

ten och utrikespolitiken står klart. Det är också därför det finns skäl att anta att den politiska utvecklingen nu glider in i mera "normala" banor. Nu är finnarna mera än förr hänvisade till att diskutera ekonomi och andra mera vardagliga frågor.

Det postindustriella systemet tar form. Det gör kanske landet mindre intressant för analytikern, men är givetvis ett hälsotecken. Finnarna kan med ro fördrå att dess politik blir mindre "bysantinsk". Likväl behåller väl vårt östra grannland alltid en särskild plats i svenska politiska sammanhang. Därför borgar historien, geografien och alltid närvarande strategiska skäl.

Mats Bergquist

Referenser

- D. Anckar – K. Ståhlberg, *Partimakt och presidentmakt*, Ekenäs: Ekenäs Tryckeri AB 1982.
U. Kekkonen, *Ekudden*, Helsingfors: Söderströms 1981.

Documentary Data in the Comparison of Committee Systems in National Parliaments: Riksdagen and the Polish Sejm

Committees are – or can be – the workshops of legislatures. To the extent that a legislative body fulfills any of its potential functions – such as legislation and, in some cases, administrative review – committees are likely to be the arenas within which this work is accomplished. Though committees originated as an expedited stage of procedure (still visible in the use of Committee of the Whole in the U.S. House), contemporary committees are likely to also embody a division of labor in combination with a specialization of labor. That is, committees often tend to have a specialized subject matter, which presumably adds expertise to expedited procedure.

In this paper, we will compare two committee systems in the context of their dissimilar legislatures: the Swedish Riksdag and the Polish Sejm. Sweden is an example of a stable, competitive democracy, while Poland illustrates a variety of a communist system. Within the former, the parliament (Riksdagen) makes and breaks governments, and is the source of legitimacy and legislative decision making. In the latter, the "leading role" of the Polish United Workers Party is enshrined in the Constitution, but so is the existence of the parliament (Sejm) as the wielder of "state authority" (Art. 2). The potential importance of the Polish Sejm is illustrated by the

necessity for recent Solidarity-induced reforms to receive legislative expression through the Sejm. That the Sejm's scheduled meeting was abruptly postponed by the imposition of martial law is another indication of its potential importance.

The committee systems are structurally similar. In both parliaments, committees are organized to parallel administrative agencies. In both, the committees have a permanent existence and membership for the duration of the parliaments' term of office, and committee jurisdictions are stable. In these respects, the committee systems of both parliaments more resemble the American congressional committee system than the ad hoc legislative committees of the British House of Commons.

Our main concerns are empirical as well as methodological: in what respects may committee systems be compared by using documentary sources? We are faced with the twin problem of differences in the two committee systems, and differences in the documentary sources which may or may not entirely flow from the first set of "real" differences.

Documentary sources are particularly valuable in the comparison among parliaments. Documents are transportable and are available (potentially) through libraries. Nevertheless, to discover legislative documents and to obtain access to them, is itself a formidable undertaking. Each parliament requires a considerable investment of time and energy to locate, much less use, the documents they do have. In most parliaments, verbatim transcripts of committee meetings are not available, and the extent to which published committee reports are either available or complete, also varies. Thus, this paper explores statistical documentary sources to ascertain both what data are available for cross-national research and what can be learned from such sources about parliamentary committees, in the period 1974–1980.

The documentary sources for the Swedish and Polish parliaments permit a comparison of the committee systems on three topics: party composition and ratios, turnover of membership and chairmen, and activities of the committee system as a whole.

Party Composition and Ratios

Political parties and committees are the main ways in which the members and work of legislative bodies are organized. They are, however, ultimately antithetical means of internal parliamentary organization. In systems in which parties are strong (illustrated by the British Parliament), committees traditionally have been few in number and weak in powers, while in those fewer systems in which committees are strong (illustrated by the U.S. Congress), parties have typically been weakly

organized, have low cohesion in voting, and make few legislative decisions (Polsby et al, 1969; Lees and Shaw, 1979 pp. 391–98; Olson, 1980 pp. 319–31).

Sweden itself illustrates these polar tendencies: when no party or coalition possessed a majority in the 1920's, the major legislative and policy decisions were made within committees, and committee decisions prevailed on the floor (Rustow, 1955). In the 1932–1976 period the Social Democrats governed sometimes alone, sometimes in a coalition with major policy decisions made either within the coalition, or in discussion among the leaders of the several parties. Since the mid 1970's, however, Sweden has experienced both minority governments and a majority 3-party bourgeois coalition. Under these circumstances, the committees have a greater opportunity than previously to become assertive.

The Polish United Workers' Party is the major source of power and decisions in the Polish Sejm. Nevertheless, two other parties also exist (the Democratic Party and the United Peasants' Party), while about 10 % of the membership is unaffiliated (Table 4).

In both countries, party cohesion in floor voting is very high. In both parliaments, members are assigned to committees by their parties, (though in Sweden formally elected by the Riksdag). In both parliaments, members are oriented to the government of the day through their political parties. In both, major legislative initiatives come from that government of the day. Thus the committees operate entirely within the limits defined for them by the political parties.

In both countries, party ratios on the committees, among the members and also among the chairmen, can be calculated from documentary sources. Party preferences for selected committees can also be ascertained from documentary lists of committee members and officers.

Membership

Sweden is far more proportional and consistent in party ratios on committees than is Poland (Tables 1 and 2). Nevertheless, the Swedish parliament is not completely proportional, either.

While the Swedish governing party or coalition (if a majority) has insisted that it has a majority on all committees, the Polish ruling party's practice is very different. In neither cases, strict proportionality is not followed.

In Sweden, the three-party coalition elected in 1979 had only a one-seat margin over the opposition parties (175–174). Exact proportionality would have required that the governing coalition have a majority of one seat on no more than a single committee. The coalition, however, argued that the government's majority be re-

flected on each committee, thus giving it 16 more committee seats than held by the opposition parties. Its total share of seats was thus increased from its bare majority of one seat in the chamber to 53 % of the total number of committee seats, while the opposition's share was correspondingly reduced to 47 %. Furthermore, the Communist Party has progressively been excluded from all committees. Consequently, but by default, the Social Democratic share of committee seats rose above its chamber proportion (Table 1).

In the Polish Sejm, the main departure from proportionality lies in the uneven distribution of party members among the committees. While each party holds the same approximate share on every committee in the Riksdag, there is no similar uniformity in the Sejm. The party ratios, different for each committee, are arranged in descending order of the proportion held by the Workers' Party in Table 3 for the Seventh Term (1976–1980).

The Workers' Party held a maximum of 69 % of the seats of two committees, but ranged down to a 37 % share on one. The Peasants' Party share ranged from a low of 14 % and 16 % (Education, and Heavy Industry) to a high of 41 % each on Forestry and on Agriculture. As the smallest, the Democratic Party's maximum was 15 % on Internal Affairs, but it held at least one seat on each committee. The independents were excluded from two committees – National Defense, having a critical external function, and Mandates and Rules, having a critical internal function. Their highest proportion of seats was held on Foreign Affairs, having an important diplomatic purpose, and on Science, a field in which many of the independents work.

The selective party overrepresentation in Poland indicates a variety of functionalism. The committee particularly relevant to the constituency base of each party are those on which the smaller parties are over represented. The same logic applies, at least in part, to the Workers' Party. Its strongest positions are held on committees concerned with Heavy Industry, Mining, Foreign Trade, Construction, and Communications. It holds the chairmanships of each of these committees as well.

Though the Workers' Party is the largest party on each committee, it does not hold a majority on all. The committees on which its share falls below 50 % are those on which the other parties have their highest share of seats. It is also on these committees that the chairmanships were held by the other two parties.

In both countries, we can note the special sensitivities of power: In Poland, the smaller parties and independents are reduced in, or excluded from, certain committees (and chairmanships), while in Sweden, even when the Communist Party did participate in committees, it was excluded from the Defense and Foreign Affairs committees.

Officers

In both countries, the committees have chairmen and vice chairmen. In Sweden, each committee has only one vice chairman, while in Poland, the number ranges 4–6 per committee. In Sweden, Communists are excluded from both positions, while in Poland, the minor parties and independents do hold some leadership positions on the committees.

Because the variations in chamber membership between the two Swedish coalitions have been quite small in the 1970's, ranging from 50 % to 52 % for the governing coalition (Table 1), variations in the party distribution of the 16 committee chairmanships have also been very small. The Social Democrats (governing in 1974, in opposition the other listed years), have held either 7 or 8 chairmanships – exactly or close to half, while the bourgeois coalition has correspondingly held either 8 or 9 chairmanships. Within the three-party coalition, the smallest party, the Liberals, has also been the most stable in size, and thus has consistently held two chairmanships, while the number of chairmanships among the other two coalition parties has varied in rough accordance with changes in their share of seats in the parliament.

The vice-chairmanships of the Swedish committees are mirrorimages of the distribution of chairmanships. Every committee with a Social Democratic chairman has had a vice-chairman from the threeparty coalition; likewise, every committee with a bourgeois party chairman has had a Social Democratic vice chairman. Thus, the two coalitions have evenly split the 32 posts of chairmen and vice-chairmen combined; 16 to each coalition, in each of the years tabulated.

Taken as a whole, the share held of the Polish officerships by the Workers' Party has varied more widely than has its share of either the full parliamentary membership or the total number of committee seats (Table 2). Nevertheless, it is only in the seventh Term (1976–80), that the ruling party has held even a majority of such positions.

The proportion of committee officerships held by the other parties has also varied within small ranges. The Peasants' Party, the second largest in the Sejm, has varied from 22 % to 28 % of the officerships of committees. The smallest of the three parties, the Democratic Party, has held 14–21 %, while the unaffiliated or independent members have held from 9 % to 18 % of such positions (Ulicki, 1980, p. 148).

While in Sweden, both the committee chairmanships and vice-chairmanships are distributed among the parties (excluding the Communists) almost exactly proportionally neither is true in the Polish Sejm. The smallest groups of Sejm members, the Democratic Party and the

independents, were overrepresented among the committee vice chairmen, while the Workers' Party underrepresented (Table 4). The imbalance was reversed, however, in the distribution of the committee chairmanships among the parties, with the Workers' Party share rising to 2/3, while the independents are excluded. (In the aftermath of the August, 1980, shipyard strike and the ensuing political turbulence, two independents assumed chairmanships of key committees in the Sejm).

Party Choice of Committees

In both countries, the parties appear partial to those committees which have a particular relevance to their constituencies.

In Sweden, this partiality is shown, not by different party ratios, but by possession of specific chairmanships. During the 1970's, for example, the Social Democrats have continuously held the chairmanships of the committees on Social Insurance and Economic Affairs, while the Conservative Party has consistently held the Defense Committee chairmanship, and the Center Party (formerly the Agrarian Party) the Committee on Agriculture.

In Poland, neither the Democratic Party (the smallest) or the independents have consistently held the chairmanship of any committee (Burda, 1975, pp. 516–521). The Peasants' Party, however, has exclusively held the chairmanships of the committees most important to it: Agriculture, and Internal Trade. The Workers' Party, while holding the chairmanships of most committees in each term, has exclusively held the chairmanships of such committees as Economic Planning, Heavy Industries, and Defense.

Summary

These data show clear patterns of party distribution among committees in both parliaments; they also show different patterns between the two parliaments.

The twin dimensions of power and constituency run through these data. On one hand, the most deviant parties in each system are excluded from the committees concerned with internal and external power. On the other, the parties are consistently associated with those committees relevant to their constituency base. Perhaps seats and chairmanships are allocated through a process of inter-party bargaining in both systems akin to that producing a governing coalition and the allocation of ministries among parties in Western systems (Lees and Show, 1979, p. 429).

The exclusion of each nation's most deviant parties from the committee system, or from certain committees, or from committee chairmanships, raises several ques-

tions. One concerns the public rationale. While the disputes over the exclusion of the Communist Party from the Swedish committees has been debated on the floor, and thus is recorded in the published record (*Riksdagens protokoll*, October 11, 1976, pp. 50–65 and October 9, 1979, pp. 65–74); no such disputes have reached public visibility in Poland.

Nevertheless, as the Sejm brought independents into prominent committee positions in the 1980–81 period, the post-hoc justifications could provide some insight into the government's intentions.

In both countries, one might speculate about the consequences for the floor behavior of parties or parliamentary members excluded from the committee system. In Sweden, the Communist Party has increasingly used the floor to raise issues and questions which it would have, or at least could have, originally raised within the forum of committees. Floor debate and voting may undergo changes in the Swedish Riksdag as a result of Communist exclusion from the committee system. In both parliaments, the usual expectation seems to be that floor time is largely utilized by the leading members of the committees having original jurisdiction over the issue under discussion.

Committee Stability and Experience

Though committees may be permanent, have fixed jurisdictions which parallel the structure of administrative agencies, and though the parties carefully calculate their respective priorities in obtaining seats and chairmanships, an experienced membership is more likely to be an active and effective one, than is an inexperienced membership. On the other hand, a lack of societal responsiveness may be the consequence of too continuous and stable a committee membership (Sisson, 1973).

Stability Rates

The stability of committee membership is much higher in Sweden than in Poland. On only two of the 16 Swedish committees in 1979–1980, had fewer than half of the members served on the same committee in the previous term (Table 5, Col. 5) as a full member. By contrast, the proportions of Sejm committee members, in a sample of 7 of their 22 committees, serving their first term on the committee ranged from 60 to 100% (Table 6). The rate of membership turnover is apparently not related to the proportion of memberships held by the ruling party.

The chairmen show the same contrast in their experience on the committees (Table 7). While none of the Swedish committee chairmen was in his first term in the chamber (but one was in his first term on his committee), close to half of the Polish chairmen were freshmen in the chamber and over half were new to their committees.

The stability of Swedish committee membership, however, must be qualified for the smaller democratic parties (three parties of the sometime-conservative coalition). For one brief period, the smallest of them was the sole party in government. As the small parties enter the government, their thin ranks of experienced members are depleted in the formation of government ministries; thus, their inexperienced members are rapidly brought into full membership on the committees simply to permit the parties to fill their quotas.

Explanations

There are several explanations for this marked contrast in committee stability and experience between the two countries. In both, these factors operate within very stable party ratios. Though the election systems are completely different, in neither nation have the parties changed much in their proportion of seats (the exception being the three bourgeois parties in Sweden, shifting among themselves).

One explanation for the marked contrast in committee membership stability and officer experience is that turnover rates for the two parliaments are very different. That is, personnel, but not party, turnover varies greatly. While freshmen are about 10% of the Swedish Riksdag, newcomers are close to 60% of the membership in any recent Sejm term (Simon and Olson, 1980, p. 214).

A second explanation lies in the different categories of committee membership. The Swedish committees have "alternates", while full memberships are limited to less than the whole number of deputies (Table 1). The newcomers are alternates. If they win re-election, they may rise to full membership. Thus, the Swedish stability rate may be artificially high, compared to the Polish, simply because all Polish (but not Swedish) freshmen immediately become "members" of their committees.

A third and related explanation is that there are more committee seats in Poland than in Sweden. In the latter, the 349 chamber members outnumber the 240 committee seats (Table 1). In the former, the 697 committee seats constitute over 150% of the chamber membership (Table 4). As a result, there is much more opportunity for committee switching among the members in the Sejm than in Riksdagen.

These figures do not measure "experience" directly, but rather duration and stability. Our impression is that the committee chairmen in both parliaments, in spite of these differing incumbency rates, are experts on their committee's subject matter, and are not randomly distributed laymen. The difference appears to be that the Polish chairmen largely have obtained their experience and knowledge outside of parliament, while the Swedish chairmen largely gain their knowledge within parliament

and on their committees. The Polish committee chairmen have an externally based expertise, while that of Swedish chairmen is internally based. However, in the latter case attention is also paid to the extra-parliamentary qualifications of the person in question.

Committee Activity: Swedish Legislation and Polish Agency Review

The two committee systems contrast greatly in their activities. Thus the documentary sources report numbers about very different uses of committee time and energy. We will examine the activity measures for whole committee systems; the same variables could also be used to compare committees within each parliament taken separately.

Meetings

The Swedish committees meet about a total of more than 500 times every year, while the Polish committees meet about 250 times a year (Tables 8 and 9).

The total meeting time may be roughly similar for the countries.

Legislation

The main work of the Swedish committees is legislation. Most of their time is spent considering the government bills and private motions referred to them. All bills must be referred to committees; the committees must report on all bills and motions referred to them. Because private motions are to some extent the product of political parties – especially those in opposition – the total load of legislation relating to government policy is much larger than indicated by only the number of government bills (cf Nils Stjernquist: *Riksdagens arbete och arbetsformer* pp 174 ff). Since the private motions often refer to matters raised by the government's bills, they are combined into a smaller number of committee reports than the total number of bills and motions counted separately (Table 8).

The legislative load in Poland is much smaller than in Sweden. About 15 bills a year were adopted in Term V, for example (Table 9). While bills ordinarily are referred to committees, they sometimes are not, especially in crisis. Committees can, and have, buried bills, unlike those in Sweden. Given the strong impulse to vote "yes" (except 1980–81) on all measures coming to the floor, the committees provide the essential arenas within which disagreement can be expressed; occasionally committees have disagreed with government bills, and have simply not reported those bills to the floor.

The potentially important and active role of Sejm committees is illustrated by the agreements reached between Solidarity and the government. Many of these agreements required Sejm legislation – to revise the labor code and the new censorship law, for example. Sejm committees met for months on the proposals, and more than one press interview with Lech Walesa of Solidarity was held outside the committee rooms in the Sejm building.

In the past two decades, committee amendment, delay and blockage has occurred on such proposed legislation as the labor code, mental health, educational reform and agricultural policies. The last policy topic illustrates a related practice: the Peasants' Party and the Workers' Party apparently negotiated for years over the content of agricultural legislation. Only upon reaching substantial agreement, did the government then initiate a bill. That bill, too, was the subject of extensive committee review and amendment (Olson and Simon, 1982, p. 70).

The reports on legislation by Sejm committees resemble those of many American state legislatures: skeletal and in multilith form. They consist solely of amendments to the proposed bill. In Sweden, by contrast, the reports are printed and numbered. They contain a statement of the committee's reasoning and a detailed listing of the proposals and private motions considered, and of the committee's actions on each. In addition, the minority disagreements are clearly stated. In all of these respects, the Swedish committee reports resemble those of the U.S. Congress.

Almost all legislation in the Sejm is now referred to at least two committees: the substantive committee and the general-purpose Committee on Legislation. The latter reviews all bills for draftsmanship and conformity to legal principles. It is also a coordination device with the government. In addition, the Sejm has increasingly formed ad-hoc coordinating subcommittees among two or more substantive committees sharing jurisdiction on a proposed bill. It is thus increasingly difficult to tabulate statistically the rate of bill referral to committees.

In both countries, the form and content of committee reports help shape subsequent floor action. In Sweden, the minority views stated in the report, will also be presented on the floor. The chamber will vote on each amendment on which the minority asks for a vote, in the order in which they are presented in the committee report. In Poland, the usual procedure is to debate the bill in general, and to then vote, unanimously, on the bill as a whole. Polish dissents are not listed in the committee report, and usually, negative votes are not recorded, if cast, on the floor.

Agency review

In contrast to the Swedish committee system, the main work of the Sejm committees is to review (and often criticize) the administration by government agencies of the budget and policies previously adopted by the Sejm.

The Sejm committees have two devices to formally express their views to administrative agencies. A "request" (*dezyderatum*) asks an agency to take a specific and discrete action. An "opinion" (*opinie*), introduced only in the early 1970's, expresses a committee's view on a more general practice or policy followed by one or more administrative agencies. In both cases, the agencies are expected to reply in writing to the committee. The committee may, in turn, find the reply unsatisfactory and send the matter back for another round of query and reply. The list of both requests and opinions, and dates of agency reply and of subsequent committee action, is kept assiduously for each committee (but not in published and publicly accessible form). While opinions are a means of at least approaching policy questions, their very breadth permits the agencies to reply vaguely if not also evasively. As a result, deputies have a very mixed evaluation of the success of the innovation of the "opinion" device (personal interviews).

One means of committee investigation is the field trip, in which a subcommittee, usually formed ad hoc, visits around the country to examine the practical operations of an agency or a group of related agencies.

While committees also invite agency spokesmen to their meetings in the Sejm building, the committees increasingly have instituted comprehensive reviews of the operations of a previously adopted policy. These reviews sometimes require the cooperation of several committees and encompass a variety of administrative agencies. These reviews have sometimes become the topics of floor debate, with spokesmen from the committees presenting extensive reports and critiques. While these reports have been presented orally, not in written form, the floor proceedings are recorded verbatim, with a resulting published record. In addition, the committee meetings and the floor sessions have been given fairly comprehensive coverage in the media, especially in the newspapers.

Summary and Conclusions

The two sets of statistics published by the Swedish Riksdag and the Polish Sejm about themselves are promising but puzzling sources of data for the comparative analyst. They are useful sources in part because they are available more readily than are personal visits and interviews. They are potentially useful because, presumably, each parliament develops statistics of utility to itself. But they

are also puzzling, for the different methods of collecting and reporting the numbers can introduce complexities which distort the empirical realities being measured. Another source of difficulty in interpreting the numbers is that they may reflect unarticulated pervasive systemic differences in the larger political system. While this inquiry has centered upon committees, for example, both they and the statistics about them reflect the differing systems of government and the differing election practices of the two countries.

The two sets of statistics are most directly similar on party composition and personnel turnover on the committees. All parliamentary members are designated by party (or as an independent), and successive years of committee lists permit a count of the names of committee members. Political parties are the basic organizational units of parliament and its committees in both countries. The remaining measures, however, introduce greater dissimilarities.

One source of difficulty in using statistics from two different legislative bodies is that the empirical events and actions, though designated by the same name, are actually quite different. Though both parliaments consider and enact legislation, the scope and variety of bills is quite different in the two countries. The marked contrast in numbers of bills between the two countries only begins to suggest the different legal traditions and governmental practices giving rise to those numbers.

Perhaps those statistical measures which are completely different provide the least unambiguous clues to the two parliaments; for, those measures which are purportedly and verbally similar might be very dissimilar. The different statistical measures between the Swedish and Polish parliaments committees center upon their activities. Several sets of numbers are reported for administrative agency review by the Sejm committees, but there is a complete absence of such reports for the Swedish committees. On the other hand, the Swedish statistics of committee activity exclusively center upon the legislative function.

The contrast in the activity measures published by the two parliaments leads us to the conjecture that activity by legislative bodies can be considered, not as an undifferentiated whole, but as a set of more discrete and separable activities. The Swedish Riksdag and the Polish Sejm rank high, but differently, in two different activities: while Riksdagen is very active on legislation, it is inactive in administrative agency review; while the Sejm is active in agency review, it tends to be less active in the consideration of legislation.

David M. Olson University of North Carolina-Greensboro
Jon Pierre University of Lund
Ryszard Piotrowski University of Warsaw

Table 1 Party Shares of Chamber Seats, and Committee Seats and Alternatives, Swedish Riksdag by Year

Parties	1974			1977–1978			1979–1980		
	Chamber %	Committee Memb %	Alt %	Chamber %	Committee Memb %	Alt %	Chamber %	Committee Memb %	Alt %
A. Bourgeois Coalition									
Conservative	15	13	14	16	14	14	21	20	20
Center	26	28	26	25	28	27	18	20	20
Liberal	10	8	12	11	11	16	11	13	14
Subtotal ^a	50	50	52	52	53	57	50(+1) ^b	53	55
B. Socialist Coalition									
Social Democrats	45	45	43	44	47	38	44	47	45
Communist	5	5	5	5	0	4	6	0	0
Subtotal ^a	50	50	48	48	47	42	50(-1) ^b	47	45
Total	100	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	100
N =	350	240	266	349	240	294	349	240	249

Notes:

^a Party percents may not add to subtotal percents because of rounding errors.^b One seat difference in favor of bourgeois coalition.

Sources:

1974 *Riksdagens Årsbok '74*, pp. 22, 29–371977–1978 *Riksdagens Årsbok '77–'78*, pp. 39, 41–481979–1980 *Riksdagens protokoll*, October 9, 1979, pp. 65–74; and *Förteckning över Riksdagens ledamöter, Riksdagens utskott, m. fl., 1979/1980*, pp. 57–64

Table 2 Workers' Party Share of Sejm Memberships, and of Committee Seats and Officerships 1956–1980

Term	Chamber	Committee Seats	Committee Officerships
II	52.0	54.1	36.4
III	55.7	53.5	43.8
IV	55.5	55.5	45.3
V	55.5	56.6	46.0
VI	55.5	54.7	49.0
VII	56.7	54.1	53.0

Sources by Term:

II–VI Włodzimierz Ulicki, *Partia a Sejm w PRL* (Warsaw, 1980), pp. 145–148.VII Calculated from Sejm, *Spis Posłow na Sejm* (1976).

Table 3 Party Ratios on Sejm Committees by Proportion Workers' Party, 7th Term 1976-80

Committee	Party				N	Party of Chairman
	Workers'	Peasants'	Democratic	Indep		
	(PZPR) %	(ZSL) %	(SD) %	%		
Heavy and Machine-Building Industry	69	21	3	8	38	Workers'
Mining, Power and Chemical Industries	69	16	3	13	32	Workers'
Light Industry	67	23	3	6	30	Workers'
Foreign Trade	64	25	4	7	28	Workers'
Construction and Construction Materials Industry	62	22	13	3	32	Workers'
Communications and Transport	61	29	3	6	31	Workers'
Maritime Economy and Shipping	60	25	5	10	20	Workers'
National Defense	59	32	9	0	22	Workers'
Mandates-Rules	58	32	10	0	19	Workers'
Foreign Affairs	55	18	8	19	27	Workers'
Internal Affairs and Judiciary	54	23	15	8	26	Peasants'
Education and Pedagogy	54	27	6	12	33	Workers'
Labor and Social Welfare	53	24	8	16	38	Workers'
Legislation	52	26	10	13	31	Workers'
Economic Plan, Budget and Finance	51	24	7	16	41	Workers'
Agriculture and Food Industry	49	41	2	8	53	Peasants'
Science and Technical Progress	48	21	6	24	33	Workers'
Administration, Regional Economy and Environmental Protection	47	27	10	16	30	Peasants'
Forestry and Timber Industry	46	41	4	8	24	Peasants'
Internal Trade	42	23	16	19	31	Democratic
Health and Physical Culture	40	20	17	23	30	Peasants'
Culture and Art	37	20	14	29	35	Democratic

Source: Calculated from Sejm, *Spis Poslow na Sejm* (1976); and reprinted from Olson and Simon (1982), p. 72.

Table 4 Party Distribution of Sejm Members and Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of Committees, 1976-80

Parties	Chamber Members ^a		Committee ^b					
	N	%	Chairmen		Vice-Chairmen		Members	
			N	%	N	%	N	%
Workers'	261	56.7	15	68	38	49	377	54.1
Peasants	113	24.6	5	23	17	22	177	25.4
Democratic	37	8.0	2	9	12	15	54	7.7
Non-Party	49	10.7	0	0	11	14	89	12.8
Total	460	100.0	22	100	78	100	697	100.0

Sources:

^a *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1977 (Warsaw: GUS) Table 1, p. 18.

^b Calculated from Sejm, *Spis Poslow na Sejm* (1976).

Table 5 Experience of Committee Chairmen and Members (1979–1980) Swedish Riksdag

Committee	Parliament				Committee		
	Av. Yrs Chm + v-chm (1)	Av. Yrs Members (2)	First Membs ^a (N) (3)	Term Alts ^b (N) (4)	1977– Memb (N) (5)	1978 Alt (N) (6)	1974 Memb/Alt (N) (7)
Constitution	14	7	0	8	9	4	6
Finance	9	8.4	2	6	7	1	3
Tax	15	10.8	0	8	8	4	9
Justice	18	8	1	6	10	3	7
Law	10	7.4	0	7	11	4	8
Foreign Affairs	15	13.3	0	4	11	2	8
Defense	19.5	10.6	0	6	12	0	9
Social Insurance	19.5	10.1	1	8	9	2	9
Social	19	12.9	0	6	11	2	12
Culture	9	8.9	1	7	9	3	11
Education	19.5	9.7	0	9	9	3	9
Traffic	11	12.1	0	6	10	3	11
Agriculture	20	10.4	0	5	12	1	10
Economy	15.5	11.7	1	7	9	2	9
Labor Market ^c	7.5	8.1	1	6	5	5	2
Civil	19.5	9.9	2	7	9	1	9

Notes:

^a Members: Each committee has 15 members.^b Alternates: Each committee, 1979–1980, has 15–17 alternates. This column measures, as does column #3, first term of service in parliament.^c Name was changed from Interior Committee in 1974.

Sources:

1974. *Riksdagens Årsbok '74*, pp. 22, 29–371977–1978 *Riksdagens Årsbok '77–'78*, pp. 39, 41–481979–1980 *Riksdagens protokoll* October 9, 1979, pp. 60–80 and *Förteckning över Riksdagens ledamöter, Riksdagens utskott, m. fl., 1979/1980*, pp. 57–64

Table 6 Experience of Committee Members: First Term of Service in Sejm and on Committees, for Selected Committees in Seventh Term

% PZPR	Committee	First Term of Service	
		in Sejm %	on Committee %
69	Heavy Industry, Energy and Chemicals	78.1	84.4
58	Mandates-Rules	63.1	68.4
57	Education	57.6	57.6
52	Legislation	51.6	80.6
51	Socio-Economic Plan, Budget and Finance	48.8	61.0
47	Administration and Local Economy	63.3	100.0
37	Culture and Art	48.6	65.7

Source:

Calculated from Sejm. *Spis Poslow na Sejm* (1976) and *Informacja o dzialalnosci Sejmu* (1972 and 1976), for the Fifth and Sixth Terms.

Table 7 Incumbency of Committee Officers Swedish Riksdag and Polish Sejm 1979

Term of Service ^a	Riksdag Chamber %	Committee %	Sejm Chamber %	Committee %
First	0	16	43.4	55.3
Second	6	25	32.1	35.0
Third+	94	59	24.5	9.7
Total	100	100	100.0	100.0
N =		(32)		(106) ^b

Notes:

^a Terms are for four years in Poland; three in Sweden.^b Each committee has more vice-chairmen in Poland than in Sweden.

Sources:

Sweden. Riksdagen, *Förteckning över Riksdagens ledamöter, Riksdagens utskott, m. fl., 1979/1980*. Poland. Sejm, *Spis Poslow na Sejm* (1976).

Table 8 Activities of Riksdag Committee System by Years, 1977-1980

Activities	1977-78	Years 1978-79	1979-80
Committee meetings			
Hours	1 080	1 101	935
Number	543	566	529
Government bills	187	221	179
Private Motions	1 507	1 961	1 765
Committee reports	627	647	655

Source:

Sweden. Riksdagen. Kammarkansliet, various statistical reports by year, mimeo, and specially compiled.

Table 9 Activities of Sejm Committee System by Terms, 1969-1980

Activities of Committees	V 1969-72	Term VI 1972-76	VII 1976-80
Number Meetings			
Total	538	1 060	1 145
Av/yr	179	265	283
Subcommittees	52	55	53
Standing	na	847	810
Laws enacted ^b	42	103	42
Agency requests			
Total	611	442	433
Av/yr	204	110	119
Agency Opinions			
Total	na	124	291
Av/yr		31	79
Field trips			
Total	273	523	530
Av/yr	91	131	130
Policies reviewed ^c	27	47	46

Notes:

^a Standing plus ad hoc.^b All bills are usually referred to at least the Committee on Legislation; many are jointly referred to at least one other substantive committee.^c Some reviews involved two or more committees.

Sources:

Poland. Sejm, *Informacja o dzialalnosci Sejmu* (1972, 1976, and 1980).

Bibliography

Books and Articles

- Burda, Andrzej, 1978. *Parliament of the Polish People's Republic*. Warsaw: Ossolineum.
- 1975. *Sejm Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej*. Warsaw: Ossolineum.
- Lees, John D. and Malcolm Shaw (eds.) 1979. *Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Mezey, Michael L. 1979. *Comparative Legislatures*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Olson, David M. 1980. *The Legislative Process: A Comparative Approach*. New York: Harper & Row.
- 1982 "The Polish Sejm in Comparative Perspective Dimensions of Analysis", *The Polish Roundtable*. Warsaw: Polish Political Science Association).
- and Maurice D. Simon. 1982. "Institutional Development of a Minimal Parliament: Changes in the Political Capacities of the Polish Sejm", in Stephen White and Daniel Nelson (eds.), *Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*. London: Macmillan, pp. 47–84.
- Polsby, Nelson, W., Miriam Gallaher, and Barry S. Rundquist. 1969. "The Growth of the Seniority System in the US House of Representatives", *American Political Science Review* 63 (September) 787–807.
- Rustow, Dankwart. 1955. *The Politics of Compromise*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Simon, Maurice D. and David M. Olson. 1980. "Evolution of a Minimal Parliament: Membership and Committee Changes in the Polish Sejm", *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, V, 2, (May) 211–232.
- Sisson, Richard. 1973. "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization", in Allan Kornberg (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*. New York: McKay, pp. 17–38.
- Stjernquist, Nils: *Riksdagens arbete och arbetsformer* (Samhälle och riksdag IV), Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala 1966.
- Ulicki, Włodzimierz. 1980. *Partia a Sejm w PRL*. Warsaw:
- Zawadzki, Sylwester. 1980. "Funkcja Kontrolna Sejmu PRL", *Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny* XLII (Winter, 1980): 15–38.

Official Documents: Poland

- Informacja o działalności Sejmu (V Kadencja, 1969–1972)*. Warsaw: Sejm, 1972.
- Informacja o działalności Sejmu (VI Kadencja, 1972–1976)*. Warsaw: Sejm, 1976.
- Informacja o działalności Sejmu (VII Kadencja, 1976–1980)*. Warsaw: Sejm, 1980.
- Rocznik Statystyczny*. 1977 and 1978. Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
- Spis Posłów na Sejm: Regulamin Sejmu, Kadencja VII*. Warsaw: Sejm, 1976.

Official Documents: Sweden

- Förteckning över Riksdagens ledamöter, Riksdagens utskott, m. fl., 1979/80*. Stockholm: Riksdagens förvaltningskontor.
- Lindmark, Sture (ed.) 1974. *Riksdagens Årsbok 1974*. Stockholm: Riksdagens Förvaltningsstyrelse.
- Lindmark, Sture (ed.) 1978. *Riksdagens Årsbok, 1978*. Stockholm: Riksdagens Förvaltningsstyrelse.
- Riksdagens kammarskansli. Various statistical reports (mimeo):
- "Fördelning på utskott av de under allmänna motionstiden väckta motionerna.
- "Fördelning på utskott av propositioner riksmötet 1978/79" and 1979/80.
- "Sammanträdestid för utskotten fördelad på månader."
- "Sammanträdestid för utskotten fördelad på veckodagar."
- "Antal betänkanden 1977/78 and 1978/79." (handwritten).
- Riksdagens protokoll*, October 11, 1976; October 9, 1979.

The authors wish to thank and acknowledge the support of the National Academy of Sciences, the Swedish Bicentennial Fund, and the University of North Carolina-Greensboro Research Council (Olson), the Research Council for the Humanities and the Social Sciences (HSFR) (Pierre), and the Institute of State and Law of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Piotrowski). The authors have enjoyed and benefited from the support and counsel of colleagues of three countries, and of parliamentary members and staff of the two nations.