationalism, and cosmopolitan values are perceived to stand in opposition to identity politics and other exclusive ideologies. Hence, cosmopolitanism may contribute to create conditions for peaceful conflict resolution and the prevention of conflict, and norms pertaining to conflict prevention are considered to have cosmopolitan characteristics. Hence, the diffusion of norms pertaining to conflict prevention may more specifically contribute to impede conflict. The UN mission UNPREDEP and the EU missions Concordia and Proxima to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are analyzed to explore their capability to promote cosmopolitanism and diffuse norms such as those pertaining to the prevention of violent conflicts. The analysis suggests that both the UN mission and to a greater extent the EU missions provided opportunities to diffuse a cosmopolitan vision emphasizing conflict prevention to Macedonia. Cosmopolitanism was promoted as a long-term preventive strategy and as an alternative to the identity-based politics that caused inter-ethnic tensions between the majority of ethnic Macedonians and the largest minority consisting of ethnic Albanians.

## Introduction

"Cosmopolitanism is back" *again* we might add (Harvey 2000: 529). Cosmopolitanism has surfaced from time to time, and at the end of the 20th century it has reemerged as a consequence of the globalization, nationalism, identity politics, migration and multiculturalism (Hannerz 1990, 2005a, 2005b, Nussbaum 1996). Within the international community cosmopolitanism has gained renewed interest as an alternative approach to deal with many of the security threats of the contemporary world that cannot be solved within national borders, such as international terrorism, transnational crime, the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and weapons of mass destruction, human rights violations and violent conflicts (Kaldor 1999, 2002). In order to come to terms with these and other problems and challenges of global concern

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states have created cooperative arrangements and alliances that can be regarded as modes of cosmopolitanism superseding the Westphalian nation-state model. In the post-cold war era, international organizations and various other regional arrangements, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and NATO as well as a multitude of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and transnational networks – sometimes described as cosmopolitan institutions– have attempted to address these security concerns. One example of this type of "cosmopolitics" is the growing trend towards peacekeeping and peace enforcement to deal with violent conflicts, gross human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing. These developments have at times been referred to as cosmopolitan law enforcement and proactive cosmopolitanism as well as cosmopolitan wars (Kaldor 2003, Taylor 1999, Zolo 1997).

Cosmopolitanism is a term used in different ways by different people. To some it refers to "cosmopolitics" and a vision of world government, global democracy and world citizenship (Cheah *et al* 1998, Falk 1996, 1998, Archibugi and Held 1995). Cosmopolitanism is here understood as a political alternative to nationalism and identity politics. The spread of cosmopolitan values in general may contribute to the prevention of violent conflict by undermining support for extremists, ultra-nationalists, fundamentalists and other exclusive ideologies that may cause political tensions and eventually violent conflicts. In addition, the norm pertaining to conflict prevention is regarded as possessing cosmopolitan characteristics, and the diffusion of such norm may more specifically contribute to the prevention of violent conflict. Efforts at norm diffusion and particularly through the practice of peace operations may however be defied. Cosmopolitan values may be perceived as "Western" rather than universal, and attempts to spread cosmopolitanism may be viewed as projections of Western power and hence resisted and rejected.

The purpose of this article is to analyze whether cosmopolitan values can be diffused through peace operations, and if so under what conditions. It also discusses if the diffusion of these cosmopolitan values may contribute to prevent violent conflicts. The UN mission UNPREDEP and the EU missions Concordia and Proxima deployed to prevent violent conflicts in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be the empirical focus of analysis. Although I am sympathetic to many aspects of cosmopolitanism, such as the commitment to humanist principles and norms and the emphasis on a global responsibility to uphold these norms, this article does not attempt to contribute to the normative discussion, but will provide an empirical analysis of the possibility to diffuse cosmopolitan values through peace operations. I have found that some of these cosmopolitan values and norms have become embedded in the international normative structure and are robust enough to guide practice. Furthermore, once norms are translated into practice, practice contributes to strengthen and develop these norms as norms and practice are regarded as mutually constitutive. This has been the case of norms pertaining to conflict prevention and preventive action (Björkdahl 2002).

## Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is clearly related to the moral dimension of international relations as well as the ethical nature of the relations between states/communities as for example in the context of violence and war (Brown 1992: 3-4). Cosmopolitanism has become more "policy relevant" in the last few years as actors such as states and international organizations have felt a need to justify their actions in moral terms. According to Mary Kaldor cosmopolitanism refers both to a "positive political vision, embracing tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy", and "to a more legalistic respect for certain overriding principles which should guide political communities at various levels, including the global level" (Kaldor 1999: 116). Cosmopolitanism also highlights for example "…the spread of norms that secure human rights, democratic freedoms and social justice" according to Pugh (2001: 347). Cosmopolitanism has however been criticized by for example Barber (1996: 30-31) on the grounds of its "abstract universalism", and by Himmelfarb (1996: 77) for being an "illusion". It has also been argued that cosmopolitanism relies on a simplistic, polarized view of the world reducible to a few dichotomies such as cosmopolitanism vs. the nation state (O'Byrne 2005: 2). In this empirical analysis of efforts to diffuse norms of cosmopolitan character and spread cosmopolitanism both the political vision and overriding principles will be regarded as both may in different way contribute to the long term aim of stable peace.

### Cosmopolitan values

Cosmopolitan values are derived from a humanist universalist context. Three values are shared by nearly all approaches of cosmopolitanism according to Thomas Pogge (1992: 48). These three elements will provide the basis for the understanding of cosmopolitanism of this article. The first is *individualism* as the fundamental units of concern are human beings, in contrast to collectives such as tribes, family lines, ethnic, cultural or religious communities, nations or states. The second element is *universality*. This refers to the equal status of all living human beings, not merely to for example men, whites, or Aryans. The third and final element is *generality* and this status has global force, meaning that human beings are the "ultimate unites of concern for everyone".

An international normative context of international law, laws of war and international human rights law is developing based on these elements in which the protection of humans against harm such as gross violation of human rights and violent conflicts is becoming a moral imperative. War and violent conflicts have been the main impetus behind the development of this normative context over the last two centuries as well as one of the principle threats to its survival. "The concept of harm or its equivalent is present in all moral codes" and it is the basis for the normative context that stipulates the need to provide protection of humans (Linklater 2001: 274). Yet, the principle harm conventions in international society were designed to maintain order between states, and there is only limited agreement about how international order should act to prevent harm to individuals. However, a consensus is emerging around

the conceptualization of human security, in which individual rights are the corner stone. It characterizes security in cosmopolitan terms as concerned with human life and dignity.[2] While the term 'human security' is only a recent addition to the lexicon of global politics, the doctrine undergirding the concept has a much more significant history. A doctrine based on the security of humans has been espoused and pursued by organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross for more than a century. In the UN Charter it is echoed in the phrase "We the peoples", which represent a considerable "advance in the normative vocabulary of international relations" and "it has permeated the framing of the human rights regime" (Dunne and Wheeler 2004: 10). Mary Kaldor (1999: 148) argues that "in some sense, a cosmopolitan regime already exists".

## The cosmopolitan characteristics of conflict prevention

The notion of conflict prevention can be traced to a longstanding tradition in international relations where Kant's work on the Perpetual Peace can be regarded as a landmark document. Kant's thoughts can be helpful to contribute to bridge the gap between traditional cosmopolitan values and the contemporary notion of conflict prevention. There is a growing international consensus that violent conflicts can and should be prevented and that incidents of severe abuses of human rights, crimes against humanity and genocide demand international intervention. This implies that the international community has a responsibility to protect, but also to prevent.[3] The idea draws on a cosmopolitan or solidarist tradition in which the motivation behind cosmopolitan politics is empathy and that states become other-regarding rather than self-regarding (c.f. Hannerz 2005a). However, one may not exclude the other. The former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright argued that states acting altruistic and according to cosmopolitan norms do not necessarily act contrary to their national self interest "…[T]he promotion of human rights is not just a form of international social work. It is indispensable for our safety and well-being because governments that fail to respect the rights of their own citizens will in all likelihood also not respect the rights of others" (Albright in Beck 2002:64). The promotion and enforcement of these cosmopolitan values through various means is to a great extent (or should be) based on other-regarding interests and the notion of "solidarity with strangers" (Beck 2002: 62-85).

The idea behind conflict prevention builds on the core notion contained within the expression: "proaction is better than reaction and…crises are and conflicts are better addressed as they emerge, rather than when they have already deepened and widened" (Lund 1996: 37). Conflict prevention refers to actions taken in vulnerable places and times to prevent the emergence, escalation and relapse of violent conflict that cause harm to human beings. Inherent in the notion of conflict prevention is a normative ambition to contribute to build a "better" society. This makes it morally per-

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2 Human security was first articulated in the UNDP 1994 Human Development report.

3 See for example the UN Report 2004. "A More Secure World. Our shared Responsibility", report by the high-level panel on threats, challenges and change.

suasive (Björkdahl 2002). Nonetheless, there are philosophical and political problems attached to distinguishing between the undesirable conflicts to prevent and those that may be constructive for transforming a society. – "It [conflict prevention] seems to"" have the qualities essential in any concept of showing how interests and ideals can be yoked to each other" (Hill 2001: 315). However, the perennial dilemmas of appeasement and ethnocentrism lurk beneath the surface challenging its universal and cosmopolitan claim.

Although non-intervention has been the norm guiding inter-state relations, sovereignty is reinterpreted in the 21st century. The rise of cosmopolitan values has contributed to this reinterpretation as these values challenge the norm of sovereignty through their diffusion and development of international regimes, norms and institutions. Furthermore, sovereignty has come to imply not only rights, but also duties such as protecting humans living within the borders of the state. Kofi Annan (1999) argues that "states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa". Hence, the treatment of a state's citizens can no longer be considered within the realm of the "internal affairs" of the state and abusive power holders can no longer be protected by the principle of sovereignty.

## Cosmopolitan institutions

The international community and its institutions take part in the global struggle against human rights violators, and to prevent violent conflict around the world. Sovereignty is increasingly regarded as conditioned by standards pertaining to those of liberal democratic states such as compliance with human rights, good governance, rule of law and peaceful conflict resolution (c.f. Taylor 1999: 538, Kaldor 2003: 19). If states fail to meet these international standards and are reluctant to alter their ways and make concessions the international community would condemn them as well as impose these standards by coercive or non-coercive means. Consequently, the international community can undertake actions against states because "their anti-democratic or non-liberal behavior…" may "undermine the ethic of co-existence that sustain the society of states" (Elliot and Cheeseman 2002: 28). Cosmopolitanism views human rights violations as well as violent conflicts to be, at least potentially, everyone's concern. It is not enough to refrain from violating human rights directly and avoid solving conflicts with violent means. Instead states should act positively to promote the welfare of human beings elsewhere, and soldiers/peacekeepers should be prepared to die for strangers who are victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing (Kaldor 1999). This makes it impossible for the international community and its representatives to see themselves as disconnected from human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, violent conflicts e t c that takes place around the world. Cosmopolitanism assigns responsibility for human rights and the prevention of violent conflict beyond those directly implicated in human rights violations and conflicts, although they of course have the greatest responsibility.

In order to shoulder this responsibility and share it among its members the international community has created international institutions that may be considered to uphold cosmopolitan values and are founded upon a cosmopolitan vision. The Interna-

tional Criminal Court should be mentioned here as a recent and innovative form of cosmopolitanism, going beyond Kant's conception of "cosmopolitan law". The ICC itself represents an attempt, in international law, to do away with the principle of the absolute subjection of individuals to the state and develop the status of individual human beings under international law. Individuals are becoming bearers of certain rights under international law, and they can be held responsible for crimes under international law in ways that penetrate the shield of state sovereignty.

International institutions if they are reflecting cosmopolitan values will have to fulfill certain criteria. They need to take individual human beings as the "ultimate units of concern" building on the idea of individualism. Furthermore, these institutions must reflect universality and attach the same status "to every human being equally", if they are to be considered cosmopolitan institutions. And, they must regard human beings as the ultimate unit of concern for *everyone,* reflecting the notion of generality (Kuper 2000: 654). In addition to traditional approaches to power, cosmopolitan institutions may exert normative power (c.f. Manners 2002: 240) and create consensus about values, norms and practices (Taylor 1999: 540). Cosmopolitan institutions may also promote cosmopolitan values through their activities, including peace operations.

### The UN – a cosmopolitan institution?

The UN is clearly no world government and was never intended to be one. Yet, despite its flaws the UN can in some regards be viewed as a cosmopolitan institution. As an international organization, the UN is based on a treaty signed by member states and the present UN system conceives of states as subject of security rather than individual human beings. Consequently, the UN fails to unambiguously view human beings as "the ultimate unit of concern". State-centrism has constrained actions to prevent individual human beings from the harm of violent conflict in various ways. The norm of sovereignty has long impeded UN efforts to prevent violent intra-state conflicts from emerging when lacking the consents of the state concerned. State-centrism has also rendered it more difficult to recognize the state as a source of insecurity for individuals. Attempts to build on the statement "We the peoples" in the UN Charter to alter the focus of security from states to humans have progressed. The 1948 universal declaration of Human Rights and various other documents that constitute the human rights regime make explicit the relationship between security and human rights. This is clear from article 3 of the universal declaration that proclaims "the right to life, liberty and security of person" to all human beings (Dunne and Wheeler 2004: 16). The development of the human security concept by UNDP among others can be viewed as a yet another shift towards taking humans as the "ultimate unit of concern“ seriously. The ad hocery of UN peace operations however may put the universality and the ambition to attach the same status "to every human being equally" in question as some human beings seem more "worthy" of UN protection than others. Hence, it is possible to view the UN as comprising two categories of subjects of security – sovereign states and individuals.

The UN is considered to exert normative power and has contributed to establishing new norms such as human rights as well as maintaining old norms such as sovereignty in global politics. The UN has also been instrumental in promotion of democracy and has assisted processes of democratization around the world. Although, democracy was never made a condition for participation in the United Nations at the level of the sovereign state, alliances between developed liberal democracies acting within the UN have since the end of the 1990's managed to move the UN to promote values with cosmopolitan characteristics such as human rights and democracy through its activities such as peace operations. UN peace operations have been concerned with electoral assistance and their approach associates democracy with at least a constitutional model that operates in an atmosphere of political pluralism (Falk 1998: 312). Paradoxically, the UN system in itself, and the UN Security Council in particular are despite reform efforts not democratic. In the General Assembly states are perceived as equal and the principle of one state – one vote is applied (Bienen *et al* 1998). Though the five permanent members of the Security Council are certainly "more equal" than their fellow states and for that reason the UN has been characterized as "autocratic cosmopolitanism" by Danilo Zolo (1997: 40).

## The EU – a cosmopolitan union?

The EU is moving in a cosmopolitan direction, according to Habermas (2003). The EU has evolved into what has been characterized as a "post-modern state" (Cooper 2002) or perhaps more sarcastically, a Kantian "post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity" (Kagan 2002). The European states have moved from confrontation to integration, and over the past fifty years the EU has "successfully domesticated security within the Union" and it is therefore highly unlikely that a member state would use military force against another member state according to Sjursen (2004).This is one reason why the EU can be regarded as a cosmopolitan institution. A second reason is that the members of the EU have come to share a number of "core norms" (Manners 2002: 242) that I view have cosmopolitan characteristics. According to the European Union Constitution, '[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. According to these norms not only states, but also individuals are viewed as bearers of rights and duties. These core norms also have a constitutive effect determining the international identity of the EU (Manners 2002: 242). By exporting these norms the EU may contribute to "set the normative standards of the world" (Rosecrance 1998; c.f. Manners 2002, Björkdahl 2005). A third reason to view the EU as an institution of cosmopolitan character is its alternative approach to power politics. It has over the past fifty years turned away from the traditional notion of power and moved in the direction of international laws, rules, transnational cooperation and integration. It exerts "softcivilian" or "normative" power to influence the world (c.f. Duchêne 1972; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002; Rosecrance 1998; Manners 2002). The Union is in a strong position to promote cosmopolitan values by way of its vast number of approaches and its capability to combine attractive positive incentives with harsh nega-

tive sanctions to an extent few other actors can match. The promotion of these core norms may also be a way for the EU to construct and/or strengthen its own identity, as identity construction is an ongoing process of "becoming" where identities are shaped and reshaped in processes of interaction. In addition, diffusing its norms may increase the legitimacy of these norms within the community and strengthen the cosmopolitan vision of the union (Björkdahl 2005).

## Peace operations

There are a number of actors involved in the diffusion of norms in global politics and a variety of channels and processes are used for norm diffusion. Much of the literature on norm diffusion has focused on efforts of transnational networks, NGOs, social movements and on processes of learning, persuasion and coercion. Yet few studies to my knowledge have focused on peace operations and their practices as channels of norm diffusion. Ideally, peace operations are motivated by the perception that humankind belongs to a single moral community with collectively shared and equally valued rights and obligations which transcend cultures, religions, communities, nations and the sovereign state. Such a sense of belonging to humankind will according to Kant also mean that "a right violated anywhere could be felt everywhere" and cosmopolitan rights (can be interpreted as human rights) override the principle of non-intervention (Kant cited in Kaldor 2003: 18). Consequently, the international community represented by for example the UN, the EU, various other regional organizations as well as INGOs has a global responsibility and a global commitment to all human beings. The legitimacy of peace operations – to protect or defend individuals – rests on this claim that human beings belong to a single community of humankind.

This article suggests that there is room for military means in promoting a cosmopolitan vision, but for defensive, protective purposes such as prevention and not as traditional war. Peace operations of this type are detached as much as possible from statist and great power purposes and they need to be conducted under the authority of broadly based international institutions such as the United Nations. Furthermore, it suggests that military forces deployed in a peace operation need to be qualitatively as well as materially different from traditional militaries in their identity and normative structure. Militaries in Western liberal democracies, in the wake of the Cold War, are searching for a new identity and are recasting their roles and purposes (Elliot and Cheeseman 2002: 36). In reconstructing their identities the "peacekeeper identity" is becoming more prevalent, and the responsibility to save strangers more pronounced. This also includes re-adjusting the military organizational and value structure according to more cosmopolitan purposes, and in practice participating in international peace operations under UN auspices. Multinational peace-keeping forces are in a sense cosmopolitan at the same time as they are characterized by an inherent tension between national and transnational belonging.

Peace operations in order to protect individuals against massive human rights abuse, ethnic cleansing and genocide are proactive i.e. inspired by the emerging culture of prevention and guided the embryonic norms pertaining to conflict prevention. Rather than just "ending" conflict (or other forms of violence), proactive peace

operations must also engage in prevention as well as reconstruction to prevent relapse. According to Elliot and Cheeseman (2002: 41) "it is crucial that the use of coercive power must be embedded in a suit of policy responses which focus on conflict prevention as well as conflict resolution". As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty discusses, the responsibility to react to gross human rights abuses must be understood also in the context of a responsibility to prevent the occurrence of such abuses in the first place. Hence, proactive peace operations are not intended for warfighting or enforcement, but rather to prevent violent conflicts where gross infringements of human rights take place. A long term goal of proactive peace operations is promoting a new form of political legitimacy, one which offers an alternative to exclusive identity politics, fundamentalism and particularism which may bring about violence.

The main tasks to be performed by proactive peacekeepers are a combination of traditional ambits such as separating belligerents and maintaining ceasefire as well as controlling airspace, and new tasks such as protecting safe zones or relief corridors. In addition, some tasks are close to traditional policing tasks – ensuring freedom of movement, guaranteeing the safety of individuals, including returning refugees or displaced persons, and the capture of war criminals (Kaldor 1999-125). Proactive peace operations are characterized by impartiality but not neutrality, as they may become an actual party to the conflict in siding with the victims as the main objective is to protect civilians (Kaldor 1999:125). Clearly, proactive peace keepers are prepared to use force against actors who threaten civilians, escalate violence or seek to undermine the operation's mandate. However, the use of such force should be demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate as well as the last resort. Finally, as Richard Falk (1996: 492) argues, the use of force for cosmopolitan purposes must benefit the peoples of the target society and the outcome ought to enhance cosmopolitan values and norms. Proactive peace operations if guided by a cosmopolitan vision and for cosmopolitan purposes can be perceived as channels of norm diffusion and for spreading cosmopolitan values. UN and more recently EU peace operations can be viewed to promote such norms through their practices. Both the UN and the EU, as previously discussed, can be regarded as cosmopolitan institutions that at times consciously attempt to advance a vision founded on norms pertaining to democracy, good governance, human rights, minority rights and peaceful conflict resolution. Through their peace operations they may attempt to extend these norms.

## A "mission civilisatrice"?

Cosmopolitan rhetoric, however, may be used to disguise interventions for other purposes such as great power interests. Clearly, it is important to question whose interests peace operations would serve. Will cosmopolitanism as a tool for peace and security be used selectively and simply reinforce Western or great power or UN Security Council interests? It has been argued that cosmopolitan values may provide the rhetoric for projecting Western power in the world. Furthermore, peace operations have been criticized for being part of a "mission civilisatrice" (Paris 2002) and a new form of imperialism or neo-colonialism (Hartland 2004, Berdal and Caplan 2004).

Clearly, humanitarian intervention or peace operations in the 1990's have, at times, been compromised both by geopolitical interests and by the unwillingness of governments to sacrifice soldiers' lives to save strangers. Contemporary examples illustrate that political leaders often have felt compelled to exploit cosmopolitan values to motivate or legitimate the use of force, suggesting that other justifications based on national self-interest have diminished legitimacy. It is clear that the cosmopolitan rhetoric also can be used as a cover for the promotion of Western power in the world and disguise neocolonial or imperial ambitions. This potential abuse motivates a defense of the norm of sovereignty as the norm of non-intervention provides limitations for the use of armed force and thereby reduces the risk of war. The norm of non-interference may act "as a brake on crusading, territorial and imperial ambitions of states" (Chandler in Elliot and Cheeseman 2002: 25). Alternatively, to counter such misuse of humanitarian peace operations, interventions cannot be determined unilaterally if to be perceived as legitimate. Only through a set of multilateral agreed procedures, such as through decisions taken by the UN Security Council may peace operations be legitimate from a cosmopolitan perspective (Kaldor 2003: 19).

## The UN mission UNPREDEP in Macedonia – promoting norms through practice

Macedonia's peaceful separation from Yugoslavia in 1991 provided the United Nations with an opportunity to deploy peacekeepers in a preventive mission. Based on the risk that the Yugoslav conflict would spread to Macedonia, and following the recommendations of the UN reconnaissance mission and the request of the Macedonian government the UN Security Council authorized an extension of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and added a Macedonian Command (MC) in 1992. In 1995 UNPROFOR-MC was replaced by United Nations Preventive Force Deployment (UNPREDEP) by Security Council Resolution 983. Despite its importance for the region, the UN mission came to an abrupt end when the Macedonian government recognized Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the country. The recognition coincided with Taiwanese promises of large investments in Macedonia (Björkdahl 1999). In response China vetoed a renewal of UNPREDEP's mandate, thereby ending the mission on 28 February 1999 (S/RES/6648).

UNPREDEP between 1992-1999 provides an illustration of how peace operations may promote cosmopolitan values such as conflict prevention through their practices. The norm pertaining to conflict prevention was put into practice as preventing the Yugoslav war from spreading to Macedonia was the short-term goal motivating the mission. The long-term ambition, as the UN mission evolved, was to promote cosmopolitanism as an alternative to exclusive ethnic based politics and to ease inter-ethnic tension.

### Promoting cosmopolitan values through practice

The mandate, but to a higher degree the practice of UNPREDEP reflected certain cosmopolitan values such as the prevention of violent conflict. UNPREDEP was a

first attempt by the UN to deploy peacekeepers in a clearly preventive operation. It was an attempt to translate the novel idea of preventive force deployment conceptualized in the landmark document *An Agenda for Peace* of 1992 into practice. Prevention was at the core of UNPROFOR-MC's/UNPREDEP's mandate as it was to establish a presence on the Macedonian side of the republic's border, primarily with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania to monitor and report any developments in the border areas that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory. Furthermore, it was to deter by its presence threats from any source, as well as help prevent border clashes (S/RES/795). The mandate was carefully designed to balance the guiding norms of the UN as formulated by the General Assembly in 1991 (Annexed to A/RES/46/182). Those guidelines stressed three sets of norms: those of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the provision of aid, those of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in accordance with the UN Charter, and those requiring the consent of the affected country and, in principle, based on an appeal by that state. Although state-centrism dominated the mandate, there were important elements of cosmopolitanism in the sense that it was explicitly preventive initially only in the external dimension, but eventually also when addressing internal causes of conflict such as inter-ethnic tensions.

UNPREDEP was a UN operation, and as such it was guided by the normative context of the United Nations. However, the mission also reflected values that were not only the UN's but also the contributing states' mainly the Nordics and the United States. For example, it has been argued that that the Nordic states attempted to externalize some of the norms that guide the practice of the Nordic states internal as well as external relations such as arbitration of disputes, consensus settlements, social solidarity and the preference of dealing with the roots of conflict rather than just its manifestation (Archer 1994: 377). The US peacekeeping doctrine that emerged at this time gave strong support for preventive peacekeeping and when addressing the General Assembly President Bush stated that "monitoring and preventive peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting start may become especially critical in volatile regions" (George Bush cited in Lund 2000: 193). In general the peacekeepers from these contributing states acted in accordance with these values and may therefore have been a mechanism for diffusing them. Hence, it is possible that the norms pertaining to conflict prevention more easily translated into practice as it was highlighted in the contributing states' vision of this peace operation and that this in turn strengthened the diffusion efforts both locally and globally.

The practice of conflict prevention affected both the external and the internal dimension of UNPREDEP as the mission evolved from short-term conflict prevention strategy of containment to long-term nation-building. Once the short-term goal of preventing the Yugoslav federal army from intervening in Macedonia, UNPREDEP pursued its long-term goal to prevent the internal tensions from escalating (Ginifer and Eide 1996: 17-21). While Macedonia's declaration of independence provoked no immediate response, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not recognize its sovereignty nor did it agree to an international border in place of the internal border (Ackermann 1996: 409-424; Lund 2000: 178). A few cross-border skirmishes was therefore prevented from escalating as the UN presence drew "a line in the sand" and

"created a meaningful political and psychological barrier sufficient to that situation" (Lund 2000: 197).

As with the border threats, the UN mission came to provide deterrence and violence avoidance also for domestic relations. Over time, UNPREDEP became better able to manage the growing internal tensions (S/RES/908). A new mandate elevated the mission's political level as well as gave new impetus to its relations with the host country. Furthermore, as inter-ethnic relations deteriorated in Macedonia, the tasks of the mission transformed and the issue of preventing interethnic violence became increasingly important (Ginifer and Eide 1996: 18; Sokalski 1997: 37-45). The presence of an international military force provided public security and the mission also allayed the insecurities of individuals by providing a neutral police function. Moreover, the international presence and the good office of the appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General provided the flexibility needed for undertaking additional preventive measures for encouraging dialogue, restraint and compromise between different elements of Macedonian society as well as promoting a cosmopolitan vision to guide the Macedonian state and nation-building efforts (c.f. Sokalski 1997: 37-45; 2003; Björkdahl 2002: 160-165). The UN's long-term efforts in Macedonia were aimed at creating a situation of peaceful co-existance between Macedonia and the rest of Yugoslavia and between the two major ethnic groups within Macedonia. Cosmopolitan ideas were promoted as political alternatives to ethnic identity politics.

## Adopting cosmopolitan values

The Balkan wars and the break up of Yugoslavia left the newly independent Macedonia receptive to the normative influence of the international community. After declaring its independence in 1991, Macedonia's ability to survive was depending on its ability to pursue a policy of "active neutrality" and the efforts of the UN preventive peacekeeping mission. The mission successfully prevented the Yugoslav conflict to spill over the borders to Macedonia. The diffusion of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention was to a degree successful, as it could build on the pre-existing normative context and the policy of active neutrality.

Since independence, Macedonian politics has been based on identity politics and few political parties appealed to both ethnic-Macedonians and ethnic-Albanians. The multi-ethnic character of the Macedonian society involves status differences and mutual distrust among communities. Shortly after independence ethnic belonging became salient in day-to day relations, and stereotypes and prejudices flourished. The internal ethnic tensions and identity-based politics remained in spite of UN efforts to establish mechanisms for reaching consensus settlements and promote minority rights as well as other cosmopolitan values pertaining to the equality of individuals. Although the Albanian minority was represented in government, it was in fact excluded from the Macedonian state-building project and was for example not part of constructing the Macedonian constitution (Interview with former Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 3, 2004). Despite difficult relations between the majority and the largest minority, Macedonia was regarded as an "oasis of peace" in a turbulent region. The Macedonian government was ambivalent towards the UN's

long-term goal of promoting cosmopolitan values as it challenged the newly established state's growing nationalism. In Macedonia, ethnic groups were living separated albeit in relative contentment. This type of norm diffusion was perceived as the UN was interfering in the internal affairs of Macedonia (Lund 2000: 198-199, Sokalski 2003: 97). Hence, the Macedonian elite was reluctant to adopt these values.

## The EU Operation Concordia in Macedonia – promoting norms through practice

Launched in Macedonia in March 2003, Operation Concordia was the first EU military operation and signified a deepening in the Union's relations with the Balkans, where the EU currently is the main international organization exerting a strong normative influence and with an ability to promote cosmopolitan visions and values such as the prevention of violent conflict.

### The EU in Macedonia

Operation Concordia was undertaken as part of an Europeanization approach to Macedonia, which involved the promotion of a wide spectrum of norms that can be considered as cosmopolitan in character. A number of EU actors such as The European Commission, the High Representative for the CFSP, the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the European Agency of Reconstruction (EAR), the EU presidency, as well as the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) supported this process. Through these different representations of the EU, the EU is or has deployed basically all its different approaches – i.e. the CFSP, the ESDP, development cooperation policy and humanitarian aid, but also trade and commercial policies – when attempting to promote a cosmopolitan vision in Macedonia. This article however selects the peace operation conducted by the EU military crisis management mission Concordia succeeded by the EU police mission Proxima to analyze their role in the promotion of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention. This article demonstrates that both the military and the police mission can readily be used to diffuse cosmopolitan values pertaining to conflict prevention.

### Promoting cosmopolitan values through practice

In early 2001 inter-ethnic tensions escalated and brought Macedonia to the brink of civil war. As a response to the crisis the Macedonian President Boris Trajkovskij requested an international military presence to prevent the escalation of conflict, and to ensure containment of the violent conflict. Once NATO's Amber Fox operation was terminated in March 2003, it was replaced by the EU mission Concordia. As the EU at the time was looking for an opportunity to test its crisis management capacity and the Macedonian conflict provided an "easy" case, one may question whether deployment of Concordia was initiated by the Macedonian request or by EU ambitions to test its new capacity. Furthermore, Concordia was part and parcel of a larger Europeanization process in the region – a process with certain cosmopolitan visions. Under

the leadership of the EU and NATO, a framework for limiting the conflict and resolving the dispute with peaceful means was negotiated. The Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed in Ohrid on 13 August 2001, contains a cosmopolitan vision including for example numerous provisions on the equal status of both ethnic groups as well as human rights.

The Concordia mission – later replaced by an EU police mission (Proxima) – and the EU Special Representative have played and still play a significant role in the process of implementing the Ohrid Agreement. Interviews with locals as well as internationals in Macedonia indicate that the EU presence on the ground is crucial in promoting a cosmopolitan vision. Proxima staff is for example located within the Ministry of Interior and the HQ in Skopje as well as in regional offices to support, mentor and advice the Ministry of Interior and the Macedonian police force. The actual presence of military and police personnel and EUMM-monitoring personnel does not mean that norms are exported through coercive means. Instead, these individuals can be perceived as carriers of cosmopolitan values and their presence can be regarded as creating possibilities for persuasion. By continued interaction, technical assistance, argumentation and the exchange of views at a very individual level (police officer to police officer), a relationship of trust may be established, which seems to facilitate both norm diffusion and acceptance. This in turn may contribute to change normative convictions. In addition, if the EU representatives such as members of the Concordia and Proxima missions act in accordance with the cosmopolitan vision they promote – i.e. support of and compliance with, for example, human rights, minority rights and the rule of law – they may provide individual examples to be followed. Concordia and Proxima can therefore be viewed as part of the EU's overall process of promoting cosmopolitan values such as peaceful resolution, human rights, minority rights and the rule of law.

### Adopting cosmopolitan values

The Macedonian government's aspiration of future EU membership makes this vision even more persuasive (Interview in Skopje with EU official, 4 November 2004). This EU presence on the ground is also an indication of the EU's commitment in assisting the efforts of the government of Macedonia in moving closer towards EU integration by adopting and institutionalizing some of the core norms of the EU. It also represents tangible evidence of how the CFSP and the ESDP may be used in advocating a cosmopolitan vision that in the long run may contribute to stability and security in the EU's near abroad. According to a former Macedonian official, Operation Concordia and Proxima have played an important role in reinforcing the government's and the international community's efforts to consolidate security and ethnic harmony in the country (Interview with former Macedonian official, 3 Nov, 2004). However, it may be possible to detect pockets of resistance against the normative changes promoted by among others the EU. For example, the implementation of the various provisions of the Ohrid Agreement has provoked various resentments among ethnic Macedonians, since it deals with symbolic issues, national identity and minority rights. This became obvious by the call for a referendum in 2004 to repeal

legislative changes introduced by the government to comply with the Ohrid Agreement. The referendum, which took place on 7 November 2004, failed due to a low voter turn-out. This result, which kept the Ohrid Agreement on track, was welcomed by the international community. Externally driven normative transformations as one may interpret the negotiations and implementation of the Ohrid Agreement may create more resistance, particularly if it is perceived as being conducted by overtly or covertly coercive means, than if the adoption was voluntary and the normative change was domestically driven.

## Concluding Remarks

To claim that the UN and the EU are important norm entrepreneurs promoting a variety of norms on the global arena and thereby contributing to setting the normative standard of the world may not be very controversial. And, it would not be inconceivable to view these institutions as reflecting certain cosmopolitan values. I suggest that these institutions, in addition, exert a normative influence through their practices, including military peace operations. If these peace operations are guided by a cosmopolitan vision and undertaken for cosmopolitan purposes, they may contribute to advance cosmopolitan norms. It may seem controversial to argue that operations such as UNPROFOR-MC/UNPREDEP, Concordia and the policing mission Proxima can promote cosmopolitanism and contribute to diffusing cosmopolitan values. Clearly one may question the authenticity of norm acceptance under these conditions. However, both the UN and the succeeding EU missions can be regarded to have been deployed in order to achieve among other things certain cosmopolitan objectives such as preventing violent conflict and establishing peaceful co-existence between two ethnic communities within one state. Since all three operations were requested by the Macedonian government and hence deployed with the consent of the host country, they did not clash with the norm of sovereignty and can hardly be perceived as hostile intervention in internal affairs. The UN mission with its explicit preventive mandate and practices demonstrated the usefulness of the idea of conflict prevention through its preventive action both to the local audience as well as to the global. However, despite its effort to promote cosmopolitanism as an alternative to the antagonistic ethnic-based politics, ethnic relations deteriorated in Macedonia.

The Concordia and Proxima operations were part of the Europeanization process and combined with aid, trade arrangements, cooperative arrangements etc and were as such successful in preventing the escalation of antagonism between the two ethnic communities. Another reason behind EU's successful exertion of normative power is the attractiveness of a future EU membership. Both communities are for somewhat different reasons positive to a future membership in the EU and well aware that a precondition for membership is stable and peaceful ethnic relations. Yet, even on their own Concordia and Proxima were useful for promoting cosmopolitan values such as conflict prevention as their main purpose was to prevent the internal tensions from escalating beyond control. Hence, they provided the practice to the norm pertaining to conflict prevention and demonstrated its feasibility. In addition, the presence of military and police personnel on the ground provided opportunities for inter-

action, communication, persuasion and expert advice, which in turn may contribute to change normative convictions. Cosmopolitanism was not adopted as identity is still the foundation for Macedonian politics. However, the Ohrid agreement that ended the 2001 conflict reflected a cosmopolitan vision and cosmopolitan values.

Cosmopolitanism could in the case of Macedonian provide an alternative to the identity-based politics and contribute to bridge the divide between the two main ethnic communities within the Macedonian state. Furthermore, it could as part of the Europeanization process move Macedonia closer to the EU and to a potential future membership in the Union.

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# Journalists, Narratives of European Enlargement, and the Man-on-the-Sofa

ALEXA ROBERTSON[1]

**ABSTRACT**

Against the backdrop of EU enlargement, the article is concerned with the possible interconnections between 'mediated worldliness' and 'banal' or everyday cosmopolitanism. Based on field work at Swedish Television, focus group interviews and an analysis of news reporting in the period leading up to enlargement, it asks what can be learned about the work of the cosmopolitan imagination by exploring the relation between journalists, narratives of enlargement and the perceptions of Swedes from various walks of life.

'Imagination' is a term that recurs in the scholarly literature on cosmopolitanism, which can be defined as having to do with a sense of 'being at home in the world', an ability and readiness to engage with people and cultures beyond the borders of the nation, with the widening of consciousness and a willingness to confront alterity (Vertovec and Cohen 2002:2). Appadurai, for example, writes about the 'work of the imagination' when referring to the annexation of the global by individuals and groups who recast ideas and images that come from elsewhere (Appadurai 1996: 4 and 54). To the researcher interested in how cosmopolitanism can be a quotidian experience as well as a theoretical construction, these 'workers of the imagination', and the products of their imagining, are a valuable source of insights.

Their workplace (to pursue the metaphor one more step) is a mediated one. Before Appadurai, social, historical and media theorists from Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan to Benedict Andersson and John Thompson had reflected on how the evolution of the media matters to people's sense of place and belonging. While face-to-face interaction continues to play an important role, our experience of the world is increasingly shaped by mediated symbolic forms. Thompson calls the result 'mediated worldliness' and explains it as follows:

> as our sense of the world and our place within it becomes increasingly nourished by media products, so too our sense of the groups and communities with which we share a common path through time and space, a common origin and

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> a common fate, is altered: we feel ourselves to belong to groups and communities which are constituted in part through the media (Thompson 1995: 35).

Thompson is not writing about the experiences of passive media consumers, into the empty minds of which broadcasters deposit messages. He and others working within the hermeneutic tradition are concerned with what has been called the 'active audience'. The idea here is that the consumers of news and other media products actively engage with them, work with them, and create meaning in their meeting with the text, and indirectly with the authors of those texts, rather than having the message imposed upon them. While using different terminology, these scholars – and such kindred spirits as Barker (2000), Stevenson (1995), Morley (1980), Ang (1985) and Liebes and Katz (1991) – are in effect writing about the work of imagination.

Literature on cosmopolitanism tends to take a bird's-eye-view, and for good reason: we are, after all, talking about global issues and a myriad of actors. But the work of imagination does not allow itself to be studied from such a vantage point, at least not empirically. It must be seen close up, and the voices of individual workers of the imagination must be made discernible and placed in a meaningful context. For this to be possible, the scope of analysis must be radically narrowed. This article thus focusses on two sorts of imagination workers – journalists, and the people they make news reports for – and on the news texts they shared in the weeks surrounding the symbolic date of 1 May 2004, when countries that had once stood on opposing sides of the first, second, and cold wars became members of the same European family. Material on which this article is based includes field notes and the transcripts of interviews conducted with journalists at Swedish Television (SVT) during the week before the enlargement of the European Union, transcripts of nine focus group interviews conducted in a small town in Östergötland and in Stockholm during the subsequent fortnight, and recordings of the main SVT news programme *Rapport* for the entire period.

We are not surprised to find cosmopolitans in front of the check-in counter at the airport; the study reported here asked whether they could also be found behind the wheel of a tractor or the desk of the local library. It asked, further, whether their sense of the world seemed to be constituted through the media, as suggested by Thompson and Appadurai, or whether face-to-face interaction was apparently still more important. There is a methodological inquiry here too: what can be learned about the work of cosmopolitan imagination by exploring the relation between journalists, narratives of enlargement, and the man-on-the-sofa?

## Analysing Imagination: narratives as a point of entry

Appadurai argues that imagination has become social practice and is 'the key component of the new global order'. The building blocks of what he calls 'imagined worlds' are five dimensions of global cultural flows, the by-now-famous 'scapes' – ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, ideoscapes and mediascapes. The last of these, in Appadurai's account, offer repertoires of images and narratives that can be used in making sense of our lives and others (Appadurai 1996:33-35).

Appadurai's perspective is in keeping with that of scholars of the narrative, who argue that we are better understood as storytellers (people with imaginations) than rational actors (people with behavioural strategies). Our identities are not givens, according to scholars inspired by the 'narrative turn', but are continually negotiated through narrative acts. Telling stories creates community: it is through the stories we tell and are told that we make sense of society; it is through narratives that our situation in the political and cultural landscape, and that of everyone else, is reinforced. For these reasons, narrative analysis can be thought particularly well-suited to the study of cosmopolitanism, and the possibilities that phenomenon entertains of forming new communities at the post-national level.

The research focus here is on interpretative frameworks 'of common, cultural references and thematic codes', incarnated in narratives which help make things comprehensible and relevant to the public (Birkvad 2000:295). These tend to be experienced as something innocent, Barthes tells us, not because their intentions are hidden, but because they are naturalized (Barthes 1993:131). What narrative analysis tries to get at, and what tends otherwise to elude the researcher, is the generation of these sorts of understandings – what we take for granted, or that which goes without saying.[2]

In keeping with Chatman (1978:19), a narrative is defined here as a text that is comprised of a story (or a 'what' – the abstract, situation, actors, complicating action or disequilibrium and resolution outlined by structuralists such as Labov and Waletskey (1967)) and a discourse (a 'how'; with a focus on the way a story is communicated, and not just its structure). By paying attention to 'story' it is possible to identify reiterated issues and themes over time. By paying attention to 'discourse' it is possible to study how naturalisation can happen through journalistic conventions that work to tell those stories in one way rather than another.

Illusions of verisimilitude, explains Brinker, are based on the viewer's 'thoroughgoing familiarity with the conventions of representation' at work. Audiences recognise and interpret these conventions without even noticing them, 'forgetting' their conventional character (Brinker 1983: 254). Chatman (1978: 41-2) uses the term 'reading out process' to refer to this behaviour – to our routinely employed abilities to decode from surface to narrative structures.

Graddol identifies two traditions used in television journalism to tell stories about the world. The dominant one is 'realism', a term originally used in this tradition to refer to a literary convention (rather than to an ontological standpoint or perspective within the study of international relations). The narrator in this tradition tends to be omniscient – 'one who can see things which individual characters cannot see and who is in all places at once' (Graddol 1994: 140). Other characters can also contribute to the narrative, of course, but they are encompassed by the omniscient narrator's voice. The other tradition is that of 'naturalism'. Used more often in documentaries than in news bulletins, it provides 'a representation of the world as it might be directly experienced by the viewer [...] From the naturalist perspective, a news report provides vicar-

2 Lieblich *et.al.* advocate the use of narrative as a way of gathering valuable data, for example about experiences of discrimination, that would be impossible to get at otherwise. Liebblich *et.al.* 1998:9.

ious experience, an image of the world as we might expect to experience it if we were to stand where the reporter stands'. (Graddol 1994: 145). The objective, omniscient narrator's voice is absent from reports in which such narrative techniques are used.

Undertaking close readings of television news reports, it is possible to explore such techniques by posing questions to the text to establish the perspectives or vantage points from which it is told. Is the reporter 'omniscient' – standing above a dispute between two or more parties, for example, or commenting on what was going through a decisionmaker's head? Or is he or she *engagé*, ostensibly committed to one side or the other? Is the account of an event given by a local villager rather than the reporter? Is one side of a conflict invisible, underrepresented? And where is the viewer situated in all this? Do we find ourselves in the middle of a crowd or do we view a given celebration or demonstration from the vantage point of a distant rooftop? Do we look at the actors through a window or fence, or are we invited to enter the room in which they lived and join in a conversation? Are we detached observers, to which information is imparted "just to let us know", or are we asked to respond in some way to the reported events, if not by acting then at least by feeling? By looking in the text (in this case, television news reports) for answers to these questions, the discourse of the narrative can be analysed.

These, then, are the methodological premises on which the larger study rests, of which the following is but an excerpt. There is not space here to present a complete narrative analysis of the *Rapport* items concerning the EU broadcast in the sample period. This article contains a glimpse of what can be considered the most interesting – perhaps telltale – features. Before looking at them, however, let us rewind the tape, or rather retrace our steps, back to the SVT newsroom and the week before enlargement, to listen to what one set of workers of the imagination had to say about what they had in mind when making such news reports and, more importantly, how they said it. A formal analysis of the 'story' of their narratives will not be presented at this point: the focus, instead, is on the 'discourse'.

## Journalist: taking a bit of the world into your living room

It is important, said the deputy head of the SVT foreign news desk a few hours before flying to Poland to cover the World Economic Summit and EU accession, to highlight positive things in bringing news about the outside world to the Swedish public, and not just to problematise:

> You shouldn't confirm people's views. You should continually change the perspective and in that way arouse more interest.

One way of doing that is to take the perspective of the average viewer, she said. Vox pops (interviews with the man-on-the-street) are important, as the issues they refer to have consequences for ordinary people. It is even better if the reporter gets to 'come in' somewhere.

SVT was devoting extra coverage to the new member states on the eve of enlargement, which was important, in the view of this journalist, given the widespread EU-

scepticism in Sweden. "We want to bring out other aspects," she said, "get people to meet on an equal level. We are not better than they are." Globalisation in general and Europeanization in particular means you have to think along different lines than before, in her view.

> I think it is extremely important to understand that we are a part of Europe. We are still our little edge of the world.

A man who had worked at SVT for 25 years, with periods in Stockholm interlaced with stints covering Latin America, the US and Asia, spoke of the trick of "seeing the world with Swedish eyes". He thought it made a difference if viewers saw him rather than an American reporter standing on a rooftop in a distant city – taking a bit of the outside world and putting it into your living room, as he put it. "Because I'm Swedish, I have the same frame of reference" [as the views in the aforementioned living room]. This feeling of identification was, in his view, extremely important. In this respect, Swedish journalists tend to work differently than their colleagues from other countries. This correspondent had been to many places, he noted, where he was the only reporter who had gone up to people and talked to them.

> Being around ordinary people is important. You mustn't 'raise your voice'.

He tried to get people to pay attention by pointing to "the black woman on the outskirts of town who is like you". Asking how this strategy is to be understood – this strategy of speaking *to* ordinary people, not over their heads – the term 'dumbing down' cropped up in the interview. The journalist responded forcefully: the strategy he had been describing was absolutely *not* a question of that. What happens is something else.

> You find a red thread and hold onto it. You don't leave the viewer with seventeen unanswered questions after the report is finished. You don't confuse: you give them something.

You had to give the viewer an experience, he said. There is so much you want to tell, and the reporter has to do it in his or her own style. This man's style was 'shoulders down', relaxed, so that people could keep up. "It shouldn't feel like breaking news," he said.

Another man on the foreign news desk, who was SVT's Moscow correspondent between 1998 and 2002, was responsible for putting together the foreign news telegrams in the week before enlargement. He thought the extensive focus on the new EU members was a good strategy:

> It's a good method (*grepp*) to let the viewers meet their new neighbours. I think it's fun with lots of new countries.

The most important task a journalist has, in this respect, is to

> acquaint the viewers with the new countries. We have created an awareness that Slovakia is a neighbour and just as good a country as ours.

Having said that,

> we can never create belonging. We can't bring people up [*uppfostra folk*].

Adult education is a lovely idea, he said, "but who has given me the right to tell people how to think?"

For this journalist, the key word is 'meeting'. A good meeting between him and someone he encounters in the field can be seen as a meeting between the man-in-the-field and the man-on-the-sofa. "I'm not the star," he said. "It's the old man on the ski slope and the woman in the Coptic village," he said, referring to people far from the halls of power on whom he had filed reports in the past. When asked of a tendency observed in Swedish television news reports (Robertson 2000, 2002) to bring the viewer (metaphorically) into someone's home or the café they frequent (more on this below), this journalist explained that it is a typical attitude among Swedish journalists. "We want to be offstage, like an invisible choir". They still have a role to play, however, even if they are not on centre stage, namely that of figures that the viewer can relate to. "They want to see themselves," he said, referring to the people watching *Rapport*: they want to see something that symbolises common sense and coffee in the midst of a chaos that is incomprehensible.

> When we see starving children with flies on their faces we distance ourselves (*skärmar av oss*). When we see a Swede brush the flies away we notice, "Oh, look, there are flies".

One of the younger reporters on the foreign desk recalled following reporting on the war in Kosovo, and how it took two to three months before reporting "took hold" of her. Then one day she saw a picture of a woman carrying a Samsonite suitcase, with her daughter, dressed like any teenager familiar from a Stockholm setting.

> Then I realized, "Help! This could happen to me!".

What bothers her is the likelihood that there are a lot more Samsonite suitcases where that one came from. "We are terrified of the modern," she said. "We don't think it has to do with us unless we see pictures of a starving African child."

Asked who or what she had in mind when putting together a story, she replied that she thinks a lot about her father, who has a general, but not specialised, interest in the news. It is, she says, important to provide him and viewers like him with a "context so that it becomes comprehensible".

When it came to coverage of Europe, and especially enlargement, this journalist thought the heightened emphasis on reporting from the new member states to be a good idea, as it was important to "reduce the distance between us and them". Was it not editorialising, taking sides in favour of enlargement, telling people they should admire Slovenians and Poles? She thought about this for a moment before replying, "As a journalist you always take a stance". This was not about information-relaying:

> It should engage. Journalism means pointing at unsatisfactory conditions. A journalist should be the voice of the weak.

A journalist should 'widen the viewer's horizons', let the man-on-the-sofa know that "this is how these people live, this is how they think". Television is a powerful medium and such images are, in her view, important.

What is the result, the purpose of this? What are people supposed to do with these images, reports, messages, and challenges? This sort of work, in her eyes, should contribute to making "a citizen who thinks more democratically with more respect for others".

Finally, a senior reporter who had been covering Europe since 1996 expressed the decided view that many political journalists covering domestic politics made their reports for politicians and other political journalists, rather than the license-paying viewers. These political journalists don't have to make an effort to explain things, she said: they can use code words and ignore the need for pictures. This is not the case if you shift the perspective to that which takes place outside the country, in her view.

The task, as this woman identified it, is to make that which takes place abroad comprehensible to people in all parts of the country – in Sundsvall as well as Stockholm – and with different levels of knowledge.

> You have to make it understandable. You have to explain it in a way that arouses the interest of the average guy and enables him to understand it straight away. […] You have to make your story fun and interesting – you have to tell your story in an exciting way so that it stays with them. […] You can't expect everyone to recognize themselves. But you can use ordinary people that you can feel identification with, that you can relate to.

It is from the perspective of these 'ordinary' people out in the world that events must be depicted "because if people feel that 'if this happened to them' they can draw the conclusion that 'it can happen to me too'".

> We think that we in Sweden are so much better, have a better society than others. But we are just like everybody else in the whole world. We get up in the morning, go to work, deal with traffic and so on and so do they. We face the same everyday problems. There are greater similarities than differences that we can exploit when we make tv programmes.

In this way, this journalist believes "we can create identification". She said she hoped the viewer would react by thinking "Hey, I recognise this."

## Summary: the narrative of the newsroom

The interviews with these journalists contain many stories – about turning over a new leaf at the beginning of a career as Europe correspondent; about trying to get the home desk interested in German news; about interviewing an old man in the Carpathians; and about 'the woman with the Samsonite suitcase', among others. But for the purposes of this article, it is more pertinent to reflect on the discourse of these narratives. If the interviews are analysed according to the categorical-form approach whereby sections or single words belonging to a defined category are collected from texts belonging to a number of narrative actors (Lieblich *et.al.* 1998: 12-13), then a

newsroom narrative (or, to be more precise, foreign-desk-narrative) emerges – an aggregate narrative as opposed to the discrete ones of the individual journalists. In this narrative, five themes, or what Riessman would call underlying propositions, are discernible.

The first has to do with the importance of identification, or incorporating the perspective of ordinary people in news reports about the outside world and showing viewers individuals they can relate to. "Being around ordinary people is important," said the Latin American/Asian correspondent. It's good if a report "conveys how people on site experience their reality", said the youngest of the three women interviewed. A journalist can "use ordinary people that you can feel identification with", let them be aware that "this can happen to me too", said the European correspondent. "People want to see themselves," said the former Moscow correspondent: a report should be about, or interest "Nisse in Hökarängen and his auntie".

The second theme has to do with the tone of voice in which the correspondent should tell his or her stories to the man-on-the-sofa. "It shouldn't feel like breaking news," said the shoulders-down correspondent. "You shouldn't speak too loudly". Swedish journalists "want to be offstage, like an invisible choir" said the Moscow correspondent, echoing what several of his colleagues said less poetically. A good report should engage the viewer and not leave him or her with "seventeen unanswered questions", but the viewer would seem to be thought capable of making up his or her own mind about the issues presented. "Who has given me the right to tell people how to think?" says something revealing about the journalist's view of the audience.

The third theme to emerge from all the interviews is the notion that Sweden is not the centre of the universe, and that Swedes have a lot to learn from others. "We are still our little edge of the world," said the German correspondent: "we are not better than they are." Slovakia "is just as good a country as ours," said the Moscow correspondent, and according to the European correspondent, "we are just like everybody else in the whole world."

The fourth theme is structured around the metaphor of 'meeting': "we want to get people to meet on an equal level", said the German correspondent, referring to enlargement coverage. The Moscow correspondent used the same word, saying it was a good strategy "to let the viewers meet their new neighbours". And the younger woman stressed the importance of "reducing the distance between us and them".

The fifth and final theme to emerge from the discourse of the journalists has to do with the importance of resisting stereotypes. A journalist has to "highlight positive things, not just problematise," said the German correspondent. "You shouldn't confirm people's views. You should continually change the perspective." Similarly, her younger female colleague emphasised that a journalist should "widen the viewer's horizons", let the man-on-the-sofa know that "this is how these people live, this is how they think".

It is not difficult to relate these themes to cosmopolitanism, however defined. The question is, can they be related to the narratives in the work they produce – news reports of the outside world and, more specifically, Europe on the eve of EU enlargement? And (at a later stage) can they be related to any themes that may emerge from

discussions with the people for whom these news stories were intended? These are the questions to be addressed in the next two sections.

## News Narratives of European Enlargement

As can be seen from Table 1, the *Rapport* broadcasts referred to in this article contained a total of 203 news items, including both telegrams (items less than a minute long, usually 'voiceovers') and reports that varied in length from one to seven minutes. Ten percent of the items in the sample had to do with EU enlargement, and 24 percent had to do with events taking place in Europe or involving Europeans. For the narrative analysis, a selection was made of all news items of at least a minute that pertained to Europe or European countries or Europeans. Together, these 13 items represent 25 percent of all broadcast time.

In the first stage of coding, two simple questions were posed to the 14 broadcasts as a whole:

- How much of my field of vision is taken up by my own country/community, and how much by the outside world?
- How does the world I live in look through the window provided by my television news screen?

Answering the first of these questions was quite straightforward, and involved comparing the amount of purely domestic news with other news in each broadcast. The second was somewhat more challenging, but had to be answered nonetheless, albeit in terms of overall impressions rather than minute quantitative calculations, partly because such reception is more faithful to the activity of the viewers for whom the broadcast were made, partly because the size of the sample made any other strategy untenable.[3]

*Table 1. Distribution of television news reports on which this article is based*

| **Distribution of material** | **n** | **%** |
|---|---|---|
| Total number of news items in *Rapport* 26 April-9 May 2004 | 203 | 100 |
| Number of news items about Europe (telegrams and longer items) | 49 | 24 |
| **Number of news items about Europe a minute or more in length** | 27 | 13 |
| Number of items pertaining to EU enlargement (incl. telegrams) | 21 | 10 |
| | | |
| Total time of news items in *Rapport* 26 April-9 May 2004 | 371 min | 100 |
| **Total time items about Europe a minute or more in length** | 87 min 41 s | 24 |

3 The enlargement study reported in this article is part of a larger project comprising the analysis of 56 days of reporting by 5 different national and international broadcasters – a total of 280 programmes.

*Table 2. The different sorts of people interviewed in Rapport news items about Europe of a minute or more in length, 26 April – 9 May 2004*

| **Category** | **Number** | **Proportion of all actors** |
|---|---|---|
| Workers, people in service industry, students, pensioners, 'man-on-the-street' | 26 | 33% |
| Entrepreneurs, engineers, management | 19 | 24% |
| Officials and politicians (including government members, foreign heads of state, municipal officials, trade unionists, police, and 8 Swedish EU parliamentarians) | 32 | 40.5% |
| Experts | 2 | 2.5% |
| **Total** | 79 | 100% |

In order to answer the question of what the world looks like when refracted through one's television screen, it is not enough to ask what goes on there. It is also necessary to ask who populates that world. Apart from the many figures referred to and glimpsed in the background, the 27 items about Europe in this sample contained interviews with a wide range of people, including a waitress, a worker, and an entrepreneur from Estonia, a farmer, environmental activists and engineers from Poland; a young, blue-jeaned Lithuanian lawyer; an optician and a Latvian economist working for a Swedish bank in Riga; a middle-aged woman who said…

> In my view we've always been part of Europe. This is our place. It's where we belong…

…and a young Polish woman who explained to the reporter that enlargement was a good thing, because "our country will be opened up to other cultures and European countries. It's important for young people to be able to study and work wherever they want."

The variety of voices and faces is more easily overviewed when organised in the form of Table 2. What the table does not take into account is which of these interviewees can be judged to be the 'primary definers'[4] of the news stories they appear in and which occupy the most space. If these things are taken into account, the first two categories in Table 2 become more prominent. Even at this stage in the analysis, however, it is clear that 'ordinary people' and the middle and entrepreneurial class of the new member states are a notable presence in these reports. This would seem to provide confirmation of the strategies spoken of in the newsroom, to give viewers people they can relate to.

What about the journalists' ambition to demonstrate that 'we' are no better than 'they' are, and to challenge stereotypes?

4 The term originates from Stuart Hall, et.al. *Policing the Crisis.*

### *Narratives of Enlargement in Rapport 26 April – 9 May 2004*

Two recurrent themes are discernible in the news stories about Europe contained in *Rapport* broadcasts in the sample period. In one, enlargement is framed as a threat; in the other it is framed as a source of potential. In the first of these themes, three risks associated with enlargement were outlined: the threat posed to Swedish jobs and welfare by cheap labour migrants from the new member states; the influx of crime from 'the East' accompanying the relaxation of border controls; and the opening of the floodgates for cheap liquor (here Swedish 'alco-tourists' were repeatedly depicted as blithely crossing the Baltic to stock up, delighted at having found such bargains in liquor stores on the other side of the sea). The treat theme originates in the political discourse prevailing in Sweden during this period. The second theme paints a different picture of enlargement, and I would argue that it originated in the *Rapport* newsroom (and field in which SVT journalists work). Four examples can illustrate the enlargement-as-potential theme.

### *Estonian manpower agencies*

In one report, viewers were told that Estonian manpower agencies had found an inexpensive way of getting around the transition rules that several EU countries were planning to impose by renting out cheap labour from their home base. The journalist visited one of the agencies that had 'mushroomed' on the eve of enlargement, and talked to both the Swedish-speaking Estonian who owned the agency, a man who wanted to go abroad to improve his income, and a young waitress who was interested in finding out how other people lived. She wanted to go to Finland because it is "another country, a different country. I'd like to get new experiences and see how the Finns really are".

From an optimistic, proactive Estonia, the viewer's gaze was directed back to Sweden, where the Prime Minister could be seen warning in parliament against 'social tourism', and where a trade unionist expressed concern about what such labour migration would mean.

This is what could be called an 'open text' in that different readers could make different sense of it. A Swedish construction worker could well be thought to pay most attention to what the trade unionist said, and find the prospect of encountering an Estonian at his workplace a matter of concern. A young Swede, however, could be thought to identify with the 19-year-old waitress, who was prepared to venture abroad in search of new experiences, and who was not depicted as threatening. It is important to note that she was a key figure in this story, while an implied Swedish construction worker (or waitress) was absent. As an open text, the evaluation is also open: the Estonians are not presented in a threatening light, but the summing up would seem to say that this was no straightforward issue. In any case, an impression the viewer may have been left with was that these new members were outgoing and enterprising, while Swedes were conservative and unprepared for change.

### The ecological Polish farmer

In another item, viewers were told that the modernization of agriculture was turning out to be a fateful issue for the entire Baltic region. Polish farms were small and environmentally friendly, but changes were required if they were going to be able to compete with agriculture in the rest of Europe. The plot of the report that followed was basically that Poland was preparing to enter the EU as an old-fashioned but respectable member, when it came to farming. The disequilibrium of the narrative consisted in the fateful question: would its modernisation turn it into an environmental abuser, like farmers in Sweden and elsewhere in the EU, as it caught up to the others with the help of artificial fertilizers?

Aided by reporter voiceovers, the story was told by the farmer Barbara, who was interviewed in the field of her farm outside Gliwice. She was worried that small farmers would disappear with EU membership, and hoped that Poles would avoid the mistakes of the European Union when it came to overproduction. Another woman, an environmental activist, said there were hopes that organic farming in Poland would develop further, and that the challenge facing Polish farmers was to aid this development. According to this woman and the reporter, should Poland industrialise its farming, the fate of the Baltic lay in the balance. It was Barbara, the farmer, who gave the evaluation:

> The future is not bright for us all, but those who are prepared to work and put their heart in it will succeed.

There seems to be a subtext in this report, as if the journalist was saying to the viewer: "this isn't what you expected, is it?". In the first place, Poland was a model country in this text, rather than a wannabe with a lot to learn from a purportedly environmentally-friendly country like Sweden. The hope expressed by all who had a voice in this story was that Poland would not become a polluter like its counterpart on the other side of the Baltic. In the second place, the actors and primary definers in this story were both women, which could challenge the stereotype of Poland as a male-dominated society. Neither was presented as an anomaly. The story, in other words, would seem to offer new perspectives, challenge stereotypes, and resist confirming people's views – to use the words of one of the SVT journalists encountered in the preceding section.

### The Polish Engineer

Men did, of course, feature in news stories about the new member states in general, and in Poland in particular. In another item addressing the problem of the environment, four were interviewed: two engineers, a member of the Polish Green Party, and the head of the municipal water company in the city of Krakow. In what narrative terminology would label the abstract of this story, viewers were told that the environment was the area that was going to require the heaviest investments when the EU's new members harmonized with the rest of the Union. Poland, the biggest of the new member states, also had the biggest environmental problems, but was investing heavily in sewage treatment plants. The 'disequilibrium' in the plot was introduced when

the Green Party member challenged the view of the municipal official that as much was being done as possible. It was an exchange familiar from the Swedish political context.

What is interesting about this particular story is its subplot. The primary definer – the man whose account opened the story and who provided the evaluation that ends it – was an engineer who had recently returned to Poland after twenty years as an émigré. To him, the sewage treatment plant he was building, and which would clean up the accumulated poison of generations, was a symbol of the 'new' Poland. "When I came back", he said,

> it was a different country, for us it was like a second emigration because it felt like we'd come to a different country, with different mentality, different needs, with development we couldn't imagine, and now we're adding more to this.

In the past, he said, people looked and saw only industrial development, because of the propaganda, and they were proud of it. But now when they looked around them they saw problems, and wanted to make improvements. They were sorting their waste and this, he said, was promising.

The symbolism is unmistakable: apart from the metaphor of 'cleaning up the waste' of generations, there is the interesting image of the émigré encountering a new country when he returns home. Given that Sweden, since the end of the 19$^{th}$ century, has been a nation of emigrants (some of whom remained in their new domiciles, others of whom returned), it would be interesting to know whether this theme found any resonance 'on the couch'.

### The Lithuanian entrepreneur

In the final example to be sketched here, the success story of Lithuania – the 'tiger' of Europe, viewers were told, and one of the fastest growing economies in the world – was related through the eyes of Tomas Juska, an entrepreneur who was 21 years old when the country became independent. With four classmates and no money, he started a flooring company that now had an annual turnover of half a billion kronor. Juska described Lithuania using the following points of reference:

> We are a society of 3.5 million people and on our roads there are about 1.2 million cars. I can pay for parking by sending an SMS message and our mobile phone penetration is more than 60 percent. Just these few examples tell how healthy our economy is.

Unease that Sweden would be invaded by Lithuanians who wanted to piggyback on the welfare system feels distant here, said the reporter in a voiceover, before introducing what, according to the terminology introduced earlier, could be thought of as the disequilibrium. One million people still lived in poverty; it took Juska twelve years to scrape together the money for his dream house (to which he could be seen driving up in a new car); and it would take another fifteen years for the whole country to attain the average EU living standard. In the elegant living room of his house, with brandy and a cordless phone on the table beside him, Juska spoke less of what Lithua-

nia hoped to get from the EU ("it is a nice label", he said) than what that country could offer the Union:

> I believe we can give to all the Europe, more developed Europe, our hunger, our energy, our readiness to work hard, and I would say exploit these things. Because otherwise not only we will maintain as province, all Europe will maintain as province in global processes. So the only way is to put together our strengths.

Even more clearly than in the other three stories, personification strategies are put to use in this item. The Lithuanian tiger is embodied in the self-confident, energetic businessman, who although young is already established. What is interesting here is that despite the disequilibrium of continued poverty for a third of the population, the dominant theme of this report is "ask not what Europe can do for Lithuania, ask what Lithuania can do for Europe", to paraphrase John F. Kennedy. Unlike the open text in which the Estonian waitress figured, this can be seen as a 'closed' text, i.e. one which urges the viewer to see the situation in one rather than several ways. This brings to mind the comment by one of the SVT journalists about giving viewers 'a red thread' to hold onto.

#### *Summary*

These four texts – and others in the sample – draw on the naturalist tradition in telling the story of various 'new Europeans'. It is the accounts of the Estonian waitress, the Polish farmer, the returning émigré and the Lithuanian entrepreneur which further the narratives in which they are actors. The perspective throughout is that of new member states (and more precisely inhabitants of new member states) looking into the European family they are about to join, rather than of established union members on the inside looking out.

An unmistakable feature of these stories is the determination and energy with which the encounter with other Europeans is contemplated by these new neighbours. The Swedes in these news items, by way of contrast, tend to be sceptical and on their guard (in the case of some leading politicians, trade unionists, customs officials and police) or irresponsible (in the case of the alco-tourists). It is not inconceivable that they would come across to culturally competent viewers as conservative, as compared to the dynamic newcomers.

Nevertheless, there are repeated occasions on which the Swedish viewer is invited to identify with his or her counterparts on the other side of the Baltic, who are beginning to buy ecological food and sort their waste, for example, who are filmed eating at elegant restaurants and walking city streets in designer jeans rather than tramping along on foot behind a horse and plough, as was the case in the mid-1990s. Nor are these entirely foreign countries, the viewer is invited to note, through shots of a familiar Swedish grocery store chain and Swedish banks in Latvia.

The question however, is whether evidence of such identification can be found. How does the average viewer make sense of such news stories, if in fact he or she

takes notice of them at all? Focus group interviews in the weeks that followed the broadcasting of these and similar news stories sought an answer to that question.

## The View from the Couch

The focus group study was intended to generate insights into how people make sense of the outside world, and into how the media might contribute to that sense-making, i.e. the role television reports, for example, could be thought to play in developing mental 'maps' (Hall 1994:207, Ruddock 2001). It included a group of pensioners, workers, musicians and librarians in Stockholm and corresponding groups in the small town in Östergötland, plus a group of farmers (an equivalent of which was not found in Stockholm). While concerned to exclude obvious candidates for cosmopolitanism like political elites, university academics, activists and businessmen, no attempt was made to include or exclude, or even to find out whether groups contained, people who were particularly bound to local environments or who had experience of living and working abroad. It can thus be seen as a finding, rather than a methodological problem, that in using this approach I ended up fishing up many people with what could be thought of as cosmopolitan experiences abroad. Walking into the pensioner's collective in a Stockholm suburb or a local branch of the library, I found myself talking to people who had lived in Africa; in the countryside I found myself talking to a farmer who helped a Swiss friend deliver dairy equipment to Chinese entrepreneurs; over pizza in the little town, music teachers and dairy workers told me about how they travelled to Germany every summer to play in the symphonic band and discuss war experiences with their elderly hosts. In every group, immigrants made their presence felt, in several cases by their participation – be they a Finnish librarian or an American or Polish musician. It ultimately occurred to me that to put together a 'pure' sample of Swedes without experience of the world outside their nation's border would have been to construct a problem of representativity, not the other way around. In sum, I have found the 'go fishing' method fruitful and defensible. While more, and perhaps larger, groups would have been an advantage, it should be pointed out that there is no definite answer to how many people should be interviewed in a good focus group study (Stokes 2003:151).

There is not room here to present an exhaustive narrative analysis of the nine discussions, or, again, to maintain the distinction between 'story' and 'discourse' involved in that analysis. What follows instead is a summary of what I take to be key aspects of a few of the discussions and particular features of them that are relevant to understandings of EU enlargement.

An attempt was made in these discussions to leave open the question of how the outside world (*omvärld)* was to be defined, as it was the respondents' definition that was of interest. The conversation started with the question of what came to mind when the word 'home' was mentioned, and progressed to what they associated with the word 'community', then 'EU' then '*omvärld*', with follow-up questions in between these key points in the discussion. Other questions probed where they got images of these things from, if they travelled, where and why, and if they ever felt at home when somewhere else. Finally, their media consumption habits were discussed, and wheth-

er they ever felt that they recognised, or felt connected to, the people in news reports about other countries.

The farmers readily gave an account of themselves as men who have stayed close to home throughout their lives. It was only in passing that it emerged that one of them had travelled extensively throughout Europe in connection with previous employment, and that another had travelled throughout the world helping a friend of his youth, from Switzerland, sell dairy equipment as far away as China. As for the EU, the farmer who had travelled in Europe in an earlier occupation said:

Farmer 2: I think, I feel a bit far away. You are too far away from it somehow. So it's hard to relate to.
Interlocutor: Enlargement, or the EU in general. It feels…?
Farmer 2: The EU feels far away. Enlargement too, I think.
Farmer 3: The EU feels so bureaucratic, I think. [*The others agree.*] It's just a lot of bureaucrats who sit in Brussels and decide everything.
Farmer 1: This is the way I see it: the bigger we get, the closer to downfall we come. If you look at it historically, *no* big constellation has held. You can go back to the Mayas, Incas, Roman Empire, Soviet Union, whatever you like: *everything* ultimately breaks down. Because you can never unite so many different cultures and so many different ways of doing things under one and the same roof.
Interlocutor: So it's not just the practical aspects of enlargement, but also the cultural…
Farmer 1: Yes, it is, it is like, if you look at our own sector, if we were to have a common seed date in the entire EU, should the Greeks sow the same day as they do in northern Sweden? [*crash with coffee cup*] My view is: you can't have it!
Interlocutor: [*laughs*] No!
Farmer 1: I think it's like [Farmer 3] says, there's a bunch of people down there in Brussels who call all the shots (*styr och ställer*) and they're, they're not living in the real world.
Interlocutor: Your image of the EU, is it bureaucrats then?
Farmers 2,3: Yes, exactly.
Farmer 2: That's the picture […]. When it comes to enlargement, I think there's going to be … how to put it, there will be a bigger difference between them… how should I put it…
Farmer 1: I know what you mean.
Farmer 2: … that the East- Baltic are a bit farther down, and then we have the others who are a bit higher up. This, there'll be too big diff., there'll be too big a range now, the gap between the good and the less good will be even bigger.
Interlocutor: An A- and B-team?
Farmer 2: Yeah, maybe you could call it that. Then the B-team wants to grow up to the A-team's level, but then the A-team has to pay for it somehow.

As can be seen from this excerpt, a clear 'Other' emerges in the discussion with the farmers: the bureaucrats in Brussels. They are not alone, however, but have the Swedish government for company, as well as the rich landowners who are seen as running the Swedish Farmers Union, all of which are pitted against an 'Us' that is comprised of the 'little people'. The key actors in the stories of the farmers are the Government, the Bureaucrats in Brussels, Regulations, Taxes and Subsidies, and the discourse is materialist, rather than one characterised by ideas or visions. As to the human actors on the other side of the Baltic Sea, they are absences rather than presences in this talk. Shown the report about the Polish farmer presented in the preceding section, they don't comment on her situation at all, either in terms of recognising it or failing to recognise it, but they *do* relate the item to their own problems and situation. The question is: is this evidence that the news item doesn't touch them, or is it evidence of the invisibility of the conventions at work in it, rendering them oblivious to

the personification/identification strategies but immediately 'internalizing' the text by associating to their own situation?

Hostility towards the EU and Brussels bureaucrats does not necessarily find a twin in hostility to the outside world and non-Swedes in general, it is interesting to note:

Farmer 1: Everyone who talks about EU, about how it's all about justice and peace, they seem to forget that the EU is building a wall around itself.

Interlocutor: And what do you think of that?

Farmer 1: I think it is utter nonsense. There we are, you know, either we're going to open outwards. Or else I don't understand what they want.

But this particular farmer *does* find one good thing about the EU and, by corollary, enlargement:

Farmer 1: What I think is positive about the EU is this possibility to travel, you know, in an easier way. Because travel, I've always been fascinated by that, and I like different people, different food cultures, where there are all sorts of things. It is fascinating. It's enriching, quite simply.

A preliminary interpretation of this exchange, then, is that even when rooted physically and discursively in a particular patch of a particular countryside, people like this farmer can express what could be thought of as cosmopolitan sentiments.

The farmers told stories of going away and coming back – one grandparent had tried living the life of the émigré in the US once upon a time, for example, before giving up and heading back to the Swedish homestead, and the farmers themselves had travelled abroad and felt it right to be back home. This theme is also in evidence in the discussion with musicians who had left the little town to study in Stockholm, who had worked with major orchestras in cities in Sweden and Denmark, but who had made a conscious decision to give that existence up for the quiet, good life of a music teacher in the small town. Like the farmers, they readily depict themselves as provincials, rooted in their community, and it is only in passing, and in response to gently reiterated questions, that it emerges that they have in fact been abroad, living, for example, with older Germans while on a symphonic band exchange, and quizzing their hosts about how the Second War looked and felt on their end. In one way, such activity is not unrelated to the work of the cosmopolitan, who is open for vantage points that are not his own. In another way, these experiences seem to be anything other than essential to these respondents, even in a discussion devoted to their view of the outside world.

The point to be made here is not that indications of cosmopolitanism are lacking in this discussion. Rather, it is that they contain evidence of non-cosmopolitanism (not to be confused with anti-cosmopolitanism, which can be thought to have more to do with fundamentalism and xenophobia). These men are quite simply satisfied with their plight and can see no reason to improve it or to share it with others. This is evident in talk of the EU, for example:

Interlocutor: If I say the word 'EU', what sort of pictures do you get in your head?

Musician 2: [*chuckles*] Red tape.

Musician 1: Yes.

Musician 2: It's mostly negative, actually.

Musician 1: Yep. The first time, when we were going to vote on the EU, then it was mostly focussed on how good and nice…

Musician 2: I don't understand why they tried that one on, when we have it so good here anyway. We managed on our own, like, we had…I don't get it, we had no need of Europe.

Interlocutor: Does it still feel the same?
Musician 2: Of course it does. It feels more like we're being used by others, if you know what I mean. Because it costs a lot to be in now.
Musician 1: Right. Plus there's such a state apparatus down there, with thousands of employees…
Musician 2: …social, secure networks, networks that we have here in society anyway: what's going to happen with them now, when there's going to be more and more coming who *don't* have that, if you know what I mean. Will we be *worse* off, like? There's unease. You feel uneasy about it. So there's nothing positive in it.
Interlocutor: Nothing at all?
Musician 2: No.
Interlocutor: If you think about… the French or British and so on, you don't think, us, that's us. You think 'them', or?
Musician 2: I don't know.
Musician 1: Sure, we're Europeans. So you have a certain community.

The second musician, in particular, expresses the opposite of "excessive imitation of traits of others at the expense of the integrity of one's own land", or someone who learns to live with diversity in modes of thought and ways of life, which are dictionary definitions of cosmopolitanism. He is, rather, the opposite: "provincial, local, limited or restricted by the attitudes, interests or loyalties of a single region".

A rather different pattern emerged in the discussion with four librarians who, as they themselves joked, represented all the generations of working life, as two were in late-middle-age, with grown children, one was heavily pregnant, and one, barely out of her teens, was just finishing her studies. Compared to the participants in the other four focus groups in the small town, who tended to give static replies, these women were quick to build on the replies of their colleagues, interweave story with story, and note the connections they themselves had made to earlier responses. Emotions could run high as, for example, when speaking of the frustration they experienced as consumers of news:

Librarian 1: The awful thing about tv news is that you stop thinking. I mean, I've almost *stopped* looking at the news because of that. I think there is *report* after *report* after *report* after *report* and I'd don't have a chance to react. And I think it's *awful*. [*The others murmur agreement.*] I think it's *terrible*. That it's like that. So I much prefer to watch, you know, *slower* programs and documentaries. When you keep up, like. Because it's, it's pure violence, I mean it's terror, terror, terror, terror. And maimed people.
Interlocutor And you mean that it's not enough just to know about what's going on, it's important to react somehow –
Librarian 1: Yes, for *me* it's important to react. Because I think sitting and being spoon-fed and not reacting, it's somehow, well you feel numbed. And anything at all can happen without you reacting, in the end.
Interlocutor: And the image you get of the outside world from the tv news is a lot of conflict and war then?
Librarian 1: *Absolutely.*

The problematic relationship these women experienced with the media, or with what was referred to at the beginning of this article as 'images from elsewhere' was illustrated vividly in response to the question of whether they had ever felt 'at home' when abroad. The experiences that sprang immediately to their minds were the very opposite, yet clearly relevant to the dynamics of sense-making being explored here. One occasion was the murder, in September 2003, of former Foreign Minister Anna Lindh. The other was the murder of two policemen in the idyllic nearby town of Mal-

exander one bright spring morning. The librarians told the following stories about receiving the news:

Librarian 1: I was in England, you see, and it was *awful*. We were a group of librarians in England, who suddenly got the news. And we stood there and felt completely *outside*, we wanted to be *home*. When it happened. And we *cried* together and it was, it was *awfully* strange. And then you saw all those pictures on tv, crying people, and you felt that *that's* where we should be. It was, it was strange. I got behind.

Librarian 3: I know, it was the same with the police murders.

Librarian 1: Exactly.

Librarian 3: And it took a long time before I caught up. On the airplane there were *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet* and it was all about my little home town Malexander, it was so strange, it was so far away to read all about that. And then *everybody* had to tell about it and I wanted to hear where everyone had been and what everyone had experienced. To be able to keep up somehow.

Librarian: It was strange.

Librarian 3: But what you said about news [Librarian 1], it's, it's so strange when you see lots of people, because obviously, all that about 9/11, it's stuff you just stand and think about for a long, long, long time, about individual cases and so on, but otherwise it's war and so on when you see that there are lots of people dying, and you aren't moved as much as when you see *one* single story, *one* person who tells it. It's easier to put yourself in the tragedy then. I don't know, that's just how it is. It's like you say [Librarian 1], you have to distance yourself, you have to screen yourself off, because if you started *thinking*, if you're going to take in *everything* and start thinking about environmental damage, all the wars, all the people in need – well, all the misery there is, well, you almost wouldn't want to go on living. That's how it feels.

Librarian 2: It feels so hopeless, I think you have to, I think you have to try to distance yourself and come back to your own little reality and try, well, do the best you can. With your own little life. That's where we usually end up when we discuss things. Sometimes we discuss all the misery but we try to do what we can in our own little library.

There are many insights to be gleaned from this dialogue, not least when it comes to the work of imagination. For these women, it was not enough to follow the aftermath of the murders in the media, or from afar. Despite all that is said about the "breaking news" pace of reporting, these women felt they would not be able to "catch up" until they were back home. They reflect on their relationship to media reporting, and find it problematic, ultimately removing their gaze from the turbulent outside world, to which they apparently feel some sort of responsibility, and return to their 'little library'.

Another difference between these women and the men in the other focus groups in the small town is their tendency to talk about people, rather than rules and regulations. When asked what they think of when the word 'EU' is mentioned, they immediately mention enlargement, which means a broadening of *their* horizons, a going out of Swedes rather than a coming in of new members:

Librarian 2: I think, I think it feels positive. It's like [Librarian 1] says with the new countries, above all the younger generation, that they want to get out and travel more and get in touch. And it's also the case that Sweden is too small a country, for many who have lived here their entire lives. They think that the whole world looks like this. And that we do the right thing and that it's best here and all that. I think we can learn a lot from each other and…and I think it's good that…we broaden somehow, that people, that we can travel easily between countries and see how others do things and pick up the good things and the bad things, or good things. Yeah, I think it's good. I think it feels positive. And I also think, when I look at the celebrations, you know, from those countries that haven't had

it so easy, you can feel, bah, it's so *good* that they are joining now, they are really wonderful and celebrate and all that. Somehow they must have felt like second class people all the time, we've had so much, we've had it so good and all that and everything for them has been a bit worse, it feels, *I'd* feel like that if I lived inn that country and saw how everyone else had it…

Librarian 1: I think they're going to go *really really far* now, it's going to be the rest of us left standing there and…cheering. [*All laugh.*] Or trying to keep up with them. Because I can almost *feel* how they want revenge, now they can try too and…be as good as the others. […]You can imagine these people who have so much, a lot of knowledge and potential to be something – they haven't been able to, because they live in a country where there aren't those possibilities. And suddenly the possibilities are *there*. Yes, I can really see before my eyes how they are going to work to be…*better*.

Librarian 2: It's going to be exciting to see. You *really* admire them…I saw a program about a computer guy, with a computer company in Poland, a *big* company, with *lots* of people. It was so easy and so… fantastic.

Interlocutor: What program was that?

Librarian 2: It was on…some news program.

There is an interesting contrast between this exchange and the first one between the librarians quoted above. While the first one would seem to indicate the presence of a certain degree of resistance to media messages and the various strategies of journalists, the image of the new EU members that emerges from the passage above is very much in keeping with that which emerges from the textual analysis of *Rapport* news items and the views of the journalists themselves. So while on the one hand, this woman feels she has become immune to news reports of a violent world, she would appear, on the other, to be making sense of other news – such as the meaning of enlargement – in the way that accords with journalistic perspectives. There is evidence, in the librarians' talk, of identification with individuals in news reports from abroad rather than the many thousands who are in trouble. For want of a better word, this could be called the woman-with-the-Samsonite-suitcase syndrome, and it is worth considering whether it is as problematic as the librarians think it is. Translating their sentiments into the language of this research, the question is whether this 'syndrome' is evidence of cosmopolitan susceptibilities, or a symptom of the difficulties that may be encountered on the way to forming a cosmopolitan outlook?

## Conclusion

A feature of these and the other focus group discussions that has not been documented here is that in the discourse of the respondents, globalisation emerges as something natural, almost organic, while the EU is artificial, the product of a bureaucratic inclination to complicate the life of the average person, and an entity held together by red tape. Another feature is that 'home' is somewhere secure and pleasant. Its opposite, 'not-home', is not a place full of foreigners, but a place defined by the presence of conflict, violence, and the aforementioned red tape (although ask a farmer and you'll learn that there's a lot of the latter at home too).

The discussions excerpted here suggest that we should not be hasty about concluding that mediated worldliness is the most important factor when it comes to making sense of the world and relations with people beyond the borders of the nation. In these and the other discussions, face-to-face interactions with Chinese entrepreneurs

and Asian tobacconists in London, and talking to people who were 'at home' when Lindh was killed or in Germany when Hitler was waging war leave their impression on the respondents and come more easily to mind than flashbacks from news reports when discussing their 'take' on the outside world. How these face-to-face and mediated interactions work together (or conflict) is one task for further research.

Cosmopolitans, it would seem, are to be found behind the desk at the local library and in the Swedish Television newsroom, at least that corner of it occupied by the foreign news desk. This is hardly a surprise – as Hannerz has noted, foreign correspondents are "key players in today's globalization of consciousness" (Hannerz 2004:2) – and indeed any other result would have been disquieting. What is striking here is, rather, the clear stance adopted in their reporting in the week before the fireworks and Beethoven of May 1st. Enlargement was a Good Thing in the view of these journalists, and their message was that Swedes and other member states should be prepared to welcome these new family members, and recognise them as kin. This emerged not only from interviews with the journalists, but also from analysis of the reports they produced during this period.

The question is whether the journalists and librarians share cosmopolitan perspectives because both these groups have similar political and moral outlooks, or because the librarians have been looking at the world through the window of SVT news reports for the greater part of their lives. Whatever the answer to that question may be (and it is, of course, a question that can never be answered), both these groups would seem to be engaged in the social practice Appadurai had in mind, a practice that may be called the work of cosmopolitan imagination.

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# The New Military: From National Defence and Warfighting to International Intervention and Peacekeeping

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**ABSTRACT**

The role of the military is changing. From national defence and warfighting, the focus is increasingly shifting towards international intervention and peacekeeping. In this article, I contextualise this 'new military' historically through a brief analysis of Sweden's history of military and political engagements with the world. Rather than a progressive development in which Sweden has become increasingly internationalised, notions of and relations between 'Sweden', the 'world', and the role of the military have continuously shifted; and consequently, international engagements at different times have signified different things. The current interventionist role of the military, therefore, needs to be related to a set of emerging transformations, which I conceptualise as 'conflict preventionism'. This transnational cultural form, I argue, is bringing about a new relationship between the military and the political spheres; between the national and the international; and, ultimately, between the notions of war and peace.

## Introduction

It was a warm spring day towards the end of April 2003 at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT), south of Stockholm. At the time, I was conducting anthropological fieldwork during the planning of the multinational Partnership for Peace exercise *Viking 03*. Initiated by the Swedish government and organised by the Swedish Armed Forces, it aimed at developing civil-military co-operation in international Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The project involved some eight hundred participants from twenty-six countries, including military officers, activists from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and representatives from international and governmental agencies. The exercise itself would be conducted during two weeks in December 2003. Preparations, however, were already well in progress. It was these

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preparatory arrangements that had brought me to SWEDINT. Together with Thomas and Magnus[2] – two Swedish officers working with the *Viking 03* project – I was about to attend an afternoon lecture at a Partnership for Peace Exercise Planners Course.

Before the lecture, we went to the officers' mess for coffee. Located on the second floor of a large brick building, the mess was surprisingly spacious and saturated with bourgeois style. The large room was divided into several smaller sections furnished with coffee tables, leather sofas, and armchairs; in one corner was a bar, and the walls were decorated with gold-framed oil paintings of former officers, medals from sports tournaments and, to top it all, a portrait of the Swedish royal family. Still somewhat unaccustomed to these kinds of military settings, to me the room looked conspicuously nationalistic and exaggeratedly stylised. Thomas and Magnus, however, seemed entirely at home within this milieu as we sat down around one of the tables.

To enter the educational part of the building after having had coffee in the officers' mess felt like leaving one world behind and crossing the threshold into another. With seminar rooms named Mozambique, Liberia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the focus had palpably shifted away from the national towards the international. The lecture took place in 'Nicaragua'. A power-point projector tangibly cleared away the old-fashioned military atmosphere and signalled a new high-tech orientation. The room also completely lacked any nationalistic appearance; instead, adorned by a United Nations flag and with a world map on one of the walls, it was decidedly internationalist. The officers' mess had been almost empty; the seminar room, on the contrary, was crowded. I counted to nineteen people, and among the participants were military officers from Austria, Azerbaijan, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Sweden, and the U.S. Thomas and Magnus, I noted seemed effortlessly at home in this context too.

This difference in decoration and furnishing between the mess and the seminar room clearly illustrates the current reorientation of armed forces: from national defence and warfighting towards international intervention and peacekeeping; a transition which has led to far-reaching transformations of the military throughout much of the world (see, e.g., Burk 2002; Dandeker 1994; Moskos et al. 2000).[3]

In this article, based on anthropological fieldwork within the *Viking 03* project, I explore some integral aspects of this 'new military'. A description of *Viking 03* is followed by a brief historical contextualisation of the contemporary interventionist focus where I discuss Sweden's history of political and military engagements with the world. A transition is discernible here: from an emphasis on nationalism in the early twentieth century, via a focus on internationalism during much of the Cold War, and increasingly towards notions of cosmopolitanism since the 1990s. I argue that this has not been a progressive development in which Sweden has become increasingly internationalised. Instead, notions of and relations between 'Sweden', the 'world', and the role of the military have continuously shifted; and, consequently, internation-

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2 These names are pseudonyms. While people on official positions, such as the *Viking 03* Exercise Director, are referred to by their real names, most informants have been given pseudonyms. Real names include surnames; pseudonyms do not.

al engagements at different times have signified and expressed different things. Finally, I relate the new interventionist role of the military, as conveyed through *Viking 03*, to a set of emerging transformations, which I conceptualise as 'conflict preventionism'. My analysis is thus not limited to a strict military sphere. 'Conflict preventionism', I argue, is bringing about a new relationship between the military and the political spheres; between the national and the international; and, ultimately, between the notions of war and peace.

## The *Viking 03* project

*Viking 03* was the third exercise in a series of international civil-military projects organised by the Swedish Armed Forces. Like its predecessors, conducted in 1999 and 2001 respectively, it was focused on civil-military co-operation in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The eight hundred people participating in the 2003 project represented twenty-six countries.[4] Apart from military officers, the participants also included representatives from NGOs, international organisations, and government agencies.[5]

### The Partnership for Peace

The project was carried out in 'the spirit of' Partnership for Peace (PFP). Initiated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1994, the PFP currently comprises 30 countries, some of which recently have become members of the NATO. (All of

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3 In these times of extensive change, decoration and furnishing – what might perhaps look like unimportant details – play an important role in conveying what 'the military' means. But they do more than to simply convey. 'Banal' visual representations are also formative constituents of the notions they seem merely to represent (cf. Westermann 2005: ix; Billig 1995). Anthropologist Robert A. Rubinstein (2003: 16-17), for instance, shows how two U.S. military units – one focused on the effectiveness of warfighting and the other emphasizing sacrifice in peace support operations – use different sets of memorabilia to represent themselves and construct their respective 'culture'. When I began fieldwork within the *Viking 03* project, I immediately noted this self-referential use of the culture concept among the military personnel. Military sociologists, too, have picked up the term 'military culture' as a tool for discussing on-going transformations of the armed forces (see, e.g., Callaghan and Kernic 2003a; Dandeker 1999; English 2004). Jean Callaghan and Franz Kernic (2003b: 17) argue that military sociologists 'need to have an intimate knowledge of and understanding for the military and its culture.' They also admit that this analytical focus on 'microcosms' poses a disciplinary dilemma: 'researchers often lose track of the broader societal and theoretical contexts of the issue being studied […] and begin instead to uncritically admire, identify with, and accept as natural and correct all behaviors and choices of those they are studying.' Researchers and officers alike, it seems, are thus busying themselves in equally uncritical attempts to demarcate the shifting content of 'military culture' today.

4 The following countries took part in *Viking 03:* Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, USA, and Uzbekistan.

5 Amnesty International (AI); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC); Save the Children; Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR); Swedish Women's Voluntary Defence Service; the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA); the National Association of Swedish Women's Voluntary Motor Transport Corps; the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA); the Swedish Police; the Swedish Power Grid; the Swedish Red Cross; the Swedish Rescue Services Agency; and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

the countries participating in *Viking 03* were either NATO or PFP members.) According to the NATO web site, the overarching aim of the Partnership is to 'reinforce stability and reduce the risk of conflict.' This goal is to be achieved through the establishment of a dialogue between NATO and each participating country:

> Joint activities and regular consultation improve transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, encourage democratic control of the armed forces and help nations equip and train to operate at the Alliance's [i.e. NATO's] side, generally furthering the democratic values at the heart of NATO's partnership policy. [- – -] By assisting participants with reforms, the PFP helps them build a solid democratic environment, maintain political stability and improve security.[6]

The Partnership centres primarily on defence related issues and military co-operation in order to enhance mutual understanding. In addition it also 'facilitates consultation and an opportunity to work together on issues such as disaster relief and civil emergency control, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, armaments co-operation and Peace Support Operations.'[7] The post-Cold War role of NATO – especially through the initiation of the PFP 'security community' – is also increasingly becoming oriented towards crisis management rather than collective defence (see, e.g., Gudmundson 2000: 12; 83-85; Huldt 2003: 11ff).

The process of planning for *Viking 03* followed a standard schedule for NATO/PFP exercises. The SWEDINT course that I attended together with Thomas and Magnus was centred on how to properly carry out these preparations, which consisted of a pre-given number of workshops and planning conferences. For *Viking 03,* most of these were carried out at conference centres or military regiments in the Stockholm area. Although some workshops were exclusively military, most included representatives from participating civilian organisations as well. The number of participants on these occasions ranged from anything between ten or fifteen people at the smallest workshops, to several hundred at the largest conferences. Between these events, planning continuously proceeded at the Swedish Defence Wargaming Centre (SDWC), at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters in Stockholm.

The objective of the *Viking 03* project was to promote:

- Civil Military Co-Operation (CIMIC);
- Transparency between all parties;
- Multinationality;
- Contacts between the Nations and individuals;
- The development of the ability to work together; and
- Greater co-operation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.[8]

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6 See http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html (accessed 2005-03-28).

7 From the Swedish Armed Forces website, http://www.mil.se/viking03/article.php?id=8965 (accessed 2005-06-26).

8 See the *Viking 03* website, http://www.mil.se/viking03/ (accessed 2005-06-26).

The aim of *Viking 03* thus echoed the policy of NATO, and the fact that Sweden is not a member of NATO was arguably one of the things that turned *Viking 03* into an attractive exercise for many of the participating countries. As the deputy Exercise Director, a Swiss officer, put it in an interview: 'to quite a number of countries [*Viking 03* is] a good opportunity. [For] those who, for whatever political reason, are a little bit more reluctant to join NATO/PFP Exercises that are NATO-led, this exercise offers an opportunity to share, in fact, the same know-how, but under Swedish command.'

## Bogaland

In order to meet the exercise aims, a fictitious country called *Bogaland* was created as a training scenario for the exercise. Troubled by violent outbursts of ethnic conflict, *Bogaland* eventually became subjected to a NATO-led and UN-mandated intervention. No military troops participated in the field during the exercise. Instead, all activities were enacted with simulation technology. The activities in *Bogaland* were represented via computers, in written documents and through fictitious media (including TV and radio broadcasts, as well as international and local newspapers). Participants also took part in various kinds of face-to-face meetings.

The *Bogaland* scenario seemed on the face of it to consist of a number of typical conflict ingredients. Described as originating in the 'local culture,' these included ancient ethnic and religious hatreds and territorial disputes between different factions of the population. In addition, what appeared as cold-blooded greediness among local warlords made any prospect of a peaceful solution of the situation seem unlikely. When scrutinised closely, however, this exercise scenario completely lacked internal consistency.[9] The construction of *Bogaland* was in other words characterised by what Gernot Grabher (2004: 1492) calls 'situative pragmatism', which implies that 'knowledge is valued according to its usefulness to solve the specific project task rather than to the authority of its disciplinary, institutional or departmental origin and status.' In the *Viking 03* fictitious intervention, the task was to 'prevent violence through the use of force', as the Exercise Director, Swedish Major General Tony Stigsson, put it somewhat bluntly. And faced with the chaotic and seemingly incomprehensible situation in *Bogaland,* a military intervention indeed looked like the only remaining alternative for the concerned members of the international community.

9 The *Bogaland* scenario was described as a 'local' conflict, caused by ancient ethnic hatreds. Such a characterisation of conflicts is thoroughly contested within anthropology. Ethnographic studies have shown that conflicts which on the face of it might seem 'local' often have global aspects and connections, which are critical to take into account for a proper understanding (see, e.g., Finnström 2005; Turton 2003). Ethnic differences tend to be seen not as causes of conflicts but rather as their results (see, e.g., Allen and Seaton 1997). And rather than created in the past, most anthropologists see ethnic conflicts as constitutive parts of the present (see, e.g. Eller 2002; cf. Kaldor 2001).

**Institutionalising Interventionism**

In April 2003 a four-day planning workshop took place at a conference centre located beautifully on the countryside just outside Stockholm. During the workshop I took part in meetings and listened in on discussions. It was still quite difficult for me to picture what the exercise would eventually look like, and I tried to concentrate on comprehending how everything would work and what *Viking 03* was about. As I look back now I think that this was in fact what most participants were up to at that stage. Everyone seemed busy trying to define roles for themselves and figuring out how these fitted into the larger project framework. Dinners, coffee breaks, and other recurrent social gatherings functioned as important occasions for participants to gradually forge a common approach towards the project and their respective roles in it. The *Viking 03* project had thus, to borrow a phrase from Robert Musil (1996: 141), become a tangible reality before anyone knew what it was.

Two things, however, were widely regarded as central to the project: internationalisation and civil-military co-operation. Albeit seldom defined in a more explicit manner, everybody seemed to agree that these issues were highly important. One evening after dinner, I was discussing the transformation of the military together with Thomas and another Swedish officer. They told me that many people who work within the Swedish military today feel that it is necessary and important for the armed forces to engage in international military co-operation, while politicians often emphasise instead civil-military co-operation as the most important aspect of the way ahead. *Viking 03* included both; and the project clearly meant different things to different participants.

Before the workshop I had been curious to learn how participants would discuss moral, ethical, and political issues related to the new role for the armed forces. What struck me while taking part, however, was that international military intervention seemed already to be completely taken-for-granted as both necessary and good. Since this was taken as a starting-point, what tended to be negotiated was mainly technological and organisational issues related to the execution of the *Viking 03* project. The focus seemed in other words to be on the nature of the preparations rather than on what was being prepared for and why.

During a coffee break towards the end of the workshop Magnus, the Swedish officer, told me that in 2002 he was suddenly transferred back to Sweden while serving in a military mission in Afghanistan. His new task in Sweden was to develop a fictitious exercise scenario. Exercises such as *Viking 03,* Magnus concluded half-jokingly, are thus apparently regarded as more important than real operations.

This workshop took place quite early in the planning phase. Civilian participation was reduced to one meeting, held in Stockholm with representatives from a number of organisations; and at this point, eight months prior to the exercise, it was not clear which organisations that, in the end, would take part. Amnesty International, for instance, was mentioned as one of the organisations, which apparently had not yet decided whether they would participate or not.

The military personnel, meanwhile, progressively continued to prepare for the exercise. But not only did the plan for the exercise interventionist solution become established before the civilian involvement in the project; it also preceded the develop-

ment of a problem that it could solve. Contrary to a rationalist perspective – according to which actors first correctly identify problems and then suggest proper solutions to them – it thus appeared in the *Viking 03* project almost to function the other way around. According to political scientist Johan Eriksson, this is not uncommon. In his recent analysis of Swedish security politics (Eriksson 2004: 155), he notes that once a solution has become institutionalised, it tends to be defended stubbornly among actors related to it. Bureaucratic responsibilities become allotted, routines set up, and budgets prepared; new organisations become established, personnel employed, and new areas of expertise emerge. The *Viking 03* project reflected that such a field, centred on international intervention as a specific militarised solution, is currently in the making.

## Sweden's engagements with the world

In this section I approach the 'new military' and the contemporary focus on international intervention through a historical contextualisation. The meaning of 'thinking historically', however, is ambiguous. It might, as William Sewell (1999: 40) points out, mean to recognise more consciously and explicitly the 'pastness' of the past we think about. Or it might mean, instead, to place the issue in question in a temporal sequence of transformations.

During my fieldwork within *Viking 03,* I noted that the participants were themselves often situating the project in a historical context. While negotiating and discussing the new international role for the military, its relation to certain issues, and to the proposed interventionist solution, they were simultaneously inscribing these issues in a historical narrative. This resulted in a perspective, common in other contexts too, according to which the changing nature of the military, and of international intervention, appear as part of an 'evolutionary' process (see, e.g., Goulding 1993) in which armed forces and related civilian organisations, after having progressively 'adapted' to novel outer circumstances (see, e.g., Burk 2002), are currently on the brink of evolving into a 'culture of conflict prevention' (see, e.g., Mellbourn 2004).

This kind of rhetoric, of course, gives an aura of historical necessity and inevitability to the present. Such a perspective, which recounts a series of changes over time but fails to indicate the distance of the context being described from the present, could be labelled 'anachronistic'. That is, 'the historian's equivalent of the anthropologist's "ethnocentric"' (Sewell 1999: 41). In pointing this out, however, I am not suggesting that the participants in the *Viking 03* project were engaged in writing bad history, but rather that they were not writing history at all. They were making sense of the present.

In my own historical contextualisation, then, I do not trace historically a set of issues as they are currently conceptualised. Doing so would inevitably 'ontologise' and reify them. Instead, I discuss briefly Sweden's history of political and military engagements with the world during the twentieth century. This has not been a progressive development in which Sweden has become increasingly internationalised. Instead, notions of and relations between 'Sweden', the 'world', and the role of the military have shifted; and consequently, international engagements have signified and ex-

pressed different things. 'What is found at the historical beginning of things,' Michel Foucault (1998: 372) reminds us, 'is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.'

## Peace, Democracy, and International Co-operation

Within the *Viking 03* project, peace, democracy, and international co-operation were key words. These concepts, and their current interconnectedness, were seen among the participants as self-evidently and inherently good, and the *Viking 03* project was regarded as important among politicians, representatives from the armed forces, and within the NGO community. In the early twentieth century, however, few would have shared this enthusiasm.

War was at the beginning of the century often described as natural, necessary, and good. To wage war – at least prior to World War I – thus constituted one legitimate strategy among others for states to reach their respective goals.[10] Democracy, as we know it today, did not represent the political norm anywhere in the world; instead, political and military sovereignty was emphasised as important at a time when adherence to nationalist ideologies was dominant. International co-operation, as a result, was widely regarded with suspiciousness. The apparent self-evident meaning and value of peace, democracy, and international co-operation – as well as the present interconnectedness of the terms and their allegedly promising direction – is in other words a historically recent conception. Words have not kept their meaning, desires have not pointed in a single direction, and ideas have not retained their logic. Rather than a leap forward in history, the *Viking 03* project was thus an expression of the contemporary situation.

In Sweden, democratisation occurred during World War I. In the inter-war era, preceded by an extensive parliamentary debate, Sweden joined the League of Nations and took also part in international operations under its auspices (see, e.g., E. Johansson 2001a). This could perhaps be seen as the beginning of a new period in the country's foreign policy, characterised by an increasing outlook towards the international. The military, however, remained a largely nationalistic and politically conservative societal establishment. In response to the infamous shootings in Ådalen 1931, where during a demonstration a number of activists were killed by military personnel, a leg-

10 Wars, obviously, mirror to some extent the societal and historical contexts in which they occur. World War I, for instance, cannot be properly understood without taking into account its intimate relation to an imperial context; and the logics of imperialism, in turn, can be elucidated through a study of that war (see, e.g., Morrow 2004). As Kaveli J. Holsti (2004: 1) points out, 'War defined as a contest of arms between sovereign states derives from the post-1648 European experience, as well as from the Cold War.' Attitudes towards war, however, have not retained the same meaning. For a discussion of changing attitudes towards war from the end of the nineteenth century – when war was understood as natural, necessary and good – to the middle of the twentieth century – when it was generally agreed that wars ought to be avoided at all costs – see A. Johansson (2003: 359-367); and see Oredsson (2001: 75ff) for Swedish perspectives. With the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact), the League of Nations formally outlawed war as an instrument of policy, and signatories of the treaty were compelled to resolve their conflicts by peaceful means (Holsti 2004: 5).

islation of strict regulations for domestic civil-military relations also created a palpable 'split' between the civilian and military spheres (see Oredsson 2001: 153-160).

At the outbreak of World War II Sweden declared adherence to the policy of neutrality, which, although increasingly debated, has continued to this day. After the war, in a national survey from 1946, only 55% of the Swedish population thought that Sweden ought to become a member of an international organisation of all states, and take part in military operations for peace (Ferm 1995: 354). Nevertheless, Sweden became a member of the United Nations (UN) the same year, and took part in the first UN military observer group, United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which in 1948 was set up in the Middle East, led by Folke Bernadotte (who was killed later the same year in Jerusalem during the course of the mission).

In 1950, a proposal within the UN suggested that member states, in order to make UN peace operations more efficient, should supply the organisation with military troops. This actualised for the first time the question of Swedish participation in military operations abroad. After an extensive parliamentary evaluation, however, the Swedish government concluded in 1952 that this would not be in compliance with national interests, and the proposal was turned down (see, e.g., Löden 1999: 339-340).

When in 1956 the UN decided to organise its first armed peacekeeping operation, however, the government came to a different conclusion, and decided to let Swedish forces take part in the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), deployed at the Suez Canal in Egypt. At the time, military co-operation with other states was very limited (Sköld 1995: 117), and this decision thus constituted a crucial step towards a more active Swedish foreign policy. The Swedish decision to send military personnel on this mission, under more or less unknown circumstances outside the national borders, cannot be explained exclusively from a security perspective. Political scientist Hans Lödén (1999: 250-253) suggests that it was also related to an ideologically based support of the UN, and to the contemporary Swedish self-image as a loyal UN member and a consistent supporter of an international legal order.

Regarded as a success, the Swedish participation in UNEF rendered Sweden international prestige, and when during the summer of 1960 the UN organised its second peacekeeping operation – this time in the Congo – the Swedish government decided immediately and seemingly without hesitation to take part.[11]

## International Activism and National Defence

Extensive participation in UN military operations became widely regarded, in Sweden and abroad, as integral to the country's international role. Still, Sweden's engagements with the world throughout much of the Cold War remained largely separated from a traditional military sphere, and took the form, instead, of political activism (Agrell 2003: 172-173). At the time, writes Michael Steene,

11 In the international system of states, different countries tend to parade distinctive virtues (cf. Meyer et al. 1997: 164), and Sweden – together with a handful of states such as Canada and the other Nordic nations – increasingly took on the role as a super-power of peacekeeping. For a discussion of Swedish peacekeeping, see E. Johansson (2001b); for a comparison between the Nordic countries, see Salminen (2003).

> Sweden embarked upon a major foreign aid policy to promote development in Third World countries and assumed a new role as champion of solidarity. In the 1960s, Sweden elected not to build a nuclear arsenal and instead became active in the promotion of arms control. Sweden – it may be said – assumed the role of a moral voice in the spirit of the activist UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld who died in the line of duty in 1961 (Steene 1989: 177).

Apart from military participation in UN missions, Swedish political activism thus ranged from questions of disarmament and international law, to trade policy, de-colonisation, and development aid.

Ideologically oriented rather than security based, international engagement was not regarded with univocal enthusiasm within the Swedish military (see, e.g., Sköld 1994: 186-191). On the contrary, many officers consistently opposed political decisions to participate in international military missions. For the Swedish government, however, supporting the UN increasingly became regarded as a matter-of-course, and decisions to send troops abroad were thus liable to be carried out irrespective of any military apprehensions.

The military scepticism towards international operations is clearly illustrated through an example from the UN operation in the Congo in the 1960s. Not only did military leaders only reluctantly provide the requested personnel (see Sköld 1994: 67; 110); when officers who had taken part in actual combat returned to Sweden, they also often found their international experiences being either simply ignored or brushed aside as unimportant by representatives from the military establishment. As one officer recalls:

> Immediately after returning from the Congo, I started at the Military Academy where tactics and strategy were discussed […]. When with great zest I tried to share some of my experiences from the Congo, they looked at me like something the cat had dragged in (cited in Agrell 2003: 190; my translation).

Representatives within the political and the military spheres thus came to different conclusions about Swedish international military engagement. The reason for their opposing views, however, was arguably their common adherence to an internationalist framework where the notion of the nation constituted a taken-for-granted starting point for all decision-making and the obvious end-goal for actions taken. Political and military decisions were thus equally motivated by and carried out in accordance with what was regarded as Swedish national interests. The Swedish minister of Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson, even explicitly stated in 1965 that international co-operation was important because it was of *national* interest to Sweden (see, e.g., Lödén 1999: 286).

Seen from this perspective, the official Swedish critique of the Vietnam War was not only – or perhaps not even primarily – an act of solidarity with the Vietnamese people. It could also be understood as a principle defence of the right of small states to their national sovereignty, and thus ultimately as a struggle for Swedish interests (Löden 1999: 195).

This interpretation seems to be supported by a speech given in August 1965 in which Torsten Nilsson elaborated the official Swedish position towards the war (see Möller 1992: 55-56). Nilsson initially described Swedish foreign policy as having become more active and that increasing partaking in UN operations had also engaged Sweden in politically sensitive international issues. He went on to comment upon the situation in Vietnam, describing the people of the country as innocent sufferers in a war caused by colliding superpower interests in a geo-politically strategic place. In his speech, Nilsson questioned the legitimacy of the conflict from an international law perspective. He stressed the importance of maintaining adherence to the principle of national sovereignty, and emphasised the Vietnamese people's right to national self-determination. By way of conclusion, he compared this Swedish position with the one taken in 1956, when the Soviet quelling of the Hungarian uprising was condemned. Apart from attempting to sustain a critical balance in the critique of the US and of the Soviet bloc, this comparison also conveyed the notion of Sweden as a politically and morally consistent actor in international matters.

While in an era of internationalism a focus on national interest thus resulted in Swedish international political activism and in a more active foreign policy, the same principle turned national defence into the most highly prioritised task for the armed forces. Interpretations of the same principle within the political and the military spheres respectively thus led to opposing ideas of what actions that ought to be taken. After several years of recurrent Swedish participation in UN missions, however, the initial military scepticism subsequently gave way to a more positive attitude towards international operations within the military too (Sköld 1995: 126).

### Armed Forces after the Cold War

As is evident from this brief run-through, notions of the world and Sweden's role in it, as well as the relation between the military and the political spheres, have shifted. While during the era of internationalism adherence to the principle of national sovereignty was regarded as morally and politically important, sovereignty is today often regarded as standing in opposition to responsibility (see, e.g., Keren and Sylvan 2002). Rather than primarily centred on national defence, armed forces are also increasingly becoming oriented towards taking part in international operations. In Sweden this has been listed as one of main tasks of the armed forces since 1997. National defence, on the contrary, is mentioned by the Swedish military today almost in the passing: 'Apart from international operations, it is also the task of the Armed Forces to guard the Swedish territory, to detect and repel violations, and, in co-operation with other government agencies, to claim our integrity. Military personnel and equipment should also be ready for use in civilian crises' (Försvarsmakten 2005: 8; my translation). It is noteworthy that a statement like this not even includes the word 'sovereignty'.

Related to the decreased emphasis on national sovereignty and state interests, the contemporary trajectory for international engagements appears to be oriented increasingly towards a cosmopolitan outlook (cf. Hannerz, this volume). This focus, contrary to that of national interest during much of the Cold War, has led political

and military representatives to draw similar conclusions concerning the proper way ahead. That is, an emphasis of the importance of engaging in international cooperation, to developing civil-military relations, and to prepare for international interventions. What is new today, in other words, is not the orientation towards the international *per se,* but rather a particular interrelation between the notions of the national and the international on the one hand, and between the political and the military on the other.

Although hitherto I have mainly discussed this set of transitions from a Swedish perspective, it is by no means limited to Sweden. Armed forces throughout the Western world are going through similar changes (cf. Dandeker 1994); and the altered 'relationship between warfighting and the political, economic and cultural-ideological domains', according to Martin Shaw (2005: 55), even constitutes the core of a 'new Western way of war'.

## 'Conflict preventionism' and the new military

Military and civilian participants in the *Viking 03* project identified each other as partners in a mutual effort towards a common goal. The fact that this makes sense today signals a shift, which is not limited to the military sphere. On a broader level, it is also connected to the emergence of a new way of conceiving the world, relating to it, and acting within it. The participants in the project functioned as activators of this specific potentiality of reality, which I refer to as 'conflict preventionism' (Viktorin, forthcoming). In this final section I focus on the new interconnectedness of concepts and the current 'conceptual interconnections of problems' (Rabinow 2003: 68) related to 'conflict preventionism', as conveyed in the *Viking 03* project.

There are several reasons for using the label 'conflict preventionism' as a conceptualisation of the matters at issue. First, 'conflict preventionism' is a much broader and more wide-ranging concept analytically than, say, 'interventionism': while not excluding interventions, it can be employed to conceptualise a variety of other practices too. Second, as an *emic* term, *conflict prevention* has surfaced as an increasingly common conception, frequently invoked in a number of international contexts. Consider, for example, the following overview:

> The United Nations' General Assembly and the Security Council have expressed commitment to pursue conflict prevention with all appropriate means. The European Union has adopted a European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, stating that the highest political priority will be given to improve external action in the field of conflict prevention. A vast number of non-governmental organizations, individuals and non-state actors have been promoting the idea of conflict prevention. Today, a near-universal agreement on the idea of conflict prevention is emerging […] when it comes to dealing with violent conflicts (Björkdahl 2002: 15).

According to the 1998 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, conflict prevention even constitutes "a way of thinking; a state of mind, perhaps even a culture that permeates the activities of all those engaged in the implementation of pre-

ventive policy – be they NGOs, states, or regional and global organizations" (Carment and Schnabel 2003: 12).

In order to understand 'conflict preventionism' analytically, it is critical to move beyond a conventional kind of critique which, somewhat routinely, tends to characterise interventions as a 'new imperialism' (Razack 2004) and civil-military co-operation in such operations as 'military humanitarianism' (Chandler 2001; Chomsky 1999). Many people who work with civil-military co-operation, rather than deliberately trying to conceal some 'real' interests behind forged humanitarian pretences, genuinely think that they are 'doing good'. This was certainly the case within *Viking 03*; and to me, it is one of the most intriguing aspects of the current situation: that the military apparently is becoming included within the category of 'do-gooders' which has hitherto been reserved for NGOs; that ideas of intervention and the use of force have changed; and that a new 'imaginary directionality' (Wolf 2001: 318) for engagements with the world is emerging.

'Conflict preventionism' is thus opening up a new space for international action, where a set of novel issues, actor-alliances, and solutions are emerging. These are connected through their common focus on three interrelated issues: knowledge of ethnic conflicts; policy concerning prevention and intervention; and the institutionalisation of peace. Within 'conflict preventionism', in other words, it is presumed that violent conflicts constitute urgent issues of international concern; that such conflicts can and ought to be prevented or managed; and, importantly, that peace is a universal value which can be implemented through intervention. A range of miscellaneous actors – including governmental officials, military personnel, NGO activists, as well as representatives from international organisations – are becoming increasingly interconnected in mutual attempts to handle these issues. And progressively, new solutions are becoming institutionalised.

The *Viking 03* project exemplifies these processes. Tangibly reflected in the fictitious *Bogaland* scenario, the idea that ethnic conflicts constitute local problems of global concern was the central topic of the entire project. This issue was discussed, communicated, and negotiated among the participants; and different civilian and military actors gradually became increasingly interconnected through these collaborative efforts. This interaction also brought about new alliances – formal and informal; personal and organisational – as well as new trajectories for humanitarian action. The process of institutionalising peace after violence had been halted in *Bogaland* (the fictitious humanitarian intervention had, not surprisingly, accomplished its main objective successfully) was also discussed during the exercise – most notably, perhaps, by participating NGOs such as the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC).

## Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

To some extent, 'conflict preventionism' could be characterised as an attempt at "top-down" cosmopolitanism, where international co-operation has emerged as a key word. The *Viking 03* project, with its aim to 'promote multinationality', exemplifies this. '[W]hat we're trying to achieve [within *Viking 03*] is an international community that tries to work together,' the Deputy Exercise Director told me in an inter-

view. 'Either the guy's doing a good job, an interesting one, or not; whether he's from this, this, this, or that country – you don't care.' This was the recurrent official rhetoric of the project: a downplaying of the importance of national belonging and a continuous emphasis instead on international co-operation.

Among many participants in the project, however, another interpretation of multi-nationalism seemed prevalent. It conveyed the idea that cultures ought to follow nation-state boundaries and that national belonging remains highly important. During a coffee break at one of the workshops, two Swedish officers were discussing cultural differences between countries in Europe, and during their conversation they continuously referred to their own experiences from taking part in multi-national military missions. Judging from their discussion, they seemed to hold that 'cultures' are different, that they are geographically organised, and that such 'cultural territories' are – or at least naturally ought to be – congruent with nation-state boundaries.

While an effort such as the *Viking 03* seems to be initiated with the explicit 'top-down' aim to promote multi-nationalism, in a cosmopolitan sense, the project might in practice affirm, instead, a 'nation-state logic'. According to Eyal Ben-Ari and Efrat Elron (2001), this is also often the case in UN military missions. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, they argue that during such operations a 'nation-state logic' is not only transcended but also strengthened and affirmed.

*Viking 03* seemed also to constitute a possible growth point both for nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations towards the world; a context in which, to some extent, it was possible to reconcile cosmopolitanism and patriotism. Or at least a context in which patriotism could be expressed in a cosmopolitan language (cf. Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 11). The 'new military' is thus not so much 'either or' in terms of 'the nation state versus cosmopolitanism'. After all, as I noted in the introduction, Thomas and Magnus, the Swedish officers, seemed equally at home both in the 'national' officers' mess and in the 'international' seminar room.

## The Reification of War and Peace

'Conflict preventionism' is also related closely to a specific way of understanding war and peace. This was exemplified in the interventionist solution institutionalised through the *Viking 03* project, but is also clearly evident in many academic contexts. The academic and the policy positions on these transformations are thus far from clearly separated; they often convey the same kind of logic.

In her book on the war in Mozambique, *A Different Kind of War Story,* anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom (1997) argues that peace eventually became possible through a 'bottom-up' peace process, in which local people united in a successful attempt to stop the violence. Nordstrom emphasises the strategy to oppose the war itself, while refusing to take sides in it, as the key to success. Contrary to the common anthropological attempt to explain the unfamiliar, and what might at first sight look strange, Nordstrom abstains from asking why to some people the war seemed worth fighting. Instead, in her analysis the war remains incomprehensible and becomes implicitly reified as the 'enemy'. The same rhetoric concerning war and peace is expressed in a recent information leaflet from the Swedish Armed Forces. Outlining the contempo-

rary role of the military, it states that 'all countries must work together in order to prevent all kinds of threats towards peace and security in the world' (Försvarsmakten 2005: 10; my translation).

This way of understanding war and peace turns these concepts into reified entities, not contingent on local circumstances, but apparently stable and universally valid. Within the *Viking 03* project this logic was perhaps most clearly exemplified through the creation of the fictitious *Bogaland*: a de-territorialised and generalised scenario, conveying a logic which allegedly could be utilised in attempts to understand any future conflict. The participants in the exercise, in turn, learned how to use military force to create peace during the fictitious intervention in *Bogaland*. In order to succeed in such a mission, it is important to find in the local population people who, like those in Nordstrom's book, oppose the conflict. Mary Kaldor (2001: 119-137; cf. also 2002), calls this strategy for managing violent conflicts 'cosmopolitan law enforcement'. According to Kaldor, it is in every conflict situation possible to identify local advocates of cosmopolitanism: 'people and places which refuse to accept the politics of war – islands of civility' (Kaldor 2001: 120). The key to success for international interventions, Kaldor argues, is to consult such people and treat them as partners.

## Conclusion

In a recent anthology on the emergence of global ethics (Eade and O'Byrne 2005), the contributors highlight some weaknesses of much cosmopolitan writings. One, as Darren O'Byrne points out in the introduction, is that the cosmopolitan tradition 'tends to rely on an overly simplistic, polarised view of the world, reducible to a few dichotomies', such as 'cosmopolitanism versus the nation state'. Another is that concepts often become reified, which implies that a critical analysis of the structures and dynamics of these concepts fail (O'Byrne 2005: 2). These analytical weaknesses are especially evident among commentators who, like Kaldor, are explicitly normative in their writings.

Anthropologists, however, as Tanya Luhrmann (2001: 281) reminds us, 'see not what moral judgement should be but how people in a particular time and place strive to be good people.' Following this perspective I have in this article explored some integral aspects of the 'new military', as enacted in the *Viking 03* project. Rather than to answer a set of questions, I have thus attempted instead to develop a specific kind of inquiry.[12]

The 'new military' tends to be portrayed as part of a progressive development to promote peace, democracy, and international co-operation. The 'new military' thus

12 As recently pointed out by Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier (2005: 17), 'the fields of moral, ethical, or political valuation and activity are shifting,' and 'consequently, these fields should themselves be a central object of [anthropological] inquiry.' Ulf Hannerz' (2004) anthropological study of foreign correspondents constitutes a recent demonstration of the potentials of such an approach. Moving beyond a common media critical stance, Hannerz explores and explains the practices of foreign news reporting; and the resulting ethnography thus not only conveys a critical understanding of the world of foreign correspondents, it also opens up for a balanced critique of certain assumptions within much of contemporary media critique.

tends to be focused on the international rather than the national; to be considered cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic; and to be related to peace rather than war.

In this article, I have problematised these presumptions. I have argued that international engagements at different times have signified different things. Rather than the result of a historical process in which, finally, it has become possible to realise what has 'always' been the goal, the 'new military' needs to be understood in relation to a set of emerging transformations, which I conceptualise as 'conflict preventionism'. Tangibly exemplified in the *Viking 03* project, this transnational cultural form is centred on certain issues, actors, and solutions, which structure international engagements in a specific direction. In order to inquire analytically into these transformations, then, it is not the military *per se* but rather this new 'conflict preventionist' framework that has to be taken as the proper object of study; a framework which, I argue, is bringing about a new relationship between the military and the political spheres; between the national and the international; and, ultimately, between the notions of war and peace.

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# From Distant Object to Close Subject: The Concept of Culture in Political Science

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**ABSTRACT**

The relationship between researchers and their objects of study has varied and continues to vary across time and disciplinary traditions. A key element in such variations is the degree of reflexivity involved in the process of knowledge production. To what extent are researchers aware of how they themselves produce knowledge? This question is discussed in the context of political science. It is suggested that the various forms the study of culture has taken in political science can serve as an indicator of different levels of reflexivity or modes of engagement. Three influential conceptualizations of "culture" in political science are presented as examples: political culture theory, civilizational theory, and constructivism. Toward the end, the case is made for a cosmopolitan engagement with culture and examples from political science of this type of engagement are introduced.

Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal.
Friedrich Nietzsche, *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*

## Concepts

The above quote from Nietzsche continues with him stating that just as no leaf ever wholly equals another, the concept "leaf" itself is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions. The result is the idea that in nature there might be something besides the leaves which would be "leaf," some sort of original form, in relation to which actually existing leaves seem like incorrect, unreliable, and unfaithful copies. If we replace the word "leaf" with the concept of "state" we immediately realize how Nietzsche's reflections can be connected to political morphology (i.e. political science). The problem of the state as concept and the state as reality might be (and most frequently is) interpreted in terms of the relationship between theory and empirical data. Such an interpretation, however, is misleading, at least with regard to Nietzsche's inquiry. Nietzsche instead points to the very condition of conceptualization and theorization: by naming something, we choose which differences we take into account and which we ignore. The concept "state" can thus be used for societies which are run like family business-

es, as well as for vast, not very integrated stretches of land like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The same concept is used for countries as large and powerful as the United States and as tiny and marginal like Liechtenstein. Which differences do we ignore when we refer to all these societies and territories with the same concept? On which grounds do we stress one or another difference, for example when we differentiate between "sovereign" and "non-sovereign" nations?

The solution to the conceptual dilemma is not to invent a new concept for each thing, phenomenon, and imagination – even if this would be in line with an altogether consistent correspondence theory. Rather, Nietzsche's observations require us to take seriously the process of knowledge production and conceptualization in general. Each field of study needs researchers who are committed to this exercise of taking conceptualization seriously. To what degree such researchers are marginalized in their field of study, however, varies between disciplines and academic departments. In this regard, it is not difficult to notice a difference between such social scientific fields as, say, economics and social anthropology. Whereas reflexive theories like hermeneutics and poststructuralism became mainstreamed in anthropology, they continue to be largely invisible in economics. In political science, the situation can be described as being closer to that of economics than that of anthropology. The relative lack of reflexivity in some academic quarters can be measured by how topics like culture, meaning, interpretation, and knowledge production are treated. These are the topics on which the reflexive movement turns. A rather stringent method of examining the level of self-reflection and self-critique in a social science is to consider how a topos like culture is being conceptualized. Roughly speaking, culture can be conceptualized in three ways: (1) distantly, that is, as an object to be explained; (2) paternalistically, that is, as an already known entity; and (3) cosmopolitanly, that is, as an unknown which holds the potential of widening one's horizon and modes of understanding.[1] Cosmopolitan conceptualizations of culture entail the direct engagement with subjective meanings and world views. Just as cosmopolitanism in general, this kind of engagement exists in tension with rationalist research strategies and truth claims. Rather than to, for example, categorize populations and measure attitudes, cosmopolitan conceptualizations of culture are encounters and dialogues with a Someone. Cosmopolitan conceptualizations are engagements with a You, not with an It. At the end of my discussion, I will get back to the tripartite criterion of distant, paternalistic, and cosmopolitan conceptualizations of culture and try to determine whether conceptualizations in political science correspond to any or all of the three modes of understanding culture. I will also name a number of what I consider to be examples of cosmopolitan conceptualizations of culture in political science.

In order to abide by the theme of academic reflexivity, let me insert a brief note on my own engagements with political science. Professionally, I am an "anthropologist plus." In my case, the plus stands for peace and conflict studies, a field I have been working in for the past few years. My engagement with political science, and in particular the field of international relations, however, precedes my work in peace and con-

1 The three modes of conceptualizing culture are inspired by Martin Buber's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's distinctions between I-It and I-Thou relationships.

flict studies. The engagement with political science has been one of inquisitiveness and critical deliberation over the last decade or so. In several professional settings, I have worked (and still work) closely with political scientists. Some political scientists I consider good friends. Intellectually, my engagements with political science exhibit some of the features of anthropological fieldwork. As a semantic and social field, political science is not really different from any old tribe. There are the rituals, the dress codes, the speech patterns, the conceptualizations and world views, and so on. More than anything, it has been the latter, the conceptualizations and world views, that caught my attention and turned me into something of an ethnographer of political science (the fact that one is likely to find considerably more neckties and sophisticated jewellery among political scientists than among anthropologists, though telling, seems less important, at least in the current context). Ethnography is always written from somewhere, which means that the difference between the observer and the observed is intrinsic to the very genre of ethnography. At the same time, enough bridging of that difference is needed to be able to grasp others' concepts and world views. Long gone, however, are the days when anthropologists assumed the role of spokesperson for some tribe or people. Today, the notion of "critical engagement with" has largely replaced that of "giving voice to." While my observations would appear to be in line with the "critical engagement" (as well as, one can wish, the type of cosmopolitan engagement described above) approach, I can only hope that members of the tribe of political scientists do not feel misrepresented or mistreated by what is to follow.

In order to create a sense of how "culture" has been and is being conceptualized, I will begin by sketching a preliminary history of the culture concept. This is mostly meant to prepare the ground for further discussion. Thereafter, one separate section is devoted to each of the three more influential conceptualizations of "culture" in political science: political culture theory, civilizational theory, and constructivism.[2] In the concluding part, I correlate these political-scientific concepts of culture to the three modes of understanding "culture" mentioned above. Finally, I propose how to arrive at a more cosmopolitan concept of culture in political science and the social sciences in general, and also provide examples of such conceptualizations in contemporary political science.

A few words on why I focus on just three usages of the culture concept in political science. Apart from their having had some influence on mainstream debates in political science (see footnote 2), the examples of political culture theory, civilizational theory, and constructivism are not picked randomly. It is in these three theoretical approaches that we find a conceptualization of culture that grants culture the analytical status of chief cause behind events, structures, and actions. While other schools of

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2 By "influential" I mean the following: influence can be defined by two criteria; on the one hand, to what extent an approach generates scholarly debate in a particular field of study (the more of debate it generates, the more influential it is); and, on the other, whether or not it is being mainstreamed in the process of generating debate (the more it is becoming part of the paradigmatic mainstream in a particular field of study, the more influential it is). This is obviously a working definition. If one considers the ongoing debate about the validity of describing the theoretical history of International Relations in terms of three (or four) major, classical debates, the precariousness of such a definition suggests itself.

thought in political science – the English school is an example that comes to mind – may take heed of cultural aspects in their theoretical models, culture is not considered the most, or even a, central factor. The same can be said about poststructuralist, postcolonialist, and feminist approaches in political science. Not only have they failed to dislodge mainstream conceptualizations of politics, they also, more often than not, take power, rather than culture, to be the basic explanatory variable. In Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches we may, for instance, find a great deal of culture-speak, but the underlying structure of hegemony, governmentality, discourse, power-knowledge, and so forth, is one of power hierarchies. (In an eighteenth-century-style pamphlet, anthropologist Marshall Sahlins composed this couplet with regard to Michel Foucault: "Power, power, everywhere and how the signs do shrink/Power, power everywhere and nothing else to think"; Sahlins 1993a:20.)[3] This, it seems, makes for a poor concept of culture. Culture, however, is a polysemous concept with a rich history, to which we now turn.

## The concept of culture

A commonplace when discussing the concept of culture is to refer to Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952) estimation that some 156 definitions of the word were in use in the 1950s and to Raymond Williams' (1983) suggestion that culture is "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language." These two references are usually deployed to convey the complexity of the culture concept. Less frequently we are told what kind of definitions Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Williams identified, and how these definitions have shaped, and continue to shape, the usages of the concept. Considering the currency and political force of the culture concept, it may indeed be worth to rehearse, at least in broad outline, the conceptual history of this particular topos.

The English word "culture" is rooted in the Latin verb *colere*, to inhabit, to dwell, to care for, to grow (in the sense of "cultivate").[4] The derived words *cultus* and *cultura* refer only to the latter two meanings of the verb "colere." The Greek were well aware of what today would be labeled "cultural differences," for example when they distinguished Hellenes from barbarians. Yet, they had no word for culture in the modern or anthropological sense. The Greek concept of *paideía*, which sometimes has served as an equivalent of culture, ought rather be translated as education, refinement. In Latin, expressions like *cultura* and *cultus* (as in *cultura agri* and *cultus agrorum*) were used as metaphors for the cultivation of human qualities. In Greek, at times, the opposite metaphorization was employed, so that one could speak of the paideía ("education") of plants. In both cases, the notion of cultivation was being metaphorically transferred between the realms of agriculture and human refinement, which gave the concept of culture its specific meaning. When Seneca and Cicero write about *cultus animi*, that is, the cultivation of the (human) spirit, they make use of this metaphorical rela-

3 For critiques of power functionalism, see, apart from Sahlins 1993a, e.g., Spencer 1997.

4 The history of the culture concept in Latin, Greek, and German is explored in Fisch 1978. My own recounting of this history is indebted to this source.

tionship. (Similar transferences appear in expressions like *cultus philosophiae*, *cultus litterarum*, *cultus iustitiae*, and so forth, which became common in late antiquity.)

The association between the concept of culture and the notion of cultivation in a figurative sense exists in other languages as well. Hindi knows two words, *sudhara* och *sabhyata*, both of which connote the concept of culture in the sense of cultivating the human character (the expression "Indian culture" or "Indian civilization," *bharatîya sabhyata* of course, has these days become a political slogan for Hindu fundamentalists). Both words, sudhâra and sabhyatâ, contain references to improvement and refinement. We have here something of a functional equivalent to the Greek concept of paideía. In Chinese, someone who had an excellent command of the language and who mastered the art of writing was called *wén huà ren*, a "cultured" person. In Japanese, the corresponding expression was *bunkajin*. Subsequently, both words came to mean "intellectual" – which, since the 1960s, is not necessarily a positively charged word in either China or Japan (or, for that matter, anywhere else). The word for cul-

*paideía* παιδεία; *sudhāra* सुधर; *sabhyatā* सभयता; *bhāratīya sabhyatā* भारतीय सभयता;
*wén huà ren* 文 化人; *bunkajin* 文 化人; *wén huà* 文 化; *bunka* 文 化;
*mizeraburu* ミゼラブル; *bigguban* ビッグバン; *karuchaa* カルチャ;
*karuchaashokku* カルチャショック; *gairaigo* 外来語

ture, in Chinese *wén huà*, in Japanese *bunka*, is rooted in concepts that have to do with language and writing. Thus, there existed in China and Japan the idea that he or she who educates him- or herself becomes a cultivated human being. Contemporary Japanese exhibits a great variety of Japanized, transvocalized English words and expressions – everything from *mizeraburu* "miserable," to *bigguban*, "new economy," the term referring to the structural reform of the financial system or "big bang." Similarly, the English word "culture" has entered the Japanese language as *karuchaa*, as in *karuchaashokku*, "culture shock." Whether or not to use this kind of loan word (*gairaigo*) is a matter of style and context, and thus itself a matter of cultural meanings.

There exists, however, no continuity between the antique concept of culture and the modern use of the same concept (which does not mean that family resemblances are entirely missing). In medieval Latin, we find only two usages of the culture concept: one, in the form of "cultus", that becomes increasingly charged with the meaning of "(religious) ritual", and which therefore probably should be translated as "veneration"; and another, "cultura", that refers back to the original meaning of agriculture, tillage, and cultivation. It is not before the twelfth century's scientific renaissance, and then only rarely, that we again come across the metaphorical use of the culture concept. At the same time, the Latin words cultus and cultura are being absorbed into the European vernaculars, in which they undergo the same semantic transformations as in Latin.

What today would be termed "cultural differences" were discussed in terms of customs, language, laws, and so on, in the Middle Ages and in early modernity. Semantic equivalents of the modern culture concept were not in common use. Someone like Regino of Prüm (dead in 915) considered the differences between various peoples to

be differences in descent, customs, language, and laws ("diversae nationes populorum inter se discrepant genere, moribus, lingua, legibus"). Cultural differences were interpreted and debated during the European colonization of the New World in quite similar terms. One way of denoting different groups of people was to use the concepts of *gens* and *natio*, what today might be called "ethnicity". What now are considered cultural traits could be ascribed to different peoples in terms of collective identity.

Only with the rise of modern historical consciousness did culture – or, as it was frequently called in a number of European languages, civilization – become the kind of noun we readily recognize from contemporary debates about cultural differences. It was the notion of civilizational progress that gave rise to the modern concept of culture. The metaphor of individual human cultivation was transfered to the context of historical development, which, before such a transfer could take place, had to be disassociated from its purely theological connotations. This movement occurred in the eighteenth century. Its beginnings are closely associated with the name of Johann Gottfried von Herder, in whose *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791) we find the first systematic application of the concept of culture in the sense of what subsequently would be considered "national cultures". Culture is now something which a certain people "has" and by which the same people is characterized. As was common in Herder's days, cultural differences in general, and the distinct historical developments of various cultures and peoples in particular, were thought to be caused by climatic variations across the globe. At the same time, Herder pointed out that cultural differences continued to exist because of the power of tradition. Indeed, the semantic nexus of culture, tradition, customs, habits, and so on, would eventually become quite commonsensical. The identification of particular cultures would draw its substance from this semantic nexus.

From Herder it is not far to early anthropological speculations about the evolution of human cultures. The evolutionary view of culture is contained, in a nutshell, in the title of one of Lewis Henry Morgan's works: *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (1877). These were taken to be the evolutionary stages through which human culture had moved. The fact that, despite evolution, so to speak, differences between cultures still existed, was explained as the contemporaneity of, on the one hand, civilization and, on the other, the relicts of savagery and barbarism. As in subsequent paradigms, such as modernization theory, non-Western cultures were considered left-overs or remains from earlier stages of evolution.

With the arrival of systematic ethnographic study of various cultures, the notion of non-Western cultures as mere relicts was abandoned. To this contributed the disenchantment with the image of Western civilization's supremacy that followed upon World War I. The taken-for-granted idea of Europe's cultural superiority met with fairly widespread skepticism. This allowed for romantic notions about "simple cultures" and more "authentic" ways of life to become popular. The discipline of anthropology, which had just been institutionalized and professionalized, turned on the key concepts of "cultures" (in the plural) and "societies", both of which were considered to be highly integrated, functional structures. At the same time, a number of re-

nowned anthropologists contributed deliberately to the kind of cultural critique that fed off the romanticization of exotic cultures (Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* is one of many examples).

It is this concept of culture, or, rather, cultures (plural), which has spread far beyond anthropology. "Cultures" is probably one of the most political concepts in common use at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As will become evident further down, this culture concept of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century anthropology has been resuscitated in political science. Another development that connects political-science conceptualizations of culture with early anthropology is the advance of political culture theory during the 1950s.

## Political culture theory

The first theorists of political culture in political science borrowed their analytical framework from the same source, namely Talcott Parsons, as anthropologists like Clifford Geertz. Like Geertz and his colleagues, they also reacted against the sort of national character studies that had been produced by anthropologists like Mead (1942), Ruth Benedict (1946), and Geoffrey Gorer (1948, 1955; Gorer and Rickman 1949). Unlike Geertz, however, they nevertheless adopted a perspective very similar to that of the anthropological culture and personality school from which had originated the national character studies.[5] The similarity in perspective has to do with assumptions about the continuity between individual behavior and cultural patterns and between the micro- and macro-levels of analysis. Before discussing these assumptions we may want to remember where political culture theory came from and where it was headed.

The canon of political science usually registers Gabriel Almond as the pioneer of political culture theory. When Almond wrote about "Comparative Political Systems" (1956), he distinguished between four types of political systems: the Anglo-American, the preindustrial, the totalitarian, and the continental European. Of these, he depicted the Anglo-American as the norm, in comparison to which he found all the others wanting – which was entirely in line with the atmosphere of modernization thinking and Cold War ideologizing that, at the time, dominated public culture in the United States. Only Americans, and possibly the British, understood politics correctly as a market place of sorts, in which the goal was to arrive at compromises. Subsequently, Almond, together with Sydney Verba, published the landmark, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (1963), in which the authors, on the one hand, tried to make plausible the Schumpeterian thesis that democracy works best when elites compete for votes among a largely lethargic populace, and, on the other, that political evolution has produced a number of distinct mixtures of traditional and modern political cultures. As in Almond's first publication on the topic of political cultures, the United States and Britain are portrayed as the most developed and balanced political culture in a sample of five democracies.

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5 Actually, a number of political scientists subsequently embraced the anthropological culture and personality tradition.

Three features stand out in the Almond-Verba concept of political culture: first, it is tightly modeled on what Talcott Parsons called social structure, which Parsons (1964:230) considered to be "a system of patterned relationships of actors in their capacity as playing roles relative to one another", second, its empirical foundation consists of nothing more than superficially conducted opinion polls; third, it was developed in the context of a very well-funded U.S. Social Science Research Council project amidst Cold War campaigns to demonstrate the inferiority of Communism. The reliance on Parsons meant that Almond and Verba's political culture concept refered to systems rather than to processes or cases. Early on, Stein Rokkan, in his 1964 review of *The Civic Culture*, questioned the treatment of political cultures as homogeneous systems in which there are direct links between individual and nation. This echoes the critique that was directed at the culture and personality school and its notion of "modal personality", which was defined as a certain personality structure that occurs most frequently within a society. To be sure, there were differences between Almond and Verba, on the one hand, and the culture and personality school, on the other. Whereas Ralph Linton, Cora DuBois, and others who developed the idea of modal personalities, made their argument in terms of deep personality structures, Almond and Verba rejected psychoanalytically informed theories.[6] Joining up, as they did, with the behaviorist movement, they thought it more scientifically prudent to study values and orientations as overtly articulated opinions. On the other hand, a closer look at the Almond-Verba political culture concept reveals that it has a similar function as that of the modal personality concept. It too is supposed to mediate between the macro-level of nationally defined culture and the micro-level of individual action.[7]

Little surprise then that Rokkan (1964:677) in his review asked why Almond and Verba, in their study, had not at least allowed for such internal differences as could be attributed to region, class, creed, and political affiliation. As Carole Pateman (1971) pointed out, this flaw may not at all have been coincidental since it served the end of idealizing Anglo-American political culture with its purportedly perfect mix of active citizens (the minority) and parochial apolitical sleepwalkers (the majority).

A more severe criticism concerned the basic assumption contained in the Almond-Verba political culture concept, namely that political culture caused a certain form of government, such as democracy, to evolve. Why, asked the critics, should it not be the other way around? Could democracy not have caused civic culture?[8] This criti-

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6 Among the classics of psychological anthropology, one can mention Kardiner and Linton 1939, Linton 1945, DuBois 1960, and Hsu 1961.

7 One could also elaborate further on the differences and similarities between psychological anthropology (a synonym for the culture and personality school), on the one hand, and Almond and Verba's link to political psychology and cultural psychology, on the other. There is, for instance, more continuity than discontinuity between the Office of Strategic Services' psychological profiling of Adolf Hitler and anthropologists' studies of national character. It can be argued that the Almond-Verba concept of political culture has the same underpinnings as these psychological approaches in that all of them aim at identifying traits. Both psychological anthropology and political culture theory thus belong to the genre of trait psychology. The continued importance of trait-psychological assumptions can be gleaned from the fact that, decades of critiques of trait psychology notwithstanding, few American presidents or secretaries of state have met with chiefs of state without first having been provided with a psychological profile of their counterpart.

cism gets to the core of the matter. It challenges the idea that culture is something more than mere ideology or a reflection of material circumstances. Neither Almond and Verba nor others who had made political culture theory their own, were able to counter this critique convincingly. The reason is quite patent. Political culture theory lacked the sort of profound conceptualization of culture that took into consideration key epistemological and ontological issues. First and foremost of such issues is the question of how culture, as an analytical category, is connected to action, events, and institutions. Only if this fundamental problem of the relationship between word and world is addressed in earnest, can one hope to award to culture the kind of central analytical importance which political culture theory attempted to do.

Political culture theory, while no flash in the pan, nevertheless had a rather short career in political science. The concept of political culture spread rapidly, generating considerable debate in political science over a short period of time, whereupon interest in it declined fairly quickly – at least among political scientists. "The systematic study of politics and culture [was] moribund", writes David Laitin (1986:171). Robert Putnam (1976:103), with considerably more pathos, complained that "values and beliefs [were] discarded from political analysis as froth on the mouth of madmen or froth on the waves of history."

This may not be an entirely acurate description. While the concept of political culture was waning in political science, it was waxing in neighboring disciplines, such as political history. American historians like Bernard Bailyn, author of *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (1967) and *The Origin of American Politics* (1968), Daniel Walker Howe, who wrote *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (1979), and Jean Baker, author of *Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (1983), seized the concept of political culture and turned it into an instrument for semiotic analysis. Bailyn and his students refered explicitly to Geertz and his contention that cultures need to be understood from the inside and that only thick descriptions of cultural systems can count as valid representations of local knowledge. The concept of thick description, Geertz borrowed from Gilbert Ryle, whose illustration of what such a description entails he also uses. To quote directly from Ryle (1971):

> Two boys fairly swiftly contract the eyelids of their right eyes. In the first boy this is only an involuntary twitch; but the other is winking conspiratorially to an accomplice. At the lowest or the thinnest level of description the two contractions of the eyelids may be exactly alike. From a cinematograph-film of the two faces there might be no telling which contraction, if either, was a wink, or which, if either, were a mere twitch. Yet there remains the immense but unphotographable difference between a twitch and a wink. For to wink is to try to signal to someone in particular, without the cognisance of others, a definite message according to an already understood code.

It is this "immense but unphotographable difference" that constitutes cultural meaning, which, in its various local renditions, we can understand only if we learn "the

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8 See, for instance, Muller and Seligson (1994) for a formulation of this criticism.

code" – or, rather, the system of codes and symbols that, according to Geertz, is culture. Being able to understand another culture is like "grasping a proverb, catching an allusion, or seeing a joke" (Geertz 1974). To become culturally competent is to understand how other people make sense of the world, which is not the same as conducting an opinion poll.

Despite their both having roots in Parsonian sociology, a profound distinction separates the Almond-Verba concept of political culture from the Geertzian culture concept. Moving from Almond and Verba to Geertz is a move from methodological individualism to methodological holism. According to Geertz, culture is made up of public and shared symbols. That is, culture consists of meanings that are not private but public (a statement that resonates with Ludwig Wittgenstein's dictum that there is no private language). Culture is social and therefore intelligible, and vice versa. The concept of political culture that was drafted by historians of American politics closely followed the Geertzian theory of culture.

Eventually, political culture theory made a comeback in political science (of course, there will always be those who argue that it never went away – but see Laitin's and Putnam's comments above). Most notably, the second generation of political culture theorists picked up where Almond and Verba had left off. In particular, they breathed fresh life into such cultural variables as social trust and civic community, which Almond and Verba already had operationalized. At the same time, they have managed to pump up political culture theory to world-historical and civilizational dimensions.

## Civilizational theory

Four names stand out in the renaissance of political culture theory, Samuel Huntington, Ronald Inglehart, Robert Putnam, and David Laitin. Of these, two, Huntington and Inglehart, have worked hardest at converting the concept of political culture into one of clashes between civilizations. Since his landmark publication, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (1992), Putnam has turned his attention to the political culture of the United States. Laitin, who started out by studying political culture in Africa and now focuses on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, tries to combine rational choice theory with political culture theory. This can be said to have resulted in two things: on the one hand, Laitin's instrumentalization of Geertz' culture concept demonstrates the shortcomings of Geertz's model; on the other, it reduces culture to preferences and choices (involving such things as equilibrium selections and tipping games).[9] Both Geertz' model and the game-theoretical interpretation of the culture concept start from a common assumption: cultural values and beliefs are shared equally among the members of a cultural community. If they were not, the problem arises what exactly constitutes a culture or cultural system, and, in the case of Laitin, what precisely it is people choose between.

Be that as it may, Putnam and Laitin have contributed only marginally to the blowing-up of political culture theory to the size of civilizational theory. This has been accomplished mainly by Inglehart and Huntington. Inglehart's pet project is the so-

9 For a brief outline of Laitin's position, see Laitin 1997.

called World Values Survey, which grew out of the European Values Survey that was published for the first time in 1981. The 1995-1998 World Values Survey questionnaire contains questions like, "If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree?" and "How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important." Aside from the absurdity of such questions – one can wonder what "complete sexual freedom" means in any circumstance? And what could I possibly have meant if I had answered the second question with, say, "3" or "6"? – Inglehart's quantifications of cultural values has led him to draw conclusions about civilizational conflicts. Inglehart identifies clashes between civilizations with regard to a number of cultural values: the societal role of religious authorities, political attitudes, and, most importantly, according to Inglehart, gender equality and sexual liberation (which is why the question about "complete sexual freedom" is far from marginal in this context).

Now, Inglehart's surveys, of course, are altogether outshone by Huntington's clash-of-civiliztions thesis in the realm of public and scholarly debate. When Inglehart subsequently criticizes Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1996), he does not question the existence of discrete cultural entities called civilizations, or whether cultural differences matter in geopolitical perspective. What Inglehart claims is instead that Huntington's focus on core political values leads him astray. The most consequential cultural differences have to do with gender equality and sexual liberation, not with what people think about representative democracy, argues Inglehart (Norris and Inglehart 2002). Quips Inglehart: "The cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves Eros far more than Demos" (Norris and Inglehart 2002:236).

It could be argued that Inglehart misrepresents Huntington's civilizational theory. Working backward from Huntington's conclusions about strengthening Western civilization as to be able to withstand the onslaught of the modern-day Huns (that is, the Muslim and Confucian civilizations which Huntington identifies as the West's major enemies), one arrives at the same assortment of core values with which Inglehart operates. Huntington, like Inglehart, believes that civilizations are path-dependent, pertinacious constellations that are organized around core values. To quote Huntington (1993:25):

> Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most importantly, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear.

What Inglehart has called the "sexual clash of civilizations" (Inglehart and Norris 2003:65) would seem to be part and parcel of this definition of civilizational differences.

Furthermore, just like Inglehart, and wholly in the spirit of modernization theory, Huntington (1993:22) holds that "major differences in political and economic devel-

opment among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures." The congruences between the civilizational theories of Inglehart and Huntington thus far outweigh whatever differences there may exist between them. That the one has come into being with the aid of copious and, one can guess, costly surveys and the other on the basis of armchair speculations about what divides one culture from the other seems to speak more to the dubious design of the World Values Survey questionnaires than to Huntington being in a state of satori. The most significant difference between the civilizational theories of Inglehart and Huntington derives from the latter's greater awareness of the need for mediating concepts that connect values and geopolitics. While Inglehart offers little in the way of a schema that makes us understand how durable cultural values can produce civilizational conflicts, Huntington makes use of the notions of contrastive identity and "kin-country syndrome". It is because "[w]e know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against" (Huntington 1996:21), and because people rally behind "their" civilization, that cultural values have geopolitical ramifications, according to Huntington.

It stands to reason that Huntington would be criticized on the same grounds as Almond and Verba. Why does he not at least consider such internal differences as could be attributed to region, gender, class, and political affiliation? The question is whether breaking up civilizations into smaller units solves the problem of treating populations, religions, territories, and cultures as if they were homogeneous. It is one thing to descry patterns of cultural differences, be they related to differences in cultural competence (which includes what commonsensically is refered to as "cultivation", *Bildung*, *culture*, 教養 [*kyouyou*], and so on; and which Pierre Bourdieu misleadingly called "cultural capital"), or in historical context, or in conditions and circumstances of living. It is a whole other thing to believe that one can divide culture into neat lots, Westerners to the left, Muslims to the right. If one goes even further, as does Huntington, and draws a thick black line across a map to indicate the border between Western Christianity, on one side, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other (Huntington 1993:30), one is guilty of committing simplification to the point of deception.

With Huntington, civilizational theory has moved (far) beyond political culture theory's methodological individualism. If political culture theory homes in on the relationship between the individual and his or her environment (or structure of opportunities), Huntington's civilizational theory only acknowledges what in Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's grid-group culture theory is termed "hierarchist" sociality. That is, social actors are not only highly, or even entirely, integrated in a sociocultural system, they also abide completely by all societal rules and share all cultural values. In comparison with Huntington's one-dimensional human, Douglas and Wildavsky's ideal-typical individuals at least come with four or five alternative cultural characteristics. According to the grid-group schema, people and their social environments can be classified along two dimensions of sociality: one of regulation or prescription ("grid"); the other of incorporation into a bounded group ("group").[10]

10 Douglas 1982:190-192.

Grid-group analysis can be mentioned as yet another cultural theory in political science, although its immediate impact on mainstream debates in political science have been rather limited. Indirectly, however, grid-group thinking has been part of most conceptualizations of culture in political science ever since the first wave of political culture theory. Today, the grid-group complex is discussed in terms of norms and identity – two keywords in International Relations constructivism.

## Constructivism

By now, constructivism can be considered one of three dominating paradigms in International Relations (IR). (The other two are neorealism and neoliberalism.) IR, for all intents and purposes, must be regarded as a subdiscipline of political science. As opposed to another subdiscipline of political science, to wit comparative politics, IR has been about the development of theories that by and large disregard ideological and domestic differences between states, and that therefore could be viewed as systemic, structural, and universal. The institutionalization of IR began in 1919 with the establishment of the first department of international politics and the Woodrow Wilson chair of international politics at the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth. The purpose was to study the international system and to contribute to the development of the League of Nations in order to prevent another global war. Today, this type of international studies would probably be refered to as peace and conflict studies. The fourth Woodrow Wilson professor and head of the department, Edward Hallett Carr, would be the one to introduce to IR the notion of international anarchy, that is, the view that world politics is a self-help system in which each nation must fend for itself, which in reality often may entail agreeing to compromises rather than going to war.

What Carr objected to most strongly was the, at the time rather widespread, idea that the First World War had been caused by the involved parties failing to understand one another. He found this idea to be idealist and utopian. Despite Carr's critique and his growing influence in IR theory, the investigation of how misunderstandings can lead to large-scale conflicts continued in the field of study that since the late 1950s is called peace and conflict studies. Contrary to the most widely spread IR paradigm, which was (and continues to be) derived from Carr's "realism", peace and conflict studies adopted a processual perspective on communication and learning. Rather than buying into the image of an international anarchy, researchers like Lewis Fry Richardson, Kenneth Boulding, and Johan Galtung, writing as they did in the system-theoretical genre of the time, tried to show that international anarchy and conflict can be unlearned. In 1992, Alexander Wendt's article "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" was published in the journal *International Organization* (Wendt 1992a). It quickly became a classical text of IR scholarship. In it, Wendt does not question the basic tenet that the international system of states is anarchical. He, however, does dispute the neorealist and neoliberal explanation that this, due to the absence of a world state, somehow is a natural state of affairs. He argues:

> A world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and do, is one in which "anarchy is what states make of it." States may have made that system a competitive, self-help one in the past, but by the same token they might "unmake" those dynamics in the future. (Wendt 1982b:183)

In this quote, which well captures Wendt's position, he would seem to do little more than echoe the received wisdom of peace and conflict studies.[11] Compared to early peace and conflict studies, IR constructivism, however, is less informed by behaviorism and cybernetics than by contemporary sociology. Processes of learning (and unlearning) need no longer be defined in terms of feedback loops. Instead, they are expressed with reference to, and in the terminology of, Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration. Both Wendt and Nicholas Onuf, who can be credited with having authored the original publication in IR constructivism (Onuf 1989), depart from Giddens, only that Onuf is more preoccupied with the role of language in structuration. Another difference between Wendt and Onuf is that the latter is closer to postmodernism in realizing that a theory of structuration necessarily also has implications for the process of knowledge production in the discipline of IR itself. Onuf asserts that there is no foundation for IR theory, and thus for constructivism, outside of the ongoing process of construction.[12]

Through Wendt and Onuf – and others, such as Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie, and Martha Finnemore – the quintuple constellation of (1) interaction, (2) norms, (3) interests, (4) institutionalization, and (5) identity has become fixed as the epistemological basis of IR constructivism. The connection between these five analytical items can be summarized as follows: interaction creates (the need for) norms and identities; norms determine how interests are defined; a relatively stable set of identities and interests can be called an institution; institutionalization creates the effect of norms, interests, and identities appearing to be natural. Where, then, does change enter this analytical constellation? To answer this question, constructivists have refered to Joseph Nye's distinction between simple and complex learning processes. To quote from Nye (1987:380):

> Simple learning uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-means chain. The actor simply uses a different instrument to attain the same goal. Complex learning, by contrast, involves recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities and trade-offs.[13]

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11 Stefano Guzzini (2003) remarks on the analogies between peace and conflict studies and IR constructivism.

12 On the relationship between constructivism and poststructuralism/postmodernism: as mentioned in the beginning, the most important criterion for including in, or excluding from, my discussion various conceptualizations of culture in political science has been what analytical status is ascribed to culture. Approaches that, in analysis, turn culture into a function or effect of power have therefore not been included. This explanation may or may not satisfy the reader who, in the presentation of IR constructivism, misses names like Richard Ashley, R.B.J. Walker, James Der Derian, and Cynthia Weber. Other discussions are available, however. For a thorough critique of constructivism from a postmodern point of view, see, for example, Zehfuss 2002. For a work that treats "conventional and radical constructivism" together, see, for instance, Fierke and Jørgensen 2001; in particular the introduction by the editors.

Change, in IR constructivism, comes from actors redefining their goals and/or identities in accordance with available cultural norms. It is at this point that we can discern the crucial distinction between constructivism and the so-called neo-neo paradigm in IR.[14] The analysis of how actors define their goals and identities is what separates rationalism from constructivism. In one case – that of rationalism – identities are interpreted as individual preferences, and goals are taken to correspond to preferences. To this is commonly added that "man's natural proclivity is to pursue his own interests" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985:ix). Actions "are valued and chosen not for themselves, but as more or less efficient means to a further end" (Elster 1989:22). The outcome of action is what matters. Actors will make choices between courses of action depending on how they judge outcomes. Norms, rules, and institutions enter the picture only as possible constraints to available choices.

Constructivists, on the other hand, may hold that actors will make decisions based on what to them seems most appropriate in relation to prevailing rules and norms. The logic of appropriateness, rather than the logic of consequentiality (to speak with March and Olsen 1989:160ff), is what seems to drive actors to make certain choices.[15] At the same time, actors are able to learn new norms and to redefine situations. And so on.

Because of its close affinity with Giddens' theory of structuration, it is possible to review and revise IR contructivism by way of rethinking Giddens. In particular, scrutinizing Giddens' central proposition that he has solved the agent-structure problem with his structuration theory seems worthwhile in the light of IR constructivism's reliance on the conceptualization of norms, identities, and interests. Quintessential to such a revision is to investigate how culture is conceptualized in Giddens' – and, by extension, in IR constructivism's – theoretical edifice. Asking where and how culture enters Giddens' theory, in principle, equals asking where and how the same concept enters IR constructivism.[16] Connected to the problem of culture in structuration theory is IR constructivism's often criticized state-centric, top-down analysis of world politics. To designate states as the principal or even sole actors in world politics has been, and still is, common in IR. This has been reproached over and again, not least from within IR.[17] The critique of state-centrism has most frequently come from those who study globalization and who would like to relabel IR, Global or Globaliza-

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13 Nye has borrowed the distinction between simple and complex learning processes from Argyris and Schon (1978), who use the expressions "single-loop" and "double-loop" learning for the same distinction.

14 That is, neo-realism and neo-liberalism – hence "neo-neo."

15 March and Olsen (1989:160ff) differentiate between two logics of decision-making, the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. With the logic of consequentiality, "human behavior is driven by preferences and expectations about consequences. Behavior is willful, reflecting an attempt to make outcomes fulfill subjective desires, to the extent possible" (ibid:160). With the logic of appropriateness, decision-making "involves what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in that situation are" (ibid).

16 That the concept of culture indeed does enter IR constructivism can be gleaned, for example, from the title of an anthology entitled, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (1996), edited by Peter Katzenstein.

17 See, for example, Held and McGrew 1998; Macmillan and Linklater 1995; Rosenau 1990; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Shaw 1994.

tion Studies, and the object of study, world politics (instead of international relations).

In the next and final section, I will discuss whether a revision of Giddens' structuration theory, and IR constructivism's account of culture, can be combined with a research approach that goes beyond state-centrism. In conclusion, I will assess the four conceptualizations of culture in political science under discussion: political culture theory, civilizational theory, IR constructivism, and a revised concept of culture that is not limited by a narrow focus on top-down, state-centric, and rationalist structures.

## Culture: from distant object to close subject

Giddens advanced a theory of structuration to solve the agent-structure problem. Giddens – just like Bourdieu with his structuralist constructivism – tried to demonstrate the mutual constitution of agents and structures. As William Sewell (1992) has pointed out, however, in one vital respect, structuration theory is both inconsistent and incomplete. In order to unite agency and structure in the single figure of structuration, it is vague on what exactly is the substance of the agency-structure connection. Giddens (1984:377) does tell that structure "exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action." But what are memory traces and human knowledgeability if not culture? And how is structure being instantiated in action?

The clues Giddens provides point into the direction of the *langue-parole* dichotomy. Ferdinand de Saussure's langue-parole opposition, as well as Louis Hjelmslev's schema-usage and Noam Chomsky's competence-performance constellations, differentiate between, on the one hand, language and, on the other, speech. What structuration theory claims is that language only exists as speech. Just like language, the structure that structures is only virtual, says Giddens. If cultural schemas only exist as instantiated by action, in what terms do people decipher and interpret other people's "memory traces and human knowledgeability"? In other words, is there room for culture outside of practice?

The answer could be yes, if we were to follow Paul Ricoeur in contending that actions and events can be considered as texts. In his seminal essay, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" (1971), Ricoeur suggests that the interpretive and explanatory work that is being performed in the ordinary course of life, in which people try to make sense of what other people say and do, is not all that different from the kind of interpretation and explanation conducted by readers of texts. If we concede Max Weber's point about human action always being perceived as somehow meaningful, actions will inevitably be subjected to interpretation and explanation. What is being interpreted and explained, however, is not action or practice in itself (whatever that may be), but its meaning. Meanings, on the other hand, are objectifications, inscriptions, fixations, and so on. It is these inscriptions of action, practice, and events which we can refer to as culture.

Another way of making the same point is to paraphrase, and adapting to the current context, Sewell's (1992) revision of structuration theory. What is lacking in this theory, and what I think is lacking in much of IR constructivism as well, is an expla-

nation for how culture can change from within. To accomodate the potential for change in a model of culture, the culture concept needs to be honed. First of all, culture cannot be likened to a homogeneous structure or system. Actors have access to alternative cultural codes and can be expected to engage in code switching. In the same vein, actors are likely to interpret and explain actions and events differently. Various cultural schemas which exist simultaneously may contradict one another. Not all actors will detect such contradictions. They may mix alternative codes freely. Cultural distinctions, however, may gain force in times of crisis (see Swidler 1986). Secondly, cultural meanings can be applied to novel or unfamiliar situations and contexts, which, in turn, can produce unforeseen consequences. To quote Sahlins (1993b:16): "the world is under no obligation to conform to the logic by which some people conceive it." History (practice) always puts categories at risk.

From this we can conclude that the human acts of interpretation and explanation introduce change into culture. It is in this sense that change comes from within culture. Political scientist Lisa Wedeen (2002:722) makes a similar point when she calls attention to the fact that "a common conceptual system (intelligibility) is not the same as a shared episteme ("common knowledge")." In her study of political rhetorics and performances in Syria (Wedeen 1999), she investigates the puzzle of why the Syrian regime expended a considerable portion of scarce material resources on the cult of the country's president Hafiz al-Asad – despite the fact that nobody, including those who created the official rhetoric, believed its claims.[18] Wedeen calls this type of political culture an "as if" politics. She suggests that "as if" politics make sense because they actually work. Citizens self-consciously submit to authority, their own disbelief in this authority's rhetoric notwithstanding. Ironical distance and disbelief are part of a larger pattern of political compliance.

Wedeen's analysis of "as if" politics can serve as an illustration of how to hone the concept of culture in political science. Culture, in the shape of semiotic practices and intelligibility, has "real" political consequences. It can either sustain a regime, as in the case of Syria, or cause radical, world-historical upheavals, as in the case of the end of the Cold War. The latter case is portrayed excellently by Robert Herman (1996) in his discussion of how Soviet  (*novoye mishleniye*, "New Thinking") emerged and turned the tide of history. As Herman reports, the members of three social science institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences – IMEMO (World Economy and International Relations), ISKAN (USA and Canada), and IEMSS (Economics of the World Socialist System) – figured prominently in this development. "Propelled by a vision of the USSR as a democratic and peaceable member of the international community and touting 'values common to all mankind,' these 'idealists' sought to eliminate the underlying causes of East-West conflict" (Herman 1996:275). Herman also makes clear that "even after the selection of Gorbachev – known more as a talented technocrat than as an ardent reformer – the country was not fated to travel the New Thinking road" (ibid:278). Alternative scenarios existed all along; and as the events of 19 August, 1991 (the date of the coup against Gorbachev) demonstrated, there were those who never agreed on the definition of the problem or the solutions offered. Even

18 What John Austin (1975:132 and 134) may have called "infelicities" or "misfires."

Gorbachev's own thinking developed significantly during his six years in power (ibid:287). Not only did New Thinking evolve over time, its outcome was not given. Both members of the social science institutes and decision-makers like Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have attested to the importance of dialogues with Western social scientists and policy experts for the development of New Thinking (ibid:285 *n* 45).

One way of conceiving of the end of the Cold War is thus as a case of cultural code switching, or, in the language of peace and conflict research, of learning. Another way of interpreting New Thinking is as an instance of what Sewell (1992:17), with reference to Bourdieu, calls "the transposability of schemas". That is, schemas "can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context in which they are initially learned" (ibid). Transposing cultural concepts of universal human rights, social democracy, and global community to a context in which class struggle, communism, and systemic conflict had been paradigmatic brought with it the end of one particular global scenario. In sociology, one often hears that if Japan did not exist as a case that falsifies many assumptions about the causes of modernization one would have had to invent it. The end of the Cold War serves a similar function in political science. Conventional approaches, from rational choice theory to systemic and functionalist theories, fall short of providing a consistent explanation for the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies. Culture and learning approaches, on the other hand, can explain historical shifts and normative revolutions. All is not bad with the conceptualization of culture in political science.

Going back to the beginning, we can note that the concept of political culture suffered from a number of decisive shortcomings. On the one hand, the entire theoretical edifice had been erected on the shakiest of epistemological and ontological foundations. The combination of methodological individualism and methodological nationalism made for incongruities between levels of analysis and clouded the very definition of what the object of study ought to be. Moreover, political culture theory, from Almond to Inglehart, has been an ethnocentric project, apparently without being awake to it. "Cultures" were treated as external objects. They were being measured, not understood.

Inglehart and his colleagues bridge the divide between the political culture tradition and civilizational theory (cynics might construe this maneuver as the world values team riding on the coat-tails of Huntington). Like political culture theory, civilizational theory, made famous by Huntington, avails itself of values and orientations as theoretical underpinnings. This, however, merely functions as the presupposition or prejudgement of the theoretical model. The gist of the theory is that huge civilizational blocs collide with one another and that, in world-historical perspective, the collisions may be of the most violent kind. Lacking even in the sort of survey data that Inglehart uses to legitimate his theses, Huntington must rely on prejudices, impressions, and scattered literary comments to classify different civilizations. Cultures are defined as imperfect and defective in relation to the culture Huntington and Inglehart identify themselves with. They are wanting when it comes to religion, political culture, sexual liberation, or all of the above. Culture is conceptualized paternalistically ("we know what is best for you"). Neither engagement with, nor understanding of, non-Western cultural processes enters the analysis.

Constructivism in IR is not burdened by the failures of political culture theory and civilizational theory. First and foremost, this has to do with IR having a different object of study. Instead of researching cultural differences, IR has searched for general rules that guide the behavior of states in relation to one another. The idea of an anarchical international system became a commonplace in IR. Constructivism introduced the notion that "anarchy is what states make of it". International norms, malleable state identities, and norm-guided definitions of national interest are at the core of the conceptualization of culture in IR constructivism. Culture is considered not in terms of methodological individualism or methodological nationalism, but from the vantage point of methodological holism. This has prepared the ground for a more cosmopolitan approach to culture in political science, as global norms and learning processes begin to replace images of the world as a jigsaw puzzle of cultures.

By emanating from structuration theory, constructivism suffers from some of the same problems as Giddens' theory. In particular, the concept of culture remains underdeveloped. As long as the dialectics of agency and structure is blanketed in fog, it is difficult to accept structuration theory's claim to have dissolved the agent-structure dichotomy. Ultimately, agency and structure stay separate.

Political scientists like Peter Mandaville, Iver Neumann, Matthew Evangelista, Michael Barnett, Lisa Wedeen (to name just a few), have actively engaged with this problem in various manners. Some of them have deserted the top-down external view of cultural processes for ethnographic research on bottom-up processes. Others have used their first-hand knowledge about top-down politics to provide cultural analyses of events and situations (see, for instance, Barnett's (2002) eyewitness account and sophisticated analysis of the United Nations' inaction during the Rwanda genocide). A cosmopolitan conceptualization of culture has occured in this intellectual environment. Culture is being studied as an unknown which holds the potential of widening one's horizon and ways of understanding. The mode of research is one of engagement: Mandaville's (2001) with global islam; Wedeen's (1999) with Syrian politics; Evangelista's (1999) with the global peace movement's role in ending the Cold War; and so on. Of paramount importance in this cosmopolitan turn is the direct engagement with subjective meanings, that is, with other people's world views. Conceptualizing culture as enabling change, even world-historical change, may, in a best case scenario, contribute to the development of political science. As there is no last word in science, we can look forward with excitement to where such a development can take us.

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# Statsvetenskapliga förbundet

FÖRBUNDSREDAKTÖR: HELENA WOCKELBERG

## Statsvetarna och massmedia

Redaktören noterar att professorerna nyligen kivats offentligt om statsvetarrollen. Hon tänker då på diskussionerna på DN-debatt mellan Tommy Möller och Leif Lewin (2/5, 3/5 och 10/5 2005) respektive Ulf Bjereld och Kjell Goldmann (4/9, 6/9 och 20/9 2005). I fokus står frågan om vilket bidrag statsvetarna egentligen ska lämna till samhället, finns där till exempel utrymme för annat än den självständiga expertens sakliga påpekanden? Vilka gränser ska vi sätta upp för oss själva?

Precis sådana ämnen vill redaktören se debatterade också på dessa sidor, välkomna med synpunkter och idéer! En relaterad fråga är villkoren för våra kontakter med massmedia, villkor som begränsar våra möjligheter att själva bestämma vilken vår roll ska vara. Många är vi som efter kontakter med journalister inser att vi riskerar att utnyttjas som brickor i ett spel som inte är vårt eget. Vilka roller vi vill spela är en sak och de massmedia tillåter oss att spela en annan. Vi kan ana att det ibland är annat än vår speciella kompetens som gör att journalisten ringer till just mig eller dig. Det kan vara så att hon eller han behöver en expert (jämför ett ögonvittne, en kvinna, en ung kvinna, en politiker, en turist eller två), precis som en radiosändning behöver mikrofoner och tidningar tryckpressar.

Varje massmediaprodukt har sina ramar och vad som helst får inte hända bara för att en inbjuden gäst ombeds uttala sig om det ena eller det andra. Redan när vi blir uppringda på tjänsterummet kan vi inse detta när journalisten serverar en färdig ståndpunkt som hon vill att en forskare ska framföra:

Journalisten: Vore det inte bättre om vi hade ministerstyre i Sverige?
Statsvetaren: Det beror på vad du menar med bättre.
Journalisten: Ja, alltså bättre för…demokratin?
Statsvetaren: Forskningen kan inte lämna ett svar på den frågan idag.
Journalisten Men vad tycker du själv, ska vi ha ministerstyre i Sverige?

Ett av problemen i situationen ovan är givetvis att statsvetaren ogärna vill ”tycka själv” om ministerstyre eller annat. Och ur journalistens synvinkel är alla ”det beror på” ett potentiellt hot mot den färdiga produkten: konflikter gör sig bra i media men en intervjuad bör helst inte vara oenig med sig själv utan med någon annan (se till exempel inledningen på denna artikel). En ur forskarens synvinkel acceptabel väg – problematisering – till den tredje

**Har du synpunkter på förbundssidan eller vill lämna bidrag är du välkommen att kontakta förbundsredaktören via e-post Helena.Wockelberg@statsvet.uu.se eller telefon 018-4713448.**

uppgiftens uppfyllande riskerar att blockeras av massmedias dramaturgi.

Vad vi alla måste ha klart för oss är att anledningen till att vi alls blir uppringda av en journalist kan vara att denne behöver en skådespelare i ett välregisserat drama. Detta kan också förklara varför vi ibland får frågor om saker som ligger utanför vår särskilda kompetens. Journalister har inte alltid tillräckliga resurser för att göra den research som krävs för att hitta rätt person utan får nöja sig med den av oss som svarar i telefon. Detta - källkritiska - problem kan vi förhoppningsvis lösa åt journalisten genom att hänvisa till ”rätt” kollega.

Den tredje uppgiften är inte att vara en passiv leverantör av ”lite expertis”, inte heller att ryckas med av hårt vinklad rapportering eller överdrivet polariserade ståndpunkter. Forskarens roll är tvärtom att stå upp för alla ”det beror på:n” och för principen att när man ägnar sig åt vetenskap så kan vad som helst hända eftersom forskningsresultat kan visa att något är ”precis tvärtom” mot vad vi förväntat oss. Om vi okritiskt deltar i massmedia på massmedias villkor bidrar vi inte till den tredje uppgiftens uppfyllelse. Så nästa gång du är i direktsändning, ta chansen att vara lite omständlig och vridande och vändande! Eller varför inte att, i pedagogiskt syfte, helt plötsligt ändra ståndpunkt och hänvisa till någon annan deltagares övertygande argument?

HELENA WOCKELBERG

## Nytt engagemang för den svenska demokratin

Tage Erlander lär ha sagt att ”intresset för författningsfrågorna är så pass ringa att varje försök att sätta massorna i rörelse kommer att misslyckas”. Så här drygt trettio år efter antagandet av vår nuvarande regeringsform kan vi nog konstatera att Erlander hade en poäng. Författningsdebatten har inte varit särskilt stormig hos det svenska folket. Den grundlagsutredning som regeringen tillsatte sommaren 2004, som skall genomföra ”en samlad översyn av regeringsformen”, har nu krav på sig att ändra detta. Utredningen skall ”skapa debatt och stimulera det offentliga samtalet om författningspolitiska frågor och om det svenska folkstyret” (Dir. 2004:96). På statsvetenskapliga institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet tas nu tillfället i akt att delta i denna diskussion på allvar. Vi genomför en ambitiös satsning på grundlagsutbildningen i form av ett författningspolitiskt rollspel, Grundlagskonventet.

Sverige har en i många hänseenden positiv tradition med politisk konsensus kring författningspolitiska beslut. Partierna har genom åren ansträngt sig för att finna kompromisser som de alla kan gå med på. Men det är ingen självklarhet att partiernas gemensamma intressen är det samma som allmänintresset när det gäller frågor om politiska spelregler. De många och långa författningsutredningar som föregick vår nuvarande grundlag präglades ofta av dagspolitiska trätoämnen. Dess slutliga utformning blev en i flera stycken märklig kompromiss mellan partiintressen (se t.ex. Westerståhl 1976:4). Det är

angeläget, även enligt partierna själva, att den nuvarande utredningen inte hamnar i samma situation.

På flera håll, bland annat i riksdagsdebatten, har idén om att involvera ett grundlagskonvent i processen lyfts fram. Ett konvent där andra personer, institutioner eller organisationer bidrar till diskussionen och tydliggör ensidiga partipolitiska intressen. Inspirationen hämtas bland annat från arbetet med den europeiska konstitutionen i det så kallade framtidskonventet, men det finns också exempel på andra håll (se t.ex. Petersson mfl 2004. Litteraturen om andra former av medborgarpaneler är stor, översikter finns i Ackerman och Fishkin 2004, Møller Hansen 2004).

I Grundlagskonventet gör vi ”verklighet” av idéerna. Vi låter våra studenter på grundutbildningen i statsvetenskap inta roller som samhällsaktörer med olika intressen och idéer om hur en konstitution bör utformas. Studenternas argument jämkas samman och illustrerar hur Sveriges regeringsform skulle kunna se ut om partierna fick sällskap av andra aktörer i den författningspolitiska debatten.

## En pedagogisk kick!

De pedagogiska syftena med konventet är att använda ett engagerande förhållningssätt på annars ganska komplicerade grundlagsfrågor. Ett rollspel innebär att studenterna får möjlighet att lära genom att uppleva, något som teoretiska ämnen som statsvetenskap ofta är mindre bra på att erbjuda. Studenterna får erfarenheter av konstitutionsbyggande i allmänhet och den svenska författningspolitiken i synnerhet. Utbildningen innebär också träning i argumentations- och analysförmåga genom att studenterna, i skrift och muntligen, personligt och i grupp, får framföra sina åsikter, kunskaper och argument i form av redovisningar, debatter och förhandlingar. En annan effekt av rollspelet är att studenterna får träning i att ta plats och ge plats i grupp, vilket skapar sociala mervärden. I tidigare utvärderingar påpekar våra grundstudenter att det är svårt att känna samhörighet med andra i de stora föreläsningslokalerna. Ofta efterlyses undervisning och aktiviteter som hjälper studenterna att känna sig som klasskamrater. Vi menar också att ämnet som sådant skulle tjäna på att våra studenter känner gemenskap med varandra. Statsvetaren är en rätt okänd figur i den stora världen, åtminstone i jämförelse med till exempel juristen, historikern och ekonomen. En gemensam identitet som statsvetare redan på grundkursnivå skulle innebära att studenterna på ett tydligare sätt tar statsvetenskapen med sig när de lämnar institutionen. Vår förhoppning är vidare att både lärare och studenter kommer att kunna bidra till en allmän pedagogisk diskussion om erfarenheterna från konventet. Via rollspelet höjs ribban i den pedagogiska diskussionen och förhoppningen är att konventet kan få ringar på vattnet genom att det inspirerar till nytänkande och ambition.

Studenterna samverkar dessutom med det omgivande samhället. De texter och presentationer som de producerar görs tillgängliga för regeringens grundlagsutredning. Det är till grundlagsutredningen som studenterna högtidligen överlämnar sina förslag på den avslutande ”presskonferensen”. Intresserad allmänhet, andra lärare, forskare och press är också inbjuden. Kursen avslutas med att studenterna kliver ur sina roller och skriver en debattartikel under sitt eget namn. Målet är att dessa artiklar skall kunna publiceras. Konventet blir därigenom ett bidrag både till samhällets författningspolitiska diskus-

sion och till forskningen om konstitutionsbyggande.

## Grundlagskonventets upplägg

Grundlagskonventet har två rundor. Nio *aktörsgrupper* med vardera (ungefär) nio individer skall i en första runda definiera sina intressen, prioriteringar, strategier och kompromissmöjligheter. I den andra rundan skapas nio *grundlagskommittéer* som består av en individ från varje aktörsgrupp. Varje grundlagskommitté enas om ett författningsförslag på varsitt område. Resultatet blir ett antal genomarbetade förslag som redovisas och slås samman på det avslutande stora *konventsmötet*.

### Tre expertgrupper – sex intressegrupper

Många aktörer i samhället har intresse av att påverka utformningen av framtidens demokratiska spelregler. Det handlar dels om *representanter för intressegrupper* som kan ha mycket att vinna eller förlora på förändrade spelregler, dels om *expertgrupper* som innehar specifik kunskap om tänkbara effekter av spelregelsförändringar. Grundlagskonventet understryker att vår nya grundlag kommer att se olika ut beroende på vilka grupper som vinner inflytande över dess utformning. Det är därför grundlagsfrågor inte uteslutande kan betraktas som en angelägenhet för de politiska partierna. En ganska självklar, men också utmanande utgångspunkt i vissa hänseenden.

Listan över gruppintressen som omedelbart eller indirekt påverkas av grundlagens utformning och användning kan göras lång. Vår ambition med gruppindelningen är tvådelad. För det första strävar vi efter en *verklighetstrogen diskussion*. De grupper som ingår i vårt grundlagskonvent skall i praktiken kunna inkluderas i ett ”riktigt” svenskt grundlagskonvent. Denna verklighetsanknytning får emellertid inte förstöra möjligheterna för *det förutsättningslösa ventilerandet av argument* som är ett av huvudsyftena för projektet. Vi vill därför för det andra möjliggöra att så många argument som möjligt kommer upp på bordet. Ju fler intressen som kan föra fram sina argument desto bättre. De nio aktörsgrupper vi har valt är medborgarna, de stora partierna, de små partierna, intressegruppen (bestående av olika minoritetsrepresentanter), kommuner och landsting, tjänstemännen, ekonomerna, juristerna och statsvetarna.

### Den första rundan: aktörsgrupperna samlas för strategimöten

Grundlagskonventet inleds med att aktörsgrupperna samlas för *strategimöten* under sammanlagt tre dagar. Syftet med den första rundans strategimöten är att deltagarna fördjupar sig kring de perspektiv på grundlagsfrågorna som är relevanta för respektive aktörsgrupp. Aktörsgruppernas arbete resulterar i ett ”hemligt” strategidokumentet som ger besked om hur den nya grundlagen skulle se ut om man fick bestämma helt själv. Dokumentet innehåller de argument och anteciperade motargument man förväntar sig i de kommande kommittéöverläggningarna. I strategidokumentet skriver studenterna hur de tolkar sin roll, definierar vilka intressen de har som grupp och individer, lägger upp en strategi för hur de skall få så stort genomslag som möjligt genom att bestämma prioriteringar, rangordna intressen, ge förslag på möjliga allianser och troliga ”fiender” och spika argumenten med hjälp av anvisad litteratur.

### Den andra rundan: grundlagskommittéerna överlägger

När strategidokumentet är klart lämnar aktörerna sina ursprungliga grupper och måste ensamt bevaka aktörsgruppens intressen i de olika grundlagskommittéerna. Målet för kommittéerna är att försöka komma överens om hur framtidens demokratiska spelregler skall se ut på nio olika övergripande områden. De nio olika kommittéernas frågeställningar beskrivs för studenterna i ett särskilt dokument. Kommittéerna är 1) Sveriges framtida statsskick, 2) regeringsbildning och regeringens organisering, 3) kammarsystemet: den lagstiftande maktens organisation, 4) den konstitutionella kontrollen, 5) det lokala självstyret, 6) politisk representation, 7) det direktdemokratiska inslaget, 8) demos samt 9) fri- och rättigheter. Kommittéerna presenterar sina förslag på det avslutande konventsmötet.

### Utrymme för större ambitioner

Svenska folket, åtminstone de unga generationerna är ett rollspelande folk. En av de snabbast växande folkrörelserna i Sverige idag är rollspelsrörelsen. Vad det säger om oss som svenskar är kanske svårt att slå fast, men vi tror att det säger något om möjligheterna att föra författningsfrågorna ut i landet med hjälp av rollspelet som verktyg. Det märker vi rent konkret när vi sätter det här i händerna på våra studenter. Det är inte första gången de arbetar på det här sättet. De kan, de vill och de engagerar sig.

Än så länge finns inga konkreta förslag på hur regeringens grundlagsutredning skall lyckas bättre än tidigare utredningar när det gäller att undkomma de ensidiga partipolitiska intressena. Risken är stor att de politiska partierna även i fortsättningen håller frågorna för sig själva. Ett antal seminarier har anordnats av utredningen, men det återstår fortfarande mycket att göra innan man kan berömma dem för stor folklighet. Med Grundlagskonventet skapar vi ett 70-tal entusiastiska grundlagsambassadörer varje termin. Unga människor som ger sig ut i samhället med kunskap om och intresse för konstitutionella frågor, i en tid där detta har brännande relevans runt om i världen. För närvarande är ramarna lagda för statsvetarstudenter i Göteborg. Steget därifrån till andra ställen är dock knappast långt. Vi ser därför fram emot diskussion och samarbete med andra institutioner och universitet och hoppas att intresserade hör av sig.

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# Statsvetenskapliga förbundets årsmöte

## Årsmötesförhandlingarna

Statsvetenskapliga förbundets årliga sammankomst hölls vid Lunds universitet 3-5 oktober. Mötet samlade i år 95 av de totalt 527 personer som är verksamma vid de statsvetenskapliga miljöerna i Sverige. Förbundet förefaller emellertid vara i gott skick. Vid de årsmötesförhandlingar som inledde konferensen framkom nämligen att de reformer som genomfördes på föregående årsmöte haft en mycket positiv inverkan på förbundets ekonomi. Principen om institutionellt medlemskap har inneburit att förbundet efter flera magra år kunnat vända underskott till överskott. I övrigt kan konstateras att mötet valde Katarina Eckerberg till ny förbundsordförande efter avgående Gulllan Gidlund, liksom att årsmötet 2006 kommer att hållas vid Karlstads universitet.

På uppdrag av styrelsen tog PerOla Öberg upp frågan om eventuella förändringar av förbundsmötets framtida arbetsformer. För att höja de seniora forskarnas närvaro och benägenhet att lägga fram papper, menade han, bör man överväga att frångå principen om att hålla möte varje år, eller möjligen att hitta en annan tidpunkt på året. I andra diskussionsinlägg framfördes bland annat fördelarna med paneldiskussioner som arbetsform.

Som vanligt dominerades emellertid förbundets årsmöte av den verksamhet som bedrevs i de tematiska arbetsgrupperna. Nedan följer korta rapporter från respektive arbetsgrupp.

JAKOB GUSTAVSSON

## Europaforskning

Gruppen i Europaforskning samlade som mest ett tjugotal personer och behandlade sex uppsatser under två intensiva arbetsdagar. Såväl yngre som mer seniora forskare deltog med liv och lust i de som vanligt öppna och prestigelösa diskussionerna. Samtalet spände, liksom uppsatserna, över vida fält, allt från EU:s betydelse för mänskliga rättigheter på arbetsplatsen, svensk Europapolitik, och EU som offentlig sfär till Europeiska Unionens betydelse i världspolitiken och hur den kritiska samhällsforskningen närmar sig Europaproblematiken. Medan ett par tre av papperna var avhandlingspromemorior, var övriga kapitelbidrag till antologier eller internationella forskningsöversikter. Både empiriska och normativa inriktningar var företrädda; därmed återspeglar dagens Europaforskningen utvecklingen inom statsvetenskapen i stort. Det gäller även den teoretiska och metodologiska mångfalden.

MAGNUS JERNECK

## Förvaltningspolitik

Ett femtontal personer hade anmält sig till denna arbetsgrupp. Efter några sena avhopp deltog drygt tio personer i de olika sessionerna. Endast tre personer lade fram något skriftligt arbete som underlag för diskussionerna. Först ut var Tove Dannestam, doktorand i Lund, med en uppsats med titeln ”America’s cup och omformuleringens politik”. Uppsatsen är en del i hennes avhandlingsarbete kring stadspolitik i en global era. Med hjälp av

fallet America's cup illustreras och problematiseras gränslinjen mellan offentligt och privat, mellan tillväxtpolitik och välfärdsfokus och mellan olika maktperspektiv på den moderna stadens politik. Även Christofer Lindgren, doktorand i Stockholm, presenterade ett arbete nära knutet till sitt avhandlingsområde. Hur skall vi förstå alla de "partnerskapssamarbeten" som förekommer inom många samhällsområden? De är på ett sätt tillfälliga organisationer, samtidigt som de är så vanliga att de nästan blivit en permanent del av förvaltningen. Christofers paper är ett försök att teoretiskt närma sig vad han kallar "Street level adhocracy" och de "nomader" till tjänstemän som verkar inom partnerskapen. Patrik Hall, lektor vid Malmö Högskola, presenterade en uppsats med det explicita teoretiska syftet att närma diskursteorin till studiet av beslutsprocesser. Patrik Hall låter svensk IT-politik utgöra empirin för sammankopplingen av diskursteori med John Kingdons perspektiv på offentliga beslutsprocesser.

De tre arbeten som behandlades under arbetsgruppens sessioner rörde sig alla i olika gråzoner och gav upphov till intressanta diskussioner. Samtidigt var antalet framlagda arbeten alltför få för att kunna uttyda någon särskild riktning inom förvaltningsforskningen. Snarast väcker det ringa antalet väl frågan om inte framtida årsmöten bör söka nya ämnesrubriker för de olika sessionerna.

HÅKAN MAGNUSSON

## Internationell politik och politisk psykologi

Arbetsgruppen i internationell politik var välbesökt med 21 deltagare. Sju uppsatser ventilerades. Förutom opponenternas synpunkter bidrog alla aktivt och konstruktivt till diskussionerna. Det var en bra balans mellan doktorander och seniora forskare. Mikael Karlsson (Södertörns högskola) presenterade en uppsats som problematiserar hur maktasymmetri i den baltiska regionen påverkar expertgruppers roll och inflytande när det gäller utformningen av kärnkraft och säkerhet. Joakim Norborg (Umeå universitet) presenterade avhandlingskapitel om partiernas ideologiska mål i utrikespolitiken. Christer Jönsson (Lunds universitet) diskuterade hur studiet av diplomati kan utvidgas genom att använda sig av fler teoretiska ansatser och perspektiv. Anette Ahrnens (Lunds universitet) presenterade ett avhandlingsutkast om politiseringen av folkrätten. Tre uppsatser behandlade politisk psykologi. Catarina Kinnvall (Lunds universitet) problematiserade i sitt papper medborgarskap, multikulturalism och minoriteter. Anders Broman (Karlstad universitet) presenterade avhandlingskapitel om demokratisk socialisation i den svenska gymnasieskolan. Sarah Scuzzarello (Lunds Universitet) presenterade ett avhandlingsutkast om olika perceptioner av "Väst".

KARIN AGGESTAM

## Komparativ politik & konstitutionell politik

Arbetsgrupperna i komparativ politik och konstitutionell politik slogs samman till en arbetsgrupp. I gruppen fanns en lagom mix av seniorer och doktorander, medverkande från många olika statsvetenskapliga institutioner och även en vetenskapsteoretisk mångfald. Tio papper behandlades, och spännvidden var bred både teoretiskt, metodologiskt och empiriskt, vilket en snabblick på pappren visar: brukarinflytande över narkotikapolitiken,

konstitutionella aspekter på religionsfriheten, hinder för mellankommunal samverkan, den svenska pensionsreformen i partipolitiskt samförstånd, mått på "quality of government", socialdemokraternas ökade marknadsvänlighet, hinder för demokratiskt inflytande, bilden av staden i utställningar förr och nu, samt demokratins rumsliga förankring i IT-samhället.

MATS SJÖLIN

## Politik och kön

Gemensamt för de fyra uppsatserna som ventilerades i arbetsgruppen var deras fokus på genusteori och genusteoretiska spörsmål. De empiriska frågorna som uppsatserna fokuserade var sjukförsäkringar, internationella dokument om amning, manliga organisationer och jämställdhetsarbete samt det svenska jämställdhetsarbetets politiska och institutionella uttrycksformer. Diskussionerna i arbetsgruppen var mycket livliga och engagerade och innehöll både kritiska och konstruktiva inslag. Speciellt positivt var det att samtliga deltagare var mycket väl pålästa. Samtalet spände över hela fältet, från detaljfrågor kring specifika formuleringar till vetenskapsteoretiska frågor. Några av de frågor som diskuterades i arbetsgruppen var exempelvis huruvida konstruktivismen kan rymma en genusmaktsdimension, vad en policy om amning säger om synen på kvinnan, om män kan anses vara offer i en genusmaktordning, hur gender mainstreaming kommer till uttryck i svensk förvaltning, vilken roll femokrater spelar i jämställdhetsarbetet, samt hur sjukförsäkringar innehåller föreställningar om kön.

ANNICA KRONSELL

## Politik och miljö

Förbundet hade för första gången en arbetsgrupp i Politik och Miljö. Intresset var därför stort, stämningen var god och diskussionerna blev livliga. Elva uppsatser presenterades och mer än tretton personer (3 doktorander och 10 disputerade) deltog i arbetsgruppens diskussioner. Uppsatsernas miljöpolitiska teman tangerade internationell politik, förvaltningspolitik och politisk teori. På grund av miljöpolitikens flervetenskapliga natur hade några uppsatsförfattarna inte bara statsvetenskaplig bakgrund utan även sociologisk, miljövetenskaplig och juridisk expertis. Det första temat som diskuterades var den globala klimatpolitiken. Uppsatserna handlade om dominerande diskurser i de internationella klimatförhandlingarna, den politiska ekonomin och företagens roll i klimatpolicies samt den roll vetenskaplig expertis har i klimatregimen. Det andra temat berörde institutioner, styrmedel och policies i miljö- och energipolitiken i Sverige och EU. Reglering av biologisk mångfald, framväxten av informella och frivilliga styrmedel i energipolitiken, livsmedelspolicy och skogssektorn var uppsatser som tangerade detta område. Vidare diskuterades förvaltningsperspektivet och miljörättsliga frågor såsom Miljödomstolens roll. Arbetsgruppen diskuterade även den större frågan om miljöpolitik skiljer sig från övriga politikområden och därför kräver speciella metoder och teoretiska infallsvinklar. Frågan aktualiserades i Andreas Duits uppsats *Sustainable Development and the Creation of Homo Ecologicus*. Efter intensiv debatt var de flesta deltagare överens om att miljöpolitikens dilemma och karaktär fångas väl av statsvetenskapliga begrepp samt i disciplinens klassiska frågor kring styrning, makt och demokrati. På grund av det stora intresset

för frågor i skärningspunkten mellan politik och miljö framförde många deltagare önskemålet att få till stånd en arbetsgrupp på miljöpolitiskt tema även vid nästa årsmöte av Statsvetenskapliga förbundet.

KARIN BÄCKSTRAND

## Politik och utveckling

Arbetsgruppen i politik och utveckling lockade en begränsad, men mycket aktiv, skara forskare. Förutom undertecknad deltog sex personer – fyra disputerade forskare och två doktorander – med uppsatser. Jan Teorell, Uppsala och Göteborg, (med Bo Rothstein som medförfattare) presenterade en teoretisk argumentation kring begreppet "opartiskhet" med syfte att ge begrepp som "quality of government" och "good governance" en mer precis och analytiskt fruktbar innebörd. Mikael Sandberg (Halmstad) lade fram en metodologiskt inriktad uppsats om hur simuleringsteknik kan användas vid studiet av global demokratidiffusion. Pelle Åberg (Södertörn) skisserade en mer kvalitativt inriktad diffusionsstudie kring civilsamhälle och vuxenutbildning. Henrik Berglund (Stockholm) analyserade det hindunationalistiska partiet Bharatiya Janata Partys uppgång och möjliga fall. Elin Bjarnegård (Uppsala) anlade ett genusperspektiv på årets parlamentsval i Thailand. Kristina Jönsson (Centrum för öst- och sydöstasiatiska studier i Lund) presenterade uppläggningen av ett forskningsprojekt om HIV/AIDS i Sydostasien. Kommentatorerna, liksom samtliga seminariedeltagare, var mycket väl förberedda och diskussionerna var genomgående synnerligen livliga, konstruktiva och stimulerande.

ANDERS UHLIN

## Politisk teori och idéhistoria

Arbetsgruppen i politisk teori och idéhistoria samlade ett femtontal deltagare, med i stort sett jämn fördelning mellan doktorander och disputerade. Elva uppsatser ventilerades. Den ämnesmässiga mångfalden var som vanligt betydande och diskussionsklimatet genomgående konstruktivt. Det blev tre mycket stimulerande dagar.

Arbetsgruppen inleddes med en nyläsning av Platons *Statsmannen* signerad Ronnie Hjort, följt av en problematisering av J. S. Mills syn på bestraffningar av "self regarding acts" av Ulf Petäjä. Dagen avslutades med en diskussion kring Mats Lindbergs skiss över ett idéanalytiskt forskningsprojekt gällande svensk författningspolitik. Andra dagen gick i rättvisans tecken. Mikael Eriksson inledde med en närgången granskning av Chantal Mouffes läsning av John Rawls *Political Liberalism*, varefter miljöpartiets syn på distributiv rättvisa sattes i idékritisk belysning av Jouni Reinikainen. Vidare problematiserades de begränsningar av rösträtten för mentalt funktionshindrade som idag råder i majoriteten av västerlandets demokratier i en kritisk uppsats av Ludvig Beckman. Dagen avslutades med två tankeväckande analyser av rättvisans temporala och spatiala gränser, signerade Ed Page respektive Rasmus Karlsson. Sista dagen fick tydlig kritisk-teoretisk färgsättning, dels genom Lily Lanefelts avhandlingsplan på temat "Social Justice and the Islamic Veil", dels genom Andreas Gottardis försök att via en omläsning av Frankfurtskolan upplösa spänningen mellan Habermas och Derrida. Arbetsgruppen avslutades med en uppsats av Andreas Johansson på temat "Demokrati och tolerans i det mångkulturella samhället" som på ett intressant sätt

aktualiserade mötet mellan normativ och empirisk teori.

Innan gruppen skildes åt drogs riktlinjerna upp för nästa workshop inom ramen för ”Svenska nätverket i politisk teori”, en workshop som hålls i Stockholm i april månad 2006. Alla intresserade är varmt välkomna!

BJÖRN BADERSTEN

# Litteraturgranskningar

**Elizabeth Murphy-Lejeune: *Student Mobility and Narrative in Europe: The New Strangers.* London: Routledge. 2002.**

IOANNIS TSOUKALAS[1]

For the last couple of years I have been engaged in the study of the European Union student exchange program, Erasmus. During the last decade this program has resulted in an unprecedented exchange of ideas and persons within the European Union. Vast numbers of students are circulating within the European Union, often spending several months in other host countries before returning to their home universities. The phenomenon is in need of systematic study.

However, my research on the Erasmus students has a wider purpose than a mere descriptive account of their lives. Within the framework of the KOSMOPOLIT project a central task for me is to try and ascertain whether the Erasmus program is a locus for the incubation of a more transnational kind of life-style and social identity. Thus issues of youth culture, social learning, collective representations, friendship networks and identity formation are central to my study.

Here I will mostly not discuss my own ongoing research but instead review a recent important book on European student exchanges. Elizabeth Murphy-Lejeune's (2002) book *Student Mobility and Narrative in Europe*: *The New Strangers* is the first extensive study of the various categories of travelling students within Europe.[2] Murphy-Lejeune is a French studies scholar living and working in Dublin, Ireland, with a clearly anthropological twist to her work. The book deals with many of the themes that are central to my research as well, and is a good introduction to this field of research.

When I first found this book it came as a very positive surprise. For almost a year I had looked for studies of student mobility within Europe and found very little. Given the radical impact that many of the exchange programs of the European Union have had on academic life across the continent, this study fills an important gap. One can even say that the effects of these student exchange programs have been so strong, with the Erasmus program being the main engine in this impressive thrust, that university life in Europe has been changed forever. Murphy-Lejeune (2002: 8) is well aware of this and thus of the mission of her book 'to meet the need to explore European student mobility'.

The study she undertakes adheres, though not strictly, to a qualitative, phenomenological approach and tries to capture and analyze the subjective side of the student exchange experience. The only previous academic studies in the area were strictly quantitative, and thus very little

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2 The book is actually a revised reprint of her PhD thesis (in French) which was published more than ten years ago in the field of linguistics.

has been known about the actual lives of these students, and even less about their own views and opinions on various topics. Murphy-Lejeune (2002: 8) is explicit in her ambition to remedy this unfortunate situation and clearly states that her intention is to 'try and account for the definition of the experience by the actors themselves, an often neglected source of information.' Three different categories of exchange students – the Erasmus, the EAPs[3] and language assistants – are successively presented, analyzed and compared. The methodology she uses is clear. A variety of methodological tools have been used in order to arrive at, and triangulate, conclusions: interviews, questionnaires and case studies. The only caveat I can think of in respect to methodological issues is that the sample of students she used was a little skewed, with most students coming from, or going to, France and Ireland.

## The theoretical lineage of the stranger

Murphy-Lejeune's theoretical preferences are with a number of classical sociologists, many of them phenomenologically inclined. The writings of George Simmel and Alfred Schutz on the status and experience of strangers in the western world serve as a point of departure. It is partly a consequence of this that her book does not join the often uncritical chorus of voices blessing the increased global connections of our time but also offers readers a darker side of the picture.

According to many of the older writers, the traveler to new lands is a stranger with a special status and perspective.[4] This "stranger theme" recurs throughout Murphy-Lejeune's book and is actually the thread that integrates much of the analysis of her empirical material. The traveling students are considered as a recent addition to this wider category which also includes the migrant, the expatriate and the refugee. According to Murphy-Lejeune, being a stranger has serious consequences psychologically, socially and symbolically. Examples of negative consequences are loneliness, confusion, and sorrow. This said, however, the picture is in the end mostly positive.

## A cartography of strangeness

More specifically Murphy-Lejeune attempts to make a modern cartography of "strangeness" in Europe, using as her material the three groups identified above. Thus she compares them with each other as well as with other types of strangers, and tries to place them in some relative perspective within the scene of contemporary Europe. She thus notes that the Erasmus students are harder to integrate in their host societies than EAPs[5], au-pairs and language assistants, due their lack of professional duties which gives them ample opportunities to escape into

3 The EAP is a French student exchange program for students studying business administration. It stretches over a three year period and includes residence in Paris, Oxford and Berlin or Madrid (not both).

4 This special status of the stranger is universally recognized. It is therefore no coincidence that sociolinguists have found out that foreigners/strangers are all over the world addressed, upon first contact at least, with a distinct and characteristic speech style which resembles that used with young children ('motherese') and mentally retarded individuals (for references see Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 195).

5 The EAPs have a period of work apprenticeship included in their education.

various enclaves, some self-chosen and some ordained, some comprised of compatriots and some of internationals. In like manner students in general (including EAPs) are harder to integrate in their host societies than working strangers like au-pairs and language assistants.

Murphy-Lejeune also points out that big cities make it easier for foreign students to avoid integration with local society. The anonymity of modern urban centers make them a perfect habitat for all kinds of avoidance behaviors, subterranean cultural flows and covert activities; so too for visiting exchange students preferring the company of their compatriots or other foreign students. In contrast many of the students who ended up in villages or small towns achieved very satisfactory degrees of adaptation and integration with local society.

The general tendency is that students living abroad like to sneak away into their favorite enclaves unless counteracted by stronger forces.[6] The company of one's compatriots is undeniably relaxing and comforting. This tendency is also fuelled by the natives who tend to see visitor's as categorical others and treat them accordingly. As a visitor in a country there is a risk that you become, whether you like it or not, an ambassador of your home country; and your "nationalism" is thus unwittingly strengthened. In my own research I have met at least a couple of Erasmus students who really wanted to become integrated into Swedish society, even learn Swedish, but could not really make it. Many of the Swedes they knew wanted to use them to learn a foreign language instead – for example Italian and French – and thus preferred them to be real "latinos".

## Who travels?

Which kinds of people end up abroad as exchange students, and which stay at home? Not everyone is equally eligible for international travel, not even within the seemingly equitable confines of the Erasmus Program. Thus people with a special personality character, family history, first encounter and age tend to have an advantage in achieving international mobility. This blend of factors, we are told, make up each individual's mobility capital. And these determinants are just a special case of the influence that socioeconomic and historical context has in determining the degree and kind of mobility available to various people. Even today, in anno 2005, one can suspect that working-class youths

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6 Some evidence for this is offered by de Federico (2001) who have made a network survey of the relational patterns found among Erasmus students:
"When we examine friendship ties, we realize (in the sample of Erasmus students we gathered in France in 1995) that 63% of the friendship ties established are crossnational friendship and only 37% are same nationality. If we look in more detail, we see that 37% of friends are same nationality, 43% are other European exchange students, 17% are local European students and 3% have other non European Nationalities. Given that the population of the hosting university is composed by 92% of local students, 6,2% of non-European students and 1,4% of European exchange students, if there were no factors influencing the selection of friends, European exchange students would have 92% of local student friends (they have 17%), 6,2% of non-European student friends (they have 3%) and 1,4% of European exchange student friends (they have 80%). Taking into account these figures we can conclude that similarity of status (being an exchange student) and what it implies seems to be the most important factor of friendship choice." (de Federico, 2001: 12-13)

are underrepresented in the big "family" of exchange students. Though Murphy-Lejeune has no statistics to prove her point, many of her empirical findings are suggestive and they certainly accord well with my own personal experience of exchange students.[7] Exchange students are a migratory elite, quite different from many other categories of traveling people.

Despite these qualifications one can suspect that the Erasmus program has functioned mostly positively. It is almost certain that it has increased the formal opportunities for students of all socioeconomic backgrounds to travel within the European Union. Still, given the fact that formal opportunities are not always translated into real opportunities, more quantitative research would seem to be needed to show us how things really turn out.

### Adaptation and culture shock

In common for most students, whether they end up well integrated or not, or start out poor or rich, is that they go through a phase of adaptation and various degrees of culture shock. A certain degree of confusion and discomfort is to be expected. However, as time passes, most people adjust themselves to the new situation. Slowly and by way of imitation of natives and role-experimentation, the students become more and more comfortable in navigating the new sociocultural terrain. Yet the adaptation process is not uniform for everybody. It varies according to several variables, and Murphy-Lejeune attempts an identification and classification of these, often assisted by the voices of the students themselves. Thus we learn that the accommodation issue (finding a place to live in; finding someone with whom one can share quarters) is of crucial importance in conditioning their future adaptation to the new milieu. Likewise the general conditions of their entrance/im-

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7 The quantitive studies mentioned above give some support to this contention, though not conclusive We can see in their tables that about 35 % of the Erasmus students had a father with a higher education degree, while the proportion of parents with at least compulsory education was even higher, on average (for both mum and dad) close to 40% (Mainworm et al 1991: 34-35) This the German scientists take as proof of the fact that the Erasmus program does not only cater for the needs of people from high socio-economic backgrounds However this is a dubious conclusion First of all we are not told the degree of educational attainment for parents of a comparable group of non-student youth (which might be much lower) and we are not told the percentage of analphabetic parents (or with discontinued studies) from southern countries which we know is still comparatively high, even in the current generation of students What happens to the children of parents with discontinued studies? I personally know that many of them end up in low-paid jobs and only travel occasionally and internally The proper comparative background is conspicuously lacking in these instances Thus at least some of the averages in this study hide potential discrepancies in educational outcomes

As for the national origins of the Erasmus students we learn from the same study that "about five percent of the students surveyed were from Denmark, Ireland, Greece and Portugal" (Mainworm et al 1991: 20) This is also an indication that smaller countries might be less able to participate on equal grounds In this case Denmark does probably not even truly belong to this group It just ends up in this group due to fortuitous factors (being a small country with a small student population) while the other three are probably united in their common relative poverty We are also informed that "students from various southern European countries had less experience of staying in foreign countries" (Mainworm et al 1991: 37) In any case given that these measures are old and several ones of interest are lacking more quantitative research is needed to ascertain the question of who travels and why

Especially when it comes to the question of national origins I believe the statistics are too outdated to be taken as evidence for today's situation National participation in the Erasmus program today seems to be fairly equitable according to my information, with small countries some time even having an advantage The fact that these small nations were underrepresented to such a degree might depend on the fact that in the early years of the program it took a bit more time for small countries to build up the necessary "stem" and catch up with the traditional troika of founding nations (Germany-France-England) The threshold for participation was higher for obvious reasons

mersion into the new country (administrative trouble, health incidents, bad experiences with natives) are also important. Finally a decisive role is also played by various kinds of cultural brokers (mentors, teachers, roommates) who via their interest in foreign people and their self-appointed patronage guide the newcomers gently into society.

Murphy-Lejeune does not deny that there is often culture shock, even in today's highly mobile world. Moving to a foreign country, or even visiting it, can be a very upsetting event (unless one is a complete tourist), and in most cases this intercultural encounter begs for an explanation; sometimes even rationalization. Still Murphy-Lejeune does not completely buy into the standard model of intercultural adaptation, and although she does not reject it, gives it a thorough and critical re-evaluation in light of her new findings. She points out that many of the students in her study do not undergo any radical turmoil and only notice minor psychological movements.[8]

She notices, moreover, that many of her students experience a certain culture shock upon return to their home country. Beside the practical readjustments they have to make in order to revert to their former lifestyle, they also have to live with the incomprehension and indifference of their friends and relatives who most of the time just do not understand what they were doing over there and what they went through. This shock is more psychological and moral in character, and more upsetting. This 'reduction of one's personhood', as one of the students I studied called it, not being seen for what one has become, can be as painful as the one they experience as strangers in foreign land, not being seen for what they are. Given that there are upsetting moments in intercultural encounters, Murphy-Lejeune finishes this part of her discussion by offering some advice to administrators and officials handling the "live-stock" of moving students. Before going away students should be advised to seek involvement with local society and avoid isolation from locals. That would only make their stay more difficult.

#### Reaching out and meeting up

As I mentioned above, Murphy-Lejeune's account ends on a quite positive note. Therefore her initial restraint and her pragmatic approach, letting much of her students speak for themselves, adds to the trustworthiness of her work. Despite all the restrictions and limitations in the various exchange programs and the circumstances that surround them, which probably prevents most students from coming close to integration in the host country,

8 For those knowledgeable in the issue of culture shock and intercultural adaptation there are a number of popular models illustrating these psychosocial processes. One of the more popular ones is the U-curve of intercultural adaptation (for example it is explicitly used at Stockholm University). This is a broad pattern stretching over the whole stay abroad and includes "two big ups and one big down". This is the model that Murphy-Lejeune revises. Thus she postulates several minor curves instead of the big U-curve and a tripartite division of the whole period (usually of six months) into an euphoric, a tribulation and a constructive phase. Also she very wisely adds in the impact of previous experience, given that many youngsters today are very well traveled (some of them could actually and without shame be called traveloholics), which results in further modification of the model. Experienced people just go through a trial phase and a constructive phase. For more details on the intercultural adaptation discourse see Dahlén (1997).

many students still make it through and manage to get in touch with the local society and its inhabitants.

Most of the exchange students start out in a similar way; many of them actually from the same physical location as exemplified by the town, the campus or the residential area to which they are "attached". Thus most students have access to three types of social contacts at the outset of their stay abroad – ethnic, international and native people – with whom they interact in various degrees and for various reasons. From this pool of people the exchange students pick and chose in order to construct a rudimentary social space. In this gradual process three degrees of intimacy of contacts are discernible and Murphy-Lejeune enumerates them for us: close friends, party partners and acquaintances. Simultaneously with this furnishing of their 'social living room' the exchange students launch their exploration of the host country. This again is a gradual and cautious process for most young people, with the exception of experienced travelers, who through expanding concentric cycles of spatial familiarization make themselves comfortable. To the degree that the students succeed in their social and cultural exploration of this new 'life space' they will feel at home away from home.

> The terms 'dislocations' and 'islands' bring forth the idea of separation and disconnection between the old and the new world. The discovery of new spaces is then conceived as crossing 'bridges'… From one known space to another, the 'bridges' which are established are often represented by the specific individuals or activities associated with the place. Interestingly, students pick up quite naturally well-known metaphors to translate their experience of strangeness. (Murphy-Lejeune 2002: 154)

Up to this point most exchange students are alike. From there on, however, their trajectories diverge, and most of them veer off unpredictably in directions uncharted by social scientists. Still one can discern two rudimentary blocks: the majority and the minority. The minority consists of those young men and women who succeed in getting in touch with the native population. Murphy-Lejeune gives some interesting clues as to what makes them succeed, while the rest fail or simply do not care. For one thing professional experience seems to be important for integration. The language assistants seem to be the best-integrated category of students, despite the fact that their mobility capital is fairly limited. Their systematic engagements with local society and language skills are of critical importance.

### A special perspective

As mentioned earlier, Murphy-Lejeune believes that the traveler to new lands is a stranger with a special perspective, able to see things in a more 'objective' way than many of his compatriots back home or the natives in the new country. This is allegedly due to the stranger's ambivalent position to distance and proximity, and his frequent oscillation between the two. This theoretical tradition is an endowment from some of her intellectual ancestors, and she tries to make use of it in her current study. Although this epistemic choice may seem out of place in today's hyperconnected world, her account is both interesting and convincing. And the whole presentation is nicely illustrated by many examples from her interview materials.

Using this 'stranger theme' she also tries to effect a connection to another theoretical tradition, that of liminality and rites-de-passage, and thus tries to cross-fertilize sociology with anthropology. This is a brave and potentially interesting move, but somehow she does not really follow it through theoretically (see more on this in the final section). She only uses the older view of van Gennep, sparingly for that matter, and not the more recent perspective of Victor Turner (Turner, 1995). This is probably a pity since Turner's theories, especially his discussion of the transformative effect of communitas, would be highly pertinent to her study. Despite this "miss" she is not oblivious to the transformative potential of a stay abroad, but gives it a serious treatment.

## A final word

Murphy-Lejeune's very good book is one of the few qualitative studies we have on on student mobility in Europe.[9] It is easy to read and understand, and discusses many interesting and pertinent subjects. In closing this review, I would nevertheless want to air some criticisms.

The mix of genres is sometimes a bit confusing, and annoying. With her shifts in styles of narration and analytical depth, it is not always entirely easy to understand from which theoretical or epistemological vantage point Murphy-Lejeune writes. It is at times difficult to know if the weight of her argument rests on theory or on the empirical results, and where her findings end and her personal opinion starts. I would also have preferred a more continuous theoretical argument; only the first chapter is explicitly devoted to theory. It is true that Murphy-Lejeune point out that she is primarily interested in the narratives of the students themselves, but precisely because she presents so much empirical material some further theoretical elaboration might have been helpful. Empirical findings cannot always stand alone.

Some further attention to theory could have included more discussion of other recent research on cross-border mobility and related matters, including conceptualizations of networks, risk society, and cosmopolitanism. For a book on narratives, this one has notably few references to classical and recent research literature on narrative theory. It is not that Murphy-Lejeune fails to support her argument successfully – she does, using her own means – but the theoretical ramifications of her argument could possibly have been taken further. There is no serious mention either of other kinds of narratives that may interact with those of her students, such as media narratives, or the political narratives of the EU. We see in Alexa Robertson's contribution to this issue how media narratives of global connections can interact in intricate ways with those of ordinary people as audience members. It seems probable that media have a formative influence on the students' narratives.

The book is also a little weak on illuminating the administrative side of the student exchange enterprise. Thousands of people are employed in academic institutions to cater for the increased bureaucratic needs caused by the onslaught of exchange students. Murphy-Lejeune does not tell us much about this aspect, although it can be legitimately suspected of

9 In the English language that is. From conversations with a French colleague – Frederic Dervin at Turku University, Finland – who is also working with the Erasmus I learned that there are more qualitative studies to be found in the French literature. Possibly the same may be true for several other languages.

having an important influence on the students' personal and collective experiences.

Again, despite these minor criticisms this is a fine book. One of its greatest merits is that is offers a very thorough scholarly account of some of the cultural processes currently reshaping our transnationally connected world. And it does so from the grassroots upward. This micro perspective is very welcome as it is frequently lacking in accounts of globalization, which sometimes build on little more than conjecture. In this way the study also sheds empirical light on bottom-up processes of globalization and cosmopolitanism. In the case of the exchange students of Europe much of their new aptitudes and self-descriptions, what may be their burgeoning cosmopolitanism, grows out of their spontaneous and self-organizing activities, often out of reach for interventions by their elders. This is encouraging to find substantiated in a book.

The personal narratives and experiences that we are treated to in this book are full of emotions and passions, and although at times troubled and perplexed, they most of the time convey an optimistic spirit. This might not be the best of worlds to live in, whether at home or abroad, but its momentous transformations make it a most exciting one! It is full of promise and suspense, and this tense anticipation is felt throughout the book, born out of the students' own experiences and mediated skillfully by Murphy-Lejeune. If there is a cosmopolitanization going on in the world, at least in the cultural sense of the word, then this is how some of it looks in Europe (see also Szepenszki and Urry, 2002). The exchange students of Europe could be on their way toward becoming the new world citizens of tomorrow; people at home in the world and with mobility as an ordinary habit.

Europe is certainly not the whole world, but European unity, if successfully achieved, could be a stepping stone for a more ramifying form of human interconnectedness and shared consciousness. For that reason alone the European exchange students are worth a study like this one. Perhaps we are heading towards a 'small world'; many findings point in that direction. In that case we will need our "little cosmopolitans" to help us navigate this new terrain. A new mind set is anyway required. Perhaps it is already in the making.

> Life abroad is a powerful experience of discovery of self and others because it shakes personal and social representations and introduces into identity processes perturbing elements, notably the notions of moving identities and flexible cognitive borders. This challenge of redefining self and others is open to a great many individuals now that Europe offers students a new stage on which to position their identity.
> (Murphy-Lejeune 2002: 30)

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