Politics as Praxis
A New Trend in Political Science

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For several decades the politcal agenda of discussion has been characterized by a dichotomy of action theory and structural theory. To phrase it in Eastonian terms, the question has been whether the authoritative allocation of values for a society is best described and explained by reference to the purposes and reasons that actors have for their political conduct or by reference to the structural needs which unbeknownst to themselves that conduct fulfils.

Today this description no longer seems to suffice as an illustration of what is actually going on in our discipline. A new trend or intellectual tendency has emerged, expressing a wish to go between actor and structure with an interactional model, linking the analysis of the rationalization of action to the analysis of its unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions. The trend manifests a shift towards a conception of political organizing as relating to the fundamentally recursive character of social life as a historical practice expressing the mutual dependence of structure and agency. It makes its presence felt within various fields of political analysis.

In the analysis of government it emerges as a gross orienting concept of the state as a temporal and multi-dimensional phenomenon, based on the argument "that the actual extent and consequences of state autonomy can only be analyzed and explained in terms specific to particular types of sociopolitical systems and to particular sets of historical and international circumstances" (Skocpol, 1979:12).

In organization theory it appears as an approach to reorganization as 'garbage cans', emphasizing how "(a)ccess rules for participants and issues change over time in response to experience, conscious attempts to control reorganizations, and the cumulative twists of history, but the general absence of precise rules controlling access makes it likely that reorganization will become garbage cans, highly contextual combinations of people, choice opportunities, problems, and solutions" (March-Olsen, 1983:286).

In administrative theory it occurs as a model of implementation steering linking actors and structures to an interactive steering process in which "three flows (socialization, information and constraining/enabling) affect one or more actor properties more or less simultaneously in a very complicated manner. The effects of one flow constitute new preconditions of the second flow, etc. Time lags may appear between the flows, implicating, say, that the constraining/enabling manifests itself immediately, that the information appears with a certain delay, dependent on whether the actor is able to interpret it, and that the socialization costs considerable time and affects the actor's interpretation of information, what gives rise to new incentives, etc." (Lundquist 1985:227).

In policy analysis it emerges as an approach to street-level bureaucracy, stressing the face-to-face interaction between bureaucrats and clients. "It is one thing to be treated neglectfully and routinely by the telephone company, the motor vehicle bureau, or other government agencies whose agents know nothing of personal circumstances surrounding a claim or request. It is quite another thing to be shuffled, categorized, and treated "bureaucratically", (in the pejorative sense), by someone to whom one is directly talking and from whom one expects at least an open and sympathetic hearing" (Lipsky 1980:9).

Together these approaches may be considered elements of a new political science, attempting to ground the analysis of individuals and collectivities, on various levels of analysis, in the analysis of their *interdependence,* on various levels of analysis. On such a view the nature of both individuals and collectivities appears as con-

stitutively malleable, i.e. as varying significantly with the constitution of their interdependencies in time and space. But what are the specific issues identifying *that* these approaches belong to a phenomenon called "New Political Science"? I shall try to answer this question by confronting James G. March's and Johan P. Olsen's description of what is going on in political science with Anthony Giddens's explication of what is going on in sociology. My argument will be that the latter provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of organizing which can serve to render the former's description of empirical political analysis distinct.

1. New Institutionalism in the Duality of Structure

Is there some over-all theme binding the aforementioned exemplars of boundary crossing theory together as a whole? March and Olsen have described them as exemplars of a New Institutionalism, embodying a cluster of challenges to conventional political thinking. They approach this cluster "from the perspective of students of formal organizations. The argument, however, extends beyond organization theory to a more general view of the place of institutions in politics and the possibilities for a political theory that is attentive to them" (March-Olsen 1984:735). The possibilities are described by reference to a variety of loosely interrelated ideas serving to deemphasize some basic uniformities involved in the conventional description and explanation of politics-in-a-society:

> The ideas deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions; they deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes and efficient histories in favor or relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency; they deemphasize metaphors of choice and allocative outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality of meaning and symbolic action. The ideas are not all mutually consistent. Indeed, some of them seem mutually inconsistent. For example, ideas based on the assumption that large institutional structures (e.g., organizations, legislatures, states) can be portrayed as rationally coherent autonomous actors are uneasy companions for ideas suggesting that political action is inadequately described in terms of rationality and choice (ibid: 738).

New Institutionalism reflects a wish to transcend the individual/collective dichotomy of conventional political thought in terms of a perspective linking the analysis of power to the analysis of meaning and norm by reference to their endogenous characteristics. On the one side, New Institutionalism "argues that preferences and meanings develop in politics, as in the rest of life, through a combination of education, indoctrination, and experience" (ibid: 739). On the other side, it holds that political "institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects the power of political actors, and thereby affects political institutions" (ibid). However, if these arguments are to function as a challenge to conventional political theory, we must be prepared to show that we can do something with them substantially different from what could be done without them. It will not suffice simply to replace the 'either/or' of conventional theory with a 'both-and' in which each and any political approach is *ipso facto* an aspect of New Institutionalism. In order to be an alternative we must point up the specific issues that make a difference between the new and the old politics. That is to say, New Institutionalism's 'both-and' must somehow be connected to an analysis, acknowledging that the issues in question are essentially *both* 'both-and' *and* 'either/or'.

Two possibilities seem available for this task. One can conduct an empirical search for the patterning of supposed exemplars of New Institutionalism in the light of March's and Olsen's loosely articulated presuppositions. One can also approach these exemplars by analogy, that is by means of a theoretical construct invented in scientific fields external to our discipline. Both strategies have their pros and cons. Yet the gap between them is smaller than it seems. Empirical analyses are always constituted in the light of some abstract theoretical presuppositions, and theoretical constructs always occur in a concrete empirical context. The ideal procedure seems to involve work in both directions. However, for matters of space and time, I shall approach New Institutionalism by analogy, namely by reference to Giddens's theory of structuration in radical European sociology. I shall do so for two specific purposes:

(1) Like March and Olsen, Giddens puts the emphasis on the interrelationship between power, meaning and norm as produced and reproduced in and through processes of interaction:

> (T)he components of social interaction are exhausted neither by its 'meaningful' nor its 'normative' content. *Power* is as integral an element of all social life as are

meaning and norms; this is the significance of the claim that structure can be analysed as rules and *resources,* resources being drawn upon in the constitution of power relations. All social interaction involves the use of power, as a necessary implication of the logical connection between human action and *transformative capacity.* Power within social systems can be analysed as relations of autonomy and dependence between actors involved in a multiplicity of transformation/mediation relations (1981:26–27).

(2) Unlike March and Olsen, however, Giddens connects the analysis of power, meaning and norms to a theory of the acting subject which situates action in time and space as a continuous flow of purposive conduct. In place of the dualism of individual voluntarism and structural determinism he substitutes a central notion of the duality of structure as the building block for an alternative paradigmatic perspective:

A fundamental postulate of the theory of structuration is the notion of the *duality of structure,* which refers to the essentially recursive nature of social practices. Structure is both the medium and outcome of the practices which constitute social systems. The concept of the duality of structure connects the *production* of social interaction, as always and everywhere a contingent accomplishment of knowledgeable social actors, to the *reproduction* of social systems across time-space (1981:27).

(1) and (2) concern "the recovery of temporality as integral to social theory: history and sociology become methodologically indistinguishable" (Giddens 1979:8). The recovery is effectuated by reference to Heidegger's philosophy in which the "temporality of *Dasein,* the human being, and that of the institutions of society in the *longue durée,* are grounded in the constitutive temporality of all Being" (1981:34). The notion of temporality is in turn related to Marx via "the problem of the generations – of how the dead make their influence felt upon the practices of the living" (ibid).

The link between temporality and the generations seems to converge with March's and Olsen's description of the new "theoretical directions suggested by a sympathetic appreciation of a tradition of institutionalist thought. Such an effort is a little like trying to write a useful commentary on Heidegger in the form of a Shakespearean sonnet. If it has virtue, it is in attempting to encourage talking about a subtle body of thought in a way sufficiently naive to entice the technically proficient" (1984:747). Their apparent relationship is a sign of the duality of theory construction and empirical analysis in the social sciences. Although their notes reveal that they have no knowledge of each other's efforts, the empirical investigations from which New Institutionalism springs seem capable of adding to the utility of the notion of the duality of structure as an alternative to conventional thought. Let us seek to specify what this alternative is all about.

1.1 New Political Science

New Institutionalism, we note, is not to be considered a new paradigmatic perspective but a set of empirically oriented attempts to cross the boundaries between existing theories in terms of a variety of approaches to the analysis of institutional order. March and Olsen mention six conceptions of order involved:

(a) Historical Order, involving "a greater concern for the ways in which institutions learn from their experience (Etheredge 1976) and the possibilities that lerning will produce adjustments that are slower or faster than are appropriate or are misguided" (1984:743).

(b) Temporal Order, providing "an alternative in which linkages are less consequential than temporal. Things are connected by virtue of their simultaneous presence or arrival" (ibid).

(c) Endogenous Order, suggesting "a number of ways in which internal institutional processes affect things like the power distribution, the distribution of preferences, or the management of control" (ibid).

(d) Normative Order, considering "the relations among norms, the significance of ambiguity and inconsistency in norms, and the time path of the transformation of normative structures" (ibid).

(e) Demographic Order, suggesting that "a human institution can be studied and interpreted as the cross-section of the lives of the people involved", and combining "a vision of organized life with attention to a property of individual lives that is itself a product of the institutional structure – the indvidual career" (ibid).

(f) Symbolic Order, examining "the ways in which the tendencies towards consistency and inconsistency in beliefs affect the organization of political meaning, the ways in which 'exemplary centers' (Geertz, 1980) create social order through ceremony, and the ways in which symbolic behavior transforms more instrumental behavior and is transformed by it" (ibid).

March's and Olsen's orders, I will hold,

manifest their ambition to distinguish the analysis of power (c) from the analysis of meaning (f) and norm (d). They furthermore express an attempt to link temporality (b) to the problem of the generations (a and e). But they do not identify the issues which bind these orders together internally as a whole. Drawing on Giddens's description of institutions as an order of sense and power relations produced and reproduced in processes of social interaction, these issues of a new political science become visible:

(1) *the issue of political stability and change.* In Giddens's framework the problem of order is "how *form* occurs in social relations, (or put in another fashion) how social systems 'bind' time and space" (1981:30). This problem manifests a break with conventional theory's tendency to derive political reproduction from the wants prompting action, whether these wants are understood as representing social values and norms internalized as need-dispositions through irrational mechanisms of personality (Parsons 1951) or as a simple individual formula in which rational political performance = ability + motivation (Downs 1957). Instead political reproduction is considered in a specific sense an 'unmotivated' phenomenon, which "always involves 'effort' on the part of social actors, but is at the same time for the most part done 'effortlessly', as part of the routine, 'taken-for-granted' nature of everyday life" (Giddens 1981:64). This alternative interpretation of order also appears in New Political Science, as the argument that "most change in organization results neither from extraordinary organizational processes or forces, nor from uncommon imagination, persistence or skill, but from relatively stable, routine processes that relate organizations to their environments" (March 1981:564).

(2) *the issue of actor and structure.* According to Giddens, the new conception of order encourages us to describe and explain actor and structure in terms of their historical interrelationship. "All social activity is formed in three conjoined moments of difference: temporally, structurally (in the language of semiotics, paradigmatically), and spatially; the conjunction of these express the *situated* character of social practices" (1981:30). The argument constitutes a methodological situationalism, breaking with a methodological individualism (Popper 1961), requiring us to account for macro-phenomena by the wants and beliefs of individuals, and a methodological collectivism (Durkheim 1951), demanding us to account for micro-events by the positions and functions of individuals in an institutionalized structure. Political action is seen as arising from the interlocking of intentionalities rather than from their singular existence. The observation of what actors do and say *in situ* is considered a prerequisite for relevant knowledge of political life as well as the building block for macro-political conceptualization (Knorr-Certina 1981). Traces of the new methodology can be localized in New Political Science: "Organization-tools are different from others in that the materials of which they are composed are autonomous, goal-forming creatures. They are human beings. As such, they have the need to preserve themselves, their values, and their self-images – they have survival needs. They also have the propensity to interact and thereby to spontaneously generate roles and behavior norms and to enforce them informally upon one another. They have a strong tendency to become interlocked in an unplanned, spontaneous system" (Thompson 1975:15).

(3) *the issue of power and legitimation.* On Giddens's view the interpolation of power as an inherent component of social systems of interaction presupposes a conceptual distinction between political and economic institutions as *modes of domination,* symbolic orders as *modes of discourse,* and law as *modes of sanction.* The distinction signifies that structures "can be analysed in terms of the transformations and mediations in human activity through which they are in turn sustained. *Transformation* and *mediation:* the two most essential characteristics of human social life. Transformative capacity /---/ forms the basis of human action – the 'could-have-done-otherwise' inherent in the concept of action – and at the same time connects action to domination and power. Mediation expresses the variety of ways in which, in social systems, interaction is made possible across space and time" (1981:53). Mediation and transformation are linked to each other "by emphasizing that structure consists of rules *and* resources" (ibid). This new emphasis serves to break with conventional theory's thesis, that any order of domination is *ipso facto a legitimate* order of domination.It indicates that there is "a considerably greater potential separation between the practices actors sustain in day-to-day social

reproduction and the over-all symbolic orders normatively sanctioned by dominant groups or classes in particular societies" (ibid:66). As such it constitutes a break with conventional structural theory's tendency to conceive of institutional domination as affected by power only in combination with a conflict of interest (Almond and Verba, 1965). And it also constitutes a break with conventional action theory's tendency to treat actor domination as one-way in the sense that it 'drains off' towards the top of the political pyramid, leaving those in its lower eschelons with a progressive decline in autonomy of action (Dahl 1961). The breaks also appear in New Political Science: "Actually the average citizen has never been so free in his range of choices as he is now and has never been able to exert so much influence when grouped together with others as he currently can. People obviously are not all powerfull and do not have the unlimited autonomy needed to bring about the utopian states they dream about. But they have much more power in other everyday practices of social life than they think. They either do not know how much they have or do not want to know so that they can keep complaining or dreaming" (Crozier 1982:5).

(1), (2) and (3) hang together internally. The analysis of stability and change by reference to the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power via routines is said to call for an actor-structure approach linking individual and collective action to interaction via outcomes, what in turn is said to call for a framework, distinguishing resources from rules, at the level of structure, by reference to the difference between capability and knowledgeability, at the level of action. Any existing political approach which calls attention to one or more of these three issues shall be said to carry elements of New Political Science as a trend or an intellectual tendency. Of course, it need not express all issues simultaneously or be logically consistent in all three dimensions; nor does its intentions necessarily have to converge with those underlying my designation of it. The fact *that* it expresses support for either of these issues is the sole identifying criterion of its relationship to new political science in this study. But let us begin analysing the discussion from which the three issues have emerged.

2. The Conventional Approach to Stability and Change

In the 1950s Dahrendorf described the conflict between the traditions as an integration/conflict dichotomy, applying to two opposed conceptions of social order which have ruled Western philosophy since its beginnings. One is the integration theory of society which conceives of social structure as a functionally integrated system regulated by normative consensus. The other he calls the conflict theory of society which views social structure as a form of organization held together by force and obligations transcended in an unending process of change (1959:159). In the 1980s, Charles E. Lindblom demonstrates that this sociological description still sways political scientists:

> *A Conventional Intellectual Tradition in American Political Science.* According to views common in theoretical circles /---/ the political system called democratic in the West is best understood as a distinctive kind of mutual-benefit society. However imperfect, it provides some degree of social order, as well as widespread benefits beyond that. In Deutsch's term, it "coordinates the learning processes". In Easton and Hess's, it attacks "problems in common". In Key's, it "translates mass preference into public policy." /---/.
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> *A Synthesis of Dissent.* An alternative view captures the most basic features of dissenting Marxist and other radical thought on liberal or bourgeois democracy. A transitional form, liberal democracy can be understood only in the light of where it came from. If we cut into the historical process at a stage at which humankind has already developed a complex social structure marked by substantial specialization of function, we see that some subsets of the population at that time rule others and enjoy various advantages denied to other subsets (1982:10).

At the heart of the integration/conflict dichotomy, Lindblom says, is two opposed conceptions of conflict. (1) a notion of conflict as competition – as an integrating force which can be 'managed' by the exercise of reason and good will, and which, therefore, is both civilized and civilizing. Competition is a means of solving problems in a peaceful way, generating new ideas, ensuring growth, etc. It spreads through a complex network of political power, and takes shape in a set of political institutions operating on the basis of inducement and consent. (2) a notion of conflict as class struggle, as a disruptive force, inherent in the capatalist mode of production. Class conflict, on this view, is incapable of solution within the boundaries of

liberal democracy. It is not a matter of problems to be solved in common but a matter of a state of domination and subjection to be ended by a total transformation of the conditions which give rise to it. Class domination spreads through private ownership and control of the means of production, and manifests itself in a political apparatus operating on the basis of coercion and class ideology (cf. Miliband 1977:17).

How does the opposition between the theories of integration and conflict occur? Because of their shared tendency to conceive of 'order' as a question of how individuals come to adhere to the normative demands of society, Lindblom answers. "We fall into a bad habit of simply taking for granted that people in any society will think alike, as though agreement were a natural phenomenon that requires no explanation" (1982:19). To analyse integration and conflict as as a matter of how far actors have 'internalized' the 'needs' of their system is simply to leave the question of how agreement is brought about largely unexplained. "Agreement on political fundamentals cries for an explanation. Why, how, through which mechanisms do people come to think alike about political fundamentals?" (ibid). As such the integration/conflict dichotomy indicates that to "assign a purpose to the political system independent of the purposes of any significant number of participants requires careful formulation and justification" (1982:13).

2.1 The Actor-Structure Dichotomy in Conventional Thinking

The last sentence shows that Lindblom considers the question of how integration and conflict are to be explained more fundamental than the integration/conflict dichotomy itself. His critiquee primarily applies to a collectivism, arguing (1) that social systems have 'needs' and (2) that identifying the ways in which they meet these needs constitutes an explanation of why particular, given social processes are as they are (Giddens 1981:16, cf. Mandelbaum 1973). In opposition to this doctrine, Lindblom offers us an *individualism,* demanding us to analyse all of the concepts used in social theory in terms of the interests, decisions, activities, etc. of individual human beings. "What do we actually observe when we observe political life?", he asks. "We observe millions of ordinary people pursuing a variety of objectives", he himself answers. "Even to an experienced observer, it is not at all clear that certain objectives common to all occupy much of their energies. On the other hand, neither is it obvious that the various partisans cohere either deliberately, tacitly, or unintentionally into two loose coalitions, the advantaged and the disadvantaged, each pursuing distinctive conflicting objectives" (1982:13, cf. Elster 1978).

Thus Lindblom rejects the idea of macroscopic laws or facts which are sui generis. His descripition of integration and conflict does consequently not only concern the question of whether the political institutions of liberal democracy serve benign or repressive purposes but also the question of whether actors are generally aware of unaware of these purposes. J. W. N. Watkins has described the latter question as embodying an intrinsic opposition between methodological individualism and methodological holism (which I call 'methodological collectivism').

> I am an advocate of /---/ methodological individualism. According to this principle, the ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and understanding of their situation. Every complex social situation, institution, or event is the result of a particular configuration of indviduals, their dispositions, situations, beliefs, and physical resources and environment (1973:168).

> Many people would regard this a truism. But some philosophers of history have taken an opposite view, equally metaphysical but recondite and exciting, perhaps because it is a piece of theology in disguise. /---/ In the secularized version of this theory it is the social whole which so determines matters for the individual that he cannot avoid (or can hardly avoid: the determinism may be a little loose) fulfulling his function within the whole system. On this view, the social behaviour of individuals should be explained in terms of their positions within its cultural-institutional structure, together with the laws which govern the system. These laws are supposed to be *sui generis,* applying to the whole as such and not derivable from statements of individuals and their interrelations. This is what is called methodological holism. (1973:180).

Methodological individualism argues that the understanding of a complex political situation is always derived from a knowledge of the beliefs, interests, activities, etc. of individuals. On this view both integration and conflict appear as a phenomenon of willed or intentional individual action, since ultimately only individuals are responsible, purposive human agents. Methodological collectivism, in contrast, holds

that the understanding of such a situation is, in the last instance, derived from a knowledge of the unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of intentional indvidual action. On this view both integration and conflict appear as the result of social values and norms operating 'behind the backs' of purposive human agents. The opposition between them consequently carries two interconnected questions: *(1) does the policy process in liberal democracy serve universal (generalizable) or sectional interests? (2) do these interests manifest the purposes and reasons that actors have for their conduct or the structural needs which unbeknownst to themselves that conduct fulfils* (Giddens 1979:210–214, cf. Berger and Offe 1982 Bluhm 1982, Effrat 1972, Gold, Lo and Wright 1975, Elster 1982, Cohen 1982, Parijs 1982, Roemer 1982).

3. An Alternative Approach: Dependence through Independence

If power can be said to refer to capabilities to achieve outcomes, the next question becomes what problem is left out by attempts to derive power from analyses of the conscious or unconscious wants prompting action, as both Lindblom and Watkins advise us to do? Precisely the problem of power itself, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron answer in radical sociology:

> O. Every power to exert symbolic violence, i. e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as egitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.
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> *Gloss 1:* To refuse this axiom, which states simultaneously the relative autonomy and the relative dependence of symbolic relations with respect to power relations, would amount to denying the possibility of a science of sociology. All the theories implicitly or explicitly constructed on the basis of other axioms lead one either to make the creative freedom of individuals the source of symbolic action, considered as autonomous from the objective conditions in which it is performed, or to annihilate symbolic action as such, by refusing it any autonomy with respect to its material conditions of existence. One is therefore entitled to regard this axiom as the principle of the theory of sociological knowledge (1977:4).

Individualism and collectivism, Bourdieu and Passeron argue, agree that here can be no interests without wants. However, since individuals are not necessarily aware of their motives (wants) for acting in a particular way, they are not necessarily aware of their interests either, i. e. of the outcomes that facilitate the fulfilment of their wants. It follows that power must be separated analytically from what is consciously intended or unconsciously wanted in the analysis of integration and conflict. Otherwise we will neglect the fact that intentions need not always converge with wants: an actor may intend to do, and to things which s/he does not want to do; and s/he may want things that s/he does not intend to instigate any course of action to attain (cf. Giddens 1976:86).

Power, therefore, does neither reduce to meaningful or symbolic action, via the capacity of individuals to realize their *will*, nor to society's 'reason' for the existence of reproduced social items, via the capacity of collectivities to realize their vested *interests*. Action involves interventions in the world, thus producing definite outcomes. These outcomes may be both intended and unintended and they may both hinder and facilitate the fulfilment of agents' wants. It follows, Bourdieu and Passeron conclude, that integration and conflict should be considered a phenomenon of *"dependence through independence" (1977:177) reproduced in the duality of structure as both the medium and outcome of human action.*

In place of individualism and collectivism, Bourdieu and Passeron substitute a methodological situationalism, arguing that the understanding of a complex political situation is always derived from knowledge of the power relations which tie the outcome of political action to *particular occasions* and to *other participants* in the *situation*. This calls attention to Giddens's attempt to connect the issue of action and structure to the issue of power and legitimation by reference to the transformative capacity of action.

3.1 The Transformative Capacity of Action

The notion of transformation connects action to domination and power. To identify this relation with the conscious or the unconscious, Giddens holds, is to neglect that, whenever we speak of human action, we imply the possibility that the actor 'could have acted otherwise':

> Many analyses of power /---/ define power as the capacity of an acting subject to intervene in the course of events in the world so as to influence or alter those events. I would include Weber's famous definition of power in this category, although the 'events' involved are the acts of others: power is the capability of an individual

to secure his or her own ends even against the will of others. Quite distinct from this idea of power are those concepts, such as that formulated by Parsons, which see power above all as a phenomenon of the collectivity. What we see here, I think, is a dualism comparable with and related to the dualism of action and structure noted earlier. The same methodological tactic is appropriate: we should replace this dualism with a conception of a duality, acknowledging and connecting each of these two aspects of power. This I try to do by means of the notion of resource. Resources are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but are constituted as structures of domination. Resources are the media whereby power is employed in the routine course of social action; but they are at the same time structural elements of social systems, reconstituted in social interaction. /---/.

All relations of autonomy and dependence are reciprocal: however wide the asymmetrical distribution of resources involved, all power relations express autonomy and dependence 'in both directions'. Only a person who is kept totally confined and controlled does not participate in the dialectic of control. But such a person is then *no longer an agent (1982:39).*

The reciprocity of power indicates that power is contingently and not logically associated with conflict. "If power and conflict frequently go together", Giddens says, "it is not because the one logically implies the other, but because power is linked to the pursuance of interests, and men's interests may fail to coincide. All I mean to say by this is that, while power is a feature of every form of human interaction, division of interest is not" (1976:112).

New Political Science stresses this point when arguing that "no organization can persist unless its members manage somehow or other to come to terms with each other's actions, to work with one another, even if antagonistically, in order to get done whatever needs to be done "for" or "in" or "through" the organisation" (1978:105). The parameters of autonomy and dependence, we are told, "are simultaneously a source of integration and conflict. The dimensions of dependence determine whether parties stay in a given relationship, attempt to change it by tactical action, increase the amount of distance in the relationship, or simply abandon it" (Bacharach and Lawler 1980:23). Hence, the reciprocity of power reveals that the parameters of autonomy and dependence in social systems can be identified neither with willed or intended action nor with social needs or interests operating 'behind the backs' of the knowledgeable human beings who (re)produce them in their interaction. In supposing so, conventional theory actually neglects that power relations are "always two-way, even if the power of one actor or party in a social relation is minimal compared to another" (Giddens 1979:93). To transcend the problem, we must connect it to an attempt to transcend the underlying actor/structure dichotomy, characterized by the fact that one fraction "views indvidual action as the derivative of the social system, and the other views the social system as the derivative of individual action" (Astley and Van de Ven 1983:251).

Both as an individual capacity and as a feature of the totality, Giddens says, pwer depends upon the utilization of resources. "Resources are the media whereby transformative capacity is employed as power in the routine course of social interaction; but they are at the same time structural elements of social systems as systems, reconstituted through their utilisation in social action" (1979:92). Neither the institutional involvement of power nor its use to accomplish outcomes implicate an acceptance of it as a valid norm, whether as an internalized obligation (collectivism) or as a right which is rational to adopt (individualism). To suppose so would be to reduce the problem of power (domination) to a normative problem (legitimation). And this would in turn conceal that the knowledge underlying its acceptance in the routine course of daily-life centers precisely on its constitution in interaction via judgments of its constitution as meaningful.

This attempt to tie the day-to-day acceptance of power to meaning or cognitive sense making rather than to norm or motivation can also be localized in New Political Science: "The dimensions of dependence are the criteria by which actors synthesize and summarize the multitude of conditions underlying a power relationship. Actors may take ineffective of counterproductive actions in part because of a miscalculation of power capabilities; similarly they may receive more outcomes in a relationship than we would expect from the objective power conditions, because they manipulate and manage the impressions others have of their power. As a consequence, it is relevant to ask whether actors are likely to use their evaluations of dependence to make subjective judgments about power and its use" (Bacharach and Lawler 1980:22). The duality of resources is therefore the correlate, in respect of power, of the duality of rules, in respect of the communication of meaning and of normative sanctions: "resources are not just additional ele-

ments to these, but include the means whereby the meaningful and the normative content of interaction is actualised" (Giddens 1979:92). Or as Crozier puts it:

> Every organized human action, every collective effort and even ideological movements lead to what can be called the perverse effect, effects that are the opposite of what the participants wanted. These perverse effects cannot be blamed on some force of evil-neither on the powerful at the top of the social scale nor on agitators at the bottom. They are the necessary consequences of interdependent relationships among people.
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> This will come as a surprise to those who still believe in the myth of the social contract, believing that the collective will of people, the sum of their individual purposes, naturally produces rational decisions. (Crozier 1983:3).

Let us see what the new view of power implicates for the interpretation of stability and change and actor and structure.

4. The Operation of Time-Space Relations in Social Systems

Both human personality and social institutions, Giddens argues, are constitutively malleable. But the temporality which gives them this malleability is not of the same level, since it expresses how the "structural practices of social systems 'bind' the temporality of the *dureé* of the day-to-day lifeworld to the longue durée of institutions, interpolated in the finite span of existence of the individual human being" (1981:28). In New Political Science this micro-macro problem is said to represent the "contradiction between the necessity of breaking with the past and the danger that this entails" (Crozier 1983:51). The contradiction indicates that the analysis of the *longue durée* of institutional time is not immediately derivable from the analysis of the *durée* of human day-to-day existence, or vice versa. Althoug the macro-relations between collectivities, at the level of *systems* integration and conflict, are the *outcome* of the micro-relations between individual actors, at the level of *social* integration and conflict, the former are still their *medium.* Thus to dissolve the contradiction, we must find the pressure points of the system "beyond the narrow structure of each institution involved. By working with time and space, the strategist of change can avoid a confrontation that would exhaust him" (Crozier 1983:52).

What does the distinction between individual and institutional time imply for the understanding of the dichotomy of integration and conflict. Above all, it implicates a rejection of the synchronic/diachronic dualism. "The characteristic view of the synchronic/diachronic distinction is that to study a social system synchronically is to take a sort of 'timeless snapshot' of it. Abstracting from time, we can identify functional relations, how the various contributing elements of a social system are connected with one another. When we study systems diachronically, on the other hand, we analyse how they change over time. But the result of this is an elementary, though very consequential error: *time becomes identified with social change*" (Giddens 1981:17). The statement that every analysis of social stability must also *ipso facto* be an account of change remains a truism, unless it is demonstrated how it is in fact to be accomplished. "Discarding the distinction of synchrony and diachrony is actually the condition of making it more than just a banality" (Giddens 1979:210).

The constitutive features of time-space relations, Giddens holds, can be comprehended by approaching integration and conflict in terms of a distinction between presence and absence or moment (micro) and totality (macro). Systems of social interaction, reproduced through the duality of structure in context of bounded conditions of the rationalization of action are constituted through the interdependence of actors or collectivities. Interdependence refers to the degree of " 'systemness', that is involved in any mode of system reproduction. 'Integration' can be defined therefore as regularised ties, interchanges or *reciprocity of practices* between either actors or collectivities. 'Reciprocity of practices' has to be understood as involving regularised relations of relative autonomy and dependence between the parties concerned" (Giddens 1979:76). As such 'systemness' is not synonymous with 'cohesion' or 'consensus'. According centrality to the notion of social reproduction does not imply emphasizing stability at the expense of radical discontinuities in system organization. "The inherent relation between production and reproduction involved in the idea of the duality of structure carries with it the implication that he seeds of change are present in every moment of the constitution of social systems across time and space" (1981:27).

4.1 Integration and Conflict in Processes of Interaction

Social integration is concerned with systemness on the plane of face-to-face interaction. It typically

occurs through the reflexive monitoring of conduct in conjunction with the rationalization of conduct. Systemness expressed in face-to-face interaction is a primary manifestation of time-space presence in social organization and is fundamental to the systemness of society as a whole. But so is struggle, understood as relations of antagonism between actors. The presence of struggle indicates that the negative aspects of the sanctioning of power are felt as immediately by the actor in the social life-world as the positive ones, though unconscious elements of cognition may close one's eyes to their presence.

The analysis of systemness and antagonism in face-to-face interaction is the actual target of Lindblom's discussion of integration and conflict above. He advises us to focus on the formation of beliefs and values among "millions of ordinary people pursuing a variety of purposes" (1982:13), in order to figure out why or how "certain transmitted beliefs and values are agreed rather than diverse" (ibid:19). And he does so, because he feels the immediate *presence* of both systemness and antagonism, although the former may be a bit more "manifest" in day-to-day political business than the latter. This is why he can argue that "the conventional emphasis on diversified conflict to the near exclusion of attention to conflict between advantaged and disadvantaged is /---/ an intellectual habit of focusing on manifest conflict rather than an emphasis warranted by empirical comparison of the two patterns of conflict which are not equally manifest" (ibid:15). On this level, his critique is both cogent and meaningful.

However, problems emerge, when he seeks to use an analysis, which applies to the analysis of integration and conflict, on the plane of face-to-face interaction between actors, for criticizing a model which applies to the analysis of the present effects of an absent totality, on the plane of interaction between collectivities. Systemness and antagonism on the plane of face-to-face interaction typically occur through the reflexive monitoring of action in conjunction with the rationalization of conduct. But, "(i)n the immediacy of the life-world", Giddens says, "social relations can be influenced by different factors from those involved with other who are spatially (and perhaps temporally) absent" (1979:77). These 'absences' show how the knowledgeability of actors is always bounded by structures via unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action – i.e. by a totality which is present only in its effects. To comprehend them we must distinguish power relations between agents from power relations between collectivities and then distinguish these two types of power relations from the *duality of structure* which "relates the smallest item of day-to-day behaviour to attributes of far more inclusive social systems" (ibid).

Collectivism applies to the analysis of systems integration which concerns the problem of reciprocity between *groups or collectivities*. Therefore, to speak of systemness on the plane of *interactions* between *collectivities* is not to assume that social *systems of interaction ipso facto* carry a motivational commitment corresponding to their *particular structures*. On the other side, since we are dealing with *systems* of interaction, conflict, on this plane, cannot refer to antagonism on the plane of interaction between *individual* actors. Macro-conflict does not concern conflict as 'struggle' but conflict as opposed structural principles of systems organization, applying to situations "where those principles operate *in terms of each other* but at the same time *contravene one another*" (Giddens 1979:141):

Table 1: Integration and Conflict

level / plane	*Integration*	*Conflict*
Social	reciprocity between actors (autonomy/ dependence)	relations of antagonism or struggle
System	reciprocity between collectivities (autonomy/dependence)	opposed princples of systems organization

The more there is a fusion or 'overlap' of opposed principles at the system plane, Giddens says, the greater the likelihood of antagonism, on the social plane, and the greater the likelihood that such antagonism will be intense. "Of direct repression, little needs to be said here. However it should be acknowledged that some of the major traditions in social science are prone to underestimate how far force and violence (or its threat) can be successfully employed to forestall the emergence of conflict as overt struggle" (1979:145). At the same time we should not take this underestimation to justify the idea that power is inherently *coercive* and that its use inevitably implies the existence of *conflict*. Since power operates on the level of integration as well, "(n)either of these ideas withstands close scrutiny: each usually reflects the assumption that power is not

an integral and primary aspect of social life" (1981:50).

The distinctions in table 1 "are not just opposites, or the 'poles' of two dimensions. The conceptualisation I intend is a more dialectical one than this. Contradiction only occurs *through* system integration" (Giddens 1979:144), and system integration relies fundamentally on the systemness of social integration. They can all be incorporated as features of structures of domination which are both enabling and obligating and which operate through both inducement and coercion.

5. The Continuity of Form in Day-to-Day Conduct

When social theory is prone to overestimate either the one or the other plane and level in table 1 above, it is basically because of a tendency to neglect that their interconnections express no 'laws' of 'invariant' connection between individuals and collectivities, Giddens holds. "The 'binding' of time and space in social systems always has to be examined historically, in terms of the bounded knowledgeablity of human action" (1981:30). Social systems exist *as* systems only in and through their 'functioning' (reproduction) over time. Organizing, therefore, should be considered a 'spacing in time' which binds the interplay of absence and presence/totality and moments in the *durée* of social interaction. "All social interaction, like any other type of event, occurs across time and space. All social interaction intermingles presence and absence. Such intermingling is always both complicated and subtle, and can be taken to express modes in which structures are drawn upon to incorporate the long-term *durée* of institutions within the contingent social act" (Giddens 1981:38).

To conceive of interaction as occurring across time-space is to emphasize that social actors do not just 'adapt' to the 'needs' of the institutions which they themselves produce and reproduce in their interaction. Institutions do indeed return the escape of human history from human intentions as unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions causally influencing human action, Giddens holds, but their causal influence does by no means implicate that the social totality is a *cause* which is absent, since a cause which is absent cannot possibly explain how it is, how it happens that its effects become a real presence.

Collectivism, Giddens argues, "implies a *derogation of the lay actor*. If actors are regarded as cultural dopes or mere 'bearers of a mode of production' with no worthwhile understanding of their surroundings or the circumstances of their action, the way is immediately laid open for the supposition that their own views can be disregarded in any practical programmes that might be inaugurated" (1979:71–72). New Political Science makes a similar point. "Cogitation is called upon to restructure interaction. /---/. When citizens do their part as analysts they subject policy dogma to scrutiny, they distinguish the more from the less important, they relate their desires to those of other citizens, and they figure out what their participation is worth not only to themselves, but to others. For citizens to be something more than ciphers, they must be able to convert their everyday activity into usable evidence for making choices about participating in public policies that connect them to other people" (Wildavsky 1979:210).

Once we recognize that 'micro-macro' does not concern actor and structure but face-to-face *social interaction* and over-all *systems* of *interaction,* it immediately becomes evident why structure cannot be treated as a *barrier* to action: The unit of interaction calls attention to the mutual dependence of structure and action. Structure forms 'personality' and 'society' simultaneously – but in neither case exhaustively: because of the significance of unintended consequences of action, and because of unacknowledged conditions of action. Thus to grasp the relation between actor and structure, Giddens says, we must acknowledge "that the reflexive monitoring of action includes the monitoring of *the setting of interaction,* and not just the behaviour of the particular actors taken separately" (1979:57). "There simply are no logical or even methodological distinctions betweenthe social sciences and history – appropriately conceived" (ibid:230). Since social conduct always displays itself as contingent upon the conduct of others, the basic methodological unit of social analysis can be neither actor nor structure. It must be the situated interaction between actors and collectivities, which reveals that all laws in the social sciences are " 'historical', in the sense that they hold under particular parameters of social reproduction, involving definite alignments of intended and unintended consequences of action" (ibid:232, cf. Cashmore and Mullan 1983, Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981).

To say that society exists only where a number of individuals enter into interaction with each other

is neither to neglect individual action nor social structure. One can bracket institutional analysis in order to concentrate on strategic conduct, and one can place an epoché upon strategic conduct, treating structures as chronically reproduced features of social systems. But this 'bracketing' and 'placing' is methodological and not substantive, since it manifests that it is neither action nor structure but the modalities of face-to-face interaction in the social life-world which are the chief prop of systems of social interaction, via the reproduction of institutions in the duality of structure. As such, the recursive relation of day-to-day interaction (moment) and systems of interaction (totality) "*is best not seen as a part/whole relation at all:* the 'parts' of society are regularised social practices, organised as social systems" (Giddens 1981:44–45).

Structures exist in time-space only as moments recursively involved in the (re)production of these practices. They have only a 'virtual' existence. "The term 'social structure' thus tends to include two elements, not clearly distinguished from one another: the *patterning of interaction,* as implying relations between actors or groups; and the *continuity of interaction* in time" (Giddens 1979:62). Practices manifest the relations between actors or collectivities reproduced across time and space. Structures, on the other side, comprise the rules and resources which are both the medium and the outcome of these practices constituting social systems. The social values and norms to which collectivism appeals as 'latent functions' determining social conduct are actually to be considered properties of practices situated in time-space. They comprise the stocks of knowledge drawn upon by actors in the (re)production of political interaction and are simultaneously the sources of accounts they may supply of the purposes, reasons and motives of their action.

The same standpoint appears in New Political Science: "Culture is created by the continuous confrontation between objectives and the resources – knowledge, power, money, talent, trust, and others – necessary to achieve the objectives" (Wildawsky 1979:42). "My preference for interaction rather than cogitation, for more "asking" and less "telling", for politics over planning, is not meant to protect interaction from scrutiny as if it were a dogma. On the contrary, skepticism should extend especially to interaction – how it develops, what sustains it, why it produces outcomes, its class and ideological biases, when it should be changed – precisely because we begin by intending to rely on it. In a word, the main task of responsible intellectual cogitation is to monitor, appraise, modify, and otherwise strengthen social interaction" (ibid:12). The true locus of the problem of order is the problem of how the duality of structure operates in social life: "of how *continuity of form* is achieved in the day-to-day conduct of social activity" (Giddens 1979:216). Such continuity through discontinuity is not assured through the motives prompting action but rather through the processes of social interaction themselves.

5.1 Practical Consciousness and Routine Reproduction

What does it mean to say that knowledge is not incidental to the operation of society, but is necessarily involved in it, even though such knowledge is not held in mind in a conscious way? It simply means that the sources of accounts actors may supply of their action need not be specifically motivated as reasons for acting in a particular way. The tacit stocks of knowledge drawn upon by actors in the (re)production of interaction are at the same time the source of accounts they may supply of the purposes, reasons and motives of their action. Yet the former cannot be reduced to the latter.

Tacit stocks of knowledge relate to actors' practical consciousness, which must be clearly distinguished from their discursive consciousness. The latter involves an *acknowledged* rule of action, covering what can be brought to and held in consciousness. The former, in contrast, covers all the things which actors know tacitly about how to 'go on' in the contexts of social life. These are normally employed in an unacknowledged way, and can only partially and imperfectly be expressed in discourse. "The stocks of knowledge applied in the production and reproduction of social life as a skilled activity are largely 'unconscious' in so far as social actors can normally only offer a fragmentary account of what they 'know' if called upon to do so; but they are not unconscious in the sense given to that term by structural writers" (Giddens 1979:40, cf. Fodor 1981).

New Political Science speaks about the relation between discursive and practical consciousness in terms of degrees: "The higher degrees of consciousness involve some kind of explicit calculus. It is an activity in which goals are identified, alter-

natives sought, consequences predicted, alternatives evaluated and choices made. The lower degrees mean repetitiveness of activities, which are undertaken in the same manner day after day" (Lundquist 1985:140). The distinction indicates that the knowledgeable character of human conduct is displayed above all in the vast variety of tacit or unacknowledged modes of awareness and competence called 'practical consciousness' which actors chronically employ in the course of daily life. The basis of this consciousness is routine (repetiveness).

"Where routine prevails, the rationalisation of conduct readily conjoins the basic security system of the actor to the conventions that exist and are drawn upon in interaction as mutual knowledge" (Giddens 1979:219). 'Mutual knowledge' refers to the interpretative schemes whereby actors constitute and understand social life as meaningful; "this can be distinguished from what I shall call 'commonsense', which can be regarded as comprising a more or less articulated body of theoretical knowledge that can be drawn upon to explain why things are as they are, or happen as they do, in the natural and social world" (Giddens 1976:115).

The distinction between mutual knowledge and commonsense is critical for the understanding of practical consciousness, since this type of consciousness, in contrast to the discursive one, does not involve the ability to give a principled explanation of an act by reference to the theoretical knowledge provided by commonsense. This is also why "behavior which is viewed as pathological within a purposive-rational framework makes sense when it is viewed as part of a ritual or ceremony, and linked to the creation of meaning rather than to the production of substantive decisions" (Olsen 1983:9). For whereas the purposive-rational action "involves the actor in providing a verbal account of what may only implicitly guide his behaviour" (ibid:114), namely the explanatory beliefs produced in such action, (ibid:114), this is not the case for the ritual action (which is routinely employed).

The ritual action does raise the question of why actors repete certain social activities when we discursively know the beliefs connected to them to be false – a question that may be as relevant for the analysis of accustomed routines in a bureaucracy as for the analysis of, say, the Hopi rain ceremonial (cf. Giddens 1979:210–216). But the answer is not necessarily to be found in the irrational. It could be said to have its basis in the fact that actors typically *know how to use* the products of purposive-rational action in a completely unacknowledged way, despite the fact that some of these products in the analysis may turn out to have lost their immediate relevance as explanatory beliefs. Hence, "when asked to explain why he did what he did at a particular time and in a particular place", the bureaucrat or the Hopi "may choose to reply 'for no reason' without in any way compromising others' acceptance of him as competent" (Giddens 1976:114). This shows that the line between the giving of a principled explanation and the giving of false reasons after the event is thin. But it also shows that there are many things which one 'knows how to do' in Praxis, but which one, when asked about it, cannot formulate discursively as an explanation of why these things are as they are, or happen as they do. Thus we also have to distinguish our practical knowledge from the discursive knowledge typically underpinning the mutual knowledge which we bring to any encounter by participants:

Table 2: The nature of human action

Types of action / Types of rules	*Conscious*	*Non-Conscious*
Acknowledged ('discursive')	deliberate and intentional choice	outcome-satisfying behaviour
Non-Acknowledged ('practical')	day-to-day routine action	enactment of unconscious motives

The notion of practical consciousness grants New Political Science an entirely new angle of incidence to the discussion of specific and diffuse support for a political system (Easton 1965B). It carries the argument that support need not be conscious because it follows acknowledged rules (specific) or unconscious because it follows unacknowledged rules (diffuse) (cf. references in Easton 1975). The first part of this statement serves to distinguish instances where action is governed by a deliberate and intentional choice for the purpose of maximizing some objective function (Elster 1979:113–114) from instances where actors develop minimally satisfying outcomes and cease searching for additional alternatives when they have achieved one of these outcomes (Waldman 1972:109). The latter, in

contrast to the former, does not imply that wo/men *consciously* calculate costs and benefits or the probable outcomes of the various action they see open to them. It merely implies that wo/men act *as if* they engage in a rational calculus, thus acting on behalf of motives which are manifestly learned but not necessarily conscious.

However, the second part of the statement, that the non-acknowledged need not converge with the non-conscious, is the far more consequential one. It enables us to conceive of the opposition between collectivism and individualism as deriving from their shared tendency to identify the ritual, familiar or traditional with the unacknowledged *and* unconscious. For, actually, they both tend to identify rule following with what is acknowledged (consciously or unconsciously), hereby neglecting the creative work of interpretation that is presumed in the everyday constitution of intersubjectivity via routines. Thus the tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, is reduced to a matter of 'blind habit' governed by a mechanism of irrationality. The mere fact that we cannot formulate discursively the (commonsense) beliefs that reflect our accumulated wisdom is ipso facto taken to prove that we *do not* know how to use them in the variety of contexts in which we participate. Indeed, as individualism argues as against collectivism, liberal democrarcy contains many types of political practices or aspects of practices which are sustained in and through the knowledgeability of political actors but which they do not reproduce as a matter of ideology or normative commitment (Barry and Hardin 1982). Yet the rational or acknowledged choice is in a sense only the tip of the iceberg, since, as Giddens indicates, "the prevalence of the routine or taken-for-granted rests precisely upon the casually employed but very complex skills whereby social actors draw upon and reconstitute the practices 'layered' into institutions in deep time-space" (1981:65).

6. Modalities of Structuration in Interaction

Practical consciousness connects to grounded principles of action, which agents 'keep in touch with' as a routine element of their reflexive monitoring of their behaviour in relation both to their wants and their appreciation of the demands of the 'outer' world. It distinguishes what is known in a conscious way (discursive knowledge) from what is known tacitly, and what is known tacitly from what is unconscious. It indicates that the predictable character of social life "is 'made to happen' as a condition and result of the knowledgeable application of rules and resources by actors in the constitution of interaction" (Giddens 1981:64).

Purposive conduct, in this conception, concerns "the application of 'knowledge' to secure certain outcomes, events or qualities" (Giddens 1976:83). That is to say, whereas purposiveness is necessarily intentional, via its ties to descriptions of 'purposive acts', the rationalization of action is not. For example, the 'as if' version of the acknowledged, rational choice may point to conditioned reflexes, which are learned but not purposive. Furthermore, as the notion of practical consciousness implicates, for conduct to be purposive, "the agent does not have to be capable of formulating the knowledge he applies as an abstract proposition, nor does it have to be the case that such 'knowledge' is valid" (ibid:76).

How does the notion of practical consciousness apply to the analysis of organizing? Principally, the distinction between the reflexive monitoring of action (intentionalization) and its principled grounding as 'means' to secure particular outcomes (rationalization) enables us to distinguish the medium of interpretative schemes from the medium of norms upon which actors draw in their constitution of interaction as communication respectively sanctions. Secondly, the fact that the attainment of certain outcomes, events, or qualities simultaneously expresses the *capability* of the actor to intervene in them so as to alter their course enables us to distinguish the medium of facilities upon which actors draw in their constitution of interaction as power from these two other media. Thus we get an approach to organizing which relates meaning to structures of signification, power to structures of domination and sanction to structures of legitimation. All social systems, we can say, have structures of signification, domination, and legitimation, since all social interaction involves (attempted) communication, the operation of power, and moral relations. "(S)tructures only exist as the reproduced conduct of situated actors with definite intentions and interests" (Giddens 1976:127).

Table 3: Modalities of structuration (Giddens 1979:82)

Interaction	communication	power	sanction
(modality)	interpretative scheme	facility	norm
Structure	signification	domination	legitimation

The modalities of structuration are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but at the same time are the media of the reproduction of the structural components of systems of interaction. They manifest how "(e)very act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act of production, a novel enterprise, and as such may initiate change by altering that structure at the same time as it reproduces it – as the meanings of words change in and through their use" (ibid:128, cf. Wittgenstein 1970).

6.1 Signification, Legitimation and Domination

Interpretative schemes and norms call attention to two senses of rule-following "or, rather, *two aspects of rules that are implicated in the production of social practices*; that relating to the *constitution of meaning*, and that relating to *sanctions* involved in social conduct" (Giddens 1979:82). There are right and wrong ways of using words in a language, and there are right and wrong modes of conduct in respect of the normative sanctions implicated in interaction. Though these two senses of rules always intersect, they can be separated conceptually as relating to the constitution of meaning respectively sanctions. "The identification of acts, in other words, interlaces in important ways with normative considerations (and vice versa). This is most obvious and most formally codified in law where, as regards sanctions that are applied, a great deal hinges on distinctions between 'murder', 'manslaughter", etc." (Ibid:83, cf. Vesey 1974).

Interpretative schemes, we have said, form the core of the mutual knowledge underlying practical consciousness and manifest how a universe of meaning is sustained through and in processes of interaction. "As with other aspects of contexts, the communication of meaning in processes of interaction does not just 'occur' over time. Actors sustain the meaning of what they say and do through routinely incorporating 'what went before' and anticipations of 'what will come next' into the present of an encounter" (Giddens 1979:84). However, the conventions whereby the communication of meaning is achieved have normative aspects, as do all structural elements of interaction. For example, what is going to *count* as 'going for a walk' in language normally intersects with norms of 'correct', 'desirable' or 'appropriate' conduct: "going for a stroll along the pavement in this aspect differs from wandering along the middle of the road in disregard of the conventions or laws governing traffic behaviour (and personal safety)" (ibid:85).

The normative constitution of interaction may be treated as the actualization of *rights* and the enactment of *obligations*. These in turn express the duality of structure in the sanctioning of conduct. "What from the structural point of view – where strategic conduct is bracketed – appears as a normatively co-ordinated legitimate order, in which rights and obligations are merely two aspects of norms, from the point of view of strategic conduct represent *claims*, whose realisation is contingent upon the successful mobilisation of obligations through the medium of the responses of other actors" (ibid:87). Their interconnection expresses the "*negotiated* character of sanctions, relating the production of meaning to the production of normative order" (ibid, cf. Strauss 1978).

Rules must not be confused with resources and thereby with the facilities which actors bring to and mobilize as elements of the production of power in interaction. Both communication and sanction have to be linked to power transactions. Resources are not just additional elements to the communication of meaning and to normative sanctions, as individualism and collectivism tend to believe, but include the means whereby the meaningful and the normative content of interaction is actualized. Power cannot be derived from the actual use of communication and sanctions, precisely because it expresses the *capability* to apply communication and sanctions. It manifests the capabilities of actors to make certain 'accounts count' and to enact or resist sanctioning processes. At the same time these capabilities draw upon modes of domination structured into social

systems. New Political Science emphasizes the same point: "While the rational managerial proponents err in failing to consider the internal dynamics of organization the adherents of the individualistic approach fail to consider the political and structural contexts that impinge on an individual's cognitions and actions. This tendency to depoliticize cognition, when combined with the other limitations, leads investigators away from discovering the rules of politics that we view as integral to organizational life" (Bacharach and Lawler 1980:212). It serves to conceal how the play of power in use "directs attention to the parties' efforts to *change* their own and each other's dependence by improving or restricting access to resources outside the relationship" (ibid:221).

7. Power as Domination

The notion of resource brings us back to Gidden's re-assessment of Weber's definition of power as "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (1969 II:926). I shall end my explication of Giddens's framework by commenting on its relationship to Weber.

Weber's definition of power is almost considered axiomatic in political science. This is no surprise, since it contains elements of both individualism, collectivism, and situationalism. If we put the emphasis on either the individual or the collective 'will', in the first part of the definition, the struggle can begin whether power is best seen as deriving from the conscious or the unconscious wants prompting action. If we instead put the emphasis on its second part, i.e. on the others who are participating in the action, the question becomes whether Weber, in tying outcomes to particular occasions and to other participants in the situation, actually sees power as contingent upon the conscious and the unconscious.

Two things are however obvious in his definition. On the one side, Weber's definition cannot be applied to justify collectivism's tendency to tie power to conflict via the capacity of a 'class' or a 'system-unit' to realize its interests (Poulantzas 1978:104 and Parsons 1951:491). This merely serves to conceal the word 'even' in his definition, which signalizes that power is contingently and not logically associated with conflict. Power, in Weber's conception, has no more special connection to the study of conflict or change than to the study of integration or stability. It does not *only* exist where there is resistance to be overcome (Giddens 1976:112–113). On the other side, the interactionistic character of Weber's definition makes it dubious whether the chance to realize one's will measures the likelihood of actors to achieve intended outcomes, as individualism will have it. However, individualism's tendency to tie Weber's concept of power to an individual will is at least understandable in the light of Weber's own attempt to link the analysis of domination to the authoritarian power of command;

> To be more specific, *domination* will thus mean the situation in which the manifested will *(command)* of the *ruler* or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others *(the ruled)* and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake. Looked upon from the other end, this situation will be called *obedience*.
>
> *Further notes:* 1. The definition sounds awkward, especially due to the use of the "as if" formula. This cannot be avoided, however. The merely external fact of the order being obeyed is not sufficient to signify domination in our sense; we cannot overlook the meaning of the fact that the command is accepted as a "valid" norm (Weber 1968 III:946).

Weber's definition of domination serves to distinguish the rulers/ruled relation from all other relations of domination and subordination. But the problem is that Weber himself tends to undermine the specificity of the rulers/ruled relation by making it appear as the simple product of a rational choice – a manifested will/an acceptance of a 'valid' norm. This conceals the significance of authority relations as a medium whereby collective interests are realized (collectivism) and, therefore, the duality of the structure of authority as both the medium and outcome of political action (situationalism). How are we to overcome Weber's ambivalences? By appreciating that Weber's definition of power encourages us to make two distinctions: (1) a distinction between *capability* and *knowledgeability,* and (2) a distinction between the capability of reaching definite outcomes and the capability to secure such outcomes in interaction *with others.*

Human action, Giddens says, "intrinsically involves the application of 'means' to achieve outcomes, brought about through the direct intervention of an actor in a course of events, 'intended action' being a sub-class of the actor's doings, or his refraining from doing' (1976:110). Power con-

sequently represents the capability of the agent to mobilize resources to constitute those 'means'. In this most general sense, as the capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course, power refers to the transformative capacity of action. Transformative capacity cannot be equated with a capacity to make decisions or choices. " 'Decision-making' is a sub-category of capability in general, if it refers to circumstances where individuals consciously confront a range of potential alternatives of conduct, and make some choice among those alternatives. The vast bulk of day-to-day social activity is predicated upon capability, the possibility of 'doing otherwise', but this is exercised as a routine feature of everyday behaviour" (1981A:163).

Hence, 'power', as transformative capacity, is the 'can' which mediates between intentions or wants and the actual realization of the outcomes sought after. It follows that 'power' in the narrower, relational sense is a property of interaction, and may be defined as referring to the situation "where transformative capacity *is harnessed to actors' attempts to get others to comply with their wants*. Power, in this relational sense, concerns the capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others." (Giddens 1979:93) "It is in this sense", Giddens argues "that men have power 'over' *others:* this is power as *domination*" (1976:111).

Power as domination cannot be equated with a rational choice, since it is a property of interaction. Nor can the use of power in interaction as domination be equated with the rulers/ruled relation, as Weber proposes. For this would explicitly conceal the domination that derives from *property* and thus from the capital/work relation. We must distinguish the domination that derives from authorization from the domination that derives from allocation, in order not to reduce the one to the other. This is what Weber fails to do, when holding that the "abolition of private capitalism would simply mean that also the *top management* of the nationalized or socialized enterprises would become bureaucratic" (1968 III:1402, cf. Abrahamson 1977 and Dragstedt and Slaughter 1981). From the fact that the rulers/ruled relation need not disappear, simply because the capital/work relation disappears, it does not automatically follow that the latter ultimately can be considered reducible to "that animated machine, the bureaucratic organization, with its specialization of trained skills, its division of jurisdiction, its rules and hiearchical relations of authority" (Weber ibid).

"In distinguishing authorisation from allocation", Giddens says, "I mean to separate conceptually two major types of resource which constitute structures of domination, and which are drawn upon and reproduced as power relations in interaction. By 'authorisation' I refer to capabilities which generate commands over *persons,* and by 'allocation' I refer to capabilities which generate commands over *objects* or other material phenomena" (Giddens 1979:100). The analysis of these two types of commands must be clearly distinguished from the analysis of their legitimation via positive and/or negative sanctions in order not to forget that power and interest are contingently, not logically, associated with each other.

Authorization and allocation do not derive from interest but from the transformative capacity of human action. It is this capacity, and neither intentions nor wants, Giddens holds, which is "the origin of all that is liberating and productive in social life as well as all that is repressive and destructive" (1981:51). Therefore, the question of how far domination is harnessed to sectional interests as repressive domination or to universal interests as liberating domination is a historical problem which has to be answered empirically via concrete analyses of the sources, scope, sanctions and effectiveness of actors' capabilities to appropriate control over 'subjects' and 'objects' in interaction. The scope of control varies with the modes of appropriating allocative and authoritative resources to secure that control. The effectiveness of control varies with the sanctions which actors can call into play.

7.1 Paradoxes of Structuration

Giddens's description of the link between transformative capacity and domination carries two basic claims, underlying his entire framework: (1) that "those in positions of subordination may, in fact, be able to achieve considerable effective control over the contexts of their activity within social systems" (1981:63), and, what follows from (1), (2) that society will always be organized in terms of asymmetrical superior/subordinate relations, i.e. as a pyramid with the few 'wise' and 'powerful' on the top and the many relatively 'unwise' and 'powerless' on the bottom.

I find (1) and (2) self-contradictory. On the one

side, we are said to possess a potential freedom of action by virtue of the transformative capacity which we all share equally in common. On the other side, we are said to be capable of becoming free only by using our equally shared power potential to appropriate 'dominion', 'mastery' or 'Herrschaft' over others and over the world of nature. The same contradiction appears in New Political Science: "Even if one partner appears completely to dominate the other, the dependence remains reciprocal – no matter how absolute the right of life and death is held by masters over their slaves. Masters are dependent on their slaves' survival in order to retain lordship over them" (Crozier and Thoenig 1976:562, cf. Crozier and Friedberg 1980). To bind organizing to a notion of 'masters and slaves', I will hold, is implicitly to make domination the *goal* of history, what in turn prevents us from introducing an alternative democratic goal of self-government, simply because it cannot be *described* as a goal of domination. Thus, in such a conception of organizing, we cannot but end up with Weber's elitism, whether we like it or not. We bring "to the forefront a theme long neglected in organizational research, namely, that organizations like other social systems may be viewed as systems of circulating elites (Michels, 1959; Mosca, 1939; and Pareto, 1935)" (1982:43).

On the one side Giddens offers political science a concept of the duality of structure which means "that the structured properties of social systems are simultaneously *the medium and outcome of social acts*" (Giddens 1981:19). In this conception, the term 'social reproduction' "is not in and of itself an explanatory one" (ibid:27). On the other side he presents a social theory in which "allocative and authoritative resources /---/ are constitutive of the social totality as a structured system of domination" via "their interlinking with the meaningful and normative components of society" (ibid 52). On this theory society = the study of changing value hierarchies = power or powerful = elite or few (Easton 1950:462). Here the term 'social reproduction' *is* an explanatory term which refers to "asymmetries of resources employed in the *sustaining* of power relations in and between systems of interaction." The theory of structuration consequently reveals an essential contradiction in its internal organization. If we accept its concept of the *duality* of structure in interaction, then we must necessarily reject its theory of the *sustaining* of structures of domination in interaction, or vice versa. It cannot both have the cake and eat it (cf. Callinicos 1985).

It has often been said that the solution to one set of problems almost inevitably raises a set of new ones. Giddens's framework is no exception. The description of institutional order as brought about by routine action, via the application of rules and resources in the duality of structure, seems indeed vital for the understanding of political organizing. It brings us far beyond the conscious/unconscious dichotomy of wants in individualism and collectivism. It shows us "that many of the most deeply sedimented elements of social conduct are cognitively (not necessarily consciously, in the sense of 'discursive availability') established, rather than founded on definite 'motives' prompting action; *their continuity is assured through social reproduction itself.* But the theorem has its price:

(1) *it binds us to the Paradox of Elitism,* according to which we must seek domination to become free. Elitism implicates that relations of autonomy and dependence can vary in degree and extent *but never in their essential order* as a system of domination (Balbus 1982, Green 1981, Macpherson 1962 and 1975, Wilden 1972). When Giddens claims that power always involves attempts "to *maintain assymetries* of autonomy and dependence in the reproduced relations constituting social systems" (Giddens 1981:61, my italics) he is actually describing this essential order of elitism.

(2) it traps us in the Liar's Paradox with the proposition that "all reproduction is contingent and historical" (ibid:27). Like 'all men are liars', this can be a true statement only if the statement excepts itself from its universe of discourse. If it defies even its own basic proposition, then why argue that "(a)nyone who participates in a social relationship, forming part of a social system produced and reproduced by its constituent actors over time, *necessarily* sustains some control *over* the character of that relationship or system" (Giddens 1982:199, my italics)? Then this universal thesis of domination will simply rest on the radical assertion of a claim. On the other side, if Giddens is willing to give up the former in favor of the latter, then what is the difference between the latter and an 'unfolding' scientific model, treating social change as "*the progressive emergence of traits that a particular type of society is presumed to have within itself from its inception*" (Giddens 1979:223)? Then history does hold out a pre-determined future, in the form of an equilibrium of asymmetries, which is said to be 'there' *in* a social system from the very beginning, as the state which always remains steady in social systems of interaction. Oscillating between the statement that all

contexts are equally valuable and the statement that all contexts are equal to one, Giddens seems to prevent himself from seeing that the one is really the imaginary mirror image of the other.

(3) it entangles us in a *Paradox of Causality* by seeking to derive society from its constituent actors. In seeking to explain how form occurs in social relations in time and space *before* having explained the existence of the social relations in which form is said to occur, Giddens actually leaves these social relations largely undefined. Or put differently, in focusing exclusively on "*the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing events-in-the-world*", he leaves us in suspense with respect to the characteristics of the ongoing social events-in-the-world in which human beings intervene. He simply puts the cart before a non-existent horse (Easton 1965A:xiv). In politics, for instance, one cannot explain the particular structures or practices through which the outputs of political decision-making for society are influenced, formulated, and implemented and that thereby determine the way in which valued goods are distributed in society before having defined the ongoing political events-in-the-world that serve to describe these structures or practices as *political* in character. It will not suffice simply to point to the characteristics of the situation. One must also be prepared to show what makes the situation *political* in the first place.

New Political Science should make the transcendence of these paradoxes additional elements in the naming of its revolution. It must decide whether it really wishes to be employed for the purpose of appropriating control over others and over nature. If not, it must seek for a general political theory capable of explicating and explaining why domination is unnecessary for the persistence of a viable relationship between politics and society. To do so it would have to distinguish the analysis of the historical conditions that govern the continuity or transformation of political *structure* from the universal conditions that govern the continued persistence of the *relation* of an open political system to its environment. I agree that he latter analysis has to be dissociated from conventional theory's interpretation of *system* as a *structure* upon which we work, as do masons on a cathedral. But if we dissociate ourselves entirely from the possibility of discovering an invariant political system, we will obtain no more than to translate conventional theory's cathedral into the image of a misbegotten little bungalow.

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