

# Multiple Goals and Constitutional Design: How the Swedish King Lost His Formal Powers

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## Introduction

In parliamentary democracies, when a new government is formed the Head of State is somehow involved in the process.<sup>1</sup> Sweden is an exception. The Swedish Monarch does not take part in government formation. It is rather the Speaker of the Riksdag who appoints a candidate for Prime Minister. This candidate is approved unless more than half of all members of parliament (i.e. an absolute majority) vote against him.<sup>2</sup>

These Swedish rules stem from a compromise known as the Compromise in Torekov (Torekovskompromissen). Torekov is a small town in southern Sweden. It was there, in August of 1971, that the members of a royal commission on constitutional affairs, *Grundlagberedningen* (GLB), reached an agreement on the new rules (SOU 1972:15).<sup>3</sup> The rules agreed upon in Torekov were included in the new constitution (Instrument of Government) that went into effect on 1 January, 1975.<sup>4</sup>

When the rules were written, two of the Swedish parties, the Social Democratic and the Conservative Parties, faced important trade-offs. Both believed that they could not simultaneously get the policy they wanted, win votes and gain government office. They had to make priorities among these goals. In one way the Social Democrats were the losers in Torekov. Since 1911 their party programme has called for a republican system of government. By accepting the compromise they accepted the continued existence of the monarchy. Leif Lewin (1985:155) has criticized this compromise, arguing that the attitude of the Swedish left (read the Social Democrats) towards the monarchy is best characterized as one lacking of principles. The left was just not willing to take the vote losses that they feared would occur if they put the issue of the republic on the electoral agenda.

This is true, but the criticism raised by Lewin misses an important point. After all, the Social Democrats were quite successful in Torekov. Having made the initial trade-off (i.e. decided not to propose a republic), the Social Democrats could have chosen simply to codify constitutional practice as it had developed. Instead the Social Democrats sought to remove the Monarch's con-

stitutional powers. Two of the four parties involved, the Centre and Liberal Parties, could, at the time, accept such a solution rather easily. The Conservatives could not, though in the end they accepted the Social Democratic solution to a Social Democratic dilemma. In so doing they passed up a chance to pursue a policy position they believed to be popular with the electorate.

The deliberations and trade-offs that led to the Compromise in Torekov and the transfer of government formation responsibility from the Monarch to the Speaker is the main topic of this essay. I reconstruct the parties' policy positions as they were before the compromise (*ex ante*) and I explain how the parties reached the compromise. In so doing, I focus on the Social Democratic and the Conservative Parties.

The argument is presented in five parts. In the next section I present the theoretical and methodological framework of this study. In the third section I present the historical, political and institutional framework in which the compromise was reached. In the fourth section I present the events in and around Torekov. In the fifth and final section I return to the trade-offs made by the Social Democratic and Conservative Parties. I also discuss the theoretical implications of this study.

## Theory and Method

Political parties have motives (or goals) that they act upon. Self-interest is a classical motive in the literature, though in different forms. Downs' (1957) seminal work assumes that political parties are above else vote seekers, suggesting that what they say and do should be understood in the light of their basic concern, which is to maximize their share of the votes.

Riker (1962) has shown that when forming a coalition, it is not rational for a purely self-interested actor to maximize support (i.e. votes) beyond the point at which a coalition is winning. To do so only decreases your own party's share of the government positions (and other perks) that are available. For Riker, office-seeking is the dominating motive behind party behaviour, not votes.

However, Axelrod (1970), De Swaan (1973), Lewin (1988) and others, have shown that political parties often behave as if they care about their policy programme. In fact, the policy-seeking motive has come to be the dominant assumption in coalition formation theory (Browne and Franklin, 1986; Laver, 1986).

Following, among others, Molin (1965), Budge and Laver (1986) and Strom (1990), I assume that political parties have multiple goals. Their behaviour is motivated by the pursuit of votes, power positions and policies, and these multiple goals should not simply be reduced to a single one. All three of these goals are associated with an important literature and have been shown to have merit. But how do political parties make priorities among these goals?

One theoretical starting point has been proposed by Sjöblom (1968), who argues that a party should be understood as having the general goal that the "party itself shall make the authoritative decisions in accordance with its evalu-

ation system” (Sjöblom, 1968:73). I interpret this to mean that policy is always the primary (or intrinsic) goal while the others are merely instrumental towards policy objectives. While this is an improvement over the single-motive assumption, it too simplifies too much. The multiple goals of political parties are reduced to one primary and two secondary goals.

I propose that none of the three goals is, *a priori*, primary and that the priority ranking among office, votes and policy goals vary across time and place (Strom, 1990). The question then becomes, how and in what circumstances do political parties assign priorities to these goals? One way to pursue this theoretical question is by looking at cases where parties have made important trade-offs. The Compromise in Torekov is such a case, which illustrates how two parties resolved their goal conflicts.

Sjöblom also stresses the importance of a fourth party goal, internal cohesion. That this can be an important goal is demonstrated by the events in and around Torekov.<sup>5</sup> However, since my main focus is on a compromise reached by two parties facing trade-offs among externally directed goals (i.e. winning votes, office and policy), I conceptualize the *internal* goal of cohesion as an influence on the trade-offs that political parties make among their *external* goals. To make this important “within-party” argument, I focus on the party leadership. I use the term “party leadership” to denote the Chairman of each party, his closest associates and the members of the Royal Commission (GLB). This term does not include other high ranking members of a party, such as the members of its parliamentary group or the representatives at each party’s national conference (or congress). These members, however, are not unimportant for the outcome. Much of what the party leadership did had to do with satisfying party members and voters.

The data come from interviews with participants in the decision making process, from written accounts by informed actors, and from party minutes. Following Hadenius (1984), I give priority to information that (a) is close in time to the events, (b) is primary rather than secondary and (c) originates with those who actually participated in the decision. In this respect I can rely not only on eyewitness accounts of politicians but also on many of the legal experts and political scientists who served as experts for the Royal Commission. I have also shared a draft of this paper with those I interviewed. Many of them, on the basis of the draft, agreed to a second, complementary interview or provided me with written comments.

## Political and Institutional Background

The compromise in Torekov should be seen in the context of ongoing constitutional reforms and Swedish political traditions. A few remarks about the Swedish party system in the early 1970s are necessary. The parties involved in the creation of the new constitution represented two political blocs. One bloc, the socialist, was dominated by the Social Democrats. They had been in government continuously for almost 40 years. The other party in this bloc, the Com-

munist Party, had never held any government portfolio, and it was not included in the deliberations on the new constitution. Within the other bloc, the non-socialist bloc, there were three parties, the Conservative, Centre and Liberal Parties. When the Riksdag convened in January of 1971, the Social Democrats (163 seats) needed the Communists (17 seats) to remain in power. Taken together, the non-socialist parties, with a combined total of 170 seats, were now larger than the Social Democrats. However, with the consent of the Communist Party, the Social Democrats continued in government.

Between 1969 and 1971, all four major parties changed party leaders. The three non-socialist parties made efforts to cooperate better (Hadenius, 1990:132; Hylén, 1991:178). Up to the early 1970s the Conservative Party had often been held at an arm's length by the Centre and Liberal Parties. In addition, the Centre Party had been something of an independent force in Swedish politics. In November of 1971, the three parties for the first time presented a joint programme on economic affairs. This programme, designed to combat unemployment, was presented at a joint press conference with all three party leaders present. The press conference was also the first of its kind. This new-found non-socialist cooperation was partly a deliberate move by the new Conservative Party leader, Gösta Bohman. For him, the removal of the Social Democrats from power, and the ability of the Conservative Party to influence policy outcomes, depended on cooperation among the non-socialist parties. He saw non-socialist cooperation as the way to achieve the overall goal of a change in power (Möller, 1986:98–120).

The joint press conference was held only three months after the Compromise in Torekov. The efforts of the Conservative party leader to establish non-socialist cooperation was thus an important part of the political context in which the Compromise in Torekov was reached. Before discussing the compromise itself, it can be useful to discuss other contextual factors that helped pave the way for an agreement at this time.<sup>6</sup>

The lack of correspondence between the existing constitution and constitutional practice helped put constitutional reforms on the agenda (Holmberg, 1972). The constitutional transition from a system of balance of power to one of parliamentary supremacy was a transition in which norms and practices had changed, while the written rules had not (Stjernquist, 1978).

Another contextual factor was the Swedish political-administrative culture. During this period the Swedish way of making political decisions was famous for its emphasis on deliberation and for the thorough and lengthy treatment of issues by royal commissions. The Swedish political-administrative culture was also known for its emphasis on compromise and consensus (Sannerstedt, 1987, 1989 and von Sydow, 1989). In the words of Anton:

No image of modern Swedish politics is more widely celebrated than that of the rational, pragmatic Swede, studying problems carefully, consulting widely, and devising solutions that reflect centuries of practice at the art of compromise (Anton, 1980:158).

The way in which the constitutional issues were dealt with for two decades before 1975 closely follow the standard description of the Swedish decision-making process (Ruin, 1983; Stjernquist, 1978). From the beginning, the parties held opposing positions on many issues including the monarchy, the electoral system and the organization of the Riksdag. But there was also consensus that a new constitution ought to be based on agreements between all four major parties (Johansson, interview; Ruin, 1988; Stjernquist, interview). If anything, this attitude grew stronger over time (Hermerén, 1987; Johansson, 1976). The norm was probably strengthened by the Commission's conferences – such as the one in Torekov – in which the members worked in secluded and relaxing environments. This helped create an almost ecumenical relationship between the members of the Commission (see Sannerstedt, 1989:311, for an analogy to constitutional compromises in other countries).

All of these contextual features were important. But while they helped create conditions favourable to a large scale constitutional reform, by themselves the contextual features need not have resulted in a new constitution. Most of these conditions probably existed in the other Scandinavian countries as well. These countries did not radically change their constitutions. What gave an additional incentive for large scale institutional reforms in Sweden was that the parties had their own interest in such reforms.

An earlier Royal Commission, *Författningsutredningen*, (SOU 1963:16–18) had deliberated on the issue of constitutional reform between 1954 and 1963. When this Commission presented its proposals a majority of its members supported abolishing the First Chamber. The Commission also proposed a new electoral system with over-representation for large parties. However, the Commission proposals were controversial, not least because the Social Democratic leader was opposed to the abolition of the First Chamber. He also feared that an over-representation for large parties would create an incentive for the three non-socialist parties to join forces (von Sydow, 1989).

In the local elections of 1966, the Social Democrats suffered significant losses. These losses came as a shock to the Social Democrats, especially since they believed that they were stronger in local than national elections. One of the issues that, according to the party leader, had helped create the electoral setback was that the party seemed (was) indecisive on the issue of constitutional reform (von Sydow, 1989). In the immediate aftermath of this election the Social Democrats accepted the abolition of the two-chamber Riksdag. Their request for a link between local and national government was to be manifest by holding elections for both national and local offices on the same day. Since the Social Democrats believed that they drew much of their electoral strength from their well-organized and effective campaign organization, they did not want a long period between elections. They therefore proposed a three year tenure for the Riksdag. They also proposed a strictly proportional electoral system. To avoid fractionalization and splinter parties on the left, they also proposed a national threshold of three percent. Thus, parties who received less than three percent of the national vote would not gain representation in the Riksdag (von Sydow, 1989).

The opposition parties, as well as many Social Democrats, were, to say the least, taken by surprise by this sudden proposal (Wentz, 1976). The non-socialist parties welcomed the one-chamber Riksdag and accepted the proposal of strict proportionality. However, they opposed the idea of having local and national elections on the same day. In their view, this would result in local issues being overshadowed by national ones. The proposed threshold of three percent was also problematic. Ohlin feared that this would help the newly created Christian Democratic Party gain votes at the expense of the Liberals. Erlander claims in his memoirs (1982:175) that Ohlin initially wanted the threshold set at five percent (see also Lidbom, 1982:192). However, the non-socialist parties reached an agreement to support a four percent threshold. In these partial reforms, the Social Democrats thus succeeded in getting a joint local-national election day whereas the opposition got the four percent threshold it wanted (SOU 1967:26; von Sydow, 1989).

The institutional changes had made a change of government more likely (Holmberg, 1976; Johansson, interview; Stjernquist, 1978). It also helped that the Commission now had worked since 1966 and that the Commission's expert study on comparative government formation was published in 1970 (SOU 1970:16). This added an impetus to find a solution (Hermerén, interview 2). But could the parties reach an agreement on the monarchy?

## The Compromise in Torekov

The old (1809) constitution gave the King the right to appoint the cabinet, to preside over cabinet meetings, to sign government decisions and to dissolve the Riksdag. In his position as the Head of State he was also formally the supreme commander of the Swedish military and he appointed higher civil servants. However, it is probably fair to say that among the party leaders, the issue of a monarchy or a republic was not held to be very important. After all, the powers of the King were largely ceremonial and symbolic. Except for its potential electoral consequences, there was little intrinsic interest at the highest party levels for the issue of the monarchy (Erlander, 1982; Ruin, 1986:250-253; Westerståhl, 1976).

However, in the eyes of many outside of the party leadership, the monarchy seems to have been the most important constitutional issue. Jörgen Westerståhl (1976), the chief secretary of the 1954 Royal Commission (FU), has expressed the surprise he felt when he repeatedly found that the monarchy enjoyed the most attention of all constitutional issues.

The Centre and Liberal Parties had some members who favoured a republic and some members who were opposed (Fiskesjö, 1973:42). In 1968 the Centre Party and the Liberal Party jointly declared that the King should not have power to influence (reellt påverka) government formation or Swedish politics (Mittensamverkan 68). This can be seen as an attempt by these parties to remain uncommitted (Dahlén, interview). Evidently, these two parties were aware that their position on the issue put them between the two major oppo-

nents and thus in a pivotal position (Hermerén, interview 2; Brändström, interview). For quite some time they maintained a wait-and-see attitude.

Support for the monarchy was stronger within the Conservative Party. The Conservatives did not want the King to be involved in party politics and they were fully in support of the parliamentary principle. At the same time, however, they saw a value in keeping the monarchy. To them it seemed natural that the Swedish Monarch (as other Heads of State) participated, to some extent, in the proceedings of the representative democracy. This would, they believed, ensure his position as a symbol of national unity (Fiskesjö, 1973:42, 51–52).

### The Social Democratic Trade-Off

When the Royal Commission (Grundlagberedningen) was constituted in 1966, one of its tasks was to consider the powers of the Head of State. In an answer to a direct question in the Riksdag, the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Erlander, in 1968 stated that this involved the issue of republic or monarchy (Riksdagens protokoll, 1968, II, Nr 25, 12). The Social Democratic leadership was in a dilemma.

Within the Social Democratic leadership almost everyone was, *in principle*, in favour of a republican form of government. However, the Social Democratic leadership knew, as did the elite in all parties, that Swedish voters were heavily in favour of the monarchy. In the early 1970s, proponents for both sides referred to polls that showed that between 60–80% of the population was in favour of the monarchy (GHT, May 5, 1972; NT, April 24, 1972).

In the 1950s and early 1960s the Social Democratic leadership was able to refer critics to the Royal Commission, *Författningsutredningen* (FU), that was deliberating constitutional reforms. When this Commission presented its report in 1963, the issue of monarchy versus republic became more salient. The Commission proposed to codify the King's role as the one who appointed the Prime Minister. The King would also have the authority to dismiss the government, refuse to submit government proposals to the parliament and refuse to follow a government request to dissolve the parliament. According to the Commission, this would ensure the King a position in which he could help strengthen the parliamentary democracy (SOU 1963:17; see also Nyman, 1981 and Tingsten, 1964).

Westerståhl (1976) argues that the issue of the powers of the King significantly helped contribute to the controversial status of the Commission's report in 1963. The Commission's proposal with regard to the King's involvement in government formation was criticized within the Social Democratic Party (von Sydow, 1989:161; SAP-PS, October 26, 1965). Prime Minister Erlander also stressed what he saw as the inappropriateness of a system in which the King had the formal powers to dissolve or refuse to dissolve the parliament (SAP-PS, December 16, 1965 and March 8, 1966).

However, whenever he was challenged on the continued existence of the monarchy, Erlander defended the party's pragmatic stand. One example he used to show the electoral liability of the issue was the 1966 elections. In 1966,

33 Social Democratic members of the Riksdag signed a parliamentary motion in which they demanded a new commission to consider a republican form of government. The Riksdag supported their request (Eriksson, 1985; Stjernquist, 1971). This issue was salient in the election. In his post-election analysis Erlander argued that the Social Democratic hesitance on constitutional reforms in general, coupled to the unresolved issue of the republic, had served the opposition parties well. He argued that they had been able to exploit the issue as a symbol of a weak and tired party unable to resolve important matters (SAP-PS, October 1, 1966).

Another example of the Social Democratic leadership's view on the republican issue was provided in 1969. At a meeting of the party's National Executive (partistyrelsen), board member Hans Hagnell brought up the unfulfilled promise of the republic (SAP-PS, June 17, 1969). Hagnell asked if the party was not supposed to work for the fulfilment of the party programme – including the issue of the monarchy.<sup>7</sup>

Erlander argued that the only way the Social Democrats could bring up a proposal for a republican system of government was with a clear argument of why this would make the representative government stronger and more effective. Without such a proposal, he did not want to bring up the issue, particularly not when, he argued, a poll just had shown that 80% of the Swedish youth favoured the continued existence of the monarchy.

In support of Hagnell, the representative from the party's youth wing, Bosse Ringholm, replied that the youth wings of the Liberal and the Centre Parties were in favour of a republic and that the Social Democrats might get help from them on the issue. But Erlander and his influential Minister of Finance, Gunnar Sträng, both refuted the idea of putting the issue of a republic on the electoral agenda. They argued that this would obscure all other (and more important) issues and that unless the Social Democrats wanted to lose the election it was an impossible suggestion.<sup>8</sup>

But the Social Democratic leadership also faced criticism from outside of the party. One of the most influential critics was Herbert Tingsten, a liberal political science professor and a former editor of Sweden's largest morning-paper (Dagens Nyheter). When the first Commission (FU) presented its proposal, Tingsten (1964) wrote a polemic and highly influential book titled *Skall kungamakten stärkas?* (roughly, Should the King be Given More Power?) in which he criticized the idea that the King could strengthen the democracy (Ruin, 1990; Sterzel 1983; Stjernquist, 1971). According to the chief secretary, it was not the case that the Commission explicitly discussed or followed Tingsten's proposals. Rather, the secretary remembers reading Tingsten and believes that most of the other involved actors were familiar with Tingsten's argument (Holmberg, interview 2). The influence was, thus, indirect.

Tingsten also suggested alternatives to the Commission's (FU) proposals. He argued that it was possible to simply let the parliament elect a Prime Minister. Or, if this was found to be unsuitable because of the obvious risk of tactical voting, the right to appoint the Prime Minister could be left to someone other than the King. Tingsten (1964:34) suggested that the responsibility for



government formation might be left to someone elected to his office – the Speaker. Thus, if not *the* first, he was certainly among the first to mention the possibility of letting the Speaker be responsible for government formation. Tingsten also suggested that it would be possible to firmly establish the parliamentary principle by requiring a vote in the Riksdag before a government assumed power. This could be done by a vote in which the Riksdag declared its support or by a vote in which the Riksdag declared that it tolerated the government. Tingsten (1964:34) favoured the latter.

Other intellectuals joined in. For example, in 1966 professor Pär-Erik Back and Gunnar Fredriksson, the editorial chief of the largest Social Democratic newspaper (*Aftonbladet*), published a book on the topic. They proposed that the constitution be reformed in two steps. In the first the King was to be stripped of all his political power. In the second the monarchy would be replaced by a republic. The Prime Minister would at first be appointed by the Speaker and later this responsibility would be given to a President.<sup>9</sup> Thus, even if a majority of the Swedes supported the monarchy, influential intellectuals did not.

The broad outlines of the solution to the Social Democratic dilemma had been articulated already in 1963 by some younger influential Social Democrats (Andersson, et al., 1963). The solution was to try to frame the constitutional reforms as a codification of a parliamentary system of government and to give as little power as possible to the King (see also Ruin, 1986:253).

In 1969, at the party congress at which he resigned, Erlander articulated the solution. He wanted the Commission (GLB) to create rules that gave primacy to the parliamentary democracy, *regardless* of whether the Head of State was a king or a president. Two issues were, he argued, of particular importance. The first was that the King be removed from government decision making. The second was that he be removed from involvement in government formation. This would ensure a constitution that could work equally well under a monarch or a president. He also stated that he believed it possible to come to an agreement with the other parties about giving the Speaker the right to appoint the Prime Minister. With this strategy, he argued, the Social Democrats would not have to jeopardize the upcoming (1970) election. The Congress accepted the Erlander proposal (SAP-Congress, 1969:335–344)

Erlander's speech was copied and sent to the members of the Commission by the chief secretary Erik Holmberg (GLB, BII Etapp 2 a 33). Holmberg also expressed the view that if Erlander's speech could be the foundation for a compromise, other problems surrounding the powers of the Head of State could probably also be solved (GLB, BII Etapp 2 a 45).

The Social Democratic members of the Commission (GLB) worked along the lines given in the Erlander speech, the Tingsten proposal and the Back and Fredriksson strategy (see also AB, March 25, 1971; ÖK, January 26, 1970). They were successful. Part of the reason for their success was that they were relatively close to the position of the Centre and Liberal Parties. The largest Swedish newspaper (*Expressen*) reported in the fall of 1970 that the Commission was close to an agreement. The King was to be given only ceremonial duties and the Speaker the right to appoint the Prime Minister (Exp., August 7,

1970). While the Liberal Party representative, Birger Lundström, was in favour of a system in which the King and the Speaker shared the right to appoint a Prime Minister, the firm stand of the Social Democrats made this an unlikely outcome. However, one major obstacle to a compromise, the Conservative Party, remained. The newspaper reported that Conservative Party leader, Yngve Holmberg, wanted to retain the King as the chair of government meetings and as the person responsible for appointing the Prime Minister.

Nonetheless, in Torekov the Conservative representative agreed to a compromise. Why? With the strong Swedish norm in favour of consensus on the basic rules of politics, the Social Democratic government would probably have been reluctant to propose a new constitution without a four party agreement. Moreover, the aging Monarch was very popular with the Swedish people and the Conservative Party could certainly hope to benefit electorally from a campaign (in 1973) in which they fought a Social Democratic "attack" against the monarchy. The key to this puzzle lies with the Conservative representative (Hernelius) himself, in intra-party considerations and in the search for non-socialist cooperation.

### The Conservative Trade-Off

In August of 1971, the Commission, accompanied by assistants and experts, met in Torekov. The Social Democrats were represented by Georg Pettersson, the chairman of the Riksdag's Committee on the Constitution (Konstitutionsutskottet). The other two members were one of Pettersson's successors as chairman of the Committee, Hilding Johansson, and Arne Gadd. Gadd was the most outspoken republican of the three.

The chair of the Commission, Valter Åman, had previously been a Social Democratic member of the Riksdag. While he followed his party colleagues when it came to decisions, he acted, for the most part, as an independent chairman. He saw his job as getting the parties to agree on a compromise. In his memoirs Åman writes that he was not a republican. In fact, he goes as far as to argue that this was one of the main reasons that Erlander wanted him to be the chairman of the Commission (Åman, 1982:172).

The non-socialist parties were represented by Birger Lundström from the Liberal Party, Allan Hernelius from the Conservative Party and Sten Wahlund from the Centre Party. Wahlund had also been a member of the first Commission (FU) and had by now spent almost two decades deliberating on constitutional affairs. It is likely that the advanced age of many of the members might have helped produce a compromise. They wanted to see the job finished (Holmberg, 1976; Gadd, interview 1). Actually, the members of the Commission were all characterized by their will to reach a result that could win broad acceptance (Johansson, letter).

For a few days very little progress was made.<sup>10</sup> Then, in a matter of two days, the Commission members agreed on a compromise. The protocol reports the final compromise (GLB, August 20, 1971), in short as:

1. The King is to be the Head of State.

2. The Head of State is to be kept informed by the Prime Minister (i.e. he is removed from government decision making).
3. The Speaker appoints a candidate for Prime Minister. Unless a majority of the members vote against the proposal, the candidate is approved. If the Speaker's proposal is rejected four times, the Riksdag is to be dissolved and an extra election called.
4. The Head of State chairs the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Council (unless it is about to make decisions, in which case the Speaker is to chair the meeting).
5. The Government is the Commander in Chief of the military.
6. The Head of State is supposed to attend the opening of the Riksdag and declare it opened (if the King is unable to do so, the Speaker can declare the session opened).<sup>11</sup>

According to Mr. Gadd (interview 1), things started to move when the Chairman agreed with the representative for the Centre Party, Sten Wahlund, that the King should preside over the government meetings at which high civil servants were appointed. When Åman presented this to his party colleagues they simply refused. Twenty years later Mr. Gadd recollects being surprised at his older colleagues' firm stand. To him it seemed almost as if they were members of the youth wing of the party and not the present and future chairs of the Riksdag's Committee on the Constitution. They would simply not allow the King to chair any meeting at which the government made any decisions. Thus, Åman had to go back to Wahlund and explain that the deal was off. After further deliberation, Åman came back to the Social Democratic group and said that the Centre Party representative had decided to accept an agreement and propose that the King be removed from all government decision-making (see also GT, August 23, 1971). The representative from the Liberal Party joined in shortly thereafter. In fact, Åman (interview) does not recall that the Liberal Party representative was any more reluctant than the Centre Party representative to accept the compromise. Åman believes that both representatives wanted to reform the constitutional powers of the Monarch.

Now three parties had agreed and it was up to the Conservatives to oppose or accept the agreement. Hernelius from the Conservative Party accepted on the condition that the King was going to be kept informed by the Prime Minister on government affairs (Gadd, interview 1).<sup>12</sup>

After the compromise, the Commission (GLB) held a press conference (SDS, August 21, 1971). At the conference it was obvious that representatives had different reasons for agreeing to the compromise. The Chairman (Åman) started the conference by declaring that the issue of republic and monarchy now was solved: Sweden was going to continue to be a monarchy. This seemed to surprise the other Social Democrats. They insisted that the issue of a republic or a monarchy had not really been dealt with. What they had done was to establish the proper powers of the Head of State. In their eyes, the new constitution would work equally well whether the Head of State was a king or a president. The non-socialist members of the Commission simply argued that if the Head of State was a king, Sweden was a monarchy. In general, however,

the members of the Commission expressed satisfaction with the compromise. Wahlund, of the Centre Party, declared that, early on, he and the Chairman (Åman) had been set on finding a compromise. The only dissatisfaction with the compromise seemed to come from the Conservative representative (Hernelius) who expressed dissatisfaction with the removal of the Monarch from government meetings at which higher civil servants were appointed.

Why, then, did Hernelius accept the compromise? Had he not agreed, the Conservative Party would have been free to take a popular stand supporting the Monarch. One important reason was probably that accepting the compromise was a way for Hernelius to secure the monarchy and prevent a republic (a point stressed by Gadd, interview 2; Hermerén, interview 1; Kristensson, interview). He feared that if he did not agree the monarchy would remain under challenge from the Social Democrats. In addition, if he did not agree to the compromise, then the other three parties could work out a proposal that, from his point of view, was even worse.

It has also been suggested that Hernelius had personal reasons for agreeing to a compromise. The argument is that he wanted to settle the issue and be known as one of the men who created the Swedish constitution (Lidbom, 1982). This argument supports the notion (mentioned above) that many of the Commission members were old and determined to get the job done. Johansson (interview) bears witness to the claim that Hernelius was personally very interested in achieving a compromise. Another reason for Hernelius' acceptance might have been that the Chairman, Åman, had impressive mediating skills (Brändström, interview; Holmberg, 1976). Åman (1982:177; Åman interview) stressed to Hernelius that his party alone had not agreed and that the issue was no longer one of republic or monarchy but one concerning a modified form of monarchy. Perhaps this helped convince Hernelius. According to some commentators, the sun and the baths could also have helped forge congeniality (Riksdagens protokoll, 1973, Nr 110, 64; Johansson, interview; KVP, August 21, 1971; Stjernquist, interview). And, as alluded to above, the strong Swedish norm that it is desirable to have broad agreements on constitutional affairs might have helped create a bargaining environment that facilitated a compromise.

Professor Tingsten, who had been perhaps the leading critic of the first Commission's (FU) proposal, expressed understanding for the compromise (GHT, September 3, 1971). It was, he argued, obvious that the Social Democrats were afraid of losing their slim electoral margin over the non-socialist parties by pushing the issue of a republic. The Conservative Party, he believed, had agreed in order to avoid a split among the non-socialist parties. Such a split could make a non-socialist victory in the next election more difficult. This, he argued, was why there was compromise rather than confrontation. It is interesting to note that members of the Commission (GLB) were interested in knowing Tingsten's reaction to their proposal and that, upon their request, the secretary distributed Tingsten's article among the members of the Commission (GLB, BIV 114).

Gösta Bohman, then the newly elected Conservative Party leader, gives a somewhat different account of what happened. He reports in his memoirs (1984) that the most important reason for the Conservative Party's acceptance was intra party considerations. In the summer of 1971 Bohman had been informed by Hernelius about the Commission's deliberations. From what Hernelius reported, Bohman concluded that the Commission was not going to come to an agreement. His party was going to argue that the Monarch should keep some of his ceremonial powers – especially the right to sign important laws and to formally appoint higher civil servants. Bohman strongly agreed with this position. He did not want a compromise on these issues. Bohman and Hernelius also agreed to discuss the issue with the Advisory Council (Förtroenderådet) of the party's parliamentary group. This meeting took place in the beginning of August 1971. The party leader could not attend the meeting, but later it was reported to him that the Council had agreed with Hernelius proposals.

In advance of the meeting in Torekov Bohman called a press conference and declared that the Conservative Party was ready for a political fight. The Social Democrats were not going to be able to abolish the monarchy "without saying so" (Bohman, 1984; Exp. August 4, 1971, author's translation).

When, through the television news, Bohman found out that the Commission had agreed on a compromise he was very surprised. He called Hernelius and asked why he had agreed. Hernelius replied that he had acted in accordance with the will of the Advisory Council at which he presented the proposal. Bohman (1984) speculates that perhaps he had misunderstood Hernelius and his willingness to reach a compromise, or perhaps Hernelius had misunderstood Bohman's intention not to agree to a compromise. The compromise was now public and the Council of the parliamentary group had given advance approval of the compromise. Bohman did not approve of the compromise, but accepted the situation and decided to throw his political weight behind the compromise.

However, Bohman's account of the events gives rise to a historical puzzle. First, the chairperson of the meeting (Förtroenderådet) at which Hernelius reported on the Commission's work stresses both that there was no decision taken at that meeting and that, when she learned about the compromise, she was one of the Conservatives most strongly opposed to the compromise (Kristensson, interview). Second, when asked about whether party representatives had contacts with their parties during the Torekov meeting, the Commission's secretary (Erik Holmberg) answers that he believes they all had such contacts (Holmberg, interview 1). Third, in the summer of 1972, under criticism for the compromise, Hernelius wrote an open letter to a young Conservative, Per Unckel, the chairman of the Conservatives youth wing.<sup>13</sup>

In his letter Hernelius defended his decision in Torekov, arguing that Unckel had overlooked the fact that the instructions for the Commission (GLB) in 1966 were discussed among the leaders of all four major parties. In general the instructions called for a constitution in which the Head of State had only a symbolic role. Only the Conservative leader (Yngve Holmberg) had raised

objections when the Social Democrats included a reference to the issue of a monarchy or a republic.<sup>14</sup> Hernelius also stressed that in the compromise the Social Democrats agreed to keep the King as the Head of State. They also had agreed that the Speaker's candidate for Prime Minister must be approved by the Riksdag.

In the letter Hernelius refuted the claim that he alone had agreed to the compromise. In 1970 he had informed the Conservative group in the Riksdag. In August of 1971 he had discussed the issue with the group's Advisory Council (Förtroenderådet). He had a number of times informed the party leaders. In fact, while in Torekov he had twice talked on the phone with the party leader (Bohman) and got his approval for the compromise.

The details of what really happened are difficult to assess. On the one hand the Hernelius letter was written less than a year after the compromise in Torekov. Bohman's memoirs about Torekov date from 1984. This would speak in favour of the letter. On the other hand, Bohman (interview) does not exclude the possibility that there actually may have been repeated contacts between him and Hernelius on the issue. He does, however, strongly stress the surprise he felt when he realized what Hernelius had agreed to. On this point, he argues, there can be no mistake. Hernelius acted independently of the wishes of the party leader (Bohman, letter). Moreover, when asked about the letter that Hernelius wrote, Unckel (the addressee) reports that he remembers being sceptical about Hernelius' version of what really happened (Unckel, interview).<sup>15</sup>

Two conclusions seem beyond doubt. First, in August 1971 both Bohman and Hernelius decided to support the compromise made in Torekov. (Albeit perhaps for different reasons.) Second, once they had decided to do so, they set out to win the party for the compromise.

### From a Compromise to a Constitution

When the compromise was first made public, Bohman greeted it as a bargaining success for the Conservative Party. He declared that thanks to the Conservatives the Social Democrats had been forced to give in and keep the monarchy. He also stressed that the King was going to continue to have some ceremonial functions (SvD, August 21, 1971).

The immediate reaction from Conservative newspapers was fairly positive. The fact that the monarchy was to be secured in the new constitution was greeted with satisfaction (BT, August 21, 1971; NK, August 21, 1971; SvD, August 21, 1971). However, in spite of this initially positive reaction, the compromise was a problematic issue for the Conservative Party. To accept the compromise, much in the name of non-socialist unity, became the party line. Within the party, however, there was a heated debate about the issue and by early 1972 the initial satisfaction had begun to fade. By the time the Commission's written report was published in 1972, there was a growing sentiment in favour of making the powers of the Monarch a salient issue in the electoral campaign of 1973 (NK, March 22, 1972; NT, April 24, 1972).

In September of 1972, the Conservative Party held a party congress. At the preceding party congress Bohman had defeated the previous party leader, Yngve Holmberg, in an open struggle for the party leadership. Bohman was now a popular and unchallenged leader for the Conservative Party. His and the party's first priority was to remove the Social Democrats from office. As mentioned above, he considered cooperation among the non-socialist parties to be a necessary means to achieve this (see also DN, September 18, 1972; SvD, September 18, 1972). The only major debate and challenge to the leadership came on the issue of the monarchy. In no less than 10 different motions party activists and sub-national party organizations argued that the Conservative Party should distance itself from the compromise (M-Congress, 1972; SvD, September 16, 1972).

Though the debate was intense, the party leadership managed to win the issue. A speech by Bohman was especially important. In that speech he gave three basic reasons why the Conservative Party should stick with the compromise (DN, September 16, 1972; Exp., September 18, 1972; SvD, September 17, 1972).

1. The compromise at least ensured the continued existence of the monarchy, whereas a renewed debate and political struggle could lead to a worse outcome – a republic.

2. The Social Democrats would label the Conservatives untrustworthy if they backed down from the compromise.

3. A reversal of the compromise would hurt the credibility of the party leadership. This would only benefit the Social Democratic government.

The party supported Bohman and rejected the proposal that the party distance itself from the compromise. However, the Congress charged the party leadership with the task of advancing the Conservative position within the framework of the compromise. And in spite of the decision of the Congress, the debate within the party continued until the new constitution was passed by the Riksdag (Bohman, 1984). One of the Conservatives most critical to the compromise recalls that one important argument used by the party leader in the internal debate was that a deal had been made and that breaking the agreement would publicly embarrass both Hernelius and Yngve Holmberg, the party leader who had agreed to the instructions for the Commission (Strindberg, interview).

There was only minor Social Democratic opposition against the Commission's (GLB) proposals.<sup>16</sup> One important exception is that the Congress of the blue-collar trade union association (the LO) demanded that the Social Democratic Party work for a republican system of government (LO-Congress, 1971:1122–1127). However, the normally very powerful LO was basically ignored and the parliamentary members and the party leadership were rather pleased with the agreement (Gadd, interview 2). In the late fall of 1971, the Social Democratic members of the Commission presented the compromise to the Advisory Council (Förtroenderådet) of the party's parliamentary group. No one challenged the compromise. Minor issues that were outside of the compromise were discussed (SAP-RGF, 1971). The Commission's proposals

were, for the most part, also accepted by the Social Democratic press (see, for example, AB, August 23, 1971; NSD, August 21, 1971). One newspaper praised the compromise as a victory for representative democracy (Arb. August 21, 1971). The most republican minded Social Democrats, such as Nancy Eriksson, accepted the compromise as a step in the right direction (Riksdagens protokoll, 1973, Nr 111, 186).

At the Social Democratic party congress in 1972, the new leader, Olof Palme, argued that the compromise had moved the Social Democratic position forward. The compromise took away every bit of the Monarch's political power. This, he explained, was what he had worked for since the mid-1960s. What was left of the once powerful monarchy was now only a decoration ("en plym"), a powerless Head of State. Moreover, this was a decoration that could be removed by a future stroke of a pen. By changing only a few words in the constitution, Sweden could become a republic and the constitution would work equally well with a president. He suggested that the Social Democrats should be satisfied with their gains, accept the compromise and not risk losing the next election. The Congress supported Palme (SAP-Congress, 1972:989–1012).

The Centre and Liberal Parties also accepted the Commission's proposal without much debate.<sup>17</sup> Newspapers close to these two parties agreed with the compromise (see, for example, DN, August 22, 1971; HN, August 21, 1971; SD August 23, 1971; UNT, August 23, 1971). Within the Centre Party, the party's representatives in the Commission never received any critique for the compromise (Fiskesjö, interview). The Centre Party has a congress every year. There was not one single motion on the powers of the Monarch during the period 1970 to 1974 (C-Congresses, 1970–1974). The Liberal Party's parliamentary group debated constitutional issues such as the organization of the Riksdag and a Bill of Rights but not the powers of the Monarch (FP-RG, March 3 1970, April 12 1973). The party held the removal of the Monarch from political decision-making to be in principle correct (Molin, interview). There had been broad and lengthy consultations on constitutional issues within the party. These consultations involved not only the party leadership but also liberal political scientists and newspaper editors. Partly because of these broad consultations, the constitutional issues did not, as was the case in the Conservative Party, cause internal disagreements after the compromise (Dahlén, interview).

There were six meetings among the party leaders before the compromise was presented to the Riksdag (Broomé–Eklundh, 1976). In these, the Conservative Party won some concessions. For instance, the Monarch would continue to enjoy immunity from civil prosecution and he was given the highest rank (but no power) in the military (Bohman, 1984; Broomé – Eklundh, 1976; Prop. 1973:90, 113, 174–175). However, among other party leaders there existed a strong will to finally settle the issue of large scale constitutional reforms and the Conservative Party leader was unable to radically alter the compromise (Dahlén, interview). The leaderships in all parties were intent on enacting the new constitution. The debate within the Conservative Party and growing public opinion against the new constitution had very little effect on the rules agreed to in Torekov (Johansson, 1976).



After the party leader deliberations the Social Democratic Government presented the proposal to the Riksdag (Broomé – Eklundh, 1976).<sup>18</sup> In their proposal to the Riksdag, the Social Democratic Government stated that the continued existence of the monarchy was a necessary condition for a new constitution to get satisfactory support in the parliament and among the general public (Prop. 1973:90,171–172). The Committee on the Constitution concurred with the Government's proposal (KU 1973:26).

In 1974, before the final decision in the Riksdag, Palme was asked to explain his 1972 statement, that the monarchy could be abolished by a stroke of a pen. Palme stressed that he saw the new constitution as one that would work well whether the Head of State was a king or a president. He admitted that it would take more than a stroke of a pen to create a republic, of course the constitution could only be changed in accordance with the rules for constitutional changes. In his view, however, with the new constitution this was more a political issue than one which needed to be considered from a formal-legal point of view (Riksdagens protokoll, 1974, Nr 25, 27–29).

At the final decision Bohman again argued for the monarchy as a symbol of traditions and national unity. However, he maintained that if the Conservative Party had refused to participate in the compromise the outcome could have been much worse. Conservative members of parliament also argued that the Social Democratic strategy to use the new constitution as a step on the way to a republic was evident in the fact that almost all reference to the words monarch and king had been removed. Instead the term Head of State was used (Riksdagens protokoll, 1974, Nr 30: 126–133). Nonetheless, only one conservative voted against the new constitution and two abstained. The rest of the Conservatives voted in favour (DN, February 28, 1974).

## Conclusion

On the potentially salient electoral issue of the existence of the monarchy, goals were conflicting. The Social Democratic Party decided that on this issue *office* and *vote* aspirations were more important than their *policy-seeking goal*. Pursuing the policy goal stated in the party programme (a republic) would probably hurt in terms of both the other goals. However, once the party had made that initial trade-off, the party leadership tried to pursue all three of their goals. The party leadership tried to satisfy party activists by removing the Monarch from political decision-making. A policy stand for a "more democratic" constitution, but one which retained the monarchy, could probably not hurt in electoral terms either. Moreover, if the Social Democrats could force the opposition parties, and especially the Conservative Party, into concessions this would help remove some of the embarrassment of having to accept the monarchy in the first place. By successful bargaining in Torekov, the Social Democrats put the Conservative Party in a situation in which they too faced a trade-off.

The Conservative leadership discounted both *policy-seeking* and *vote-seeking* and gave priority to their *office-seeking* aspirations. One reason that the leadership of the Conservative Party choose to accept the compromise was that it ensured the continued existence of the monarchy. This was probably especially important for the party's representative (Hernelius) in the Commission. If the party withdrew from the compromise, opted for vote-seeking and their vote increase was not large enough to unseat the Social Democrats, they might lose the policy-issue by enabling the Social Democrats to say that they had won a mandate for establishing a republic. However, given that the Conservatives must have known that the electorate was heavily in favour of the monarchy, this was hardly the most important reason why the Conservative Party accepted the compromise. More important was that by accepting the compromise, the leadership prevented two other potential problems.

To withdraw from the compromise would be, in effect, to say that the party leadership had been wrong in accepting the compromise in the first place. This would not look good for a party which just had recovered from a internal struggle over the party leadership. It would be embarrassing for both Hernelius and Bohman. After all, Bohman had greeted the compromise as a success for his party when the compromise was first made public. The party's acceptance of the compromise secured the credibility of the party leadership.

Another potential problem was that breaking the agreement reached in Torekov could result in a split between the Conservatives and the other two non-socialist parties. The Conservative Party was struggling to be accepted as a partner on equal terms. It did not want to jeopardise credibility and thereby a non-socialist victory in the 1973 election.

Having chosen *not* to give to priority to the preferred policy (important symbolic powers for the Monarch) nor to vote-maximize on this issue, the Conservative Party acted to change the compromise without breaking it. In so doing, the party was successful on issues such as the King's immunity and military rank. In this way the party leadership could reduce some of the criticism from party activists.

In sum, both parties discounted their programmatic policy-seeking goal in favour of the other goals. The Social Democratic Party was afraid to lose votes and power and did not want to pursue the policy stated in the party programme (a republic). The Conservative Party could expect to win votes on the issue, but because office seeking was more important to the Conservative Party, it agreed to a policy compromise.

The Compromise in Torekov illustrates three theoretically interesting points about the trade-offs between multiple goals. First, when it was not possible for the parties to simultaneously satisfy all of their goals, both the Social Democrats and the Conservatives discounted their policy seeking goal. Second, when a policy was (at least potentially) salient on the public agenda, the parties worried a great deal about the reactions of the electorate. Most important, perhaps, was the concern *not* to lose votes on the policy issue. This, rather than an aspirations to win votes, was the bottom-line for the parties. Third, once the parties had made their initial trade-offs, they strived to get, within the estab-

lished framework, policy concessions from the other parties. These findings can perhaps contribute towards a better understanding of how political parties make trade-offs among multiple goals.

The future will show if the Compromise in Torekov was a step towards a republic or if it secured the monarchy for many years to come. Incidentally, the non-socialists in the next election (1973) got the same number of seats as the socialist parties and after the 1976 election the three parties formed the first government for more than forty years which did not include the Social Democrats. It was now the Speaker who suggested the new prime minister (Fälldin) to the Riksdag.

## Acknowledgements

I wish to thank everyone who helped me with ideas, interviews and sources. Because of the generous help of many, I have truly enjoyed researching this paper. A special thanks to CK. Remaining errors are my own responsibility. This paper is a version of a forthcoming dissertation chapter. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the workshop on "Party Behaviour, Party Organization and Democracy" at the joint session of workshops, the European Consortium for Political Research, University of Essex, March 22–28, 1991 and the workshop on Swedish politics at Statsvetenskapliga Förbundets Årsmöte, September 30–October 2, 1991, Linköping, Sweden.

## Notes

1. The Head of State often has little real influence in the government formation process. Instead the defining characteristic of a parliamentary democracy is that the government (the executive) must be supported or at least tolerated by the parliament (Bogdanor, 1984; Brusewitz, 1929). Nonetheless, only in Sweden is the Head of State formally removed from the government formation process.

2. In translation, the relevant article of the constitution reads,

"When a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the Speaker shall summon for consultation one or more representatives from each party

group in the Riksdag. The Speaker shall confer with the Deputy Speakers and shall then submit a proposal to the Riksdag.

The Riksdag shall proceed to vote on the proposal, no later than the fourth day thereafter, without preparation in committee. If more than half of the members of the Riksdag vote against the proposal, it is rejected. In all other circumstances it is approved" (*Constitutional Documents of Sweden*, 1990:47).

Formally, the Prime Minister appoints the other government ministers.

3. In Sweden, the traditional translation of such a commission into English is "royal commission". Von Beyme (1989) argues that this can be misleading since the Swedish commissions are more central to the process of legislation than their British counterparts. Therefore, Swedish and British royal commissions are not functionally equivalent. However, "royal commission" is a well known translation so I will use it here.

4. Sweden has, in fact, four laws with constitutional status. One is the "Act of Succession" (Successionsordningen) which regulates the order of succession of the monarchy. Another is the "Freedom of the Press Act" (Tryckfrihetsförordningen) which is the basic act guaranteeing freedom of the press. A third act, the "Freedom of Expression Act" (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen) guarantees free speech in other media. The fourth act, the "Instrument of Government" (Regeringsformen), lists the political rights and specifies the basic political institutions and their powers. Only this last act is discussed in this paper.

5. Also, the Social Democratic party leaders during the years 1946-1986, Erlander and Palme, are reported to have seen the goal of party cohesion as the one of the main (if not the main) responsibility of a party leader. They held party cohesion to be a prerequisite for success in terms of other goals (see, for example, Erlander, 1982; Elmbrant, 1989, Ruin, 1986).

6. This is similar to the argument about "policy windows" put forward by John W. Kingdon (1984). The idea is that at certain points in time, the time is right for a particular proposal: "These policy windows, the opportunities for action on given initiatives, present themselves and stay open for only short periods" (Kingdon, 1984:174).

7. In a characteristically convoluted way, Erlander first replied that the issue of a republic would probably not be an electoral problem. The reasons were that the Liberal Party was split on the issue and that he had heard that the Centre Party, which had planned to make the issue of a republic a salient one in the next election (1970), had changed its mind. According to Erlander, the Centre Party leader had discovered that both of his deputy chairmen were (in principle) in favour of a republican system of government. Erlander welcomed this because it meant that the opposition parties probably would not want to fight an election on the issue.

8. There are also reports that Erlander and the King were fond of each other on a personal level. Moreover, one of Erlander's ministers argues that in 1966, when the issue of a republic was on the agenda, Erlander made sure to comfort the King on the issue (Lindström, 1970:297). A member of the King's staff claims that the King seemed worried until Erlander could calm him down (Björkman, 1987:97).

9. The president was to be elected by the parliament (Back & Fredriksson, 1966).

10. However, progress had been made at several meetings earlier the same year (GLB, January 7, 1971; GLB, March 5-7, 1971 and GLB, April 5-6, 1971). What was left to agree upon was, partly, minor details and, more importantly, the final agreement of the whole package that was the compromise.

11. The Compromise in Torekov did not include the right for females of the royal family to inherit the throne. All three non-socialists were opposed to the Social Democratic majority on this point. (A few years later the non-socialist parties succeeded in changing this rule and the females of the royal family can now inherit the throne). Hernelius also added a reservation in favour of granting the king immunity from civil prosecution.

12. The chief secretary (Holmberg, interview 2) and the chairman (Åman, interview) do not dispute Gadd's account of the events.

13. This open letter was also addressed to the members of the party's National Executive (partistyrelsen). Copies of the letter are part of Hernelius papers (he died in 1986) and the Conservative Party archive.

14. Svensson (1970:111) argues that Erlander once told him that the Social Democrats were willing to add "among other things" (bland annat) to the instruction that said that the King's powers were to be symbolic. This was prevented by the Liberal Party leader (Ohlin). At the time he did not want people to believe that it was his party that wanted the King to retain some formal powers.

15. It is also possible that Hernelius talked to Bohman, both before and during the Torekov meeting, without clearly expressing his intentions. In both volumes of his memoirs Bohman (1983, 1984) writes that he and Hernelius had quite different personalities. In the first years of Bohman's party leadership they often had difficulty understanding each others' intentions. Bohman and others also report that, while Hernelius was highly respected and seen as something of a living encyclopedia, it was often difficult to hear and understand what he said (Bohman, 1983, 1984; Kristensson, interview; Strindberg, interview).

16. Incidentally, in March of 1973 the King and the Crown-Prince were informed by Åman about the Commission's proposal. According to an interview conducted with Åman a couple of weeks later, the King did not react much one way or the other. The

only time he expressed dissatisfaction was when he found out that he would no longer be the formal commander of the military. Åman and the King then agreed that it would probably be suitable if the King were given a formal military title. When Erlander was asked by the same reporter about the King's reaction to the proposals, he replied that the King had expressed concern that he would be excluded from the process of government formation (Fjellman, 1973:174-178).

17. The Conservative Party leader (Bohman) believes that one reason was that the youth wings of their parties were in favour of a republic and that they wanted the issue off the political agenda (Bohman, 1984:51).

18. Before the new Instrument of Government was decided upon there was a controversy over the Bill of Rights included in the act. In fact, the Commission's (GLB) chief secretary believed that this issue could deadlock the Commission's entire proposal (Holmberg, interview 1). Karl-Göran Algotsson (1987) has analyzed the issue of the Bill of Rights. It is sufficient in this context to say that a "second compromise", which among other things entailed a new royal commission on the issue of an extended Bill of Rights, helped carry the whole Instrument of Government through the Riksdag.

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