A Rejoinder

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1. On Understanding and Misunderstandings

In my article "The Conflict between the Traditions" I sought to highlight how much of the conflict within political science stems from the fact that the different world-views of political scientists often lead to totally different organizations of the perceived world.

In the case of David Easton and his critics I demonstrated that the conflicting interpretations of the systems model could be organized in terms of three different perspectives focusing from different levels on different aspects of Easton's texts concerning this model. Through this organization of the Easton-debate I found it possible to argue that many misunderstandings of Easton's texts resulted from his critics having analysed his texts with too limited a conception of science and/or having concentrated much too much on the scientific level (the texts concerning the systems model) at the expense of other levels.

I did not intend to argue that logical and/or empirical analyses of texts on the scientific level were of no value. Certainly the ultimate relevance of Easton's texts is a question of the success or the failure of his systems model. I only wanted to show that the questions of success and failure are always determined in the light of the analysts' specific world-view, which tells them what to perceive of the world and how to act in the world – that even logic can be deceptive if the analysts fail to understand the world-view from which a given scientific model springs. In my opinion it is quite impossible to grasp the scientific level of a given text-system without having grasped its other levels, as you cannot remove one element from a text-system without changing the whole content of this system.

In Scandinavia it seems to be a main point for the interpreters to search for inconsistencies and lacks of continuity in theories. But I will argue that if a given theory springs from a world-view foreign to that of the interpreter, then the inconsistencies and lacks of continuity picked up by the interpreter often only come to reflect the interpreter's own misunderstandings of the complex of problems under investigation. Every text-system hangs together internally by virtue of its own complex of problems, and if you shall be able to grasp these problems you have to begin your analysis from the assumption that the theorist has tried to make his texts consistent.

This furthermore implies that you cannot uncritically apply some instruments foreign to the theory being analysed without risking to create disorder where order otherwise existed. General instruments are indeed useful, but they have to be elaborated in such a way that they can catch different theories springing from different world-views.

In my article on the Easton–debate I argued that the framework of the critical traditions had these qualities and thus could help us to regard Easton's texts as reflecting a developmental process through which an actor acquires global beliefs, attitudes and patterns of behaviour. And in this way it became possible for me to reinterpret Easton's texts as an integrated whole on three levels performing three autonomous functions, addressing itself toward three fundamental kinds of subject matter and operating from three different types of explanatory model.

In their replies to my article Dag Anckar and Tom Bryder accuse me respectively of trying to press Easton's texts into my own analytical categories and of using terminology as a substitute for empirical analysis. But in reality my scheme of analysis represented the preliminary result of a five year long process through which a long row of instruments have been rejected by me, because they did not seem to fit my parallel empirical analyses. The above considerations about text-analysis are certainly a product of experience, as I-in the same way as Anckar-set off from the assumption that Easton's systems model not only was inconsistent, but also covered a conservative ideology behind a technical interest.

In order to avoid further misunderstandings I shall therefore reserve my answer for a presentation of my method and empirical analyses, although I should have much preferred to comment on Jan-Erik Lane's exquisite outlining of the sys-

tems point of view. However, a good deal of Lane's questions with respect to Easton's specific systems theory, I have tried to answer in the article "Nothing but Survival?" (written before I knew Lane's answer), where I confront Lane's and Easton's point of view concerning the concept of persistence (forthcoming in Scandinavian Political Studies).

1.1. On knowledge and human interest

Although my method and instruments are still in a process of development, and therefore need not only further clarification but also may contain as well theoretical as practical contradictions, and although I am perfectly aware that the article did not leave space for a thorough explication of the way in which Easton's world-view and metascience break through at the scientific level around the concept of persistence, I do not think that these factors in themselves can explain the differences in the replies from three such able political scientists as Bryder, Anckar and Lane. On the contrary, their replies to my article seem to be a good indication of the way in which different definitions of knowledge, history and society lead to different organizations of the perceived world.

Bryder perceives my framework as totally relativistic (but at the same time he also blames me for being a genuine Comteist) and serving as a "context of justification" for a consistent Easton.

Anckar perceives me as an Easton-proselyte, whose framework only serves to manipulate facts so that Easton's model appears as something different from what it *really* is.

And Lane perceives my instruments as convincing and illuminating – showing that the different ways of modelling political data do not offer contradictory alternatives for theoretical interpretations – but in need of further clarification of the methodological problems of systems analysis.

Both Anckar and Bryder blame me for not having answered the methodological problems in Easton's model at the same time as their criticism of me and my model is basically ontological. Lane on the other hand takes grip on the *structure* of my framework, searches out its weak points and tries to elaborate it still further.

The same individual/ontological respectively structural/epistemological split can be seen in their comments on Easton and his model.

Bryder tells me that a rehabilitation of Easton is impossible because of Easton's almost pathological, *radical* critique of Pareto and the other elitists, which makes him confuse the questions of actors and structures, empirical and analytic systems in his model. Anckar teaches me that Easton is a ruthless, chameleonic opportunist, whose elitistic inclinations (!) pervade his whole model in the form of a homeostatic theory reducing the question of the actors to a question of the survival of the elite. And Lane announces Easton's model as *the* major systems theoretical work in political science – although Easton has failed to solve the basic question of the identity of political systems – and concludes that the predictable revival of the relevance of the systems model in the eighties will probably mean a renaissance of the Eastonian systems analysis. In opposition to Bryder's and Anckar's statements these statements of Lane's seem to indicate that Lane has changed his opinions a good deal with respect to Easton's model since his own Easton-criticism "There must be Limits to Confusion" (1978) – especially with regard to its future possibilities.

I cannot help feeling that these different statements justify the thesis that different definitions lead to different organizations of the perceived world as well as my claim that we are in need of general instruments in which the positive elements of the different scientific traditions are somehow preserved – a line of reasoning which Bryder himself sums up wonderfully in his Easton analysis:

> "It is, indeed, almost axiomatic ... that our attitudes toward any issue, event or object depends on our frames of reference. Our frames of reference provide us with an orientation as to what we encounter in our various social roles, the assembly of which makes up our personalities ...
>
> ... the frame of reference employed in either a scientific or political situation will be of ultimate importance for both social action and interpretation since it embodies the main selective mechanisms at work when we – as interpreters and practioners – perceive, supplement, omit and put into order those data which we encounter as stimuli for our various activities ...
>
> ... there are those to whom it is sufficient that the observer's interpretation of analysed situations is offered ... there also exists a strand of thought which grants the ontological status of subjective points of view ... a special importance.
>
> ... a juxtaposition would be similar to an argument where one observer claims that he sees a forrest and not an area with trees, and another observer sees nothing but an area with trees refusing to accepts its constituting character of being a forrest" (Bryder, 1976, p. 4–8).

In the light of this quotation I find it difficult to understand why Bryder seeks to dissociate himself so thoroughly from my investigation of the first and second level frames of reference of respectively Easton and his critics. If Bryder sees it as almost axiomatic that our attitudes toward any issue, event or object depend on our frames of reference, how can he then expect to make sense of, or to be relevant in his criticism of, a scientific model – which may be different to that of himself – without having examined the world-view and metascience from which it springs?

I certainly agree with Bryder that the pre-condition of the whole process of knowledge of a real object is the existence of this real object outside of thought. I also agree with him that it is only on the basis of our concepts we become able to separate truth from mere appearances. But from this does not follow that only human agreement decides what is true and what is false. Because, as Wittgenstein has pointed out, it is what human beings *say* that is true and false. Human beings agree in the *language* they use, and as there exists different languages their agreement comes not only to reflect an agreement in opinion but also an agreement in a specific way of life (McCarthy, 1978, p. 165).

We must not forget that the whole process of knowledge relies on our sharing of some common *rules,* which we are *trained* to *obey*. To follow a rule is analogous to obeying an order, and there is consequently an unreducible element of moral and of authority in the scientific enterprise. The conflict within political science arises precisely from the fact that political scientists react – often differently – to different orders and different trainings, which in turn leads to different perceptions and thereby to different organizations of the perceived world. The whole point in the critical traditions' critique of positivism is their elaboration that positivism – by making the world *appear* as a universe of facts whose lawlike connection can be grasped descriptively – suppresses the transcendental frame of reference that is the precondition of the *meaning* of the validity of such theoretical propositions. As soon as this objectivist "illusion" is dispelled and theoretical statements are understood in relation to prior frames of reference in the life-world, however, their connection with respectively a theoretical, moral and political interest that guides knowledge also becomes apparent.

1.2. On "meaning" as a basic category

As I see the world, an acknowledgement of Bryder's view concerning the effects of our frames of reference must imply an acknowledgement of the above three interests of science connected respectively to the function of "theory construction", "organization of enlightenment", and "political action" and to the goal of "true statements", "authentic insight", and "prudent decisions". Because – as Easton says – if truth were obtainable only upon the exile of our moral premises, it would become forever unattainable because of the inescapable presence of values. The distinction between facts and values is purely analytic, as we always select our facts in terms of a prior interest, and as we always have in mind some concrete state of affairs to which our goals apply when we talk of these goals (Easten, 1953 B, chapter IX)

The inspiration behind political science is therefore clearly ethical, and its application is just as clearly political, as we all want to understand the political system so that we can use this knowledge for our own purposes. The claim of the value-relativists is in itself moral and cannot be resolved by reference to facts, as you find no a priori or logical reason why moral matters cannot be examined by political science. In my view, on the contrary, it seems as if there are good reasons to claim that the different languages of theory and of moral must walk hand in hand and together, if we want to establish a democratic society released from any frozen relations of dependences.

I certainly agree with Lane, when he says that the adherence to a subjective ontology is by no means tied to a subjective epistemology, but I very much doubt that his "explanatory tradition II' really has succeeded in transcending the understanding traditions. Because, as I have tried to touch upon above, our different frames of reference and thereby our different definitions seem to imply something more than a mere acceptance of the cognitive status of a faculty called Empathy. The definition of the situation, through which the actor's behavioral reactions are mediated, is not simply a matter of subjective motivations, of an intervening process located inside the human organism. Those meanings to which social action is oriented rather seem to be intersubjective meanings *constitutive* of the social matrix in which we find ourselves and act: inherited values and world views, instiutionalized roles and norms, and so forth. Social action seems to be oriented to a communicable meaning which has its source

in the transmitted *semantic* contents of a cultural tradition representing a complex of symbols that fixes the world-view – articulated in ordinary language – of a social group (such as Lane's own explanatory tradition).

Thus Lane's (and for instance Bruun's, Abel's, Hempel's and Nagel's) reflections on *Verstehen* and the teleological model in my opinion do not cut deeply enough, as empathetic *"Motivverständnis"* seems to presuppose a *Sinnverständnis* of the cultural and institutional setting, which gives the behavior to be explained its significance – a significance which also shows us why we cannot simply reduce meaning to a construction of psychological models of the type which behaviorism proposes. If you accept "meaning" as a basic category, the mode of access to social reality can neither be only a question of controlled observation and experimentation, nor simply a question of an empathetic identification based on introspection and imagination. An interpretative understanding of the form of life in which an action is located is not only a prerequsite for the identification of relevant "stimuli" and motives but also for the proper identification of this very action – or expressed in Wittgensteinian terms: the proper identification of an action depends on knowing the stock of action descriptions available in a given language game, as well as the criteria for their application.

With respect to Easton's systems analysis this assumption made me ask: How did we (Easton, the critics, myself) *learn* the meaning of this word (systems analysis)? From what sort of examples? In what language games? And although I shall be the first to admit the need for a further elaboration and clarification of my framework, I shall also maintain that the understanding of meaning is the eye of a needle through which methodology must pass, if we shall succeed in establishing a political science which can stand up to the theoretical and pratical needs of our societies.

1.3. On the real object versus the object of knowledge

From the assumption that we have to take into account the existence of different language games within political science does not follow that I am also supporting a relativistic outlook, as Bryder seems to believe. And from my emphasis on the interest orientation of knowledge does not follow that I either see the different modes of social science organization as purely subjective or deny the possibility of a value-neutral Erkenntnis, as Lane seems to assume. Because, by viewing social science as a *learning* process, I am also stressing that the different organizations of the world spring from *socialized* individuals. Therefore, the basic question of science can no longer be one of whether we directly perceive phenomenal events and actions. The task is rather to develop an epistemology which can explicate how – despite socially conditioned perceptions – the door is still open to objective knowledge (Easton, 1973B).

The way in which Easton accomplishes this task is however far removed from that type of methodological pluralism, which Bryder seeks to impute to Easton and myself. Because, although I wrote that "we are free to define politics in any way we wish and to organize these definitions with the aid of whatever instruments and languages we bring to the knowing process" (P 18) Bryder forgets to mention that this assumption sprang from an epistemology "seeing explanation and prediction as the ultimate test of validity" (P. 18). Surely, methodological pluralism cannot be an aim in itself. But if we wish to transcend positivism and prevent political science from being a dead enterprise, seing the world as dead "obvious" facts, we must also make a distinction between the *real object* (the concrete *apperceptive mass* directly known to the sense, *if* this were genuinely a "knowable" event) – which remains, before as after the knowing process, outside the intellect and independent of it – and *the object of knowledge* (those *sets of interactions* which we select or abstract from the real object in accordance with our different definitions). We must not forget that the pre-condition of the whole process of knowledge of a real object is the existence of this real object outside of thought.

But neither must we forget that the process of knowledge takes place *in thought*, and not in the real object, as thought operates on the transitional sets of interactions, which *designate* the real object in order to produce a concept of it, and in the next place a correlation of it, which may return to the real object as the truth about itself.

Social science is neither a question of aimless relativism nor a question of dead, frozen, ossified knowledge. Knowledge of the concrete does not come at the beginning of analysis but in the end, and it only becomes possible on the basis of useful concepts, and not on basis of the immediate evidence of the concrete. (Althusser, 1976, chapter III, and Easton, 1965B, chapter III.)

2. On the Method of Understanding

From the assumption that knowledge does not proceed from the concrete to the abstract but from the abstract to the concrete also follows that we, as interpreters, never approach our subject as a tabula rasa – as an ideally neutral observer with a direct access to the "given". Rather we bring with us a specific world-view that belongs to our own life-world, and we consequently perceive our subjects from the perspectives opened up by this world-view. No one looks at the whole world at once or even at any total event or action. The nature of perception permits us only to view the object-world selectively, to see aspects of it. What we perceive of the real object as our object of knowledge depends upon how we define it, and how we define it depends upon the technical and pratical developmental level of our own life-world. As perceivers we select or abstract from the real object those sets of interactions relevant to our interests. What is perceived is organized through what we bring to the knowing process, and what we bring may or may not be conditioned by historical and social circumstances. Thus, the end product of this process with respect to text-analysis – our interpretations – is something *other* than the real object, although these interpretations are indeed *related* to this object through history.

Therefore, when Bryder says that my scheme of analysis resembles an artificial reconstruction, he is quite correct. My aim is indeed reconstructive, as I find that the nature of perception excludes the possibility of seeing things exactly as Easton saw them. Even if I should succeed in interpreting Easton's text-system as a whole where the interconnectedness of the variables seems clear and obvious, this would only tell that I had succeeded in making Easton's text-system intelligible in my own frame of reference. And even if most political scientists should agree to my interpretation, we would nevertheless still be dealing with appearances and not with truths, as knowledge of the concrete does not come at the beginning of analysis but in the end.

But inversely this also implies that Bryder's own interpretation of the "real" Easton I, II, and III, as well as Anckar's interpretation of the systems model as elite-oriented by "nature" deal with appearances (the object of knowledge) and not with truths about the real object. One of the main assumptions in my article was exactly that many critics were often more interested in presenting their own appearances as truths – and thereby their own object of knowledge as the *only* legitimate one – than in having a dialogue with foreign points of view.

2.1. Some basic principles of understanding

To understand a given text-system is in my opinion to explicate to a point at which the complex of problems in question – which constitutes this text-system – appears worthy of consideration from a common point of view of humanity. The nature of perception implies that the meaning of a given text-system is in principle incomplete and open for interpretations from future perspectives. The movement of history and the changing situation of the interpreter bring out new aspects and cast former elements in a new light. The meaning of a given text-system goes in this way beyond its author, and understanding is therefore a reconstructive enterprise –that is, not merely reproductive but also productive (Ricoeur, 1979 B).

The interest in understanding is consequently an interest in *dialogue* with others, with the past, with alien cultures and so forth about the common concerns of human life. And such an orientation is not that of the neutral observer but that of the partner in dialogue. If we fail to understand a given text-system, we can of course appeal to error, logical fallacies, self-delusion and so on to explain something that we are unable to understand. But since we have no monopoly on truth and goodness, we must maintain an openness to the ideas of others and be prepared to learn from them (Gadamer in Connerton, 1976, P. 117–134) – what in turn implies:

1) That we regard any text-system as a complex, organized, uneven whole, which hangs together internally by virtue of its own complex of problems, and in such a way that you cannot remove one element without changing the whole content of the system. This implies that you cannot just pick up some few texts of an author for analysis, as you may thereby remove some important elements.

2) That you cannot determine the content of a specific text-system on behalf of its relation to a foreign text-system, but only on behalf of its relation to the existing theoretical and practical field of traditions, and to the social problems, motives, intentions, and structures which constitute and reflect themselves in this field of traditions. Among other things this assumption implies that you must be careful in your choice of model in order not to produce disorder where order otherwise existed.

3) That the development of a specific text-system in this way comes to depend upon a) the text-system itself, b) the field of traditions, and c) the social problems, motives, intentions, and structures. This, for instance, implies that you have to see a given text-system as reflecting a developmental process on different levels, which hang together internally.

4) That the prime mover in a specific text-system therefore must be the author as a concrete, historical actor, as history reflects itself in the individual development of the actor through the complex bonds, which – with the process of socialization as mediator – connect the actor to history. In my opinion this implies that you have to set out from the assumption that the author tries to make sense of his texts instead of setting out from the assumption that the author is an illogical and/or unpractical creature.[1]

2.2. The process of understanding

From the 4 principles above furthermore follows that I see the process of understanding as having a hypothetical and circular character. From the perspectives available to him, the interpreter makes a preliminary projection of the sense of the text as a whole. By penetrating further into the different parts of the whole, the preliminary projection is revised, alternative proposals are considered, and new projection are tested. This process of understanding the parts in terms of a projected sense of the whole, and correcting the latter in the light of a depth-analysis of the parts aims at achieving a unity of sense – that is an interpretation of the whole into which the interpreter's detailed knowledge of the parts can be integrated without violence. (McCarthy, 1978, p. 169–193).

The process of interpretation must consequently be guided by a trained openness for cultural and structural differences. This is not to say that openness is a matter of the interpreter's ridding himself of all preconceptions and prejudgements. Because of the analytic nature of perception all understanding is of necessity tied to such preconceptions and prejudgements. The problem of understanding is not simply the having of a worldview but rather the unselfconscious imposition of this worldview on a foreign text-system. Openness means that the interpreter seeks to conceptualize his material in such a way that while its foreignness is preserved, it is nevertheless brought into intelligible relation with his own field of traditions, and with the problems, motives, intentions, and structures which constitute and reflect themselves in this field of traditions.

This does not mean that we as interpreters uncritically have to accept all the different theoretical, moral, and political validity claims raised in a given text-system, but only that we have to see all these claims as possible responses to questions and concerns that we ourselves share. Openness means that we accept that the definition of life is not pre-given in a social system, and that the continued attempts to define cultural life are a necessary (but not a sufficient) component of the very life process of socially related individuals.

2.3. A definition of "meaning"

From my thesis that the nature of perception excludes the possibility of establishing eternally valid frameworks, however, does not follow that you cannot obtain valid generalizations of the real object, as the usefulness of our conceptualizations lies precisely in their ability to change something in reality by adding something *known* to it. We must not confuse our interpretations with the real object. Because, since knowledge *of* reality belongs in advance to reality, since it is knowledge of *nothing but* reality, our concepts only add something to reality on the puzzling condition of adding nothing to it. On behalf of reconstructions – dictated by the factual development – each age adds to reality its own knowledge of that reality, but in each age reality is only putting in the pocket what in advance belongs to itself. The social sciences do not reflect disciplines wandering aimlessly from one conceptualization to another, as they respond to changing historical conditions, but disciplines whose history reveals an insistent search for increasingly reliable knowledge about social reality for the benefit of mankind (Easton, 1955 A and 1973 B).

Truth about social life does not lie in the discovery of some one and only system cohering out there in the phenomenal world; nor does it call for us arbitrarily to order that world of complex relationships in terms of our concepts. Meaning does not lie in the phenomena alone (the correspondence view) nor does it derive exclusively from the utility of the way our socially conditioned minds may order these phenomena (the instrumentalist view). Meaning arises from the dialectical process through which the knower perceives and understands relationships among phenomena and the existential limits these phenomena impose on the process itself. These limits lie in the need to test, through experience, the utility of a particular ordering of phenomena by its con-

tribution to our explanatory and predictive powers (Easton, 1953 B, chapter XII and 1973 B).

3. On the Interpretation of David Easton's Text-System

In the light of what I have said with respect to "understanding", I shall now, briefly, try to *reconstruct* the way in which I sought to come to terms with Easton's text-system.

When I sat out some years ago with Habermas' texts in the one hand and Easton's two books on the systems model in the other, I considered it an easy match to "prove" the theoretical and practical shortcomings of Easton's model. After all I had *learned* how to proceed from Habermas' own criticism of Luhmann's (1971) systems model. To my surprise, however, I soon realized that Easton's model did not only resist much of Habermas' general critique of systems analysis but also seemed to focus upon the same theoretical problems as Habermas' model from "Legitimation Crisis" (1976).

In order to find out whether some other interpreters had made similar observations I began collecting material on the Easton-debate, from which I learnt that although I stood rather alone with these observations I nevertheless seemed to face a puzzling problem – reflecting itself in the long row of self-contradictory nicknames Easton had had to put up with.

By penetrating into Easton's first book "The Political System" (1953 B) – which primarily focuses upon the pre-conditions of (political) knowledge production – I realized that Easton's systems model apparently sprang from an epistemology and ontology very similar to the critical traditions' – an assumption which seemed to be confirmed by my reading of other less well-known Easton-texts (for example 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1955 A).

Through a depth analysis of Easton's earliest articles I furthermore got convinced that Easton – in the same way as Habermas – had started his life-work with a critical reconstruction of positivism and historicism around the complex of problems concerning the relation "understanding/explanation" and the relation "elite/mass" – a thesis which seemed to be justified when I later on came into possession of Easton's doctoral thesis (1947) "The Theory of the Elite: A Study of the Elitist Trends in English Thought."

My problem was now, how to organize Easton's texts as a whole into which my knowledge of the parts could be integrated without violence. I tried my hand on several models which did not seem to have this quality until I suddenly stumbled upon a critical model distinguishing between four different levels of social science: the world-view level, the metascientific level, the research policy level, and the scientific level (Dunn/Fozouni, 1975).

3.1. On the practical syllogism

By excluding the research policy level in the first round – as this level referred to Easton's activities in research commissions, committees and so forth – I found out that the critical model could help me fit Easton's texts into a practical syllogism expressed in the form of a teleological explanation turned upside down:

(1) Easton intends to bring about a scientific, actor/structure model of the political system centrated around the relation "elite/mass".
(2) Easton considers that he cannot bring about such a model without a reconstruction of the world-view and metascience of respectively the explanatory and understanding traditions.
(3) Therefore Easton sets about to do this reconstruction.

Having oriented himself within the existing field of traditions, Easton considers it necessary to reconstruct this field in order to elaborate a comprehensive actor/structure model of the political system. Thus, the issue in this part of my Easton-interpretation was the understanding of Easton's behavior "reconstructing". My assumption was that Easton thought it *necessary* to do a reconstruction in order to develop a comprehensive political model. Easton might indeed have misjudged the circumstances and consequently might have failed with respect to the development of such a model. But this by no means invalidates the understanding of his behavior "reconstructing", as the objectivity of this behavior may be teleologically established, irrespecitve of the truth of its consequences. As von Wright expresses it:

> "Premises of a practical inference do not with logical necessity entail behavior. They do not entail the existence of a conclusion to match them. The syllogism leading up to action is "pratical" and not a piece of logical demonstration. It is only when the action is already there and a pratical argument is constituted to explain and justify it that we have a logically conclusive argument. The necessity of practical inference schema is, one could say, a necessity conceived ex post actu." (von Wright, 1971, p. 117).

I will argue that it is this type of explanation Lane's explanatory traditions II have difficulties in coming to terms with. Because, in the context of practical inference, teleological explanation must commence from a conclusion and subsequently work its way back to the premises. The patterns of behavior are so to speak "post-determined" – and not "pre-determined" – by premises, and, as such, a practical inference does not predict behavior.

The practical syllogism may therefore also explain why I react so "violently" to Anckar's character sketch of Easton. How can Anckar on the one hand speak so warmly for the study of the actor's intentions and on the other hand judge Easton to be a ruthless, opportunistic elitist on the basis of an explication of the elitistic nature of the systems model? Even if you could prove this model to be elitistic – and I will argue that you cannot – this would in itself be no proof that Easton *intended* to be an elitist. And an explication of Easton's intentions demands in my opinion a more comprehensive material than Anckar's.

Thus I may also ease Anckar's reactions to my description of him. I named him an understanding scientist, because I perceived him as acting as if he belonged to the understanding traditions. Whether or not he also intended to be a member of these traditions would of course be a matter of a much more comprehensive analysis of his text-system.

3.1. On the development of Easton's text-system

In the light of my practical syllogism above and my preliminary findings from the depth-analysis of the parts (the basic functions, subject matters and explanatory models of social science) I examined whether the critical model could help in organizing the Easton-debate, and in this way justify not only my preliminary findings but also its own application. And having experienced that my knowledge of the parts as well as the Easton-critics apparently could be integrated into this model without violence, I then examined if the model could also be applied to justify the developmental process of Easton's text-system indicated by the practical syllogism.

By letting each chapter in Easton's books count as an article – in order to place all the articles at the different levels assumed by the critical model – and by discriminating between a theoretical and an empirical level at the scientific level, I arrived at the scheme below, demonstrating the development of Easton's text-system from 1947–1976.

SCHEME I

The Development of David Easton's Text-System.

	WORLD-VIEW	METASCIENCE	THEORETICAL SCIENCE	EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
1947		The Function of the Governing Class in Elitist Theory. (9 pages)		
		Politics and Semantics. (31 pages)		
		The Elitist Theory of the Governing Class (63 pages)		
		Political Creativism (14 pages)		
		The Psychological Foundations of Creativism. (31 pages)		
		The Search for Elitism in English Thought: English views of the Governing Class. (7 pages)		
		Frederic Harrison: The Challenge to Democratic Liberalism. (15 pages)		
		The Sociology of the Mind. (20 pages)		
		The Mind of a Class. (35 pages)		
		Myth - The Mind over Matter. (22 pages)		
		Myth - The Ideology of Positivism. (19 pages)		
		Human Nature and the Governing Class. (13 pages)		
		Social Values Underlying Harrison's Psychological Positivism. (17 pages)		
		Walter Bagehot: Progress and the Mind. (19 pages)		

	WORLD-VIEW	METASCIENCE	THEORETICAL SCIENCE	EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
1947		Psychology and the Class Structure. (12 pages)		
		The Class Models. (21 pages)		
		The Role of the Multitude. (10 pages)		
		The Power of the Myth. (7 pages)		
	The Ethical Theory of the Governing Class. (28 pages)			
	Elitism - The Citadel of Reaction. (25 pages)			
1949	Walter Bagehot and Liberal Realism. (21 pages)			
1950		Harold Lasswell: Policy Scientist for a Democratic Society. (28 pages)		
1951	The Decline of Modern Political Theory. (23 pages)			
1952		Problems of Method in American Science. (18 pages)		
1953	Mood and Method (34 pages)	The Orientation of Political Research (35 pages)		
	The Condition of American Political Science. (27 pages)	Situational Data. (22 pages)		
	Conceptions of Science and Theory in Empirical Research. (26 pages)	The Total Structure of the Situation. (29 pages)		
	A Convenient Guide for Political Inquiry. (24 pages)	Behavioral Data. (19 pages)		
	The Moral Foundations of Theoretical Research. (14 pages)	The Decline of Modern Political Theory (33 pages)		
1953	The Rejuvenation of Political Theory. (14 pages)	Critique of a General Political Theory (41 pages)		
		Limits of the Equilibrium Model in Social Research. (9 pages)		
1955	Shifting Images of Social Science and Values. (16 pages)		A Theoretical Approach to Authority. (63 pages)	
1957			An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. (18 pages)	
			The Function of Formal Education in a Political System. (13 pages)	
1958			The Perception of Authority and Political Change (27 pages)	
1959		Political Anthropology. (53 pages)		
1960				The Child's Changing Image of the President. (14 pages)
1961			Youth and the Political System. (26 pages)	
1962	The Current Meaning of "Behavioralism" in Political Science (26 pages)			The Child's Political World. (18 pages)
				The Role of the Elementary School in Political Socialization. (9 pages)
1965	Theory and Behavioral Research (22 pages)		The Identification of the Political System. (11 pages)	The Child's Image of Government (18 pages)
	Political Life as a System of Behavior (11 pages)		The Environment of a Political System (17 pages)	

	WORLD-VIEW	METASCIENCE	THEORETICAL SCIENCE	EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
1965	The Theoretical Status of Systems. (11 pages)		Persistence in a World of Stability and Change. (24 pages)	
	The Form of Theoretical Analysis (14 pages)		The Political System Under Stress. (15 pages)	
	The Goals of Systems Analysis. (20 pages)		The Responding Political System. (16 pages)	
			Some Fundamental Categories of Analysis. (20 pages)	
			Demands as the Input of a System. (20 pages)	
			Demands as Source of Stress. (13 pages)	
			Conversion of wants to Demands. (15 pages)	
			Regulation of Want Conversion: Structural Mechanisms. (15 pages)	
			Regulation of Want Conversion: Cultural Mechanisms. (17 pages)	
			Regulation of the Flow of Demands: The Communication Channels. (11 pages)	
			Regulation of the Flow of Demands: Reduction Processes. (25 pages)	
			Support as an Input of Systems. (18 pages)	
			Objects of Support: The Political Community. (19 pages)	
			Objects of Support: The Regime. (22 pages)	
			Objects of Support: The Authorities. (8 pages)	
			Stress Through the Erosion of Support. (10 pages)	
			Cleavage as a Source of Stress (17 pages)	
			Structural Regulation of Support. (20 pages)	
			The Generation of Diffuse Support. (11 pages)	
			Diffuse Support for Authorities and Regime: The Belief in Legitimacy. (11 pages)	
			Sources of Legitimacy. (22 pages)	
			Diffuse Support for Authorities and Regime: The Belief in a Common Interest. (9 pages)	
			Diffuse Support for the Political Community. (23 pages)	
			The Nature of Outputs. (20 pages)	
			The Feedback Loop. (19 pages)	
			The Feedback Stimuli. (19 pages)	
			The Feedback Response. (10 pages)	
			The Communication of Feedback Response. (19 pages)	
			Output Reaction - I. (18 pages)	
			Output Reaction -II. (23 pages)	

	WORLD-VIEW	METASCIENCE	THEORETICAL SCIENCE	EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
1966			Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics. (12 pages)	
			A Systems Approach to Political Life. (22 pages)	
1967				The Child's Acquisition of Régime Norms. (14 pages)
1968	Political Science (18 p)			
1969	Explanation of the Child's Developing Images. (16 pages)	The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization. (26 pages)	Socialization and the Political System. (14 pages)	The Image of Government. (31 pages)
			A Political Theory of Political Socialization. (26 pages)	Visibility and Salience of Political Authorities. (23 pages)
			The Beginnings of Political Socialization. (22 pages)	The President as a Focal Point of Political Socialization. (28 pages)
			Socialization of Support for the Structure of Authority. (16 pages)	The President, the Presidency. (16 pages)
				How the Child Sees the Policeman. (20 pages)
				How the Child Feels about the Policeman. (14 pages)
				Authority Objects in Later Childhood. (30 pages)
				Shifting Images and Support for the System. (14 pages)
				Political Stability and Change after Childhood. (30 pages)
				Predictors of Cognitive Responses to Political Authorities. (23 pages
				Predictors of Affective Responses to Political Authorities. (29 pages)
			The Membership Role in the Political System. (15 pages)	
			Beyond the American System. (20 pages)	
	The New Revolution in Political Science. (11 pages)			
1971	Continuities in Political Theory. (20 pages)			Politics in the School Curricula. (13 pages)
1972	Integration Through Policy Analysis? (15 pages)	Some Limits of Exchange Theory in Politics. (20 pages)		
1973	Reflections on Criticism. (21 pages)			
	Systems Analysis and its Classical Critics. (33 pages)			
1975			A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support. (23 pages)	
1976	The Relevance of Biopolitics to Political Theory.(11 pages)	Theoretical Approaches to Political Support. (18 pages)		
1947-1976	Number of Articles: 24 Number of pages: 492 ALL FOUR LEVELS: NUMBER OF ARTICLES: 119 NUMBER OF PAGES: 2.424	Number of Articles: 32 Number of Pages: 734 World-view level + Metascientific Level: Number of Articles: 56 Number of Pages: 1.226	Number of Articles: 46 Number of Pages: 854	Number of Articles: 17 Number of Pages: 344 Theoretical + Empirical Level: Number of Articles: 63 Number of Pages: 1.198

As you can read from this scheme there seems to be good reasons to speak of Easton I, II and III, as Bryder proposes, at the same time as one can perceive all these "Eastons" as reflecting a developmental process within the very same critical framework. In the period from 1947–1955 one can sense the young critical Easton, who seeks a reconstruction of the world-view and metascience of the existing field of traditions in order to reestablish the dialectic relationship of knowledge and human interest around the problems of "understanding/explanation" and "elite/mass" – a relationship and a complex of problems which – according to both Habermas and Easton – were abandoned at the time of Marx and Hegel in favor of "Scientism" meaning science's belief in itself.

In the period from 1955–1969 we seem to find the behavioralistic Easton, who – in terms of his reconstruction of the relation between social science and values – seeks to elaborate a scientific model which can stand up to his own conclusions on the world-view level and metascientific level.

And in the period from 1969–1976 we can sense the self-reflecting post-behavioralistic Easton, who in the light of his detailed knowledge of the parts in his text-system principally seeks to refine and correct his original projection of the whole, and secondly applies this projection on the systems model in order to achieve a unity of sense.

Thus conceived there is no need – as Bryder claims – to interpret Easton's many references to himself in his books as a sign of an uncritical attitude. Because, as the critical traditions in their present form – which represents a comprehensive, materialistic reconstruction of earlier critical texts (such as Horkheimer's and Marcuse's) – are primarily a product of the late sixties and the seventies, and as Easton's text-system is primarily a product of the fourties, fifties and early sixties, you can hardly blame Easton for referring to himself as an authority whith respect to a critical and materialistic reconstruction of social science and with respect to the elaboration of a political model springing from this reconstruction.

You can of course expect that his text-system does not only reflect a context-free, extensional monologue but also an intentional, historically oriented dialogue with foreign points of view. You may also expect that this dialogue reflects the complex of problems which seems to constitute his text-system. But if Easton regards himself as an advocate for a critical social science developed in opposition to both positivism and historicism, it would in my opinion be quite natural to expect his references to himself to be in the forefront on the world-view level and scientific level, and to expect the references on the metascientific level to be reserved for a comprehensive discussion and elaboration of his world-view and of the complex of problems, which constitutes this world-view and thereby the entire text-system.

3.2. On the structure of Easton's text-system

In order to justify the claims above and in order to secure myself from merely pressing my own assumptions and analytic categories upon Easton's text-system I began examining Easton's references to respectively books/articles and names and arrived at the tables below – showing the references with the highest values. (In sum you find 2.757 references to books/articles and 6.317 references to names in my present material.)

On the scientific/theoretical level you find Easton himself as the totally dominating figure, whereas he shares this position with R. E. Lane on the scientific/empirical level. Apart from the extremely low frequency of references per page – which may explain why many interepreters in my opinion get lost, if they only base their interpretations on an analysis of the systems model – you may also note that Easton's domination in combination with the presence of many well-known developmental psychologists seems to indicate something more than a traditional, structural-functionalistic outlook.

Table 1: References to books and articles at the scientific/ theoretical level.

1. A Framework for Political Analysis (David Easton)	33
2. A Systems Analysis of Political Life (David Easton)	23
3. The Political System (David Easton)	22
4. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (M. Weber/T. Parsons)	20
5. Political Socialization (H. Hyman)	13
6. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems (David Easton)	10
Total number of references:	637
Number of references per page:	0,75
Number of references per article:	13,85

Table 2: References to names in the texts excl. notes and to names in the notes at the scientific/theoretical level.

1. M. Weber	17	1. David Easton	124
2. K. W Deutsch	13	2. K. W. Deutsch	21
3. D. Riesman	10	3. T. Parsons	18
4. E. B. Haas	6	4. R. Hess	16
5. J. Piaget	4	5. G. R. Boynton	13
		6–8. H. Hyman	12
		S. M. Lipset	12
		J. C. Wahlke	12
Total number of references in the texts excl. notes:	137	Total number of references in the notes:	831
Number of references per page:	0,16	Number of references per page:	1,03
Number of references per article:	2,98	Number of references per article:	18,07

Table 3: References to books and articles at the scientific/empirical level.

1. Political Ideology (R. E. Lane)	11
2. The Voter Decides (A. Cambell/G. Gurin/W. E. Miller)	10
3. Political Life (R. E. Lane)	8
4–5. A Systems Analysis of Political Life (David Easton)	7
The Childs Changing Image of the President (D. Easton/R. Hess)	7
6. An Examination of Role Theory (J. J. Preiss/H. J. Ehrlich)	6
Total number of references:	219
Number of references per page:	0,64
Number of references per article:	12,88

Table 4: References to names in the texts excl. notes and to names in the notes at the scientific/empirical level.

1. J. F. Kennedy	16	1. David Easton	32
2. R. E. Lane	12	2. R. E. Lane	20
3–4. D. D. Eisenhower	7	3. R. Hess	16
G. F. Washington	7	4. A. Cambell	14
5. M. Weber	5	5. W. E. Miller	13
6–7. S. Freud	3	6–7. F. I. Greenstein	8
M. Lerner	3	T. Gurin	8
Total number of references in the nexts excl. notes:	67	Total number of references in the notes:	346
Number of references per page:	0,19	Number of references per page:	1,01
Number of references per article:	3,94	Number of references per article:	20,35

When we come to the metascientific level, we experience that Easton's dominance at the scientific level does not imply that his whole system reflects an extensional monologue. The frequency of references per page is here not only remarkably high compared to the scientific level, but the references themselves also seem to indicate a historically oriented dialogue around the very complex of problems which constitutes the entire text-system. On the one hand you can almost sense the comprehensive debate around the relation elite/mass – a debate where also Marx seems to have something to say – and on the other hand it also appears as if the debate concerning the relation understanding/explanation, and thereby the question of actors versus structures, is fairly well represented.

Table 5: References to books and articles at the metascientific level.

1.	Mind and Society (V. Pareto)	84
2.	The Ruling Class (G. Mosca)	75
3.	Les Systemes Socialistes (V. Pareto)	64
4.	Physics and Politics (W. Bagehot)	56
5.	Order and Progress (Frederic Harrison)	47
6.	The English Constitution (W. Bagehot)	26
7.	Positive Philosophy (A. Comte)	24
8.	The Process of Government (A. F. Bentley)	23
9.	Philosophy of Common Sense (Frederic Harrison)	21
10–11.	African Political Systems. (M. Fortes/E. E. Evans-Pritchard)	18
	Works and Life of Walter Bagehot (ed. R. Barrington)	18
12.	A History of Political Theory (G. H. Sabine)	17
13.	Politics, Who Gets What, When, How (H. D. Lasswell)	16
14–15.	Public Administration (H. Simon/D. Smithburg/V. Thompson)	15
	The Stydy of the Principles of Politics (G. E. G. Catlin)	15
Total number of references:		1.205
Number of references per page:		1,64
Number of references per article:		37,66

Table 6: References to names in the texts excl. notes and to names in the notes at the metascientific level:

1. Frederic Harrison	255	1. Frederic Harrison	118
2. V. Pareto	244	2. V. Pareto	116
3. W. Bagehot	211	3. W. Bagehot	92
4. G. Mosca	179	4. G. Mosca	77
5. A. Comte	131	5. H. D. Lasswell	64
6. H. D. Lasswell	122	6. A. Comte	36
7. K. Marx	53	7. D. Easton	34
8. A. F. Bentley	47	8. T. Parsons	31
9. G. E. G. Catlin	36	9. H. Simon	20
10. C. H. McIlwain	30	10. C. E. Merriam	18
Total number of references in the texts excl. notes:	2.081	Total number of references in the notes:	1.451
Number of references per page:	2,84	Number of references per page:	1,98
Number of references per article:	65,03	Number of references per article:	45,34

At the world-view level we experience how Easton crops up again, although it is now – quite naturally – his first book, which takes the lead. The frequency of references per page here is also high compared to the scientific level, and the references themselves point out many of the same philosophers and scientists as Habermas applies in his reconstruction of the world-view of the social sciences as well as Easton's own early sources of influence – especially Bagehot – who in my opinion helped to shape the development of the concept of persistence (Easton, 1949).

4. Final Comments

The tables above could of course have been commented much more thoroughly, and they might also have been approached from several different angles. But – if nothing else – (and apart from the important clues they gave for my continued analysis of the parts) they at least seem to point out that my model indeed may help in making a unity of sense of Easton's text system. On the one hand they seem to justify my assumption that Easton operates at the same levels as the critical traditions. And on the other hand they also seem to indicate that Easton's text-system may be seen as hanging together internally by virtue of its own complex of problems.

But although the tables in this way seem to support my thesis that we have to grasp the interconnections between the different levels of a given text-system in order to avoid misunderstandings on either of its levels, I do not expect that

Table 7: References to books and articles at the world-view level

1. The Political System (David Easton)	61
2. David Easton's Poltical Theory (E. F. Miller)	33
3. Physics and Politics (W. Bagehot)	24
4–7. A Framework for Political Analysis (David Easton)	7
A Systems Analysis of Political Life (David Easton)	7
Administrative Behavior (H. Simon)	7
Power and Society (A. Kaplan/H. D. Lasswell)	7
Total number of references:	696
Number of references per page:	1,41
Number of references per article:	29,00

Table 8: References to names in the texts excl. notes and to names in the notes at the world-view level.

1. E. F. Miller	121	1. David Easton	82
2. W. Bagehot	92	2. E. F. Miller	35
3. M. Weber	30	3. W. Bagehot	17
4. K. Marx	25	4. J. Dennis	14
5–6. Aristotle	18	5–6. H. D. Lasswell	13
V. Pareto	18	T. Parsons	13
7. J. S. Mill	16	7. M. Weber	11
8. A. Comte	15	8–11. G. A. Almond	9
9. F. Harrison	14	J. Bryce	9
10–13. E. Burke	13	A. Kaplan	9
J. Bryce	13	H. Simon	9
J. Locke	13	12–13. R. Merton	8
G. Mosca	13	14. D. Truman	8
14. Plato	10	R. Dahl	7
Total number of references in the texts excl. notes:	635	Total number of references in the notes:	769
Number of references per page:	1,29	Number of references per page:	1,56
Number of references per article:	26,46	Number of references per article:	32,04

the tables alone may change for example Dag Anckar's attitudes toward Easton and his model. I only hope that these tables in combination with my outlining of the method and process of understanding may help in opening up for a constructive discussion of the dominant form of text-analysis in Scandinavia, which first and foremost aims at finding inconsistencies at the scientific level in a text-system.

With respect to Easton's scientific model, however, my forthcoming article on "persistence" shall, hopefully, demonstrate the way in which my intentional analysis of Easton's world-view and metascience opens up for quite another model than the elitistic one outlined by Anckar. And with respect to Anckar's character sketch of Easton as a chameleonic elitist the statements of the "behavioralistic Easton" below may help to indicate that this sketch may be a product of a confusion of structures and intentions, and that Easton's discrimination in "A Framework ..." (p. 7) between ethical evaluation and empirical explanation really implies something more than an ordinary behavioralistic outlook. (The quotation stems from a round-table discussion in February, 1967 – that is, two years before his "Credo of Relevance" – in Marrissett, I/Stevens, W. W., 1971)

"*Wiggins:* ... Who says that the rules of the game for the majority are appropriate for the minority?
Gibson: Give me a rule that is not appropriate for both.
Wiggins: It would appear to me that one could develop an effective argument for riots being useful to society.
Gibson: I could not.
"*Easton:* Oh, yes you could, in Hitler's Germany! ... I would like to state a position counter to one expressed in Professor Gibson's chapter (5). I feel closer to that alternative which says "just as we might feel resentment in an attempt to transmit the political values of the nineteenth-century establishment to us, so might this new

generation resent our efforts to transmit our values." I would most likely, agree with Professor Gibson's values about our present conception of democracy, but democracy is a dynamic and changing concept. I would be reluctant to commit us to transmitting to this new generation the kinds of values that we happen to hold at the moment. For example, we have practiced very deliberately, in the past, a set of values which excluded blacks from integration into certain parts of the city. We run into the danger of transmitting a substantive set of values that will not be workable for the next generation.

An alternative to this procedure would be to train the child to examine his own values and to examine the values of the community around him. Presumably he then would be in a position to talk about these values and to appreciate them. If the student is unable to rationally assess and weigh values and to determine their origins, he will possibly not be a useful citizen, according to some prevalent criteria of citizenship.

The outcome of this alternative is that the child may be very ciritical of the type of society that he lives in and move very forcibly in another direction. He then may say that the use of force or violence is necessary and argue this in a very rational fashion. Even the most conservative philosophers in history agree that violence at some point is absolutely necessary. We may differ with someone who is engaging in a riot because we simply do not believe that at that point it is necessary. The important thing is rational examination, the ability to weigh, to assess; these I consider to be the attributes of a good citizen. I do not consider a good citizen to be necessarily one who is a rah-rah democrat or who is very much attached to the system. These *could be* some of the consequences of being a good citizen in my judgment, at a particular time and place, but under certain circumstances such characteristics may be those of the worst citizen in the world – for example, a person living in and supporting Nazi Germany." (p. 69–70)

And in the discussion of history and philosophy Easton furthermore outlines, how this mediation of moral and of theory in a citizen's "prudent" decision springs from a discrimination between "true statements" and "authentic insights":

"Let us assume that we include in the scientific enterprise the process not only of ordering and validating knowledge, but also that of discovering insights that can be ordered, systematized, and validated, and that the discovery process itself is an important part of a scientific process. I would, in fact, suggest that this discovery process is probably the most important part of the scientific enterprise. If this is the case, narrative history (and I am not sure I want to identify history exclusively as narrative history) has a unique value of its own. It is an important mechanism for stimulating the imagination to discover insights, hypotheses, and so on. I think, then, we can retain history as one of the major components of contemporary social science. There is no doubt in my mind that we would be worse off if we destroyed history by trying to make it over in our own limited conception of the social sciences. We do not have to change history in order to use it, but we have to change our own understanding of the social sciences" (p. 60).

Footnote

[1] These four principles are developed from Althusser (1976) and from Lundquist's reflections on understanding (1981). When one takes into account our different theoretical perspectives, it is curious – but not unnatural – that Lundquist by applying almost the same method of understanding as mine on Lenin's texts, ends up, like myself, with an interconnected whole in which Lenin's organizational theory takes on quite a new meaning compared to the common interpretations. It is not difficult to predict that Lundquist will experience much of the same type of criticism as myself from the Lenin-interpreters.

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