STATSVETENSKAPLIG TIDSKRIFT

A World in Transition
Feminist Perspectives on International Relations

Introduction
Workshop reports
Karin Aggestam: Gender Perspectives and International Security
Astrid Hedin: Feminisms in Europe – East and West
Annica Kronsell: Resistances to Gendering and Gendered Resistances
Erika Svedberg: Theory and Practice: In Search of Each Other
Christine Sylvester: Feminism and International Relations: Or Encounters with Wolves in the Woods
Mark Elam: Feminist Perspectives on Security: The Work of Outsiders, Mavericks or Nomads
Mairi Johnson – Bice Maiguashca: Praxis and Emancipation: The Lessons of Feminist Theory in International Relations
Alena Heitlinger: Émigré Perspectives on Feminisms in Europe – East and West
Jacqueline True: Victimisation or Democratisation? Czech Women's Organising Potential in a Globalising Political Economy
Etela Farkasova – Mariana Szapuova: Between Theoretical Models and Self-Reflection: On Teaching and Researching Feminist Theorizing in Bratislava
Leo Flynn: Marketing the Union: Some Feminist Perspectives
Karin Lundström: Women Caught in a Logical Trap in EC law: An Analysis of the Use of Quotas in the Case of Kalanke
Pauline Stoltz: And When We Speak ... On political solidarity between Black and white women
Oonagh Reitman: Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights – Fiends or Foes?
Galia Golan: Militarization and Gender: The Israeli Experience
Maria Stern-Pettersson: Contextualizing In/Security: The Political Identity "Mayan-Woman" in Guatemala
Biographical notes
Abstracts

Årgång 100 1997 1

INNEHÅLL

A World in Transition. Feminist Perspectives on International Relations

Introduction 1
Workshop reports
Karin Aggestam: Gender Perspectives and International Security 3
Astrid Hedin: Feminisms in Europe – East and West 5
Annica Kronsell: Resistances to Gendering and Gendered Resistances 8
Erika Svedberg: Theory and Practice: In Search of Each Other 11
Christine Sylvester: Feminism and International Relations: Or Encounters with Wolves in the Woods 13
Mark Elam: Feminist Perspectives on Security: The Work of Outsiders, Mavericks or Nomads 19
Mairi Johnson – Bice Maiguashca: Praxis and Emancipation: The Lessons of Feminist Theory in International Relations 27
Alena Heitlinger: Émigré Perspectives on Feminisms in Europe – East and West 42
Jacqueline True: Victimisation or Democratisation? Czech Women's Organising Potential in a Globalising Political Economy 47
Etela Farkasova – Mariana Szapuova: Between Theoretical Models and Self-Reflection: On Teaching and Researching Feminist Theorizing in Bratislava 63
Leo Flynn: Marketing the Union: Some Feminist Perspectives 67
Karin Lundström: Women Caught in a Logical Trap in EC law: An Analysis of the Use of Quotas in the Case of Kalanke 74
Pauline Stoltz: And When We Speak ... On political solidarity between Black and white women 87
Oonagh Reitman: Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights – Fiends or Foes? 100
Galia Golan: Militarization and Gender: The Israeli Experience 115
Maria Stern-Pettersson: Contextualizing In/Security: The Political Identity "Mayan-Woman" in Guatemala 123
Biographical notes 139
Abstracts 141

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A World in Transition

Feminist Perspectives on International Relations

Introduction

In 1997, the Swedish Journal of Political Science, *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* is celebrating its one hundredth anniversary. In commemoration of this special event, the journal's editors decided to invite us as guest editors to put together a theme issue entitled 'Feminist Perspectives on International Relations'. In 14-16 June, 1996, the Department of Political Science and the Sociology of Law Section hosted a three-day international conference, *A World in Transition. Feminist Perspectives on International Relations.* As guest editors, we are therefore pleased to present a number of the conference papers in this theme issue.

The events leading up to *A World in Transition* began in 1993 with the founding of a feminist seminar at the Department of Political Science, Lund University. In this seminar (later re-named 'The Feminar') there were six to ten Ph.D. Candidates of Political Science, Sociology and Law who regularly participated. Five of the members of 'The Feminar' later decided to draw together feminist scholarship at an international conference that would largely mirror later years of feminist research and debates within the field of International Relations.

Since feminist studies traditionally is an interdisciplinary field, the conference sought to encourage participants in different fields and disciplines. Consequently, students and scholars concerned with the recent political, legal, social and economic developments and their effects on women's everyday lives came together in Lund. All in all fifty-nine papers were presented *(see* the workshop reports below) with participants from twenty countries, mainly from Western and Eastern Europe but also from the US, Canada, Hong Kong and Israel.

The increasing globalization of the economy and processes of democratization, integration and disintegration are indeed challenging traditional understanding of political and legal contexts. Feminist analysis of these dynamic processes are therefore vital. In other words, feminist perspectives can add to a deeper understanding of the world today, both in terms of practical politics and research approaches.

As an inspiration to the workshop sessions, the first day was devoted to presentations of a number of highly esteemed key note speakers. These were Christine Sylvester, Jane Roland Martin, Hanne Petersen, Hilary Rose and Galia Golan. Building on their own respective research traditions, the speakers presented their different perspectives on global politics.

The themes of the workshops were linked to the topics of the keynote speeches and represented contemporary feminist analyses in International Relations and Law. It was important that the conference participants would be

able to ventilate each paper extensively and to receive comments as well as establish personal research contacts within each workshop. The papers were circulated before the event and the participants were asked to remain in the same workshop during the conference. In an effort to create links between the different workshop themes, each day ended with a short plenary session in which brief reports were given by the workshop facilitators.

To promote networking between participants, we also had a social event at the end of each day. The first evening we gathered at the Art Gallery of Lund where Bruno Weimark's exhibition "Spuma" was shown. The second evening was reserved for a banquet in the beautiful and prestigious Hall of Pillars in the University Building. Professor Jane Roland Martin (piano) and Minna Gillberg (alto flute) – one of the organizers – quickly rehearsed in the afternoon and surprised us all with a most exquisite musical performance.

A much appreciated event at the conference was the speech made by the Vice-Chancellor (Rector) Boel Flodgren at Lund University. In a warm and personal way she spoke about her academic life, her career as a woman professor and as the first appointed vice-chancellor at a Swedish university. With examples from her own experience, she emphasized the importance of international academic exchanges and the role of the university in promoting women in society. Among the things Professor Flodgren discussed was the issue of gender and power structures. In her opinion, women have much to gain from thinking more strategically.

At the end of the conference, Professor Galia Golan from the Hebrew University spoke of her impressions: "I think that one of the really valuable things here has been not only bringing together feminists and different ways of thinking about these issues, but to bring graduate students together with professors; and what was the Eastern Bloc with the West. It has been an extraordinary experience."

Finally, this is an opportunity to once again thank our sponsors, the Swedish Institute (SI), the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN), the Department of Political Science, the Department of Sociology, Lund University and Nils Larsson's foundation. The generosity and support of the sponsors enabled us to realize the primary goal of having a multi-contextual conference. The sponsors provided us with the means to support more than half of the participants' travels to Sweden. This included both a significant number of graduate students from across the world as well as scholars from Russia, Slovakia, Poland, Croatia and Romania among others.

In the preparatory phase of the conference we made extensive use of the new information technology. With our own web pages we were able to distribute up-dated information to various research networks on the Internet. After the conference the number of people networking has grown. This has been facilitated by a discussion group *lundfemconf-1@svet.lu.se* as well as an electronic bulletin board, *http://www.svet.lu.se/fem/fem.html*

Karin Aggestam, Astrid Hedin, Annica Kronsell, Erika Svedberg
Guest Editors

Workshop report

Gender Perspectives and International Security

Karin Aggestam

In the workshop, various dimensions and problems related to international security were discussed and analysed. It was recognised that there exists a need to broaden our knowledge; redefine and expand the concept of international security; and to include in the analysis the experiences of women and the notion of gender. Ten papers were presented and ventilated in the workshop with Dr. Regina Karp as a facilitator. The papers contained great variations, both theoretically and empirically, on problems related to security and gender.

Dr. Mark Elam elaborated in his paper (*see further*, his article in this issue of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*) how we are to 're-write' international security and where feminists may place themselves as "outsiders", "mavericks" or as "nomads."

Other papers explored how war affects women in general and their participation in particular. Two papers highlighted women's participation both in the military and in conflict management. Ph. D. Candidate Dovile Budryte, presented a study of women soldiers in Lithuanian and Polish Armies during a period where these countries are undergoing a transitional period toward democracy. Dr. Leokadia Drobizheva centered her study to the management of ethnic conflicts and how women participate at various levels of conflict, for example, in an organisation such as, "Women for Global Security" (WINGS). In this organisation, women convene peace-making conferences and make their opinions and expertise visible in the media. Dr. Biljana Kasic and MA Marina Liborakina raised the question of the challenges war poses to human rights and particularly women's rights. Liborakina highlighted the national debate about the war in Chechnya which, in her opinion, is more concerned with 'power grabs' and corruption than with the need to protect democracy and constitutional order. The gender dimension of the war, for instance, is illustrated in the drastic decline in the status of women in Chechnya. Kasic reflected in her paper, how the war in former Yugoslavia has shaped women's lives and how new feminist knowledge is being constructed from their own experiences, but also from the policies of the new states on the Balkan.

Another area examined was how we are to conceptualise security. Ph. D. Candidate Maria Stern-Pettersson analysed the political identity of Mayan-Women in Guatemala and how they view security and insecurity (*see further*, her article in this issue of Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift). In a similar vein, Ph.D. Candidates Lara Stancich and Lesley McCullogh discussed women and their own security agenda in an inductive case study on Philippine women. Ph. D.

Candidate Johanna Hakala emphasised the societal dimension of security in a multicultural context. Societal security raises questions about identities, in which women act as boundary markers. Hakala related her theoretical discussion to Muslim women in Europe and particularly to the debate in France on Muslim women wearing headscarves and veil. Undergraduate student Sara Smith focused in her paper on the relevance of the environment that leads to a decline in the status of indigenous women. Smith analysed the Saami women in Northern Sweden and how environmental degradation and current policies affect and threaten their culture and status as native women. Likewise, Ann Therese Lotherington stressed how women are affected by regional policies by highlighting specifically, the reasons and outcomes of Norway's regional policy to support women in rural areas during the last decade.

Conference papers presented in the workshop:

- Dovile Budryte, USA *Why do Women Join the Military? The Study of Women Soldiers in Lithuanian and Polish Armies.*
- Leokadia Drobizheva, Russia *Management of Ethnic Conflicts.*
- Mark Elam, Denmark *Feminist Perspectives on Security: The Work of Outsiders, Mavericks or Nomads?*
- Johanna Hakala, Finland *"Societal Security", Multiculturalism, and Muslim Women in Europe.*
- Biljana Kasic, Croatria *Feminism – New Challenge at War Time.*
- Marina Liborakina, Russia *Women and the War in Chechnya.*
- Ann Therese Lotherington, Norway *The Disappearing Reason: Norwegian Women-Oriented Regional Policy at a Crossroads.*
- Sara Smith, Sweden *Gender Perspectives in Environmental Security: The Case of Saami Women in Northern Sweden.*
- Lara Stancich & Lesley McCullogh, United Kingdom *The Silenced War: Women and (In) Security – the Case of South-East Asia.*
- Maria Stern-Pettersson, Sweden *Contextualizing In/Security: The Political Identity 'Mayan-Women' in Guatemala.*

Workshop report

Feminisms in Europe – East and West

Astrid Hedin

The recent transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe entailed simultaneous transitions in gender relations. And the continuing consolidation of new political patterns involves flux and stabilization of new gender systems. How can we analyse these changes? The ambition of the workshop *Feminisms in Europe – East and West* was to address the challenge posed to (Western) feminist theorizing by the democratizations of the European former Communist countries. The workshop brought together feminist researchers from East and West who, speaking from different experiences and contexts, have interesting differences in perspectives.

Masculinist transitions?

The myth of state socialist emancipation is long since peacefully laid to rest in the archives on Communist party propaganda. But Western feminist research has generally concluded a masculinist character of post-Communist transitions. The rapid democratizations and introductions of market economy seem to have given East and Central Europe unegalitarian forms of both: feminization of poverty and male dominated parliaments, coupled with a perhaps puzzling 'allergy' to feminisms. Adding the perspectives of East and Central European scholars generally makes the picture more complex. Key concepts that could characterize the workshop papers were differentiation and de facto feminism.

Across the countries of the former east bloc, differences in gender relations are very large, and within countries show contradictory tendencies, depending on the frame of analysis and perspective of the researcher. For example, the state parliaments of former East Germany presently contain on average 30 percent women, which is above the level of the federal German parliament. In contrast, only 19 of 200 Czech parliamentarians are women. Of the many Czech women's organizations created after democratization, few regard themselves to be political and most are sceptical of Western feminisms. As Jacqui True notes in her following article, these organizations are geared to solving professional, humanitarian, ecological and motherhood problems in every-day life.

'de facto feminism'

Reading these organisations as de facto political and de facto feminist, as True proposes, goes against not only Western feminist tendencies to view East

European women as conservative and victimized. It also expands the often narrow focus of research on democratic transitions on free elections and system stability. Deepening the definition of democracy, Czech women's organizing for self-management can in itself be seen as democratization. Furthermore, a vital civil society is precisely what the new democracies in East and Central Europe have been observed to lack. For the long-term quality of parliamentary politics, a democratic civil society can contribute to the formation and aggregation of interests, as well as to the development of democratic skills and other potentials for larger organizations and, as True observes, for possible future social movements. How would broadening the concept of political participation change the general picture of East and Central European women's engagemant in politics?

Democratizing under globalization

Shifting the context of analysis, Czech women's organizing can be seen to be addressing issues that arise from the gendered impact of globalization, Jacqui True argues. Commonly, globalization is implied to mean the globalization of the economy, entailing the spread of certain (neo-liberal) state economic policies. The transitions to democracy are being ensued not by transitions into market economy, following the steps of early Western democracies, but into a global market economy. Under these conditions, the state is not necessarily the only optimal focus of feminist political efforts.

Globalization is also the transfer of political learning: of methods of political change, knowledge of the existence of alternatives and encouragement because of success elsewhere. When the grip of the Soviet Union loosened over the East Bloc countries, the international flow of information gave the impetus for pro-democracy actors to take their chances and launch democratic upheavals in country after country.

Feminist perspectives

One aspect of globalization is the intensified transnational diffusion of feminist political and academic discourses. But the diffusion of feminisms is part of the general pattern of globalization and, as Alena Heitlinger's text highlights, has not steered free of its inequalities. Using her own fascinating emigré biography, Heitlinger discusses the possibilities and limits of East, West and emigré scholars to do research and reach acknowledgement for their perspectives. She assesses the possibilities of emigré feminists to embody the 'migratory' or 'multiple' subject advocated by post-modernist theorists such as Christine Sylvester, and to act as interpretors between East and West.

Globalizing in Lund

Holding the conference at Lund University was a concrete experience of integrating east-west feminist research, with the ambition of enacting dialogues. The thirteen participants of the workshop "Feminisms in Europe" came from or lived in Poland, Lithuania, Belorussia, Germany (East), the USA, Canada, Finland and Sweden, divided evenly between former east bloc countries and

Western countries. The workshop's 12 papers could be sorted in under the broad themes: political transitions and civil society; globalization and 'modernization'; the social status of women after transitions; and state policy, work, family and time.

The sessions turned out to be an experience not only of an east-west dialogue, but almost more of an east-east exchange. Notedly, most of the participants from Western countries had spent considerable time in their country of research or were, as Alena Heitlinger, migrants, which probably facilitated mutual understanding. The workshop facilitator, professor Myra Marx Ferree from Connecticut University, USA, started up the sessions by asking us to reflect on our own east-west position: to whom are we explaining what?

During the two days of paper-discussions, many of the participants found a common interest in doing more comparative work on former east bloc countries, with research agendas set for a home-country audience. Some of the participants decided to continue as a group and meet in Warsaw to focus around issues of family. In a later report on the workshop, one of the East German participants, who had interviewed women from the former GDR opposition movement, wrote that the workshop sessions had been an "unusual and productive" opportunity for her to articulate detailed analyses in discussions, without being immediately interrupted by Western models of explanation.

Differentiating 'Eastern Europe'

In applying Western theory to present developments, it is easy to slip into regarding current post-Communist politics simply as some deep-frozen and thawed earlier stage of the development of Western societies. With its lively discussions of the importance of perspective, context and standpoint, feminist research has good possibilities to be forerunners in acknowledging diversity of experience and interpretation in research on democratic transitions and consolidations.

Workshop report

Resistances to Gendering and Gendered Resistances

Annica Kronsell

The workshop *Resistances to Gendering and Gendered Resistances* was aimed at exploring resistances that have been mobilized in reaction to hegemonic policies and politics that affect women's lives around the world. The contributions to the workshop showed that global politics are indeed carried out far from the limelight of diplomacy and summit meetings and that such resistances take numerous and varying forms. Wendy Harcourt was the facilitator of the workshop. Her background in academics and her current involvement with NGOs, women and development issues proved to be a great resource contributing to the success of the workshop. Her serious engagement with the topic and her enthusiasm for creating dialogue proved to be just the type of guidance needed both to structure the workshop and to develop it in such a way that there was an ongoing conversation throughout the sessions. A conversation that had a base in the individual contributions of the workshop participants but went beyond that to two central themes.

The themes emerged from the papers and were spelled out during the workshop discussions. One theme was the shaping of resistances in terms of how women mobilize and organize. The papers showed ample examples of such activities. Another theme, difference, emerged as central to a few papers and while it was more implicitly expressed in others, the two days of workshop discussions kept returning to the subject of difference. Particularly important was the question of how we can live with and embrace difference among women, while at the same time function as a collective, resisting hegemonic politics. Pauline Stoltz' paper pointed to difference between white and black women's possibilities to organize and be politically represented. She was particularly concerned with what solidarity might mean in that context. Her contribution is included in this volume.

Anca Dumitrescu's paper on women's networks and studies in Romania under transition accentuated the need to bring forward examples of women's activities and historic experiences that can serve as inspiration in a place where much history has been either denied, falsified or simply rewritten. In a similar way, Irene Andersson's research on Swedish women's resistance to war in Europe 1915-1940 showed the importance of making historic connections. Irene's research focus is particularly on how women worked on the whole issue of war and peace. Irene suggested that the activist women were subversive because they were breaking many conventional boundaries. Much of their strength in organizing came out of their friendship. Friendship created a link

between the public political arena and the personal one. The workshop proceeded to discuss the strategic importance of friendship – pleasant and fun – against resistance as a drab affair with hard, sometimes life threatening, struggles against hegemonic politics. It can also be fun to resist hence, irony, jokes and laughter could be useful strategies to pursue. This echoes Hannah Arendt who suggests that the surest way to undermine authority is through laughter.[1]

The paper presented by Larisa Fedorova on the problems of Russian women's NGOs in relationship to international conventions directed our attention to what democratic women's rights mean in the Russian context. UN conventions are a product of a western liberal ideology and can create problems when they are to be translated into a different cultural context. Oonagh Reitman developed a similar argument in her work on the international human rights discourse. Starting from the hegemonic view of human rights as "universal norms applicable across culturally different contexts" she discusses the reaction to this discourse with the cultural relativist debate and particularly focuses on the conflict between cultural relativity and the need for women's rights – a discourse with a tendency toward universalism. Her article is included in this issue. The problem of how to approach difference was a concern that remained with the workshop the entire two days and Diana Mulinari explored this theme further in her paper *Thinking About Feminism.* Diana discussed difference in relation to the recent trends in feminist theory. The postmodern move away from a totalizing vision of "woman" is also a good move, she argued. However, while there is an acute need to contextualize both feminism, research and political practice it ought not to 'guilt trip' us into silence or toleration toward hegemonic power practices. The need to bridge academic feminism with the feminist movement was also stressed.

The importance of critically addressing academic practices was argued to be important and exemplified in Karin Bäckstrand's contribution. In her paper she deconstructed the work of one often cited ecologist; Dawkin, and showed how sexist his influential theory of biological systems is. Her paper can be seen as a contribution and a warning to the feminist and women's movement, not to uncritically embrace ecological theories into an ecofeminist critique of environmental degradation.

Evidence of women's varying contexts and resistance practices were provided throughout the workshop. Pernilla Berlin's paper discussed how women in Cambodia are struggling to organize and how they meet obstacles in the form of customary norms of the Khmer tradition. Another such example was Ilja Luciak's paper on women within the Salvadorian guerrilla movement (the FMLN). He shows the extension of women's active participation in the guerrilla struggle. Despite having fought in a revolutionary struggle, the women were subject to sexist patterns both within the guerrilla organization and in the democratization process which followed. Hereby we see how such struggles are also gendered activities. The guerrilla soldier is a man and not a woman. Hence, the female soldier could not become a hero for the people the same way the male soldier could, because she had betrayed her family role by leaving it in order to fight a guerrilla war.

the male soldier could, because she had betrayed her family role by leaving it in order to fight a guerrilla war.

Other examples of how women organize against hegemonic politics was given in Loes Keysers' paper on women's movement for reproductive health and rights. Her contribution centered on the different strategies employed by the women's lobby in the preparations for and during the International Conference on Population and Development hosted by the UN in Cairo in 1994. Loes argues that this conference was transformative because it gave voice to a previously silenced group. This group which had earlier been objects of population and health policies, and never engaged as participants in developing such policies, had been empowered. The women's movement was empowered through networking and coalition building strategies and thereby became key actors, actively engaged in forming policies related to reproduction rights and reproductive health.

Elvira Orlova presented a paper on the women's movement in Russia and argued that women's activities in Russia are extensive and spreading to many sectors of society and areas of interest. Elvira focused on women in the academic community and exemplified their organizing with Women in Global Security (WINGS). This is an international organization which has strengthened the female academics in Russia because it has given academic women in Russia a forum where their work can become publicly known and is outside the competition with male colleagues over small financial resources. Based on her study of WINGS, Elvira argues that transnational cooperation between women's organization can be one way to assist and encourage that women communicate across national borders. The workshop itself was an example of such bridging of borders and boundaries that was made possible through an inclusive conversation around issues of interest to us all, regardless of discipline, age, nationality or academic status of the workshop participants.

Note

1. Hannah Arendt (1986) 'Communicative Power' in Steven Lukes (ed) *Power*, New York, NUP, p 65.

Workshop report

Theory and Practice: In Search of Each Other

Erika Svedberg

In this workshop it became obvious that its title, *Theory and Practice: In Search for Each Other,* and the brief introduction included in the *Call for Papers*, could be interpreted in many different ways. This was reflected in the paper topics as well as in our discussions, led by workshop facilitator Professor Maud Eduards, Stockholm University. Hence what came to be true for the conference overall was also true for workshop number five; discussions were animated, intense and bold in the broad spectrum of topics they dared to uncover.

However in retrospect, two major themes summed up the multitude of ways to associate around the topic. For some writers, the theory/practice question dealt with a growing gap between the theoretical academic feminisms and the practical activist feminisms, and the need for developing new ties between them. For others, it was a concern within academia itself, i.e. the need to do more in terms of high-lighting feminist theorizing by bringing in more empirical findings.

Discussions within the first theme was especially inspired by listening to one of the opening speakers, Professor in Philosophy Jane Roland Martin, University of Massachusetts. In her talk, Martin elaborated upon the danger of academic feminisms becoming more and more isolated and estranged from the practice of gender equality. Martin calls this the esoteric trap, i.e. that feminist analyses are developing into a body of knowledge designed for the specially initiated alone. As we shall see below, two other philosophers Etela Farkasova and Mariana Szapuova, Comenius University, Bratislava, share their both practical and theoretical experiences of trying to combine feminist theory on an abstract level with personal reflection, both in their work with students and as researchers.

For some of the workshop participants, pedagogy was seen as providing a possible meeting point of theory and practice. One of them was Sarah Blackstock, Department for Politics at Trent University, Canada. She wrote about male initiation rites within the Canadian armed forces as well as at Canadian universities, and even proposed how these issues could be more constructively used in the classroom discussions, at the university. Edmé Dominguez Reyes, at The Peace and Development Research Institute, Göteborg University, presented the results from an empirical study of twenty-one students and their perceptions of graduate studies and research as an occupation.

Another paper which focused specifically on the Swedish context was Dana Rundlöf's paper, which discussed the historic development of the Swedish welfare state. Basing her analysis on a number of feminist political theorists, Dana Rundlöf showed how the project of eradicating inequality between the sexes in Sweden largely had failed due to an inability to address the issue of male privilege. Olga Voronkova, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw wrote theoretically on the topic of gender and justice.

A number of paper had a clear international focus. For example, Sara Goodman, Centre for Women's studies, Lund University, who compared the research on reproductive technologies in the US, Britain and Sweden. Marian Paules, Syracuse University, looked at the gendered language used in the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings and elaborated upon the topic of women's ways of dismantling and resisting patriarchal control on both the local and the global levels. In her essay "Breaking the Sovereign Grip of Time?", Gillian Youngs, Hong Kong, reflected upon the ongoing debate on time and globalization. Mairi Johnson and Bice Maiguashca, whose paper has also been included in this theme issue of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, show the relevance of today's feminist critique of International Relations as a field of study.

Feminism and International Relations: or Encounters with Wolves in the Woods

Christine Sylvester

We know that old European fairy tale about Little Red Riding Hood, a young, innocent, insouciant girl who meets up with a big, malevolent, and conniving wolf in the woods of life. "What big teeth you have," she says wonderously. "The better to eat you with," he responds most directly, lacking wonder. Transpose the action a bit and we have a perfect *mise en scene* for feminists confronting the academic field of international relations (IR). Little Red Riding Hood, we remember, cleverly survives the fictional wolf and so also feminists survive IR. But survival is only the basic necessity. More pertinent: how can feminism flourish in a setting of canonical IR that lets us be, more or less, but does not itself dress in the garb of any "girl?"

Feminism is one of the avant-gardes of IR, a bold chaser after innovative vision in a field that has little taste for visions avant-garde. It stands in many locations, draws many connections, looks for neglected spaces of the international and the many relations that have been overlooked in this core area of men's studies, this area devoted to great states, military strategies and hardware, statesmen, presidents, tyrants, soldiers, interstate diplomacy – war, war, and a little peace. Feminism shines lights into corners, shows the conventional as the *fauve*, can turn a field upside down and back and forward. It can, and in IR does, also fall a bit short of itself, a bit on this side of the usual avant-gardist effort to advance into the fray as the first to break through.

Feminism comes in types, forms, and the question is what forms seem most suitable to the moment of relations international before us in the next millennium.[1] Up to now, feminist IR has basically engaged in two overlapping projects: to outline women in places of international politics where they have never been seen before, and to inline gender in the texts and practices of international politics and IR to see where and how evocations of "women" and "men" occur without any dark outlines being drawn.

When people like Cynthia Enloe find average and nonaverage women in diplomatic offices, vacationing on beaches abroad, working in textile factories for Benetton, or making a living as prostitutes around US military bases, she is engaged in an important outlining project.[2] She is finding and fitting women into those otherwise austere, Anselm Kiefer-type landscapes of the international painted by mainstream schools of the field. With the help of outliners, we see women for the first time – as though they were never around before –

in countries we might not always notice or territories between them, in departments of state and foreign ministries, in international organizations, in international political economy, and in development.[3] Outlining puts the hands of the woman arranging the papers and the conferences and the diplomatic evenings into the analytic picture. For those of us who have struggled to see these women where once they were seemingly homeless in international politics, the *longue duree* of IR's apparent autonomy from women is exposed.[4] We realize that we have been duped into the woods of thinking that there are no (or very, very few) women relating internationally. We realize we need to ask "what the discipline might look like if the central realities of women's day-to-day lives were included in its subject matter."[5] And we have been asking away.

Sometimes, though, only shadows of "women" appear out from under a plethora of heavy outlines already drawn as international politics. Women can be not quite visible, difficult to fathom, to hear and see in some accounts, implied or implicated only in discourses comprising the field. They can be sketched in watery ways in and among the many layers of assumptions that ooze out of crisp renderings, that spill forth from a written text, that suggest hidden roles that never get any attention. The Australian defense plan for the late twentieth century, for example, says very little directly about women. However, a great deal is inlined of them through the silences and the meager suggestion that women in Australia's military should be studied in order to assess their special problems and achievements. No suggestion is made that men be so studied or that studies be undertaken to measure the performance of sex and gender as regulatory norms that influence identity and task assignments.[6] Women are inlined instead of outlined in this gendered Australian White Paper. As another example of inlining, we know Jean Elshtain went looking for women and war more generally and ended up following war stories as narratives inlining what people called men and women could legitimately do, recount, remember about war.[7] In other cases, inliners find gender-relevant relations international in art museums, novels, and poetry.[8] In each case gender takes shape from the outlines of places and people accorded significance; it pops out of narratives that are ostensibly about something else.

Both approaches bring IR to a different visual acuity, a different opticality, and a different sense of who some of the actors really are in the relations of the international.[9] But wolves in the woods linger and persist in their ways of self-showcasing. How many mainstream North American and European and Australian journals of IR regularly offer their readers selections from feminist writings? By my count, only the British journal, *Review of International Studies*, puts in a half-way decent showing in this important area of representation. Some actually seem to bare big teeth to feminist IR – the US-based *International Studies Quarterly* leaps to mind.

As a new millennium dawns, feminists might consider adding to their outlining/inlining virtuosities the memory of early Westphalian era carnivals, when everyday people scoffed at deities and their high priests without dismissing the old for the new. Carnivals were serious venues for parodic revelation. They were vehicles for the poor, the lower classes, the usual voiceless ones to act out

of line, out of assigned character, and still survive. Laughter, the funny, became the key to their exposures and their safety.

Funny, feminists have not picked up on this mode of analysis (albeit they certainly laugh among themselves). Laughter, you see, is disallowed in rigorous academic work as fundamentally incompatible with making serious philosophical statements. It is too intellectually low and commonplace, too absent rationality to offer a guideline for better seeing in the world, for going ahead as an avant-garde. Irony, however, is allowed in some circles. The relative of laughter, irony juxtaposes seemingly incommensurable ideas in ways that make us smile. Kathy Ferguson maintains that irony "allows contending thematizations of subjectivity to negotiate a political relationship that does not depend upon unanimity, consensus, or even majority agreement to any particular configuration of identity, gender, or nature, or to any one metatheoretical stance."[10] "To negotiate" suggests that there is contact between high priests jested about and those laughing, in which "competing claims for identity and desire undercut as well as enable one another and produce an enhanced appreciation of each."[11] I have called this "enhanced appreciation" empathetic cooperation and have recommended it for the field.[12]

Feminists are willing to cooperate with IR more so than mainstream IR shows signs of donning much feminist clothing. But the cooperation is, perhaps, not yet as ironic as it could be, not sufficient to turn a deadly serious, deadly earnest field into a location of some earthiness that exposes high abstractions and narrow spatial scope as laughable. Indeed, feminists in IR do not even talk much about irony qua research method (albeit some of their writings are very ironic), let alone engage in the self-parodies that could raise capacities for empathy and allow others to laugh at us. In this realm of what medievals called *ridendo dicere verum* – to speak truth laughingly[13] – feminism can fall short of itself and impale on the wolves' teeth. We present ourselves as earnestly authentic in an insufficiently authentic field, as avant-gardes tend to do. We have a love-hate thing with being on the outside – as undiscovered avant-gardes tend to do. We reason, we rail, we outline, we inline, we give forty-two and a half good reasons why feminism should be taken into consideration when investigating all issues of the international. Meanwhile the tragedy of IR limps on, keeps us trying to please, keeps us from irony.

Carnival is a method of raucous transgression. We can still help women survive by drawing their outlines in Mexican factories, in Indian textile mills, in Zimbabwean cooperatives and in trails of immigrants. We can still help unmask the strictures of scholastic gender by rereading the texts for inlined identity and place. We can also laugh more and go our own ways more, somewhat less concerned about praising our accomplishments as an avant-garde or with getting the mainstream audience to believe, believe, believe us.

Feminist carnivals might cultivate two irony-producing attitudes. First, I suggest we get our hands dirty more by doing concrete fieldwork in neglected locations of the international, in places IR says belong to area studies, to cultural studies, to women's studies, any place other than to IR. Feminists in IR need the people or texts of another place than that inherited from IR. We must

not replicate the flights of abstract fancy to which much of IR is prone, particularly in its neorealist branch. We must pick up something of the world that IR refuses and thereby acquire some agility in moving in and between the low and common, where IR would rather not go because it is insufficiently heroic, and the high intellectual world of academia. "So what are you, really," I am often asked, "an Africanist or an IR person?" You're making me laugh! Go where the people and the evocations are in an ironic showing up of IR's canonical vacuities.

Second, feminists should explore oddities in that world delivered to us by academic IR – odd in the sense of hilariously miscast, hideously hidden. We could look at the ironies of peace conferences. The Bosnian peace: where rape has been a war-fighting strategy, where combat has been foisted upon women through bodily assault, where were those issues in the peace conference? Where were the outlines of everyday women in the deliberations to end a war, a war painted against the inlines of silent, bayonet-in-the-breast ghosts? Then there is the spectacle of self-congratulation over German unity while east Germans were colonized. A veritable carnival of everyday people walked laughingly through the Cold War's iron curtain. They changed the face of western history, while, ironically, the great powers that failed to break down the Cold War got the credit – or lately, the blame. If those at the center of a sea change in relations international are all but ignored in IR, then feminists must pick up on these hidden agents and let the carnival of exposures begin. Let the IR question in feminism come to the fore: instead of bringing feminism to IR, where it is trampled under foot by wolves with big teeth, bring IR and its newly outlined people, its inlined evocations of "women" out of place, to carnivalesque feminism. And bring it hither while bearing in mind that there is no one nation of feminism into which we must amalgamate all people or all of IR. Feminism must be too ironic for that type of universalist closure, too diffuse, too prone to spawn migrants and dissidents of/from our own.[14]

As we mark out neglected spaces of the international, we develop sight with our eyes, site as ability to locate, and cite as the necessity of giving recognition to people we are told by IR to ignore or else (be eaten alive by the wolves). In the spirit of avant-garde carnival, though, we must also cite those who would deny us sites and bring them into political conversations oriented toward diversity and the common, toward world – worlds – rather than self.[15] Little Red Riding Hood will flourish then in many gala costumes as s/he speaks, laughs, outlines, inlines and lines up stories about sex, gender and women relating to the international. S/he will not defeat the wolfish high priests, but that is not necessary when one travels with empathy and ironic laughter in one's entourage. Revealing taunts, disarming gleaming smiles, unmasking games and those injured and ignored by them, s/he skips down new paths to negotiations of all sorts. She laughs millennially without worrying whether her IR is acceptable to those who, most remarkably, may persist in being stodgily garbed and lacking wonder about worlds.

Notes

1. "Relations international" as a preferred term to international relations is discussed in Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), last chapter.

2. Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Bases, and Beaches: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations* (London: Pandora, 1989), and *The Morning After: Sexual Politics in the Post-Cold War Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

3. E.g., Jan Pettman, *Living in the Margins: Racism, Sexism and Feminism in Australia* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992); Simona Sharoni, "Middle East Politics Through Feminist Lenses: Toward Theorizing International Relations from Women's Struggles" *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, 18, 1, 1993:5-28; Rudo Gaidzanwa, "Citizenship, Nationality, Gender, and Class in Southern Africa" *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, 18, 1, 1993:39-60; Nancy McGlen and Meredith Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy: The Insiders* (New York: Routledge, 1993); Catherine Hoskyns, "Gender Issues in International Relations: The Case of the European Community" *Review of International Studies*, 20, 3, 1994:225-239; Carol Miller, "Women in International Relations? The Debate in Inter-War Britain " in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., *Gender and International Relations* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991):64-82; Sandra Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-governmental Organizations* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Christina Gabriel and Laura Mcdonald, "NAFTA, Women and Organising in Canada and Mexico: Forging a "Feminist Internationality" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 23, 3, 1994: 535-562; E. Koffman and Gillian Youngs, eds., *Globalization: Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1996); Marianne Marchand and Jane Parpart, eds., *Feminism/Postmodernism/ Development* (New York: Routledge, 1995); and special issue of *Women's Studies International Forum* on Links Across Differences: Gender, Ethnicity, and Nationalism, 19, 1/2, 1996.

4. See discussion in Christine Sylvester, "Homeless in International Relations? "Women's" Place in Canonical Texts and in Feminist Reimaginings" in Marjorie Martin and Adam Lerner, eds., *Reimagining the Nation* (London: Open University Press, 1993).

5. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. xi.

6. Christine Sylvester, "The White Paper Trailing" in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce, eds., *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995):134-149.

7. Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

8. See Christine Sylvester, "Picturing the Cold War: An Art Graft/Eye Graft" *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, 21, 4, 1996: 393-418; "Masculinity, Femininity, and International Relations: Or, Who Goes to the Moon with Bonaparte and the Adder" in Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, eds., *Feminisms, Masculinity, and Power in International Relations: Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); "Riding the Hyphens of Feminism, Peace, and Place in Four-(Or More) Part Cacophony" *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, 18, 1, 1993:109-118.

9. For further discussion of feminist outlining and inlining, see Christine Sylvester, "The Contributions of Feminist Theory to International Relations" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996):254-278.

10. Kathy Ferguson, *The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 157.

11. Ferguson, *The Man Question*, p. 157.

12. See Christine Sylvester, "Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR"

Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23, 2, 1994: 315-34.

13. See discussion in Michael Bristol, *Carnival and Theater: Plebian Culture and The Structure of Authority in Renaissance England* (New York: Methuen, 1985).

14. Ien Ang warns against recruiting for a nation of feminism that can be seen as the "'natural' political destination for all women, no matter how multicultural." See her "I'm a Feminist But...'Other' Women and Postnational Feminism," in Barbara Caine and Rosemary Pringle, eds., *Transitions: New Australian Feminisms* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995), p. 57.

15. See discussion in Wendy Brown, "Feminist Hesitations, Postmodern Exposures" *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 3, 1, 1991, p. 80.

Feminist Perspectives on Security: The Work of Outsiders, Mavericks or Nomads?

Mark Elam

Introduction

Feminists are arguing that women can no longer afford to defer the provision of security to male authority and that they must be prepared to take matters into their own hands. Cynthia Enloe, for example, insists on writing about international security very differently. By starting her accounts of international relations in the lives of "ordinary" women she aims to level out the political landscape and bring leading statesmen down to size. Her belief is that if we are to change the hard realities currently associated with international security, we must first recognize the contingency of the varieties of masculinity and femininity traditionally enacted and affirmed through the conduct of international politics (Enloe 1993: 5). International politics and sexual politics are inseparable.

But who is someone like Enloe to talk? What kind of consciousness do feminists possess as they re-write relations of international and sexual similarity and difference? Traditionally, scholars of international relations have approached difference in a very negative fashion. Security studies has been about gauging difference in terms of threats to a sovereign body. Difference has been conceived of as something you have to be secured *from*, not *with*: it has been seen as something giving rise to a need for protection, not connection. While feminists appear to want to turn the ontological tables and transform security studies into a discourse of positive difference, the question remains; where do they imagine themselves to be located as they re-write difference and similarity? And following on from this: how do they intend to hold themselves accountable for the new international relations they propose?

These are the questions I wish to engage with here, if only in a provisional fashion. I want to take up three alternative figures for the feminist security expert: the outsider, the maverick and the nomad. While I believe the adoption of any one of these intellectual identities is appropriate for challenging existing state-centric approaches to security, I want to propose that a nomadic consciousness is better for re-enacting international security as a discourse of positive difference. Outsiders or mavericks may have the capability to shift the

subjects of security, but not without falling foul of the same negative vision of difference as those swimming in the Hobbesian mainstream of international relations. They still tend to constitute their subjects of security through acts of exclusion and on the basis of hierarchy.

To explore my three feminist figures I shall discuss the work of three individuals who live out these different roles in exemplary fashion. My security expert as outsider is Virginia Woolf and the particular text I want to take up is her *Three Guineas* published on the eve of the outbreak of World War II. My headstrong maverick is C. Wright Mills, hardly a feminist, but someone whose work has been recently put forward within International Relations as valuable for the qualitative renewal of the discipline. To capture the figure of the nomad I want to take up the work of Rosi Braidotti and her commitment to sexual difference as a nomadic political project. A project that like the one engaging Cynthia Enloe generates a fusion between sexual and international politics.

"As the Daughter of an Educated Man I Want No Country"

Virginia Woolf wrote *Three Guineas* as an attack on the "tyranny of the patriarchal state" and the rising tide of authoritarianism. She saw herself engaging in a struggle involving men and women working together but still in separate ways (1938/ 1992: 303). She remained against moves to merge identities as women "should not give effect to a view which our own experiences of 'society' should have helped us to envisage" (1938/ 1992: 308). However, just as Woolf found it hard both rationally and emotionally to imagine joining forces with men, so she also found it hard to imagine joining forces with many other kinds of women. She considered it best to describe herself as belonging to a group comprised of "the daughters of educated men". This was a group of women potentially strong, but currently weak in the struggle to combat the drift towards war. While working women could refuse to continue making munitions, Woolf saw women like herself as deprived of a serious weapon to enforce their will. Faced with relative powerlessness, Woolf attempted to articulate a new identity for the daughters of educated men capable of uniting them as an emergent class. This new identity was that of the Outsider: together they could form an Outsider's Society (1938/1992: 309). Woolf rooted this Society in a special attitude of "complete indifference" which members would exude in the face of men's war-making activities. This would be an attitude only educated women could properly cultivate: an intelligent attitude with a "firm footing upon fact" and based not only on instinct, but also Reason (1938/1992: 311). An attitude relying upon careful observation to build a sober understanding of what "our country" means to an Outsider:

> "Our Country"...throughout the greater part of history has treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share in its possessions. "Our" country still ceases to be mine if I marry a foreigner. "Our" country denies me the means of protecting myself, forces me to pay others a very large sum annually to protect me, and is so little able, even so, to protect me that Air Raid precautions are written on the wall. (1938/1992: 313)

Knowing this the daughters of educated men would be able to feel fully secure in their attitude of complete indifference towards the martial exploits of their brothers because each of them would know that; 'As a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world'. (ibid)

Formulated so these brief sentences have lived a life of their own far removed from the (con)text in which they were written. They were written by Woolf in quotation marks as being said by one of her outsiders who could only be a woman like herself–an educated woman and the daughter of an educated man. Woolf didn't believe that "my country is the whole world" could apply to all women as she wrote it as something only a very few women were capable of saying. These women could not contend that they felt the whole world as their country because they felt an affinity with women everywhere regardless of class or creed, but because they, unlike other women, were able to use Reason to think dispassionately about their particular situation. They could say that they no longer wanted a country because thanks to an education they had become subject to the rule of Reason, and Reason cannot be contained within territorial boundaries. The power of Reason offered them the chance to not only make something worthwhile out of their situation but also to transcend it altogether and rise above the terrible realities of war, violence and patriarchy. In the pursuit of knowledge they would find the best refuge against a world going steadily mad – for them it would have to make the difference between a worthwhile life and death[1].

Maverick (C. Wright Mills)

ma'verick *n.* Unbranded calf or yearling; unorthodox or undisciplined person. [f. S. A. *Maverick*, Texas engineer who owned but did not brand cattle *c.* 1850]

More than thirty years after *The Sociological Imagination* was published Maverick has ridden into International Relations. In a major debate article in a recent number of *Millenniuum*, Justin Rosenberg argues that Maverick's classic text published, by "curious coincidence", in the same year as Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State and War* provides us today with the opportunity to move beyond negative critiques of Realist International Relations towards a concrete conception of what a "non-Realist discipline of IR might look like" (Rosenberg 1994: 86)[2]. According to Rosenberg, the powerful critique Maverick launched against American social science in the 1950s closely resembles the type of critique levelled against Realism in International Relations in the 1990s by a range of individuals, including himself. However, the difference is that Maverick included in his text a "clear and inspiring alternative conception of the method and purpose of social science"; he stamped his negative critique with "real authority" by telling of the historical promise social science was failing to fulfil. Thus, Rosenberg sees it as his task to transfer this stamp of "real authority" to critiques of realism in IR by translating the sociological imagination into the international imagination:

> If as Maverick argued, 'the history that now affects every [person] is world history', then no discipline is better placed to take up this vocation today than International Relations. To do so, however, we must turn not to Realism, but to the international imagination. (Rosenberg 1994: 108)

The appropriate question for this paper to ask therefore is whether or not feminist scholars should also aspire to be Mavericks in a non-Realist discipline of International Relations? Is Maverick also the natural choice for them confronted with today's Wilder West and a life on the frontier between modernity from postmodernity?[3]

Writing of Maverick, Cornel West depicts him as an all-American intellectual and the guardian of a particular culture of radical democracy: as someone who fitted well with "the Emersonian animus against conformity and routine" (West 1989: 124). Although some would no doubt take exception to the comparison, *The Sociological Imagination* can be productively read as an updated and extended version of Emerson's famous oration *The American Scholar*. For Emerson writing in the 1830s, the new American nation was still in a position of cultural dependency vis-à-vis Britain and lacked a mind of its own. He thought the geography of the new nation was sublime but not yet the people; he felt himself in the midst of a "puny and feeble folk". In response to this situation he invented a mythic self who could act as the Saviour of the infant nation:

> The scholar is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future. He must be an university of knowledges. If there be one lesson more than another, which should pierce his ear, it is: 'The world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law of all nature...in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason; it is for you to know all, it is for you to dare all. Mr. President and Gentlemen, this confidence in the unsearched might of man belongs, by all motives, by all prophecy, by all preparation, to the American Scholar. (Emerson 1837/1984: 69)

Maverick in the 1950s can be interpreted as having been overwhelmed by a sense of nostalgia for something similar to Emerson's vision of America and the ideal of individuality it advanced. A fantastic ideal which held that; "each man shall feel the world is his, and man shall treat with man as a sovereign state with a sovereign state" (Emerson 1837/1984: 68). For Maverick, Emerson's vision had become very close to lived reality in the "self-balancing society" of nineteenth century liberal America. This was Maverick's own idea of a sweet homeland – a place where; "competition was a means of producing free individuals, a testing field for heroes; in its terms men lived the legend of the self-reliant individual" (Maverick 1951/1977: 12)

In the twentieth century, however, everything had turned sour in Maverick's eyes and America had lost its way. In *White Collar*, Maverick tells of how the continued progress of industrialization during the first half of this century had coincided with an ascendent trend of rationalization and the organized pursuit of rationality without reason:

> In a world crowded with big ugly forces, the white-collar man is readily assumed to possess all the supposed virtues of the small creature...The white-collar man is

> the hero as victim, the small creature who is acted upon but who does not act, who works alone unnoticed in somebody's office or store, never talking aloud, never talking back, never taking a stand. (Maverick 1951/1977: xii)

Surrounded by "small creatures", Maverick saw himself surrounded by unAmerican behaviour. The only source of genuine hope and agency in the nation was once again the lonely American Scholar. With the onset of the Cold War things only got worse in Maverick's eyes. As a new post-modern epoch loomed large, it looked to him as though his compatriots were on the verge of giving up trying to lead human lives altogether and settling for artificial lives instead:

> The ultimate problem of freedom is the problem of the cheerful robot, and it arises in this form today because today it has become evident to us that *all* men do *not* naturally *want* to be free; that all men are not willing or not able, as the case may be, to exert themselves to acquire the reason that freedom requires. (Maverick 1959/1980: 193-94 original emphasis)

Faced with such a desperate situation Maverick had no option but to act the Master Narrator and attempt to enslave his helpless readers. This is something Norman Denzin picks up on in a recent article when, in contrast to Justin Rosenberg, he describes *The Sociological Imagination* as "a hypocritical text with dubious ethics" (1990: 4) through which Maverick seeks to construct "a spurious dialogue with the reader" (1990: 3). As Denzin expresses it; *The Sociological Imagination* proposes dialogue only to break down into a harangue and "a monological tirade on the state of mid-century American life" (ibid). In the same moment Maverick takes sides with "ordinary people" he constructs them as inferior to him. Their imagined inferiority standing in direct relation to his imagined superiority. They are branded, docile, disciplined and trapped in precisely the same way that he is unbranded, insubordinate, footloose and free.

At the Risk of Feeling Insecure

> Survival in fact is about the connections between things... (Said 1993: 407-408)

> Woman is no longer different *from* but *different so as to bring about alternative values*. (Braidotti: 1994: 239)

The figure of the nomad stands in indirected contrast to both that of the outsider and the maverick. Woolf's strategy was to use a position on the outside to appropriate the faculty of reason for Women. However, her new-found position can be interpreted as one of critical no-whereness, a place of solitude – an observation platform in outer space. From this remote position, which also promises to be a commanding position, it may be possible to visualize Man and Woman differently, but most likely at the expense of many and only to the advantage of a privileged few.

In the case of Maverick, Rosenberg commends him for giving authority to his critique of American social science by clearly articulating the historical promise it was failing to fulfil. People were feeling lost and confused because

social science was neglecting its most important task – the cultivation of the sociological imagination. Moving into the present and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world, Rosenberg argues that as non-Realist scholars of international relations our task is to supply the world with the international imagination as a package deal of sensibilities nobody can properly do without today. But what do we find when look into the the relations of similarity and difference out of which Maverick constructed his sociological imagination? We find an embattled social scientist determined to stand alone by constructing himself as One of a kind. Maverick stamped his sociological imagination with authority by depicting himself as our last hope. The only trouble is that the more prestige Maverick was able to attach to his own Self, the more pathetic everybody else around him was bound to become. His sociological imagination is nothing we can share in because it is precisely the quality that allows people like him to talk over our heads.

Conceived with the dangers of outsider and maverick consciousness in mind, nomadic thought is also a form of resistance to hierarchial and exclusionary views of subjectivity. The nomad is not an outsider because s/he is no longer prepared to relate to others as insiders. The nomad is not a Maverick because s/he finds it impossible to find his or her true self among many others. The nomad rejects the view that only settled subjects who are dead sure of themselves can be political and make reasoned choices as *the nomad makes the construction and regulation of subjectivity itself into a political issue.* The nomad practices politics therefore at the level of conflicting ontologies and conflicting visions of nature and humanity. Viewed from the perspective of the discipline of International Relations, the nomad inevitably spells trouble because s/he deprives the discipline of its favourite subject – the sovereign subject. The message is that International Relations has to stop working in defence of sovereignties and start recognizing and constructing other richer, more complex varieties of subjectivity:

> Being a nomad, living in transition, does not mean that one cannot or is unwilling to create those necessarily stable and reassuring bases for identity that allow one to function in a community. Rather nomadic consciousness consists in not taking any kind of identity as permanent. The nomad is only passing through; s/he makes those necessarily situated connections that can help him/her to survive, but s/he never takes on fully the limits of one national, fixed identity. The nomad has no passport – or has too many of them. (Braidotti 1994: 33)

Nomads want to recognize and legitimate many sides to both themselves and to others without losing a stable sense of self completely. They want to have the best of many possible worlds. Crucially, this means that they must be able to enact and affirm a positive vision of difference without fear of falling into a condition of moral and political relativism. The spectre of relativism is only something that those wishing to continue addressing international and sexual relations of similarity and difference in a negative fashion will be prepared to raise.

In her work, Rosi Braidotti thinks about interntional difference by thinking through sexual difference. Like Cynthia Enloe she believes that transforming

international politics means transforming sexual politics and that the two are impossible to separate. Who we think we are as men and women is crucial in deciding where we locate ourselves in the world. More than others women have recognized that general calls for global solidarity must be replaced by close attention to, and accountability for, the relations of similarity and difference we enact on an everyday basis. In relation to the pursuit of international politics, feminist scholars are the first to tell us that internationalization starts at home: recognizing the multiple differences that exist among women means recognizing the "domestic foreigners" living in our midst:

> Migrant women constitute the bulk of what we would call the "domestic foreigners" in our postindustrial metropolis...How close are we, the "white" intellectual women, to the migrant women who have even fewer citizen rights than we have? How sensitive are we to the intellectual potential of the foreigners that we have right here, in our own backyard?...For internationalization to become a serious practice, we must work through this paradox of proximity, indifference, and cultural differences between the nomadic intellectual and the migrant women. (Braidotti: 1994: 255)

However, the holding of ourselves accountable to the "domestic foreigners" in our midst does not necessarily have to be a pursued in a mood of dour seriousness. If difference is always negative difference then dour seriousness is fully justified, but if the ambition is to emphasize the positivity of difference our mood must be lighter, softer and more sympathetic. If we are to seek security with others rather than from them, we must be prepared to live slightly more dangerously than in the past; putting at least some part of ourselves continually in jeopardy and seeing where this takes us.

Notes

1. Of course it is possible to argue that in trying to articulate the difference between the daughters of educated men and other groups in society Woolf was also trying to articulate the differences she experienced within herself as a result of the precariousness of her mental health.

2. Another person arguing the relevance of Maverick as an inspirational figure for the pursuit of alternative perspectives on international relations today is Edward Said. According to him Maverick can supply us with one of the "best and most honest" answers to the question "what does the intellectual represent today?" (Said 1994: 15). To express what the proper task of the intellectual should have been during the Gulf War, Said says s/he should have done as Maverick would have done and worked to "unearth the forgotten, to make connections that were denied"; s/he should have staked his or her whole being on a critical sense that refuses "to accept easy formulas, or ready-made clichés, or the smooth, ever-so-accomodating confirmations of what the powerful or conventional have to say, and what they do". (1994:17)

3. Some may wish to argue that Maverick is an impossible feminist figure – that Maverick was and can only ever be a Man. However, in opposition to such a view I think we only have to take into account the most popular and debated "feminist" film of the 1990s: *Thelma and Louise* (Scott 1991). Cutting loose, leaving their ordinary women's lives behind them, and becoming a law unto themselves, the two heroines of Ridley Scott's film make wonderful Mavericks.

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Praxis and Emancipation: The Lessons of Feminist Theory in International Relations

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Introduction

There has been much debate in recent years about the potential contribution that critical theory can make to International Relations (IR). What is most striking about this debate, apart from the absence of any real intellectual engagement between the combatants, is the complete disregard, accorded by all sides, to the place of feminist theory in this inter-paradigm jousting for the lead. Strange as it may seem, despite the obvious parallelisms, critical international theorists have paid scant attention to the work of their feminist colleagues, and when they have nodded in their direction it has been only to beckon them over into the more 'inclusive' 'neutral' arena of a universalistic, rather than gendered, critical theory (Linklater 1994:128).

Our interest in this paper is to explore the relationship between these two bodies of theorising in light of Stephen Leonard's argument that feminist theory is one example of *Critical Theory in Political Practice* (1990). Indeed, the central thesis of this article is that feminist IR theory, at present, is the most developed form of critical theory in the discipline. We shall show how feminist theory explicitly seeks to accomplish that task which Marx, the patriarch of critical theory, originally defined as its main purpose, that is, 'the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age' (Marx 1968: 41).

In order to develop this argument, we have divided the paper into three parts. In the first part, we outline what we take to be the three defining features of critical theory, emphasizing the significance of praxis in each. In the second part, we examine the theoretical frameworks offered by two leading critical international theorists – Andrew Linklater and Robert Cox – and argue that the introduction of gender analysis problematises the approaches of both scholars. In the third part, we illustrate the ways in which the theoretical approaches of two feminist IR theorists, Christine Sylvester and Cynthia Enloe, embody the central requirements of critical theory.

Theory and Praxis: Critical Theory's Three Tasks

The best way to begin our discussion of what constitutes a critical theory is to refer to the defining features outlined by Stephen Leonard in his book, *Critical Theory in Political Practice*. Here, he outlines what he takes to be the overall purpose of critical theory and its three central tasks. The over-riding goal of critical theory must be the realization of self-liberating practice. In order to achieve this task, critical theories must embody the following three moments: a) the task of deconstructing prevailing truths and social practices in order to locate the sources of domination within them; b) the task of grounding its theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions *in the actual social practices and struggles* of particular marginalised groups and their experiences of domination; and c) the task of offering an alternative vision of a life free from such domination (Leonard 1990: 4-8).

In the first moment, critical theorists illuminate relations of domination and particularly, how they are characteristically underwritten by theoretical perspectives which relegate the self-understandings of particular groups to the margins. In the second moment, the critical theorist allies herself with a specific addressee. As Leonard states, 'without the recognition of a class of persons who suffer oppression, conditions from which they must be freed, critical theory is nothing more than an empty intellectural enterprise' (Leonard 1990: 14). Thus, rather than speak from an 'objective' understanding of what constitutes oppression, the theorist seeks to critically interpret the experiences and struggles of her addressee. The third moment calls on the theorist to critically draw on the *actual practices and discourses* of her addressees in order to imagine new forms of social life which may liberate them from domination.[1] These alternatives, however, cannot be utopian; rather they must be based on identified possibilities for change within the existing social order.

What is most important about Leonard's framework for critical theory is that it centralizes praxis as both the objective of critical theory and as a central conceptual tool. The term praxis is now making frequent appearances in critical IR literature, although it remains a relatively undefined and unexplored concept.[2] Thus, we would like to explain what we take it to mean in this paper. The *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought* defines praxis as follows:

> This Greek term for 'action' or 'practice' was given a special meaning in the early philosophy of Karl Marx. It refers to the idea of 'the unity of theory and practice'. Thought or theory, Marx claimed cannot be seen as separate from practice as some abstract standard or contemplative ideal. It arises out of practice and is developed and modified by it. Marx considered that the split between ideal and reality, between an irrational world and a rationalist critique of it, could only be overcome by the development of a theoretical consciousness among social groups engaged in the practice of changing the real world (Bullock, 1988: 676).

Thus, on the one hand, praxis gives rise to and fundamentally shapes theory, and on the other hand, it is fostered and given direction by critical thought and reflection. It is important to be clear that the relationship that we are focusing on in this paper is that between theory and praxis; that is the relationship be-

tween theory (and the theorist) and theory-guided struggles oriented towards social change. This relationship implies that the theorist takes a supportive, but at least partially autonomous and critical approach *vis-a-vis* her addressee. In this conception, theory is not only a scientific or philosophical exercise but also a politico-normative one which has *practical intent*. The truth of the theory, therefore, can only be verified, in the final instance, 'in the successful process of enlightenment and that means: in the practical discourse of those concerned' (Habermas 1973: 2). In other words, critical theory is successful to the extent to which its normative orientation, theoretical explanations of social relations, and its ability to identify possiblities for social change resonate with the experiences and aspirations of its addressee.

At this point, it is important to clarify, in greater detail, what we mean by the notion of an addressee. Within the critical theory tradition there have been two ways of conceptualising the addressee. On the one hand, Marxists and early Frankfurt School theorists sought to ally themselves with one particular social agent, *i.e.*, the working class, in the belief that their interests could be generalised to society as a whole. Revolution of the working class was the liberation of all. On the other hand, those critical theorists following in a Habermasian vein rejected the idea of a particular addressee in favour of a universal subject, *i.e.*, humanity. The problem with the former position is that it assumes that it is possible to prioritise our different experiences and identities and to privilege one over all others. The problem with the latter position is that it tends to downplay difference and overestimates the feasibility of speaking to the interests and experiences of all people; it thus fails to appreciate, at least theoretically, the conflictual and power-riven nature of social relations. The danger then is that, in the name of a universal addressee, the needs and interests of particular groups, usually the most powerful, prevail. Both approaches, in different ways, rely on a false universalism, a particular addressee masquerading as a universal. As we shall see below, the approaches of Linklater and Cox fall into this trap.

We now turn to the work of Linklater and Cox, who both seek to offer critical theories of international relations which privilege historical change, praxis and the question of emancipation. While neither approach claims to capture the specificity of gender relations, both ostensibly seek to offer a comprehensive explanation of the dominant modes of exclusion and subordination that exist in global politics. Given their intention to offer a *macro*-theory, therefore, we will interrogate both of these approaches in terms of their ability to shed light on forms of gender domination and feminist praxis. Our argument here is not that every critical theory must engage in gender analysis, but rather that any theory that claims to be critical and comprehensive, must, at a minimum, allow the theoretical space to do so. In other words, its logic and concepts cannot, at the outset, preclude its theorisation. In this light, it is Cox who offers the more critical and, therefore, more promising approach, although, as we shall see, there are serious limitations to the critical potential of his project as well.

Turning first to Linklater, the main weakness of his framework stems from how he understands the main objective of critical international theory. He

specifies its most important task as follows: '[t]he critical project in International Relations needs to understand the interconnections between different levels of exclusion *but it should focus the greater part of its attention on the sovereign state as a problematic form of political community*' (Linklater 1994: 129, our emphasis). While this statement of purpose may seem rather straightforward, at least to international relationists, it in fact involves four inter-related claims about power and its location in social life.

The first of Linklater's claims is that there are different forms of power relations – what he refers to as dynamics of inclusion and exclusion – that exist and intersect. Presumably, these would include not only relations of gender, class, race, and sexuality but also the power dynamics created by geographical, regional and linguistic differences. His second claim is that the sovereign state is a problematic form of political community. Here Linklater implies that, despite the variety of power relations that exist in our social life, some of the most important exclusionary practices can be understood in terms of prevailing understandings and practices of citizenship. His third claim, which is not referred to explicitly in the quote above, is that the problematic nature of the state and, more specifically, the social bond of citizenship, derives from the fact that it creates and justifies an insider/outsider dynamic which both excludes obligation to the external 'other' (foreigner) and works to marginalise the internal 'other' (cultural minorities) within the state. His final claim is that it is this particular dynamic, that of insider and outsider, that should be the focus of critical international relations theorists.

The tensions within this framework abound. While Linklater, in one breath, recognizes that different dynamics of inclusion and exclusion exist and intersect, in the next breath he privileges one of these dynamics as *both primary and separable* from the others. By making it *primary,* Linklater has uncritically accepted the statist terms of IR discourse in developing his problematique. Unwilling to give up the sovereign state as the central concern of international relationists, Linklater is forced to constrict his vision of exclusionary practices only to those which explicitly stem from the existence of the sovereign state, *i.e.*, citizenship. By making it *separable* he is claiming that we can do the critical project in IR without understanding how power relations are mutually constitutive. Thus, in the first instance, Linklater is making an unqualified, unreflexive claim about what forms of domination and exclusion are primary in global politics. In the second instance, he is effectively *abstracting* the state and the insider/outsider dynamic from its concrete social and political content.

The weakness of Linklater's work becomes evident when we explore some of its dimensions in light of feminist insights on power, praxis and emancipation. First let us take citizenship, the social bond that Linklater privileges in his exploration of the inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics of the state. Feminist approaches to citizenship have shown that to understand the 'us/them' dynamic of citizenship solely in national or even cultural terms is to hide from view the myriad of cross-cutting, unequal social relations that constitute it. In terms of gender, as Evelyn Fox Keller states, dominant conceptualisations of citizenship displace 'women, their work and the values associated with that

work, from the culturally normative definitions of objectivity, morality, citizenship, and even of human nature' (Quoted in Jones 1991:783). In other words, from a feminist perspective, Linklater's central concern, that is the 'insider'/'outsider' dynamic, is one already predicated on masculinist identity and power.

A second way of throwing into relief the contradictions of Linklater's approach is by examining the political implications of his normative vision. Linklater's emancipatory goal is the decentering of the sovereign state through both the sub-nationalisation of political authority, in order to protect cultural difference,[3] and the internationalization of authority, in order to extend our citizenship bond beyond the sovereign state. Two questions arise when considering his first recommendation of devolving political authority to cultural minorities. First, what normative grounds does he rely on to justify his privileging of cultural difference over other forms of difference? Why should critical international relationists only pay attention to this form of exclusion? Second, what should be done when the devolution of power to one minority group implies the subordination of another? This is not just an abstract problem. As feminist analyses of nationalism have shown, many nationalist leaders and governments have defined women's traditional roles as the kernel of their cultural authenticity, arguing in domestic and international fora that the question of women's rights is a cultural rather than political one (Kandiyoti 1991, 1995, Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). In India, for example, where there are conflicting Hindhu, Muslim, and Sikh interpretations of the appropriate role of women in community life, the state has chosen to oppose Muslim women who have tried to use state-wide constitutional provisions to assert and protect their rights against those communal interpretations (Kandiyoti 1991). Turning to his second recommendation, the internationalization of decision-making, one again is struck by the problematic nature of this trend for women. Feminist research on women's participation and influence in politics has shown that women participate more and have most influence at the local level.[4] Thus, the internationalization of political authority in contexts such as the EU cannot be assumed to be a positive force in the enabling of women's political participation.

In sum, Linklater's efforts to articulate an emancipatory project is fundamentally limited by his attempt to work within the narrow parameters of the discipline of IR; as a result, he simplifies and circumscribes the task of critical theory to the understanding of the sovereign state as a problematic form of political community. Rather than confront the complexity of different power relations that exist within as well as across sovereign state boundaries, Linklater abstracts and privileges one particular social relationship, that of citizenship, and what he sees as its attendant identities: cultural/national identity, the statist identity of citizenship and our identities as humans. By ignoring both the way in which power relations intersect, and thereby generate a myriad of other identities, and the way in which these relations constitute not only the social bond of citizenship, but all others relations within a political community,

Linklater is unable to foresee the exclusionary political implications that his approach legitimates.

Turning now to Cox, at first blush, his framework resonates with the conception of critical theory set out in the first section of this paper. Indeed, the emphasis on social and political relations, the insistence on a historical approach, the view of theory as normatively laden and a commitment to social change and emancipation make his framework an ideal candidate for the most developed form of critical theory in IR. Nonetheless, despite the obvious strengths of the Coxian paradigm, a number of questions arise when considering his conceptualisation of social forces and praxis from a feminist perspective.

Although Cox offers us a conceptual tool – 'social forces' – to identify and talk about alternative forms of praxis, he weds this concept to a *productionist paradigm* to the extent that it refers to a social grouping 'engendered by the production process' (Cox 1996: 100). This narrowing of the potential addressee to a social class within the relations of production serves to substantially constrain his political imagination: class conflict becomes the primary motor of social change while alternative forms of transformative politics are left in the shadows of his structuralist framework.

This privileging of class relations, in theory, and working class alliances, in substantive terms, is underwritten by his Marxist understanding of identity formation and politicisation. While Cox does focus on the legitimating function of ideas as well as their transformative power, he does not consider the way in which identity is socially constructed. For him, ideas can take two forms. The first are intersubjective meanings which are broadly shared ideas about social reality; they are taken-for-granted truths about the world. For example, for most of us, that we live in a world of sovereign states is an accepted truth. The second are collective images held by specific groups of people and derived from their particular position in the relations of production. In other words, workers will have a different world view from their bosses.

This two-sided depiction of the role of ideas is problematised as soon as one considers feminist arguments about the socially constructed nature of identity. In terms of Cox's intersubjective meanings, feminists would agree that ideologies exist which serve to legitimate dominant power relations, but they would question to what extent these ideas are in fact shared and, if so, by whom. More specifically, they would seek to illuminate in what ways these ideologies and discourses are masculinist and serve to justify a particular set of gender relations. Although Cox's framework would not preclude this line of enquiry, it offers few tools in this regard. With respect to Cox's collective images, we find a more problematic conceptualisation of identity. Here it is assumed that the ideas that we hold about the social world are constructed around our experience within a mode of relations of production. Feminists have demonstrated, however, that the construction of a politicised identity does not necessarily occur within the context of class relations. Identity, Sylvester has argued, cannot be understood as static, singular or universal (Sylvester, 1994a). Nor can it be easily deduced from the material circumstances of social forces. Instead, it

must be conceptualised as the changing expression of peoples self-understandings within the context of intersecting power relations.

The implications of this understanding of identity become clearer when one looks at just some of the different forms of praxis that are occurring in the world today. Cox suggests that one possible source of emancipatory praxis is the mobilisation of unestablished or established workers. Clearly this is one place to look since both women and men have responded politically to the negative effects of the globalisation of production. However it is important to note that women often experience the detrimental effects of globalisation differently from men and, indeed, their needs and interest as workers are often subordinated to the resistance efforts of male workers. For example, in Honduras, while male banana plantation workers attempted to challenge the stranglehold that the United Fruit Company had on their lives, their female counterparts (who worked as cleaners and packers) were 'excluded from the unions by their fathers and brothers who imagine[d] their own conflicts with management to be more "political", more "serious" than those of the women' (Enloe 1993: 108-9). If women workers are marginalised by their male colleagues, on what grounds can a counterhegemonic alliance be built if it is to avoid another type of hegemonic politics, a gendered politics? Furthermore, both women and men have organised around issues which cannot be reduced to the politics of production. Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights and Women Living Under Muslim Laws are two transnational movements that have prioritised other power relations and identities.

In sum, although Cox's approach offers a starting point to conceptualise the importance of ideologies in the constitution of power relations, it does not provide the tools to explore the way in which power relations overlap around a variety of identities. By separating out relations of production from gender relations and assuming that the latter can be understood in terms of the former, Cox circumscribes his projects' ability to speak to the experiences of a number of marginalised constituents. Thus Cox and Linklater, despite their very different projects, ultimately fall into the same trap of relying on a false universalism which marginalises difference in general and gender in particular.

The Unity of Theory and Praxis: Feminist Theory as Critical Theory

In this third part of the paper we explore the argument made by Stephen Leonard, that feminist theory is a critical theory, in light of the work of two feminist IR scholars, Christine Sylvester and Cynthia Enloe.[5] As we shall show, both Sylvester and Enloe take as one of their main tasks the demonstration of the link between the practices that oppress women and the ideologies, theories and metatheories that support those practices. In other words, they engage in a ground-clearing exercise which exposes taken-for-granted truths to be socially constructed, historically contingent, gendered and, therefore, oppressive. Second, rather than attempting to realise theory in practice, they both seek to draw from feminist struggles in an effort to see how theory can

simultaneously speak from praxis as well as critically guide it. Finally, to differing extents, they both seek to outline an alternative vision of self-liberating politics.

The Unity of Feminist Metatheory and Praxis: Sylvester's Empathetic Cooperation

While Christine Sylvester's attention has been largely focused on the metatheoretical debates in IR theory, her work still engages with the three central moments of critical theory. Starting with the first moment, Sylvester engages in a broad-ranging critique of the tradition of western political theory and the 'great debates' in IR theory (Sylvester 1988, 1992, 1994a and 1994b). Demonstrating how these gendered discourses reflect characteristically male ways of knowing and being, she explores how they construe and eclipse women as knowers and as actors, leaving women 'homeless in the canons of IR knowledge' (Sylvester 1994a: 316).

In a self-reflexive move, Sylvester also takes issue with the two dominant approaches in feminist social theory: feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism. At the heart of the debate between these two perspectives is a disagreement over the nature of the female subject in feminist theory.[6] On the one hand, she agrees with standpoint feminism that there is a need to preserve the notion of women as real historical subjects who act in the world, experience marginalisation in a number of ways and produce particular types of knowledge which, in turn, can be drawn upon in the construction of more emancipatory social relations. On the other hand, Sylvester problematises the essentialising tendencies of standpoint perspectives by asserting the postmodern claim that as 'women' we are socially constructed beings with no fixed identity. The challenge for feminists then, according to Sylvester, is to 'snuggle into the tensions at the fulcrums of feminist representations of "women"' and to embrace both '*the situated and shifting* frames of knowledge that filter across the eyes of disenfranchised groups' (Sylvester 1994a: 317, our emphasis). Using Kathy Ferguson's concept of 'mobile subjectivities', Sylvester argues that our identities:

> ... are temporal, moving across and along axes of power (which are themselves in motion) without fully residing in them. They are relational, produced through shifting yet enduring encounters and connections, never fully captured by them. They are ambiguous: messy and multiple, unstable but perservering .... (Ferguson, quoted in Sylvester 1994a: 326)

Thus, for Sylvester, women must be understood both as real historical subjects who experience domination as gendered beings and as 'imagined subjects' who are constructed by dominant patterns of knowledge and power which impose on them particular ideas of what it means to be a woman and 'foreclose a vast array of alternative identities' (Sylvester 1994a: 323). The task at hand, then, according to Butler, is to negotiate 'the apparent need to formulate a politics which assumes the category of 'women' with the demand, often politically articulated, to problematise the category, interrogate its incoherence, its

internal dissonance, its constitutive exclusions' (Butler, quoted in Sylvester 1994a: 322).

Thus, it is important to understand that Sylvester's focus on this seemingly abstract debate about epistemology is grounded in an interest to respond to a longstanding tension within the feminist movement, that is, how does one build solidarity among women, when efforts at feminist praxis have highlighted the difficulties of organising and uniting women with very different experiences and identities. It is in response to this challenge that Sylvester addresses the second moment of critical theory and offers us what she calls a method of 'empathetic cooperation'.

As a practice, empathetic cooperation involves 'the ability and willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully in a subjectivity-moving way. It is to take on board the struggles of others by listening to what they have to say in a conversational style that does not push, direct or break through to "a linear progression which gives the comforting illusion that one knows where one goes"' (Sylvester, quoting Minh-ha, 1994a: 326). It is to negotiate respectfully with difference allowing for identity slippages. As a research gaze, it provides a lens to navigate through contending versions of IR in order to locate and illuminate empirical instances of this form of cooperation. Sylvester documents empathetically cooperative practices in the actions of feminist peace campaigners at Greenham Common and in negotiations between EC officials funding women's producer cooperatives in Zimbabwe. With respect to the latter case, Sylvester documents how all the different actors involved in the cooperatives – the EC micro-projects officials, the Greek women who helped to establish the cooperatives and the Zimbabwean women who run them – allow for slippages in their identities in order to achieve their different, sometimes seemingly incommensurable goals (Sylvester 1994b: 197-207). Thus, empathetic cooperation is at once a way of engaging in politics, a conceptual tool which helps to locate this form of praxis, and a metatheoretical resolution to the political dilemmas of the feminist movement.[7]

Finally, as part of the third moment, the method of empathetic cooperation calls on all of us, both as theorists and practitioners, to enact our ability to be self-reflexive and to allow our identities to be decentred in order to make room for 'the other'. According to Sylvester, it enables us to recognise and realise the normative goal of respectful negotiation 'that heightens awareness of difference and enables us to appreciate that theory [and practice] can be a range of cooperatively decided and contending positions'(Sylvester 1994a: 327). Thus, Sylvester manages to develop a method that points to the possibility of self-liberating practice, which allows for both solidarity and difference.

On a more critical note, we have seen in Sylvester's work a reflective and insightful negotiation of the question of feminist epistemology and female subjectivity. While important to the development of self-liberating praxis this is not enough. In order to critically guide feminist praxis, feminist theory in IR must incorporate, into a single framework, *both* the metatheoretical insights, developed largely through the post-positivist turn in critical/feminist theory,

and analyses of more structural and material dimensions of power. It is in this connection, that Sylvester's work is at its weakest. While granting considerable attention to understanding the contingent and fluid nature of agency, she overlooks the way in which power relations can obstruct any efforts at empathetic cooperation and leaves us with the impression that, as agents, we act in a void. It is when we turn to the work of Enloe that some of these structural forces come into view.

Theory from the Bottom Up: Enloe and the Politics of Everyday Life

Whether she is starting with the Filipina maid in Gulf War Kuwait, the Russian mother challenging the state's right to conscript her son, the Banana plantation worker in Honduras, the Zapatista rebel in Chiapas or the American woman soldier challenging the masculinized regime, Enloe's focus is on women and men in their daily lives and everyday struggles. From this vantage point, Enloe constructs a critical theory that illuminates the dense webs of intersecting power relations that together make up world politics.

The deconstructive moment in Enloe's work centers on the interconnected discourses and practices of both international and domestic politics. Her range of interests cover the Cold War, the Gulf War, Banana plantation politics, the politics of nationalist movements and governments, the American military, and more. In each case her critique proceeds from the perspectives of the many women (and men) implicated by these structures of power. Enloe's analysis of the Gulf War, for example, does not begin with George Bush, Saddam Hussein, oil politics, or the balance of power, although all of these are eventually brought into her analysis. Rather she starts with Saudi women challenging the restrictions on their right to move freely in their country, Kuwaiti women trying to hold their elites accountable to their promises, American women soldiers mobilized for the war or a Filipina maid in Kuwait City. She explains her preference for beginning at the margins when she says,

> I had been taught by feminists over the last twenty years to be wary of presuming that political actors with the most power – and the most media coverage – were the most useful starting points for figuring out exactly how politics work. I might get back to George Bush, Francois Mitterand, King Fahd, and Saddam Hussein eventually. But coming to their ideological outlooks and uses of state power by way of particular groups of women, and the relationships of those women with other women, would prove more fruitful than taking the masculinist shortcut. That was the path paved with presumptions that powerful men would reveal the most about why a crisis had developed and why it was following a particular course (Enloe 1993: 162).

By looking through the Filipina maid's eyes at the Gulf War, a number of power dynamics come into view. This includes the impact of the oil boom on the family economy within Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the strategies of state elites in countries such as Sri Lanka and the Phillipines who chose to ignore the plight of their female nationals working abroad, in an effort not to offend Gulf states on whose oil they depend (Enloe 1993:167). What is also brought

into the field of vision is the class and ethnic politics at work when Iraqi soliders act out their masculinist privilege in choosing to rape a Filipina maid over a Kuwaiti woman. The discourses and practices of the Gulf War, then, from this vantage point cannot be understood solely in terms of balance of power politics. According to Enloe,

> [T]o make sense, then, of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we have to talk about soldier's ideas of manliness, middle class women's presumptions about housework, and the IMF's strategies for handling international debt. *Debt, laundry, rape and conquest are only understandable in relation to each other* (Enloe 1993:168).

Thus, Enloe's starting point brings into focus a spectrum of relations of domination that help to sustain a range of social and political hierarchies as well as a militarized, statist politics.

If Enloe's earlier writings focused on empirical and conceptual analysis, her recent work has more consciously and explicitly attempted to draw out the theoretical implications for IR. She begins by pointing out to her IR colleagues that her analysis of the everyday lives of people at the margins provides evidence of 'the amounts and varieties of power it takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships between states' (Enloe 1996:186). To begin with states, for Enloe, 'presumes *a priori* that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so naturally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer' (Enloe 1996: 188). One consequence that flows from this is the oversimplification and reification of world politics in general and power in particular: 'international politics looks 'like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollack' (Enloe 1996: 188-89). Thus, in the first moment of critical theorising, Enloe challenges international relations theorists to dare to look beyond the statesman and the state to those marginal locations where power is producing its effects; by looking there, she tells us, one can learn something about the the operations of power at the centre.

Turning now to Leonard's second moment, Enloe clearly grounds her theorisation of power in the struggles and activities of everyday life. One example is her analysis of the Zapatista uprising against the Mexican state in 1994. Here she provides a reading of the power dynamics and social relations of rural Indian Mexico and the ways in which the rebels developed analyses of the connections between the policies of the neo-liberal Mexican state, the emerging inter-state relationships embodied in NAFTA and their own poverty-stricken lives (Enloe 1996: 195). Thus, in stark contrast to Linklater, Enloe's focus on praxis allows her to provide us with a very different view of power:

> Hierarchies are multiple, because forms of political power are diverse. But the several hierarchies do not sit on the social landscape like tuna, egg and cheese sandwiches sitting on an icy cafeteria counter, diversely multiple but unconnected. They relate to each other, sometimes in ways that subvert one another, sometimes in ways that provide each other with their respective resiliency (Enloe 1996: 193).

From the perspective of those marginalised one can see more clearly the way in which power relations *intersect and mutually constitute each other*; those

seeking to resist power structures often make connections that are hard to see from the centre. Thus, Enloe's approach to power helps us to understand, in a relational way, how power at the centre is related to and in many ways dependent on domination at the margins.

While an understanding of power is necessary to locate the possibilites for social change, this, on its own, is not sufficient. One also needs an understanding of how these power structures can be resisted and transformed; it requires at least a conceptualization, if not a theorisation, of the tensions granted within social structures and the ways in which praxis may transform these structures. Although Enloe's stated intent is to understand the possibilities for social change – and occasionally she does give us examples of successful praxis – she dedicates most of her attention to locating and analysing praxis, rather than conceptualising *the relationship between* praxis and social change.

Turning to the third moment of critical theorising, Enloe refuses to develop a grand vision of social change. Instead, she suggests that any emancipatory project must build upon the aspirations of those in the margins; they must be visions from the bottom up. This in turn means that they must be socio-historically located, multiple and subject to change: a more accountable military in the Soviet Union, a less masculinized military in the US, a more equal distribution of resources in Chiapas along class, cultural and gender lines, a less masculinist nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, a recognition of the contribution of women to the Banana Plantation economy in Honduras, and so on. Thus, for Enloe, the normative project is given voice through the interpretation of the struggles and aspirations of those seeking to change their lives.

In sum, Enloe's work, probably more than any other in international relations, fulfills the central requirements of critical theory. Her work speaks directly to her addressees in their many and diverse locations. It is a type of critical theorizing that does not allow for levels of analysis or disciplinary divisions, and does not work around any clean separations or lines. Centres are understood in relation to margins and margins are understood in relation to centres. While, it is messy and hard to get a handle on in parts, so is the world. This is not to say that there are no problems in her approach. By not taking the easy route of reducing international politics to any one dynamic, and by grounding her analysis in the experience and praxis of those most marginalised, Enloe faces a far more daunting task than her realist or Marxist colleagues. At times her work can tend toward the anecdotal and seems too descriptive; her lack of theoretical analysis of her addressees' critical projects, and the connections between them, prevents her from conceptualising the possibilities for broader projects of social change. It clearly needs more of an explicit theoretical focus if it is to speak to critical international relationists. But then again, they are not her preferred addressees.

Conclusion

This paper began with a question about the relationship between feminist theory and critical international theory. Despite their ostensibly common concerns with relations of domination and emancipation, these two approaches have had very little to say to each other. We have argued that the reason for this silence has been due, at least in part, to their different approaches to the question of praxis; while critical international theory has developed along lines which have served to marginalise praxis, feminist theory has centralized it both as one of the main sources of its metatheoretical and theoretical reflections and as a form of politics to which it is committed. As such, we have argued in this paper that feminist theory in IR is the most developed form of critical theory in the discipline.

If critical international theorists are indeed committed to enabling self-liberating praxis, what can they learn from their feminist colleagues? It is important to be clear that we are obviously not arguing that feminist theory is the only 'true' version of critical theory; there are other addressees whose historical situation requires theoretical attention and critical support. We are arguing, however, that feminist theory teaches us at least three crucial lessons in terms of formulating a genuine critical theory.

First, any critical theory that tries to formulate a perspective from the vantage point of a *universal addressee* needs to seriously reflect on the feasibility of speaking meaningfully to the needs and experiences of all people. While orthodox Marxists may still hold onto the notion of the proletariat as the universal class, most critical thinkers now have questioned the possibility of deriving a generalizable interest from the needs and interests of a particular group. As feminists have shown, power relations operate in a variety of ways that cut across class, racial, ethnic, and political lines. Any critical theory concerned with not reproducing new forms of oppression must be sensitive to different forms of exclusion and domination, and particularly how they are mutually constitutive. The challenge then for critical theorists, and particularly for those in international relations, is to articulate a theoretical approach which recognises the importance of solidarity while at the same time acknowledges the multiple, fluid and contingent nature of our identities.

In this connection, a further point needs to be made. One problem that is clear in the work of both Linklater and Cox is that neither scholar explicitly addresses the question of identity and the conditions under which it becomes politicised. As arguably one of the fundamental requirements for theorising praxis, it is telling that, in the context of IR, it is the work of a feminist theorist which stands out as the most sustained effort to tackle this question and its importance for alternative forms of politics.

Second and related to the previous point, feminist theorising has brought to light the difficulties of *macro-theoretical* approaches. Any attempt to understand the world as a social totality runs the risk of reducing the world to one structural principle or dynamic and thereby universalising people's experiences. There is a difference between noting the mutually reinforcing nature of

structural forms of oppression and seeking to prove that all these forms derive from one single power source. As feminists have told us, any theory that does not consider the impact of gender as a form of power in and of itself cannot possibly understand one of the central features and sources of domination in contemporary societies.

Third, as Leonard has argued, any theory explicitly trying to realise a normative goal must take into account the wishes and objectives of the struggles that they support. Feminists have also argued that abstract ethical debates have a limited source of imagination to articulate a conception of the good that is both meaningful to particular constituencies and practically realisable. Indeed, as feminists have learned it is only in the context of negotiating the practical and strategic questions faced by movements that one can begin to fully grasp the philosophical and ethical dilemmas posed by these questions. For them, the universal/particular dichotomy is not a philosophical quandary, as it is for Linklater, but rather a strategic, political and normative question which can be resolved only in relation to praxis.

International Relations has always reified structural forces, abstacting them from the power dynamics animating all aspects of social life. Critical international theory, if it is to succeed in its central goal of fostering emancipatory praxis, must turn away from IR's disciplinary starting points and seek out new points of departure. It has been argued in this paper that feminist theory can steer the way, not because world politics is reducible to gender, but because feminist theory has demonstrated the necessity and possibility of uniting metatheory, theory and praxis.

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Notes

1. The articulation of an alternative vision then is not solely a philosophical or ethical project, but rather one grounded in the aspirations and perspectives of those marginalised groups addressed by the theory.

2. Exceptions to this neglect of praxis are Fred Halliday (1996), Jurgen Haacke (1996), and Christian Heine and Benno Teschke (1996).

3. Although Linklater talks about the recognition of special group rights in general terms, it is clear throughout his discussion that he is talking about cultural groups.

4. This is not to say that women have not successfully used political authority at the regional or international level. In the EU for example, they have successfully used European laws to challenge the practices and laws of their own states. However, this was the result of contingent factors rather than a necessary outcome of regionalised institutional politics. The fact that the women's movement in Norway were a large part of the coalition against joining the EU because they felt that EU standards would have the effect of eroding the political and socio-economic rights they have gained as women in the Norwegian state, we would argue, bears this point out.

5. Our contention is not that all feminist theory is critical theory but rather that, because it has grown out of a political movement, there is an imperative to ground even metatheoretical and ethical debates in practical problems. To what extent some feminist theories are grounded enough to be useful to their addressee is an open question.

6. For a helpful review of this aspect of Sylvester's work and a comparison to Cynthia Enloe's approach to the female subject, see Marysia Zalewski (1994).

7. Of course, this resolution applies to similar types of dilemmas experienced in the praxis of other movements.

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Émigré Perspectives on Feminisms in Europe – East and West

Alena Heitlinger

Feminist political and academic discourses have become increasingly internationalized, but the power and influence of different national feminisms are far from equal. The transnational dialogue tends to take place in spaces created by Western wealth and influence. Western feminists can take advantage of their countries more developed media, publishing and distribution capacities, and greater resources for education, travel, conferences, public advocacy, etc. (Heitlinger and Manicom 1996).

Since 1989, a variety of approaches to the situation of women in East Cental Europe has been generated, both in East Central Europe and in the West. Nora Jung (1994a, 1994b), has found important differences in perspectives among East European scholars who were born, raised and remained in Eastern Europe, émigrés who left their countries and now live in the West, and Western scholars lacking first-hand knowledge of local languages and culture. Western feminist scholars have tended to rely on secondary sources and on interviews with the same 'key informants', thus repeating the knowledge produced by previous authors. Moreover, the dominance of English in international feminist exhange allows local speakers with proficiency in English greater access to Western researchers and audiences. Thus perspectives of East European scholars and activists who speak English, who are familiar with Western feminist politics and academic discourses, and who have contacts with Western feminists, tend to be privileged. Knowledge couched in (inappropriate-yet-familiar) Western feminist terms not only distorts the complex postcommunist reality, but also perpetuates the hegemony of Western feminist discourses.

Émigré feminists speak the local language. This is an important asset with which they can access indigenous documents, journals and public debates, and interview other than English-speaking informants without the need for an interpreter. However, émigrés can also experience unique problems in conducting cross-national research, since their exile location may determine the type of data they can gain access to. Local hostility to émigrés can also hinder research. Thus, an émigré status can create both special opportunities and special problems in transnational feminist research.

The main objectives of this paper are to (1) explore the role of émigré feminists in the cross-cultural translation and mediation of East-West feminist perspectives, and (2) use the contours of my personal and intellectual biography

as a Czech-born, British-trained, Canadian feminist scholar, to trace the ways in which I have reinterpreted my experiences and understanding of gender relations in my 'home' and 'adopted' countries. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of issues of 'representation' and 'voice-appropriation', and of the impact of different geographic and political locations on knowledge claims.

Émigré/exiled/expatriate/diasporic feminists are a diverse category. For the purposes of this paper, the common denominator are the migrants' ongoing attachments to feminism, the adopted country, and the country of origin, however ambivalent these attachments might be. Émigré feminists therefore draw on at least four distinct traditions: (1) the history and culture of their country of origin, (2) the history and culture of their adopted country (or countries), (3) the history and politics of local, regional and international feminist movements, and (4) the exilic/diasporic experience of migration, displacement, and ethnic minority status. Émigré feminists in many ways embody the notions of 'world-travelling', 'nomadic', 'migratory', 'hybrid', 'multiple' or 'resident alien' subjects, elaborated by feminist and post-modernist theorists such as Mani (1990), Braidotti (1994), Sylvester (1995) or Wolf (1995).

The birth and evolution of a Czech émigré feminist

I was born in 1950 in Prague, Czechoslovakia, where I lived until 1968. When the Warsaw-pact armies invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, I was vacationing in England. Fearing the resurgence of antisemitism, my parents urged me not to come back. I agreed, and my life was changed forever. I stayed in the U.K., becoming a full-fledged exile. I suddenly lost my Czech roots, language and culture, and I did not know when I would be able to return.

At the same time, however, the conditions of my exile could not have been more favourable. I was very young and ready for new adventures, British public opinion was quite sympathetic to the plight of Czechoslovak refugees, the government gave all Czechoslovak refugees open work permits, and eligible students were able to enrol in post-secondary educational institutions already in October 1968, less than two months after our exile began.

The years of my undergraduate and postgraduate studies coincided with the emergence of the Women's Liberation Movement (WLM), with whose goals, political style and membership I quickly identified. I was particularly attracted to feminism by the discovery that I did not have to use make-up, that my mother's 'double burden' was not inevitable, and that it was possible for both parents to accept responsibility for domestic labour and childcare.

Given the oppresive political context of post-1968 communist Czechoslovakia, my role as an émigré feminist was of necessity limited to one-way flow of information *from* Czechoslovakia and the USSR *to* the U.K. and other Western countries. During the course of researching and writing my Ph.D. dissertation and my first book, *Women and State Socialism*, I gave little thought to any potential benefit the book might have for Czech and Slovak women. The book

is written in English (as are all my publications), and its major intellectual and political concern was the assessment of the relevance of the state socialist experience for Western feminist theories and practice.

When I moved to Canada in 1975 to take up a full-time teaching job at Trent University, my second emigration did not involve a major displacement, since this time around there was no loss of language, and only a minimal loss of roots and culture. In the early 1980s, I embarked on a new Czechoslovakian study, focusing on the social and individual management of reproduction. Published in 1987, my second book, *Reproduction, Medicine and the Socialist State*, was once again inspired by Western feminist concerns and by my on-going association with Czechoslovakia. At that time I was very interested in the growing Western feminist literature on the medical management of childbirth and I decided to extend the Western-based research to Czechoslovakia. Immersion in Czech and Slovak data soon convinced me that the topic of medical management of childbirth is too limited and that it would be more fruitful to broaden my focus to the whole reproductive sequence, from coitus to post-partum.

As time went on, I felt more and more at home in Canada. I also found my visits to Czechoslovakia more and more depressing, both because of the political situation there and because I increasingly felt that I had nothing new to say about the situation of women in East Central Europe. I thus began to explore research options that would include Canada and also Britain. In order to meet the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada requirement that research grant applicants had to demonstrate links with previous research, I eventually came up with the idea of applying my research on socialist women's equality and pronatalism to the very different social, economic and political contexts of Canada, Britain, and Australia. The results of this research were published in Heitlinger (1993).

The timing of the geographic and political shift in my research focus was highly ironic. As I watched the unfolding of the Velvet Revolution on my TV screen in Canada, I was about to start writing a book which had nothing to do with East Central Europe! In the spring and summer of 1990, many of my acquaintances visited Prague, but I went to Australia! I did not visit postcommunist Prague until May 1991, although I have gone regularly every year since. While annual or even bi-annual research visits were quite sufficient during the communist period – things changed rather slowly then – this mode of operation is clearly unsuitable for the current situation of rapid social change. I have found my location in North America, and the fact that I do not want to leave my family for more than a month at a time, a real disadvantage. The only way I can now conduct meaningful Czech-based research is in collaboration with locally-based researchers.

Having spent most of my professional career in efforts to explain variety of women's issues in East Central Europe to Western feminist scholars and activists, I was hoping that, with the fall of communism, I would finally be able to transmit something back *from* Canada and the U.K. *to* my country of origin. As a Czech-speaking feminist émigré scholar, I was looking forward to ex-

plaining to interested Czech women (and men) the scope and concerns of various Western feminisms. However, my personal experience as a young Czech émigré in the U.K., who in the early 1970s eagerly identified with the goals and political style of WLM, turned out to be a poor guide to the understanding of Czech women's reaction to Western feminism. I soon found out that, like many other long-time émigrés, I am now more Canadian than Czech. My knowledge of local culture has aged, since my memories, life-style, political concerns, and cultural and ethical values are very different from those of most Czech women and men.

My attempts to comprehend the negative Czech reaction to Western feminism eventually led me to the analytic notions of 'framing', 'frame resonance' and 'frame alignment'. I found that Western and Czech women are approaching a shared problem (of women's inequality) with frames based on very different life experiences, socio-economic contexts and ideologies. The world view of Czech women is informed by the social legacy of communism, and as such it currently lies outside the descriptive and theoretical frameworks of Anglo-American feminism (Heitlinger 1996). As an émigré feminist, I also had to confront the issues of 'voice-appropriation' and 'representation'.

I first encountered these issues in August 1978 at the Ninth World Congress of Sociology in Uppsala, Sweden, where I presented a paper entitled "The Women's Movement in State-Socialist Czechoslovakia". During the question period, the male head of the Czechoslovak delegation suggested that only Czechoslovak-based (and communist party-state sanctioned) sociologists could legitimately speak at international congresses about the lives of Czechoslovak women. He stated the following: "We have heard some strange things about Czechoslovakia, *a country we know, because we live there.*" The Czech sociologist then invited the audience (consisting mainly of Western feminist scholars) to visit Czechoslovakia to see for themselves "our beautiful girls". Not comprehending why he was booed and hissed for this remark, and assuming that the audience did not believe him, the Czech gentleman then made a complete fool of himself by repeating that "Czechoslovak girls are truly beautiful", without addressing any of the issues raised in my paper. More than a decade later, the events of 1989 finally ended the communist insistence that only 'home grown', party-sanctioned researchers could produce legitimate accounts about the lives of women in the region.

Regional and national feminisms are constrained and regulated by international mechanisms. For example, U.N. documents on the advancement of status of women disallow all issues which do not fit their criteria, and in this way dictate the kinds of categories which local women's movements and government policies must measure themselves by (Heitlinger and Manicom 1996). However, international standard-setting activities should be also seen in a positive light. International instruments could be helpful in creating alternative political spaces for local feminists, and in legitimating certain types of public protests, advocacy and lobbying. By using the U.N. instruments as standards by which to evaluate governmental actions and policies, women's

groups are engaging in legitimate democratic activity to hold their national government accountable.

Equally powerful in the regulation of national feminisms are the conditions imposed by funding agencies. The practices of funding agencies can be also seen in both a positive and a negative light. On the one hand, they might impose some inappropriate criteria and agendas, but on the other, they might create valuable alternative political spaces which otherwise would not exist. Thus the Prague Gender Studies Centre owes its existence not only to its founder, Jiřina Šiklová, but also to the financial assistance from the U.S.-based Network of East-West Women and the German feminist foundation Frauen-Anstiftung.

Conclusion

Émigré perspectives on, and participation in, local and global feminist movements are phenomena which have so far received little attention in scholarly analyses. My critical biographical self-reflection suggests that the role of émigré feminists in the transnational flow of feminist discourses and practices requires further substantive investigation and analysis.

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Victimisation or Democratisation?

Czech Women's Organising Potential in a Globalising Political Economy

Jacqueline True

> My women friends among the dissidents undoubtedly know a great deal about the sad position of women in our country. Despite this, they found even the vague suggestion of feminism in the fact that the [peace] declaration in question was to be strictly a women's affair intrinsically objectionable. I do not wish to ridicule feminism. I know little about it and am prepared to believe that it is far from being the invention of a few hysterical women, bored housewives or cast-off mistresses. Still, I have to note that in our country, even though the position of women is incomparably worse than in the West, feminism seems simply "dada".
> – Vaclav Havel, Anatomy of a Reticence, 1985[1]

Since the revolutions that precipitated the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/1990, western liberal and socialist feminists[2] have sought to investigate the plight of women in subsequent post-communist "transitions" to democracy and market economies. The dominant thrust of western feminist scholarship has been to document how the majority of Central and Eastern European women have been disadvantaged and deleteriously affected by post-communist transformations due to the rescinding of former socialist rights to employment, childcare, political representation, public services and social assistance (Mies and Shiva 1993; Einhorn 1993; Watson 1993). Contrary to this widespread view, in this essay I argue that at least in the case of the Czech Republic, women are by no means "victims" of the transition. Rather, the past six years of political-economic restructuring have evidenced greater socio-economic class differentiation, that has brought both opportunities and contradictions for Czech and other central and eastern European women, and as a result they have begun to develop new political strategies – for survival and community.

Frequently also, western feminists have interpreted the *anti-political* conviction[3] of central and eastern European women's organising, their avoidance of parliamentary politics, and formation of professional, humanitarian, ecological, motherhood, and traditional women's associations, as conservative, conformist, victimised, or anti-feminist (Šiklová 1991; Vodrázka 1994).[4] They explain this apparent conservatism in terms of women's reaction against communist emancipation projects that forcibly integrated them on a massive, unprecedented scale, into the post-war industrial labour-force, and created a dual burden of waged labour and unwaged household work in their daily lives . However, now that communist regimes have fallen and new democratic gov-

ernments are in place, western feminists attribute a certain "false consciousness"[5] to post-communist women; what they perceive as their passivity under transformed political and economic conditions. Here I propose an alternative interpretation. I argue that Czech women's ideas and activities are not simply ideologically anti-communist and as a result blind to women's "real interests", (i.e. material and psychological well-being), but that we can also understand them as forms of resistance to the destabilising and often impoverishing effects of post-communist reforms. In this way, Czech women's rejection of existing politics may potentially be a form of democratisation from below and expression of local dissent in the face of the global spread of neo-liberalism: that is, the subordinate integration of East-Central Europe into the global political economy, the formation of a new Czech neo-liberal state, and the dominance of neo-liberal ideas in political parties and other "political" fora, that has characterised six years of post-communist transition in the former Czechoslovakia and more recently the Czech Republic. Seen from this perspective, western feminist empirical work and theorising about "Eastern Europe" is conditioned by universalist assumptions and categories, which may lead to the analytic exclusion of the full range of democratic potentials that might counter neo-liberal reform and forge foundations for transnational feminist co-operation against its globalisation.

This essay is a critique of notions of democratisation and the discourses of post-communist transition associated with them, as well as a critique of certain developments within western feminism that have contributed to a theorisation of transformation in the former East bloc. I challenge popular feminist analysis of Central and Eastern European women and anti-feminism because I believe it is vital to acknowledge "the different forms that feminisms take and the different practices that can be seen as feminist movements" (Grewal and Kaplan 1994: 20). At the same time, to speak and act effectively, I realise that we must arrive at some common understanding of the term *feminism*. Yet, that understanding, as Karen Offen (1988: 119) heeds, "cannot be derived exclusively from our own culture, it must be not only historically sound but comparatively grounded" and I would add, receptive to differences among women. In the analysis that follows, I attempt to summarise and engage with some of the assumptions and errors of recent western feminist analysis, and with what I consider some of the crucial points relating to the conservative politics of Czech women and the anti-feminism that has been attributed to Czech culture, while situating these in a broader context of post-communist transformation and a globalising political economy.

Methodology

With the goal of advancing the above theoretical and practical agenda, this paper is part of a larger project to develop a critical feminist analytical framework and normative perspective. Indeed this paper gives substance to three dimensions of transnational feminism. First, it assumes a much more compre-

hensive and differentiated concept of globalisation than is usually understood by the economic rhetoric of *globalisation*. The notion of globalisation implied here goes beyond transnational historical materialist theorisations that incorporate the ideological and socio-political globalising forces, but do not analyse the gendered discursive and reproductive context of the spread of markets, commodities, desires, signs, democratic, feminist and other ideas, and the revolution of knowledge and information that are transforming our social, political and economic relations. This feminist formulation contributes to transnational historical materialist analysis, especially insofar as it illuminates the differentiating processes of globalisation, particularly the globalisation of neo-liberalism. This relates to the second dimension of feminist transnational historical materialism, that globalisation constitutes and indeed depends upon different genders and state forms, and thus that resistance and alternatives to neo-liberalism must be differentiated. In short there will be different kinds of counter-movements to neo-liberalism depending upon the space and location.

Thirdly, feminist transnational historical materialism reveals how neo-liberalism as a social mode of reproduction is simultaneously gender-neutral and gender-differentiating, and therefore contradictory. On the face of it, neo-liberalism represents and interpellates the generic individual as an abstract commodity to be empowered through the mechanism of possessive individualism across time and space. This gender-neutrality has the effect of incorporating some elite women into the ideals and practices of neo-liberalism, further differentiating women along class lines and making their solidarity more difficult. In practice, however, neo-liberalism also undermines its own social bases of reproduction and relies on ideologies and state institutions that effectively re-gender the marketplace and family (and other sites of reproduction) insofar as they are kept separate. Some women may suffer the gender-differentiating outcomes of neo-liberal policies that rescind public provision for non-market social reproduction. Consequently, these women, and men similarly situated, are likely to turn against neo-liberalism as they are forced to pick up the slack of the state, while being further alienated from increasingly technocratic forms of politics and political representiaton. Thus, the potential for new local and transnational democratic social movements is central to the theory and practice of feminist transnational historical materialism. I turn now to the processes of transformation in East-Central Europe and the potentials for Czech women's organising in this context.

Czech women and democratisation

The Czech lands have a rich and recent history of transnational solidarity and networking with the experience of communist-dissidents and their human rights *Charter 77* movement. Transnational citizen co-operation has thrived on the post-communist opening of Central and Eastern European societies and markets, as have foreign investors. Here, of course, the measure and currency exchanged is not the material culture of money, but the relatively free-circu-

lating, "self-regulating", political culture of ideas, language, and movement. East-West feminist co-operation is a constituent element of this post-communist restructuring. Indeed the networking and co-operation between women and women's movements worldwide, which I call *transnational feminism*, is a constitutive dimension of globalisation. Transnational feminism moreover, conceptualises interaction at the level of theoretical ideas and political strategies between different forms of feminism (Grewal and Kaplan 1994; True 1997).

There has been much contestation among Czech women scholars and activists, in the national and international media, and within East-West feminist dialogues, about the meaning and value of feminism in the Czech-lands (Gzowski 1993, Ascoly 1994; Wheatly 1992; Funk and Mueller 1993; Šmejkalová-Strickland 1993, 1995; Šiklová 1991, 1994, 1995). In Eastern Europe, Ann Snitow (1994) declares, feminism has been called a bourgeois luxury, drab totalitarianism and *everything else in between*. I have questioned elsewhere why feminism is received as cultural imperialism from outside, when in contrast, foreign investment, business practices, constitutional models, and tourist onslaught are, more often than not, celebrated (True 1995). Clarification and bridge-building is clearly needed from both East and West perspectives (Heitlinger 1996), and I attempt to do this by exploring a number of western assumptions about Czech women and (anti) feminism in Central and Eastern Europe.

The politics of the market

Feminist empirical work published in the west on the situation of women in the former East bloc, has tended to focus on the extremely deleterious effects of post-communist reforms on women in some of the worst case scenarios and countries (e.g. Russia, the former East Germany), and to generalise these to all women in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In doing so, western feminists have created the category of the victimised "Eastern European woman", not unlike the "Third World woman" that Chandra Mohanty (1991) has located and criticised in western feminist scholarship (see also Jung 1994). It is not that the impoverishment, suffering, and insecurity, which this feminist empiricist work documents is inaccurate (that it does not *exist*), but rather that it conveys and reinforces the popular impression that post-communist social and economic transformation is an entirely coherent, elite-driven, homogenising and determinant process that will necessarily disadvantage women over men.[6] In my view, the gendered processes of neo-liberal restructuring and post-communist political and economic reform generally are contradictory, in the way they include and exclude different social forces, and are contested by these same social forces.

In the Czech Republic the economic situation is particularly contradictory and under transition, such that conclusions about women's defeat in the transition seem at best premature, and at worst, self-fulfilling. Due to the socialist

state's promotion of women's higher education and economic activity, Jaroslava Šťastná (1995) contends that Czech women are less the victims than the beneficiaries of new opportunities in the market economy. In contrast to the experience of most western and former socialist states, privatisation of industry and employment in Czech Republic has actually closed the wage-gap between men and women by ten percent: women's average wages are currently 78% of men's (Cermakova 1996). Women workers constitute forty percent of private sector employment, located primarily in the growing tertiary sector of tourism, financial, administrative services in an increasingly knowledge-based economy. At the same time, in part attributable to the historical legacy of communism, women place great importance on their family roles and are held primarily responsible for family life in Czech society. Thus women entrepreneurs, who made up approximately seven-percent of the labour-force in 1994[7], may be evidence less for the gender-neutrality of the market, than of women seeking to use the market structure to accommodate their duals roles as mothers and professional workers. This is obviously not evidence that entrepreneurship alters women's structural position within the labour market or within Czech post-communist society generally however. The same could be said for the opportunitites that the market offers for flexible part-time and homework and combining family and career, informal and formal work. Julia Szalai (1995) argues that these home-based female strategies of adaption and the family-bound forms of women's self-protection in Hungary are especially important in the transition period and one of the reasons why women are distinterested in feminist or other women's organisations.

Valentine Mogdaham's (1992) work on post-communist macro-economic transformations provides another instance of western feminist scholarship foreboding the plight of Eastern and Central European women in order to prove a general theory of women's global economic oppression. She predicts that the integration of former socialist economics into the global political economy will effectively reduce female employment, just as the global integration of third world economies has increased the employment of women workers, on the global assembly line (Moghadam 1992: 62-3). She argues that female labour always plays an essentially more important role in the transformation of employment structures. While this later statement may be true, without specific analysis over a period of time, it is not obvious what the role of female employment/unemployment will play in the restructuring of the Czech economy, and to what extent it will be "essentially more important".

The almost immediate adoption of a neo-liberal reform programme six months after the communist government fell in the former Czechoslovakia, created some unemployment, only half of which is accounted for in registered (3.6%) unemployment figures (Rutland 1993: 126). The other half is generally ascertained to be voluntary departures of women and eldery people from the paid labour force (Murray 1995). Moreover, between 50% and 60%, a disproportionate, but not overwhelming percentage of registered unemployed are women (Paukert 1993). Unions, however, have accepted redundancies in feminised sectors, symptomatic of gender-segregation in the socialist-derived

economy and the gender-bias in Czech society. According to Peter Rutland (Ibid:125), Czech union officials volunteered comments such as: "a lot of these girls were not really productive workers anyway".[9] Organised labour's adaptation to neo-liberal policies thus appears to be occuring along gender lines, in continuity with the masculine-bias of socialist economic policy. The only Export-Processing Zone established in post-communist Czech Republic for example, is the textile manufacturing industry on the Western Bohemian border with Germany: not surprisingly most of the workers there are women, often migrants (Murray 1995).

At the same time, the gendered use of woman as a sign or sexual symbol in advertising and marketing of new products and services, in the mass-media and information-exchange is a common and politically-charged device for extending commodification (Williamson 1987: 102-3; Indruchová 1995). This is a particularly powerful and widespread strategy in the emerging markets of post-communist East-Central Europe. Gender difference in the popular culture of capitalism reinforces Czech women's absence from public space and political power. Moreover, it undermines their expressions of agency and equality in entrepreneurial business activity and the importance of their voluntarism in non-governmental organisations and civic initiatives .

Still, the political and economic responses of Czech women do not suggest their capitulation to capitalism or patriarchy, rather, I would argue that their responses are contradictory. On both statisical accounts of labour force participation and accounts of personal preferences, Czech women value their competency in paid employment as well as their family roles. This view is in contrast to arguments such as Elzbieta Matynia's (1995) which state that in Czechoslovakia "one of the most puzzling trends ... post 1989, has been the expressed desire of women to withdraw from the world of work into the world of the household, domesticity, and the family." Further, disputing such arguments about women's retreat to the home, Czech society appears to approve both of self-regulating market principles and a strong state sector for social provision. Since 1989, changes in social policy have been contradictory too. Post-communist social policies have been designed in compromising ways to assist the market transition, but against the background of a neo-liberal philosophy that valorises "the private sphere" and a neo-liberal state that bases its legitimacy on ensuring access to markets and maximising the scope and autonomy of this private sector. Consistent with the state's constitutional gender-neutrality, legal maternity leave has been extended to men as well as women, to become "parental leave", and has been increased from three to four years – probably the longest parental leave in the world. However, exceedingly few fathers have yet to put this gender-neutral provison into practice, and it would seem to encourage women to "stay home". In contrast, to the apparent extension of social benefits, childcare and abortion facilities have been privatised and since 1991 have operated on an increasingly user-pays basis. There was little politicisation of this shift from state to market provision which primarily affects women (Cook 1993; Reuters 1993). Additionally, Václav Klaus's government has suggested that there will be a similar shift to user-pays university

education and health services in the future. For the time being however, housing subsidies and social security benefits for pensioners, single parents, unemployed persons have been reduced only slightly, although they are not at a level that keeps pace with today's market prices.

When western feminists state that Central and Eastern European women are returning to the family (and not therefore "to Europe") they make universalist judgements about the patriarchal nature of the state and the family across communist and post-communist state forms.[8] During communism, the private sphere was highly valorised as a place of freedom from state domination (Mische 1993). It was also a place embedded in deep-seated notions of gender difference which preserved traditional roles for men and women. The maintenance of conventional gender divisions of labour and power in Central and Eastern Europe, Barbara Einhorn (1993) suggests, has had much to do with the desire to keep the family as a de-politicised sphere, in a form of passive resistance to what was perceived as an ubiquitous state presence. At the same time the communist-era gendered discourses of the family and private life are a potent resource for Czech neo-liberals who want to rewrite the collectivist social contract (Klaus 1991). Post-communist states have capitalised on the way communist state forms constructed gender as a hierarchical social relation, whereby women worked a double day as "workers" for the state and as "women qua women" in family households. In the course of its restructuring, the Czech post-communist state has cut social expenditures and benefits and begun to privatise responsbility for the social safety-net. It has been able to rely upon the continuity of gendered notions of responsibility and social reproduction in transferring their burden to women. Such gendered structures of social responsibility ease the pace of change. They are, moreover, partly the dialectical result of women and men's resistance to the Communist project of emancipation.

Thus, the family is now part of the neo-liberal *totalising* economic zone and seen as a reflection of a market society (Cot: p. 301): the natural order of the market converges with the genetic order of nature in the neo-Darwinian household. However, this process of co-opting private households, and women in particular, to provide goods and services formerly the responsibility of the state sector is highly contentious in a society that strongly approves of collective redistribution and values the family for its relative distance from and limit to opportunism, individualism and commodity power. I suggest that given its history, rather than becoming an *invisible [female] hand* to the neo-liberal market, the family-household might just as well become a symbolic and material *site of resistance* to neo-liberalism and its impoverishing effects.

Neo-liberal restructuring therefore, provokes a "double movement" in post-communist gender relations (cf. Polanyi 1957). On the one hand, some women experience the break-up of traditional gender arrangements by way of market expansion and changed gender relations of production: They seek self-protection from patriarchy in the free market of labour. On the other hand, women experience disadvantage in selling their labour due to the historical, global devaluation of "women's work" and increasing struggle in daily life as they

attempt to balance necessary waged with unwaged domestic work. They seek protection from this unjust market in patriarchal relationships within particular state and family forms. The historical gender contradictions of capitalism are arguably heightened in this era of global restructuring and post-communist transformation. Contradictory articulations of gender-neutrality and gender-difference in emerging neo-liberal structures and post-communist symbolism achieve this function of legitimation.

The politics of the political

The second major assumption that western feminist scholarship has commonly made is that Central and Eastern European women are apolitical and passive, evidenced by their absence for the most part from national democratic institutions.[10] Czech sociologist Jaroslava Šťastná (1995) in part accepts this analysis when she suggests that women are passive in the political realm because they largely accept the representation of their citizen interests in the existing democratically-elected government and thus choose to retreat from representative roles themselves. She sees no contradiction between her characterisation of women's political passivity and her prior assertion of women's active entrepreneurship (above). Her view betrays a tacit endorsement of the neo-liberal separation of politics and economics and the discreteness of political and economic life. Alternatively, Julia Szalai (1995) argues that "party-politics is an arena for meeting men's needs in the transition, a channel to correct masculine patterns of occupational mobility. This situation in Hungary, she says, reinforces women's sceptical attitude towards party politics, which they do not perceive as the best place for developing alternative visions of society. I support Szalai's observation, but would add that women *are political,* albeit not in terms of their activity within formal political institutions such as political parties and national parliaments, and that these are in any case historically male-biased indicators of political expression and activity.

Currently, the dominance of neo-liberal ideas in Czech political parties and institutions appears to converge with their male domination. Structural and cultural barriers to gender-equality in political office are not the only issues at stake; leading women who are active in formal politics also generally have a distaste for the economism of the Prime minister Václav Klaus and his governing civic-democratic coalition (Hauser 1996; Vodrázka 1996).[11] Ironically, the neo-liberal assumption that women's material and social position will improve with increased participation in the market, is remarkably similar to state socialist prescriptions for women's emancipation. Post-communist citizens are highly critical of the economistic form of women's emancipation under communism, but will they be so critical of neo-liberal gender-equity and gender hierarchy? "Yesterday's Althusserians" Meaghan Morris (1992: 29) remarks, "can become today's econocrats". Like marxist solutions, neo-liberal answers do not comprehend the resistance that integrating women into market sphere "is likely to encounter in the household, in the actual marketplace, and in state

apparatuses" (Kabeer and Humphrey 1991: 98). Jaroslava Šťastná (1995), among others who celebrate the market economy, does not mention gender discrimination in recruitment, employment and remuneration practices, sexual harrassment in the workplace, unequal pay structures, the structural constraints on small business entrepreneurship, *inter alia,* that are beginning to be politicised by Czech women from below (McClune and Stojaspol 1996, Perlez, 1996).

Feminist perspectives illuminate the gender nature of neo-liberal politics. Neo-liberal philosophers Von Hayek (1989) and Milton Friedman (1962) propose not only *private property* as a minimal state-sponsored institution neccesary for the successful operation of the market, but also the *patriarchal family.* Free markets depend upon legitimate property regimes, founded on class exploitation, and legitimate family regimes and their non-instrumental social relationships, founded on gender exploitation. Gender identification with constructions of rational and autonomous masculinity and traditional femininity is promoted by neo-liberalism. Indeed, major structural change convergent with neo-liberalism may be mediated through shifting forms of masculine identification; from worker egalitarianism to entrepreneurial individualism (Morris 1992). Neo-liberal theory and practice appeals to men and women in gender-specific ways. It appeals to men whose identities have been historically tied-up with the economic sphere of production separated from the social sphere of household reproduction, private (family) life, and feminised domesticity. In contrast, neo-liberalism may appeal to women who can take advantage of institutionalised "gender-neutrality" and the material and cultural opportunities that the market offers for their liberation from public and private patriarchal structures. Further, neo-liberal discourses may mobilise men, whose masculine identities are undermined by the disintegration of class-based state forms and related changes in gender relations and the gendered organisation of everyday life. They may also mobilise women who have been marginalised by leftist or communist politics and have experienced gender-based exclusion within the class-formations of welfare and socialist states.

The global spread of neo-liberalism is therefore linked to class and gender-specific identities and interests. At the transnational level, the elites who represent the interest-convergence of transnational capital and state forms are predominantly male. Stephen Gill (1990: 8) refers to an international fraternity of elites, who belong to public and private transnational institutions furthest removed from democratic accountability.[12] Thus, it is not surprising that Czech women do not find political parties and the increasingly internationalised neo-liberal state apparatuses as appropriate or desirable places for participatory and civic forms of politics.

Indeed, in the course of my reading and conversations with Czech female theorists (Trnka 1993), two of their main expressed concerns in the transition are the development of broad-based, democratic citizenship, and associated with this development, the maintenance and growth of institutions of social solidarity and reproduction, such as the family, Czech cultural community, private kin and local networks. Obviously there are generational and other

differences among the conscious political expressions of Czech women. However, what is striking about their perspectives generally is a disinterest in masculine national level politics and political parties, scepticism towards institutionalised western feminism and other identity politics, and anti-party political concern with creating inclusionary women's organisations that respond to concrete problems as they arise in everyday post-communist life. There are 33 women's organisations in post-communist Czech Republic, only seven of these relate to politics *per se* or to political parties (Prague Gender Studies Centre 1994, Hauser 1996).

In my view, the so-called anti-political perspectives of Czech women's professional, humanitarian, ecological, motherhood, and traditional organisations make sense *both* in the historical context of communist institutional framing of women's emancipation and in the present context of the implementation of western neo-liberal models for post-communist transitions. Hana Havelková (1995) argues that Czech women's resistance to adopting western feminist ideas and struggles reflects their determination, in contrast to Czech men in positions of power who accept western expertise and models, to maintain their autonomy and defend their life worlds in the process of mediating *westernisation*. Czech women have good reason to be sceptical of western feminism. They know only too well that collective identities and strategies developed in another historical context cannot be easily transplanted. Unlike neo-liberals, they understand that social movements must evolve spontaneously within their own cultural conditions and contradictions. Jiřina Šiklová (1993: 9) discusses the women's organisation *Prague Mothers* as an example of "an informal, spontaneously-arisen organisation of women who are interested in ecological problems and stand up for the interests of women". However, Šiklová explains that "they outright reject feminism and even refuse to discuss it", which they believe is for intellectual, university women. Meanwhile, *Prague Mothers* have set up networks of centres for mothers across Czech Republic, in collaboration with a German women's organisation.

Further, de-facto feminists in the Czech Republic are aware that a language with which to articulate problems relevant to them must also evolve locally: *Gender*, an anglophone word distinguished from sex, is used in the name of the Prague Centre for Gender Studies – a centre of resources, research and networking for women's organisations in the Czech Republic – but is *explained* in relation to the activities that develop in and around this Centre (Hradilkova 1993). *Gender* does not have an ahistorical, universal meaning. Ann Snitow (1994) tells the story of opening a bank account for the Prague *Gender* Studies Centre with Jirina Šiklová on behalf of the Network for East-West Women: the teller asked if the organisation these ladies were representing was a brothel. Concepts and discourses undergo change in their translation from other languages and other contexts (Gjuricova 1991).

Czech women are also equivocal about the noted individualism of western feminism. This pertains particularly, I would argue, to American feminisms, especially liberal feminism. They perceive this brand of feminism to be a contradictory embrace of masculine power, politics, and individualism with im-

plicit biases towards families, men, and social soldiarity generally. Šiklová (1993), hints at the egotism of western women's movements: "Sometimes women in the West abandon their traditional positions in society, rooted in their own culture, and give up the typical social roles of women without asking who will take over their tasks". Havelková (1995) notes the resistance of western social reality to feminist achievements. I interpret her observation to mean, for example, that in spite of western feminist impact on public legislation the material conditions and social status of many women have not necessarily improved.

Last, Czech women are critical of the western feminist emphasis on women's *political* representation and *public* achievement. This incredulity derives from women's experience of the impotency of decision-making and representative quotas in the communist state and their affinity for the Czech-dissident model of *anti-political* opposition as well. Post-communist women's organisations share, with the former *Charter 77* dissidents, a desire to expand spaces for citizen participation and initiative. They do not want to *capture the state* or that form of centralised power, but rather, to transform the civil society, the sources of social power within which the state operates within. In a post-communist context, where western analyst Stephen Heintz (in Woodard 1995) observes, there is "democracy at the macro level ... but a lack of decentralisation of political power", this post-revolutionary strategy of transformation from below is vitally important, to a critical response to depoliticising and unaccountable neo-liberal national and transnational politics. It is also remarkably similar to the practical philosophies of women's movements worldwide, the networking and co-operation between, which I call *transnational feminism*. The so-termed anti-political associations and organisations of Czech women are regarded by Czech female scholars themselves as their own kind of virtual or *de facto* feminism, in spite of the fact that many of the women involved state themselves to be "anti-feminist", or simply "not feminists".

Conclusion

In *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi argued that while the nineteenth century "laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate state action, subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not" (1947: 141). Thus, in the late twentieth century, protective counter-movements against the destructive effects of the global market are likely to emerge spontaneously as a result of contradictions that develop in specific structural and cultural contexts. Collective responses to the social ruin and human divisiveness of the self-regulating market are provoked by post-communist state attempts to make it operate in totalising, totalitarian ways. Social movements are mobilised in molecular fashion, creating new political spaces, social bonds, and regulatory institutions to constrain and direct globalising forces. The questions posed here are whether neoliberalism in the Czech context will produce a feminist counter-movement to

protect society from the vagaries of the global market? And consequently, whether Polanyi's double movement is a useful way to conceptualise the context for Czech women's organising, East-West feminist co-operation and the development of transnational feminism?

Socialism, Polanyi (1957: 234) writes is "essentially the tendency, inherent in an industrial civilisation to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society." Socialist states did not fulfill this inherent tendency Polanyi attributed to socialism because they failed to allow democratic struggles to occur among social forces, autonomous of, albeit related to, class forces. It is wrong today also to impose western blueprints for East-Central European democratic transformation, or an Anglo-American-derived, global model for economic development. The Czech lands have a long history of linguistic, political and ideological domination. They rightly fear, and we can learn from this scepticism, situations where "ideology precedes reality" (Havelková 1995). There is not space left to conceptualise the alternatives to current neo-liberal politics and economics that might emerge through the development of post-communist feminist challenges, supported by transnational feminist movements (see also Molyneux 1994). Czech women themselves request the time and space to think through their major social and economic transformation (Grunell 1995). Their experiences offer important lessons for rethinking politics, dissidence, and feminism for the West as well as the former East; especially urgent in states where neo-liberal policies have transformed the nature of politics and the structural relation between public and private. 1990s feminism and neo-liberal reform have "coincided with the growing apathy of most women", especially poor, married and single, working mothers (Benn 1993: 238). Democracy has become a democracy of the market, of consumers, taxpayers and owners, of those who possess individual economic possibilities (Ibid: 235) and is pervaded by technocratic experts transnationally. In the context of this "privatisation of politics", Melissa Benn (1993: 238) argues that "professional feminism has come to substitute demands for equal representation with politics itself". Like Czech women, many women in western countries shun the ruthless self-regard of career women and men who participate in public life (Ibid: 239). This serves to remind us that feminism, if it is to thrive, must not be devoid of pro-active responses to actual political struggles. As part of broader democratic movements, feminism must further strive for an analytical perspective on neo-liberalism and the globalising political economy that illuminates their process of creative destruction: how destroying old solidarities and forms of politics, in fact, opens up new potentials for building democratic civil societies. Finally, feminism must develop a normative position that critically acknowledges our global situation of unequal power relations and is committed to transforming this situation democratically.

Notes

1. I begin this essay with the full paragraph context of a quote from Havel's dissident writings consistently misquoted by several western feminists as: Václav Havel says "feminism is for a few hysterical women...". This act of misrepresentation is indicative of some of the worst aspects of knowledge produced in the West about East-Central European women and feminism.

2. I use the term "western feminist" to refer to the literature produced on the former second world from the first, although I find it problematic: first, because to extent that the East bloc has disintegrated, and the bi-polar world order has also collapsed, it is no longer clear to me what the "West" is, or what it means to be "western" exactly; second, "western feminist" tends to homogenises the several varieties of feminist theory and practice that exist in different countries, with different political and cultural histories, but that are broadly labelled "western"; third, to be called a "western feminist" implies a level of privilege and access to dominant knowledges that is not shared equally by those who come from western countries and may call themselves "feminist". For example I have gone to East-Central Europe as a graduate student, non-American, English-speaker who has travelled a long way and I recognise that those identities constitute particular and distinctive positions in themselves, positions that are not easily discernible within the category of "western feminist".

3. I have avoided the term "anti-politics" here which is often used to characterise the conservative politics of central and eastern European women. *Anti-politics* was coined by Václav Havel and Gyorgy Konrad to describe the moral philosophy of eastern European independent initiatives and civil society during communism. It is often misinterpreted as meaning "apolitical" when it is really intended to convey opposition to the particular Communist Party brand of politics. As Melvin Croan (1989, 190) writes, "anti-politics" is meant to convey an unconditional rejection of the ruling elites' [communist party] kind of politics. Therefore, I have chosen to dispense with the term and emphasise the political nature of east European civil society movements, including women's organisations. Croan writes further: "Propogating "anti-politics" is thus itelf a political tactic, contrived to disarm the wielders of power through the ever so slightly disingenuous assurance that their intellectual critics do no seek their jobs."

4. The small numbers of women represented in national political institutions is commonly given as an example of East Central European women's oppression and the backwardness of their democratic states. Yet, the political representation of East Central European women is not relatively low when compared with that of women in western states such as the UK, the USA, or other comparatively wealthy states such as Japan.

5. I realise that this orthodox marxist term is problematic insofar as it assumes as discernable division between science and ideology, appearance and reality, and therefore between true and false consciousness of interests and identities. Of course in a positive theory of ideology one does not assume such a division, rather ideology, identity and interests are understood to be actively constructed by groups as an ongoing social and political process. Yet, in the western feminist literature on East-Central European transitions there is often an implicit or explicit accusation that women do not know their identities and interests (yet), when they should in the context of profound transformation of their societies.

6. This is consistent with the feminist view that "globalisation" is a homogenizing, structurally-detemining process that "will almost certainly shrink the public space available for women to exercise their democratic rights as voters, citizens and workers...and will reinforce patriarchal attitudes, privileges–and practice" (Menon 1996: 16).

7. Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic 1995, Czech Statistical Office 1995.

8. Alena Heitlinger notes, in her correspondence with the author, that the western feminist claim that women are "returning to the family" is not only empirically inaccurate in the Czech republic, but incoherent as well.

She points out that at least three generations of Czech women have grown up in families with employed mothers, and that consequently, one can hardly talk of "returning to full-time domesticity" when it has not existed in the past fifty years.

9. Sexism in labor unions is common throughout East-Central Europe. In Poland, the Business Community and the Unions oppose the costs of maintaining the benefit structure of the socialist system which is associated with women's maternity leave and childcare. Solidarity workers in Polish factories expressed the view that there are going to be fewer jobs and they want them. When interviewed male workers said that there should be no question about it; women cost too much." Speaking the language of neo-liberal economics they argued "we' re technologically advanced; we want to be privatized, we want to do everything we can to make ourselves attractive to foreign investors and to Polish companies... women should voluntarily take themselves out of the work force and go home". Men expect to benefit from marketization, if necessary, at the expense of women. (In Center for Democracy and USAID 1992).

10. Few women hold high public office in the Czech Republic, although 30 out of 200 parliamentary deputies are women.

11. Good examples are; Květoslava Křinkova, the only female minister in Czechoslovak government, 1990-92, Dana Němcova, former Charter 77 dissident and also parliamentarian 1990-92, and Petra Buzková, currently member of Parliament and vice-chair of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD).

12. Richard Falk (1993) estimates that 98% of those currently engaged in capital-finance operations on a global scale are men. Here, feminists, like left critics, heed the regressive dynamics of political-economic globalisation. Mona Harrington (1992), for instance, warns us, that beyond the bonds of the male-dominated liberal state lies an even more powerful and elitist white, male economic managerial class unacountable to "the people" especially those marginalised by the swift flight of capital and other globalising processes.

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Between Theoretical Models and Self-Reflection:

On Teaching and Researching Feminist Theorizing in Bratislava.

Etela Farkasova – Mariana Szapuova

Introduction

The professional theorizing and concept of women studies (or gender studies) was introduced to the intellectual and cultural spheres of former Czecho-Slovakia at the beginning of the 1990s. As we had no direct experience with feminism as a political movement, the main reason to introduce women studies in our country was our need to reflect upon and articulate those experiences which we had during the times of socialist practice of emancipation in our country. This reflection is also important as a starting point for understanding our situation nowadays and for shaping new routes for gender equality in the future. The absence historically of a true feminist movement in Slovakia greatly influenced the way in which introducing and later on establishing women studies at Comenius University took place. The close relationship between the political and theoretical activities, typical for early Western feminism, was not existing in our country at all.

Teaching feminist theorizing at Comenius University

From the outset, the main intention behind our efforts was to acquire knowledge about Western feminist thinking, its basic theories, conceptions and arguments and to present these theories to our students. In this process, the need to reflect upon our life experiences was born. We needed some conceptual apparatus for this self-reflection, so we tried to use certain Western theoretical models as tools to interpret and explain our own experiences as well as to reflect upon our current situation. When organizing these courses we had mainly two aims: a) that the students would gain a basic knowledge about some of the most important feminist conceptions elaborated abroad; b) to encourage students to reflect upon our own experiences during socialism, with the concept of emancipation. Both of these tasks are, according to us, very important and we try to join our forces to fulfill them. Though we have not established a Women Studies Department at our University, developing these courses have been successful, both in terms of their thematical content and judging from the level of interest from the students. While in the beginning we worked in small

groups of 5-6 students at our department, focusing on some introductory themes, today we teach two-term courses for the entire student body of the university. They are attended by 20-25 students, women and men, from various disciplines. Besides this, there is also a variety of minor courses as non-compulsory, "electives," on subjects concering particular questions or important concepts. For example, feminist epistemology and feminist ethics.

However, in hindsight we realize that the establishment and development of women studies as a "normal" and equally important subject at the University will take much longer than expected. No doubt, bringing in gender issues as a natural part of the political agenda will also be a much longer process.

Feminist Initiatives to Organize Women

When we, in the academic year of 1990/91, began teaching feminist theory at the Faculty of the Arts at Comenius University, it was with a special focus on feminist philosophy. At the same time, feminist thinking was introduced into various other academic areas and topics. As part of this, we were involved in organizing several conferences and seminars and we also participated in a number of workshops concerning women's issues organized by different organizations in former Czecho-Slovakia. In connection to this,we would like to stress the fact that apart from the theoretical/intellectual problems that we have to face, we also always have to deal with quite difficult material shortages. Especially in terms of lacking books and journals, current and "the classics" alike! Not to mention having hardly any technical teaching aids, which in the West would be considered "standard" in most classrooms.

Nevertheless, we are also seeing hopeful lights on the horizon lately. Despite the lack of tradition of feminist thinking in our country, there have been several initiatives to promote women's issues. For example, in 1993 a Women's Association called Aspekt (an NGO) was founded. This association set out from the start to publish the first Slovak-Czech feminist journal, with the same name, *Aspekt*. *Aspekt* was put together by a group consisting of both Slovak and Czech women who cooperated with several feminists from abroad. The Alliance of Women of Slovakia was founded as a network of women from all over Slovakia. Its aim is to analyze the current state of women in Slovakia, to identify their problems and to propose strategies and solutions. Another initiative arising in 1993, was in the field of women's literary activities. The initiative came from among women writers who formed a support network called the Club of Women Writers of Slovakia. It promotes women's literature and reflects the need of many writing women to discuss literary problems and life experiences.

Current feminist research in Slovakia

Since the feminist research has no traditions on its own and lacks a specific methodological apparatus, in our teaching we have decided to pay attention to philosophical/theoretical issues. To us it is of great importance that we, feminist researchers of Slovakia, start to theorize around these issues by relating

them with empirical feminist research. Our aim is to develop some methodological basis for conducting and summarizing their results. However, an obstacle to empirical research in not only a limited number of capable and interested researchers in the field. But also there is lack of solidarity between women, and, by extension, a lack of cooperation among women's organizations and clubs. Organized women are often times more interested in the political programs of their respective parties than in women's issues. Consequently they usually act more as members/sympathizers of their respective political party than as representatives of a particular women's group. This fact was acknowledged by several sociological researchers (for example O. Plavkova in cooperation with the University of Glasgow, as well as the organization IREX). In our teaching, we use these empirical findings as a basis and a point of departure for theoretical analyses and for our self-reflection. Although empirical research is very important as a basis for feminist theorizing, it cannot be sufficient for the development of a feminist consciousness and for implanting this to wider fields of thinking and acting.

The introduction of feminist thinking to our country was not, and still is not, easy. The problem is to find an adequate expression of how to explain the meaning and role of feminism in an academic, as well as in a wider cultural, context. The main reason is the lack of feminist tradition in our country; and, in comparison with Western countries, different social, historical, political and cultural conditions. It seems to us that because of the above mentioned differences, the content, goals, strategies and methods of women studies at Western and East/Central European universities are different. Western feminists were engaged more deeply in elaborating the theoretical issues and categories arising from practical needs. We, feminists in post-socialist Eastern Europe, have more practical experiences with realized emancipation which, in a certain sense, failed. What we urgently need is to elaborate on a contextually adequate conceptual and methodological apparatus. Furthermore, this is needed in order to analyze our practical experiences. In other words, it seems that the experiences of a socialist social order require another set of specific categories which will deal with these differences and not mask our specific historical experiences as women in former East bloc countries.

The future of feminist theorizing in Slovakia

Because of our long isolation from Western feminism as well as our specific experiences, the task of developing a feminist theorizing which rises out of our context is difficult indeed. Despite the fact that various scientific branches begin to reflect women's issues or gender differentiated perspectives in their subject area (e.g. sociology and psychology) it seems that the old reluctance to deal with these questions is still alive. However, the situation in the public arena is even more complex. The term "feminism" still has a pejorative connotation. To many people feminism sounds like something strange or unimportant and marginal. Differences between attitudes of men and women to-

wards feminism in our days in Slovkia are shown in research made by Z. Butorova et al.

Until recently, the feminist way of thinking played no role in the consciousness of the scientific communities. On the other hand, there has always been the research, within the social sciences, with a focus on women and the family. The significant point is that this research did not analyze its findings from a feminist perspective. Even today, six years after the revolution when many efforts to introduce and establish feminist theorizing were done, there is still a lack of feminist perspectives. In some of this particular empirical research *gender differentiation* is taken to mean that gender differences are something "given" or "natural." Therefore their cultural and sociopolitical character remains hidden and unreflected. But there are also quite a few women intellectuals and researchers who never express, and probably don't feel any need for, a gender-differentiated thinking. These intellectuals are inclined to accept a so called "gender-neutral" perspective, identifying themselves with the traditional and stereotypical gender roles which are imposed on us all by social conventions.

To conclude, in Slovakia we are really at the starting point of developing feminist research. There are nevertheless also encouraging signs on the horizon. As we see it, something has started. A process of a rising feminist consciousness has begun. No doubt, this will eventually lead to the development of greater sensibility to gender issues and gender differentiation in our country.

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Marketing the Union: Some Feminist Perspectives

Leo Flynn

Introduction

The pivotal role of the internal market in EC law has important implications for any feminist perspective on the area. While feminist perspectives on law have offered a set of powerful critiques of many aspects of law, and these insights have been applied in relation to key features of the legal system in many jurisdictions, in relation to EC law, the contribution made by feminist lawyers and scholars has been relatively limited. There has been sustained feminist commentary on EC social policy (in particular relating to equality between women and men at work and in relation to social security); however, relatively little has been written about other areas of EC law which employs feminist scholarship or which seeks to examine the origin and/or impact of EC law from a feminist stance. The aim here is to examine some of the central characteristics of the European internal market law from a feminist perspective. The analysis will then shift to the new player in the integration game, the European Union. This legal entity is heavily dependent on the existing law of the internal market, and the feminist critique offered of the legal regime in the internal market will be carried over to the European Union.

It might be argued that EC law is sexist, given the overwhelming preponderance of men in positions of power within its institutions. For example, in a study of the Court of Justice the authors observe before giving an outline of the judges' biographical details that these will deal exclusively with men because, 'a woman has still to be appointed to this office, although ... the French, with true republican "*egalité*", chose a woman for appointment as advocate general in 1981'[1]. However, changing the number of women within the top ranks of the Community's legal and political order would not necessarily change the nature of the system in the absence of a major culture shift. Therefore, this essay will use two other strategies, the claim that law is male, in that it employs modes of reasoning and perception that are culturally associated with masculinity, and that it operates as a gendering mechanism. These elements will be developed once the role of the internal market in EC law is considered.

The Internal Market

The Treaty of Rome established the European *Economic* Community and although the name was changed to the European Community in 1993, the creation and maintenance of a common or internal market remains close to the heart of the Community's activities. The culture of the market and principles of market efficiency and competition are central to the creation of the internal market, and to the legitimacy of the legal order founded on it. Article 7a EC defines the internal market as 'an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.' However, Kirsten Scheiwe notes: 'a definition of the market concept cannot be derived from a mere description of market policies', and suggests that, '[i]t is not simply a 'market logic' that affects and fuels the dynamics of these developments, but a selective logic (with a gender dimension) which excludes or includes certain policy areas according to criteria of relevance other than ill-defined 'market-connectedness''[2]. This critique is an important one; and it will be argued here that the dominant conception of the internal market reflects a set of male norms and assumptions. In this sense, it is claimed that EC law is male because its assumptions, values and modes of reasoning are associated with masculine traits in our culture.

It is first necessary to delineate the scope of the market. The institutions of the EC have, for the most part, taken the view that any activity and any object can be assimilated to the market. In identifying the objects and subjects of the EC internal market's legal order, a very broad approach can be discerned. For example, in 1984 the Commission stated that, 'Contrary to what is widely imagined, the EEC Treaty applies not only to economic activities but, as a rule to all activities carried out for remuneration, regardless of whether they take place in the economic, social, cultural (including in particular information, creative or artistic endeavours and entertainment), sporting or any other sphere'[3]. This approach embraces many individuals and institutions which would not necessarily be seen by those who are unfamiliar with EC law as participants in the market.

The Court of Justice has also taken a broad view of the scope of the market, as is clear from its jurisprudence on what constitutes 'goods' for the purpose of the free movement rules contained in the Treaty. The Court's approach does not flow automatically from any internal rationale of EC law, found within the norms and the jurisprudence of the rules of EC law, and what emerges from a critical consideration of its caselaw is that the Court defines the market, it does not discover it. This can be seen in *Commission* v. *Belgium*[4] where the Commission claimed that an import ban imposed by the Walloon Regional Authority on waste products was incompatible with Article 30 EC. The ban was intended to stop Wallonia from being the final halting site in "waste tourism", the movement of by-products of industrial processes from wealthier regions to poorer regions for disposal or treatment. Amongst the arguments raised by Belgium was that when waste can no longer be recycled or reused, and so has

no commercial value, it cannot come within the scope of the rules on free movement of goods. The Advocate General took the view that non-recyclable waste constituted "goods" within the Treaty rules because, although it had no intrinsic value, it could form the subject of commercial transactions in that waste disposal companies are paid to dispose of it[5]. The Court of Justice took a similarly robust view, holding that objects transported over a national border to effect a commercial transaction must be subject to Article 30 EC, irrespective of the nature of the transactions[6]. Clearly, the Court's approach gives pre-eminence to a market paradigm, ignoring critics who assert that, 'The central problem is that the EEC fails to differentiate between different kinds of goods. One *should* look to the nature of the good because all goods are not the same. After all, some commercial transactions have a negative environmental impact'[7]. That critique treats this case as a local anomaly. However, when the masculine nature of EC law is identified, a systematic failure can be recognised. A basic feature of EC law is its powerful impulse towards market deference[8], and that failure cannot be addressed until EC law adopts other values, of connection and solidarity, and a different epistemology, contemplating 'masculine' assumptions of atomistic, de-contextualized objects and individuals as well as a 'feminine', holistic vision.

It should be noted that it is not necessarily desirable to be placed *outside* the market. Patricia Williams points out that the market is a plastic construct whose precise boundaries vary over time. She goes on to observe that it is, nonetheless, constant in one feature;

> whether something is inside or outside the marketplace ... has always been a way of valuing it. Where a valued object is located outside the market, it is generally understood to be too "priceless" to be accommodated by ordinary exchange relationships; if the prize is located within the marketplace, then all objects placed outside become "valueless". Traditionally, the *Mona Lisa* and human life have been the sort of objects removed from the fungibility of commodification, as priceless. Thus when black people were bought and sold as slaves, they were placed beyond the bounds of humanity.[9]

This insight, that to be excluded from the market is not to share even the limited benefits which it offers, reminds us that it is not the market itself which is the only source of concern for those casting a critical eye over EC law from a feminist perspective. Instead, our attention should also be on the way in which the market could become the only source of valuing others and the world around us. This issue might be addressed in several ways. If the exclusion of the feminist perspectives on sources of value canvassed above is an integral part of the formation of the market concept, a real challenge to EC law's dependence on the market may require a fundamental transformation of the presumptions used to construct that concept. It may be, however, that feminist perspectives militate towards abandoning the market because the concept cannot endure the pressures created by such transformational pressures and/or because the market cannot deliver what feminists require of it.

The European Union

The adoption of the Treaty on European Union creates a new legal subject, the Union citizen; all persons who possess the nationality of the member States shall be citizens of the Union (Article 8 EC). These citizenship provisions provide a core element in this novel dynamic entity, the EU. The figure of the Union citizen carries within itself the legacy of the internal market; more specifically, that entails in turn that both the citizen and the Union are shaped by concepts and values which are usually valorized as masculine. As a result these new legal concepts are vulnerable to critique from a feminist perspective which can in turn provide an important corrective to those unbalanced constructs.

The outline and contents of this new figure, the Union citizen, is almost entirely determined by existing, market-centred norms and practices. At a superficial level, the creation of the citizen appears a marketing exercise in its own right, the latest product in a line including Euro-passports, a Euro-flag and anthem, and sundry European years dedicated to worthy causes[10]. In this guise it can be seen as an additional attempt to legitimise or "sell" the idea of Europe to the very people, mainly ignorant or apathetic or sceptical about the Union, who have recently become its citizens. It has been claimed that the introduction of Article 8a-e EC means that 'the mobility of economically active persons has now been elevated to the core of European citizenship and expanded into mobility for persons generally. In other words: economically irrelevant people have been promoted to the status of persons'[11]. However, these mobility rights are expressed as subject to the limitations already set out in the Treaty. The central figure, therefore, in the Union citizen's origin is the EC worker who enjoys rights under EC law when working, seeking work, or having worked, in another member State by virtue of Article 48 EC and associated legislation. For the most part these rights are taken up by those in work; a factor which already disadvantages women as a group. In 1991 the average female unemployment rate in the EC was 50 per cent higher than the average male rate[12]. Another important consideration is that the ability and willingness of individuals to migrate is dependent on several factors, including real income differentials, attitudes to risk, and age[13], as well as a variety of "push" and "pull" factors[14]. Given the uneven distribution of caring responsibilities between the sexes and, consequently, the greater exposure to risk from uncertainty for women, their opportunities for free movement are even further reduced. As such, we can argue that the configuration of rights set out in Article 8a-e EC renders the concept of Union citizen a sexist one, unevenly distributing its resources and opportunities on the basis of sex.

However, the Union citizen can be subjected to a feminist critique on a deeper level. A key point of concern must be the manner in which the Court of Justice has defined *who* is to be seen as economically active and so entitled to mobility rights; this certainly covers workers and persons who provide and receive services. The definition of worker produced by the Court of Justice is based on a requirement that the individual is involved in genuine and effective work as opposed to marginal and ancillary activities under the direction of an employer

for remuneration. The Court has fought shy of extending rights to a working relationship premised on a religious or philosophical basis, and in *Steymann*[15] the Court held that this test did not cover the situation of a German member of a Bhagwan community in the Netherlands who carried out plumbing jobs and general chores for this religious community in exchanges for his lodgings and food. Given this approach it is unsurprising that the category of "worker" does not embrace women who are economically active within the home and do not engage in paid employment. The possibility of treating these women as workers might exist if traditional assumptions about the worth of work within the home were set aside, in light of the minimal value of the labour which a "worker" in EC law must produce. However, given the common assumption about the altruistic nature of this "private" labour, it is unlikely to be treated as an economic activity. Thus, in *Achterberg*[16] the Court of Justice held that a woman who had not been in employment outside her home could not claim rights under EC law which was directed at workers as she 'had not had an occupation.' The jurisprudence of the Court still overlooks the value of a significant segment of the economically active female population. The core right of the citizen, that of mobility, remains anchored in the categories of economically active persons already established in EC law and is available to women in a more restrictive fashion than to men because of the Court's failure to include in its decisions modes of economic existence which are informal, unstructured and largely experienced by women.

The rights of workers in EC law are extensive, encompassing rights to be accompanied by spouses, children and certain other relatives. However, these statuses have had to be defined by the Court and in doing so it has limited those rights. The manner in which the limits are applied reinforces heterosexual marriage and fails to adopt a more egalitarian model of inter-personal relations. In *Reed* v. *The Netherlands*[17] the Court of Justice held that the long-term companion of a worker, who is a national of a member State and is employed in another member State, cannot be treated as his 'spouse' for the purposes of EC law. However, where Dutch nationals could obtain permission for their unmarried non-Dutch companions to reside with them, other EC workers could not be subject to discrimination because of their nationality (Article 6 EC) and could also obtain such permission. This judgement converts the relationship between an unmarried heterosexual couple into one where the presence of the partner who is not an EC worker is a "social advantage", a material benefit for the other. *Reed* indicates that the attempt by women to define themselves as economic subjects rather than as objects to be traded[18] is one on which EC law's stance is ambiguous. It is not being claimed here that support for the institution of marriage is necessarily anti-feminist; however, as Katherine O'Donovan notes it is an institution which carries a deep history of oppression for women[19]. EC law has deliberately chosen to subscribe to that history. In addition, the view which the Court of Justice takes of marriage is a wholly formal one; it is not necessary that the spouses co-habit at any point or that there should be or ever have been any emotional or sexual relationship between them. Thus in *Diatta* v. *Land Berlin*[20] the Court found that where a marriage

had not been dissolved, it was to be treated as still existing even if the spouses were separated and had no intention of ever living together again.

When we look to see how this affects women, the creation of a new market can be seen. In London and other large cities located in member States with strict immigration laws, a market in EC (as opposed to host State nationals) workers who are unmarried lesbians has emerged in recent years. Such women cannot enter into a legally recognised spousal-like relationship with other women and they are likely to be less well-off than men. If they are EC workers they have a right to the residence of a spouse of theirs in the same member State, and this economically valuable right is, increasingly, being traded. The trade is, undoubtedly, one which occurs on a grey market but it is a real phenomenon. The creation of the European Union and the construction of a new model citizenship on the basis of the existing market order should be judged in light of this trade in women, a new variation on an old tale of female oppression which was authored by the European Community and is now continued by the European Union.

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Notes

1. L. Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, *The Court of Justice of the European Communities* (4th ed.) (1994) Sweet & Maxwell p.55.

2. Kirsten Schiewe, 'EC Law's unequal treatment of the family: The case law of the European Court of Justice on rules prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex and nationality', (1994) 3 *Social and Legal Studies* p.241 at p.247.

3. Commission of the European Communities, *Television without frontiers* Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting especially by Satellite and Cable, COM (84) 300 final (Luxemburg: OOPEC, 1984) p.6.

4. Case C-2/90, [1993] 1 CMLR 365.

5. Para. 16.

6. Para. 26.

7. David A. Demiray, 'The movement of goods in a green market', 1994/1 *Legal Issues of European Integration* 73 at p.109. Emphasis added.

8. See also Rossa Phelan, 'Right to life of the unborn v Promotion of trade in services: The European Court of Justice and the normative shaping of the European Union', (1992) 55 *Modern Law Review* p.670; Ian Ward, 'In search of a European identity', (1994) 57 *Modern Law Review* p.315 at p.327.

9. Patricia J. Williams, 'On being the object of property', in *The alchemy of race and rights* (1991) Harvard University Press p.227. EC law is not so deferential toward art treasures as Williams might expect.

10. Cris Shore and Annabel Black, 'Citizens' Europe and the construction of European identity', in Victoria A. Goddard, Josep R. Llobera and Cris Shore (eds.), *The Anthropology of Europe: Identities and boundaries in conflict*, (1994) Berg: Oxford pp.286-287.

11. Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, 'European citizenship: Its potential, its meaning' in Renaud Dehousse (eds.) *Europe after Maastricht: An ever closer Union?* (1994) Law Books in Europe: München p.132.

12. Mike Artis and Nick Weaver, 'The European economy', in M.J. Artis and N. Lee (eds.), *The economics of the European Union*, (1994) Oxford University Press pp.47-48.

13. D.G. Mayes, 'Factor mobility', in Ali M. El-Agraa (ed.) *The economics of the European Community* (4th ed.) (1994) Harvester Wheatsheaf p.441.

14. See Loukas Tsoukalis, *The new European economy: The politics and economics of integration* (2nd rev. ed.) (1993) Oxford University Press pp.153-154.

15. Case 196/87, [1988] ECR 6159.

16. Joined Cases 48, 106 & 107/88 *J.E.G. Achterbeg-te Riele and Others* v. *Sociale Verzekeringsbank, Amsterdam* [1989] ECR 1963.

17. Case 59/85, [1986] ECR 1283.

18. See Susanne Kappeler, 'The international slave trade in women; or procurers, pimps and punters', (1990) 1 *law and critique* p.219 at p.235.

19. Katherine O'Donovan, 'Marriage: A sacred or profane love machine?' (1993) 1 *Feminist Legal Studies* p.75.

20. Case 267/83, [1985] ECR 574.

Women Caught in a Logical Trap in EC Law: An Analysis of the Use of Quotas in the Case of Kalanke

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Introduction

Among feminist legal theorists today, there is a great deal of scepticism regarding the possibility of promoting sex equality within the existing legal systems. This is because laws, as well as legal methods and legal systems as a whole, rest on a patriarchal foundation celebrating a traditional masculine perception of the Self and this particular (male) Self's relation to the world at large.[1] In order to change and improve legal systems it is therefore very important to thoroughly analyse how the existing legal systems work, especially in regards to systems which pass themselves off as actively creating equality between the sexes.

In our day and time therefore, the legal system of the EU, as it manifests itself in the rulings of the European Court of Justice, is of great interest. Because of article 119 on equal pay in the Treaty of Rome and the EC-legislation that has followed the equal pay principle, the European Court of Justice has become the highest legal authority in the process of shaping sex equality in the EU member states.

In this article I will analyse the case of Kalanke[2] which is the first EC-case which goes into the question of the use of quotas. The case has been subject to intense discussions and caused the Commission of the European Community to take a very unusual step; it has proposed an amendment of the article interpreted by the Court in the Kalanke-case.[3] The proposed amendment has not yet been enacted and it is doubtful whether it ever will, since an amendment requires an unanimous resolution by the Council of the European Community.

As the Court's judgment in the case of Kalanke does not leave much reasoning to be analysed and as the Court followed the legal opinion of Mr. Advocate General, the analysis is concentrated on Mr. Advocate General's opinion. In order to analyse his reasoning I use the same method as in my doctoral thesis titled, "Equality between men and women in the EC law. A feminist analysis". In this article, I shall begin by briefly introducing the theories used, followed by a summary of the Kalanke case and the EC-law brought into focus. Thereafter I present my analysis of the legal opinion of Mr Advocate General. The

article ends with an estimation on how quotas could be used if there were an awareness of the complexity and the seriousness of problems with sex-discrimination in the Court of Justice. However, before pursuing this any further, I would just like to say a few words about the different notions of equality from a feminist perspective.

Notions of equality

The abstract standard of equality is based on the Aristotelian notion which means that likes ought to be treated alike, and unlike unalike. As women were seen as different from men, these differences were the reasons for treating men and women differently. In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill advocated against laws which denied women equal civil rights in the areas of property, suffrage, marriage, education and employment. Mill's argumentation is the historical basis for the notion of *formal equality* in the liberal tradition: as there are no real, substantive differences between the sexes, there are no reasons to treat women differently from men.[4] Formal equality has got the implication that women ought to be treated *as men*, not that women and men ought to be treated alike. In order to create a legal structure that imposes the recognition of formal equality between the sexes, many Western legal systems have introduced a ban on discrimination on the grounds of sex. That is, to deny a person equal treatment by reference to the person's sex is called *direct discrimination*.

During the last decade, a number of prominent feminist legal theorists have realised that the traditional liberal legal formula is unable to produce real, substantive equality. As Finley puts it, "To be treated as if you were the same as a norm from which you actually differ in significant ways is just as discriminatory as being penalized directly for your difference."[5] Thus for a multitude of possible underlying reasons like sociological, structural, historical, cultural, psychological, biological or whatever else, differences between women and men have been created and should not be ignored.

As a consequence of the realization that the traditional liberal notion of formal equality cannot produce what can be labeled *substantive equality*, the notion of *indirect discrimination* has been developed. This was first introduced by the US Supreme Court in a case of race-discrimination: Griggs vs. Duke Power Co.[6] In this case, the Court ruled that US law proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also such *practices which may be fair in form but are discriminatory in practice*. In other words, it was realised that in order to tackle the roots of discrimination it is necessary not to focus only on the question of intention to discriminate, but to look beyond, at the actual implications of the decisions in question. In regards to the EC legislation, the notion of indirect discrimination was included into its praxis without any explicit reference to the Griggs-case, but in the case of Jenkins the plaintiff cited it and the European Court of Justice accepted its argument about unintentional discrimination.[7] It is clear that the notion of indirect discrimination could become very useful, especially if it were realised that discriminatory practices include discrimina-

tory structures. It also means that a rule itself may be proved or shown to be biased if based on patriarchal philosophical assumptions.

Theory and method

It has become more difficult to answer the question why men's domination of women perpetuates since theorists have become aware of how complex the question is. Joan Scott is one of the theorists who suggests that the question has to been answered on different levels.[8] She means that gender involves four interrelated elements: 1) culturally available symbols, 2) normative concepts, 3) social institutions and organisations and 4) subjective identity. According to Scott the cultural symbols are open to many interpretations of meaning, but when the symbols are interpreted through normative concepts these concepts attempt to limit and contain the metaphorical possibilities of the symbols. Normative concepts are expressed in legal, religious and political doctrines and typically take the form of fixed binary oppositions, categorically and unequivocally asserting the meaning of – for example – male and female, masculine and feminine. Every analysis of normative concepts must, according to Scott, include a notion of politics and reference to social institutions. Scott's approach is fruitful in feminist legal analysis since the legal language is based on dichotomies, oppositions and conflicts.

In this article I shall focus on some of the normative concepts shaped by the European Court of Justice. While analysing normative concepts, Joan Scott uses Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralist linguistics and Jacques Derrida's theories of how meaning is constructed in the Western philosophical tradition.[9] de Saussure has claimed that meaning is made through implicit or explicit contrast, that a positive definition rests on the negation or repression of something represented as antithetical to it. Fixed oppositions conceal the extent to which things presented as oppositions are interdependent. They derive their meaning from a particularly established contrast rather than from some inherent or pure antithesis.

According to Derrida, the interdependence is hierarchical with one term dominant and prior and the opposite term subordinated and secondary. Derrida argues that the Western philosophical tradition rests on binary oppositions like unity/diversity, identity/difference and universality/specificity. To the numbers of binary oppositions feminist theorists have added among others reason/emotion, culture/nature, mind/body, activity/passivity, day/night and sun/moon.[10] The leading terms, Derrida claims, are accorded primacy while their partners are represented as weaker or derivative. Yet the first terms depend on and derive their meaning from the second to such an extent that the secondary terms can be seen as generative of the definition of the first terms.

The EC-law

In the field of equality between men and women the EC-law contains a number of pairs of words. The aim of this article is to show how they are made oppositions and hierarchical. The most important pairs of words in the Kalanke case

are the following: men/women,[11] individual/collective, direct discrimination/indirect discrimination, formal equality/ substantive equality and legal actions/ positive actions.

The Kalanke case

Mr. Kalanke was a horticulturist employed by Bremen's Parks Department. He had applied for a post as section manager but was not appointed because there was an equally qualified female candidate. According to Bremen's *Landesgleichstellungsgesetz* women were to be given priority for every appointment, provided that: a) women had the same qualifications as men applying for the same post and b) women did not make up half of the staff in the relevant personnel group within a department. Mr. Kalanke brought actions against the decision of appointment in the Arbeitsgericht, the Landesarbeitsgericht and the Bundesarbeitsgericht, without success. The Highest Court ascertained that the disputed provision was consistent with German Basic Law, but turned to the EC Court to ask whether the provision was consistent with Articles 2(1) and 2 (4) of the directives 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working condition.[12]

Relevant EC legislation

Article 2(1) of the directive 76/207 defines the principle of equal treatment for men and women. The principle means that "there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status". When this directive was passed, twenty years ago, it was the first time indirect discrimination was explicitly prohibited. However, neither in this directive nor in any later is there a definition of the two types of discrimination. Thus, by reading the text of the article it is impossible to came to any other conclusion than that the two kinds of discrimination are equally valued, that is, indirect discrimination is as prohibited as direct discrimination.

Through the Court's judgments the term "direct discrimination" has come to imply all discrimination by explicit reference to sex.[13] The term "indirect discrimination" has been developed gradually. From this point of view the Bilka-Kaufhaus-case is the most important.[14] Here the Court declares that a seemingly objective provision may constitute indirect discrimination if a statistical study shows that the provision is a disadvantage for a far greater number of women than of men. Then the burden of proof changes to the defendant who has to prove objective reasons for the provision for the purpose of justifying the indirect discrimination. Indirect discrimination has thus got an important meaning as it queries the objectivity of the rules and aims to create substantive equality.

Article 2(4) states that the principle of equal treatment in article 2(1) shall be without prejudice to positive actions for women enacted by Member States.

Positive actions are defined as "measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities" in the labour market. This exception from the principle of equal treatment was initiated late in the enacting process, which means that there are no comments on it.[15]

However, in the first community action programme 1982 – 1985 the Commission took the responsibility for giving the term "positive actions" a substance.[16] The Commission referred to "affirmative actions" in the US and in the Scandinavian countries but then gave the notion such a limited meaning that I think it is important to draw a distinction between the EC-notion of positive actions and the notion of affirmative actions. From the Commission's action programme it is obvious that positive actions are something else than legal measures. While legal measures are designed to afford rights to individuals, positive actions mean practical measures whose purpose is to remove non-legal obstacles for women in the labour market; attitudes for example.[17] Information campaigns, investigations and training are some of the positive actions the Commission proposed in the first action programme.

In the recommendation on the promotion of positive action for women[18] this division between legal action and positive action is repeated already in the preamble. The positive actions then recommended are not legal in their character: to inform and increase awareness, qualitative and quantitative studies and analyses, to encourage, adapt and so on.

Article 6(3) of the agreement on social policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty also contains a provision for positive action. According to that article, the principle of equal pay for equal work does not prevent Member States from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for women to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in their professional careers. Here it is not that obvious that positive actions are something else than legal measures.

The judgment of the Court

The judgment of the Court in the Kalanke case is brief. It ascertains that a national rule which automatically gives women priority involves sex-discrimination.[19] The question of whether this sex-discrimination is permissible under the derogation for positive actions in article 2(4) the Court answers by quoting a previously delivered judgment, in which it declared that article 2(4) specifically and exclusively is designed to allow measures "which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life".[20] As article 2(4) is a derogation from an individual right laid down in the directive it must be interpreted strictly.[21] Therefore, the Court ascertains without further argumentation, national rules, which absolutely and unconditionally guarantee women priority for appointments, are not consistent with article 2(4) while they go beyond promoting equal opportunities and overstep the limits of the

exception in the article.[22] Furthermore, the Court adds, as far as the German system "seeks to achieve equal representation of men and women in all grades and levels within a department, such a system substitutes for equality of opportunity as envisaged in Article 2(4) the result which is only to be arrived at by providing such equality of opportunity."[23] This means that even when a woman candidate is equally qualified with a male candidate, the use of quotas is contrary to the principle of equal treatment in article 2(1) because quotas make the female sex the decisive factor. Quotas are not in accordance with the derogation in article 2(4) either since the only permissible kinds of positive actions are those which remove obstacles for women in order to achieve equal opportunity to compete in the labour market. The use of quotas takes one step further, beyond the scope of the derogation, since it seeks to bring about equal representation of men and women in the labour market. Equal representation is the result of equal opportunity to compete, that is; the Court presupposes that there is an automatic link between equal opportunity to compete and equal representation.

The reasoning in this judgment is difficult to understand if it is not read in the light of the opinion of the Italian Mr. Advocate General Tesauro.[24]

The legal opinion of Mr. Advocate General

Mr. Advocate General Tesauro's legal opinion is charged with emotional rhetoric, hardly ever seen in judgments in Sweden. However, the problem with Swedish judgments is often that their reasoning is so meagre that the judgments may well be based on emotions, though this is thereby carefully concealed from every analysis. As mentioned above, in this article I will concentrate on Mr. Tesauro's use of pairs of words, especially formal equality/substantive equality, but also men/women; individual/collective and legal actions/positive actions.

Formal equality vs. substantive equality

Mr. Advocate General Tesauro uses different and inconsistent notions of equality. He commences with a definition of formal and substantive equality, which has not been explicitly stated before. To Mr. Advocate General, *formal equality* means equal treatment of individuals belonging to different groups and *substantive equality* denotes equal treatment of groups.[25] Here I would like to claim that Mr. Advocate General has not, it seems, realized the meaning of the term indirect discrimination. The statistical material of the group of men and the group of women which is necessary for proving indirect discrimination is only a method of investigation. If this statistical investigation shows that a far greater number of women than men are at a disadvantage under a seemingly objective rule it means that the rule is not objective and thus that a large number of individual women are directly discriminated against by that rule.

In his text, Mr. Tesauro commences with assuming an implicit hierarchy between the two terms by asserting that any action which aims at giving group

favours will conflict with the principle of formal equality.[26] Likewise, if the terms were equally valued he would also have declared that any application of formal equality which leads to indirect discrimination conflicts with the principle of substantive equality.

According to Mr. Tesauro's definition, positive action means to temporarily remove obstacles which stand in the way of the achievement of equal opportunities between men and women.[27] He connects positive action to the secondary form of equality by stating that the aim with positive action is to create substantive equality.[28] At the same time he declares that the only permissible measures to create substantive equality are those necessary to eliminate the obstacles which prevent women from pursuing the same results as men on equal terms. The reason why only such measures are permissible is that it is only those which are merely discriminatory in appearance. Mr. Advocate General here refers to the same judgment as the Court quoted.[29]

In his legal opinion of the Kalanke case, Mr. Tesauro then expressively creates a hierarchy of the terms *formal* and *substantive equality*, "the principle of *substantive equality* complements the principle of *formal equality*."[30] (italics added). For that reason, Mr. Tesauro argues, it is only permissible to deviate from the principle of formal equality if the purpose is to create *actual equality* which, according to Mr. Advocate General, means equality between persons.

Actual equality is a new term for equality introduced by Mr. Advocate General. The principles of equal pay and equal treatment concern economic and social rights. Any intent to create equality between persons concerning economic and social rights does not exist in EC law, much less a ban on discrimination in this respect. Thus, deviating from the principle of formal equality, in liberal tradition referred to as individual equality, is only justified if the purpose is to realize a kind of socialist goal which does not exist in EC law.

Mr. Advocate General also introduces the term *reverse discrimination* which, until now, has not been utilized in reference to equality between the sexes. Reverse discrimination does however frequently appear in questions relating to discrimination on the grounds of nationality. More specifically, the term relates to queries regarding less favourable treatment of the own citizens than migrants from other EU-countries, for example in matters of social advantages. However, Mr. Tesauro does not care to define the term reverse discrimination in the field of sex discrimination. He just ascertains that it *is* reverse discrimination to grant women priority on the grounds that they are women. Is Mr. Advocate General implying that the male population is in fact the EU's own citizens whereas women are a kind of migrants? If so, this coincides with Simone de Beauvoir's famous conclusion, "He is the Subject, the Absolute – she is the Other."[31]

An important element of the term indirect discrimination has been that no demand exists to prove intent to discriminate. Still Mr. Advocate General takes the intent into consideration in the Kalanke case.[32] He states that the under-representation of women in certain segments of the employment market may indicate inequality, but this is not necessarily attributable to an intent to marginalize women. From this he draws the conclusion that there is an element of

arbitrariness inherent in systems of quotas: "Hence the element of arbitrariness inherent in any preferential treatment which is mechanically confined to the under-represented group and based solely on that ground."[33] In other words, individual men have not necessarily had any intent to discriminate against women. The right of individual men to employment must not therefore be violated by quotation of women. Mr. Advocate General thus succeeds in creating an association between *positive actions* and *arbitrariness*. Like the word emotional, arbitrariness has been attributed to the feminine. Masculine has been attributed adjectives like logical and rational. Thus the masculine is the predictable, the opposite of arbitrary.

Finally, Mr. Teasuro ends his opinion with a volte-face concerning the mutual hierarchy of the terms formal and substantive equality. In contrast to genuine derogation from the principle of formal equality, which aim at eliminating obstacles, the derogation in the German law is false as it is destined to achieve equal representation of men and women in the labour market.[34] Such *numerical equality* is *only formal* equality, illusory and devoid of all substance.

To conclude, when the formal equality aims at giving equally qualified women an individual right not to be discriminated against, formal equality is, according to Mr. Tesauro's conception, illusory and empty and therefore subordinate to substantive equality.

The fact that Mr. Advocate General some points earlier has stated that the ultimate objective of equal opportunities is to promote representation of women in the employment market and thus attain *substantive equality* does not appear to be a contradiction to him.[35]

According to Mr. Advocate General "the fundamental, inviolable objective of equality – the real equality, not that equality which is only called for – may only be pursued in compliance with the law, in this case a fundamental principle."[36] He does not explain what this fundamental principle is, but he must refer to the principle of *formal, individual equality* as it is this principle from which it is not permissible to deviate unless the aim is to create *actual equality* between persons, in other words socialist equality. Mr. Advocate General does not think that women will merit from the *formal, numerical equality* in the German case at the cost of "an incontestable violation of a fundamental value of every civil society"[37] which must mean men's individual rights since the discrimination of individual women in attitudes and social structures is not any violation of a fundamental value of civil societies.

This is another example of Mr. Advocate General's thinking in terms of subject/object. Men are per definition subjects with individual, inviolable rights. Women are objects to a legislation which – possibly – aim at giving them status as individuals with individual rights in certain respects, namely as workers. However, women can not acquire status as individuals with individual rights at the expense of men's individual rights. The use of quotas violates men's individual rights to employment. Furthermore, women will not merit from violating men's rights. Mr. Tesauro's, "women do not merit the attainment of numerical – and hence only formal – equality"[38] could indeed even be perceived as a sort of threat: Watch out women, your situation will only be-

come worse if you try to challenge the superior-inferior relationship between men and women!

What according to Mr. Tesauro, is necessary above all in creating genuine equality for women is to produce "a substantial change in the economic, social and cultural model which is at the root of the inequalities".[39] The revolutionary changes Mr. Advocate General suggests here are usually not made in accordance with the law, especially not in liberal legal systems such as the EC's just because of the inviolable rights of male individuals. But "the fundamental, inviolable objective of equality may only be pursued in compliance with the law."[40]

Thus in Mr. Tesauro's world, women in the EU seem to be trapped. For whereas women on the one hand cannot expect to have genuine or substantive equality via means produced by the legal system of the EC, on the other hand, the equality women might acquire by staging a social revolution would not be a fundamental inviolable equality since it would not have been acquired in accordance with the law.

Men vs. women, individual vs. collective

Must each individual's right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sex yield to the rights of women in order to compensate for the discrimination suffered by them in the past? This is a question Mr Advocate General puts at the beginning of his opinion.[41] The question is interestingly formulated. It puts the individual against the collective; the individual man against the collective of women, and the present against the past, which presupposes that discrimination against women no longer exists. It is also Mr Advocate General's conception that it is the discrimination of women in the past which still persists and appears in the marginalization of women in the employment market. However, in one point he admits that there still exist "particular social structures which penalize women, in particular because of their dual role".[42] In spite of this he considers quotas as a kind of collective, historical revenge.

It is only in one respect that he describes women as individuals: when he compares the derogation in article 2(4) with the derogation for protective measures for women in connection with pregnancy and maternity in article 2(3).[43] According to Mr. Advocate General, the latter article leaves the Member States with a discretion to protect the woman in connection with pregnancy and maternity in order to "eliminate the unfavourable consequences for women of their biological conditions." On the contrary the derogation in article 2(4) is not linked with any specific condition of the woman but relates to all women as such in their general situation of disadvantages "caused by past discrimination and existing difficulties connected with playing a dual role". Here a new pair of words appears: *biological difference* and *social difference*. Thus, through the biological difference from the man the woman becomes individual. This biological difference motivates special derogations from the principle of formal equality which the social difference does not. However, it is not the biological difference in itself which constitute the legal grounds for

derogation but the way this difference manifests itself: pregnancy and maternity. When the woman then becomes a mother and she has to play dual roles and therefore meets difficulties on the employment market, she is not seen as an individual any more but belongs to the collective of women. Then it is not the biological difference but the social difference which causes discrimination and the latter difference does not motivate the special derogation from the principle of formal equality which the former difference does.

Thus it seems that women as biological, birth-giving human beings are individuals with the right to formal, individual equality, while women in roles as culturally and socially conditioned mothers belong to the collective of women without any corresponding right to formal, individual equality. Obviously, Mr. Tesauro does not recognize that the collective of social mothers consists of a number of individual women and consequently he does not confer them formal equality with individual rights.

Legal actions vs. positive actions

That Mr. Advocate General holds the view that positive actions are not legal, but practical actions, is evident when he outlines different types of positive actions and chooses the one he describes as follow: "...remove, not discrimination in the legal sense, but a condition of disadvantage which characterizes women's presence in the employment market".[44] Thus, positive actions are not capable of removing legal discrimination and must therefore be subordinate to the prior notion of legal actions.

In this case Mr Tesauro's repeats the meaning of the notions "legal action" and "positive actions" received by the Commission in the first action programme and later on in the recommendation on the promotion of positive action for women.[45]

Concluding remarks

After analysing Mr. Tesauro's legal opinion, it is easier to understand the philosophical underpinning to the European Court's interpretation of article 2(4). Men are seen as subjects with inviolable, individual rights, whereas women are seen as subordinated objects. As such women may possibly become individual subjects, however not if it threatens men's status as subjects. Thus, in the status of being subjects, men are seen as individuals whereas women as objects are transformed to a collective. Therefore men are protected by the higher principle of equality, i.e. the principle of *formal equality*, whereas women are relegated to the secondary and hierarchically lower principle of *substantive equality*.

Finally, that positive actions and quotas are seen as policies aimed at a collective also means to materialize the second kind of equality, substantive equality, and thereby it has become subordinated in a double sense: positive actions are subordinated legal actions and aim at ensuring the subordinated

Men	Women
Subject	Object
Individual	Collective
Formal equality	Substantive equality
Legal actions	Positive actions
The Absolute Norm	The Handicapped Other

Table 1. Mr. Advocate General's reasoning in his legal opinion in the Kalanke case.

principle of substantive equality. The existing obstacles standing in the way of equal opportunities for women in the labour market, which positive actions aim to remove, are seen as women's handicap and thus belong to women and the right side of the table below.

The hierarchy so crucial to understand Mr. Advocate General's reasoning in his legal opinion is shown in table 1.

The Commission has interpreted the Kalanke case as meaning that the only kinds of quotas which are not in accordance with the EC-law are those which absolutely and unconditionally guarantee women priority for appointments. As if the Commission itself does not believe in its own interpretation it has also proposed an amendment of article 2(4). According to the proposed amendment quotas are explicitly a kind of permitted positive action "provided that such measures do not preclude the assessment of the particular circumstances of an individual case."[46]

The model of positive action Mr Advocate General used in the Kalanke case, i.e. to temporarily remove obstacles which stand in the way of the achievement of equal opportunities between men and women, could in fact have been used in accordance with the existing formulation of article 2(4) if there had been an awareness of the complexity and the seriousness of sex discrimination in the Court of Justice. The obstacles quota aims at eliminating are existing discriminating structures and attitudes, and the equal opportunities quota aims at creating are equal opportunities to provide for oneself and to be economically independent. To be employed is not an end in itself, the end is the economical output.

That the objective of the directive 76/207 is to implement the principle of equal treatment as regards *access* to employment appears already from the title of the directive, but Mr. Advocate General and the Court named the access as the result and the representation, and declared that the access fall outside the scope of the directive.

However, this model of reasoning requires an understanding of Derrida and his theory of how meaning is constructed in the Western philosophical tradition. In his work, Derrida shows how meaning is constructed in hierarchically organized binary oppositions, which in fact are interdependent of one another. The terms men/women; individual/collective; formal equality/substantive equality and legal actions/positive actions are not hierarchical opposites, but describe differences within the terms themselves. As put by Barbara Johnson:

> The starting point is often a binary difference that is subsequently shown to be an illusion created by the working of differences much harder to pin down. The differences *between* entities... are shown to be based on a repression of differences *within* entities, way in which an entity differs from itself. The "deconstruction" of a binary opposition is thus not an annihilation of all values or differences; it is an attempt to follow the subtle, powerful effects of differences already at work within the illusion of a binary opposition.[47]

Consequently, women and men are all individual subjects belonging to the collective of human beings. Formal equality is necessary but not sufficient to create substantive equality, thus formal equality is only part of the broader notion of substantive equality; and legal actions and positive actions are part of all available measures in order for creating equality between the sexes.

Notes

1. See Catherine MacKinnon (1993), 427-453, Margot Stubbs (1993), 454-475, Janet Rifkin (1993), 412-418, Lucinda M. Fineley (1993), 571-581.
2. Case C-450/93 Eckhard Kalanke -v- Freie Hansestadt Bremen (1995-I) ECR 3051.
3. The proposed amendment is published in Official Journal C no. 179/96, 8.
4. Linda J. Krieger and Patricia N. Cooney (1993), 162.
5. Lucinda M. Finley (1993), 198.
6. Griggs -v- Duke Power Co 401.US 424 (1971).
7. Case 96/80 Jenkins -v- Kingsgate Clothing Production Ltd (1981) ECR 911.
8. Joan Scott (1988), 43-44.
9. Joan Scott (1995), 36-37.
10. Helene Cixous and Catherine Clement (1986), *The Newly Born Woman*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 63, 65. Cited in Rosemarie Tong (1989) *Feminist Thought. A Comprehensive Introduction*, London: Routledge, 224.
11. It is interesting to note that in all legal material of the EC of the older member states, the sexes are named as follows: men/women, hommes/femmes, Männer/Frauen, uomini/donne, maend/kvinder. However, in the newly become member Sweden's translations of the directives, the opposite order is used persistently, namely "kvinnor och män."
12. The directive is published in Official Journal L no. 39/76, 40.
13. See for example case C-177/88 Dekker -v- Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassennen (1990-I) ECR 3941.
14. Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH -v- Weber (1986) ECR 1607.
15. Hoskyns (1996), 104.
16. The community action programme is published in COM (81) 758 final.
17. Ibid, 6, 8.
18. Council Recommendation on the promotion of positive action for women (84/635/EEC) Official Journal L no. 331/84, 34, third recital.
19. Case C-450/93 Kalanke, paragraph 16.
20. Ibid., paragraph 18. The case the Court refers to is Case 312/86 Commission -v- France (1988) ECR 6315.
21. Ibid., paragraph 21.
22. Ibid., paragraph 22.
23. Ibid., paragraph 23.
24. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tesauro, 6 April, 1995.
25. Ibid., point 7.
26. Ibid., point 11.
27. Ibid., point 20.
28. Ibid., point 15.
29. Case 312/86 Commission -v- France.
30. Ibid., point 16.
31. Simone de Beauvoir, 13.
32. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General, point 24.
33. Ibid., point 24.
34. Ibid., point 17, 28.
35. Ibid., point 14.
36. Ibid., point 27.

37. Ibid., point 28.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., point 27.
41. Ibid., point 7.
42. Ibid., point 14.
43. Ibid., point 17, 18. It is difficult to follow Mr. Advocate General's reasoning in the English version in which he talks about women in the plural in both exceptions. In the French translation he talks about "la femme" in relation to protection in connection with pregnancy and maternity, and about "les femmes" in relation to positive actions.
44. Ibid., point 9.
45. The action programme is published in COM (81) 758 final and the recommendation in Official Journal L no. 331/1984, 34.
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And When We Speak...
– on political solidarity between Black and white women[1]

Pauline Stoltz

and when we speak we are afraid
our words will not be heard
nor welcomed
but when we are silent
we are still afraid
so it is better to speak
remembering
we were never meant to survive (Lorde 1982)

The days are gone when feminists spoke of 'we' in a manner that indicated all women. Smaller groups are often indicated nowadays, like 'we Black feminists' as in the above quote, or 'we socialist feminists'. This is a consequence of the realization that women do not have common origins or live under the same circumstances, as previously was claimed by essentialist feminists. In the same vein another observation can be made: that sometimes women have competing interests, even from other feminists. This leaves us with a situation in which women sometimes work together; sometimes try, but do not succeed; sometimes separate themselves from other groups of women in their political struggles... There is nothing new about all of this.

The present theoretical focus on the concept of 'women' instead of 'woman' can be related to the observation that the political demands that are made in the name of 'women' are maybe not as clear as they used to be. This does not always have to create problems, but on a certain theoretical as well as practical level obviously does. A focus on the political cooperation between Black and white feminists highlights this problem.[2] The Black feminist critique of white feminist analysis is that racism is just as important as sexism in the analysis of women in society. White feminist analysis is said to not always take this as a serious consideration (hooks 1984; Parmar 1989).

I take as a starting point the political activities of Black feminists in Europe and will describe some of the structural aspects of the political activities of Black feminists, as well as some of the attempts at cooperation between Black and white feminists. As cooperation between Black and white women is an

important political issue within the women's movement, we will focus on how political solidarity is carried out in practice.

1. Never Seen? Never Heard?

Black women choose to fight for their political issues both within the Black liberation movement, within the women's movement and autonomously, finding allies in both movements. In spite of this political activity, Black women are often not visible in the mainstream political debates of Europe. This is partly due to the constraints that are put upon women's political activity in general on both an EU as well as a national level. Restrictions which in terms of Black feminist organizing have certain specific characteristics.

There are several foci possible in terms of our discussion of political solidarity

(1) One focus is a discussion of the issues that are raised as important to feminists. Is racism for example considered important? When concepts like 'work' or 'citizenship' come up, are the issues of Black women taken into consideration?

(2) Another focus is the implications of strategic considerations for the solidarity and cooperation between feminists within the women's movement.

(3) A third focus could be a discussion of the characteristics of the academic and political actors who formulate feminist issues or make strategic decisions.

The first discussion will only indirectly be touched upon here as our concern will mainly be with aspects of the second and third points.

There are two political arena's that can be identified when discussing the political activities of Black women in Europe, the arena of party politics and the arena of (women's) organizations, both in a national as well as a European context.

1.1 The Legal Status of Women

We will start out with party politics, an arena which knows hardly any Black women at all. This stands in sharp contrast to the activities of Black women within interest organizations.

The constraints on party political activity can first of all be said to be due to matters of citizenship. Without full citizenship it is impossible to vote or be elected for any parliament or position of political influence at either the national or the European level. Post-colonialism has influenced the legislation on citizenship rights in many European countries, although not always in the same or even in a consistent manner. The rights of migrant women, who may or may not be Black, are also of interest here. In many countries, among these Germany, migrant women do not have a legal status which gives them political rights. As a consequence these women are not represented in the political parties. The constraints that migrant women face overlap with those of Black women with full citizenship rights. Even when they have full citizenship, as is

the case with many citizens from former colonies in either the first (as in the United Kingdom) or the second generation (as in France), it can still be problematic to get on the list of party candidates. Issues of qualification, which are familiar to many women, also show up here, combined with a presumed everyday level of racism.

Ever since the time of the suffrage movement the topic of citizenship has received a lot of attention by feminists (Okin 1989). The classical conception of citizenship, according to Marshall (1950), includes not only formal political rights but also civil and social rights. Feminists argue that such a conception is blind to the ways in which women are excluded from acquiring full citizenship. In addition it is criticized by Black feminists because of the ways in which ethnicity and racialization function to exclude access to full citizenship (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992).

Migrant women's legal status is often characterized as rather weak. Civil rights are concerned with rights necessary for individual freedom, for example industrial rights, which include the right to belong to a trade union (Layton-Henry 1990). Migrant women's access to rights concerning working permits is often dependent on their husbands or other male relatives. They are not seen as independent subjects, but are supposed to migrate according to the rules of family reunification (European Community document COM (88) 743 final; European Parliament 1995).

Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis have shown that immigration and nationality law differentiates between men and women and casts women as dependents of men. Under British immigration law women have tended to be seen only as mothers and wives. Successive immigration acts have also failed to give women the right to confer citizenship on their children or pass on patriality to their husbands (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992).

Black women have protested against the legal status which casts women as dependents to male relatives rather than as independent subjects in their own right.[3] The issue of citizenship rights in terms of a legal status in a country of residence, but also in terms of the European Union, influences the possibilities for the political organizing of Black women. The way concepts of gender, race and class have informed the legal status of women in immigration and naturalization laws, as wives and daughters, mothers and workers, has been of great importance to the role Black women have been allowed to conduct in society in general. Black women have pointed out that the effects of these laws on Black women, either as migrants or as Black women without a 'foreign' citizenship status, in terms of the racist assumptions of Black women's womanness often is similar in society in general.

1.2 The European Union

The possibilities of acquiring full citizenship rights are dependent on the legislation of the different European countries. There is considerable variation in immigration and naturalization policies. Since the EU functions as an interna-

tional regime for migration at a regional level, citizenship rights are dependent also on EU legislation (Hollifield 1992).

EU legislation influences Black and migrant women's lives also in terms of 'the four freedoms', of which the freedom of movement of labor is one, the others being of goods, capital and services. These freedoms apply only to EU-citizens, not to citizens from outside its borders. A third country national, having a right of residence in one country, thereby being ensured of being entitled to housing, health care, pensions, etc., but having a nationality from outside the EU, cannot count on any political or social rights when moving to another country, as he or she will not be able to transfer these rights the way EU-citizens can. Living under a racialized division of citizenship, the third country national lives as a so called denizen, a second rate citizen of the European Union (Brah 1993).[4]

A country's electoral system can promote different candidates before others, influencing not only the procedure of proposals for candidates, but also who gets to be elected from the list of candidates. In that sense the British example, with one candidate representing a local district in competition with one other local party-candidate is supposed to be disadvantages for women in general. However, a usual comment from British members of the European Parliament is that this system also makes representation of for example Black people more secured, as a local constituency of primarily Black citizens can vote away a candidate if it does not feel properly represented. On the other hand, there are electoral systems with national lists of parties competing with each other, and candidates that can be brought forward out of political reasons. Women seem in general to be benefiting from this system at some level. Black and migrant women on the other hand do not (Vallance and Davies 1986; Layton-Henry 1992).

The European Parliament is but one of the institutions of the EU, and although its power has increased since the Maastricht Treaty, it is still not comparable to the power and influence of the parliament of a democratic nation-state (Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities 1992). It is on the other hand one of the few channels through which citizens of the European Union can influence their situation on a European level, and to a certain extent control what the other institutions of the EU are doing (Vallance and Davies 1986; Hoskyns 1996). The influence of Black women upon the EP is related to the earlier discussions on legal rights.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this in terms of EU-legislation is that when Black as well as migrant women are perceived of as 'migrants', the insecure legal status that these women have in relationship to their husbands is ignored. When they are perceived of as 'women' the differences in political circumstances between white and Black women become invisible. Issues related to the combination of 'migrant' and 'women', of race and gender, in the context of EU-legislation are therefore hardly dealt with.[5]

1.3 Interest Organizations

The grass roots activities of Black women and the degree of separate organization, apart from white women, in different European countries depend upon several aspects (all described in European Parliament 1995). One aspect is whether there are many women as well as men coming from one specific country? When there are many people, the probability of an organization to exist becomes higher. The wider networks with the countries of origin can also play a role, as well as the reasons for migration and settlement. Also the policies of integration and assimilation of the new country are of importance. The Netherlands has many both local and national migrant groups based on nationality and ethnic origin, organization is encouraged because it is not seen as a challenge to and undermining of Dutch society. In France, on the contrary, the building of such groups is seen as a challenge to French identity, particularly when pursued by the Muslim cultures which remind of the war with Algeria. This is therefore also reflected in the organizational thinking, which is aimed at assimilation. The degree of racism, xenophobia and sexism within a country influences the possibility of organizing in a more indirect way. Another important aspect is whether women are unemployed or employed, because possibilities to organize are often related to work and to qualifications that stem from the work situation. Totally apart from tasks like combining work and children, supporting an unemployed partner or keeping together the family against racist and sexist attacks .

The institutional barriers to organizing are also apparent when discussing the legal status and rights of Black women in the country. In Greece for example, the state level protection for migrant women's rights is minimal. Problems concerning these rights are then addressed by interest organizations of Black women. But when many women are undocumented the fear of getting on a name-list can be a problem, as this increases the possibility of getting caught and deported. The circumstances under which these organizations work are rather poor and their activities more or less underground. Southern European countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, but also Ireland, have a tradition of emigration combined with a less developed structure of rights for migrant communities. There are very few Black women organizations in these countries and the possibilities of support or funding are minimal.

The northern countries, such as Britain and the Netherlands, have more established Black women organizations. This is due to a combination of a different history of emigration, different legal status, length of stay in the country, integrationist policies and a more established framework of rights, such as the British race legislation. In the Netherlands, funding is much more related to central or local government programmes, which is reflected into well-structured local, regional and national tiers. Transnational networks are more common here than in other parts of Europe. The organizations that work here might still be marginalized, but are visible in a totally different way and work with a whole different set of opportunities than similar organizations in Southern European countries.

Funding is one of the key factors which dictate the scope of activities of an organization. It can mean the difference between limiting the activity to counseling, immigration advice, work on welfare rights and domestic violence, or extending it to also including campaigning activities. It can mean the difference between relying solely on volunteers or having a staff with salaries. Funding also determines whether an organization will be accessible and have a permanent office or whether it will have to move around and rely on temporary arrangements. In Britain and the Netherlands membership funding is often the largest source of income. Obstacles to obtaining funds can include lack of access to information and networks, lack of knowledge about the political process of lobbying and lack of an appropriate level of financial support.

Although there are big differences between the possibilities of Black feminist organizing in the countries of Europe, also a number of European wide networks have emerged, especially during the 1990's. Most of these networks are based in Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium.

In sum, whereas Black women seldom are found within party politics, the second alternative, of interest organizations, often leaves Black women better options. Problems still arise particularly in cases when there are no links between the two arenas. This means that issues raised by Black women through grassroots channels are not taken up within party politics, because hardly any Black women are present in party politics and the white women who are presumptive allies choose not to take up issues of race and gender.

Cooperation between women is obviously lacking, otherwise the situation would look different for especially Black women. What makes it so difficult to cooperate? After all, as bell hooks has stated, the feminist movement is the one political location where bonding between Black women and white women has been raised as an important political issue (hooks 1995). I would suggest that it has to do with amongst others two things, the situation in which priorities are made, as well as the images women have of each other. The next section of the paper deals specifically with the cooperation between Black and white feminists.

2. Encountering Subjects

Black women's organizing has both inside the Black movement, as well as in an autonomous manner or inside the women's movement, often been concentrated around the interrelationship between issues of 'race' and gender. The relationship between Black and white feminists has, also because of this, been rather stressed. White feminists have seemed embarrassed by the topic of racism in general and uncomfortable in discussions on racism within the women's movement. Both European and American Black feminists have therefore expressed their disappointment about relations with white feminists and have described them as at best patchy, at worst non-existent, as was the conclusion of the 'Confronting the Fortress' report (European Parliament 1995).

In terms of the troublesome cooperation between Black and white feminists two levels of understanding can be suggested. One being on a societal level, the other being on an individual level. On a societal level we could see that interest organizations were more accessible as an arena for political activity for Black women. The links between political parties and interest organizations are of importance. One of the problems that occur in terms of the cooperation between Black and white feminists could be said to be strategic decisions on what to bring up in what fora and on what grounds. Here problems concerning priorities occur. An interesting example in this context is the European Women's Lobby (EWL).

2.1 Priorities

Since 1990 the European Women's Lobby is working 'to promote the interests of women living in the European Community Member States including immigrants, ethnic minorities, vulnerable and marginalized social groups, within the framework of a united and democratic Europe' (European Women's Lobby 1993 a). Their fundamental aim is the achievement of equal rights and opportunities between women and men.

The Lobby is an international organization of non-governmental women's organizations. Its activities are mainly directed towards the EU. The Lobby draws primarily on EU-legislation and action programmes[6], but also on UN declarations like the 'Forward Looking Strategies of the Advancement of Women' from the Nairobi women's conference of 1985, as well as other international agreements establishing the equality between women and men (European Women's Lobby 1993a).

The EWL was set up on a meeting in Brussels in September 1990 by 40 women, all representing non-governmental women's organizations. Soon after the lobby's formation a proposal was presented to the lobby by members of the European Forum of Left Feminists (EFLF or Forum), which were members of the EWL. They were concerned with the fact that there were apparently no Black women represented among the women who set up the lobby. At the time issues concerning Black women were due to be debated at the EC-level but there were no Black women present there either. Also the EC policies on women's rights, after all the context of the lobby's actions, lacked specific programmes for Black women. If EC policy making seemed distanced from women's organizations in general, this was certainly true concerning organizations of Black women (European Parliament 1995).

Therefore Forum members proposed that in the lobby's first work programme priority should be given to a project which would first identify contacts and organizations among Black and migrant women and second look at the existing barriers to greater visibility and representation of Black and migrant women at the European level. This was adopted and resulted in a Black and Migrant Women's Project, co-ordinated by the Forum.

Although the project was carried out and the report finished, and although motions regarding Black and migrant women and racism are accepted, the

members of EWL are not always in agreement, not even in the condemnation of racism. The issue at stake seems to be whether or not to bring up immigration issues on the agenda (European Women's Lobby 1993 b; Hoskyns 1996).

2.2 Solidarity as Hard Work

What to prioritize is not only difficult but also a sensitive decision. For Black women the solution can sometimes be found in rather organizing separately. A problem around priorities will then not occur in the same manner (Black women are after all neither all the same), and the possibility of making one's voice heard without interference will change. For example the Southhall Black Sisters (SBS) came to this conclusion. Pragna Patel describes how the SBS, who works within a predominantly Black, Asian community in Britain, were a challenge to both the feminist movement as well as to the anti-racist movement when they started in 1979. Whereas the feminist movement was devoid of an understanding of race and racism, the anti-racist movement refused to accept a gendered analysis of race. This left the SBS with the task of defining themselves. Cooperation is still of interest. In 1992 Pragna Patel's call is for "A new thinking..., one that moves us away from uniting on a basis of common origins, to uniting on the basis of a common agenda for the future" (Patel 1992).

The desire to cooperate with different women's organizations and to resolve the problems related to it have in the Netherlands lead to the formation of the Multi Etnisch Vrouwenoverleg (Multi Ethnic Women's Talks). This is a national initiative of women from Black, migrant, refugee and white women organizations, primarily aiming at stimulating the practical cooperation between Black and white women. Out of the conviction that everybody agrees upon the necessities of cooperation, after which nothing usually happens, several publications and seminars have been initiated since 1988 (Multi Etnish Vrouwenoverleg 1992). One of these publications is the highly interesting 'Bondgenoten?' ('Allies?'), in which one of the contributors, Leila Jaffar, has come up with a number of factors which highly influence the cooperation between Black, migrant- and white women (Jaffar 1992).

In her work as course director Leila Jaffar has noted as troublesome the expectations upon a natural solidarity between women. She claims that in practice there is a competition between issues of race and gender in terms of both positive action and fundraising, as well as of the pressure upon Black women to join both Black or migrant organizations as well as women's organizations in their political struggle.

A point Jaffar raises that seems widely known and recognized is the situation that the goals of groups of women might be the same, but the means to obtain these goals and the priorities made on the way, might not be. International women conferences are perfect examples of occasions in which this happens. What issues should be raised and who raises them are questions I would like to suggest should come up in this context.

Stereotypes about how white people as well as how Black people are, play an important role here, often emanating from a colonial history as in the case

of the Netherlands. All groups of women have ideas about other groups of women, often telling us more about themselves then about each other. For example the view that Black women are in need of help. An attitude among white women that they should give and also want to give, in spite of a lack of time, without expecting anything substantial back in return is such an example. A long tradition of women's organizations in other countries, successfully working in their own way, is often unrecognized by white women. For many Black women, according to Jaffar, receiving support or help from colonial white people that have this attitude is often irritating and not very appealing. It leaves Black women with long explanations of Black women's own situation, stressing at the same time that support is welcome, but that an attitude of pity is not. When Black women do not fit into this stereotypical picture of helplessness that has been created for them, it leaves white women confused, wondering where they have gone wrong? Black women are seen as aggressive and both parties doubt the good intentions of the other. Jaffar stresses the importance that white women acknowledge that they belong to a dominant group, in spite of how unusual it is for white women to perceive themselves in that way.

2.3 Solutions?

A possible strategy for white women is one of self reflection and self education. Knowledge about the impacts and mechanisms of racism both on an individual as well as a societal level are crucial. Acknowledgment of one's own position in itself does at the same time not lead to a better cooperation between Black and white women.

American Black feminist bell hooks has stated in this matter that:

> When individual black and white females attempt to build bonds without divesting of (a) will to compete, there is usually a rupture of closeness. Competition fosters distrust. But the moment white and black females refuse to compete with one another an important intervention happens: the existing sexist/racist structure is disrupted. If that will to compete is replaced with a longing to know one another, a context for bonding can emerge (hooks 1995).

According to Judit Moschkovich bonding should not be done by means of an attitude of 'teach me everything you know', but rather by one of reading and listening, after which there might be something to share. How difficult this is becomes clear when she addresses themes of non-duty of the oppressed to educate the oppressor, the problems of being a resource person, and of tokenism (Moschkovich 1981, sec. ed. 1983).

Lack of connection between Black and white women still seems a major issue. According to bell hooks, at first the issue was one of lack of connection between the groups. When more Black women joined the movement, the recognition of such a lack of connection was given more serious attention. After twenty years of active engagement she now finds the major barrier to be that individual white women tend to be unaware of the way racism over history has institutionalized structures of racial apartheid and determined patterns of social relations. Hooks, like Jaffar, also addresses the tendency among white

women to look for a way to 'please' Black women, when these have allowed themselves to open up and express the legacy of hostility and rage towards white women as a result of their complicity with white supremacy. 'Pleasing' not being the issue here. Rather a relationship from a position of awareness and respect is looked for (hooks 1995).

An attempt to do this is exemplified by a recent Dutch project on a common celebration of international women's day organized by Black and white feminists. The project ran on a regional level as a cooperation between 28 women's organizations and involved amongst other issues a training in cooperation. Both the concreteness of the project as well as the fact that Black women were involved at the idea stage, when nothing was decided yet, were important preconditions for the project. According to co-organizer Shirley Dewkinandan from the Surinam umbrella organization Un Doro are Black women far too often asked to cooperate when everything already is decided, this project was a good break in that pattern (van Hooft 1992).

We can conclude that successful cooperation between Black and white feminists is hard to find. In the previous section we saw that Black women are not passive or helpless in spite of the images or stereotypes that are created around them. White women at the same time have a task of acknowledging this.

> While white women can and must assume a major voice speaking to and about anti-racist struggle to other white women, it is equally important that they learn to speak with and, if need be, make it necessary to speak for women of color in ways that do not reinscribe and perpetuate white supremacy...
>
> ...This can only be done in critical engagement and dialectical exchange with non-white peers...(hooks 1995)

Ask Yourself...

To look at the concept of 'women' in the light of political solidarity, rather than common origins, gives a different angle to the ways in which concepts of gender and race overlap. It shows different as well as common tasks for Black and white women. It is within the women's movement that the arguments are made and will have to be made for the issues women want to raise as important and to find solutions that make sense to women.

Women as political actors can be seen as attempting to find ways of describing common interests, issues and arguments around which we can unite. This includes being self critical within the movement while still attempting to find common grounds to struggle from. This way of describing 'women', mainly as feminists and as political actors fighting common causes, sometimes with other women, sometimes with men, ends exactly there and should in my view be separated from a description of 'women' targeted at solving specific problems of specific groups of women in different societies.

When looking at the different organizational settings, like in the European Parliament, it obviously is a problem that Black women can rarely represent themselves and that they have to rely on others, often white women, to influ-

ence the policies that concern them. Several aspects of this reliance work to the disadvantage of Black women, such as white women's (and men's) lack of knowledge about Black feminist issues and/or real or presumed lack of interest in obtaining this information, the distance between the Parliament and its voters, combined with the prioritizing of other issues then those of Black women, identified as more central to 'women in Europe', etc. In all of the above discussed organizational and institutional settings do strategic considerations play in. Strategies that also can be changed.

The possibilities for Black and white women to cooperate and make links between the political institutions and the interest organizations seem rare, considering the nature of the constraints and the structure of the institutions. It could therefore be seen as one of the main tasks for both Black and white women within the women's movement to reveal and question the structures that keep women from having channels of representation and information between different political arenas.

Notes

1. A longer version of this article was presented at the conference 'A World in Transition – Feminist Perspectives on International Relations – an Interdisciplinary Conference', June 1996, Lund, Sweden, at the workshop on 'Resistances to Gendering and Gendered Resistances'. I would like to thank the participants of this workshop for their comments.

2. In this paper I will use the terminology Black and white feminists. This brings up the question of what is meant by 'Black' and 'white' in this context. First of all can it be stated that there is no common terminology around the issue of 'Black' and 'white'. The word 'Black' has a linked but also seperate and distinct history when one compares its use and the politics around it in the USA and in Britain. I will be using the British definition in which it signifies the entangled racialised colonial histories of 'Black' settlers of African, Asian and Carribean descent. It affirms a politics of solidarity against racism centered around colour. Within this discourse and in spite of the diversity of origin and variation in geographical, historical etc. reference points, 'non-whiteness' is a common theme, which entails certain commonalities of experiences in terms of confronting racist practices. These commonalities formed conditions for a politics of solidarity. The politics of 'Black' thereby also subverted the logic of the dichotomy 'white/non-white'. The unity of Black women as Black feminists can also be seen as a political phenomenon, that seeks a coherent and coordinated opposition against the varied manifestations of oppression. Black feminism and white feminism are therefore not essentialist notions. They make in the context of this article only sense as a dichotomy to highlight certain issues. Both are historically contingent, relational discursive practices, rather than fixed sets of positionalities. Their agendas both overlap and can be articulated seperately. (see also Brah 1996)

3. In the Netherlands exists the Komitee Zelfstandig Verblijfsrecht voor Migrantenvrouwen, the Committee for Individual Residence Rights for Migrant Women.

4. The term 'denizen' was introduced by Tomas Hammar and refers to a division in three gates at the entrance of many Western European states. The first describing the entrance of temporary foreign visitors and guestworkers with little or no citizenship rights. The second describing the regulation of status as denizen, granting permanent work and residence permits as well as full

social and legal rights, although usually not full political rights. The third describing naturalisation, meaning the granting of full citizenship including political rights. (Hammar1990).

5. The possibilities for Black women of changing this situation themselves are rather harsh. This must also be seen against the background of EU politics and the Schengen Agreement (see Meijers et al, 1991; Bhavnani 1993; Miles and Thränhardt (eds) 1995; Standing Committee 1993).

6. Action programmes are policy programmes drawn up by the Commission of the European Union. The Comission recommends the member countries to follow the policy without having the authority to impose punishments if they are not followed.

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Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights – Friends or Foes?*

Oonagh Reitman

This conference paper aims to generate workshop discussion about the similarities between two critiques of international human rights – those made by cultural relativists, on the one hand, and by feminists, on the other. The broad contours of these critiques will emerge in the ensuing discussion and I therefore propose the following initial brief description.

By the cultural relativist critique, I mean the critique which is made of the claim that human rights are universal, that is, that human rights are those held simply by virtue of being human and whose substance, form and interpretation are not subject to variations in culture (Donnelly 1989: 109-110). Cultural relativism consists in the rejection of this claim, contending instead that the source of human rights is culture, and since cultures are diverse, so too are the (non-universal) human rights which they dictate.[1]

The feminist critique of human rights argues that, in practice, those who hold human rights are men and not women, and that gender equality, and freedom from discrimination for women, is given a low priority in the international arena.[2]

This paper will describe how these two critiques have come to oppose each other in the realm of women's international human rights. Section 1 consists of an exposition of cultural relativist arguments made in the field of women's human rights, by way of description of the site of intersection and disagreement between the feminist and relativist critiques. This section also suggests that cultural relativism seems to have a negative effect on the realization and enforcement of women's human rights, which fact goes towards explaining the feminist difficulties with relativism, which, in turn, may partly account for the relativist wariness of feminism. The apparent tensions, however, between the feminist and cultural relativist criticisms of the hegemonic ideology of human rights and, in consequence, of each other's respective positions, is, I shall suggest in Section 2, unfortunate and indeed unnecessary, in that important similarities exist between them. The parallels thus noted between the two branches of critique suggest the possibility that they might operate together, rather than in opposition to one another, to achieve progress in their respective goals, particularly their apparent concern for the dignity and well-being of women,

including women belonging to cultures which the relativists claim to want to protect ("women of culture", for want of a better abbreviation). In Section 3, I shall tentatively propose an outline of what I term this "cooperative approach".

1. Cultural Relativism of Women's Human Rights

This Section will examine relativist claims made in relation to women's human rights in the context of United Nation conferences, and those underlying reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW")(United Nations 1980). Finally, the obstacle represented by these claims to the protection of women's human rights is suggested.

1.1 United Nations Conferences

Women's rights have been the focus of two conferences held this decade, the forums of which were also appropriated as sites for the making of cultural relativist contentions.

The International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in September 1994 was dominated by an opposition between the universality and relativity camps, and the relevance of gender in this debate came to the fore. Family planning and population control were at issue at the conference, and the fundamental question of women's rights to control their bodies, free from the constraints of others, whether they be the community or family members, was debated. The claims of relativists clearly appear in the report of the Conference itself in the form of oral and written declarations reserving on certain crucial passages (United Nations 1994: 135-151). The reservations were predominantly motivated by religious objections (based in Islam and Catholicism) to abortion and family planning services. The spirit of the reservations is summarized in the statement of the Holy See (Vatican) which described its "intention...to associate itself with [the] consensus [of the international community approving the conference document] in a partial manner compatible with its own position, without hindering the consensus among other nations, but also without prejudicing its own position with regard to some sections" of the final document (United Nations 1994: 147). The reservations were of a varied nature, ranging from the explicit and detailed, such as that entered by the Holy See (United Nations 1994: 146-9), to those which made sweeping reference to *Shariah* (Islamic) Law as setting the boundary of the reserving country's participation in the consensus, as in the reservation of Kuwait (United Nations 1994: 138). Some reservations, such as that entered by Libya, took the opportunity to scold the international community for engaging in some form of cultural imperialism: "no country, no civilization has the right to impose its political, economic and social orientations on any other people" (United Nations 1994: 139).

This represented the perfect arena for a cross-cultural coalition against certain women's rights championed as autonomy rights, in which "countries"[3] with cultures as varied as that of the Holy See and Libya could form part of the same group.

This cultural relativist alliance was reproduced at the Fourth World Conference on Women (Bohlen 1995: 5), held in Beijing in September 1995, in which culture-based reservations were appended to the Conference's final document (United Nations 1996: §V). Similar patterns can be detected in that the bulk of the reservations seem to refer to religion, be it Islam or Catholicism, and broadly relate to similar rights as those contested in Cairo. On a positive note, some countries which reserved in Cairo failed to do so in Beijing, as is the case, for instance, of Brunei, Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. There are, however, negative conclusions to be drawn from the comparison, emanating from the fact that the number of reservations increased between the two conferences, that some countries, such as the Dominican Republic and Malta, simply reiterated their Cairo reservations, that some countries, such as Egypt, filed more expansive reservations relating to religious values, and that others, such as Iraq, Malaysia and Morocco, added reservations pertaining to *Shariah* or, as in the case of Tunisia, to fundamental laws.

1.2 Reservations to CEDAW

Cultural relativism in reservations to CEDAW[4] can be distinguished from that detailed above by the simple fact that resistance comes *after* consent - via ratification of the Convention - to work towards the goal of elimination of gender discrimination.[5] The purpose, however, is the same - to exempt the reserving state from having to comply with part of a document, be it a binding international human rights instrument or a document approved by a consensus of delegates to world conferences.

The resistance here is of a varied nature but is essentially rooted in religious law and customary practices (Rehof 1993: 253-281). Thus, some countries, such as Egypt, Iraq and Libya, filed reservations based on *Shariah* Law, while others, such as Tunisia and Jordan, referred, in their reservations, to domestic laws which themselves incorporate religious laws. Some reservations, such as that of Egypt to CEDAW's article 2, are drawn in broad terms whereas others, such as Egypt's reservation to article 16, are more specific and informative. Some, such as that made by Libya, are made with reference to the whole of the Convention, whereas others are drawn in terms which relate back to specific provisions, as in the case of Egypt's reservations. The unifying theme is the desire to be seen to make a commitment to the elimination of discrimination against women while, in substance, omitting the term "all forms" (of discrimination) from the title of the Convention, on the grounds of culture and religion.

Having outlined cultural relativity in the field of women's international human rights, I shall now turn to consider the degree to which this presents an obstacle to the enforcement of these rights.

1.3 Relativism as an Obstacle to the Protection of Women's Human Rights

Both arenas of cultural resistance noted above result in weaker enforcement of women's human rights. To expose the extent of this obstacle, one should distinguish between hindrance of the rights of women who are citizens of reserving states and those who are not. For both sets of women, the fact of cultural resistance indicates the emergence of a deadlock in international negotiations concerning women's rights which detracts from a maximized consideration of the substance of those rights. For the women whose countries have filed reservations, the fact of cultural relativism effectively enables violations of those rights touched by the reservation to be carried out with impunity, or so it must seem from the perspective of the international consensus. However, as I shall now discuss, even as concerns the rest of the world's women, the fact of reservations by countries other than their own may be of relevance to their rights.

In relation to documents agreed at international conferences, although these are not – in contrast to Conventions, such as CEDAW – binding, the fact and nature of the consensus of the international community, and the degree of reservations to it, will affect the practical force of the documents themselves. A consensus, reached solely by way of bracketing the universality of women's human rights, will be weakened. Thus, if non-reserving countries see that reserving countries can get away with not respecting a given right, the former will be less shameful of having agreed to something which may no longer, at the practical level, be desirable to be put into effect.

CEDAW reservations also affect women from non-reserving states in that the integrity of the Convention is inferior to that of instruments in relation to which no or fewer reservations are entered (Clark 1991). CEDAW is one of the instruments most severely plagued by the reservation phenomenon, and it may be no surprise that the Convention is also one which seems to suffer disproportionate difficulties in terms of its enforcement.[6]

On a more pragmatic note, however, it must be conceded that to enter the international human rights forum with reservations is better than not to enter it at all. Reservations are, as it were, the lesser of two evils if they are truly a condition for a reserving state to enable a consensus to be formed at an international conference or to ratify a human rights convention.[7]

Having suggested that cultural relativism poses a serious obstacle to the enforcement of women's rights, most clearly as regards the rights of women from reserving countries but also of those from non-reserving ones, the remainder of this paper will concentrate on ways to clear this hurdle. Similarities between cultural relativist and feminist critiques will be explored in the next Section, as a basis for arguing for the cooperative approach proposed in Section 3.

2. Comparing the Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of Human Rights

This Section will discuss three broad areas in which similarities can be detected between the feminist and cultural relativist critiques of human rights: their

respective difficulties with the claim to the universality of human rights; the potential which each has for being the vehicle for often hidden, political agendas which bear little or no relation to the apparent substance of their respective critiques; and the vulnerability of both critiques to the charge that they erroneously settle upon a set of essential characteristics belonging to gender or culture, as the case may be, to the exclusion of other aspects of the identities of those whom each claims to represent.

2.1 Difficulties with the Hegemonic Claim to Universality

Both the feminist and cultural relativist critiques of human rights highlight the emptiness of the claim that human rights are universal (Bunting 1993; Kandiyoti 1995: 19; and An-Na'im 1994: 171-2). They differ, however, in the sense that feminists do not dispute the theory of universality, but merely its translation into practice; relativists, on the other hand, dispute both the theory and practice.

1. Feminists argue that universality has not been realized in practice, that only men's rights are protected and that women have not yet been included in the "human" of human rights. The argument is well represented in unifying campaign slogans such as "Women's Rights as Human Rights"and variations on the same theme. If human rights really are to be universal, claim feminists, women's rights must also be guaranteed and the failure of the international community to do so, attacks the universal foundation of such rights.

2. Cultural relativists, for their part, echo these claims in their contention that existing catalogues of international human rights are imbued with a culture which is specific to the ideologies of certain regions, peoples and/or religions which are said to occupy, or have occupied, a dominant position in the international community. Human rights are seen as a modern form of imperialism, with "Western",[8] principally North American and European, countries seeking to impose their particular view of society on the rest of the world, in much the same way as colonial powers in former times (Kandiyoti 1995:20-21).

3. The parallels between the two critiques are notable: just as, in the feminist version, human rights are made in the image of man, so too, from the perspective of cultural relativists, are they made in the image of the West; just as the hegemonic claim to universality serves to mask the male perspective of, and the benefit which men derive from, human rights, so too does it obfuscate the distinct ideology of the West with which human rights are imbued (*cf.* Kim 1993: 61). Thus, with different emphases, both sets of resistance argue that human rights are written so as to give priority to a certain type of social relations. Human rights result in the exclusion of alternative conceptions of society and the marginalization of those whose life situations do not or cannot fit the prescribed mold.

4. However, the relativist critique goes beyond the feminist to the extent that relativists, at least in their more radical manifestations (Donnelly 1989: 109), dismiss the possibility of universal norms, and reject the quest for universality. Feminists, to the contrary, strive towards the ideal of universality and, far from

giving up on the idea of it, base many of their arguments on the gap between the theory and practice of universality in the realm of women's rights. It is out of this last difference, as we shall see in Section 3.2, and the areas discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 that the antagonism between the two critiques develops - that difference emerges, as it were, from a degree of sameness.

2.2 Hidden Politics

Both critiques have the potential for being appropriated to serve goals superficially unrelated to the apparent objectives to which their respective resistances are directed.

1. The manifest purpose of the feminist critique of human rights is the attainment of equality and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. However, according to some, notably cultural relativists, behind this argument lies a host of hidden agendas, ranging from the imperialistic, 'Islamophobic', to those which (otherwise) serve the national interests of states allied with the feminist cause (Mayer 1995a:184). It is claimed either that feminists themselves embrace these agendas, as imperialists (Kim 1993: 43, 60) or 'Islamophobes', or that their critique is being appropriated by unlikely bedfellows, namely states which do not otherwise much care about gender inequality and discrimination against women, but are using these 'easy' targets as a front for other motives, such as attacks against states with whom they have antagonistic international relations on other grounds.[9]

2. In relation to the cultural relativist critique, a similar tendency can be detected. The apparent motive for making cultural relativist arguments is to elicit respect for, and to protect, the diversity of cultures, religions and fundamental values. The argument is that Western, individualistic perspectives on equality cannot be demonstrated to be superior to other systems based, say, on the complementarity of gender roles. This is the rationale to be found, for example, in the equality *versus* equity debate which came to the fore in negotiations in Beijing (Tempest 1995) and, for instance, in the language of a number of the reservations both to CEDAW (e.g. Egypt's reservation to article 16) and to U.N. conference documents (e.g. the Holy See's reservation in Beijing). However, beyond this rhetoric, argue some, principally feminists, is a hidden agenda in which objectives other than the promotion of the dignity of women are being pursued.

Firstly, relativism, far from being sympathetic to the well-being of women, is deeply antithetical to it, the objective of the cultural reservations being precisely to maintain the status quo of male dominance and gender discrimination (Mayer 1995a and b; Hérnandez-Truyol 1996: 660; Halim 1994: 407-410). Thus, it is highlighted that relativists choose to focus preponderantly on gender relations, whereas changes in other areas, such as trade and commerce, are deemed acceptable, notwithstanding that they may conflict with religious or customary precepts prevailing at the time of change (Kandiyoti 1995: 20; Halim 1994: 408-9).

Secondly, and in a somewhat less antagonistic vein which does not involve the claim that relativists are *necessarily* sexist, feminists posit that relativism appears in the realm of women's rights by way of a knee-jerk reaction against the West and its perceived imperialism (Halim 1994: 411). Cultural relativists fail to go beyond the perception that 'others' are trying to colonize 'their' culture, to consider the substantive gender issues in question.

Finally, studies have shown how certain countries, and/or movements operating within them, have used gender relations and the status of women to further political, be they nationalist or religious, goals (Moghadam 1994; Jayawardena 1986; Davies 1983). Here, the focus is not on women except as a means to an apparently unconnected political end.[10]

3. In sum, both critiques are accused of either or both of the following acts: first, of being antagonistic to the goals of the other critique. Thus, cultural relativists see feminist imperialists and feminists, sexist relativists. Secondly, the struggles of both camps are seen to have been appropriated by surprising partners: feminists are allied with sexist imperialists, and cultural relativists are seen to comprise a "hypocritical" (Mayer 1995b) alliance between mutually non-respecting cultures, as in the collaboration, for the purposes of the Cairo and Beijing conferences, between, say, the Christian and Islamic "fundamentalists" who would, in another context, be in an adversarial relationship with one another.

2.3 Essentialism

Both the feminist and cultural relativist critiques are seen to be guilty of essentializing that which they claim to protect - namely, women or culture, as the case may be - at the expense of a more holistic and heterogeneous vision which is inclusive of the multifaceted identities of "women of culture". They each are said to adopt an 'either/or' approach, failing to admit the significance of both gender and culture within the ambit of their respective critiques and, especially, in the identity of the "woman of culture". Here, again, the bulk of the criticisms directed at each set of critique emanates from the other - cultural relativists accusing feminists of essentialism, and feminists, cultural relativists.

1. Cultural relativism is said to be essentialist in that it depicts culture as a monolithic and readily recognizable entity (Mayer 1995b), often as a unitary system, as in one African tradition (Winter 1994: 955) or one notion of Islam. Culture is represented as something which is incapable of alteration to keep apace of changing circumstances and is seen as being impervious to the influence of globalization. To make reservations based on culture indicates a reluctance in principle to consider the possibility of progressive reform and thereby suggests that culture is being used blindly to maintain the status quo. Indeed, given the arguments detailed above that this serves to perpetuate male interests, some have been drawn to question whose version of culture is being protected (*cf.* Kim 1993: 87-104). There are instances of feminists within reserving states voicing objections to the portrayal of culture evinced by the reserva-

tions and arguing for internal reform in line, broadly, with the very rights touched by the reservations (Mayer 1995b). What voice is given to these women in the description of what culture is? Does not the essentialist portrayal of culture by relativists exclude its performance and understanding by women who are, by virtue of the drawing of state boundaries, imprisoned in the 'official' depiction of, and the male perspective on, the culture in question (Mayer 1995a: 181)?

2. Feminists, for their part, are accused, principally by cultural relativists, of having a particular type of woman in mind in their consideration of women's human rights. The woman who is to have international human rights does not belong to a minority culture and is not deeply religious. She is from the West and a product of Western ideology. She wants the sort of equality and freedom from discrimination which is defined by individualistic rights discourse and strict formal equality, at the expense of a system based on community, complementarity and the like (United Nations 1996: V§11 (Holy See)).

3. In sum, feminists accuse cultural relativists of protecting a male version of culture and cultural relativists see the feminist agenda as being founded on a Western notion of equality. The interrelatedness of these last accusations and those noted in Sections 2.1. and 2.2. are clear and the comparisons revelatory. Recall, for instance, the fact that relativists claim that universality masks a Western perspective on human rights, and for feminists, that it hides a male perspective. However, in the charge of essentialism which each levels against the other, they are accusing each other of committing the very error which each identified in the dominant claim to the universality of human rights. In other words, feminists are said by relativists to be protecting a Western notion of equality, much as universality discourse is seen by them to promote Western ideologies; and relativists are accused by feminists of safeguarding a male notion of culture, just as universality was identified by them as a vehicle for promoting male interests. That is, that in their respective critiques of the dominant discourse, rather than progressing beyond its failings, each is said to be perpetuating them.

4. At this juncture, I must confess to an unfortunate brevity, itself verging on the essentialist, in my depiction of the two critiques. However, I offer the following two explanations: first, for the sake of clarity and simplicity of exposition in this restricted space, and given that the focus of this paper is on the point of *intersection* between the two critiques, I have come to limit my description of them. Secondly, the act of limiting my exposition has been governed by the desire accurately to reflect the voice which emerges as dominant within each critique.[11] This is not to say, however, that there are no subdued and sometimes silent voices within one critique which may be sympathetic to the views espoused by the 'other' (Mayer 1995a: 180; Mahoney 1996: 829-837)[12]. Indeed, part of the project of this paper is to think of ways in which to enable those voices to be heard, and it is to this end that I propose the following cooperative approach.

3. Towards a Cooperative Approach

In this concluding Section, I shall draw upon the findings of the foregoing Section to signal some of the lessons which should be learnt so as to ameliorate the relationship between the two sets of critique and, therefore, to assist the enforcement of women's human rights, especially those of "women of culture". I shall broadly outline a cooperative approach which is suggested by the comparisons of the previous Section.[13]

The approach I favour is one in which feminists and relativists work alongside each other and, rather than viewing each other as enemies, take serious account both of the substance of their respective critiques of human rights, and of the potential effect which their policies might have both on the 'other' critique and on "women of culture".

At worst, given the enormity of the gulf between feminists and cultural relativists, this project may seem naïve; at best, however, it is a pragmatic and strategic proposal which ought to be tried and tested before being abandoned as unrealistically optimistic.

There are two facets to this approach, the substantive and strategic.

1. I propose that feminists and relativists take each other's standpoints more seriously and respect each other's positions. The argument that I would make in favour of this approach rests on the uncanny similarities which exists between them. First, they attack the same targets, namely the dominant position within the international community, and especially the universality rhetoric which it espouses. Second, they employ the same arguments against each other, namely, as we have seen, the charge of essentialism and of furthering hidden agendas. Finally, they are both, although to differing degrees, emphasizing the same essential value, which is respect for difference, be it based on sex[14] or culture.

Clearly, there are a number of differences between the feminist and relativist camps which this paper has ignored in the desire to make the case for the cooperative approach more forcefully and simply. I would argue, however, that these differences should be considered *within* the framework of the cooperative approach advanced in this paper. In what follows, I shall hint at ways in which any remaining conflicts between the two camps might be resolved in this way.

2. Turning to the pragmatic aspect of the cooperative approach, since my concern is for the enforcement of women's human rights, my focus here will be on the feminist critique, given that it most obviously shares this concern. I shall argue that feminists have reason to take account of relativist positions when devising their strategies, if they are to be mindful of the potential for a relativist backlash.

This potential is considerable and I shall take the case of feminist campaigns centring on universality as an example. "Mainstreaming", a policy advanced by feminists in recent times, founded on slogans of universality of human rights, seeks to ensure that women's rights are placed within the mainstream of human rights by the international community and not, as seems to be the

case, on the periphery, relegated to specialized institutions, with inferior funding and enforcement powers than the core human rights institutions (Bunch 1990 and 1995; Friedman 1995: 27-31).[15] The result of the campaign, however, was costly for talk of universality could only strengthen the relativist opposition to women's human rights and the feminist goal of universality (see 2.1). In real terms, in relation to the document produced at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights of 1993 – the prime testing ground for the mainstreaming campaign, given the conference's focus on human rights generally – the aims of the campaign may have been frustrated for, far from being imbued with a gender-conscious perspective throughout, the document merely (although an achivement in itself) devoted discrete sections to women's rights (Sullivan 1994). In other words, the cost of the relativist backlash may have outweighed the benefits gained from adopting the universality rhetoric. Although this rhetoric clearly ought to have resonance for the dominant grouping in the international community with its favour for universality, in practice it seems to have failed to produce the kind of gains which would justify the negative impacts the campaign may have generated in the form of a relativist retort. Indeed, universality may be a misguided slogan for feminists on another ground for it can be used in a modifying sense by relativists to limit women's human rights, such that only those rights which are accepted by *all* cultures, religions or traditions are fit for the label 'universal' (Hérnandez-Truyol 1996: 654n.196). Had those struggling for women's rights enforcement adopted the cooperative approach and sensitized their campaigns in light of the relativist position, I believe that the cost-benefit analysis might have been more positive. Thus, if the campaigns were to avoid the notion of universality and argue, instead, for the substantive results of mainstreaming, and highlight the fact that their claims are not primarily being made in response to those of relativists against universality, perhaps the relativist backlash would abate.[16]

Another example of the lack of sensitivity to the relativist position is found in the overtures of the CEDAW Committee (the body charged with CEDAW's enforcement) towards the reservations made by Islamic states to the Convention. The Committee proposed that a study be effected of how Islamic law affects women's rights under CEDAW. This was a reasonable and valid proposal given the number of reservations which refer to *Shariah* and the fact that the general language in which a number of them are written prevents the Committee from appreciating the exact boundary between matters covered by the reservation – and therefore beyond the Committee's purview – and those not. However, the Committee was forced to abandon the project and retreat with an air of embarrassment having had accusations of imperialism leveled against it (Bayefsky 1994: 352-3; Mayer 1995a: 178; Clark 1991: 287-8). Had the Committee taken account of the relativists' sensitivities, particularly as perceived victims of 'Islamophobia', perhaps a different outcome would have been yielded in which the serious problems posed by the reservations might have been more fruitfully addressed.[17]

3. For consistency and a degree of completeness, I shall venture to suggest how the strategic element of the cooperative approach might translate into

practice in relation to the aims of cultural relativists. I believe relativists should actively seek endorsement of their policies by women. The choice, for instance, of Professor Mary-Ann Glendon, a Harvard law professor who has worked closely on family law (Glendon 1977, 1987 and 1989), as the chief delegate of the Holy See at the Beijing Conference, is a strategic move, of the type I have in mind, to encourage the dialogue between the relativist and feminist camps (Butterfield 1995). Indeed, a comparison of the draft and final form of the wording of the crucial paragraph 9 of the Beijing document (setting out the Conference's objectives) suggests that a degree of compromise was in fact reached between relativism and universality of women's rights. The draft version was replete with brackets around words such as "respect for the various [religious and ethical values, cultural background and philosophical convictions of ... people]" and "[universal]" (United Nations 1995b: 11) (original brackets), indicating disagreement over these central issues. Although the final version omits all reference to universality, it stresses "the full realization of *all* human rights and fundamental freedoms of *all* women". It also argues for "respect for various religious and ethical values" (United Nations 1996: 21-22; emphasis added).[18]

Furthermore, if relativists can show that "women of culture" have been given the opportunity significantly[19] to reflect upon, and contribute in the process of defining, the extent to which human rights should give way to the demands of their culture, I would argue that any remaining dissatisfactions which feminists might have ought to be considered with caution.

4. Surely it is unacceptable to force a choice upon "women of culture" between siding with the feminist and relativist critiques, that is, either to give priority to their culture or to their gender. Both critiques need to work alongside each other, by first examining their respective tendencies towards essentialism and ensuring that they are not serving any hidden agendas unrelated to the goals of gender equality or respect for the diversity of cultures (as the case may be), in order then to proceed with a multidimensional, respectful, and sensitive approach which promotes the dignity of the "woman of culture" and gives voice to her multifaceted identity. As things stand, neither can really stake the claim to speak on her behalf before the international community, be it in the name of gender equality, or of cultural diversity.

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Notes

1. *See generally*, for doctrinal works, Coomaraswamy 1994; Donnelly 1989, 109-124; Mayer 1995a; Renteln 1990; for cross-cultural works, An-Na'im 1992a; Baehr 1996; Pollis 1980; and for feminist cross-cultural works, Cook 1994; Peters 1995: 51-100.

2. *See generally* Bunch 1990 and 1995; Burrows 1986; Byrnes 1992; Charlesworth 1991; Cook 1994; Dallmeyer 1993; Engle

1992; Peters 1995; Pietilä 1994; Symposia 1981 and 1996.

3. The inverted commas indicate the vexed status of the Holy See in the international community.

4. *See generally* Clark 1991; Cook 1990; Jenefsky 1991; Lijnzaad 1995: 298-370; Rehof 1993; Venkatraman 1995.

5. However, all States within the UN system have undertaken not to discriminate on the basis of sex under United Nations 1945: art. 1.3 and United Nations 1948: arts. 2 and 7.

6. There are many factors which result in the inadequate enforcement of, and inferior respect given to, CEDAW, some of which may be unrelated to its reservations. *See generally* Byrnes 1989 and 1994; Coliver 1989; Galey 1984; Holt 1991.

7. *See* Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Case, 1951 ICJ Rep. 15 (Adv. Op. 28 May) and the authors cited in note 4.

8. The inverted commas serve to question the existence of a homogenous Western culture. *See* Bunting 1993: 9 (many in the West are critical of liberal individualism and Enlightenment universalism reflected in human rights).

9. Compare studies in post-colonialism highlighting the use by colonisers of colonised women to paint an inferior picture of colonised society. *See* Shaheed 1994; Kandiyoti 1995: 20-1. *See also* Nesiah 1993: 193 n14 (forced sterilization policies cynically use rhetoric about vomen's rights).

10. *But see* Freeman 1993: 14.

11. *But see* Nesiah 1993: 191n.10.

12. For examples of feminist scholarship centered on engaging with these voices, *see, e.g.*, Engle 1992b and Nesiah 1993.

13. *Cf.* An-Na'im 1992b and 1994; Halim 1994: 419; Mahoney 1996.

14. The vexed sameness/difference debate within feminist literature exceeds the confines of this paper. *See generally* Becker 1994 (for references).

15. *See also* the authorities cited in note 6.

16. Note, however, that feminists may be responding to the low premium placed by the international community on women's rights, which itself may explain why relativism has been tolerated, and therefore allowed to become an obstacle, in the realm of women's rights.

17. The Committee has now settled upon an alternative mechanism for dealing with reservations, through the reporting procedure under CEDAW. *See* IWRAW 1996: 59-60. Of course, the advantages of a comprehensive survey initially advocated by the Committee are the comparisons between different embodiments of Islam and the leverage these give to women. *See* Shaheed 1994.

18. Although this paragraph reproduces part of the wording in the Vienna conference document, which paradoxically refers *both* to the universality of "all human rights" and "the significance of...cultural and religious backgrounds" (United Nations 1995: 30), it is significant to note that references to "universality" were omitted in Beijing.

19. *See* Rao 1995.

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Militarization and Gender: The Israeli Experience

Galia Golan

There are many factors that lead to gender inequality, and in a country such as Israel which was once, inaccurately, believed to be egalitarian, there are still additional, perhaps unique factors. Not least of these is the disproportionate influence of religion and, in particular, an archaic religious establishment wielding a good deal of political power (despite the very small size of the religious population). Perhaps the most insidious factor impacting on gender relations, however, in a country such as Israel, is the militarization of society.

In a situation of prolonged armed conflict and the chronic absence of peace, accompanied by a chronic fear of war or terror, the military as an institution assumes a central role. With this role, come the norms and values of the military. This is clearly the case for Israel, which has been in a virtual state of war since its inception, and indeed even before. It is difficult to describe just how central an institution the military is in Israeli society and in the lives of almost all its citizens. Given the compulsory service for Jewish citizens, male and female, almost all of the Jews in the country – and many non-Jews, on a voluntary basis – pass through this institution. For the new immigrant, the army is a major vehicle for education and integration into the society; for the vast majority of Israelis it is part of the life cycle. At age eighteen one is inducted into the army, and it is there that one experiences what amounts to the last stage of socialization, emerging from adolescence to adulthood. Men then continue to serve, regularly and actively, throughout most of their adult lives.

Yet this central and socializing institution of the military is the quintessence of a patriarchal institution, reinforcing and perpetuating the stereotypical role of women as subordinate, subservient and superfluous. For this is the manner in which the army relates to women; at the very least it is the message the army emits from the months preceding the draft to the (unequal) mustering out grants it pays. In the year prior to the draft, the various branches of the army court the boys, appearing in local high schools, competing with each other to attract the best recruits. No such courting takes place with regard to the girls. The different approach is evident even in the letters sent out for the pre-registration of seventeen year-olds. Then, it is far easier for girls to obtain an exemption from service than for boys. This fact accounts for a 15-20 % difference in the numbers going into the service. Following a far shorter basic training, girls serve far less time than the boys, and they do virtually no reserve duty – as distinct

from the near lifetime of active reserves expected of the men. These distinctions in themselves deliver a most important message about the worth of women in comparison with men. This message, however, is amplified many times over during the period of required service, both by the nature of the tasks permitted or accorded women and the attitude, and behavior, exhibited toward them during this period.

Status in an army is determined by one's relationship to combat. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), men are the only sex that can serve in combat positions. The reason most often given (though not officially) for excluding women from combat positions is that women might fall prisoner and be raped. This is an explanation that certainly exemplifies and reinforces the stereotypical view of women as vulnerable and in need of protection – ignoring the fact that men too may be subject to atrocities and indignities as prisoners.

This is not to say that some "status-bearing" positions are not open to women; indeed the closer a women's task is to an actual combat position, the higher her status, albeit after that of her fellow male soldiers. The majority of women conscripts, however, are employed in clerical or service positions and as such viewed by their male commanders and male colleagues alike as generally unnecessary for an army, at best a source of warmth and comfort for their otherwise Spartan existence.

Nor is the situation any better in the professional army, where women may not rise above a certain rank, and, more importantly, women cannot hold a field command – which is the prerequisite for advancement to all but one of the highest positions in the army. Through the work of feminist organizations in the country, the rank of the head of the women's branch of the army was raised to brigadier-general; prior to that and for all other women officers, the glass ceiling remains at the rank of colonel.

A break-through on the issue of women in combat positions, or at least combat-like positions, was achieved early in 1996. This came in the form of recruiting women to Border Guard units, the main force dealing with terrorism. The border guards, however, do not belong to the army but rather to the police force. Moreover, they are perceived by the public as less educated, less important and less respected than the army. Just as women serving in the police has not helped the image or status of women, it is doubtful that this change, permitting them combat-like positions in the Border Guards, will be more successful. Nonetheless, it may represent a psychological step towards equality.

A far more significant step was the 1995 Supreme Court case in Israel brought by the Israel Women's Network and the Association for Civil Rights. This was the case of Alice Miller, a young woman who possessed a civil aviation pilot's license and a degree in aeronautics but was refused permission to take the qualifying tests for the pilots' course when inducted into the IDF. Following a public battle, including futile appeals to the President of Israel, Alice Miller took her case to the courts. There it was ruled that the air force must make appropriate arrangements to permit women to become candidates and, if qualified, enter the pilot training courses. Since that decision tens of

women have applied and steadily increasing numbers have already begun these courses.

One may argue that the road to take is not the road of militarization, seeking combat positions or equality with men in the military. Indeed, as the Israeli army under universal service has grown beyond that which is necessary, it has been proposed – by the army – that women no longer be called upon to serve. The IDF is ready to do away with women's service because it views women as expendable, non-essential, of little to no worth. Many feminists support the idea of relieving women of the burden of serving, particularly in the present circumstances both of the nature of women's service in the IDF and the use of the IDF in what most feminists if not most Israeli women (or men) perceive as unjust Israeli occupation over the Palestinians. Certainly there is much to be said on the issue of pacifism and feminism which I shall discuss below. It may be argued, however, that given the centrality of the institution of the military in a society at war, however repugnant war may be, total exclusion from this institution would only contribute still further to gender inequality and the view of women as subsidiary, unimportant and marginal to the society.

Militarism and the negative impact of the absence of peace goes beyond the influence of the military establishment itself. A country in a state of war, by necessity or custom, values the male child above the female. The male is our potential defender; he may be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice for our benefit and safety; he has a special, critical role to play in and for our society. This may indeed be positive in cultivating a sense of self-worth and pride in boys and young men; what message does it give girls? Moreover, such a situation inculcates and venerates "military" traits: strength, force, aggressiveness, bravery. That is, the very traits generally associated with masculinity or the male stereotype.

In addition, the presumed superior qualities developed in the course of a military career, coupled with the status accorded the professional soldier in a country at war, provide privileged positions for the ex-military man upon his return to civilian life – advantages unavailable to women. Coming out of the professional army, men are "parachuted" into senior positions in business, administration, government, and especially politics. The ex-general is extolled and admired not only for his devotion but for qualities of leadership, organization skills, assertiveness and any number of other traits associated with high rank. Moreover, he is considered an expert, with experience and knowledge, on the subject that has priority over all other topics in a society at war: security. The subject of security, upon which women cannot have either the expertise or experience of the Israeli male, is what makes the ex-officer valuable to a political party, to the parliamentary committees that are viewed important and to the tasks considered important by the media.

Not only have ex-generals permeated Israel's political life, it is even the participation of ex-generals and ex-officers that render legitimacy to the peace movement in Israel. Israel may be the only country in the world where the mass peace movement (Peace Now) was founded (in 1978) by reserve officers and soldiers coming out of combat units. Exemplifying their intent, the women

officer among the founders was denied public acknowledgment at the time because, as a woman, her military background did not accord her the expertise and therefore legitimacy that was being emphasized by the organizers. That situation has since improved with that particular movement, and a smaller but important movement specifically of former high-ranking officers, the Council for Peace and Security, founded in the 1980s has included two or three former women officers (from among the very few who had reached high ranks) on a more or less equal basis (more or less meaning they are less known to the public and given virtually no publicity by the organization, which prefers to emphasize the ex-generals in their ranks).

To the list of advantages accruing to men from their military service one might add the phenomenon of the old boy network created by the army, mainly by reserve duty, which helps men in many areas of society. Reserve duty plays an additional role in providing advantages to the young male soldier that are unavailable to the young women soldiers. My reference is to role models. The eighteen or nineteen year old recruit is in constant contact with men from all walks of life who are doing their reserve duty – engineers, psychologists, artists, writers, lawyers, doctors, professors. This contact provides role models throughout their service. Inasmuch as women do virtually no reserve duty, the young woman soldier does not have the benefit of similar but female role models. Here too there is a message, to the young male and the young female soldier, regarding which sex is skilled, valuable, important.

Women as well as men tend to internalize the message conveyed by all of the above factors. Especially in time of war, psychologists have reported, women tend to feel guilty that they are saved from the danger and sacrifice demanded of men. In time of war, according to a study conducted during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, women are forced back into the most traditional roles of providing solace, care-packages and the like, to their fighting men (Bar-Yosef & Padan-Eisenstark 1977: 134-145). Confined to home because of the closure of schools in time of crisis, they are still further excluded from decision-making bodies as these bodies contract in times of war or crisis. At the same time, prolonged military conflict – in our the maintenace of a long and violent occupation – legitimizes the use of violence, leading to a rise not only of crimes of violence in Israel but also, and in particular, violence in the home.

To all this one might add the perhaps less insidious but nonetheless debilitating problem characteristic of societies in a state of war: they have a particular set of priorities. Gender equality is not high on this list of priorities; women's issues are deemed less than secondary, certainly less urgent than the struggle at hand and, therefore, capable of awaiting solution. Together with the power of the religious establishment in Israel, this may be one of the main factor delaying progress toward gender equality.

Thus, there is a connection between the quest for gender equality and the quest for peace, that is the effort to end armed conflict and the militarization of society that accompanies such conflict. This may indeed be the link between women and peace, if there is in fact such a link. Certainly peace would reduce if not eliminate a powerful barrier to equality in Israel. This is not to say that

pacifism is a natural attribute of women. From a feminist perspective, the linkage of pacifism with women appears to accept and reinforce the stereotypical, essentialist view of women as possessing attributes which render us more peaceful, more moral, more caring than men. And this is often traced to our capacity for motherhood. The psychoanalytical school of feminism has suggested that there is, indeed, a basis, in infant development and early childhood, for a tendency in women to be more empathetic than men; Carol Gilligan has found similar gender differences in relation to moral issues without necessarily explaining their origin (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982).The question is, are these intrinsic attributes of women, or are they the result of socialization, that is, a socialization which is different for women than for men. On the other side of the question, the fact that there are many women, notably in the political arena, who are less peaceful than men or, we might say, more like men, exhibiting qualities such as aggressiveness, does not prove any particular theory.

The dilemma remains. Women have indeed been drawn to the peace camp for many reasons, not necessarily intrinsic to their nature as women, but, nonetheless, possibly for reasons derived from their particular situation as women. It may well be that women, who are themselves oppressed as a group, denied self-determination and freedom – and power – of the type available to men, empathize more directly with the oppressed, the victim. This is one possible explanation for the flood of women to the peace movement in Israel during the Palestinian intifada of the 1980s. Women do not benefit from, nor do they usually advocate, the concepts of "the glory of war", heroism, male bonding and the like. In interviews conducted among Jewish men and women in Israel during the period of the intifada, we found women more likely to see only the losses, the pain, the sorrows of war rather than even the pragmatic idea of necessity.[1]

Nonetheless, research in Israel has been equivocal on this point. Studies conducted in the United States, Canada and some European countries in the 1980s did find some differences between men and women on questions of the use of force, negotiations, willingness to compromise, opposition to capital punishment, and other measures (Bourque & Grossholtz 1973: 255-266; Lansing 1983; Evans 1981: 210-221; Frankovic 1982: 439-448).The differences found, however, were not great, leaving the issue open (for some) as to the statistical significance of the findings. A colleague and I undertook a similar research project in the 1980s in order to determine if, in a society under prolonged conflict such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, gender socialization might be different, producing attitudinal results different from those found in the U.S., Canada and various western European countries. Would the situation of prolonged conflict eliminate the differences between men and women, suggesting the importance of socialization, or would we find there were indeed differences as in the other countries, suggesting a more essentialist (though not necessarily essentialist) view. Our findings, however, were not conclusive. The first study we examined, conducted in Israel in the early 1980s, did indeed find women slightly more willing than men to compromise and negotiate rather than employ the use of force. On a whole series of related questions, men scored some-

what higher than women on what might be called a scale of militarization (hawkishness). The gender differences on these questions increased the greater the number of years of education; the gap also increased when the variables of marriage and of parenting were added. Men and women both exhibited greater dovishness with these variables, but women significantly more so than men. The variable of religiosity also produced a gender difference, but in the opposite direction: the more religious the more hawkish, particularly among women. However, a second survey, conducted by us in the late 1980s during the intifada, found virtually no differences in attitudes between Israeli men and women on the same or similar questions. Only on one question and in relation to one variable were there significant differences: women were more fearful than men; single women were more dovish than married women or men altogether. One explanation may be that the Israeli population as a whole became more dovish, that is, willing to compromise and end the conflict, during the intifada. Thus the gender gap may have been eliminated by the change that took place among the male population. Another explanation may be, however, that there are simply no significant differences between men and women on these questions. Such a conclusion is suggested also by the absence of a women's vote in Israel with regard to elections to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), including the election of 1996.

Women are socialized differently from men in Israel, and women clearly suffer from the militarization of society in a way that men do not, but Israeli women do not appear to be more peace-loving than men. This would seem to be an indication both of the power of the conflictual situation and the absence of intrinsic differences – motherhood notwithstanding. It is tempting, for a feminist perhaps, to believe that women are peace-loving, even if such an attribute is a product of socialization, including culture and education, rather than an attribute intrinsic to women. One might well prefer to see such attributes in men as well as women. The only way to reach this, however, is through change of the values and norms of our societies as a whole.

It was with an eye to this type of change, linking the pursuit of peace with feminism, that a group of Israeli and Palestinian women created the Jerusalem Link in the early 1990s. In what is called a joint venture for peace and the empowerment of women, Israeli and Palestinian women view dialogue as a key to change and the resolution of conflict. Clearly there are also men engaged in dialogue between enemies. There are also women who reject dialogue and any idea of compromise. It has been our hope, and to a large degree our experience, however, that communication (at least), if not understanding, and the ability to overcome demonization of the enemy are somewhat facilitated by our mutuality as women and the mutuality of our oppression as women in patriarchal societies. Such affinity may not be sufficient to bridge the abyss of enmity and fear that have accrued for generations in our region, but it is a starting point that can reduce the sometimes apparently insurmountable barriers we face.

The operative word is "reduce" rather than eliminate, for our class, ethnic, religious or national identity can be as strong if not stronger than our gender

identity. The basis of the Jerusalem Link has been to build on our gender identity, and in our efforts to empower women each in their own community and to introduce mutuality in order to open the way to dialogue. In the Jerusalem Link, we began the dialogue for the same reasons men did: in response to the conviction that the official leaderships would not or could not communicate with each other despite the overwhelming need, on both sides, to end the conflict. We chose women's dialogue (often in addition to mixed dialogue) primarily because we believed as feminists that we would be able to build on gender identity. We also sought to give women a voice in communities in which women were generally excluded from the decision-making bodies – in Israel as well as the Palestinian community.

Dialogue began at the elite level and was designed to break-down the stereotypes and demonization both sides had created about the other. The most important task initially was to overcome our mutual suspicion, namely, the Israeli view of the Palestinian as terrorist, only; the Palestinian view of the Israeli as soldier with gun poised to kill, only. The advantage we had as women is that this view of the other was far less salient – an Israeli women sitting across a room from a Palestinian did not necessarily evoke the image of soldier cum deadly weapon; similarly the Palestinian women did not necessarily evoke the image of bomb-throwing terrorist. Nonetheless, national loyalties and with them suspicion built over decades of hostility and bloodshed do not, and did not, necessarily crumble before feminist consciousness.

As women socialized in a particular way, in both our societies, our inclination was to avoid our differences, even to ignore them, lest confrontation destroy the possibility of cooperation. Thus, in order to avoid destroying the dialogue, contact was virtually suspended in times of acute crisis between our two societies (such as the period of the Gulf War in 1991). Yet the key, we discovered, was to face and accept our differences, and in so doing, respect the integrity of the other side, the enemy side. Practically as well as symbolically, we maintain our independence, as two sovereign groups bound by a common goal, working separately and together.

A second problem that derived from our being women, in addition to the tendency to avoid confrontation, was the existence of a certain vulnerability within our communities. This was a vulnerability born of powerlessness or the precariousness nature of our positions of power insofar as any of us had such positions. There was, therefore, a tendency toward caution and the avoidance of bold decisions or innovative positions so as not to "get ahead of the camp," that is, the formal male leadership of our respective parties and publics.

In theory, at least, we as women had somewhat of an advantage over men with regard to grass roots support, for we had (particularly on the Palestinian side), large grass-roots women organizations through which to reach the public. Yet here too, being too far ahead of our publics was a factor of concern given the fact that both our societies are accustomed to receiving their political signals from male leaders. Thus, cooperation at the elite level progressed far more rapidly and effectively than at the grass-roots level. Yet it is essential to go beyond the formal agreements reached at the elite level in order to give such

agreements a basis for implementation and stability. On both the Palestinian and Israeli sides, this is a more difficult task, for it is at the grass roots level that we encounter the phenomena of "difference" and resistance, conflicting identities and traditions, in their strongest forms.

The task is, therefore, difficult, and the challenges are great. Particularly as both societies are moving from the path of peace, as a result of the 1996 Israeli elections, and returning to the mode of militarization and force. It is now that we must call upon all our resources and mutuality as women to preserve the understanding that had been achieved, to overcome the increased difficulties between our communities and within our communities, in the realm of women's rights, in the realm of human and national rights. Success in one can be affected by or impact upon success in the other; indeed they may be integrally connected.

Note

1. Unpublished research conducted by Naomi Chazen and Galia Golan in a project on "The Attitude and Behaviour of Israeli Women on Issues of War, Peace and Conflict Resolution."

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Contextualizing In/Security: The Political Identity 'Mayan-Woman' in Guatemala

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Introduction

Many Mayan-women in Guatemala claim that they are insecure in multiple ways: as women, as members of an ethnic group, and as members of a socio-economic class which struggles to attain the basic requirements for survival. Many are also threatened in different and related manners in the variant spatio-temporal contexts which inform their lives, such as the family, society at large, their organizations, or the Guatemalan nation-state project. Similarly, those who threaten these persons may, in a different context, be their closest ally. Many Mayan-women's in/security is therefore contingent and multiple – even hybrid.

However, despite (and in the function of) their subaltern positions, many Mayan-women have begun to make their voices heard in protest of their self-defined[1] triple discrimination, both on a national level, and within their own communities and organizations. For the first time in Guatemala's history, Mayan-women are making claims for security and identity *as Màyan-women*. They are thus re-constructing both what this identity and what security means in the context of seemingly intractable conflicts between those who wield power in Guatemala, and those who are striving to empower themselves in the face of violence and marginalization. They are also making it increasingly clear that they too are subjects in the fashioning of the society in which they are living.

Mayan-women's claims must be seen in light of the current conjuncture in Guatemala. Although the bloody war no longer terrorizes the majority of people who live within (and were forced to flee) Guatemala's borders to the extent that it did in the late 70's and early 80's, most still suffer the heritage of over 30 years of armed conflict, counter-insurgency tactics, and unjust distributions of resources.[2] Nevertheless, hope can be found in recent advancements and in a quelling of the direct violence. Since 1986, a series of 'democratic' regimes has replaced a long line of military dictatorships.[3] After 7 years of negotiations, on December 4, 1996, the URNG and the government signed a peace agreement to put an end to the insurgency/counter-insurgency war. Furthermore

popular protest – more and more often articulated in terms of ethnic identity – has burgeoned[4], although with trepidation. Recently[5], the 'Mayan *pueblo*' has become an increasingly unifying political identity – an identity celebrated both as a source of pride and a basis for political rights for a growing movement which includes many sectors of the civil society. In 1995 an accord on the Rights and Identity of the Indigenous Population was signed by both the URNG and the government, as part of the peace process. This document, borne out of the work of the Mayan coalition in the Civil Assembly[6], forges significant new paths in the history of Guatemala, and in Indigenous-*Ladino*[7] relations; it reflects the growing salience of the political identity of the Mayan *pueblo*. Even if the accord may be unrealistic and vague in its provisions, it achieves an undeniably monumental goal: It has named the indigenous peoples – and in particular, indigenous women – as citizens of Guatemala.

However, despite these vast advancements, the large majority of the population continue to live and work at the bottom of many interwoven systems of oppression, such as those that spur counterinsurgency tactics, sexual violence, unjust land distribution, and violence and discrimination on the basis of gender or (supposed) 'racial' or ethnic differences. Substantial and peaceful change in the fabric of the Guatemalan nation-state project and in the insecure positions of Guatemala's majority – and perhaps in particular, Mayan-women – remain uncertain indeed.

It is this very focus on the security and insecurity of Mayan-women which I intend to address in this article.[8] How can one begin to understand what in/security[9] possibly can mean *to and for* them, given their particular locations in different systems of oppression and the specificity of their struggles? Exploring the specificity of Mayan-women's in/security helps make the security talked about, written, and implemented in the fields of International Relations and politics more accountable to the actual experiences of in/security of real people in precarious situations.

Theoretical Motivation: In/security and Identity

Can in/security as it is written about in (most) dominant and alternative texts in the fields of International Relations Theory and Peace and Development Research adequately address the hybrid and multiple experiences of insecurity and struggles for security of people who are making claims from a particular political identity?

In/security, as it is commonly understood, evokes notions of threat, danger, vulnerability, as well as (perhaps) a striving for well-being, safety, autonomy, etc. It is most often understood as relating to nation-states in military terms. Dominant understandings of security posit political subjectivity at the level of the state or the individual (man-citizen). The state does not pose a threat to 'its' people, but, instead is their protector. The 'state' (also a fixed category) therefore enjoys a monopoly over the use of 'legitimate' violence in both the 'domestic' and the international environment. National security is paramount be-

cause, as the principle of state sovereignty dictates, states compete in a hostile international system characterized by belligerent 'others'. Danger resides 'outside' the borders of the state in aggressive ambitions of similar, yet significantly different, political bodies, that is, in other states. *The nation-state is therefore the target and the agent of security.*

The mechanisms of state sovereignty also locate danger 'inside' the community, in challenges to the 'internal' universality of the political identity of the state. It can be found in ulterior expressions and interpretations of political subjectivity (such as claims to class, ethnic, gender, race, sexual identity). These are seen as undermining of the necessary monopoly over identity held by state nationalism (Campbell 1992: 71). Hence despite what might be a 'weak' or failing' project (such as is arguably the case in Guatemala), the need to create a homogenous and overriding national political identity supersedes all other claims to political identity.

It is therefore clearly not adequate to rely on an analysis of Guatemala's national security borne out of the mainstream security discourse to understand Mayan-women's in/security. Ironically, many of Guatemala's national security policies are the very mechanisms which continue to threaten the people who live within (or were forced to flee) its borders.

The mainstream security discourse, however, has recently been widened to encompass threats to the environment, the economy and society at large. An alternative discourse has arisen as a critique to the state-centered and 'negative' military emphasis on security found in mainstream analysis. However, it has not adequately addressed how in/security may differ depending upon one's gender or ethnic identity. Nor has it addressed what it means to be in/secure, or to seek security in different locations in varying matrices of power systems. Security continues to be treated as a fixed, gender neutral, and universal concept—a concept reliant upon a sovereign (masculine) subject.

Hence, although extremely important work has been done in the field of security studies in expanding the concept of security to encompass aspirations for equality, justice, and peace—and in effectively challenging the sovereignty of the nation-state—security (generally) remains the domain of those at the top of gender, class and racial hierarchies. A growing number of feminist theorists, for example, have rendered explicit how constructions of security in Western political theory and policy have been gendered and how gender is deeply implicated in the way in which particular bodies experience and execute threat and violence (see, for example, Tickner 1993; Peterson 1992; Sylvester 1987, 1994).

How then can one address Mayan-women's in/security? A common suggestion within the Alternative security discourse is to shift the focus from state security to human/individual security, drawing on the human rights discourse. However, focusing on 'individual' security also insufficiently addresses Mayan-women's hybrid or multiple insecurities. Mayan-women feel that they are triply discriminated against—triply insecure. Security for one person in one context may differ drastically in another context; what security means in the family, for example may differ from what it means in encounters with *Ladino*

society, or in the Guatemalan state in general. Moreover, security for one person may represent insecurity for someone else. Similarly, security depends upon where people are located on intersecting systems of oppression or ruling, such as sexism, classism, or racism. In order to understand a particular meaning of security it is helpful to address the different spatio-temporal contexts that inform her life. Furthermore, Mayan-women's struggles for security center around claims for identity. Consequently, in exploring Mayan-women's in/security, one needs to pay close attention to who these person say they are – *to their political identity.*

Given the centrality of the significance of identity in the struggles for security articulated by Mayan-women, a central question concerns how identity politics (that is, politicized gender or ethnic identity) can become a means for *both securing and in-securing* people in respect to who they are as political subjects. As Peterson questions: "through what identity do we seek security"? (Peterson 1992: 53).

Identity is a social construct, an activity, an expression of multiple and constantly changing relationships, orders, discourses: it is a repository, a reflection, a product, as well as (re)creator of our surroundings (Ferguson, 1993:159). The politicization of social identity provides a momentary resting place for the formation of a political subject. The identity of this subject is continuously recreated, yet nevertheless more fixed and definable than the many different social identities she moves into and out of in the rhythms of everyday life. For example, when politicized, a particular representation of identity, such as that of "Mayan-woman", becomes a less fluid, more stable subject (although never static). A *politicized* subject refers to a person who, according to her self-definitions, actively engages in trying to affect her "place and fate in the political and socio-economic structures of (her) state and society"(Rothschild 1981, quoted in Lindholm 1993). In the capacity of her politicized identity, this person thinks and acts from a relatively stable place – *together with other like subjects* – in order to achieve certain aims.

Identity formation (both gender and ethnic-national) is contingent upon the meaning given to "markers" which can be *perceived* and deeply *experienced* as given, fixed, natural – especially when much is at stake in identity claims – but are constructed. Claiming that a political identity is constructed does not mean that all identities can change easily or quickly, or that they are not deeply imbedded in the histories of peoples lives. Particular contexts, however, determine the assignment of the social and political meaning of the identity markers. My emphasis on the political and socially constructed aspects of the 'Mayan' identity therefore is not intended to belittle the very 'real'-ness of cultural and spiritual traditions that have been handed down from generation to generation, nor the importance of these traditions – beyond the political ones – in the daily lives of the Mayan people. For instance, women's traditional dress, *traje*[10], has been an important cultural tradition for centuries; focusing on *traje* as a symbol of subjugation, or resistance – and a boundary marking difference – simply says that women's dress, although perhaps a natural part of ancient daily cultural traditions, has taken on a specific political and contemporary meaning.

Furthermore, in the process of politicization, elites and others making claims based on a collective identity (be it a 'nation-state', an ethnic group, or a group organized on the basis of gender) often assume some sense of 'unity', and coherence within the collectivity. This assumption discourage changes or variance within this identity category. Deviance may come to be interpreted as disloyal or even dangerous to the political goals of the collectivity (Butler 1990: 14-15). It may become necessary to employ, what G. M. Dillon calls, 'discourses of danger' to maintain internal homogeneity and sovereignty (as is clearly the case in Guatemala's national security policy). Although Dillon's explanation rest on the idea of the hegemony of state sovereignty, his point is also relevant in terms of a marginalized ethnic identity. Dillon draws our attention to how danger, fear and threat are employed in an 'in/security discourse' to secure sovereign identities and to imperil identities which challenge the sovereign subject's hegemony. (Dillon 1990-91: 108). He explains that this discourse is a self-securing process which constitutes legitimate political subjectivities. Through maintaining the exclusive rights to define the 'enemy', the principle of state sovereignty controls the definitions of, as well as the use of danger. Within the in/security discourse, norms of identity are created through the decision of who/what is excluded. *A particular community maintains its salience from the perpetual need to protect itself from different, challenging orders; notions of threat and survival can become the legitimizing reason for sustaining the order, and can even be seen as constructing the order* (see also Campbell 1992 for a discussion on 'discourses of danger').

Contextualizing In/security? – the Use of Narratives

Given the limitations depicted above of any strict, predetermined definition of security which includes an assigned referent object and subject (e.g. 'nation-state, or 'individual'), I will not depend upon a fixed definition of in/security to understand Mayan women's in/security. Instead, I hope to better learn what in/security means to and for the persons I have interviewed. I have found the use of narratives to be an invaluable method for this task.

The narratives I will analyze in the following pages are stories of the development of these persons' political consciousness: how they make sense of their past and how they have come to be who they were at the time of the interview[11]. The narrative was decided (in part) by what the narrators included, excluded, as well as what they wanted *me* to know, what they wanted me to tell *other people*, who these other people are, as well as what they *did not* want me to know. Safety concerns, personal trust, as well as political aims were all significant factors in the construction of their stories. Because the text-story is created from the perspective of a politicized identity, the in/securities described are those remembered as significant from the explicit spatio-temporal site of the politicized identity, 'Mayan-woman'.

Although my intention is to explore the contingency of security in relation to the political site 'Mayan-woman', I must employ an analysis schema for interpreting Mayan-women's experiences and reflections as significant in terms of

in/security. This is especially the case since a direct question such as "What does security/insecurity mean for you?" was not possible, nor desirable in the research context. *I will therefore rely on the basic assumption that insecurity (may) involve the experiences of threat, danger and harm; security implies a striving for well-being, safety.*[12] The way in which the narrators talk (or do not talk) about their experiences as being ones of feeling threatened, harmed, or endangered is the basis for my assessment of their insecurity; similarly, my assessment of their security rests on their descriptions of their struggles for well-being, for safety. However, these categories are not exclusive; they often flow into each other, hence the term: in/security. For example, in the struggle to 'secure' someone or thing, to render it 'safe', 'well', one limits its possibilities, thus causing it 'harm' or 'endangering' it (for further exploration of this relation, see Campbell 1992; Connolly 1991).

Despite the need to – loosely – define in/security in order to explore the specificity of its meaning to and for Mayan-women, its content, and perhaps most importantly, its referent object and subject are dictated by the unfolding of the narrative: who/what is rendered in/secure from whom/what? Where do the threat and the promise of safety reside? In/security thus becomes a textual construction – a key trope in the construction of the political subjects in the narrative, (as well as those narrating). Indeed, in/security in these narratives can be seen as the foundation for 'terror-writing'[13] where experiences of violence and victimization are transvalued to become the skeletons of a political identity, and the legitimization for the making of certain political claims. Treating in/security as a construction site of political identities, whereby in writing in/security, the subjects write themselves, their histories, and their visions of a better future (a more 'secure' world), indicates the political nature of the assignment of threat and danger, as well as safety and well-being. In/security thus can be seen as an ontological yet contingent condition of identity[14]. This rings true not only for 'marginalized' in/securities, but also those perceived as given or 'objective' such as national security. Guatemala's national security policy has defined Mayan-woman as dangerous threats to national identity, constructing a hegemonic national subjectivity based, in part, on the exclusion and fear of contesting political identities; similarly, the political identity 'Mayan-women' is constructed in relation to the assignment of those who threaten, namely, the Guatemalan government/military, *Ladino* society, men, etc.

Nevertheless, such a textual treatment of in/security is not intended to preclude attention to, or to call into question, the very real terror and danger that Mayan-women experience.

In their texts, the narrators speak of the different contexts in their lives as both sites of security and insecurity. They draw a map of many of the power relations which informed their experiences and who they were. They also talk of these contexts as spaces where they began to develop (construct) identities in relation to systems of oppression and ruling, perhaps rejecting or modifying those inherited identities[15] that harmed them, or rendered them insecure. These contexts are sites of subjugation, but also of resistance for the textualized subjects in their stories. In order to address Mayan-women's hybrid in/securities,

I have structured my analysis of the narrators' words in terms of the crucial spatio-temporal contexts in their texts.

In the following pages, I will briefly explore one of these contexts: Organization/Political Movement. I have analyzed three narratives (of 18) as a pilot study[16] because they reflect the richness and diversity of the different narratives, as well as indicate the commonalty of certain contexts and themes. One of the persons interviewed works in a Mayan cultural organization ("Rosa"), one in the women's movement ("Manuela"), and one in a human rights organization ("Andrea").

Organization/Political Movement

All three narrators are making claims (to differing degrees) as Mayan-women and are active in some form of organization and political movement. The meaning of this collective identity, however, is somewhat contested. The Mayan movement includes many different interpretations of the problems facing the 'Mayan *pueblo*', as well as divergent strategies and goals for the transformation of Guatemalan society.[17] Similarly, Mayan-women's interpretation of their roles within this movement, as well as their positions in their communities and organizations, are far from united. Nevertheless, all three of the narrators (as well as the rest of the 18 participants in my study) agree in naming their 'triple' oppression and in explicitly struggling for some sort of security for themselves and for the majority of the population in Guatemala. It is therefore possible to draw useful conclusions from talking about the aggregate political identity, 'Mayan-woman'.

Through their engagement with their organizations and larger movements (such as the Mayan, Campesino, or Women's movement, or the generalized term for the many groups which protest the violence and injustices in Guatemala: the popular movement) they are constructing an increasingly forceful political identity as Mayan-women – both within these movements, and in the Guatemalan society at large.

Organizing or belonging to a political movement that can be considered critical of the state is still often treated as a subversive act in contemporary Guatemala. Being an explicitly politically active person (perhaps especially a woman[18]) in Guatemala is therefore dangerous. For instance, many of the people whom I interviewed explained that they were under constant surveillance; several told me that they had received death threats, as recently as a few weeks before our conversation. Rosa fears leaving the organization at night, walking alone during the day, and even attending social gatherings, because "the enemy might be there". Organizing openly therefore implies committing oneself to live life in a state (both literally and figuratively) of constant insecurity.

Yet, despite the often dramatic insecurity which openly protesting the state (and others in power, such as the plantation owners) entails, Andrea, Manuela, and Rosa express that they feel better organizing than remaining quiet; organizing provides them with a community in which they feel secure. Rosa explained: "If you organize you are considered bad, if you don't, the same – [its]

better to organize." Their organization and movement provides comradeship, a collective counter-force to the brutality of the hegemonic forces of those in power. Rosa tells of how, once in the context of her organization, she did not allow the military to intimidate her. Together they fought back with tools soldered in the experience of collective marginality and resistance:

> when I received death threats, I did not go backwards. On the contrary, I said I'll have to find a way to solve this, and I counted on the organization and the *Compañeros*. [I asked them] 'What ideas do you give me, because if I continue with my struggles, I will always be persecuted, if not the enemies will always bother me...so its better to keep struggling.

Manuela talks of the safety she found in her first experience with a church-based organization at a time when the military's counter-insurgency tactics had led to what many call a 'culture of silence' and a 'culture of fear': "the message was to not confide in anyone, because you never know.... [it gave me] much security to be in a group of people where no one would say what you said to anyone else." Hence, according to Andrea's, Manuela's, and Rosa's experiences, belonging to an organization offers a united front against the oppressor, and a forum for the sharing of confidences – ensurances that the narrators described as offering security and safety in the midst of an insecure existence.

Additionally, the narrators demonstrated that belonging to an organization and a larger political movement can also provide security through the very feeling of belonging to a collective identity. All three relay that they belong to a larger project, a collective with a particular history. They locate themselves and their trials in this history, thus finding solace and inspiration for struggling to change the situation of their people. If they die in this process, there will be many more to carry on the work, hence their immortality is in some sense guaranteed. Andrea declares that she is not afraid for herself: "I am not afraid because the struggle is just."

Furthermore, they all talk about the context of their organizations and political movements primarily as spaces for the canalization of their struggles. In this sense, this context offers a place where they can fashion who they are and who they want to be – individually and collectively. They thus create for themselves an identity which offers security. In this process, they also define this identity as the referent object for their struggles for security: they are working to 'secure' the identity: 'Mayan-woman' from the various threats which endanger them.

Rosa remarks that in the beginning of her work in her organization, she did not navigate her own life: "I didn't know anything....I was totally confused....I didn't know what I was saying [when she went out and lectured on the work of the organization.]" I read this as an inability to see herself and act as a political subject – as a recognition of her marginality even from her own political struggle – a struggle dominated by men. Rosa then describes her process of "consciousness", where she becomes increasingly aware of her self as a political subject. She explains, for example, that she has come to realize "that an aware woman can interpret and manage any term." Refuting the negative meanings

given to the identity 'Mayan woman', Rosa politicizes this identity and imbues it with new meanings that offer her more security.

Through her work with the organization Rosa thus also learns to co-direct (together with the collective) the construction of her political identity. "Little by little I was developing. Now I have clarity about why I am struggling: How, for whom and against whom. I see the reality...If we don't know why we are organizing, we are lost..." From her position of clarity she can place her and others experiences in a relational and historical context. She defines her struggle, enemy, allies, goals. She thus also determines who she – the textualized subject and narrator – is in all of these relations, in the narrative moment, and in the historical moment of the telling. In this process, I propose, she (re)constructs her political identity as a Mayan-woman.

Andrea, as well, talks about her process of politicization as a turning point, a gaining of "clarity", and a connecting of her experiences to those of the collective. Andrea describes in detail the injustices against Mayan-women, as well as the reasons why Mayan-women should be re-vindicated, drawing upon the myths surrounding the history of the Mayan *pueblo*. She (re)interprets her experiences and places them in the context of Mayan-women throughout history, as ever sacrificing and resisting. In so doing she also defines who she is in relation to those who threaten her today, such as the military, the state, and men, as well as her enemies of the past, the Spanish (who become easily interchanged with their descendants: the *Ladinos*.)

> So, my consciousness was born there [in the jungle and the Communities of Resistance] and its not correct when they tell us today that we are not worth anything that we don't have any participation in the society, in the development of Guatemala...the same situation that I have experienced since I was a child up until today has made me have this consciousness to rise up as women to guard our heritage, to guard our sacrifices, these pains that we have had and that I have had.... Always the female elders said that...when the Spanish came here to Guatemala, when they came to invade, our grandparents were tortured, were burned alive...in this sense...I understood the situation which they talked about when I had to live it. So I came to appreciate the elders because it is they who know more of the culture, how we have been for 500 years...for me its painful that we have not [only] been suffering for 10, 15 years, but we have resisted for 500 years.

Andrea thus establishes her political identity, places it in the context of her past and experiences of insecurity throughout history, and fixes it as a timeless given. She thereby establishes for herself a stable base for resistance – an identity to be secured – which rests upon the heritage of over 500 years.

Andrea's need to maintain cohesion in the face of external threat seems to have led to a certain circumscribing of the identity categories upon which claims for change are being made – in relation to her re-collections of the past: "how we have been for 500 years". Security/safety may then necessarily involve cautiously defining, reinforcing, and limiting who she is in the many different power relations which affect her life, as well as carefully weaving a direct life-line to a certain and linear history to which she belongs. It may also involve a system for knowing who belongs and who does not. For example, when I asked Rosa what the difference was between Mayans and *Ladinas*, she

described an elaborate system whereby, based on the use (or non-use) of *traje*, she could tell who was Mayan, who was not, who was denying that they were Mayan, who had lost their identity, and who hadn't lost their identity although they did not wear *traje*. She thus stipulated rather explicit criterion to determine who belonged in the identity category, Mayan-woman, and who did not. Similarly, Andrea explained that she was very happy that "women [were] taking their place in the struggle... [that] Mayan-women [were] demanding their own voice." She also explained that "*Ladinas* come to manipulate our struggles, [but] we have to [struggle] *as* Mayan-women." In this statement, she is making an important distinction between those who are allowed into the struggle of Mayan-women, and those who should remain outside. It is crucial to her that the category is closed and protected – secure.

Yet Manuela's reaction to experiences when she felt herself being forced into a stereotype or excluded from an identity category indicates that delimiting identity categories – for security – and establishing strict criterion for who belongs and who doesn't runs the risk of erecting exclusionary – and harmful – boundaries that homogenize and control the inside while excluding those outside. People might be rendered insecure as result of this process. Manuela, for example, expresses the frustration and pain she feels as a victim of such boundary construction and maintenance.

> I assume the triple identity [Mayan, woman, poor], even if I don't look like one thing or another for a lot of people. They even question me about it, because there have been people who have questioned my Kaqchikel[19] identity. They say: 'your not Kaqchikel, you speak like a *Ladina*, you think like a *Ladina*. So I said: 'we are making stereotypes amongst our own selves, so if I don't appear [to be Kaqchikel], I'm not?... So what does it mean to be indigenous?

She further explains that in a discussion she had with a Mayan-woman who questioned whether or not she is or isn't indigenous, she argued "you are pushing me out of a space, without any right, out of a space that I consider mine as well ..." She explicitly talks about this exclusion as something which frightens her: "It [the criterion of wearing *traje* and *corte*[20] as necessary in order to be a Mayan-woman] makes me afraid ... because it has to do with how we are making claims for ourselves and in front of others."

For Manuela, the Mayan movement's tendency to intransigently define Mayan identity de-limits what for her is a highly personal and fluid identity. She explains that constructing a unifying identity as 'Mayan' (instead of the more local identities for the 22 different folk groups) may be necessary as a political strategy. She fears that by fulfilling the need to create a political identity in resistance – in response to threat –, the Mayan movement may reproduce some of the injurious – unsafe – mechanisms of homogenization, control and exclusion which the nation-state exercises to the harm of the indigenous and poor people in Guatemala.

> If you go and ask any woman in any community what she is, she'll tell you: 'I am Mam, Pocomam, Tzutuil, I am Canjobal' whatever it is. I believe that in many circles they use the word, the name, or the denomination of 'Maya-Kaqchikel, Maya-Pocomchi, Maya-Quiche, Maya-I-don't-know-what. It has to do with po-

> litical questions, that is to say with the necessity to construct themselves as a nation, as a *pueblo* with the necessity to take a stand as social subjects with sufficient force and sufficient thrust to really obtain some change, some benefits. In this meaning, I am in accordance that this denomination is used, but now the question is that we can not generalize...there is a tendency to homogenize to say 'we are all Mayas'...and if I am not in agreement [with the definition]?...There are different visions from the different Mayan pueblos in Guatemala...[The movement's definition] is converted into a dogma, like the religious dogmas.

The need to protect the cohesiveness of an identity, however, may also preclude the developing of other – challenging – loyalty bands. Manuela explains, for example, the conflicts that arise when Mayan-women locate sexism within their own communities and organizations.

> We talked before about the necessity to present a common front, cohesive, before a situation of discrimination and exploitation of more than 500 years. But I personally believe that it is a risk not to recognize the differences and it is a risk not to take a stand as Mayan-women, because at least in my daily life and in the processes which I have had, seen, and lived, discrimination {occurs} even by Mayan men towards Mayan-women. And I believe that it is almost taboo to talk about these things...but its like moving the floor because its a delicate theme. On one occasion a woman said that she felt that she was betraying her ethnic identity by the fact of taking a stand and saying, 'I also feel discriminated as a woman in my own organization.

Similarly Rosa explains (after I asked her about conflicts in her struggles as Mayan and as a woman)

> there are conflicts between groups. The oppression comes from the same system. There is paternalism, homogenization. Some *compañeros* did not want me to (organize for women). The organization is mostly for men – it was difficult for me to work for the participation of women.

Although Rosa mentions sexism in the context of her organization, both she and Andrea seemingly resolve the conflicts of divided loyalties by explaining sexism as really an external influence and threat. As Rosa explains, the oppression of sexism comes from the invasion and colonialism: it's not 'their' men's fault.

The narrators have re-created a story about their struggles as Mayan-women. How they re-collect their experiences of insecurity and their struggles for security in this context reflects what is significant for themselves at the time of the interview in their position of leaders, and from the perspective of their politicized identity in a specific organization and member of a popular political movement. In their organizations/political movements the narrators and their textualized subjects contend with an existence filled with multiple insecurities. Yet they choose to risk their lives in order to struggle for the security of a larger collective – a collective with which they identify. The textualized subjects in the narratives reject a perhaps lonesome site in which they are threatened and join together with other persons who have experienced similar insecurities, even if this means placing their individual lives in greater danger. Within this context, they construct a political identity in relation to: their experiences of

insecurity; the others in their collective throughout history; and to those (or that) which threatens them.

Hence, that Andrea told me of how she believed that Mayan-women needed to struggle on their own without the intervention of *Ladinas*; or that she related her integration into the Mayan movement to the violence she experienced in flight from the army and her increasing respect for the female elders, allows me entry into both how she makes sense of her integration into this context and her political project. I can then infer that for Andrea (the narrator), insecurity in the context of the organization/political movement may mean continued threat from the military, as well as threats from 'outsider's who intend to control the struggle which belongs to Mayan-women. Security may mean identifying herself with a collective, connecting her (and other's) struggle to a long history of struggle and sacrifice, and maintaining the power of definition over this struggle. Similarly, Manuela re-counts her experiences of marginalization from the Mayan movement and identifies the threat of homogenization and exclusion as her primary insecurity in this context; security may therefore imply (among other things) the freedom to struggle for transformation without limiting herself and others within strictly defined identity categories.

Theoretical Implications?

By taking seriously Mayan-women's claims that they are triply oppressed and by listening to the stories of their struggles, one can explore how in/security can be a multiple or hybrid site—a site which is sculpted out of both subjugation and resistance.

Contrary to how in/security is largely written about in both the conventional and alternative security texts, Mayan-women's narratives attest that in/security—experiences of insecurity and struggles for security—is not a thing which can be uniformly procured for different bodies in different places and different times or that *we* attain through a certain method – its content determined and its character defined. These narratives have led me to conclude that meanings of in/security are crafted in the different spatio-temporal contexts in the narrator's lives and in relation to a matrix of intersecting power relations, such as classism, nationalism, racism, and sexism. Additionally, they have indicated that what in/security means to and for the narrators and their textualized subjects also relates to their political identity and depends upon who is threatening them (such as 'man', 'military officer', '*Ladino*', or 'Compañero'.). Their struggles for security relate to who they say they are and inform the claims they make on each other, the men in their communities, the *Ladino* society at large, and the state. For example, both Andrea and Rosa explain that their security depends on (among other things) the space to express their cultural rights through the use of their language and traditional dress. Their struggles for security and for identity involve making claims on the state for the protection of these rights.

Hence, extrapolating from the experiences described in these narratives, one can surmise that in addition to threats to the most basic survival needs, such as

food, water, shelter, affection, and lack of critical bodily injury, how human beings experience in/security has much to do with who they are. The threat of ethnocide, for instance, would not be a threat if the people affected felt that their ethnic identity were not crucial to their subjectivity, and a critical condition for their security.

Yet, also learning from the narratives, it becomes clear that political identity, like in/security, is not static. Mayan-women's (textualized subjects') political identity is constantly re-formed in relation to experiences of threat and insecurity. Their experiences of threat and insecurity changed in relation to the re-formation of their political identity. For instance, from her insecure position in exile, Andrea's "consciousness was born", she formed the political identity, 'Mayan women' which was tied to a specific and grand heritage. Andrea then began to experience the threat that the female elders' knowledge and traditions would die out; she consequently directed her struggles for security to include re-redeeming their status. I therefore propose that there exists therefore a dynamic relationship between in/security and subjectivity.

However, the narratives also indicate that struggles for security do not necessarily avoid causing harm and re-constituting 'discourses of danger' in order to maintain internal homogeneity and sovereignty – discourses that re-produce injurious practices of exclusion and inclusion. As Christine Sylvester has pointed out (citing Germaine Greer), security is a chimera (Sylvester 1994:183). Struggles for security which are intended to provide safety and well-being may involve limiting what it means to belong to the threatened group in need of protection. The more threatened members of a group – be it ethnic, gender-defined, or a nation – may feel, the more important it may become to define what needs to be protected and to maintain the boundaries between those who belong to the group and the (dangerous) Others. In Andrea's and Rosa's narratives, for example, indisputable boundaries are constructed between the Mayan *pueblo* and *Ladinos* to secure the Mayan *pueblo*. Markers for these boundaries such as Mayan-women's *traje*, as symbols of the culture under siege, become representations of loyalty and belonging or, if they were not borne, of apostasy. As a 'Mayan' identity becomes more politicized, myths of common origin and history – a grand and noble history worth protecting and dying for – bind the people closer together and to the dominating and gendered definitions of what it means to be Mayan. Struggles around a gender identity, for instance, which challenges the loyalties demanded by the ethnic identity may then be considered a threat to the ethnic group and its struggles. Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion may become more stringent, in essence in/securing those who do not fit into the rigid confines of the identity.

The narratives thus illustrate an inherent conundrum in in/security. However, they also indicate possible strategies for constructively dealing with (although not fully resolving) it: the (silent) hyphen point between 'Mayan' and 'woman' in their self-identification.

The hyphen point[21] in the identity, Mayan-women indicates how the narrators' ethnic and gender identities are fused, inseparable, and continually inform each other. Much feminist literature, as well as literature on identity in

general, have convincingly argued that social divisions, such as gendered and ethnic divisions, compose fluid and porous social identities which flow into and inform each other. These identities are suffused with an endless combination of mobile[22] hyphen points, such as in 'Mayan-woman-campesina-heterosexual'. When politicized, a section of this feasibly endless chain of identifications becomes more fixed (although never static). I propose that the hyphen sets different yet intimately intertwined and interfused subject positions in relation to each other, yet it also implies a conflict[23] between these subject positions. The hyphen point is a site of negotiation, as can be seen when the security demands of one identity (or subject position) such as 'Woman' comes into conflict with that of 'ethnic'. How the narrators handle these conflicts sheds light on the immediacy of their perceived insecurity, and the extent to which their security demands prioritizing "one struggle over another"; or fixing these subjectivities in one position in relation to each other (such as strictly defining that being a Mayan-woman requires that she wear *traje*). Although all of the narrators deal with such conflicts in different ways, their attention to these very negotiations promises powerful disruptions of existing relations of ruling and discourses of danger and in/security. The transformative power of this identity perhaps lies, then, in these very hyphen points. This involves addressing both Mayan-women *as* women, *as* Mayan, *and* the hyphen point in between these subjectivities. It also demands attention to what *they* articulate as threats and harm as well as conditions for their safety and well-being.

One can hope that in more closely listening to persons whose voices have been marginalized in the discourses of International Relations and Peace and Development Studies, as well as in the circles of power where security polices are directly crafted, we can better enable a transvaluation of in/security which would provide for more safety and less harm.

Notes

1. Mayan-women's "triple oppression": "as women, Mayan, and poor" is a common description made by members of popular/cultural movements.

2. Since 1960, an insurgency-counter insurgency 'civil' war has been officially taking place in Guatemala. The most recent, and perhaps, most directly violent attack on the indigenous people occurred during the late 70's and early 80's when the Guatemalan state conducted a major counter-insurgency campaign. This campaign was aimed at destroying the Guerrilla's popular base. In actuality, this meant killing the peasantry—the large majority of which was indigenous – and destroying both their cultural and economic resources.

3. It remains to be seen whether or not the Arzú government, elected in January 1996, will (be able to) implement significant transformative strategies.

4. Previously, any sign of 'deviance' or subversion' was quickly attacked through the workings of, for example, death squads.

5. The recent Mayan movement is understood by many as anchored in the celebration of 500 Years of Resistance, and Rigoberta Menchú's winning of the Nobel Peace Prize (Interviews, and Bastos and Camus 1993, 1995.)

6. After President Serrano's auto-coup in 1993, a Civil Assembly was formed with the aim of arriving at demands to be presented at the peace negotiations.

7. According to most accounts of the demographics of Guatemala, there are three main folk groups: Indigenous peoples (of Mayan descent); *Ladinos* referring "to people of mixed blood and western culture...and also...to Indians(*sic*) who have adopted western costume and culture." (Handy 1984:14) and *Criollos,* the descendants of (white) Spanish settlers who make up the elite aristocracy of the ruling coalition. The superior positions of the *Ladino* populations *vis a vis* the indigenous reflects the racism that reigns in Guatemala.

8. This article can be read as a pilot study for my larger dissertation work. It is based on fieldwork in Guatemala (June-October, 1995). During this period, I conducted partial life stories with 18 leaders of different organizations.

9. Security can not be divorced from insecurity, for the very need for security implies a lack of security: insecurity. And, the very recognition of insecurity implies a struggle for security. This discussion is treated in more depth elsewhere (Stern-Pettersson 1995).

10. In Spanish *traje* means "suit, clothes"; however, in the context of Guatemala it has come to also mean the traditional dress worn by indigenous women (and sometimes men). Women's *traje* has certainly changed over history with the introduction of new materials and styles.

11. The narratives consist of c.40-60 pgs. The interviews were conducted in Spanish; I bear full responsibility for all translations from Spanish to English.

12. This broad working definition arises out of reflection inspired from numerous texts on the nature of security—documented elsewhere (Stern-Pettersson 1995).

13. I am indebted to Henrik Rönsbo and Finn Stepputat (Centre for Developing Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark) for this point. See Rigoberta Menchú for the most widely read example of such 'terror writing'.

14. I am grateful to David Campbell for this point.

15. An 'inherited identity', as I am using the term here, refers to specific, and often dominant, understandings of identity categories and their content, such as 'woman', 'Mayan', or 'Guatemalan'. These categories can be received from the dominant group (ascribed) or from within the politicized ethnic community. They can also be received through the codes of daily relations.

16. I interviewed each of the narrators twice and shared the transcribed texts with them after each of our meetings. Each narrator has authorized the text and given me permission to cite her in the context of my work. For precautionary reasons, I do not refer to the specific date of the interviews when I cite them.

17. It is difficult to talk about the different Mayan organizations as one movement. I have chosen to do so here for the purposes of clarity. In my dissertation work. I will discuss the different factions, groups, and negotiations/conflicts over meaning within this larger 'movement'.

18. R. explains, for example, that when she began working for human rights she received threats because "woman didn't have the right to organize men."

19. Kaqchikel is one of the 22 folk groups that belong to the wider category, 'Mayan'.

20. Spanish for a 'piece of material'. It has come to mean the specific skirt worn by Mayan women.

21. I have placed this hyphen point between 'Mayan' and 'women'. The narrators use (in Spanish) 'Mayan women'.

22. I am inspired to use this term by Ferguson, 1993.

23. I am indebted to both Lester Edwin J. Ruiz (ICU, Japan) and Amy Kaminsky (University of Göteborg) for this insight.

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Abstracts

CHRISTINE SYLVESTER: *Feminism and International Relations: Or Encounters with Wolves in the Woods.*
This paper plays with metaphors of fiction and art to address the question: How can feminism flourish within a canonical international relations that lets us be, more or less, but does not itself take on many feminist messages? The answer given is that feminist scholarship should not expect IR citations. Rather, in an avant-garde spirit, it is most useful for those who are often ignored in a narrow field to site newly sighted international topics on the broader, more robust and, simultaneously, carnivalesque terrain of feminist theory.

MARK ELAM: *Feminist Perspectives on Security: The Work of Outsiders, Mavericks or Nomads?*
Feminists are currently rewriting international security highlighting the links between international politics and sexual politics. This paper identifies and discusses three alternative figures for the feminist security expert: the outsider; the maverick and the nomad. All three are considered suitable for challenging existing state-centric approaches to security. However, like conventional analysts of state security, outsiders and mavericks are seen as still relying very heavily upon acts of exclusion and the production of hierarchies in the articulation of in/secure subjects. Nomads, on the other hand, it is argued promise to enact and affirm a vision of security where the building of new forms of connection takes precedence over the invention of new forms of protection and where difference is viewed firstly in a positive rather than a negative light.

MAIRI JOHNSON – BICE MAIGUASHCA: *Praxis and Emancipation: The Lessons of Feminist Theory in International Relations.*
The starting point of this article is Marx's claim that critical theory must undertake 'a self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age'. The authors argue that feminist IR theory is the most developed form of critical theory in the discipline because, in its deconstructive, reconstructive and normative moments, it centralizes the praxis of an addressee. The argument proceeds through an examination of the work of two leading critical international theorists – Andrew Linklater and Robert Cox. It is argued that although the projects of each author in ways fulfill the criteria of critical theory, in each the emancipatory potential of the theories is circumscribed. Some of their limitations are demonstrated through an examination of the extent to which each of the theories can deal with questions of gender. In the final section, the authors consider how both Christine Sylvester and Cynthia Enloe centralize feminist praxis in developing their critical feminist theories of International Relations. In the conclusion a number of questions are raised about the critical potential of macro-theoretical and universalist critical theories.

ALENA HEITLINGER: *Émigré Perspectives on Feminisms in Europe- East and West.*
The main objectives of this paper are to (1) explore the role of émigré feminists in the cross-cultural translation and mediation of East-West feminist perspectives, and (2) use the contours of my personal and intellectual biography as a Czech-born, British-trained, Canadian feminist scholar, to trace the ways in which I have reinterpreted my experiences and understanding of

gender relations in my 'home' and 'adopted' countries. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of issues of 'representation' and 'voice-appropriation', and of the impact of different geographic and political locations on knowledge claims.

JACQUELINE TRUE: *Victimization or Democratisation? Czech Women's organising potential in a globalising political economy.*
Since the revolutions that precipitated the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/90, western liberal and socialist feminists have sought to investigate the plight of women in subsequent post-communist transitions to democracy and market economies. The dominant thrust of this western feminist scholarship has been to document how the majority of East Central European women have been disadvantaged and deleteriously affected by post-communist restructuring of former socialist rights to employment, social services, and political representation. Contrary to this widespread view, this article argues that in the case of the Czech Republic at least, women are by no means victims of the transition. Rather, the past six years of transformation have evidenced greater differentation in the social and economic position of Czech women, and among East-Central European women generally. Further, it is argued that feminists working on the former second world from the first world are conditioned by universalist assumptions and categories that may lead them to exclude from their analysis the full range of democratic potentials that might counter neo-liberal reform in East-Central Europe and forge foundations for transnational feminist co-operation.

ETELA FARKASOVA – MARIANA SZAPUOVA: *Between Theoretical Models and Self-Reflection: On Teaching and Researching Feminist Theorizing in Bratislava.*
In this article Farkasova and Szapuova, reflect upon their own experiences as feminist researchers and lecturers of the practice of introducing courses on feminist theorizing at Comenius University in Bratislava. Courses on feminist philosophy have been largely a success among the students at Comenius and today it is included as a standard course of the curriculum. The authors also bring up the issue of feminist research and thinking gender at large in Slovakia today. As a post-communist society in transition, the heritage of the socialist ideology of women's emancipation to become workers first of all still has an influence on the perception of the status of women in society. In Slovakia, the terms 'feminist' and 'feminism' has a negative connotation which effects the treatment of gender issues and roles today. There is nevertheless reason to be hopeful for better feminist scholarship and changing attitudes in the future.

LEO FLYNN: *Marketing the Union: Some Feminist Perspectives.*
In relation to EC law, the contribution made by feminist lawyers and scholars has been relatively limited. This article examines some of the central characteristics of the European internal market law, specifically from a feminist perspective.

The legal entity of the European Union depends upon the substantiation of the existing internal market law. The analysis presented takes some of the feminist critique offered of the legal regime in the internal market and carries this over to the European Union. More specifically, the article discusses the legal ramifications of the creation of a new legal subject under the Treaty of the European Union, the Union citizen. It is argued that both the citizen and the Union are shaped by concepts and values which are usually valorized as masculine. A critique from a feminist perspective may prove to be an important corrective to those unbalanced constructs.

KARIN LUNDSTRÖM: *Women Caught in a Logical Trap in EC law: An Analysis of the Use of Quotas in the Case of Kalanke.*
This article looks at the first case in the EC-law which puts into question the use of quotas, i.e. the intensely debated Kalanke case. Karin Lundström applies feminist theories as well as Derrida's theories of how meaning is constructed in Western philosophical tradition to the legal reasoning in Mr. Advocate general's legal opinion. In so doing she argues that it is hardly possible

for women to acquire genuine equality within the existing legal system of the EC since women are caught in a logical trap. This trap is based on a well-established way of thinking in terms of hierarchically organized dichotomies. As a consequence of this model of thought, men and the legal instruments that aim at protecting male individuals are always granted superiority over women and the legal means aimed at giving women equality. Genuine equality for women requires radically new ways of thinking within EC-law.

PAULINE STOLTZ: *And When We Speak... On political solidarity between Black and white women.*
Working from a focus on the concept of 'women' in the light of political solidarity, rather than common origins, this article addresses the cooperation (or lack thereof) between Black and white feminists. The writer takes as her starting point the political activities of Black feminists in Europe and describes some of the structural aspects of the political activities of Black feminists, as well as some of the attempts to cooperation between Black and white feminists. Since the cooperation between Black and white women is an important political issue within the women's movement, we are left with the question how political solidarity is possible in practice?

The answer is suggested in terms of on the one hand strategies that include being self critical within the movement and attempts to find common grounds to struggle from, and on the other hand the revelation and questioning of structures that keep women from having channels of representation and information between different political arenas.

OONAGH REITMAN: *Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights – Friends or Foes?*
Reitman begins her analysis of the conflict between the cultural relativist and feminist critiques of international human rights by describing their primary area of disagreement – culture-based reservations to women's human rights – and by suggesting the obstacles which these reservations pose to the international enforcement of women's rights. She then highlights the similarities between the two critiques – their difficulties with the hegemonic claim to the universality of human rights; their potential for serving goals apparently unconnected with their respective objectives; and their essentialist tendencies – in order to argue, in conclusion, for a cooperative approach which those engaging in one critique should strive to adopt in relation to those making the other form of criticism. In the hope of achieving greater respect for the dignity and multifaceted identities of female members of minority cultures, conflicts between the two critiques ought, she argues, to be resolved within the framework of this cooperative approach.

GALIA GOLAN: *Militarization and Gender: The Israeli Experience.*
The major effect of militarization on the status of women and gender equality derives from the centrality accorded the army in Israeli society. In a society engaged in war or protracted armed conflict the army assumes an essential and critical role in the lives and views of its citizens. Insofar as the army is a patriarchal institution, it is these partriarchal values, norms and stereotypes that will be promulgated and reinforced as the young citizen moves from adolesence to adulthood in his and her obligatory military service. The different nature (and length) of this service for men as distinct from women, combined with the different way in which the military service of the two sexes is perceived both by the military and society at large, and the advantages accrued to the men, as distinct from the women, all contribute to the inequality of women in Israeli society. How this affects women's interest in peace is a controversial question, only partially addressed by research and women's peace activism in Israel.

MARIA STERN-PETTERSSON: *Contextualising In/Security: The Political Identity "Mayan-Woman" in Guatemala.*
Many Mayan-women in Guatemala claim that they are insecure in multiple ways: as women, as members of an ethnic group, and as members of a poor socio-economic class. Many are also threatened in different and related manners in the

variant spatio-temporal contexts which inform their lives. Their in/security is therefore contingent and multiple – even hybrid.

How can one begin to understand what in/security possibly can mean *to and for* Mayan women, given their particular locations in different systems of oppression and the specificity of their struggles? Treating in/security as a construction site of political identities, this article focuses on the dynamic relationship between security and identity in an analysis of individual narratives of politically active Mayan women. In particular, their in/security in the site of their organization/political movements is explored as a pilot study to a more in depth inquiry.

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6 Refererad litteratur redovisas i särskild litteraturförteckning, placerad efter huvudtexten. Förteckningen utformas i enlighet med följande exempel.

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7 Vid *litteraturgranskningar* redovisas på titelsidan det granskade arbetet enligt följande exempel.

Torbjörn Aronson: *Konservatism och demokrati. En rekonstruktion av fem svenska högerledares styrelsedoktriner.* Lund Political Studies 64. Stockholm 1990: Norstedts.

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