

- Public Dissatisfaction Intensifies in Russia, 1995. *USIA Briefing Paper*. Washington: U.S. Information Agency.
- Rose, R – White, S, 1996. Boris Yeltsin's Changing Popular Support, *Studies in Public Policy*, no. 261. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy.
- Rutland, P, 1997. The Significance of the Chechen Elections, *OMRI Analytical Briefs* 1.
- Tishkov, V, 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union – The Mind Aflame*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Whitefield, S, – Evans, G, 1996. Support for Democracy and Political Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 12, 218-242.
- Zhirinovskii, V, 1993. *Poslednii brodok na yug*. Moscow: LDP.

Fifteen Votes and One Voice? The CFSP and Changing Voting Alignments in the UN

Introduction¹

The EU member states have cooperated officially in the foreign policy field since 1970 when the then six members decided to establish European Political Cooperation (EPC). The Six stated that it was time to step up their cooperation in the foreign policy field "so as to bring nearer the day when Europe can speak with one voice" (*The Luxembourg Report* 1970). In 1986, EPC was formally tied to the Community framework by being incorporated into the Single European Act as its "second pillar". Some five years later EPC changed name to become the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which is now constituting the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. Although still accused of being anything but effective, this foreign policy cooperation has been both broadened and deepened over the years, and is nowadays an important factor in the foreign policy formulation of all member states.

During the almost thirty years of EPC/CFSP, a number of what might be called "foreign policy instruments" have been shaped to suit the practices of a collective foreign policy. These instruments can be divided into three groups: joint statements, joint actions, and coordination in international fora. The last one, as formulated in the Maastricht Treaty, states that "[t]he Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international con-

ferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums" (TEU Art J.2.3).

The aim of this study is to analyse the use of this particular foreign policy instrument and its development over the last twenty years by looking at the EU member states' voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Whereas this kind of study has been undertaken before (e.g. Hurwitz 1975; Luif 1995), few seem to have made a systematic attempt to discuss the reasons behind the observed changes. Therefore, a number of factors that are generally thought of as either worsening or improving a unified stance on foreign policy matters are here contrasted against the ups and downs of EU performance in the UNGA. The results are presented in the form of some working hypotheses, or tentative explanations of changes in EU foreign policy behaviour.

The choice of the EU members' voting behaviour in the UNGA is based, first, on the uniqueness of this assembly both concerning the number of participants and the variety of issues covered. Secondly, the UNGA is also a major arena where the EU member states can demonstrate their ability to act collectively towards the rest of the world (Lindemann 1982:110; Bartali 1992:137; Keatinge 1997:276). The great effort put into the work of trying to reach common EU positions furthermore indicates that the UNGA is a forum in which the EU members have perceived it highly desirable to speak with a single voice (Nuttall 1992:139).

This study consists of three parts. The first one pictures briefly the working procedures that have developed between the EU member states in the General Assembly over the years. The second part deals first with overall trends in EU

unity and then with the divisions and changes within the EU group. Finally, the third part discusses some possible reasons for the observed changes in EU unity in the UNGA.

A note on material

For the statistical analyses, a database consisting of all resolutions that were taken to vote in the UNGA during 1975 and 1995 was put together. All in all, some 2,700 resolutions constitute the cases in the base, and 16 states (15 EU members plus Norway) constitute the original variables. For the production of the database, the material was collected from three different sources:

- For the years 1975 to 1985, the voting records from a database set up by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Ann Arbor, Michigan) have been used. The data were originally collected by the Consortium. Enclosed with the database are short summaries of each resolution, summaries which have been used when coding the content of the resolutions.
- For the years 1986 to 1994, the EC/EU members' voting records as published in EPC Bulletin/European Foreign Policy Bulletin have been used. For those states that were not EC/EU members during this period, voting records were gathered from the UN's database Unbis. When coding the resolutions from this period into issue-areas, the more scarce information (in the form of one or two subject words) appearing in the EPC Bulletin has been used.
- For 1995, Unbis has been used for all states. The coding into issue-areas was made from the names of the resolutions, as stated in Unbis.

The European Union in the United Nations

The EPC/CFSP framework

Acting in a unified manner in international fora has been an objective ever since the early years

of the EPC (Bartali 1992:137; Nuttall 1992:136). A first attempt appeared already in 1971, when the then six EC members announced that they would operate as a group in the upcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), despite the CSCE's emphasis on individual membership with a view of bridging the gap between the two Cold War blocs (Pijpers 1990:129).

During the early years of EPC, cooperation in the United Nations between the member states was however rather limited, at least partly due to the fact that West Germany did not become a member of the UN until 1973. In fact, rumour has it that in November 1973, when a joint EEC declaration on the Middle East was circulated for the first time in the UN, the Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik asked 'Who are these nine?'. Two years later, however, the cooperation among the EEC members had been widely acknowledged, and the same Mr Malik addressed the EEC ambassadors as 'the Mighty Nine' when informing them, as a group, of a Soviet initiative on disarmament (Lindemann 1976:262; de Schoutheete 1986:210).

Thus, from 1973 onwards, the cooperation in New York intensified, much as a result of German initiatives (Nuttall 1992:136). In 1973, the UN was specifically mentioned in an official document, stating that the Nine were determined to contribute to international progress, both through their relations with third countries and by adopting common positions whenever possible in international organizations, notably the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies (Nuttall 1992:136; cf. Luif 1995:275).

In 1975 the Political Committee (which was the EPC's small coordinating unit, composed of the Director of Political Affairs from each member state) started to engage in systematic preparations for the General Assembly (UNGA). A UN working group was also set up among the Nine that was to provide guidance for matters discussed at the UNGA, and in New York the nine member state delegations started with consultations on a daily basis. The same year, the EC's President-in-Office started to address the General Assembly on behalf of the member states.

Subsequently these joint statements were introduced even earlier in the decision-making process, at the committee level, in order to increase the influence of a unified stance. In 1977 an "early-warning system" was also introduced so that subjects difficult to agree on could be identified at an early stage (Lindemann 1976:262-3; Nuttall 1992:136-39; Regelsberger 1988:16-17).

The Community framework

The EPC/CFSP is however not the only framework through which the EU members cooperate in the United Nations. The EEC's common commercial policy, which was set up in the Rome Treaty in 1957, has of course meant that the member states have had to be co-ordinated when considering commercial and trade issues in the UN. These issues are dealt with within the Community framework, and co-ordinated by the EU Commission. In 1974 the EEC got observer status both in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and in many UN committees and subsidiary bodies. As an observer in these fora, the EC is represented by the Commission. In the 1990s, the Community has also been granted full participation status in a number of UN conferences, such as the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio, the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen, the World Conference on Women in Beijing the same year, and the 1996 Habitat II conference in Istanbul (Nuttall 1992:137; Berendt 1995:10).

This practice, of having two separate frameworks for dealing with external matters, naturally resulted in some problems of co-ordination. This led, in the second half of the 1970s, to the regulation of a division of labour. It was decided that matters that were of strict Community competence should be handled by the Commission and all other matters should be dealt with by the UN working group (Nuttall 1992:137-8). There are however very few issues in the UNGA that actually fall under strict Community competence. Furthermore, those issues that do fall under the first pillar are generally handled in the UNGA's Second Committee, which has a tradi-

tion of trying to reach consensus without resorting to a vote (Brückner 1990:180).

The Changing Degree of EU Unity

How to measure voting behaviour?

Originally developed early this century, primarily for the study of party and group cohesion in the American Congress, roll-call analysis has subsequently been applied to all kinds of legislative bodies in which votes are recorded (MacRae 1970:1). One advantage of analysing roll-calls is the relative simplicity of the material; the basic categories—yes, no, abstain, and absent—are already recorded and need no further categorisation. Another is the suitability of this material for various kinds of statistical analyses, and its advantages when making comparisons over time (Bjurulf 1972:126).

In the UNGA, however, not all resolutions are taken to a vote. Those that are, are naturally the most conflictual ones, that could not be adopted with consensus. In general, although this varies from year to year, among half of the resolutions are finally put to a vote (Marin-Bosch 1987:709). A roll-call analysis of the UNGA resolutions thus measures only the degree of unity/dissunity for the actual votes, which means in fact that the degree of unity is always much higher than is pictured by this type of analysis.

Identifying EU unity

Identifying the cohesiveness of a group of states, in terms of voting behaviour, can be done in a number of different ways. One of the most basic methods is to decide, for the whole group, the percentages of identical and divided votes.² The foremost advantage of this method is its simplicity and its capacity to reveal some basic trends in changes over time for any specific group of states. This is also why this method is chosen for the initial part of this study.

In a forum such as the United Nations there are four options available for the states in each roll-call. This means that the divided votes can be of different kinds. It is therefore necessary to de-




Figure 1. Changes in EC/EU member states' voting behaviour 1975-1995.

cide, first of all, how to deal with the votes in which one or more member state is absent. If the statistical material is not too vast, it is possible to handle the absences by deciding for every individual absence the reason for it, and to judge it either: "a lack of essential data" (and exclude the roll-call vote); a "symbolic negative vote" (and accordingly code it as a "no"); or an abstention (and accordingly code it as an "abstain") (Lijphart 1963:910; Hurwitz 1975:229). The material used in this study is however too vast to decide the status of every individual absence. In the initial part of the study, the votes in which one or more EU members have been absent will therefore be excluded from the analysis.

Having excluded the absences, each "divided" roll-call vote can then be of two basic types. Together with the identical vote, each roll-call is thus categorised into one of the following:

- *Unanimous vote.* All EU members vote in an identical manner.
- *Two-way split vote.* At least one member state abstains whereas all the rest vote either yes or no.
- *Three-way split vote.* At least one member state votes no whereas the rest vote yes, or,

at least one member state votes no whereas some abstain and some vote yes.

Presented over time, session by session,³ this method can then reveal trends in both EU unity and disunity.

Unanimity vs. split votes 1975-1995

The general trend of EC/EU voting in the UNGA has certainly had its ups and downs. Five quite distinct periods are visible, during which the identical voting has either steadily increased or decreased.

During the early years of foreign policy cooperation in the UNGA, the Six/Nine were increasingly casting unanimous votes. In 1973, when West Germany became a member of the United Nations, the then nine EC members voted unanimously on 47% of the total number of roll-calls in the General Assembly (Regelsberger 1988: 48). Two years later, the corresponding figure was 57% (see figure 1). This upward trend continued, almost uninterrupted, until it reached a peak in 1978 when almost two thirds, 63%, of the votes were cast unanimously by the Nine.

For the five years following the peak (1979-1983), the trend was directly the opposite. There

was a steep fall in the percentage of unanimous votes, and in 1983 the then Ten did not even manage to vote identically in every third roll-call. During the same period the share of three-way split votes also increased dramatically, and in 1984 there were both "yes" and "no"-votes among the Ten in every fourth vote. This deterioration seems to be related to the whole spectre of different issues covered in the UNGA, but the consensus was particularly low on the resolutions related to the Middle East, decolonisation, and nuclear arms (see appendix; and Luif 1995:279).

Between 1984 and 1987, however, the trend was again reversed and at the end of this period the EC members voted unanimously in almost every second vote. The three-way split votes were also down to some 12%. Again, the Middle East resolutions seem to have been one of the most important issue area when accounting for the difference, but consensus on resolutions related to South Africa and to the UN as an organisation also increased during these years.

This period was followed by three years of relative "stagnation" that lasted until 1990. Whereas the consensus on resolutions related to security issues and South Africa deteriorated somewhat, the agreement on Middle East resolutions continued to rise (Luif 1995:279).

Beginning with the 1991 session there was an unprecedented rise in the share of unanimous votes. The percentage of identical votes rose from 46% in 1990 to an all-time high of 69.4% in 1994. The identical voting on Middle East resolutions was up to somewhere around 80%. The record was however still particularly bad on resolutions dealing with decolonisation (see appendix; and Luif 1995:279).

Identifying EU subgroups

The percentages of unanimous and split votes do not however say anything about which states are more prone than others to break the unity, and which states constitute cohesive subgroups. A suitable method, advocated for instance by Arend Lijphart and used by Leon Hurwitz in an EU setting, is to produce an "index of voting cohesion".⁴ The index is constructed by counting

the number of votes in which each pair of states vote in an identical manner, adding half the number of votes in which the same pair of states vote in partial cohesion (that is, one vote "abstain" and the other vote either "yes" or "no"), and then divide the sum by the total number of roll-call votes in which both states participated.⁵ Multiplied by 100, the figures then represent indices of voting cohesion (IVC) between the two states.

Thus, an IVC of 0 for a pair of states means they never voted in an identical way during the period studied, and an IVC of 100 means that the states always voted identically. In order to identify the subgroups, all pairs of states that have high IVCs in relation to each other can be clustered. This is done by producing a matrix and arranging the states in such a way that all states with relatively high IVCs are grouped together. Thereby, cohesive subgroups can be distinguished (Lijphart 1963:912).

One of this method's strengths is that the groups must not be defined beforehand. States outside the proposed group can just as well be included in the analysis. For the purpose of comparing behaviour before and after membership in the EC/EU, the paired states are the present 15 member states plus Norway. The matrix is thus comprised of 16 x 16 cells, which is probably somewhere near the limit for being possible to handle and present in a manageable way.

One problem with this type of analysis has to do with the decision on how high the IVCs should be before a number of states are considered a cohesive group. The figure chosen will of course always be of an arbitrary nature, but one possible way to go is to start out high, at 100, and move downwards until groups can be distinguished (Lijphart 1963:913). If comparisons are to be made over time, however, the boundary can not be floating. In order to see possible changes in the membership of the subgroups, the figure should be the same over time. In this study, the figure has been set at 90.

To keep certain factors constant, the 21 years covered by this study have been divided into five periods, motivated by the following reasons:

Table 4. Indices of voting cohesion 1990-1994.

	Belgium	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Italy	Germany	Portu- gal	Sweden	Finland	Den- mark	Norway	Spain	Ireland	Austria	Greece	France	UK
UK	89.89	89.75	90.28	89.47	90.45	86.58	80.69	83.19	84.55	83.84	80.34	80.90	79.67	79.35	92.86	
France	91.86	91.71	91.69	91.43	90.43	88.43	83.62	85.03	87.00	86.54	84.14	83.29	82.86	82.29		
Greece	89.47	89.61	89.01	89.33	88.90	92.56	91.67	91.39	92.84	93.18	97.89	93.12	93.45			
Austria	89.69	89.83	89.25	90.11	89.14	93.04	96.80	94.29	94.15	94.43	92.76	96.66				
Ireland	90.45	90.87	90.56	91.43	90.45	94.48	95.97	94.04	94.94	94.99	92.42					
Spain	90.45	90.59	90.00	90.87	89.89	93.26	90.70	90.14	92.98	92.76						
Norway	93.87	94.01	93.44	94.01	93.32	95.82	95.96	94.85	98.61							
Denmark	94.38	94.80	94.23	94.52	93.82	96.35	95.42	94.86								
Finland	92.92	93.33	92.76	93.06	92.36	92.66	96.94									
Sweden	90.69	90.83	90.25	90.83	90.14	92.64										
Portugal	96.07	96.49	96.20	96.77	95.79											
Germany	98.60	98.46	98.73	98.46												
Italy	98.74	99.16	98.87													
Netherlands	99.30	99.44														
Luxembourg	99.58															
Belgium																

the newcomer, Greece, did not vote very similar to any of the other states. Greece was however closer to the Scandinavian group and to Spain than to any of the others (see table 2).

From the mid-1980s, however, some distinct changes started to take place. The core group of five (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany) now expanded to a group of seven. One of the two new members, Portugal, suddenly had IVCs over 90 with this group, and France and the Netherlands also had an IVC over 90 which places France within the core group (see table 3).

Also the Scandinavian group had received two new states in the periphery – Spain and Greece – linked mainly through Ireland. The EC's core group and the Scandinavian group had by this time no longer any links to each other over the 90 level. Ireland and Denmark seems to have opted more for the Scandinavian group during this period than they did when they first entered the EC (cf. Lindahl & Larsson 1991:88). Also, the link from the EC's core group to Britain had been weakened, and the UK only had IVCs over 90 with France and Germany.

During the first half of the 1990s the picture had changed considerably. Only two states – France and UK – had fewer IVCs over 90 than under with the other member states (see table 4). The core group of seven from the second half of the 1980s had not only expanded to include three of the EC members that had previously voted primarily with the Scandinavian group, namely Ireland, Denmark, and Spain, but those three had also been accompanied by at least three of the applicant states – Finland, Norway and Sweden. Austria still had IVCs under 90 with six of the member states, but in the almost melting together of the Scandinavian and the EC group Austria can not be said to be distinctly outside the EC group. Austria, together with Greece, did however still vote more similar to the "old" Scandinavian group than to the "old" core group of the EC. The opposite goes for France and UK, who voted in line with the original five of the core group (or the other way around), but were still not in conformity with the old Scandinavian group.

In the last period covered here, 1995 only, the melting together of the two groups continued. Table 5 shows the picture of one big happy fam-

Table 5. Indices of voting cohesion 1995.

	Nether-lands	Luxem-bourg	Belgium	Italy	Germany	Spain	Sweden	Finland	Den-mark	Norway	Portu-gal	Ireland	Austria	Greece	France	UK
UK	88.97	87.50	88.24	86.57	88.24	83.82	83.82	87.77	85.29	83.07	83.82	82.35	83.01	82.35	94.03	
France	89.55	91.05	91.79	90.15	90.30	90.30	87.31	88.81	88.81	86.07	87.31	88.81	86.57	88.81		
Greece	90.44	91.91	92.65	92.54	92.65	97.06	92.65	92.65	94.12	93.55	94.12	94.12	91.91			
Austria	94.12	95.59	94.85	96.27	94.85	94.85	99.27	94.85	97.79	95.16	96.32	97.79				
Ireland	93.38	94.85	94.12	95.52	94.12	97.06	98.53	94.12	97.06	95.16	95.59					
Portugal	94.85	96.32	95.59	97.02	95.59	97.06	97.06	95.59	98.53	97.58						
Norway	95.16	95.16	94.36	95.90	94.36	95.16	95.97	97.58	97.58							
Denmark	96.32	97.79	97.06	98.51	97.06	97.06	98.53	97.06								
Finland	97.79	97.79	97.06	98.51	97.06	94.12	95.59									
Sweden	94.85	96.32	95.59	97.02	95.59	95.59										
Spain	93.38	94.85	94.12	95.52	95.59											
Germany	97.79	97.79	97.06	98.51												
Italy	97.76	99.25	98.51													
Belgium	96.32	97.79														
Luxembourg	98.53															
Netherlands																

ily, except the compulsory black sheep that goes with the concept. Britain had an IVC over 90 only with France, and had thus actually moved away slightly from Germany and the old core. Greece, on the other hand, had moved to the other side of the 90 boundary and was found, for the first time, within the EU group. France was still balancing at the border, very close to the EU group but closer again to Britain. Norway, who did not become a member on 1st January 1995 was nonetheless found in the middle of the EU group.

The individual member states

In the above, some changes in individual states' voting behaviour have already been presented. The very visible changes of for instance Greece, Portugal, and Spain have been made clear already. In order to pin more exact numbers on these changes however, an alternative use of the IVC can be of some help. The pairwise IVCs have been used to create an index of voting cohesion for every individual state towards *all* the other EC/EU member states, calculated as the mean of all pairwise comparisons between that state and the other members of the time. One weakness of this method is that it easily fools the

eye, due to the changes in EU unity as a whole. If, for instance, a new member state often vote in opposition to the rest, this will naturally lower all states' IVCs during the period. To solve this problem, the IVCs for the individual states to the rest have also been accompanied by the ranking among the member states (i.e. the state that votes most in conformity with all other states has been ranked number 1, etc.).⁶

In table 6, the means of each member state's pairwise comparisons with all other member states are presented. The measure can be said to constitute an index of conformity with all other EC/EU states. The means of the non-members' pairwise comparisons with all members have been calculated in order to provide a picture of changes after membership. The upper half of the table therefore presents the figures and rankings for the members, and the lower half presents the figures and the *hypothetical* rankings the non-members would have had if they were members at that time.

Two of the most significant changes have been made by Spain and Greece. Both had, in the second half of the 1970s, a mean IVC to the nine EC members of 77 at a time when the EC group had a mean of 90. In 1995, Spain's average IVC to the rest of the EU states was 94.3 at a time when

Table 6. Individual states' voting similarity to others.

To all other EC/EU states*:					
	1975-1980	1981-1985	1986-1989	1990-1994	1995 only
Italy	91.1 (4)	89.3 (3)	91.1 (3)	94.5 (2)	95.8 (1)
Denmark	89.2 (7)	85.9 (7)	87.2 (7)	92.8 (7)	95.8 (2)
Luxembourg	92.6 (1)	89.7 (1)	91.3 (1)	94.6 (1)	95.5 (3)
Germany	91.4 (3)	87.3 (5)	89.5 (6)	94.0 (5)	95.2 (4)
Belgium	92.3 (2)	89.6 (2)	91.3 (2)	94.4 (3)	95.1 (5)
Netherlands	90.7 (5)	88.9 (4)	90.9 (4)	94.4 (4)	94.6 (9)
Ireland	88.8 (8)	82.3 (9)	84.6 (10)	90.3 (8)	94.1 (12)
France	86.9 (9)	86.5 (6)	86.2 (9)	88.6 (11)	89.5 (14)
UK	89.9 (6)	83.6 (8)	83.9 (11)	86.8 (12)	86.1 (15)
Greece		72.9 (10)	80.7 (12)	89.5 (10)	92.0 (13)
Portugal			90.7 (5)	93.9 (6)	94.6 (8)
Spain			86.2 (8)	90.3 (9)	94.3 (10)
Finland					94.9 (6)
Sweden					94.8 (7)
Austria					94.2 (11)
EC/EU mean	90.304	85.585	87.792	91.995	93.769
To all EC/EU states**:					
Greece	77.0 (10)				
Portugal	81.8 (10)	85.4 (8)			
Spain	77.2 (10)	82.0 (10)			
Finland	80.2 (10)	78.4 (10)	82.1 (12)	91.3 (8)	
Sweden	83.7 (10)	81.2 (10)	82.8 (12)	90.3 (9)	
Austria	84.3 (10)	80.2 (10)	83.0 (12)	90.1 (10)	
Norway	87.0 (9)	87.3 (5)	87.5 (7)	92.9 (7)	94.1 (12)

* Numbers in parentheses represent ranking among the EC/EU states

** Numbers in parenthesis represent *hypothetical* ranking among the EC/EU states

the EU mean was 93.8. Although Greece's similarity to the rest of the EU states in 1995 was below the EU average, the country had still moved to the 92 level. In the case of Spain, and also Portugal, these changes can be distinguished quite clearly immediately after membership, although some changes seem to have taken place already during the years prior to membership. This, however, was certainly not the case for Greece, who seems to have changed its voting behaviour mainly during the 1990s.

Another significant change is the Danish one. From having been ranked number seven for the 20 years between 1975 and 1994, Denmark was number two in 1995. To test whether these are real changes, or if these figures are dependent on the fact that the three newcomers, all of which voted very similar to Denmark prior to the accession, are included in the Danish mean IVC for

1995, the mean IVCs for 1995, but without the new states, have been calculated.

The result (table 7) is that Denmark is still ranked number two, although the rank is shared with Luxembourg this time. Thereby, we can conclude that Denmark has changed its voting behaviour in the last few years, and had by 1995 become one of the most "conformist" states among the members.

Again another interesting observation is the changes among three of the four applicant states during the first half of the 1990s. Sweden, Finland and Austria were all three clearly changing their voting behaviour during this period (cf. Bjereld 1995: 189-91). Norway, on the other hand, was closer to the EC already at the beginning of the 1980s, and supposedly did not feel a need to change its voting any further.

Table 7. Mean IVCs for 1995 (EU12 only).

1	Italy	95.4
2	Luxembourg	95.2
2	Denmark	95.2
4	Germany	95.0
5	Belgium	94.8
6	Netherlands	94.3
7	Spain	94.2
8	Portugal	94.2
9	Ireland	93.4
10	Greece	91.9
11	France	90.1
12	UK	86.5
	EU mean	93.4

Some Tentative Explanations

As has been shown in the above, there has not been one single trend of EU voting in the UNGA over time, but rather a number of periods of ups and downs in EU unity. By contrasting these trends against explanations of different kinds, we should be able to generalise to some extent on the reasons for changes in EU voting. In the extension, we might also treat voting in the UN as a case of collective foreign policy behaviour, and thereby attempt to say something about the conditions that should promote the development of the CFSP.

The effect of institutional/procedural change

We might first of all, then, hypothesise on the relation between new steps of formal integration and the result on the EPC/CFSP. If formal cooperation is increased, or if the texts in the treaties are more strongly formulated, we might expect that this will show on the "output"-side. During the period in focus here, four new formulations on texts governing the EPC/CFSP were adopted.

In 1981, the London-report laid down some new guidelines for EPC. Among other things, the Commission, which had up until this time been at least partly excluded, was admitted to be "fully associated with political cooperation, at all levels" (*The London Report* 1981). According to one practitioner, the London Report was

"a signal that Political Co-operation was institutionally on the move again after a long period of stagnation" (Nuttall 1992:177). Institutionally on the move, however, seems not to be immediately the same as on the move in practice. During the two UNGA sessions following the London Report, the percentage of unanimous votes dropped steadily.

In 1983, on the other hand, the Solemn Declaration on European Union was adopted. The declaration, for the first time, mentioned the concept of "political and economic aspects of security", words which had previously been banned from the EC/EPC agenda (Regelsberger 1988: 25). The declaration certainly coincides in time with the upward trend in the share of identical votes that has been largely uninterrupted since that time.

In December 1985, the Single European Act (SEA) was agreed on by the European Council, but the ratification process dragged on for another year and a half before the act finally came into force in July 1987. The delay was due to Irish doubts about the suggested incorporation of EPC into SEA (including the wordings on political and economic aspects of security, which were sensitive for neutral Ireland), doubts which ultimately led to an Irish referendum and a Supreme Court approval of the Irish ratification (Keatinge 1991:150). In the first UNGA session following the coming into force of the SEA, the upward trend that started in 1984 continued, but the three following years constitute the period of "stagnation" between 1987 and 1990.

In December 1990, the intergovernmental conference on Political Union, that was to result in the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, opened in Rome (de Schoutheete de Tervarent 1997:45). The treaty was signed in February 1992, and finally ratified by all member states in October 1993. Maybe the most important change from earlier provisions governing the EPC was the decision that the new common foreign and security policy should cover "all areas of foreign and security policy" (TEU Art J.1.1). Similarly to the period following the Solemn Declaration on Political Union, this period of institutional change coincided with a steep rise in identical voting.

With this kind of analysis there is however no way to tell whether there is any causal relationship between institutional change and voting in the UNGA, especially when the process of creating the Maastricht Treaty coincides with another important change, namely the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Communist bloc.

The effect of the end of the Cold War

The most important dividing line in the UNGA during the post-war period was the Cold War division, which alone accounted for a large part of the voting alignments in the Assembly (Alker 1969:149-51; Holloway 1990:279-80; Kim & Russett 1996:629). With this conflict dimension out of the picture, it is plausible to assume that the room for manoeuvre for the EU members (as well as all other states) would have increased considerably (cf. Krupnick 1996: 149-50). Or, as Thomas J. Volgy and John E. Schwartz have put it:

Conditions of multipolarity increase the flexibility of all actors. States run fewer risks in deviating from hegemonic leadership. It is possible to lose alliance members without the fear that the opposing alliance will automatically gain those members. The ideological glue which helps to bind together the alliances in a bipolar situation is significantly weaker under multipolar conditions (Volgy & Schwartz 1994:32).

This increased room for manoeuvre, however, could have had two very different effects on EU unity. On the one hand, and following the reasoning of Leon Hurwitz, intra-European solidarity would have decreased. According to this line of thought, a unified EU-voice would not be very important in a world characterised by détente (Hurwitz 1975:236), and in the UNGA the EU would not have to follow the Cold War division any longer. On the other hand, and according to the logic that a lessened interest by the US in European security would force the Europeans to "move toward more autonomous security activity", intra-European solidarity would have increased after the Cold War (Krupnick 1996:155; Soetendorp 1994:114).

The steep rise in the unanimity-curve, starting in 1991, suggests that the EC/EU members have not used the new flexibility independently of each other. It is tempting to argue that the fact that the EC/EU states did not respond to the new world order by voting in a more divergent way is a testimony to the importance of the EPC/CFSP despite its intergovernmental nature, something that the neo-functionalist school of thought would have predicted. Thus, the end of the Cold War might very well have affected EU voting in the UNGA, but in a way favourable to EU unity.

To stretch this argument a bit further, this kind of systems-level explanation could be "tested" by moving backward in time. If we consider the end of the Cold War a case of decreased tension in the international system, we might compare that case with changes in tension *during* the Cold War. It is then clear that changes in EU unity definitely coincide with the changes in the conflict climate during the Cold War. Until its break-down at the end of the decade, the continued détente during the 1970s also constituted one of the periods when EC unity increased rather dramatically, whereas the following period of "renewed" Cold War showed just as dramatic a decline in EC common voting. When Gorbachev introduced perestroika and glasnost in the mid-1980s, this again coincided with a steep rise in the unanimity curve. It seems, thus, as if the changes in the structure of the international system certainly have had an impact on the international conditions of the EPC/CFSP.

The effect of successive enlargements

An often used argument in relation to EU enlargement is that an increasing number of members will lead to ever more difficulties in reaching common standpoints, especially as long as intergovernmentalism is the norm.

During the history of EC/EU, there have been four enlargement rounds. The first one, in 1973, when the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC is not covered by this study. It is enough to note that, surprisingly enough, during the first four years following the first enlargement the share of unanimous votes were steadily increasing.

The second enlargement, the Greek entry into the Community, took place in 1981. Greece's entry has by many been judged the main reason for the rather disappointing EC foreign policy performance in the 1980s (e.g. Nuttall 1992:28; Regelsberger 1988:25), but a quick glance at the line-chart above reveals that the unanimity-curve actually started to fall two years before the Greek accession. Furthermore, the share of three-way split votes started to increase already in 1978.

The first year of the third enlargement, the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, shows an increased share of identical votes again. The following three years showed, however, a slight set-back in the unanimity-curve and a rise in the three-way split curve.

A special enlargement took place in late 1990, namely the German reunification (cf. Petersen 1993:166). Following this special case, the period of a steadily increased share of identical votes started. After the most recent enlargement of the EU in 1994, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined, there was again a small drop in the share of unanimous votes.

These observations certainly provide some ground for a doubtful stance on the hypothesis of an automaticity in the relationship between more members and more disunity, even if the same observations cannot prove the opposite either. One tentative and rather interesting explanation to why unity does not seem very affected by the enlargements has been suggested by Christopher Hill, namely that for fear of disunity when new members are taken on "the existing members of the EU are driven to play up their unity more than is justified by the record of their own actual preferences" (Hill 1997:88).

The effect of membership

Above, it was suggested that an increased number of members had not, in general, had a negative effect on EU unity, with the exception of Greece. The other way around, however, there seems to be a distinct relationship between becoming a member and changing voting behaviour. Again, with the exception of Greece, the newcomers in two of the three latest enlarge-

ments have clearly changed their voting behaviour in connection to becoming members. Thus, there might be some truth in the sometimes suggested proposition that the so called *acquis politique*, a political equivalent to the more well-known concept of *acquis communautaire*, does have an impact on the foreign policy choices of the member states (e.g. Hill & Wallace 1996: 10). The fact that the CFSP is still intergovernmental in its nature, and the fact that a member who fails (voluntarily or involuntarily) to comply with the treaty provisions can not formally be punished, means of course, at least in theory, that the "implementation remains hostage to the political discretion of each of the member states" (Rummel 1994:116). However, as Reinhardt Rummel has pointed out, this discretionary power has been narrowed down over the years. Both by a set of procedural ground rules, which "constitute a morally binding nonlegal foundation" for the CFSP, and by the "accumulated political positions that constitute the common basis and collective heritage" for the members (ibid.).

The changes in the new members' voting behaviour have, however, often occurred not immediately after membership, but have started in the period prior to the accession. This phenomenon is maybe most apparent in the last enlargement, when Sweden, Finland and Austria apparently moved closer to mainstream EC/EU sometime during the period 1990 to 1994. In the Swedish case, this change was made at the expense of the tradition of voting with the Third World on many resolutions (Bjereld 1995:191).

The knock-on effect

The reverse trends do however also require a short discussion. Why did some states actually move away from the core group during certain periods? A comparison of tables 1 and 3 shows that this was the case for both Denmark and Ireland, both of which started off rather closely to the core group in the mid-1970s, but slowly moved away from the core during the 1980s and (re)turned to the Scandinavian group.

A plausible explanation might be what Simon Nuttall has called the "knock-on-effect". This effect would take place if one member state repeat-

edly breaks the unity, thereby making a united approach a far more distant objective and thus making it "less costly" for others to break the unity as well (Nuttall 1992:28). So, Greece alone can not directly be held responsible for all the drop in the unanimity-curve following the Greek entry in 1981, but Greek behaviour might have had a knock-on effect on other states' behaviour as well.

The effect of domestic change

This is not the place to go through a large amount of domestic changes that might have affected the voting behaviour of various states. The most apparent case, that will serve as an illustration, is Greece (again). Since 1974, two large parties in Greece, PASOK and New Democracy, have taken turns in government. The first change took place in 1981, when PASOK won the elections after seven years of New Democracy governments (Clogg 1987:83). This period coincides with the deterioration in Greece's voting behaviour compared to the other EC states (see table 6). Between 1989 and 1990, Greece held four elections due to problems of coalition-building when no party could form a majority government. Finally, PASOK was outvoted and in the April elections of 1990 New Democracy formed a new government (Heidar & Berntzen 1995:268). This event certainly coincides again with the radical change in Greek voting at the UNGA. This change has however not been reversed after the return of the PASOK in the 1993 elections.

Conclusions

Before any far-reaching conclusions are drawn from a study such as this one, one should bear in mind that no comparisons have been made here with the changes of the general "conflict level" in the UNGA. Previous studies, however, suggest that EU unity might be changing rather independently of the over-all climate in the UNGA (Foot 1979:352).

Judging, then, from the period in focus here, the most important factor when explaining the record of EU voting behaviour, seems clearly to be of a systems-level nature. The shifts in the international system tend to be followed rather

perfectly by the level of EU performance in the UNGA. The prerequisite for this kind of reasoning is of course that the member states have had an institutionalised cooperation to resort to.

Nonetheless, this explanation certainly has to be complemented with others of a more cooperation-related nature. Both the ups and downs of EU performance tend to be reinforced by what game-theorists would call changes in the pay-off structure. If one state repeatedly breaks the unity, the choice for the rest of the members is no longer one between *total EU unity* versus being the *one that breaks the unity*. It is rather a choice between *securing partial EU unity* versus *deteriorating the partial unity even further*. In the latter situation, the "costs" of deviating from the EU line of action becomes less severe. Illustrated by the apparent shifts in Danish and Irish voting behaviour after the Greek accession, this kind of game-theoretical reasoning certainly seem to have some explanatory power. In its extension, this argument would also predict that a period of continuous rise in EU unity could very well be reinforced by changing the nature of the *de facto* choices of the member states.

Finally, another testimony to the fact that the member states do not act totally independent of each other once they become members of the EPC/CFSP, is the way EU unity has been affected by the enlargements. With the exception of Greece, the other three enlargements have not particularly worsened the record of voting cohesion for the EC/EU group. This finding is somewhat surprising in light of the many differences in the newcomers' foreign policies compared to the original members. During the latest enlargement round, for instance, concerns were often expressed that the neutral states would not be able to conform with the CFSP (Pedersen 1993:35). This study suggests that these worries were rather exaggerated, at least concerning the united front in the UN; the applicant states actually started to conform by the time they handed over their applications. This trend of changes in voting behaviour is furthermore very apparent also in the case of Spain and Portugal.

It is tempting to argue that some of those results are a real testimony to the political importance of the CFSP for the member states. If the

very existence of an embryonic collective foreign policy can make states change their stand on at least some foreign policy issues for the sake of a united front, the CFSP has certainly become a very important factor in the formulation of the foreign policies of the member states. One might even argue that, despite the intergovernmental structure of the CFSP, the formulation of the member states' national foreign policies is now to a certain extent taking place in Brussels, if not always physically so at least psychologically.

Maria Strömviik

Notes

1. I would like to thank the participants (grad-students as well as lecturers) in the Quantitative Research Seminar in Lund and Umeå 1997, and also Jakob Gustavsson, Magnus Jerneck, Rutger Lindahl, Edward Moxon-Browne and Michael Smith, for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
2. For some examples of studies which have used this method, see Lijphart 1963:906.
3. The UNGA holds one session every year.
4. Lijphart's name of the index is "index of voting agreement", but, as Hurwitz has pointed out, the term "agreement" can easily give the impression that the states agree with the resolution being put forward, which is not necessarily the case. Following Hurwitz, the term "index of voting cohesion" will be used throughout this paper (Lijphart 1963, pp 909f; Hurwitz 1975).
5. The method for dealing with absences is thus different in this analysis compared to the measures of identical votes. All roll-calls are included in the analysis, and only excluded in those cases when one or both of the pair is absent.
6. In order to compare the behaviour of new members before and after membership, IVCs for all fifteen member states, plus Norway, have been calculated. The IVCs for the non-members are then calculated as the mean of that particular state's IVCs with all members. The IVCs for the non-members are thus never affected by other non-members.

References

- Alker, Hayward R. (1969) 'Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly', in John E. Mueller (ed.) *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey*. New York: Meredith Corporation.
- Bartali, Silvia (1992) 'Italy and the EC at the UN', in Francesco Francioni (ed.) *Italy and EC membership evaluated*. London: Pinter.
- Berendt, Michael (1995) *The European Union and the United Nations: Partnership and Commitment*. Brussels: ECHO Information Office.
- Bjereld, Ulf (1995) 'Sweden's Foreign Policy After the End of the Cold War—From Neutrality to Freedom of Action', in Rutger Lindahl & Gunnar Sjöstedt (eds.) *New Thinking in International Relations: Swedish Perspectives*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
- Bjurulf, Bo (1972) 'Från minoritetsparlamentarism till majoritetskoalition: En studie av Riksdagens rösträkningar 1925-38', in *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, No. 2, pp. 125-188.
- Brückner, Peter (1990) 'The European Community and the United Nations', in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, No. 1/2, pp. 174-192.
- Clogg, Richard (1987) *Parties and Elections in Greece – The Search for Legitimacy*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Foot, Rosemary (1979) 'The European Community's Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, pp. 350-360.
- Heidar, Knut & Berntzen, Einar (1995) *Vesteuropeisk Politikk: Partier, Regjeringsmakt, Styreform*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Hill, Christopher (1997) 'The Actors Involved: National Perspectives', in Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent & Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Hill, Christopher & Wallace, William (1996) 'Introduction', in Christopher Hill (ed.) *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Holloway, Steven (1990) 'Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting', in *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol 23, No. 2, pp. 279-296.
- Hurwitz, Leon (1975) 'The EEC in the United Nations: The voting behaviour of eight countries, 1948-1973', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 224-243.

- Keatinge, Patrick (1991) 'Foreign policy', in Patrick Keatinge (ed.) *Ireland and EC membership evaluated*. London: Pinter.
- Keatinge, Patrick (1997) 'The Twelve, the United Nations, and Somalia: The Mirage of Global Intervention', in Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent & Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Kim, Soo Yeon & Russett, Bruce (1996) 'The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly', in *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 629-652.
- Krupnick, Charles (1996) 'Between Neorealism and Liberal Institutionalism: The CFSP and European Security Cooperation', in *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. XIX, No. 2-3, pp 143-163.
- Lijphart, Arend (1963) 'The analysis of bloc voting in the General Assembly: A critique and a proposal', in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 902-917.
- Lindahl, Rutger & Larsson, Lars-Göran (1991) *Det europeiska politiska samarbetet – EPS*. Stockholm: SNS.
- Lindemann, Beate (1976) 'Europe and the Third World: the Nine at the United Nations', in *The World Today*, Vol. 53, July, pp. 260-269.
- Lindemann, Beate (1982) 'European Political Cooperation at the UN: a challenge for the Nine', in David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel & Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *European Political Cooperation*. London: Butterworth.
- The London Report* (1981). Reprinted in Rutger Lindahl & Lars-Göran Larsson (1991) *Det europeiska politiska samarbetet – EPS*. Stockholm: SNS.
- Luif, Paul (1995) *On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria's Finland's, and Sweden's Accession to the European Union*. Vienna: Braumüller.
- The Luxembourg Report* (1970) Reprinted in Rutger Lindahl & Lars-Göran Larsson (1991) *Det europeiska politiska samarbetet – EPS*. Stockholm: SNS.
- MacRae, Duncan Jr. (1970) *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Marín-Bosch, Miguel (1987) 'How nations vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations', in *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 705-724.
- Nuttall, Simon J. (1992) *European Political Cooperation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Pedersen (1993) 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Challenge of Enlargement', in Ole Nørgaard, Thomas Pedersen & Nikolaj Petersen (eds.) *The European Community in World Politics*. London: Pinter.
- Petersen, Ib Damgaard (1993) 'The EC and the challenge of enlargement', in Teija Tiilikainen & Ib Damgaard Petersen (eds.) *The Nordic Countries and the EC*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press.
- Pijpers, Alfred E. (1990) *The Vicissitudes of European Political Cooperation: Towards a Realist Interpretation of the EC's Collective Diplomacy*. Leiden: Cip-Gegevens Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 's-Gravenhage.
- Regelsberger, Elfriede (1988) 'EPC in the 1980s: Reaching Another Plateau?', in Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?* Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- de Schoutheete, Philippe (1986) *La coopération politique européenne*. Brussels: Editions Labor.
- de Schoutheete de Tervarent, Philippe (1997) 'The Creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy', in Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent & Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Soetendorp, Ben (1994) 'The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor', in Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith (eds.) *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*. London: Sage.
- Treaty on European Union* (1992) Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Volgy, Thomas J. & Schwartz, John E. (1994) 'Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint', in Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan & Martin W. Sampson III (eds.) *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Appendix 1. Issue-areas and EC/EU unity over time.

	1975-1980			1981-1985			1986-1989			1990-1994			1995		
	Unani- mous split	Two-way split	Three- way split	Unani- mous split	Two-way split	Three- way split	Unani- mous split	Two-way split	Three- way split	Unani- mous split	Two-way split	Three- way split	Unani- mous split	Two-way split	Three- way split
Middle East %	61 76.3	19 23.8	0	80 53.7	52 34.9	17 11.4	62 59.0	36 34.3	7 6.7	88 77.2	25 21.9	1 0.9	15 83.3	3 16.7	0
Nuclear arms %	30 37.0	44 54.3	7 8.6	8 7.3	56 51.4	45 41.3	13 17.6	31 41.9	30 40.5	11 33.3	17 51.5	5 15.2	7 70.0	2 20.0	1 10.0
Military, other %	28 68.3	13 31.7	0	49 46.7	41 39.0	15 14.3	46 50.0	34 37.0	12 13.0	31 50.8	22 36.1	8 13.1	7 63.6	4 36.4	0
Security, other %	8 53.3	7 46.7	0	15 55.6	9 33.3	3 11.1	12 48.0	9 36.0	4 16.0	12 100.0	0	0	1 100.0	0	0
South Africa %	32 30.8	59 56.7	13 12.5	18 17.8	59 58.4	24 23.8	28 42.4	25 37.9	13 19.7	10 52.6	7 36.8	2 10.5	-	-	-
Decolonisation %	26 48.1	28 51.9	0	1 2.6	27 71.1	10 26.3	2 6.9	19 65.5	8 27.6	5 13.9	20 55.6	11 30.6	0	1 20.0	4 80.0
Human rights %	20 76.9	6 23.1	0	15 51.7	14 48.3	0	24 75.0	8 25.0	0	22 95.7	1 4.3	0	5 71.4	2 28.6	0
Eco. & devel. %	40 76.9	11 21.2	1 1.9	29 51.8	24 42.9	3 5.4	35 67.3	16 30.8	1 1.9	7 38.9	10 55.6	1 5.6	1 20.0	3 60.0	1 20.0
UN as org. %	80 65.6	36 29.5	6 4.9	47 50.0	21 22.3	26 27.7	19 70.4	4 14.8	4 14.8	6 85.7	1 14.3	0	1 50.0	1 50.0	0
Other %	18 69.2	8 30.8	0	12 38.7	16 51.6	3 9.7	12 25.5	26 55.3	9 19.1	13 50.0	8 30.8	5 19.2	6 85.7	1 14.3	0

N.B. First row for each issue-area is number of resolutions in issue-area for the period, and second row is the corresponding percentage.

Nordens och EU-ländernas agerande i FN:s generalförsamling

Inledning

Denna uppsats handlar om hur dels Norden, dels länderna i den Europeiska Gemenskapen/Unionen (EG/EU) agerar i Förenta Nationernas (FN:s) generalförsamling.

Vid de årligen återkommande mötena i generalförsamlingen tar stater ställning till en rad olika frågor som står på den världspolitiska dagordningen. Röstförfaranden och uttalanden i generalförsamlingen är ett sätt för länder att definiera sin position i det internationella politiska systemet.

För utomstående betraktare framstår Norden ofta som en gemenskap. De nordiska länderna har ofta lätt kunnat enas i en rad internationella politiska frågor och Norden har av tradition samordnat sitt agerande i generalförsamlingen. I FN har Norden sedan länge betraktats som en homogen grupp och den nordiska samsynen är berömd bland andra FN-medlemmar. I FN-sammanhang brukar man ofta tala om en nordisk profil. Det nordiska FN-samarbetet har varit omfattande trots att det traditionellt varit baserat på informella strukturer. Man kan fråga sig om det nordiska samrådet i FN framöver kommer ha en lika framträdande plats, när tre nordiska länder är medlemmar i EU?

EU-länderna betraktas allt mer som ett block, och utgör idag kanske den tydligast markerade ländergruppen i generalförsam-