Global Democratization

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule during 1989–1991

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1 Introduction

During the last decade there has been an almost global trend towards democracy. This wave of democratization is also reflected in a great deal of recent research[1]. Whereas an influential research project of the 70s had the title *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Linz & Stepan 1978), the most influential research project in this field in the 80s is, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (O'Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead 1986). Since this work was published the trend has been even more accentuated with further democratization in Latin America, the breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, and increasing demands for democracy in Asia and Africa.

In this study we will focus on these processes of democratization and/or liberalization as they have manifested themselves around the world. What is interesting is to what extent such processes have actually occurred and, which factors are relevant for the development of such processes. Three main questions will guide the study:

> Which countries have experienced a process of democratization, and/or liberalization during 1989–91?

> Why is it that some authoritarian political systems of the world experience these processes of democratization and/or liberalization while others remain authoritarian?

> What are the characteristics of a successful transition to democracy?

On the basis of these three questions, we will test some general hypothesis that are relatated to the question of democratization, such as the importance of socio-economic development, communication, geographical position, political systems, religion, and colonial heritage. Important in this respect is also whether changes have occurred as a result of initiatives from above or pressures from below, and if there has been any use of violence.

We will make a quantitative study including 107 independent states of the world, thereby including all major countries which were not stable democracies in 1988. The study will be limited in time to 1989, 1990, and 1991. This limitation is motivated by the many interesting events concerning democratization/ liberalization that have taken place in the world during this time.

The choice of states will be based on Axel Hadenius' democracy index from 1988 (Hadenius 1990). Hadenius outlines five interrelated criteria in order to evaluate degrees of democracy in 132 Third World states[2]. Those states receiving more than 9 points will be excluded from our study, as they are considered to be too democratic to make it useful to talk about democratization and/or liberalization. Instead we will add the states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Whereas Hadenius analyses the state of democracy at a certain time (1988), we will use his criteria to study the process of democratization over time (1989–1991).

Thus a distinction will be made between democratic and non-democratic states, where all stable democracies will be excluded from our study. The remaining states will be classified into three major categories, which will serve as our dependent variable: a) states which have experienced a process of increased democracy during 1989–1991, and b) states which have experienced a process of decreased democracy during 1989–1991, and c) states where no considerable democratic changes – positive or negative – have taken place during 1989–1991.

Category a will thereafter be divided into two subclasses, depending on how far the processes of democratization have proceeded: 1) states which have experienced a process of democratization, and 2) states which have experienced a process of liberalization. Those states which have not experienced either a process of democratization or a process of liberalization of any major significance during 1989–1991, category c, will further be divided into three subclasses: 1) states which have experienced certain degrees of democratization and/or liberalization but where setbacks have occurred, the result being no visible change, 2) states which have experienced ineffective demands for democratization, and 3) states where there were no processes of democratization/liberalization or any demands for democratization during these years. Each state will thereby be placed into one main category and possibly into one subclass as can be shown in the following figure:[3]

Increased democracy	Decreased democracy	No change
Democratization Liberalization		Democratization + setbacks Ineffective demands No demands

These categories and concepts will be defined below. The classification is based on reports in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 1989–1991, and, to some extent; *Political Handbook of the World*. This might be regarded as a rather crude measurement and the validity of the study could be questioned. It could for instance be argued that we only measure the priorities and evaluations of Keesing's instead of actual processes of democratization/liberalization. This is certainly true. However, we argue that events reported in Kees-

ing's are reasonable indicators of world events as it has a reputation of reliability and is often quoted in scientific works.

We are obviously well aware of the limitations facing journalists working in certain authoritarian states, thus inhibiting reports on demands for democracy in these states. Still, we would like to consider our operationalizations of enough relevance to allow for the kind of tentative conclusions and hypotheses that we are aiming at, in spite of the existence of validity problems.

The above mentioned three categories and subclasses of states will be our dependent variable. From a theoretical point of view we will select a wide range of socio-economic and political factors as independent variables.

In the analysis we will work with multiple-field tables. The material does not allow for any more sophisticated statistical analysis as our dependent variable is on the nominal scale only.

For the independent variables, the data base *Länder–91* (Countries–91) has been used in all cases where no other source is mentioned.

Before presenting the analysis we will define our central concepts.

2 Democracy

Defining "democracy" is not an easy task. First one has to choose between a principal definition (defining democracy in terms of general principles) and an institutional (or formal) definition (defining democracy by certain formal institutions such as free elections, certain types of collective decision-making bodies etc.) (Boström 1990:40–43, O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986:7–8). A principal definition does not have to take the "liberal" form of democracy developed in the Western World as a point of departure. To some respect it is thus possible to avoid the problem of ethnocentrism when discussing democracy in the Third World. Still, most authors seem to prefer an institutional (or formal) definition as it is easier to operationalize. An example of such a definition is the following:

> ...a political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. (Huntington 1984:195).

This definition includes *competition* ("periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes") and *participation* ("virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote") (cf. Dahl 1971:4–9). However *participation* could mean more than voting in elections. It also implies that multiple groups can be organized to promote their interests, and that these groups have an institutionally guaranteed access to political institutions, and, as long as they play according to the rules, do not forsake their right to keep on playing. This means that conflicts are processed and terminated according to rules that are specified a priori, explicit, potentially familiar to all participants, and subject to change according to rules. Characteristic of a democracy, in this sense, is that each

group has some choice of strategies and that strategies have consequences (Przeworski 1986:56–57).

A third component of a (formal) definition of "democracy" is the inclusion of basic political and human rights (Boström 1990:43, Diamond, Linz, Lipset 1989:xvi). Human rights are not always included in the concept of democracy. However, we regard the respect for basic human rights (for instance those contained in the UN Declaration of Human Rights; such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), as a fundamental part of the definition of a democratic system. Without the respect for these rights, the existence of regular elections and universal suffrage becomes more or less meaningless.

In this study we will take our point of departure in the works of Hadenius. His democracy index is constructed on the basis of five criteria: 1) universal franchise (limitations in the right to vote are abolished), 2) meaningful elections (increased power of the legislative assembly), 3) freedom of organization (political parties, trade unions etc. are allowed to work freely), 4) freedom of opinion (limitations in freedom of speech and in freedom of the press are abolished), 5) freedom from repression and political violence (amnesty for political prisoners, actions taken against torture, certain restrictions regarding the use of authority on behalf of the people in power).

The problem of etnocentrism is obviously there as these criteria stem from the political system in the Western world. However the scientific use of this definition of democracy could be justified by the widespread influence of this form of democracy in the contemporary world. As stated by O'Donnell & Schmitter:

> Given the existence of certain prominent "models" and international diffusion, there is likely to exist a sort of "procedural minimum" which contemporary actors would agree upon as necessary elements of political democracy. (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986:8).

Hadenius', and our, use of the concept of democracy could be seen as a standard definition of *political* or *liberal* democracy, i.e. the existing form (or at least the existing idea) of democracy in advanced capitalist countries. A regime could be more or less democratic compared to this standard definition of democracy. However we do not regard this form of democracy as the "highest" possible. It is our conviction that democracy could be deepened and improved in the political sphere as well as extended to the social and economic spheres (cf. O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986:9–14, Stepan 1986:13). But for analytical reasons it seems reasonable to use this definition of democracy as a point of departure. The liberal form of democracy has been very influential and there appears to be almost consensus about the minimum conditions included in the definition.

3 Authoritarian Regimes

Before proceeding to a more general discussion around authoritarian regimes, we would like to outline some main typologies as used by Derbyshire & Derbyshire in their work, Political Systems of the World (1989:31–40). This list is by no means exclusive, which will be discussed below, but can be said to put into focus certain characteristics that are more or less representative for a great many studies concerning these types of regimes. The classification by Derbyshire & Derbyshire will be used in the following analysis.

Communist systems are those where the Communist Party is firmly in charge, dominating state institutions, having assumed its prescribed role as the 'vanguard of the proletariat', so as to protect socialist society before the advent of true communism. The recent development in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of course suggests that the likelihood of acheving this theoretical ideal remains remote. Still, it can be said without too much distortion that there are states which subscribe to the ideology of communism, in Marxist terms.

Nationalistic socialist states display many of the attributes of a communist state but in a less developed and structured form. We have the existence of one political party of avowed socialist orientation, but whose role has been more that of a promotor of nationalism, and an opponent of imperialism than of 'guardian of the proletariat' and radical transformer of the country's economic structure. Private farming and petty manufacturing have, for example, remained predominant in these states and a distinctive characteristic is often that of a charismatic leader.

Authoritarian nationalist states are those where nationalism is used as a device to claim the loyalty and obedience of members of the public. States subscribing to authoritarian nationalism usually put restrictions on the activities of all political parties, or a limitation to one which gives undivided and uncritical support to the state. Representative is also an authoritarian personal or collective executive and the absence of an assembly to balance the power of the executive or the presence of an assembly which is essentially the servant of the executive.

Military authoritarianism is a form of authoritarian nationalism whereby military leaders take it upon themselves to impose a government on the people, claiming that it is for the public good. Sometimes a state based on military authoritarianism will try to disguise itself by using a civilian administration as a facade, fronting the military power behind.

Absolutism: A state based on absolutism lack any constitutional form of government, or a popular assembly or judiciary to counter executive power. Instead, legitimacy is often claimed through the accident of birth in the form of an absolute monarch. Characteristic is also the denial to form political parties or other forms of organized interests.

Apartheid: A state based on apartheid keeps separate races of different colours, especially of Europeans and non-Europeans in South Africa.

One main characteristic in the typology above is the prevalence of limited pluralism which in authoritarian regimes takes a variety of forms. According to Linz (1975:277), authoritarian regimes on that account range from those dominated by a bureacratic–military–technocratic elite that preexisted the regime, to those in which there is a privileged political participation and entry into the elite through a single or dominant party emerging from the society. Or we have a variety of social groups and institutions defined by the state which are allowed to participate in one degree or another in the political process under certain forms, but where the initiative comes from the state rather than from the individual. However, limited pluralism, in an authoritarian setting, can also entirely exclude a large part of the society from organized participation on the basis of an ascriptive characteristic like race or ethnicity.

Another way of categorizing or creating typologies is to base these on specific traits, characteristics, or a certain mentality guiding the people in power. In doing this we can, according to Linz (ibid:284), avoid the tendency to study political systems only within the framework of geographical cultural areas like Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. And, we can also avoid the inclination to specialize in a certain type of ideological system, for instance that of communist politics, which in many cases have led scholars to ignore potential comparisons with non-communist countries. Guillermo O'Donnell (1986:15–16), uses this way of categorization when he divides authoritarian rulers into hardliners vs softliners, where the former are said to reject all traces of democracy which they try to eliminate from political life, using terror tactics; while the latter realize that some kind of electorial legitimation will be necessary in the future. The hardliners try to overcome this dilemma of change by using propaganda and terror. Specific in this propaganda is not the direct threats and crimes against individuals, but the use of indirect, veiled and menacing hints against all that will not heed its teachings (Arendt 1969:345). In authoritarian states this has often taken the form of ideological teaching, where propaganda and terror are used in a combined form, as relating concepts of repression.

Authoritarian regimes can in this sense be described as regimes characterized by political terror as defined by Dallin and Breslauer; "as the arbitrary use, by organs of the political authority of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups" (Dallin and Breslauer 1970:7).

For the purpose of this analysis, however, authoritarian regimes have been defined in more limited, and rather conventional terms, which means a focus on regimes that share at least one characteristic: they are non-democratic. The advantage of this definition is the fact that we thereby have the possibility of taking into account those regimes that exist on the borderline of any 'ideal' type included in different typologies or categorizations. It also allows us to extend the concept of authoritarian regimes further than a definition focused on political terror as defined above can do, and it emphasizes the importance of comparisons across cultures, geographical areas, and between different political systems. Our earlier definition of democracy based on a general discussion

concerning Hadenius' five criteria will thus serve as our guiding principle. All states that received less than nine points in Hadenius' democracy index from 1988, together with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will be classified as being non-democratic, thus as being ruled by authoritarian regimes in 1988. From this premise, they will then be divided into main categories and subclasses as described above with reference to the *process of democratization* during 1989–1991.

3.1 Democratization

In line with their principal definition of democracy as being guided by the concept of citizenship, O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986:8), define democratization as "the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g. state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc)".

In accordance with this way of reasoning, but proceeding from Hadenius' above mentioned definition of democracy as being based upon 1) contestation (Hadenius' 1st and 2nd criteria, 2) participation (Hadenius' 3rd criterion), 3) political and human rights (Hadenius' 4th and 5th criteria), we will take democratization to mean the extension of political contestation, participation and rights to an increasing amount of institutions, issues and people.

It is important to be aware of the fact that the breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not have to be equivalent to democratization. An old authoritarian regime might be replaced by a new, but different authoritarian regime. We can only speak of a transition to democracy if "(1) the old authoritarian power apparatus is dismantled and (2) the new political forces opt for democratic institutions as a framework within which they would compete for realization of their interests" (Przeworski 1988:63, cf. Pye 1990:9).

The breakdown of an authoritarian regime might be regarded as the first (analytical) phase of a democratization process. The second phase then is the construction of a democractic regime, while the final phase is the consolidation of democracy (cf. Bermeo 1990:368). A parallel to this analytical distinction is Rustow's (1970:352–358) distinction between (1) a "preparatory phase" characterized by political struggle between social classes, (2) a "decision phase" characterized by compromizes when political leaders choose democracy as a guiding concept, and (3) a "habituation phase" when politicians and citizens get used to democratic rules. The first and the second phase are what is important in most studies, as these refer to the transition itself, i.e. the interval between one political regime and another. During this transition period the rules of the political game are still not defined, instead, according to O'Donnell

and Schmitter, actors struggle not only to satisfy their own interests, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners or loosers in the future. And, if there exist any effective rules and procedures at all during this transition, these tend to be in the hands of authoritarian rulers. The emergence of a transition will thus be visible when these authoritarian rulers "begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the right of individuals and groups" (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986:6).

Examples of states which have gone through a process of democratization during 1989–1991 are the new emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, as well as Gabon, and Nepal.

3.2 Liberalization

It is important to distinguish between democratization and liberalization. O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986:7) define liberalization as the process of redefining and extending rights whereas democratization has to do with the rules and procedures of citizenship. The distinction is not perfectly clear, but as far as we can see, these definitions take liberalization and democratization to be qualitative distinctive phenomena. A similar way of reasoning can be found in the works of Alfred Stepan (1988:6), who states that democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political concept. Liberalization, Stepan argues, fundamentally refers to civil society, while democratization involves civil society but fundamentally refers to political society. Another way of approaching these two concepts is to take them to mean the same kind of processes where liberalization is looked upon as an imperfect form of democratization, or a process stopping short of 'real' democratization. Following this line of reasoning, Przeworski (1988:61) defines liberalization as a "process whereby the power apparatus allows some political organization and interplay of interests but maintains intact its capacity to intervene".

The phase of opening up or liberalization is thus characterized by reforms which, while similar to the ones of the democratization process, are neither guaranteed by the state nor formally accepted by the various interest groups. In other words, these reforms have a provisionally and arbitrary character. They can be annulled at any time by the regime without any legal recourse against this decision on the part of the opposition. Consequently this period is characterized by great uncertainty and by contradictory measures and decisions (Ethier 1990:11–12).

Liberalization in an authoritarian setting may thus consist of a mixture of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media, greater freedom for organizations of autonomous working-class activities, more legal safe-guards for individuals, releasing of political prisoners, the return of political exiles, changes in income distribution and an emphasis on private initiative, and perhaps even the toleration of some kind of political opposition.

Quite a few states governed by authoritarian regimes have experienced a process of liberalization during the last few decades, especially from an econ-

omic perspective, but this has not necessarily meant that democratization has occurred. In this study we will use the concept of liberalization as a process stopping short of democratization, where the instigated reforms have a provisional and arbitrary character. In more concrete terms this means that a state which does not adhere to all five criteria outlined by Hadenius, will not be considered to have gone through a process of democratization. In those cases where reforms are instigated, economic or political, but where these are not formally guaranteed by the state, the state in question will be considered to go through a process of liberalization.

3.3 Decreased democracy

As stated before, authoritarian regimes are often characterized by instability, leading to measures taken which have an arbitrary or uncertain character. Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Robert Dahl, among others, have argued that attitudes and beliefs are ultimately decisive in whether democratic institutions can be made to work. However, as argued by Weiner (1987:861), a list of countries in the contemporary Third World that have sustained democratic institutions suggests how difficult it is to find an explanation that fits all the cases. What counts in the formation of policy is, according to Remmer (1990:316), not merely the rules of the game, but also the composition of governing coalitions, the ideological orientations of government leaders, and the structure of decision making.

The result of a regime change may thus be the decline of democracy. The development of terror can, for instance, follow the deposition of the former ruler(s), where the new ruler(s) want to build processes and institutions distinct from the style of the past, while at the same time standing in front of other groups of society which also want to gain something from the downfall of the earlier regime. Or these processes may occur when ruling elites in societies are undergoing increased pressure for social, economic, and political reforms, which they are unable to respond to. Instead, they respond to the changing environment with a curtailment of civil and human rights, with increased militant policies of coercive control of collective and individual behaviour. Other factors leading to the decline of democracy might appear in the aftermath of civil wars, or in cases when states increasingly regard themselves as living in a hostile environment where they have to struggle for survival and therefore use national security as an excuse for increased oppression and repression (see e.g. Stohl & Lopez 1984:60–61).

3.4 Processes of democratization/liberalization resulting in considerable setbacks

This subclass might be approached with some hesitancy, as at a first glance it could appear indistinguishable from that of our former category. The reason for including this subclass stems from a need to put into focus those states which have experienced, at some point in time, an ease of restrictions as related

to a general notion of processes of democratization and/or liberalization as defined above, but where the result of these processes has led to an immediate setback, the two factors thus counter-balancing each other.

3.5 Ineffective demands for democracy

Myron Weiner has suggested that "...less attention should be paid to conditions and prerequisites, more to the strategies available to those who seek a democratic revolution" (Weiner 1987:863). These strategies obviously varies from one regime to another, and while the successful historical struggles for democracy were largely against absolute monarchies, in the twentieth century they have primarily been against military regimes or military-backed regimes. According to Weiner, a monarchy that is overthrown can be removed from the scene, but the military remains even after its domination is ended. Therefore, popular mobilization against a military regime, or a military-backed regime, is not always sufficient. Sections of the military must be won over, and for democracy to be sustained military aquiescence to democratic civilian rule must continue. Successful transitions have taken place when popular support for democratic rule has been combined with a willingness of the military to relinquish power (ibid:863–4).

But, according to Nathan, not only the military has to be won over. Where the state is strong, democratization will not occur unless it serves the immediate interest of an important sector of the elite to take the risk (Nathan 1990:125–126). So although we might have several demands for democracy on behalf of oppositional forces in a society, this does not mean that any processes of democratization or even liberalization must occur. Authoritarian rulers might fear the return of radical political parties, and therefore outlaw the Communists or other radical groups in order to set constraints on who can participate in the political arena. Or they might fear prosecution in case of civilian rule, unless any real assurances are given that this will not be the case. Another significant drawback on the account of the opposition is how well organized it is, whether it is one group struggling together or whether it is fragmented, perhaps even struggling between each other instead of showing a united front. It might also prove to be of value whether the struggle for democracy receives international recognition or not.

In this study we will thus consider ineffective demands for democracy as being demands which never result in any visible changes.

3.6 Authoritarian states not influenced by the global trend towards democracy

Our categorization also includes those authoritarian states not affected by any processes of democratization/liberalization, or any demands for such processes to occur. In these states, no transitional processes have been reported in Keesing's or in the Political Handbook of the World during 1989–1991. One could ask why these states appear to have remained untouched by this global

trend towards democracy. Lack of international recognition might be one important factor, as mentioned above. Another could be their self-imposed isolation, hindering any oppositional movement to gain grounds. North Korea seems to be an outstanding example where mass media is extremely restricted and where contacts with the outside world appears to be minimal. Extreme poverty could also be an explaining factor where neither time nor effort can be concentrated on political processes, at least not among the general population.

4 Causes of the democratic trend

Recent literature on democratization appears to face a constant pondering over what is the appropriate strategy for pressing authoritarian rulers and their military supporters to open up the political system to competitive politics. A great deal of authors have suggested that a high rate of economic development is a precondition for democratic development, and hence that a low rate is destabilizing. Others have focused upon the kind of values essential for the maintenance of a democratic system, where value patterns of particular societies are evaluated to see how well they fit. But, according to Myron Weiner, empirical democratic theory has very little to offer to those who seek answers to questions dealing with these issues (Weiner 1987:861). Instead of a ready made formula on the prerequisites or conditions for the creation and persistence of democratic regimes, quite a few scholars suggest that we look at the conditions under which the survival of an authortarian regime may be threatened. Adam Przeworski (1986:50) has for instance listed four such conditions. 1) The authoritarian regime has realized the functional needs that led to its establishment and collapses because it is no longer necessary. 2) Loss of legitimacy. 3) Conflicts within the ruling bloc. 4) Foreign pressures to "put on a democratic face". Together these conditions reflect the actor-orientation of the above mentioned "Transition project". But one important actor appears to be missing: the democratic opposition or movement for democracy.

This is what Diamond (1991:34–39) refers to as being of utmost importance as explanatory causes of the democratic trend, i.e. the importance of changes and mobilization in civil society, where an "upsurge" of popular mobilization pushes the transition forward. What we are talking about here is the fact that predominant values and norms in society may have altered over time to become less tolerant of repression and concentration of power and more demanding of freedom; a so called value change has occurred. A second change may come in the alignment of interests in society. That is when important elites in society come to the conclusion that the authoritarian regime is dispensible (Diamond 1991:38). Finally, we have changes in society which comes in the growth of formal and informal organizations in civil society, and in their capacities, resources, autonomy, and self-confidence. Student marches, workers' strikes, or lawyers refusing to cooperate any longer in legal charades, are all examples of factors that may undermine authoritarian rule. Together these constitute the earlier mentioned "popular upsurge": "Trade unions, grass roots

movements, religious groups, intellectuals, artists, clergymen, defenders of human rights, and professional associations", as they "all support each other's efforts towards democratization" (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986:54).

In literature dealing with the subject of democratization one can notice this trend away from socio-economic factors to pure political factors, and a tendency to emphasize actors instead of structures. Bermeo, for instance, states that individual actions are less determined by structural factors during the breakdown of authoritarian regimes than during the breakdown of democratic regimes (Bermeo 1990:361). Still, this study will to a great extent be concentrated upon structural factors as these cannot be entirely rejected. But it is extremely important to be aware of those other factors as outlined above that may result in regime changes and transitions from authoritarian rule.

4.1 Socio-economic development.

Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been the notion that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well off a nation is, the more likely it is to become or remain a democracy (e.g. Lipset 1959).

This explanation is largely inspired by modernization theories (e.g. Lipset 1959, Deutch 1961), according to which there exist a casual relationship between the modernization of economic structures, the differentiation of social structures, and the stability of democratic political institutions (Ethier 1990:15). These theories have been much criticized. Horowitz, for example, puts weight on the importance of modernization theories in order to understand the role different elites play in domestic conflicts, especially from an economic perspective. But, he says, theories based on the concept of modernization have difficulties in explaining why non-elites act as participants in domestic conflicts. And, also why so many conflicts have taken place in some of the most under-developed countries in the world, e.g. Sudan, Ethiopia and Papua New Guinea (Horowitz 1985:139–140). Only if we give the term "modernization" a very broad definition, almost to the point of describing change in general, can this theory be of any value.

However, this might be to underestimate the importance of change. According to Pye, there is no guarantee that democratic yearnings will produce true democracies in the newly industrializing countries that have taken the first steps away from authoritarian rule, or that market forces will win out over centrally planned economies. But, forces of modernization have made it harder for political willpower to mobilize and dominate a society. The modernization process, Pye argues, inevitably changes the character of the relationship between subjects and rulers so that the benefits increasingly seem smaller and the cost of forgoing freedom greater. This means that the emergence of a middle class and the growth of a technically educated population create new centers of power, which leads to drastically altered attitudes about the nature of authority (Pye 1990:9).

Table 1. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–1991) dependent on the GNP/capita 1989. %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low < 500$	Average 500–5000$	High > 5000$	Total
Democratization	13 (6)	16 (8)	46 (5)	18 (19)
Liberalization	40 (19)	41 (20)	– –	36 (39)
Decreased democracy	6 (3)	6 (3)	– –	6 (6)
Democratization + setback	6 (3)	8 (4)	– –	6 (7)
Ineffective demands	21 (10)	18 (9)	9 (1)	19 (20)
No demands	13 (6)	10 (5)	46 (5)	15 (16)
Total	100% (47)	100% (49)	100% (11)	100% (107)

Socio-economic development also tends to generate a value change, meaning a change in the alignment of interests in society and growth of formal and informal organizations in civil society (Diamond 1991:39).

Two main arguments are usually forwarded to support this middle-class thesis. One argument concerns the motivations and preferences of the middle class existing within authoritarian regimes. This class is easily exposed to and receptive to democratic ideas from "reference societies" (Bendix 1978:12–13,292, Cheng 1990:10). Another argument is based upon the capability and resources of the middle-class, including members of small and medium enterprises that can provide entrepreneurs with funds. With professional–intellectuals among its ranks, the middle-class is provided with legal expertise and the ability for information diffusion, issue definition, and social mobilization for political reform to occur (Cheng 1990:10).

One indicator of the general level of economic development is the GNP/capita.

The hypothesis that there is a connection between a high level of economic development (measured as the GNP/capita) and democracy is not clearly confirmed by table 1. Around 50% of the states with a low respectively an average GNP/capita experienced a process of democratization or in most cases, liberalization during 1989–1991. Although five out of eleven states with a high GNP/capita (Eastern Europe) did go through a process of democratization, the remaining six states with a high GNP/capita which were not democracies in 1988, have not experienced any such processes. Five of these states (The United Arab Emirat, Bahrain, Oman, Quatar, and Singapore), were not at all influenced by the global trend towards democratization, and the remaning state, Kuwait, was classified as only experiencing ineffective demands for democracy. Still, it is important to be aware of the fact that almost all states with a high GNP/capita are already established democracies, which implies that these six states are an exemption to the rule. The high level of economic

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Table 2. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989) dependent on the GNP/capita 1989. %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low < 500$	Average 500–5000$	High > 5000$	Total
Democratization 1989	– –	14 (3)	33 (3)	13 (6)
Liberalization 1989	25 (4)	33 (7)	– –	24 (11)
Decreased democracy 1989	12 (2)	– –	– –	4 (2)
Ineffective demands 1989	25 (4)	29 (6)	11 (1)	24 (11)
No demands 1989	38 (6)	24 (5)	56 (5)	35 (16)
Total	100% (16)	100% (21)	100% (9)	100% (46)

Table 3. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1990) dependent on the GNP/capita 1989. %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low < 500$	Average 500–5000$	High > 5000$	Total
Democratization 1990	5 (1)	8 (2)	17 (1)	8 (4)
Liberalization 1990	37 (7)	42 (10)	– –	35 (17)
Decreased democracy 1990	– –	8 (2)	– –	4 (2)
Democratization + setback 1990	– –	8 (2)	– –	4 (2)
Ineffective demands 1990	26 (5)	12 (3)	– –	16 (8)
No demands 1990	32 (6)	21 (5)	83 (5)	33 (16)
Total	100% (19)	100% (24)	100% (6)	100% (49)

Table 4. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1991) dependent on the GNP/capita 1989. %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low < 500$	Average 500–5000$	High > 5000$	Total
Democratization 1991	21 (5)	21 (3)	17 (1)	20 (9)
Liberalization 1991	33 (8)	21 (3)	– –	25 (11)
Decreased democracy 1991	4 (1)	7 (1)	– –	4 (2)
Democratization + setback 1991	12 (3)	14 (2)	– –	11 (5)
Ineffective demands 1991	4 (1)	– –	– –	2 (1)
No demands 1991	25 (6)	36 (5)	83 (5)	36 (16)
Total	100% (24)	100% (14)	100% (6)	100% (44)

development in these states might even explain the lack of demands for democracy, as people might be satisfied with the living conditions prevailing in these countries.

What is very interesting concerning this variable, is if we choose to look at the trend from year to year, as such a division clearly shows an interesting development. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show how the processes of democratization and liberalization have proceeded between 1989 and 1991.

In 1989, it was first and foremost states with a high GNP/capita that experienced democratization. 75% of the states with a low GNP/capita experienced no such processes (some of these states even went through a process of decreasing democracy during this year). Only 25% of the states went through a process of liberalization, and no state with a low GNP/capita went through a process of democratization. In 1990, a process of liberalization is starting (and in some cases even democratization in states with a low or an average GNP/capita). In 1991, we find the highest figures (both in absolute values and in percentages), of states with a low GNP/capita that go in the direction of increased democracy. The trend is quite obvious. First states with a high GNP/capita went through a process of democratization, while during 1990 and especially in 1991, the trend towards democracy has affected states with a low GNP/capita. Liberalization and democratization, especially in Africa, have shown that a high level of economic development is not an absolute necessary precondition for democratization to occur.

Another indicator of socio-economic development is the ability to read. Table 5 shows a high positive relationship between the ability to read among the population, and democratization. 64% of the states where more than 90% of the population had the ability to read, went through a process of democratization during 1989–91, and another 14% experienced a process of liberaliza-

Table 5. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91) dependent on the ability to read (1989). %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	0–29%	30–69%	70–89%	90–100%	Total
Democratization	10 (3)	12 (5)	9 (2)	64 (9)	18 (19)
Liberalization	43 (13)	35 (14)	44 (10)	14 (2)	36 (39)
Decreased deocracy	– –	2 (1)	17 (4)	7 (1)	6 (6)
Democratization + setback	7 (2)	5 (2)	13 (3)	– –	6 (7)
Ineffective demands	23 (7)	28 (11)	9 (2)	– –	19 (20)
No demands	17 (5)	18 (7)	9 (2)	14 (2)	15 (16)
Total	100% (30)	100% (40)	100% (23)	100% (14)	100% (107)

Table 6. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91) dependent on a general standard of living, measured as Human Development Index (1987). %, absolute values in parenthesis. (HDI includes three indicators: average life-expectancy, ability to read and write, and the GNP/capita. The index is from 0 to 1000 (higher values=better values). Low=0–500, average=501–800, high=801–1000.)

	Low	Average	High	Total
Democratization	10 (5)	10 (4)	53 (10)	18 (19)
Liberalization	44 (21)	38 (15)	10 (2)	36 (38)
Decreased democracy	– –	13 (5)	5 (1)	6 (6)
Democratization + setback	8 (4)	5 (2)	5 (1)	7 (7)
Ineffective demands	25 (12)	13 (5)	16 (3)	19 (20)
No demands	12 (6)	20 (8)	10 (2)	15 (16)
Total	100% (48)	100% (39)	100% (19)	100% (106)

tion. States with a lower level of literacy appear to proceed somewhat slower in a direction towards democracy, however, quite a few states (53% in the group where the ability to read were less than 30%) have experienced at least a process of liberalization.

A general indicator of the level of socio-economic development is the Human Development Index. It includes average life-expectancy in addition to our two earlier variables. An analysis of this index in relation to our dependent variable gives a similar pattern to that given in the tables 1 to 4.

The table for the Human Development Index (table 6) resembles the pattern we found when studying the GNP. States which receive high HDI values have been democratized to a greater extent than have other states. But, as was the case for the GNP, the trend over time clearly shows high HDI values to be important but not necessary preconditions for democratization to occur. In 1989, only states with high HDI values went through a process of democratization. During 1990 and 1991 the global trend towards democratization and liberalization were spread to states receiving lower HDI values. Tables 7, 8 and 9 show this development over time.

4.2 Globalization

As noted by several scholars, one of the most interesting aspects of the recent global trend towards democracy is the *diffusion* of democratic ideas and the importance of *international demonstration effects* (cf. Boström 1990. Diamond 1991).

In research about democratization there appears to be a tendency to stress mainly internal forces. So does for instance the above mentioned project on

Table 7. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989) dependent on a general standard of living, measured as Human Development Index (1987). %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low	Average	High	Total
Democratization 1989	– –	– –	60 (6)	13 (6)
Liberalization 1989	21 (3)	36 (8)	– –	24 (11)
Decreased democracy 1989	– –	9 (2)	– –	4 (2)
Ineffective demands 1989	36 (5)	18 (4)	20 (2)	24 (11)
No demands 1989	43 (6)	36 (8)	20 (2)	35 (16)
Total	100% (14)	100% (22)	100% (10)	100% (46)

Table 8. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1990) dependent on a general standard of living, measured as Human Development Index (1987). %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low	Average	High	Total
Democratization 1990	4 (1)	12 (2)	12 (1)	8 (4)
Liberalization 1990	44 (10)	24 (4)	25 (2)	33 (16)
Decreased democracy 1990	– –	6 (1)	12 (1)	4 (2)
Democratization + setback 1990	– –	6 (1)	12 (1)	4 (2)
Ineffective demands 1990	26 (6)	6 (1)	12 (1)	17 (8)
No demands 1990	26 (6)	47 (8)	25 (2)	33 (16)
Total	100% (23)	100% (17)	100% (8)	100% (48)

Table 9. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1991) dependent on a general standard of living, measured as Human Development Index (1987). %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Low	Average	High	Total
Democratization 1991	17 (4)	12 (2)	60 (3)	20 (9)
Liberalization 1991	. 35 (8)	19 (3)	– –	25 (11)
Decreased democracy 1991	– –	12 (2)	– –	4 (2)
Democratization + setback 1991	17 (4)	6 (1)	– –	11 (5)
Ineffective demands 1991	4 (1)	– –	– –	2 (1)
No demands 1991	26 (6)	50 (8)	40 (2)	36 (16)
Total	100% (23)	100% (16)	100% (5)	100% (44)

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (concerning Southern Europe and Latin America), state that internal forces are more important than external by showing that the strategic divisions and interactions among contending regime factions and between the regime and the opposition have constituted the central dynamic of the transition process (Whitehead 1986:4, O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986). However, contrary to their main argument, O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986:18) argue that transitions from authoritarian rule during recent decades have often began with military defeat in an international conflict.

So, although external factors might not be the one and only cause for a transition process to occur, they are certainly relevant as "... transnational forces involving a dynamic world economy and revolutions in technology and information are compelling authoritarian governments to open up their economies and relax their political control" (Pye 1990:6). According to Pye, authoritarian regimes are experiencing a process of crisis as they are characterized by a fundamental clash between the culture of modernization (the world culture) and the various national political cultures. This clash is especially evident in Marxist/Leninist systems, as their ideology has long emphasized that no such contradiction exists. A host of international forces are here at work simultaneously, such as international trade, finance, communication and technology, which influence the national societies to a certain extent. As a result of this, Pye argues, authoritarian regimes are being seriously undermined (ibid:6–11). But, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:15), the limits imposed on authoritarian rule is not only the world economy, but also the worldwide "marketplace" of ideas. As such a special form of external influences is the transnational diffusion of democratic ideas.

The invention of microchips and satellites has taken this aspect even further. Authoritarian rulers not only find it increasingly hard to isolate their countries from the intellectual and cultural trends sweeping the world, but they also have to take into consideration that their own actions are constantly played back to them and to their people. As a consequence, the costs of repression for authoritarian rulers have increased tremendously, and in most cases forced them to seek at least half-way measures of liberalization. What this information revolution has brought about is calls for decentralization and a diffusion of power throughout the society that appears to be incompatible with authoritarian rule, which in turn has sharpened the crisis of authority (Pye 1990:8–9).

For a process of diffusion of democratic ideas to take place there has to be communication with other countries. In this study we will take the number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations as one indicator of communication with other countries and the degree of openness to the outside world. We will also construct an index of "external contacts".

Our hypothesis is that the more open an authoritarian state is towards the world, the more external contacts it has; the more likely it is to be influenced by successful worldwide processes of democratization.

One indicator of external communication is the number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations. It has been argued that such organizations have strengthened civil society and thereby fostered democrat-

Table 10. Democratization, liberaliization etc. (1989–91) dependent on the number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations (1990). %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	< 200	200–600	> 600	Total
Democratization	11 (4)	12 (6)	41 (9)	18 (19)
Liberalization	42 (15)	35 (17)	32 (7)	36 (39)
Decreased democracy	6 (2)	4 (2)	9 (2)	6 (6)
Democratization + setback	– –	10 (5)	9 (2)	6 (7)
Ineffective demands	17 (6)	24 (12)	9 (2)	19 (20)
No demands	25 (9)	14 (7)	– –	15 (16)
Total	100% (36)	100% (49)	100% (22)	100% (107)

ization (Diamond 1991:54). Transnational networks of INGOs are also obvious potential channels for diffusion of democratic ideas.

The pattern in table 10 is quite clear. 73% of the states with a great deal of INGO-memberships went through a process of democratization and/or liberalization during 1989–91. Not one single state with a large amount of memberships in INGOs was untouched by the global wave of democratization. At the same time, no sign of democratization processes could be found in 25% of the states with the lowest numbers of INGO-memberships.

In order to obtain another indicator of external communication we have constructed an index which includes the number of televisions and memberships in INGOs, as well as the amount of foreign trade as percentages of the GNP. The pattern in table 11 is not perfectly clear. A relatively large number of states, 45%, with much communication with the outside world went through a process of democratization, which supports our hypothesis. But at the same time 27% (3 states) of the states with much communication were not at all affected (no demands) by the global trend towards democracy. This should be compared to the fact that only 3% (1 state) falls into this category among states with little communication.

Still, some of the independent variables of external communication that we have tested in relation to democratization, provide rather strong support for the hypothesis that a high degree of communication with the outside world makes a country more likely to democratize. It seems likely that a diffussion process is at work. According to diffusion theory nearness in space is an important factor. Innovations are more likely to spread among neighbours (Hägerstrand 1968:175). It might therefore prove interesting to examine the geographical position of states that experienced a process of democratization, liberalization etc. during 1989–1991.

As shown in table 12, the last three years' wave of democratization have first and foremost affected Europe (Eastern Europe), and Latin America, along with

Table 11. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91) dependent on communication with other states. %, absolute values in parenthesis. (The communication index includes foreign trade as % of the GNP (1983), the number of TVs/1000 inhabitants (1983) and the number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations (1989). All countries are given points ranging from 3–9. 3–5= little communication, 6–7=average, 8–9=much.

	Little	Average	Much	Total
Democratization	13 (4)	16 (6)	45 (5)	19 (15)
Liberalization	43 (13)	40 (15)	9 (1)	37 (29)
Decreased democracy	3 (1)	8 (3)	– –	5 (4)
Democratization + setback	13 (4)	8 (3)	– –	9 (7)
Ineffective demands	23 (7)	16 (6)	18 (2)	19 (15)
No demands	3 (1)	13 (5)	27 (3)	11 (9)
Total	100% (30)	100% (38)	100% (11)	100% (79)

increasing liberalization in Africa. Even the Middle East and the rest of Asia show an increasing amount of states experiencing a process of liberalization during 1989–1991. Still, we will have to study each year separately to find out if any processes of diffusion have taken place. (See tables 13–15.)

In 1989, the process of democratization was mainly located to Eastern Europe, and while five states in the Middle East were liberalized, only one single

Table 12. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91) in different geographical regions. %, absolute values in parenthesis. (Europe, Africa south of Sahara, Middle East, South Asia, the rest of Asia, Latin America, Oceania.)

	Euro-pe	Africa s of S	Mid East	South Asia	Asia (rest)	Latin Amer.	Oce-ania	Total
Democratization	70 (7)	12 (5)	– –	14 (1)	– –	31 (5)	33 (1)	18 (19)
Liberalization	20 (2)	45 (18)	41 (7)	29 (2)	42 (5)	19 (3)	33 (1)	36 (38)
Decreased democracy	10 (1)	– –	– –	14 (1)	25 (3)	6 (1)	– –	6 (6)
Democratization + setback	– –	8 (3)	– –	– –	– –	25 (4)	– –	7 (7)
Ineffective demands	– –	22 (9)	24 (4)	29 (2)	17 (2)	12 (2)	– –	18 (19)
No democracy	– –	12 (5)	35 (6)	14 (1)	17 (2)	6 (1)	33 (1)	15 (16)
Total	100% (10)	100% (40)	100% (17)	100% (7)	100% (12)	100% (16)	100% (3)	100% (105)

Table 13. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989) in different geographical regions. Absolute values only.

	Euro-pe	Africa s of S	Mid East	South Asia	Asia (rest)	Latin Amer.	Oce-ania	Total
Democratization 1989	5	–	–	–	–	1	–	6
Liberalization 1989	2	1	5	1	1	–	–	10
Decreased democracy 1989	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	2
Democratization + setback 1989	–	5	2	–	2	1	–	10
Ineffective demands 1989	–	5	2	–	2	1	–	10
No demands 1989	–	5	6	1	2	1	1	16
Total	7	16	15	3	8	4	1	54

Table 14. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1990) in different geographical regions. Absolute values only.

	Euro-pe	Africa s of S	Mid East	South Asia	Asia (rest)	Latin Amer.	Oce-ania	Total
Democratization 1990	1	–	–	1	–	2	–	4
Liberalization 1990	–	9	2	–	3	2	1	17
Decreased democracy 1990	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	2
Democratization + setback 1990	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	2
Ineffective demands 1990	–	3	2	2	–	1	–	8
No demands 1990	–	5	6	1	2	1	1	16
Total	2	17	10	4	5	9	2	49

Table 15. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1991) in different geographical regions. Absolute values only.

	Euro-pe	Africa s of S	Mid East	South Asia	Asia (rest)	Latin Amer.	Oce-ania	Total
Democratization 1991	1	5	–	–	–	2	1	9
Liberalization 1991	–	8	–	1	1	1	–	11
Decreased democracy 1991	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	2
Democratization + setback 1991	–	3	–	–	–	2	–	5
Ineffective demands 1991	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	1
No demands 1991	–	5	6	1	2	1	1	16
Total	1	22	6	2	5	6	2	44

case of liberalization were reported in Africa south of Sahara. In 1990 this pattern is changing, and now a process of liberalization starts occurring in several African states, which is followed by further liberalization and de-

mocratization during 1991. Those states not at all affected by the global de-
mocratic trend are mainly to be found in the Middle East (6 states).

The breakdown of the Communist regimes obviously involved a regional
diffusion process (cf. Diamond 1991:3). And the same is likely to have been
the case in Africa south of Sahara. Here it seems likely that a diffusion process
has eminated from Eastern Europe as well as from South Africa.

4.3 Authoritarian Political Systems

In this section we will deal with the question of which authoritarian systems
have become democratized and which have remained untouched by the global
democratic trend. As mentioned earlier, there appears to be a general tendency
to make a distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. The for-
mer is, in this sense, related to ideology while the latter is more diffuse covering
a wide political spectrum. Hanna Arendt, for instance, states that authority, in
whatever form, is always aimed towards restricting or limiting freedom, but
never to abolish it. Totalitarian domination, however, aims at abolishing free-
dom, even at eliminating human spontaneity in general, and by no means at a
restriction of freedom, no matter how tyrannical (Arendt 1969:404–405). This
line of reasoning suggests a tendency towards the destruction of the line be-
tween state and society and the emergence of "total" politization of society by
political organization, generally the party and its affiliates. According to Linz,
this is to stretch the matters too far. Instead, he says, the dimensions that have
to be retained as necessary to characterize a system as totalitarian are an ideo-
logy, a single mass party and other mobilizational organizations, and concen-
trated power in an individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not
accountable to any large constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by
institutionalized, peaceful means (Linz 1975:188–189). Together these condi-
tions, according to Linz (ibid:193), explain the propensity towards coercive
methods in such systems and the likelihood for continuing terror.

Underlying the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian systems is
an assumption that the latter (i.e. mostly communist regimes) are more stable
and less likely to be democratized. This hypothesis we would like to test in this
study. Is democratization less likely to occur in totalitarian systems compared
to other authoritarian political systems?

Using the earlier outlined classification by Derbyshire & Derbyshire we get
table 16.

Table 16 shows that 9 out of 13 communist countries went through a process
of democratization and/or liberalization during 1989–1991, and 13 out of 19
nationalistic socialist countries experienced the same kind of processes during
this time. Thus, what could be termed left-wing authoritarian regimes seem to
be highly vulnerable to the global democratic trend. The hypothesis about the
relative stability of left-wing totalitarian regimes therefore seems to be rejected
by our results. The more right-wing oriented authoritarian regimes included in
the categories authoritarian nationalistic and military authoritarian, have in-

Table 16. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91), dependent on the political system. (Communist, nationalistic socialist, authoritarian nationalistic, military authoritarian, absolutism, apartheid.) (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1989.) %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Com-munist	Nat. soc.	Auth. nat.	Mil. auth.	Abso-lutism	Apart-heid	Total
Democratization	46	21	7	12	10	–	19
	(6)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(1)	–	(14)
Liberalization	23	47	47	44	10	100	38
	(3)	(9)	(7)	(7)	(1)	(1)	(28)
Decreased democracy	15	5	–	–	–	–	4
	(2)	(1)	–	–	–	–	(3)
Democratization + setback	–	5	13	12	–	–	7
	–	(1)	(2)	(2)	–	–	(5)
Ineffective demands	–	21	27	19	30	–	19
	–	(4)	(4)	(3)	(3)	–	(14)
No demands	15	–	7	12	50	–	14
	(2)	–	(1)	(2)	(5)	–	(10)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(13)	(19)	(15)	(16)	(10)	(1)	(74)

creasingly moved in the direction of increased liberalization, while states governed by absolutism seem to be less sensitive to the democratic trend.

Another indicator of the difference between left-wing and right-wing regimes is their orientation in the cold war.

Table 17 shows that pro-west states tend to remain authoritarian to a greater extent than pro-east states. Only one state belonging to the category, pro-east, experienced ineffective demands for democracy, while the number of pro-western states came to 17. Our results reflect the impact of the transformation and breakdown of the central communist state, the Soviet union, and the collapse of communism. The struggle for democracy in pro-west, right-wing authoritarian states appears to be harder. With regard to the relatively weak democratic performance of quite a few pro-west states, one might question the proposition that the established democracies in the West have spread democracy to authoritarian regimes in the Third World.

4.4 Colonial heritage

Every country with a population of at least 1 million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) that has emerged from colonial rule since World War II and has a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony. (Weiner 1987:20).

Most writers dealing with the subject of transitions from authoritarian rule, tend to take for granted that pre-democratic representative regimes have contributed to the production of practices, habits, environments, hazards, and wanted or contrary effects from which arise ulterior democratic developments as well as their accidents and failures. This is to a great extent explained by the

Table 17. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91), dependent on orientation in the cold war (1982). %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	East	Pro-east	Non-align.	Pro-west	West	Total
Democratization	70	–	15	13	–	17
	(7)	–	(2)	(9)	–	(18)
Liberalization	10	78	38	32	100	36
	(1)	(7)	(5)	(23)	(2)	(38)
Decreased democracy	–	–	31	3	–	6
	–	–	(4)	(2)	–	(6)
Democratization + setback	–	–	–	10	–	7
	–	–	–	(7)	–	(7)
Ineffective demands	–	11	15	24	–	19
	–	(1)	(2)	(17)	–	(20)
No demands	20	11	–	18	–	15
	(2)	(1)	–	(13)	–	(16)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(10)	(9)	(13)	(71)	(2)	(105)

type of colonial power that ruled before the country in question gained its independence. Weiner (1987:862), concludes that not a single newly independent country that lived under French, Dutch, American or Portugese rule, has continually remained democratic. In contrast it appears possible that the British model of tutelary democracy has been more successful in creating democratic institutions and processes in newly independent countries. One important aspect in this sense is the emphasis put on administrative units within the highly hierarchical British Empire, as compared to that of other colonial powers. According to David K. Leonard (1991:26), the English needed a manageable number of leaders whom they could hold responsible for the behaviour of their people, and where they did not find them they created them. This implicates that the political procedures of the British were transplanted into the different societies to a larger extent than was the case elsewhere.

We would like to study whether states that have been under British rule are more likely to experience a process of democratization/liberalization than are other ex-colonial states?

Our results in table 18 show that it was mainly states that had not been colonized which experienced a process of democratization, while a liberalization process could be found in non-colonial states as well as in states being previously governed by British and French rule. The results, thus, do not support the above statement of Weiner. However, one should remember that most established democracies in the Third World are almost all of them former British colonies. The fact that virtually all democratic countries in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean are former British colonies is also an evidency of the potency of cultural and institutional diffusion (Diamond 1991:48). But in the most recent wave of democratization, a history as a British colony does not seem to be a decisive factor. Instead we find an interesting development among especially

Table 18. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91), dependent on colonial heritage. (No colonial power, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Italy). (USA, South Africa, Australia not included.) %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	No col.	G.B	France	Belg.	Holl.	Spain.	Port.	Italy	Total
Democratization	38	6	8	—	—	—	50	—	19
	(13)	(2)	(2)	—	—	—	(2)	—	(19)
Liberalization	29	34	54	—	—	50	50	100	37
	(10)	(11)	(13)	—	—	(1)	(2)	(1)	(38)
Decreased democracy	6	6	—	—	50	—	—	—	5
	(2)	(2)	—	—	(1)	—	—	—	(5)
Democratiation + setback	12	—	8	33	—	—	—	—	7
	(4)	—	(2)	(1)	—	—	—	—	(7)
Ineffective demands	3	31	25	33	50	—	—	—	19
	(1)	(10)	(6)	(1)	(1)	—	—	—	(19)
No demands	12	22	4	33	—	50	—	—	14
	(4)	(7)	(1)	(1)	—	(1)	—	—	(14)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(34)	(32)	(24)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(1)	(102)

non-colonial states, but also among states previously governed by French and Portugese rule as well as that of British.

4.5 Religion

Religion can have many very diverse effects on national political integration. Some religions are so otherwordly that their main impact on politics is their own withdrawal from political concerns. According to Lipset (1970:305–373), there exists a major distinction between gnostic religions, which do not emphasize collective religious and political behaviour, and those that are strongly collective and link religion and politics in a consumatory fashion (cf. Huntington & Domingues 1975:83).

On the basis of Weber's inexplicit definition of religion, Laitin (1986:24–28) stretches this statement somewhat further in that he concludes that in any society outside the birthplace of a religion, three religious elements may influence political life: first, the pure doctrine as it would be analyzed by theologians; second, the practical religion which emerges out of the interaction of doctrine and the social origins of the ideas; and, third, the interaction of the practical religion with cultural conditions of the community of converts from a different culture which yields a practical religion of the converted. Within each religious tradition there is thus inevitable pressures and cross-pressures on a variety of concerns. Religious virtuosos who have decided to reform the religion will be at odds with the accomodators. And, religious elites will often

Table 19. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91), depending on the predominant religion. (Catholicism, protestantism, ortodox, islam, buddhism, hinduism, animism, atheism.) %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Cath.	Prot.	Ortod.	Islam	Buddh.	Hind.	Anim.	Athe.	Total
Democratization	37	25	67	—	—	50	20	33	18
	(10)	(2)	(2)	—	—	(1)	(3)	(1)	(19)
Liberalization	22	25	—	52	56	—	33	—	36
	(6)	(2)	—	(21)	(5)	—	(5)	—	(39)
Decreased democracy	4	—	33	—	22	50	—	33	6
	(1)	—	(1)	—	(2)	(1)	—	(1)	(6)
Democratization + setback	15	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	6
	(4)	—	—	—	—	—	(3)	—	(7)
Ineffective demands	15	25	—	28	11	—	13	—	19
	(4)	(2)	—	(11)	(1)	—	(2)	—	(20)
No demands	7	25	—	20	11	—	13	33	15
	(2)	(2)	—	(8)	(1)	—	(2)	(1)	(16)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(27)	(8)	(3)	(40)	(9)	(2)	(15)	(3)	(107)

attempt to differentiate themselves from the immoral non-believers, thereby implying that whatever is bad about society forms no part of their religion.

These factors draw attention to the fact that there exists a certain rivalry between different religious values, and that these values may influence different societies to greater or lesser extent. What is interesting at this point is to study the different religions' importance for a transition from authoritarian rule to occur. Table 19 will show this relationship.

The latest democratic development can mainly be found in states where the predominant religion is Catholicism. 10 out of 27 Catholic states went through a process of democratization, while another 6 experienced liberalization. What table 20 seems to point to, is the problem of combining Islam and democracy. No cases of democratization can be found in this category, and in 19 out of 40 states where the predominant religion is Islam, no change in a democratic direction took place between 1989–1991. However, one should observe that in more than half of the world's Muslim countries, a process of liberalization has occurred.

4.6 Initiatives from above or below?

As stated earlier in our discussion about causes of the democratic trend, Nancy Bermeo (1990:368) has argued that "... authoritarian regimes will not be transformed unless someone presents a "preferable" and (to be more specific) "feasible" alternative." The "someone" in this quotation, although not explicitly stated by Bermeo, is mostly individuals and/or organizations struggling for

Table 20. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91) dependent on whether the initiatives for change come from below, from above, or from both above and below. Classification built on reports in Keesing's Contemporary Archives. %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	From below	From above	From above and below	Total
Democratization	8 (3)	25 (3)	32 (13)	21 (19)
Liberalization	27 (10)	75 (9)	50 (20)	44 (39)
Decreased democracy	5 (2)	– –	5 (2)	4 (4)
Democratization + setback	8 (3)	– –	10 (4)	8 (7)
No demands	51 (19)	– –	2 (1)	22 (20)
Total	100% (37)	100% (12)	100% (40)	100% (89)

democracy. It has been argued that these demands from below are often the real origin of democratic transitions (cf. Diamond 1991:37).

However, initives for democratization may also come from above, i.e. from within the authoritarian regime itself. It might also be a combination of demands from below and initiatives from soft-liners in the authoritarian regime that result in changes.

Table 20 shows that democratization is easier to obtain if the initiative comes from below as well as from above. This puts emphasis on the importance of negotiations and compromises between the regime and the opposition. If the initiative comes mainly from the authoritarian regime, the process will not necessarily fail, but in most cases (75%) the results will be more modest reforms (liberalization) and not full democratization.

4.7 The use of violence/non-violence

Repression, like oppression and suppression has to do with pressure, which can be exerted either physically against the members of a group or class of subjects, or it can be exerted in the form of psychological pressure, affecting the emotional, mental or spiritual well-being of target groups. These concepts are central in the works of Stohl & Lopez (1984:4–9), who focus upon state terrorism. Repression, however, does not necessarily include violence, while state terrorism does in one form or another. Repression, in its milder form, is usually aimed at a certain target, where the state directs its threat against those it wishes to influence. The state has in other words, a relatively clear picture of its enemy. This is not the case when repression is used by the state as a terror tactic, i.e. when leaving the milder form of repression and instead discuss the state as terrorist. Here the picture is more diffuse; the terror can strike against anybody; at any time and at any place; and it is used as a deterrent strategy as can be

Table 21. Democratization, liberalization etc. (1989–91) dependent on the use of violence/non-violence. Classification built on reports in Keesing's Contemporary Archives. %, absolute values in parenthesis.

	Violence state & people	Non-viol. state & people	State: violence people: non-violence	Total
Democratization	8 (2)	18 (7)	46 (11)	23 (20)
Liberalization	58 (14)	33 (13)	42 (10)	42 (37)
Decreased democracy	12 (3)	8 (3)	– –	7 (6)
Democratization + setback	8 (2)	10 (4)	4 (1)	8 (7)
No demands	12 (3)	31 (12)	8 (2)	20 (17)
Total	100% (24)	100% (39)	100% (24)	100% (87)

shown by the Chinese proverb: "kill one, frighten ten thousand". The terrorist acts are thus not aimed at the victim himslf but also at a watching audience (Ibid.).

What is important at this point is the impact of these terror tactics for processes of democratization/liberalization to occur and how the masses respond to this kind of repression. In our study we have approached this problem according to reported events in Keesing's. If there has been any clear evidence of violence in form of armed struggle on behalf of those propagating for democracy, this has been considered as violence used by the people. In those cases where extensive state terror have been used on behalf of the regime, we have taken it to be violence used by the state against its own people. All other cases are to be regarded as non-violence. Table 21 will illustrate this analysis.

Non-violence seems to have a greater impact for both democratization and liberalization to occur. In 41 states out of 57 where democratization and/or liberalization took place, no violence was used by the people. Only in 2 states out of 20 where democratization occurred were violence used by both the people and the state. However, one should note that table 21 shows that liberalization occurred in a great number of states (14), in spite of the use of violence and state terror.

5 Concluding remarks

The following tentative conclusions can be drawn from our study:

1. There has been a substantial trend towards democratization/liberalization during 1989–1991.

2. The relationship between a high level of socio-economic development and democratization, is not clearly confirmed by our study. Especially in 1991 has

the trend towards democracy affected states with a low GNP/capita. This is particularly valid for Africa where liberalization and democratization have shown that a high level of economic development is not an absolute necessary precondition for democratization to occur.

3. A country's communication with the rest of the world, and especially its number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations, seems to be a decisive factor behind the process of democratization.

4. It seems likely that a diffusion process has been at work for processes of democratization and liberalization to spread. This is particularly valid for Eastern Europe, but is also most likely to have been the case during the last year's significant changes in Africa.

5. Communist, and other left-wing authoritarian regimes, seem to be much more vulnerable to the recent global democratic trend than right-wing authoritarian regimes. However, in quite a few right-wing authoritarian ruled states we found an increasing number of states going through a liberalization process, while absolutist states seem to be least affected by the democratic trend.

6. Most states experiencing a process of democratization during 1989–1991 had no colonial heritage.

7. The process of democratization appears to be least successful in Muslim countries.

8. Democratization is easier to obtain if the initiative comes from below as well as from above.

9. In struggles for democracy, the use of non-violent methods seems to be a more successful strategy than the use of violence.

10. Nepal seems to be an interesting deviant case (cf. Molnar 1967). In virtually all respects it was a state that was the least likely to democratize. Nevertheless Nepal went through a process of democratization during 1989–1991. It has a low GNP/capita, low ability to read among its population and a low general level of socio-economic development. Furthermore Nepal had relatively little communication with the rest of the world. It was an absolutist state with an autocratic king, not likely to be influenced by the breakdown of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. (The fact that the communists were one of the main driving forces behind the democratization process in Nepal makes the state even more interesting to study as a deviant case.) Such a study, however, cannot be done with quantitative methods. To obtain a better understanding of any specific case, qualitative methods will have to be used.

Appendix

List of states
As related to processes of democratization/liberalization etc., during 1989–1991

Democratization
1. Benin
2. Bolivia
3. Bulgaria
4. Cape Verde
5. Chile
6. Colombia
7. Czechoslovakia
8. Gabon
9. Germany (East)
10. Guinea–Bissau
11. Hungary
12. Nepal
13. Nicaragua
14. Panama
15. Poland
16. Romania
17. Solomon Islands
18. Soviet Union
19. Zambia

Liberalization
20. Albania
21. Algeria
22. Angola
23. Burkina Faso

24. Cameroon
25. Comoros
26. Congo
27. Egypt
28. El Salvador
29. Equatorial Guinea
30. Ethiopia
31. Fiji
32. Ghana
33. Guatemala
34. Guinea
35. Iran
36. Jordania
37. Laos
38. Libya
39. Mali
40. Mauretania
41. Mozambique
42. Niger
43. Nigeria
44. North Yemen (Yemen 1991)
45. Pakistan
46. Peru
47. Sierra Leone
48. Somalia
49. South Africa
50. South Korea
51. South Yemen (Yemen 1991)
52. Taiwan
53. Tanzania
54. Thailand
55. Togo

56. Tunisia
57. Turkey
58. Vietnam

Decreased democracy
59. Burma (Myanmar)
60. China
61. Philippines
62. Sri Lanka
63. Surinam
64. Yugoslavia

Democratization + setback = no change
65. Brazil
66. Haiti
67. Ivory Coast
68. Madagaskar
69. Mexico
70. Paraguay
71. Zaire

Ineffective demands for democracy
72. Bangladesh
73. Bhutan
74. Central African Republic
75. Djibouti
76. Guyana
77. Honduras
78. Indonesia
79. Irak

80. Kenya
81. Kuwait
82. Malaysia
83. Morocco
84. Rwanda
85. Senegal
86. Sudan
87. Swaziland
88. Syria
89. Tchad
90. Uganda
91. Zimbabwe

No demands for democratization
92. Afghanistan
93. Bahrain
94. Burundi
95. Cuba
96. Gambia
97. Lebanon
98. Lesotho
99. Liberia
100. Malawi
101. North Korea
102. Oman
103. Papua New Guinea
104. Qatar
105. Saudi Arabia
106. Singapore
107. United Arab Emirats

Notes

1 See e.g. Huntington 1991, who speaks about a third wave of democractization.

2 See p. 9. Each state is given points ranging from 1 to 10, where 10 is the most democratic.

3 (See appendix). It should be stressed that we focus on democratic *changes*. Our classification says nothing about the relative state of democracy in a certain country. Thus, states placed in the categories of "ineffective demands" (e.g. Malaysia, Senegal) and "no demands" (e.g. Papua New Guinea, Singapore) might be far more democratic than some of the states placed in the liberalization category (e.g. Guatemala, Iran, Libya).

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