

# Population Pressure and Agrarian Property Rights in Haiti

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*This paper demonstrates that population pressure on the land has been an important determinant of agrarian property rights in Haiti, including property rights in human beings. Major changes in the density of the population are identified and linked to redefinitions of property rights. The paper ends with a discussion of possible future monopolization of landholdings in Haiti.*

## Introduction

Furubotn and Pejovich define *property rights* as "the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use," and argue that the "prevailing system of property rights in the community can be described, then, as the set of economic and social relations defining the position of each individual with respect to the utilization of scarce resources."<sup>1</sup> For a long time, property rights constituted a neglected field in economic theory – presumably, mainly as a result of the increasing mathematization of the discipline after the Second World War. During the past decade, however, the concept has played an increasingly important role in economic research, especially in attempts to link theory with empirical evidence. According to Furubotn and Pejovich, the aim of the property rights approach to economics is to establish operationally meaningful, i.e., empirically testable, propositions about the economy, given postulates on maximizing behavior and the sovereignty of individuals' preferences or values in guiding economic choice. For such an approach to yield fruitful insights, the institutional environment within which economic activity takes place must be specified with great care.<sup>2</sup>

The development of property rights and institutions can itself be subjected to economic analysis. This paper attempts to link the concept of property rights with the degree of population pressure on the land in the setting of an underdeveloped agrarian economy: that of Haiti. It will be shown how changes in population pressure, and, hence, in relative factor supplies, have constituted an impor-

tant determinant of the system of property rights in Haitian agriculture from the French colonial period up to the present time. In this context, the "things" referred to by Furubotn and Pejovich are not only land but also men – those men who work the land. The major changes in population density have been linked to important changes not only in relations between the laboring and non-laboring classes, which pertain to the use of agricultural land, but also in the relations connected with the use of labor. Property rights in both land and human beings have been redefined and the degree of population pressure has had an important role to play in this process. This has not been a role which could be unequivocally predicted from a known man/land ratio or from a change in this ratio, but one which has differed as a number of circumstances exogenous to population growth have differed.

## The Rise of the Plantation System

Present-day Haiti was a French colony from 1697 to 1791. With respect to property rights, the main characteristic of Saint-Domingue, as the colony was known, was the combination of large-scale plantations with slave labor. By the time of the French Revolution, some 450,000 Negro slaves<sup>3</sup> were sustaining an economy which produced a number of export crops, notably sugar and coffee, on fairly large-sized plantations. The largest were the sugar plantations which ranged from 150 to 300 hectares, while coffee and indigo plantations were usually less than a hundred hectares.<sup>4</sup> Sugar was the most important crop. It was basically the technical requirements of sugar production in

combination with an extreme demographic situation which produced the system of property rights that prevailed in Saint-Domingue and then, in a slightly modified form, in independent Haiti for more than a decade after liberation from the French.

Sugar cane came to Hispaniola at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The West Indian climate presented extremely favorable conditions for its cultivation and Hispaniola and the rest of the Caribbean islands possessed a strong comparative advantage in sugar production. The structure of this advantage was not such, however, that it could be acted upon directly. The technology available to the sugar planters required comparatively heavy concentrations of capital, land and labor for profitable operations.<sup>5</sup> Each plantation had to have a crushing mill, the optimum economic size of which was fairly large. This optimum, in turn, determined the optimum size of the plantation and the size of the required labor force.

Establishing plantations of the requisite size was easy, but the recruitment of the necessary labor force presented a formidable problem for the planters. The reason is to be found in demographic changes. When Columbus discovered Hispaniola in 1492 the island sustained a large Indian population, estimates of which range from 200,000 to 1,200,000.<sup>6</sup> A century later hardly a soul of this population was left. Spanish practices of forced (*encomienda*) labor in combination with imported European diseases and outright slaughter in battle had taken a heavy toll. This meant that there was plenty of land to turn into plantations, but also that Negro slaves had to be imported from America to man them. This practice was already underway in 1502, but it was not until the French period that the slave traffic reached its peak, with average annual imports possibly exceeding 20,000 people.<sup>7</sup>

The dwindling population was less of a problem during the Spanish period, when extraction of alluvial gold was the Spaniards' principal economic interest. When this activity ceased, cattle grazing and livestock trade became the dominant activities occupying this position as early as the 1530s and 1540s. Cattle ranching is a highly land-intensive activity requiring very little labor with the cattle being allowed to stray across vast open ranges. The basic economic units in this system were the *hatos*, "immense possessions. . . where horses and cattle [were] raised with little care."<sup>8</sup> By 1650, *hatos* may have covered as much as one-third of the area of Hispaniola.<sup>9</sup> Cattle

ranching was quite in harmony with the factor proportions prevailing in the island, but after the formal cession of Saint-Domingue to France by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, this equilibrium was upset. The French colonists, who had penetrated western Hispaniola at least seventy-five years earlier, had been hesitant to undertake the large investments required to make sugar cane a profitable crop as long as the territorial status of Saint-Domingue remained uncertain. With the Spanish threat removed, sugar cultivation was expanded rapidly across the French colony. Large plantations emerged and property rights were created not only in land, but also in men as an artificial means of overcoming the obstacle posed by an extreme demographic situation where plantation labor on a voluntary or forced basis was unavailable locally.

It must also be mentioned that, although the slavery-based plantation system was the "final" solution of the labor force problem, it was not the only one attempted. At an earlier stage, indentured laborers (*engagés*) had been brought in from France on contracts specifying the number of years (usually three) they had to work before gaining complete freedom.<sup>10</sup> This, however, was no solution to the problem of mobilizing labor for the sugar estates. The coercive measures at the disposal of the planters vis-à-vis the *engagés* were too weak. An indentured laborer could be held only for a limited number of years, could not be driven as relentlessly as a slave and when the labor contract expired he was a free man. With plenty of unsettled land available, backbreaking labor on a sugar estate would never have attracted a single *ex-engagé*. The necessary effort could only be extracted from slave labor. For sugar to be a profitable crop, extremely strong property rights had to be established not primarily in land, which was plentiful, but in human beings.<sup>11</sup>

#### A Nation of Free Peasants

After the French were expelled from Haiti, slavery was abolished in 1793 and fifty years later Haiti was a nation where free peasants were making an independent living on land which belonged mainly to them. During the intervening years, Haiti's entire economic system had been profoundly reshaped. The set of property rights had undergone a fundamental change and once again one of the main determinants of change was to be found in the relative availability of production factors.

Based as they were on slavery, the large plantations – *la grande culture* – gradually disappeared after 1793. The institution of slavery could be upheld only as long as there was a supply of slaves and slaves were available only as long as effective sanctions excluded the Negro masses from other ways of making a living. After independence, the range of opportunities increased as a result of the drastically increased availability of land together with weak public administrations.

The transition from slavery-based plantations to free peasant smallholdings did not take place immediately after the end of French rule. On the contrary, the first rulers of independent Haiti felt that the plantation system should be preserved and made strenuous efforts to retain it.<sup>12</sup> Much of the system had been physically destroyed during more than ten years of intermittent warfare, but enough was left for a restoration of *la grande culture* to be a feasible option. Thus, up to the historically significant year 1809, the year of the first land reform in Latin America, an agrarian system which differed from slavery in name only existed in Haiti. Ex-slaves who during the turmoil produced by the wars of liberation had been acting mainly as independent agricultural small-scale producers were, as far as possible, brought back to the estates. The plantations were rented to members of the emerging Haitian elite and strict military supervision of the agricultural workers was resorted to in order to secure the necessary labor input.

The restoration was only a temporary episode, however. In 1809, Alexandre Pétion, president in the southern half of the country, decided to set his serfs free and to redistribute the large landholdings. Ten years later, Henry Christophe followed suit in his northern kingdom. By 1840 Haiti had become a nation of free peasants and this situation was to be reinforced during the rest of the nineteenth century. In thirty years, the system of agrarian property rights had been completely transformed. No one now held any rights in his fellow men, and, one way or another, the peasant population had access to land which they could till for their own benefit: as outright owners, as squatters or as sharecroppers. This constituted one of the most decisive events in Haiti's economic history. The creation of an economy comprised of free peasants set Haiti on a course which diverged widely from the pattern typical of most of Latin America.<sup>13</sup>

The transition from plantations to peasant holdings can be traced to a large extent to the chang-

ing effective supply of labor and land.<sup>14</sup> To understand how this worked we may take a brief look at the phenomenon of *marronage*. During the colonial period this term referred to the escape, organized or unorganized, of slaves from the French plantations. These runaway slaves fled to remote regions outside the effective control of the colonial administration where they attempted to make a living as subsistence farmers.<sup>15</sup> *Marronage* never developed into a mass movement. Its success was ultimately conditioned by the amount of land available for illegal squatting without interference by the authorities and during the colonial period this area was limited in practice. The planters and their administrative machinery were sufficiently strong to ensure that *marronage* was a solution for a minority of dissatisfied slaves only. Policing expeditions were regularly sent out when it was felt that the strength of the maroon communities exceeded the tolerable level.

During and after the wars of liberation the extent of *marronage* increased.<sup>16</sup> When the French administrative apparatus had been destroyed and the balance of power no longer weighed so heavily against the Negro masses and when, in addition, many colonial plantations had been abandoned and lay without effective ownership, the area available to those ex-slaves who preferred independent subsistence farming to militarily supervised serfdom increased. Now, the masses were provided with an attractive alternative to remaining as landless workers on plantation estates with a rigid discipline.

The increased availability of land had important repercussions in the labor market. During the wars most ex-slaves, when given a choice, preferred to work on their own small plots instead of going back to the plantation system. In Saint-Domingue part of the slaves' subsistence was secured by providing them with small garden plots, the produce of which the slaves could dispose of themselves, in markets or by direct consumption. To a certain extent, these "provision" plots provided the colonists with foodstuffs.<sup>17</sup> During the wars of liberation when imports of food or their distribution within Saint-Domingue were disrupted, the food supply gradually came to depend on the "slave gardens", and it appears that a very widespread reaction among the ex-slaves was simply to remain as cultivators on their "old" plots.<sup>18</sup> Presumably, it was the very knowledge of this which made the first Haitian rulers take the decision to reinstitute the plantation system on a *forced* labor basis. Any attempted solution based on a

free choice would have failed. On the macro-economic level, the situation was turned further against the plantation system by the population decline which eventually resulted from the wars. From 1790 to 1805 the Haitian population declined by an estimated 150,000.<sup>19</sup> Of these, 40,000 were whites<sup>20</sup> but the majority of the remainder were Negro ex-slaves.

Thus, the relative supply of land had increased, while that of labor had decreased. Only artificial administrative devices could for a time guarantee the survival of the "colonial" pattern of property rights and when the administrative apparatus had been sufficiently weakened the pattern broke down. Toussaint and Dessalines could muster enough strength to keep the old military system working for some time. Since no agreement had been reached with France regarding the territorial status of the country, the threat of renewed war activities had not been removed when Dessalines was murdered in 1806. When Haiti was divided into two states intermittently waging a civil war upon each other following his death, successively less money and energy could be spent on preventing the system of property rights from falling apart. At the same time the costs of supervision and enforcement had increased. The masses had tasted freedom during the revolutionary wars and were less prepared than ever to go back to the plantations. The beginning of the end came in 1809 in the southern part and ten years later in the north. Although there were occasional attempts,<sup>21</sup> no subsequent Haitian administration was able to reverse this order of things. The new system had come to stay. When rights were seriously threatened, rural protest movements arose which sometimes turned into outright peasant revolts.<sup>22</sup> Subsequent changes in the agrarian property rights system have been modifications within the peasant mode of production rather than profound transformations involving the relative freedom of men.

### Securing Peasant Ownership

By 1842 probably none of the colonial plantations remained in their original form. Around one-third of the population were peasant-owners, another third were squatters and most of the remainder were sharecroppers.<sup>23</sup> All of them were smallholders. This distribution of land did not remain unchanged, however, during the nineteenth century. Before 1900 the majority of the Haitian peasants could probably safely be termed "owners". The

reason for this development was the comparatively strong bargaining position conferred on the peasants by the low man/land ratio. In 1798 the population density amounted to 174 persons per square kilometer.<sup>24</sup> In the 1820s, the maximum figure was 25,<sup>25</sup> a figure which was to increase only slowly during the course of the nineteenth century. To see how peasant "owners" came to dominate the scene we will outline more details of the change from large plantations to smallholdings.

When the attempt to preserve the colonial plantations was made at the beginning of the nineteenth century most of the land was declared government property and, thereafter, was rented to high army officers and other members of the new upper class. As the colonial property rights structure finally began to crumble under Pétion and his successors this government property was transferred to private hands. At the same time the landed elite found that plantation labor was no longer available in the quantities and on the conditions necessary for profitable operation and took steps to adapt to the changing circumstances. Since cultivating the soil themselves was out of question, the first option was to lease the land to the peasants against collection of some type of rent, usually a share-rent: one-half of the crop. This strategy was obviously feasible only for a limited period, however, because the interests of landlord and peasant often clashed when it came to the exact determination of contractual obligations.

The area of conflict was in the physical harvesting of the crops planted under sharecropping arrangements.<sup>26</sup> In contemporary Haiti the sharing arrangement means that a division of the rented plot is made *before* the plot is harvested and the landlord *himself* must harvest his half and see that the produce is marketed. Presumably, the same type of arrangement became the rule in nineteenth-century Haiti.<sup>27</sup> This posed a very obvious problem for the landlord class:

Except for the owners of coffee plantations...<sup>28</sup> the nineteenth century Haitian landlord was in the almost ludicrous position of having fields cultivated in crops which did not really interest him, and of having furthermore to harvest those peasant crops himself. As a last straw he was also obliged, if he was to make any money of the arrangement, to himself arrange for the marketing of that produce within the arena of a popular market system dominated by energetic female peasants. If the image of a self-respecting member of the gentry

digging up his own sweet potatoes is humorous, the image of his genteel, French-speaking wife lugging them to a local market to sell them in noisy competition with skillful peasant *machand* is absurd.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, except for the case of coffee, this type of sharecropping contract was more or less doomed from the beginning. Only during the first few years after the initial redistribution of land would we expect to meet it and then presumably with the sharecropper harvesting the portion of the landlord as well. Unfortunately, no statistics have so far been uncovered to support the hypothesis, but it seems reasonable to expect that a majority of the sharecropping contracts in 1842, referred to above, dealt with coffee plantations.

Due to the comparatively easy availability of land for cultivation the Haitian peasants were in a much better position to oppose landlord claims than their counterparts in most parts of the world. Sharecropping was not a viable solution from the point of view of the landlords and, therefore, it gradually disappeared. Instead, the predominant pattern became one where the peasants actually *owned* their fields – generally without deeds. This situation arose in two different ways, by *laissez-faire* squatting and by alienation of parcels by the landlords through actual sales.

The bulk of the literature on Haiti puts the emphasis on the importance of squatting.<sup>30</sup> When the landlords found that going back to the plantation system was impossible and that sharecropping was not viable, they simply gave up, withdrawing to an urban life and allowing their tenants or other peasants free reign. Recently, however, Gerald Murray has strongly challenged this traditional view and pointed to the possibility that most peasants actually acquired their land via regular purchases based, on the one hand, on the need of the landowning group to capitalize on land which its members did not want to cultivate themselves and for which no hired fieldhands could be found, and, on the other, on cash accumulated by the peasants from transaction in the domestic marketing circuit.<sup>31</sup>

Murray's interpretation is interesting since it simultaneously provides an explanation of why in spite of a general absence of written titles, peasant holdings appear to have been fairly secure and highly marketable in Haiti.<sup>32</sup> A sales transaction should constitute a firmer basis for both tenure and further transactions than simple squatting. Two more considerations could, however, be added here. In the first place, the sales to which

Murray refers took place during a period when land was plentiful in relation to the population. There was enough land for everyone who wanted a plot at least up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century.<sup>33</sup> In this situation, few people, (and especially not outside interests), were likely to question even unwritten land rights, since the labor necessary to produce an income from the land was lacking.

The second point is one which has relevance also to the contemporary situation. Rural Haiti is a relatively classless society<sup>34</sup> and a vast majority of all land transactions take place within the context of the rural world, i.e. between people of basically the same social standing – people sharing the same values. Such people are not likely to question the rules of a game which has evolved within more or less the same setting during a century and a half. The situation would be different if rural Haiti had been socially highly stratified and land transactions had been carried out mainly on an *interclass* rather than an *intra*class basis.

By the end of the nineteenth century the transition from slavery-based plantation to a society where the vast majority of cultivators were peasants who owned the land themselves had been completed. The history of the development of property rights during the twentieth century is not well known. No cadastral survey has even been undertaken in Haiti which can shed light on the contemporary situation. An attempt was made during the America occupation of the country (1915–34) to straighten out the land tenure situation, presumably to prepare the way for American-owned plantations. Aerial photography was carried out but before the photographs had been interpreted the building where the negatives were stored burned down "in an unexplained fire".<sup>35</sup> To evaluate today's situation, we are left with the rather unreliable figures of the 1950 census and a number of local surveys.

Presumably, however, no major changes have taken place. The available information is difficult to interpret but, in the main, it indicates that a majority of all Haitian peasants own their land. The 1950 census indicated that up to 85 percent of the peasants were "owners". This impression is confirmed by at least two later major surveys, one nationwide in 1970 and another of more than 7,000 farmers in the *arrondissement* of Cap-Haïtien in 1974, in which it was found that 60 percent of all parcels and 75 percent of all the land, respectively, were cultivated by the owners themselves.<sup>36</sup> According to all three sources, the in-

idence of tenant farming and sharecropping was low: some 8 percent in 1950 (peasants owning *no* land – not part-time tenants), 28 percent of all parcels in 1970, and 14 percent of the area in the 1974 Cap survey. The generally accepted picture of today's landholding system in Haiti is that a majority of the peasants still own their land with or without deeds and that most of the land *area* is held in this way.

### Future Monopolization of Land?

Let us end with a brief look at the future. From the mid-nineteenth century up to the present time Haiti has stood out as an exception to the land tenure pattern prevailing in most Latin American states. Land has not been concentrated in the hands of a minority while the mass of the rural population have been landless laborers, tenants or minifundistas working on artificially overcrowded marginal soils. Haiti has not had any "land problem" in that sense. Rather, the main difficulty has been to maintain fertility on fairly equitably distributed plots in the face of population growth. In this struggle, the Haitian peasant has generally not been successful,<sup>37</sup> but at least, one can claim, he has been spared exploitation by a landlord class. Can we expect the same pattern to continue into the future or will the growth of the Haitian rural population lead to dramatic shifts in the structure of agrarian property rights towards increasing concentration of land and, hence, also to exploitation of the landless?

Most of the literature which deals with the possibility or existence of land concentration in Haiti is concerned with attacks on peasant freedom by a class of absentee landlords. A number of authors have, in fact, attempted to prove that such a concentration of land already exists in Haiti.<sup>38</sup> However, such an interpretation violates the observable facts.<sup>39</sup> Haiti *de facto* is a country where most of the rural population has access to land on terms which cannot be qualified as monopolistic.

What then is the likelihood of the emergence of such a class? It is well known that very few Haitian peasants can present any written titles to their land.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, Haitian history points to a number of instances where, when the value of the land has increased, peasants have been subject to eviction by outsiders.<sup>41</sup> However, such cases must be considered rare. Murray found that in a community he studied in depth this had *never* occurred.<sup>42</sup> The main reason appeared to be that although very few peasants could present indi-

vidual titles to the plots they owned, the *grâ-pyês* generally still existed. This "big" deed to the undivided land of a family estate some generations ago was kept by some relative and could be used to trace subsequent land transactions.<sup>43</sup> The existence of such documents undoubtedly makes alienation of peasant land difficult for outsiders.

A problem may arise even among those possessing legal deeds. Unwritten property rights, as we have already pointed out, are generally regarded as valid by the peasant class from which potential "insiders" would come. This convention is reinforced by a second factor based on sorcery. In Murray's community the most important threat to peasant security was not seen as coming from outsiders but rather from distant kin who actually *did* have legal rights to land but who, by emigrating or otherwise, had in practice forfeited their rights. In such cases it is, of course, possible that generations later heirs could come up with a legal title. This type of intruder was, however, regarded as being particularly vulnerable to sorcery exercised by those actually *using* the land.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the likelihood that people with legal rights to land which they had chosen to leave would come back to claim that land seems low.<sup>45</sup>

Population growth may possibly disrupt this relative security. One such pattern has been suggested by Murray. His point of departure is that an individual who can today buy land in Haiti will never lack the labor to make the land productive and, hence, to make the transaction worthwhile.<sup>46</sup> This, according to Murray, is ensured by the existence of potential sharecroppers. He then goes on to argue that

it is precisely such a situation which is conducive to the emergence of patterns of land concentration. Such a danger would exist no matter what the pre-existing tenure mode were. But in a society such as Haiti, where even at a "grass roots" level land has traditionally been alienable, the danger is especially great. For where there is land purchase, there must also be land sale and – ipso facto – the emergence of at least temporary resource differentials. And where land is further transmitted via inheritance, as is true of Haiti, these differentials will easily be intergenerationally perpetuated. Furthermore, since the children of the better-off start life in a somewhat stronger economic position than the children of the less well off, they are more likely to purchase more land, the differentials will thus increase, and land concentration will have set in.<sup>47</sup>

This has not occurred so far, however, because there is another mechanism which serves as a pe-

riodic regulator of the distribution of land, namely, voodoo. For reasons connected with the need to finance voodoo ceremonies at various times over the life cycle, land has to be put on the market for sale. Murray found that a majority of all land sales in the community were motivated by these needs. The result of these transactions, as Murray sees it, has been to reduce class differentials based on land tenure:

The mechanism has not eliminated differentials, but it has kept them within the basic confines of a life-cycle modality of resource management, and has prevented the emergence of intergenerationally perpetuated local strata.<sup>48</sup>

Such a view of the land market is highly dubious. This double role as a generator and moderator of class differences is definitely not inherent in the market mechanism. *A priori* there is no reason to expect that those with more land are better farmers who will improve their economic positions and, therefore, also buy more land.<sup>49</sup> Neither should we expect that those with less land are necessarily the main sellers. Finally, there is nothing in the market mechanism which guarantees that the land coming from voodoo-induced transactions is land which is alienated by those holding relatively much land. All these propositions have to be proved before Murray's case can be established.

Perhaps the most realistic type of mechanism based on population growth which may eventually undermine the prevailing set of agrarian property rights in Haiti is to be found in increasing poverty itself.<sup>50</sup> There is a tendency for rural incomes to fall over time. So far, one of the main regulators here has been migration to the capital city and abroad. In the future there are, however, no guarantees that emigration to other countries will continue to provide a safety valve. It may very well be that other countries feel that too many Haitians are coming in and they may, therefore, take steps to curtail immigration.<sup>51</sup> In such a situation greater stress will be placed on the domestic economy to provide the population with non-agricultural employment. Hitherto, the economy has failed to do so. If the rural population continues to grow, marginal peasants may find themselves in a situation where they have to increase their indebtedness with land as collateral and this may lead to an eventual transfer of land into the hands of moneylenders. Alternatively, land may have

to be sold to cover immediate needs. This is a familiar pattern in other agrarian communities.<sup>52</sup>

Concentration of land tends to lead to monopolization of the labor market. When large segments of the population lack land of their own they become increasingly dependent on landowners for employment. In this situation exploitation may be a reality.<sup>53</sup> Whether such a situation will develop in Haiti remains to be seen. So far, nothing indicates that it is imminent, but it may be prudent to concentrate some attention on uncovering possible hidden or unknown trends in the development of agrarian property rights. One cannot simply trust the market mechanism since there is, of course, nothing inherent in that mechanism which guarantees that the development of property rights takes the most "desirable" course. In this sense the market is neutral. It all depends on the circumstances under which the market mechanism is allowed to work.

#### Footnotes

- \* University of Lund. Thanks are due to Carl-Johan Dahlman, Lennart Jörberg, Bo Larsson and Jim Love for their constructive criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.
- 1 Furubotn and Pejovich (1972), p 1139.
- 2 Ibid, p 1157.
- 3 Moreau de Saint-Méry (1958), p 28.
- 4 Lepkowski (1968), pp 48-49.
- 5 For details regarding the sugar economy see Lundahl (1979), pp 256-59.
- 6 The estimates of the indigenous population vary widely from source to source. For a sample see e.g. Palmer (1976), p 38, Cauvin (1977), p 39, Lundahl (1979), p 189, Caprio (1979), p 28 and the sources indicated in these work. Cook and Borah (1971) discuss the aboriginal population of Hispaniola at length.
- 7 Lundahl (1979), p 189.
- 8 Moreau de Saint-Méry (1796), p 65.
- 9 Palmer (1976), p 51.
- 10 The *engagé* system is discussed in Debien (1952).
- 11 In this respect, the colonial economy is consistent with the Domar hypothesis regarding the causes of slavery or serfdom which states that out of free land, free peasants and non-working landowners, any pair of elements, but not all three, can exist simultaneously (Domar [1970]). For an efficient exploitation of the possibilities offered by sugar cane when land was plentiful and when landowners would not work themselves on the land, laborers had to be enslaved to prevent them from taking advantage of the easy availability of land. Also, ownership of land was monopolized by the free citizens of the colony.

- <sup>12</sup> See Lundahl (1979), pp 259–63.  
<sup>13</sup> This course is analyzed at length in *ibid.*  
<sup>14</sup> See *ibid.*, Chapter 6 for a discussion of all the factors involved.  
<sup>15</sup> Extensive discussions of *marronage* can be found in Debbasch (1961), (1962), Debien (1966), and Fou-chard (1972).  
<sup>16</sup> Lepkowski (1968), note, p 80.  
<sup>17</sup> Murray (1977), p 49.  
<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 57–64.  
<sup>19</sup> Lundahl (1979), p 272.  
<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p 320.  
<sup>21</sup> See *ibid.*, pp 264–68.  
<sup>22</sup> See Nicholls (1979), esp. pp 30–31.  
<sup>23</sup> Leyburn (1966), p 76.  
<sup>24</sup> Lundahl (1979), p 55.  
<sup>25</sup> Franklin (1828), p 404.  
<sup>26</sup> A second area of conflict, suggested by Murray (1977), pp 94–96, that of the choice of crop to be planted, is harder to accept. Murray argues that "the entire orientation of landowners of the period was the production of crops for export, above all the production of sugar cane which had underwritten so many colonial fortunes," (*Ibid.*, p 94) while the peasants preferred to grow crops which could be sold via the internal marketing system with which the peasants were familiar since the colonial period. Exceptions here were coffee and cotton – "simply because the trees were already there. . ." (*Ibid.*, p 95.) The sales of export crops were conducted via licenced government traders with whom peasant contacts were "disadvantageous and perhaps perilous," (*Ibid.*) while the marketing of domestic crops took place via a network of market women basically coming from the peasant class itself.
- There are at least two difficulties with such an argument. In the first place, sugar quickly ceased to be an export crop in the post-independence period. With the technology of the period, as we have already discussed, sugar processing required high concentrations of capital, labor, and land, and such concentrations were simply beyond the means of the small peasant producers who rented the land. It is therefore not likely that the landlords would have insisted on sugar cane being grown, especially not since increased competition from Cuba and other Caribbean islands as well as from European beet-sugar made the price of sugar decline during the first half of the nineteenth century (Lundahl [1979], p 274). The second difficulty lies in the fact that an argument which holds that sales of export products are difficult due to the risks entailed in dealing with government licensed intermediaries and which simultaneously maintains that there was no conflict over the choice of crop in the case of coffee is self-contradictory, since coffee is the prime example of a crop marketed in this way. Rather, the absence of conflict in the case of coffee should have been due to the extremely low labor requirements connected with this crop.
- The standard procedure was to leave virtually eve-

- rything except harvesting to nature. (Cf Lundahl [1979], pp 236–37, 564–65.) Hence, the attraction of coffee for the peasants was that it could be cultivated without much labor effort and still yield an income to be added to that resulting from the cultivation of foodstuffs. (Murray employs the latter argument as well but attempts to reconcile it with that of the choice of marketing channels.)  
<sup>27</sup> Murray (1977), pp 96–97.  
<sup>28</sup> Cf. note 26.  
<sup>29</sup> Murray (1977), p 97.  
<sup>30</sup> Especially the highly influential works by Leyburn (1966), pp 76–79, and Moral (1961), pp 27–28. Cf. also Lepkowski (1968), pp 120–21.  
<sup>31</sup> Murray (1977), pp 107–08.  
<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp 349–54.  
<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p 410.  
<sup>34</sup> For discussions of the Haitian class system, see the numerous references quoted in Lundahl (1979), note 83, p 361.  
<sup>35</sup> Schmidt (1971), p 179.  
<sup>36</sup> Lundahl (1979), pp 48.  
<sup>37</sup> This is the main theme in Lundahl (1979). Cf., however, also Palmer (1976), pp 167–71, for an exception to this pattern.  
<sup>38</sup> E.g. Casimir (1964), Brisson (1968), Pierre-Charles (1969), Jean (1974).  
<sup>39</sup> Cf. Lundahl (1979), pp 51–52, Zuvekas (1978), pp 92–98.  
<sup>40</sup> According to Murray (1977), p 351, probably fewer than one percent.  
<sup>41</sup> Lundahl (1979), pp 603–04.  
<sup>42</sup> Murray (1977), p 352.  
<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 310–11, 352–53.  
<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 320–22.  
<sup>45</sup> Palmer (1976), p 149, however, reports the opposite pattern, where those remaining in the countryside do not dare touch fallow land owned by people who have left the community.  
<sup>46</sup> Murray (1977), pp 463–65.  
<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 463–64.  
<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p 465.  
<sup>49</sup> In economies of the Haitian type, there is frequently a low correlation between the initial wealth of a person and his entrepreneurial abilities. Cf. McKinnon (1973), p 11.  
<sup>50</sup> Cf. Lundahl (1979), pp 645–46.  
<sup>51</sup> Emigration from Haiti is dealt with in *ibid.*, pp 623–28 and Zuvekas (1978), pp 73–76.  
<sup>52</sup> Cf. Myrdal (1968), pp 1039–47.  
<sup>53</sup> Cf. Griffin (1976).

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