

## Motivational Approaches to the Study of Political Leadership\*

### Introduction

Political psychologists study motivational factors in decision making in order to interpret, describe and explain observed changes in behaviour which occur in individuals, *leaders* as well as *followers* and *spectators* (Milbrath & Goel, 1977). Such actors operate within various *situational contexts* (Cf. George, 1959, pp. 107-121, for a classification of situational contexts). Thus, for example, the observation that a person is increasingly likely to vote "yes" to increased taxes as public cuts begin to affect him, in the form of non-available medical treatment for diseases he acquires as he grows older, can be understood by invoking the concept of *situated motivation* (A general introduction to *situated behaviour*, arguing that motivation is primarily linguistic construction, is Mills, 1940). As the example above suggests, motivation is not typically measured directly, but is rather *inferred*, or *attributed*, as the result of changes in political behaviour in reaction to *internal* (decay in bodily functioning) and/or *external stimuli* (proposals for improvements in public health care systems).

It is also important to understand that motivation is primarily a *behavioural* (Dahl, 1961; Easton, 1967b) variable. That is, the origins and effects of changes in motivation may be temporary and socially relative. If the individual is a young and healthy person, he may not approve of increased taxes to pay for public health, since he or she is unlikely to be afflicted by disease himself or herself. Also, if the individual can afford private treatment, he or she may not share an incen-

tive to raise taxes to pay for public health. Conversely, the old, sick and poor are more likely to be positively inclined to vote for tax increases to pay for public health. However, if asked if they would rather prefer to get the money as cash (higher pensions) to pay privately for their ailments, we cannot logically predict that they would still prefer public, tax-paid subsidies for healthcare (Cf. Lane, 1981). To have *earned* an income is still regarded, by most people in Western society, as preferable to be *entitled* to an income, through legal provisions.

The indirect way to obtain the public good, the deliverance of which one could just as well pay for directly – provided a check or higher pensions are supplied by the welfare agency – is *non-transparent* and assumed to be *more expensive* than the direct way. There is a sense in which poverty can be attributed to injustice in the distribution of wealth, which is *not* regarded as a natural condition by most people, but as a political one. On the other hand, as a rule, the distribution of good health is more likely to be attributed to natural causes. As a consequence, we may perhaps expect that policies based on the direct redistribution of income to meet the needs of the sick, is more likely to meet with success than proposals to subsidize the public health care system.

### Conceptualizing motivational processes

The example, above, may serve as a first illustration of how we can use studies of political motivation to describe, interpret, explain, and modestly predict political leaders' motives in order to determine one policy preference rather than another. Studies of leaders' motivation presume the existence of *motives*, that which *motivates* persons to act.

Motives can conveniently be classified into two elementary categories, *primary*, or *basic* motives, and *secondary* or *acquired* motives. The primary motives are not learned and we can observe them in animals as well as humans. Basic motives can, roughly speaking, be attributed to inheritance and biological functioning.

### Explanatory complications

In the study of motives, we encounter a complicating factor usually known as *the multiple types of influence by a multiplicity of disjointed variables*. For example, we may eat because of energy needs, but some people also eat when stressed or anxious, when depressed or alone, or because of social conventionality such as the polite habit of eating when other people are dining. The taste qualities of certain foods may also cause us to eat when we are not hungry. Other people do not eat because they are on a diet, or because they cannot afford it, or because they dislike the food being served. This interaction of many factors in determining the motivation of behaviour is a serious hindrance in our ability to understand even basic motivational processes. Therefore models of motivated behaviour have to be focused on specific topics and proximate contextual factors relevant for the behaviour in question.

The *secondary motives* are learned, and we can observe their variability when studying differences in motivation between different groups, or types of groups, and types of people. Primary motives are often listed so as to include hunger, thirst, sex, avoidance of pain, and perhaps aggression and fear. Secondary motives, often studied in humans, include achievement, gregariousness, power motivation, and other, more or less specialized motives. Like attitudes, they indicate *propensities to act* in a specific way. This propensity is more likely to have a *trait* character, when we study basic motives. Learned motives, on the other hand, are likely to be activated by behavioural *states* (Billig, 1976, p. 157), cues supplied from the proximate environment.

In addition to these initial distinctions, some scholars also find it convenient to classify mo-

tives into "pushes" and "pulls." *Push motives* concern internal changes that have the effect of triggering the aforementioned *motive states*. *Pull motives* represent external goals that influence one's behaviour toward them, and they are often the result of calculated benefits for oneself or one's primary group. Traditional political science would tend to treat the pull motives as the rational guarding or promotion of *interests*.

Most motivational situations include a combination of push and pull conditions. For example, a leader's policy involving political mobilization, in order to avoid fears of political disorder, may partially be signalled by *internal loss* in the ability to handle the cognitive complexity of a situation he faces (technically: *apraxia*), but motivation to get involved in politics and to seek office may also be influenced by which *positions are available*, and the expected efficiency of using the political decision making process, rather than some other means (Davies, 1963; Burns, 1977). Some leadership positions, and the values they enable office holders to affect, are more desirable than others. This, of course, also exerts an influence on our behaviour toward such positions and behaviours assumed to be related to them. *Motivated behaviour*, in other words, as contrasted with *habitual behaviour*, is a complex blend of internal pushes and external pulls.

Besides for disposing people to act, motives may also be used to *explain* and *legitimize* political behaviour. Two types of motives may conveniently be analytically distinguished here. *Because-of-motives* refer to basic motives that are related to states with some degree of apparent permanent and un-alterable features, such as belonging to a social class, having a rural background, a physical handicap or advantage or a cultural inheritance. *In-order-to-motives*, on the other hand, refer to secondary motives, volition and free agency for which we, in most Western societies, can be held morally, socially and politically responsible (Schutz, 1970).

When we explain our behaviour in terms of the pull-motive of pursuing interests, we are accountable for our actions and inactions to our fellow humans. On the other hand, when we refer to our conduct as the outcome of a *forced* situation, emanating from the satisfaction of a

basic need, as when we defend our personal integrity when being attacked by a drunkard or a dictator, we typically encounter a push-motive—we do something we would not otherwise have done because we were *forced* to do so. The volitional component of the first type of motive is evident in liberal beliefs about individuals' rights and freedom to act, less so in perceptions of duties and responsibilities following the exercise of such freedoms and rights. The obligation and forced component of the second type is found in various kinds of traditional beliefs

about inevitability, beliefs that may or may not result in *fatalism*. Such beliefs are dominant among those conservatives and socialists, whose world-view tends to be organic.

### Wants and needs

The modern psychological study of political leaders and leadership needs to go beyond the findings of such classical thinkers as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche and Adler, all of whom postulated the origins of human society in terms




Figure 1. Leader behaviours, outcomes and contingency factors.

of an *elemental drive for power*. With Maslow's well-known studies in the 1940s we have come a long way in terms of theoretical as well as empirical research. This, I would contend, is very much due to a conceptual distinction Maslow made when he separated "wants" from "needs" (Cf. also Easton, 1967a; Burns, 1978).

*Needs* are also called motives because needs *move* or *motivate* people to act. Etymologically the word motive is derived from the Latin term *motivus* ("a moving cause"), which suggests activating properties of the processes involved in psychological motivation, such as needs and wants.

In motivation, the feeling of a "want" is highly subjective, autonomous, and private. If we follow the argument suggested by Winter (1973, p. 24) that "physiological explanations of motives do not fully substitute for motive explanations, although they can be a valuable supplement to them", then it needs to be understood that in terms of wants and needs, the physiological idiom – which is located at another level of analysis – is much closer to "wants" than to "needs".

James MacGregor Burns tells us that (1978, p. 64):

The concepts are often confused; some of the elements of 'want' set forth... are often labeled 'need' and needs are often seen as substituting wants... these concepts, both important, we sharply differentiate here. *Need* in long-time English usage implies a more socialized, collective, objective phenomenon, in the sense of persons requiring something needful in *the view of others* as well as themselves. *Wants* are subjective, genetic, biological, organic, self-activating, inescapable. I *want* sweets but I *need* vitamins, so I am told.

As for wants, Burns' adjectives "genetic, biological, organic, self-activating, inescapable" are perhaps not all so well found. Wanting sweets can hardly be generally referred to in these terms. Rather, wants are *short-term* subjective wishes without due regard to *long-term* consequences. Needs, on the other hand share the properties described in the above quotation, and in a layman-expert context, one of the main characteristics of professionals is that they can

diagnose my needs which I, as a layman, can not ("I need vitamins, so I am told").

If motives are fed on needs it is also true that in civic society, man does not automatically turn to politics to satisfy his hunger, or such goals as respect, welfare, security, income, deference, love, and similar values. It is far more likely that he or she will go to the food market, attempt a career in dignified professions, increase his load and quality of work, take insurances, try relationships with the other sex and so on. As Davies (1963, p. 10) says, "If achievement of these goals is *threatened* by other individuals or groups too powerful to be dealt with privately, people then turn to politics to secure these ends." (Cf. also Burns 1977, p. 268-269). Assuming this is fairly reasonable, at least in our culture, we may say that if an individual cannot gratify his desires and wants by his own efforts, he will turn social and try to get the gratifications by means of collective efforts, provided he has the right kinds of resources in terms of competence, money, skills, knowledge, time etc. available.

### The compensation-rationalization hypothesis

Motives involve *objects* around which motivation is organized. Some motives can be accounted for in rational terms, whereas others cannot. Motivational objects can be *private* or *public*. Whereas *cognitive*, as contrasted with *emotive* theories of political involvement and functioning tend to stress *rationality*, or at least *purposefulness*, (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) in the making of decisions for whole societies, it is probably correct to say that, "...the boundary between the rational and the irrational is not always that easy to draw." (Katz, 1973, p. 204). One complication is the inability of humans to handle great amounts of complex information, which often leads to *bounded rationality* (Simon, 1976; Simon, 1985) and *cognitive simplification* ("black-and-white thinking").

This becomes all the more obvious when we consider the following line of reasoning: The behaviour of political leaders and top executives fullfills a variety of *expectations* that are expressed or at least harboured by a wide variety of

client-groups and audiences. In short, it is *multi-role* conduct. The client-groups and audiences include those of the general public, interlocking personal and political networks, interest groups and political parties, as well as the leaders' own *entourage*, which form major links to the vast bureaucracies through which public policies are implemented.

In this complex pattern, one of the principal tasks of the political leader is to establish co-ordination and "role balance." While in quiet times a standard repertoire can be used to assign priorities concerning the role spectrum, in times of distress and crisis some general formula for action and its political *legitimization* is needed.

Certain personalities, it would seem, are particularly prone to stress this aspect. In his studies of Gandhi, Trotsky, and Lenin, Wolfenstein (1967, p. 33) argues that "leaders crave, relish, and have confidence in their own power and authority," but this has to do with surface phenomena for, as he also points out (1967, p. 13), they additionally need a feeling of the rectitude or legitimacy for themselves and the cause they serve.

It was Lasswell who, in *Power and Personality* (1948, p. 38), wrote that:

The political type is characterized by intense and ungratified cravings for deference. These cravings, both accentuated and unsatisfied in the primary circle, are displaced upon public objects (persons and practices connected with the power process). The displacement is rationalized in terms of the public interest.

Let us see what this means in analytical terms of political motivation.

### Rationalisation, displacement and sublimation

Rationalization is part and parcel of our everyday language and needs little more conceptual clarification than a stress on its similar function for individuals, as *ideologies* for groups and societies. *Displacement*, however, calls for a definition. Psychological *displacement* is the mental process in which energized motives are transferred from one direction to another. More gen-

erally, displacement is the process by which an individual shifts interest from one activity to another in such a way that the latter becomes a substitute or equivalent for the other. Displacement of sexual energy to artistic creativity is the classical example used by psychoanalysts. Displaced frustration and aggression in group sports, from an original drive towards political or personal violence, is another example. The process of displacement knows no boundary between the private and the public space. Private frustration may result in propagated public disaffection, provided those who displace the private frustration have the skills, knowledge, energy and other resources required to make private problems look like public grievances. The range of available forms of expression and interpretation will play a major role, and this range may be both culturally and psychologically and sociologically determined.

Displacement occurs in patterned sequences. If we were not able to produce serial displacements, we would be unable to symbolize our thoughts and important environments in meaningful ways, and thus to engage in social communication. We would be solipsists.

A special type of serial displacement, *sublimation*, relieves us from the dictates of instinctual tensions. Modern ego psychology lists this form of serial displacement under the category of "defences" and, according to the same body of theory, defences typically come into operation when we encounter environments that are distressful because information needed for problem solving is unavailable, confusing or contradictory.

Having said this, however, it should be added that in everyday life we utilize the psychological mechanisms of defences to ward off anxieties and psychic disequilibrium so as to feel well, and that it would be unwarranted to interpret the usage Lasswell made of "displacement" and "sublimation" in purely pathological terms, if by "pathology" we mean "sick".

The motive to avoid inferiority feelings  
The idea of *egoistic* motivational propensities being reshaped to take on seemingly *altruistic*

characteristics is reminiscent of Alfred Adler's early attempts to explain political involvement in terms of "inferiority complexes." Compensation in private life may be exemplified by those who feel an urge to buy prestige objects to confirm their own worth.<sup>1</sup> Compensation in public life, according to this mode of thinking, relates to the exercise of political power. Power seeking emerges to compensate for low self estimates, a process that may or may not be terminated once the political actor gets "feed-back" from his audiences. There is always a risk that the saturation of wants leads to a motivation to come back for more.

In *Political Mobilization* (1967, p. 184), Peter Nettl discussed Lasswell's formula at length:

Because of its conceptual awkwardness, the compensatory definition of politics seems largely to have eluded political sociologists.... In general, perceptive social scientists are well aware of the underlying function of politics as compensation, though they usually hesitate to analyse it specifically.

Perhaps the most commonly observed stimuli in Western society which are recognized for their strong motivational properties are *power, prestige and possession*. Because power, prestige and possession are paired with many other strong motivators, they also often become strongly determining in themselves. Correlates of power, prestige and possession, in a world where suffering and guilt is caused by violence, disrespect, economic deprivation and speculation, are *safety, deference and income*. This was also the starting point for Lasswell's concern with the development of the *policy sciences*.

Motivational research emphasizes the role of needs for *self-esteem*, as I have previously attempted to demonstrate. But in addition to this, and compatible with the selective version of the compensatory striving hypothesis, a *need and capacity for role taking* ("social competence") must also be present. When Adler formulated his theory of psychological compensation he used these two dynamics, the psychological and the social, and particularly stressed the role of *empathy* that is, a person's capacity to reconstruct a social situation from the point of view of another

person without charging this image with sympathy or antipathy (technically: *positive and negative cathexis*).

Burns (1978, p. 95) concluded that the mutual interaction of factors influencing self-esteem and empathy in adolescence socialization are central factors shaping a potential for leadership. These factors obviously seem to provide that type of cognitive complexity which Stone (1981) saw as important for the execution of efficient leadership behaviour.

The displacement of private motives on public objects constituted the first part of the compensatory striving hypothesis, a fact that should alert our attention more directly to motivational research. In a critical review of Lasswell's work, Tucker (1981, p. 56) said of the compensation hypothesis:

This hypothesis is open to serious question when treated as a universal formula. In all probability, it is more applicable to some people in political life than to others, and in any given leader's case more applicable on some occasions than on others. The important truth to which it points, however, is that the public world of the leader-as-political-actor is not insulated from the private world of the leader-as-person.

According to Lasswell and modern psychology, psychoanalysis, and psychiatry, displacement occurs because in earlier experiences, the subject in question has *learned* the appropriate norms, and formed what psychoanalysts call a "superego" of the culture or setting where he was raised, through *repression* or *facilitation* in the handling of instinctual impulses. When encountering similar situations, the predisposition to act, which was once repressed, is automatically "channelled" or displaced through other routinised paths – cognitive maps, scripts or schemata – that were once before suggested or facilitated by the setting or environment in which the actor found himself (Axelrod, 1973; Axelrod, *et al* 1976).

The cognitive theory of conceptual mapping posits that just as a leader in his *private* life has a mental repertoire of expectable situations in which he may find himself, so does the *public*

person. This means that new conditions will be calculated as potential new instances of previous public situations. *Analogy* (Cf. Stenelo, 1980; Høffding, 1923) therefore, is an important component in learned motivation. Nasser is seen as Hitler when he nationalizes the Suez Canal in 1956, by Anthony Eden, Vietnam is similar to Korea, as seen by US military strategists in the mid-1960s, Saddam Hussein is likened to Hitler, in early 1992 by George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, and the behaviour of Argentine's dictator Galthieri in 1982 is seen as similar to Hitler's behaviour in Munich in 1938, by Thatcher and her Minister of Foreign Affairs.

### Getting to know the motivational power field

Political motivation, then, is situated within a field where power has previously been seen or imagined as *effective*. This finding is fully compatible with George's modification of the original Lasswellian formula (George 1968, p. 38-39):

In order to overcome or compensate for low self-estimates, the power-seeking personality attempts to carve out a sphere of activity in which he can demonstrate his competence and worth... Achievement of competence in a given sphere of activity, however narrow or specialized it may be, provides the personality with a "field" where it can function productively, possibly with considerable autonomy... the selective version of the hypothesis holds that manifestations of power striving are not encountered throughout the entire range of the subject's political behavior but operate more selectively, that is, only when he is performing in his actual or assumed field of power.

The major contention of social learning theory (Cf. Rotter 1966) is that in some way, all behaviour can be described, analysed and predicted by specifying the subject's *reinforcement history* and the stimuli present in the situation where we contemporarily observe him. But we obviously need a distinction between *habits* and *motives*.

*Stereotyped response patterns* characterize habits, and it seems inappropriate and inconvenient to speak of motivation when we try to de-

scribe, for example, the moves of our feet in walking. David Winter, an experimental psychologist, has the following to say in terms of definition (1973, pp. 17-18):

By the power motive, I mean a disposition to strive for certain kinds of goals, or to be affected by certain kinds of incentives. People who have the power motive, or who strive for power, are trying to bring about a certain state of affairs—they want to feel 'power' or 'more powerful than...' Power is their goal. We would expect that they tend to construe the world in terms of power and to use the concept of 'power' in categorizing human interaction, but they do more than that... they also want to feel themselves as the most powerful.

### The individualistic basis of motives

To speak of "motivated systems," according to the analytical positions adopted here, is either patent nonsense or conceptual obfuscation. Motivation is a concept whose anchoring point in empirical as well as theoretical research belongs to the micro-level of analysis, that is, the level of individuals and interpersonal relations (Cf. Dalton, 1998).

Sometimes political scientists slip into the error of reification and anthropomorphosis, i. e. of "individualizing" the decision-making units which they study, thereby disregarding the levels-of-analysis distinction and the importance of group syntality characteristics.

Morton Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* (1951, p. 254) provides an example of this:

Needs provide motivation. A social system is motivated as truly as an individual human being.

This is a strikingly odd observation, but considering that Kaplan is also alleged to have said (Cf. Holsti 1976, p. 24) that,

... when most psychologists, psychiatrists, or psychoanalysts turn to political subjects, they employ the maxims of psychoanalysis as patent nostrums and are thus indistinguishable in manner from the itinerant hucksters of Indian snake oil ...

the statement is, perhaps, not so surprising. According to the thoughts developed here, collective actors, such as parties, states, and transnational organizations can be said to have *interests* but whether an interest is "objective" or not is in many cases difficult to determine.

If systems, parties, states and similar political units cannot be characterized as "motivated," it nevertheless needs to be said that motivation of an individual is sometimes also influenced by the presence of other people. This creates *group syntality*. Social psychologists, especially scholars in the field of group dynamics, have been active in discovering how the presence of others in given situations influences motivation. For example, students and teachers behave in predictable ways in the classroom, waiters and restaurant guests behave in predictable ways, and post-office clerks and their clients are similarly engaged in a kind of scripted behaviour, which is *culturally determined*. This means that conscious or unconscious *norms* and *norm-systems*, shared by a group of people, rather than anything else, cause the observed behaviour (Cf. Homans, 1967). *Role-taking* and *role ascription* go with the establishment of norm systems. Culturally

determined behaviours are often quite different from the way the aforementioned actors behave outside the interaction contexts. Studies of conformity, obedience, groupthink, and helping behaviours (which benefit others without reward or expected rewards) are four areas in this field that have received considerable scholarly attention. Compliance to group-norms in such situations is not adequately classified as motivated behaviour, in the sense used here (For analytical distinctions, Cf. Harsanyi, 1969).

### Maslow's need hierarchy

In order to understand the theories of modern motivational psychology, we need to take a brief look at its historical origins. Abraham Maslow in 1943 wrote an essay on needs and motivation, which was refined and expanded in the book, *Toward a psychological theory of being* (1962). The following remarks provide the concepts and basic hypotheses of leadership motivation, as they can be found in the works of social and political psychologists, belonging to "humanistic psychology," a scientific movement whose members regard Maslow as its founder (Cf. Welch *et al* 1978).




Figure 2. Maslow's Need Hierarchy.



In the essay, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, a distinction is made between “basic” needs and “higher” needs, between that which Burns would call “a tissue necessity” on the one hand, and “preferred end-states,” on the other. According to the seventh proposition of Maslow’s theory (1943, p. 370):

Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say, the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more pre-potent need. Man is a perpetually wanting animal. Also, no need or drive can be treated as if it were isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of satisfaction of other drives.

So Maslow’s theory suggests that human needs can be assigned to various levels, and that each level of need has to be gratified to some extent before the next level assumes importance.

- *The first level* is basic, and includes physical needs such as food, drink, shelter, air to breathe, sleep, sex, etc.
- *The second level* is safety and security needs which include pension plans, trade union association, insurances, membership in community clubs, unemployment guarantees.
- *The third level* is socially voluntary affiliations such as those leading to feelings of belonging, peer acceptance, opportunities to socialize, and enjoying a hobby together.
- *The fourth level* is concerned with esteem. It includes attempts to achieve or maintain status, indicated by titles, status symbols, self-promotions, and praise.
- *The fifth level* is self-realization. At this level behaviour is motivated by the desirable in feelings of accomplishment, the realization of one’s potential, and the accomplishment of significant social and political goals.

According to the clinical and experimental results of Maslow’s research, as well as the findings of his successor, Frederick Herzberg (Cf. Herzberg, 1966), the satisfaction of basic needs releases persons from basic physiological and psychological hazards so as to free them to respond to higher needs. The compatibility of the compensatory striving hypothesis and Mas-

low’s theory is particularly obvious in Maslow’s discussion of damaged self-esteem, where he says that, “thwarting of these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness and helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends” (Maslow 1943, p. 382).

Based on his observations of selected individual cases, which Maslow believed displayed self-actualisation, including historical leaders like the U.S. presidents Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson, he outlined a detailed cluster of 14 characteristics, which, he claimed, can be found in self-actualised individuals.

In narrative form, these characteristics can help us to define individuals who are accepting themselves and others, who are relatively detached and independent of the culture or society in which they live, are somewhat detached about persons in their primary groups, but at the same time have very close personal ties to a few intimate friends, and they are, additionally, deeply committed to solving problems that they see as important.

Self-actualised persons intensely appreciate simple or natural events, such as the sound of waves on the beach, and every now and then they experience profound changes in what could be called “peak experiences.”<sup>2</sup> Peak experiences are difficult to describe in non-subjective terms, but they often involve a momentary loss of self and feelings of transcendence. What Maslow had in mind can be found in reports that outline feelings of limitless horizons opening up. Peak experiences also include feelings of being simultaneously very powerful and yet weak and insignificant. Peak experiences are extremely endowed with positive meanings and can cause an individual to change the direction of his or her future behaviour. According to Maslow (1971), everyone can have peak experiences, but he thought he had demonstrated that self-actualised persons have these experiences more often.

While some of the conclusions made by Maslow have been confirmed many times, it needs to be understood that – as Burns has pointed out (1978, p. 70) – Maslow’s theory as a whole, in certain respects, is somewhat imprecise and that confirming empirical studies are limited.

## Stages in the development of morality in political leaders?

Burns' study, *Leadership* (1978), has previously been mentioned. Its underlying theory was built on comparative observations of political leaders in different types of settings, framed within a conceptual edifice supplied by Maslow's theory of need hierarchies paired with aspects adopted from Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral stages and sequences of human development.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development is concisely narrated in the essay, *Stage and Sequence. The Cognitive-developmental Approach to Socialization* (1969).

According to Kohlberg, we may fruitfully distinguish between two pre-conventional levels, two conventional levels and two post-conventional levels in the sequence of moral learning. As it were, Burns found it convenient to relate and recombine Maslow's conception of need hierarchies with this model of socialization. This would, ultimately, mean that if something went wrong with leadership, the reason would have to be sought for in the socialization process.

As I have already mentioned, Burns' book – for which he was awarded the prestigious Pulitzer Prize – has been criticized for having a moralistic undercurrent, allegedly at odds with its scholarly qualities (Cf. Strum 1979; Seligman 1980, p. 156; and Stuart 1981), something which undoubtedly has to do with the theory's affinity with "the third force" in psychology, the so called "humanistic school." While this may be so, a more serious defect would seem to stem from the theory's inability to treat what one could call political leadership "regression."

Somewhat simplified, *regression* means dropping back to some lower level of development or turning to previously surpassed modes of need gratification. The essence of what we would mean by political leadership regression is epitomized in Lester Seligman's thorough and clarifying review article on Burns' book, published in *The American Political Science Review* (1980, p. 156):

In our times, we have seen leaders and movements that aimed at transcendence of "lower" needs succumb in the end to self-interest, corruption, and abuse of power. What is the de-

fence against such developments in Burns' conception?

Perhaps questions like this, as well as the previously discussed problems with the "marriage" of Kohlberg and Maslow's theory are all remediable within the basic framework of Burns' conception. At any rate, the comparative empirical parts of the work show many instances where the general argument of the theory would seem to fit.

## Cognitive theories of motivation

Cognitive theories of motivation start with the notion that political behaviour is designed in particular ways as a result of the active collection, storing, processing, retrieval, dissemination and interpretation of information (Bennet, 1981). Motivation, from this point of view, is not seen as a mechanical or innate set of drives, biological states or processes, but as a *purposive and persistent set of projected behaviours* based on the information available. Expectations, based on past experiences, and stored in *cognitive maps, schemata or scripts*, serve to direct behaviour toward particular goals.

Important concepts of cognitive motivation theory can also be found in *expectancy-value theory* (Rotter, 1966), *incentive motivation theory*, (Tsbelis, 1990); *cognitive dissonance theory* (Bem, 1967; Bem 1972; Festinger, 1957; Hollander, 1978); and *social learning theory* (Bandura, 1977; Sjöbäck, 1988).

### Expectancy-value theory

Let us presume that motivated political leaders' behaviour is the product of two, and only two dimensions<sup>3</sup>: the *value attached to a goal* or an *end-state*, and the *expected outcome* of decisional intervention. The matrix below shows the combinations facing the motivated political leader.

The corollaries of expectancy-value theory assume that in situations, where more than one behaviour is possible, the behaviour chosen will be the one with the largest product of expected social success and the highest value (1). Examina-

		Expected outcome of intervention	
		Positive	Negative
Value of intervention	High	1	2
	Middle	3	4
	Low	5	6

Figure 3. Values and expected outcomes of decisional intervention.

tion of its use in achievement motivation, to be described and discussed later on, can serve to represent the various types of expectancy-value motivations. Alternative (2) is highly valued, but the prospects of achieving anything by means of decisional intervention are negative. Choosing this alternative means a propensity for risk-taking. Alternatives (3) and (5) have descending values and the prospects of a decisional intervention are positive and, therefore, the ranking of 1, 3, and 5 is relatively easy. Similarly, the negative expectations about decisional intervention in cases 2, 4, and 6 present us with an order of willingness to take risks. Since alternative 2 has a high value, and alternative 6 a low value, at the same time as expectations of obtaining the values decline down the row, we have a risk-taking set of preferences which is well-ordered.

In expectancy-value theory we often start with discussions and investigations of *external* and *internal* loci of control. The psychologist Julian Rotter (1966) made this distinction a major point of departure, not unlike the way the sociologist David Riesman had done in *The Lonely Crowd* (1955). Reinforcement of beliefs about the degree of one's own fate-control have become a standard measure in modern psychological research, and it is generally considered to be a robust measure of the links between attitudes, values and motivation, on the one hand, and actual behaviour on the other.

In the field of achievement motivation, the expectancy-value approach suggests that the over-

all tendency to achieve in a *particular situation*, or *field of real or assumed power*, depends upon two, and only two stable motives – a *motive for success* and a *motive to avoid failure* – and the evaluation of the *probability of success* in the situation. In the Western world, as contrasted with some Oriental cultures, the motive for success is regarded as a relatively stable personality characteristic after adolescence.<sup>4</sup>

One's motive for social success is believed to result from learning in prior situations where the individual has performed successfully. Thus, someone who has, for the most part, had successful social experiences in the past will presumably become highly achievement-oriented. The motive to avoid failure is also assumed to become relatively stable as the individual matures. Avoidance of failure represents the lessons learned from the aggregated previous instances where achievement behaviours were unsuccessful.

Summarily stated, those who have experienced many unsuccessful attempts in achievement situations will develop a strong motive to avoid failure. They drop down on risk-taking. For those who have been successful, on the other hand, having learned how to achieve a specific goal, the appetite will in many cases not lead to saturation, but to a return for more of the same kind.

Individuals with a strong motivation to avoid failure and weak motivation for success will try to avoid most achievement situations if they can.

		Motivation to avoid failure	
		Strong	Weak
Motivation for success	Strong	1	2
	Weak	3	4

Figure 4. Success motivation and failure avoidance.

People with high motivation for success and low motivation to avoid failure will, on the other hand, be achievement-oriented. They end up in alternative 2, and this holds for the matrix in figure 4 as well.

Besides for re-enforcement history, deliberate *calculus* (Buchanan & Tullock, 1963) also has an important place in the value-expectancy approach to motivation. The *expected probability* of success in a particular achievement situation is important for the behaviour to be explained. By means of deduction, the approach proposes that persons *highly motivated for success* will tend to choose to participate in achievement settings which they judge to be moderately difficult (technically: *where the establishment of Nash-equilibrium is not expensive*). However, the approach also suggests that people *highly motivated to avoid failure* will tend to choose tasks that they judge to be either very easy or extremely difficult. Failing in an extremely difficult task or setting is not expected to lead to blame or stigmatization.

### Incentive motivation

Incentive motivation can be seen as a sub-variety of expectancy-value theory. It is at the core of a wide variety of *rational choice* and *public choice* models of political behaviour, and these models are usually linked to *game theory*. Incentive motivation theory, in combination with postulates from general expectancy-value theory and game theory, is also, when applied to politics, called *analytical political theory*. (Cf. Tsbelis, 1990, for one of the most sophisticated devel-

opments in the field). Moreover, incentive motivation has been successful in the field of micro-economics where it is, in most Western societies, the dominant explanatory paradigm.<sup>5</sup>

Like in general expectancy-value theory, incentive motivation is concerned with *the way goals influence behaviour*. For example, a person might be willing to travel long distances to eat at a special restaurant, which serves a favourite exotic fish. On the other hand, that same person might not be willing to travel the same distance to eat an ordinary fish-and-chips meal. The two meals have *different incentive values* and motivate behaviour to differing degrees.

Researchers concerned primarily with human motivation have suggested that much of human deliberation behaviour can be understood as being directed toward *specific* goals. Decisions are made on the basis of the expected *pay-off* for choosing one specific goal, rather than another. Focused incentive motivation research suggests that general expectancy-value postulates and models must be better specified in order to reach more reliable standards of prediction. By doing so the expectancy-value approach loses some of its parsimoniousness and elegance but that is, perhaps, inescapable in a field as complex as motivation theory.

### Cognitive dissonance

Kelly Shaver (1975, p. 89) has written that, "In an important sense, to ask 'Cognition or motivation?' is to ask the wrong question: self-perception is neither purely cognitive nor purely motivational, but rather contains substantial ele-

ments of both.” But what do we mean by cognition, then? How does cognition relate to motivation?

Cognition may have many everyday and scientific meanings, but here it is treated at the sampling, storing, interpretation, retrieval and dissemination of *information*. One of the most dominant cognitive approaches to the study of motivation has been the theory of *cognitive dissonance*. It was first systematically studied by the American psychologists Festinger & Carlsmith (1959) and Bem (1967) in the 1950s. This theory proposes that people attempt to *maintain consistency* among their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. According to this theory, a motivational state termed *cognitive dissonance* is produced whenever beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours are *inconsistent* or *incoherent*. Cognitive dissonance is considered to be an *disequibrated* psychological state that triggers other behavioural mechanisms so that cognitions are brought back into a consistent relationship with one another (Cf. Hollander, 1978).

Much of the research on cognitive dissonance has centred around what happens when attitudes and behaviours are incoherent, such as research on the “risky-shift” and “post-decision regret.” This research suggests that behaviour inconsistent with one’s beliefs – if there is insufficient justification for the behaviour – will often bring about modification of those beliefs. Suppose, for example, that a person is required to undergo a stressful initiation in order to join a select group, such as getting mensur-scars when entering a German student union (*Burschenschaft*) in the Weimar Republic. After undergoing this initiation the person discovers that becoming a member of the group does not provide the satisfaction originally expected. Such an outcome should produce cognitive dissonance because the behaviours required and the current belief about the group are inconsistent. As a result, the theory suggests that motivation will be triggered to bring the dissonant elements back into a consistent relationship. A decision to join a religious sect, like the scientology church, which is both expensive and socially demanding, exemplifies how later on the cost of leaving the sect is avoided because the astonishing results of the

initial membership paired with invested money combine to help the subject to continue. The behaviour cannot be changed because it has already occurred; the belief, on the other hand can be changed. Under these conditions dissonance theory predicts that the person’s attitude will change and that he will actually come to believe that he likes the group more.

### Observational learning

In another type of learning technique, *observational learning*, or modelling, a new motive is learned simply by watching the behaviour of someone else. It is a kind of imitation. Such a learning of motives demonstrates the ability to profit from other peoples’ mistakes and successes. The significance of this type of learning is understood because the learning can occur without an individual ever having to perform the behaviour himself or herself. Thus, watching another child burn his or her fingers when lightening a match is often enough to keep the observing child from playing with fire. Similarly, noticing that other students get good marks at the university, because they study hard and attend lectures, may be a sufficient stimulus to motivate students to follow their example. Albert Bandura, a Canadian psychologist, and Hans Sjöbäck (Cf. Sjöbäck, 1988), a Swedish psychoanalytically influenced psychologist, have proposed, and provided a wealth of support for the observational learning of aggression and other politically relevant behaviours in humans. Bandura has shown that young children will imitate the aggressive responses they see performed by adults. Such aggressive responses can also be learned by observation of violent acts in film or on TV, or by reading or hearing excessively about violent behaviour.<sup>6</sup> One can conclude from the results of social learning theory that successful use of violence as a means to an end may create scripts of violence that may be utilized at some future occasion by the observer.

## Achievement, affiliation and power motivation

### An introduction to empirical motivation theory

Henry Murray, the inventor of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), in the late 1930s, was one of the first US psychologists to systematically analyse achievement as an important source of human motivation. The initial combination of picture tests and Maslowian assumptions proved to be a vital source for empirical research.

In the early 1950s, however, motivational research began to develop along somewhat different paths. With the publication of McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell's book, *The Achievement Motive* (1953), motivational research was also put on a firm, though different, empirical and theoretical basis, compared with Maslow's initial work. The research group explained their basic hypothesis in the following way (1953, p. 28):

Certain stimuli or situations involving discrepancies between expectations (adaption level) and perception are sources of primary, unlearned affect, either positive or negative in nature. Cues which are paired with these affective states, change in these affective states, and the conditions producing them become capable of reintegrating a state (A') derived from an original affective situation (A), but not identical with it.

The word "reintegration" in the hypothesis was meant to imply previous learning, and the McClelland group consistently maintained that all motives are learned. The group also maintained that, "There is ... some theoretical justification to our empirical finding that motives can be measured effectively in imagination" (ibid. 1953, p. 42).

Like Murray, the McClelland-Atkinson team used TATs in the shape of ambiguous pictures about which subjects were asked to tell or write stories, which were later on content analysed to provide a scored profile of the subjects' achievement imagery. The model which Atkinson and

McClelland developed was based on an impressive amount of empirical research, and its fundamental concepts were "expectancy" and "goal value." The model was later on expanded to cover a wider scope of human motivation.

In 1961, David McClelland, in his book, *The Achieving Society*, proposed that humans are motivated by some pivotal needs. Need for achievement or *nAch*, need for power or *nPow*, and need for affiliation or *nAff* were singled out. Below is an attempt to clarify what these needs are:

1. **nAch**, The desire or drive to excel in whatever one does. It is the inner urge to do things better and better or more and more efficiently than before; to strive constantly to achieve self-set standards.
2. **nPow**, The desire or drive to influence, or have impact on, others; it urges one to acquire prestige and/or control over others.
3. **nAff**, The desire or need to be liked and accepted by others; it is the drive to form and maintain meaningful relationships with others.

The promise of McClelland *et al's* research is that the motive profile of a person can change, both as a function of one's life course as well as through formal training. McClelland has, among other things, demonstrated, with abundant evidence, that *nAch* can be increased by formal training. Since this finding is conducive to social engineering, this kind of motivational research has found a market in production industry (Cf. Andersen, 1999) and among people interested in political leadership.

### Achievement motivation

Two years before *The Achievement Motive* was published, McClelland had published an essay, *Measuring Motivation in Phantasy, The Achievement Motive* (1951) in Harold Guetzkow (ed.), *Groups, Leadership and Men* (1951).<sup>7</sup> In this essay, McClelland touched upon the locus of this methodological posture for measurement by saying that, in the main, his method was similar to both the Freudian psychoanalytical modes of observation and Henry

Murray's TAT-procedures. He concluded that (1951, pp. 202-203):

The final rating, whether it be the psychiatrist's or the person's own, represents a synthesis or integration of ... many factors and is not, therefore, at least in a theoretical sense, 'pure.' That is, it does not represent any one aspect of personality but is a judgement involving many.

The differentiation of motives in both theoretical and experimental research was achieved in the years that followed. Some twenty years later, McClelland in his essay, *The Two Faces of Power* (1970) tried to summarize the implications of motivational theory for the scientific study of political leaders' behaviour. In particular he stressed the fact that, "stimulating achievement motivation in others requires a different motive and a different set of skills than wanting achievement satisfaction for oneself" (p. 30). Emphasizing also the cultural setting, he noted (p. 32):

It is a fine thing to be concerned about doing things well (n-Achievement) or making friends (n-Affiliation), but it is reprehensible to be concerned about having influence over others (n-Power). The vocabulary behavioral scientists use to describe power is strongly negative in tone.

Why is this so? Before we continue this exposition of empirical motivation research we obviously need to take a closer look at affiliation and power motivation, in addition to achievement motivation.

As it has been conceived, the *need for achievement* is particularly important to entrepreneurial behaviour, and given that it is learned, this style of thinking (this motive) can be taught. McClelland has demonstrated that it is possible to develop a course of instruction in achievement motivation and has implemented this instruction in developing countries (McClelland & Winter, 1969).

At the end of his career, McClelland and his associates increasingly saw the effect of the need for achievement, on societal development, as a mass phenomenon. That is, the rise and fall of the economic fortunes of a nation depends, so they argue, on widespread motivational tendencies

rather than the motivation of a few "heroic" entrepreneurial leaders. The need for achievement has also been studied in political leaders.

Donley and Winter (1970) made a pilot study of achievement motivation among twentieth-century American presidents. More recently, Winter has done a study of the motivational profile of George W. Bush (personal communication to the author). The work of Browning and Jacob (1964) was an initial study which was later on extended (Browning, 1968) to suggest that self-promoting political leaders, who attempt to reach to high office and who comply with the tasks of the offices that they do hold, score high on both achievement and power motivation. Nevertheless, the examples from Donley and Winter's investigation suggest that each of these motives may have distinctive contributions to the political orientation of political leaders. Nixon, for example, scored very high on achievement motivation but was only moderate on the power scores. Both the Republican Teddy Roosevelt and the Democrat Harry Truman scored high on power, but at the same time they only reached a moderate level on achievement. An anticipatory word will perhaps convince the skeptical reader. Winter and Stewart (1977) have outlined the method of scoring these motives, a method which testifies to the robust nature of their results.

In *The Achieving Society* (1961), McClelland assembled evidence that the achievement motive has been important throughout recorded history, evidence that nations may have thrived or declined as a function of the level of motivation present in the people at particular moments in the nation's history. Of particular interest are McClelland's comparisons of Protestant and Catholic countries' rates of economic growth—the higher growth rates in Protestant countries, usually attributed to the Protestant work ethic *a la* Max Weber, may reflect particular conditions which foster the growth of achievement motivation. James C. Davies (1971) argues that "It is not capitalism or socialism or even protestantism that spontaneously activates the need for achievement. This organically based need, latent in a premodern society, becomes active whenever a favourable environment develops,

whatever ideology or institutional structure may accompany its development.” Just one comment on this: There is, as far as I know, no secure evidence that achievement is an *organically* based need. As I have already suggested, most social motives are based on a need for effectance. Most researchers, however, have argued that these motives are *learned*, or are based on non-organic *social priorities*. Therefore it seems more likely that they are derived from *belief systems, institutional norms*, and the possession of mental and material *resources*.

### Affiliation motivation

Those among us who are primarily driven by the affiliation motive are concerned about the quality of our social and interpersonal relationships. Affiliation motivated people enter into relationships for the sake of the relationships themselves, and not primarily for economic gain or political influence. They are concerned with how harmonious and reliable their relationships are and they are likely to be upset when conflict occurs.

When analysing stories told, either when respondents are exposed to TAT-pictures, or when experimental situations are otherwise arranged, we see that affiliations themes are revealed in stories about establishing, maintaining or restoring close and friendly relationships, joining groups of likeminded, participating in pleasant social activities, and enjoying shared activities with friends or family members.<sup>8</sup> It reflects behaviours toward others that are *supportive, cooperative, and friendly*. The emphasis is on the value of belonging to a group or network, and conformity to shared group norms. Affiliation motivated people obtain great satisfaction from being liked and accepted by others, and prefer to work with others who prefer group harmony and cohesion. They are generally speaking pragmatic within the organisational context, but can be very principled when dealing with non-members and “out-groups.”

Those who score low on affiliation tend to be lonesome both in habits and preferences, and they are usually uncomfortable when they have to socialize with others. The kind of introversion

they exhibit does not have to exhibit itself within an inner circle of a few close friends, or in family settings. Those who are low on nAff, by definition, lack motivation or energy, or both, to maintain many and close social contacts in networking, group presentations, public relations, and building close personal relations with peers and subordinates. This makes them “outcasts” in most managerial and leadership situations.

Those who are high on affiliation motivation are unwilling or reluctant to let work interfere with harmonious personal and social relationships. Moderately, affiliation motivation is related to effective management, both in politics and in business. Strong affiliation motivation may, however, be detriment to effective political and administrative leadership. This is so since strong affiliation needs often lead to avoidance of unpopular decisions, permitting exceptions to rules, and showing favouritism to friends. In a variety of organisational contexts, this often leads to confusion about *procedural rules*, “jumping on the bandwagon” and flattery, and anxiousness about the direction of organisational activities. It also causes uncertainty about inequity, jealousy and subservience.

Summarily we can say that affiliation motivation is present when any one of the following three circumstances occurs in the imagery of studied subjects:

- Someone in the story told is concerned about establishing, maintaining, or restoring a positive emotional relationship with another person or group. Friendship is always involved since it is the most basic kind of positive emotional relationship. If there is mention of two characters in the story, their role as friends is a minimum basis for scoring imagery. Other kinds of relationships, such as father-son, mother-daughter or relations between spouses or lovers, should be scored only if they have the warm, compassionate quality implied in the definition given.
- Included among themes about affiliation motivation we find ideas figuring one person who likes or wants to be liked by someone else, or the idea that someone in the story has some similar feeling about another



person, also appearing in the story. Disrupted or broken interpersonal relationships allow for imagery to be scored if someone else, in the story told, feels grief or is sorry or takes action to repair the relationship.

- In order to obtain scores, we should also look for mentionings of such *affiliative activities* as social parties, reunions, visits, or relaxed small talk, for example at a conference, or when coming home from work. However, if the affiliative nature of the situation is explicitly denied in the story, such as by describing it as a purely business meeting or an angry debate, imagery is not scored. Friendly actions such as consoling or being concerned about the well being or happiness of another person are scored, except where these actions are culturally prescribed by the relationship, e.g., family relationships. In short, the index of affiliation motivation must not include content which points solely or primarily to a sense of duty or obligation.

This outline of scoring criteria must be kept apart from imagery derived from affiliative *decision rules*. By *affiliative decision rules* I mean rules, which pertain to the policy maker's affiliation with others in his or her formal organization. Most often these rules are formal rules used to preserve the policy maker's relationship with a primary group, such as a small planning committee that meets face to face to work on major policy recommendations. They are part and parcel of the organisations' *standard operative procedures* (technically: S.O.P.). Sometimes affiliative rules are also used to deal with constraints arising from the policy maker's membership in secondary groups, such as a political party, a corporation, a ministry or the whole government. Knowledge of how affiliative decision rules work comes mainly from the field of *group dynamics* (Cf. Cartwright, Zander *et al* 1968), which was a research field developed by Kurt Lewin and the school of social psychology he created ("field theory").

### Power motivation

The noun "science" in social science implies that all social behaviour has some antecedent cause, that behaviour can be *explained* in causal or contingent terms. One antecedent to which particular *political behaviour* is often attributed is *power motivation*. Thus, if we observe political leaders angrily condemning their opponents for excessive spending of the tax payers' money, at the same time as they propose economic re-distribution reforms increasing social cleavages, one might infer that such political leaders are merely out to get votes among the politically active and that they are not working for altruistic benefits at all, as implied by the message. Moreover, we – as social scientists – do not assume that they behave *erratically* or *randomly*. Rather, we assume, as did McClelland, Winter and others, that some motive, a power motive, is the antecedent, which makes them behave as they do.

Those among us who are motivated by *power concerns* have fantasies about our impact on other peoples' decisions and ways of life. Power motivated people try to convince others about the correctness of their point of view about the exercise of power, and when they act benevolently, rather than egoistically, they attempt to *empower* others around them. The assumption is, of course, that power makes a difference for the *outcome* of decisions. Power motivated people also engage in social relationships where they can find ways to connect with and influence other powerful people.

Power motivation is assumed, and has been demonstrated to be predictive of leader effectiveness (Andersen, 1999). The power motive is necessary for leaders to be effective because it induces them to engage in social influence behaviour

The need to find an appropriate measure of the power motive other than that which would use "surface" interpretations of a given communication is then, quite obvious. Groups and individuals in our culture, especially if they are prominent in public life, would almost certainly never say that their actions were motivated by a desire for power. But the leader who is personally not

attuned to the power games of political life would find it un congenial.

The concepts of *rationalization* and *ideology* subsume a wide variety of words and vocabulary that hides the realities of power known by political scientists and psychologists: "duty," "responsibility," "service" and perhaps "legitimate and democratically executed power." These euphemisms and rationalisations make it difficult to study the power motive.

This is methodologically important for the psychological study of "the power motive" among political leaders and must be taken into consideration in attempts to observe and measure the dimensions of this phenomenon. As Winter (1973, p. 3) has observed:

... just as sexuality was repressed and denied during the nineteenth century, so today power strivings are repressed and achieve only disguised expression through defence mechanisms such as distortion, displacement, projection, and rationalization.

Together with David Winter, McClelland in the 1960s started to study the effects of social drinking on fantasy, and at an early stage of this research it was found that it increased sex and aggression fantasies, some of which were markedly exploitative, an instance they, in turn, felt was derivative of feelings about having "an impact" on others. This, they stipulated, could make it part of an n-Pow scoring definition of some utility in laboratory experiments and test situations.

In later research projects, McClelland began to distinguish two basic forms of power motives, that is, a "personalized" and a "socialized" version (McClelland 1970, p. 36):

At the level of action, a personal power concern is associated with heavy drinking, gambling, having more aggressive impulses, and collecting "prestige supplies" like a convertible or a Playboy Club Key. People with this personalized concern are more apt to speed, have accidents, and get into physical fights. If these primitive and personalized power-seeking characteristics were possessed by political office holders, especially in the sphere of international relations, the consequences would be ominous.

After the politically embarrassing events associated with the Vietnam War, such as the massacre at Song My (My Lai) and the Watergate scandal, we are all too well aware of that.

But, according to McClelland, there is also another side to the power-motive (ibid. p. 36):

At the fantasy level (the socialized version, TBr) expresses itself in thoughts of exercising power for the benefit of others and by feelings of greater ambivalence about holding power—doubts of personal strength, the realization that most victories must be carefully planned in advance, and that every victory means a loss for someone. In terms of activities, people concerned with the more socialized aspect of power join more organizations and are more apt to join in organized informal sports, even as adults.

This conception of high power/low inhibition versus high power/high inhibition (pPow and sPow, to use the technical terms) was later criticized and redeveloped by Winter, who elaborated on the Veroff n-Power scoring system so as to account for two other dimensions Hope/Fear of Power (Winter 1973, p. 162-163). This distinction, he said, would side-step the moral issue of "bad" versus "good" leadership and power, of "domination" versus "genuine leadership," reminiscent of Pigors' researches from the 1930s, and Burns' from the 1970s. At the same time, the basic distinction between task-oriented and social-emotionally oriented political leadership would not be thwarted. Let us now turn to the indicators of power motivation as we can find them in, for example, Thematic Apperception Tests.

We will expect that power motivation is present in a story when any one or more of the following things are reported:

- Someone in the story is emotionally concerned about getting or maintaining control of another person. Wanting to show dominance or to win a point in an argument. Attempts to convince someone in order to gain a position of control, as well as wanting to avoid humiliation, are obvious examples of this. However, weaker expression such as wanting to inspire or teach another person

should also be scored. However, if the *advice* is asked for regarding this element, imagery should not be scored unless there is additional evidence of power concern.

- The second instance that must be scored is when someone is actually *doing* something to get or keep control of another person by, for example giving a command, demanding, arguing, or forcing, trying persistently to convince, or using punishments in interpersonal behaviour. It would seem that any activity could be scored here, so long as it is directed toward influence and control in interpersonal or inter-group relationships. Physical power should always be scored as power imagery.
- Scoring the power motive requires caution. Some statements about interpersonal relationships are *culturally* defined. In these statements we find some, in which a superior has control over a subordinate. These statements must indicate power or influence relationships, which not only are mentioned, but also practised. If an employee-employer tale continues as an elaboration of an affiliative bond, then power imagery should not be scored as a power motive but as an affiliation motive. Scoring a power motive, furthermore, requires either that the subordinate must be mentioned and/or the effect on her or him is clear. The asymmetric parent-child relationship, in and of itself, is not scored as a power relationship, since it is part of a culturally defined family relationship.

As previously mentioned, a high need for power may be expressed as “personalized power” or “socialized power.” People with high personalized power motives may have little inhibition or self control, and they usually exercise power impulsively. Correlated with this are tendencies to be rude, to excessively use alcohol or other drugs, to engage in sexual harassment, and collecting symbols of power (e.g., big boats, big offices, expensive desks, fancy cars, etc., so called “penis extenders”). Such people, when they give support or advice, only do so with the intent to further bolster their own position. They demand *personal* loyalty to themselves rather than to the

organization, which they represent, perhaps they are unable to distinguish the two.

The need for socialized power is most often associated with effective leadership (Andersen, 1999). The leaders who harbour the socialized version of the power need tend to direct their influence and power in socially positive ways, ways that will benefit the organization and others. This version of the power motive is not intended to be a reflection of the idea that it is through power that important tasks are accomplished. Such leaders are more hesitant to use power in Machiavellian or other forms of manipulative behaviour, to engage in “expression management,” and those who are influenced by this version of the power motive are also less narcissistic, and collect fewer outward symbols of power, prestige or possession. Usually they have a long-range perspective, show consideration and they can also handle consultation and advice, for what it is, in rational terms.

#### A note about the application of McClelland’s research to political examples

The most striking impressions left by the findings of Rufus Browning’s research on power motivation among business men and politicians during the 1960s, when considered independently of situational factors, were a lack of aggregate *motivational* differences between the politicians and the businessmen and an extreme *heterogeneity* among the politicians on the McClelland measures. However, when controlling for situational factors, particularly the operative (as opposed to the institutional) norms and expectations connected with various political offices in different communities, distinct motivational profiles began to emerge. Politicians who approached styles of behaviour which could be described as a “hard-driving activist” syndrome – identified by Browning in terms of high scores in the needs for achievement and power and low scores in the need for affiliation – were found in some political contexts and not in others. One may wonder whether this is not associated with the functionality of institutions and organizations, either so that effective or-

ganizations recruit and/or attract such people. With the original findings of McClelland in mind – that motives always are *learned* – we should then not generalize too quickly and generally about leaders, who enter positions of power, where it had previously been exercised in democratic or authoritarian ways.

### Some summary and concluding remarks

Motivation is a complex topic that spans virtually all areas of psychology, dynamic, structural, cognitive, emotive, physiological and psycho-analytic. No one set of hypotheses or theory is capable of explaining all that we know about motivational processes, as I have tried to show in this overview. Also, leadership and motivation are closely related, as I have tried to show. Therefore leaders should guard against the tendency to assume that the same factors will motivate all individuals, in all situations and times, or that motivational factors are role-independent.<sup>9</sup>

It is often claimed that many of society's problems are motivational. This observation usually means that the goals and values of economically affluent groups in the Americas, (WASPs), Europe, and Asia are not shared by members of deprived urban populations. Neither does it cover the millions of rural poor people in industrially developing countries.

Many techniques have been tried in business and industry to effect motivational involvement with production on the part of ordinary employees. The research by McClelland and his associates is no exception to this. Some of them have had success. Incentive systems, employee participation in company planning and decisions, and human-relations training exemplify the procedures used. A substantial corps of specialists throughout the world provides programs, to industry, designed to improve the motivation, morale, and satisfaction of workers at all levels. Although these programs have wide acceptance, most of them have received very little objective evaluation, but it seems reasonable that some kind of motivational research may be valuable when leaders and managers try to empower

those who would otherwise not be able to affect their own destiny.

Tom Bryder

### Notes

\* This is an attempt at narrating political psychological concepts, hypotheses and theories of motivation. The article does not aspire to present new empirical results from primary research. Its justification relates to what emerges as an effect of combined insights from the rather dispersed field of research called "motivational psychology."

1. The critics of capitalist society claim that alienated man in the free market buys things, he does not need, for money he does not have, in order to impress people, who do not care.
2. Arne Naess retiring to the Norwegian mountains, or Ludwig Wittgenstein retiring to his house on the west-coast of Norway, are pertinent examples, and so was the late Jeff Rubin's challenging mountain climbing which regrettably lead to his death.
3. A dimension is here seen as a variable covarying with another variable.
4. Game theoretical models, based on the idea that striving for success is a *universal* phenomenon, were used by US military strategists during the early years of the Vietnam War. These models lead US military thinking into wrong directions, since in the Orient, the desire to avoid failure or disaster (losing face) was much more widespread than a desire to "win it all." In cognitive terms, perceptions of the militarily superior capability of the Americans induced the Vietnamese to value human qualities more than weapon qualities.
5. James Buchanan, one of the co-authors of *The Calculus of Consent* (1963) is a Nobel Prize laureate.
6. Hans Eysenck (private communication) has claimed that one cannot postulate a general propensity to violence, by watching violence on TV. Probably, the ability to abstract from concrete events and cognitive complexity are influential variables but this is gain-said by Eysenck whose studies were done with young children.
7. I owe this point to professor Guetzkow, who also gave me more facts about the development of motivational research in the United States at the 1992 an-

nual scientific meeting of the *International Society of Political Psychology* in San Francisco.

8. Robert Putnam (2000) claims that this kind of motivation is declining, particularly in American society. In a sense, however, his reflections are reminiscent of Ferdinand Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.

9. This is perhaps most evident from a reading of the works of Erving Goffman, Cf. Goffmann, 1959.

## References

- Andersen, Jon Aarum (1999). 'Are Power Motivated Leaders More Effective? A Review of McClelland's Theory.' *Current Topics in Management*, Vol. 4, pp. 41-59.
- Axelrod, Robert *et al* (1976). *Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press.
- Axelrod, Robert (1973). 'Schema theory. An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition'. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67, 4, pp. 1248-1266.
- Bandura, Albert (1977). *Social Learning Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Bem, D. J. (1967). 'Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena.' *Psychological Review*, Vol. 74, pp. 183-200.
- Bem, D. J. (1972). 'Self-perception theory.' In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. Vol. 6. New York: Academic Press.
- Bennet, W. L. (1981). 'Perception and Cognition. An Information Processing Framework for Politics', in Long, Samuel L. (Ed.): *Handbook of Political Behavior*, New York: Plenum Press. Vol. 1, pp 69-193.
- Billig, Michael (1978). *Fascists. A Social Psychological View of the National Front*. London & New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Billig, Michael (1976). *Social Psychology and Inter-group Relations*. London: Academic Press.
- Bryder, Tom (1998). *The Human Face of Politics. Essays on Political Psychology and Politicised Culture in the Twentieth Century*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press.
- Bryder, Tom (1984). 'Harald Høffding och den Moderna Statskunskapens Vetenskapssyn'. In *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, Vol. 87, 4, pp. 323-336.
- Browning, Rufus and Herbert Jacob (1964). "Power Motivation and the Political Personality," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 28, pp. 75-90.
- Browning, Rufus (1968). "The interaction of personality and political system in decisions to run for office: Some data and a simulation technique." *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 24(3), pp. 93-109.
- Buchanan, James M. & Tullock, Gordon (1963). *The Calculus of Consent*. Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks.
- Burns, James MacGregor (1978). *Leadership*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Burns, James MacGregor (1977). 'Wellsprings of Political Leadership', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71, pp. 266-291.
- Cartwright, Dorwin P. & Zander, Alvin (Eds.) (1968). *Group Dynamics*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1961). 'The Behavioral Approach in Political Science. Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest.' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55, 4, pp. 763-772.
- Dalton, Russell J. (1998). 'Comparative Politics: Micro-behavioral Perspectives.' In Goodin, Robert E. & Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.). *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davies, James C. (1963). *Human Nature in Politics*. New York: John Wiley.
- Davies, J. C. (1971). 'Where from and where to?' In J. N. Knutson (Ed.), *Handbook of Political Psychology*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Donley, R. E., & David G. Winter (1970). 'Measuring the motives of public officials at a distance: An exploratory study of American presidents.' *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 15, pp. 227-236.
- Easton, David (1967a). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. London: Wiley.
- Easton, David (1967b). 'The Current Meaning of Behaviouralism', in Charlesworth, J. (Ed.): *Contemporary Political Analysis*. New York: The Free Press.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
- Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, Vol. 7, pp. 117-140.
- Festinger, L., and J. M. Carlsmith (1959). 'Cognitive consequences of forced compliance.' *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 58, pp. 203-210.
- George, Alexander L. (1959). *Propaganda Analysis*. New York: Row, Peterson and Company.
- George, Alexander L. (1968). 'Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders'. In *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. XXIV, 3, pp. 29-49.
- Goffman E. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

- Guetzkow, Harold (Ed.) (1951). *Groups, Leadership and Men*. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press.
- Harsanyi, John C. (1969). 'Rational Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories.' *World Politics*, Vol. 21, 1, pp. 513-528.
- Herzberg, F. (1966). *Work and the Nature of Man*. New York: The World Publ. Co.
- Høffding, Harald (1923). 'Begrebet Analogi.' (The Concept of Analogy) In *Det Kgl. Danske Videnskaberne Selskab, Filosofiske Meddelelser*. 1:4, København.
- Hollander, Edwin P. (1978). *Leadership Dynamics*. New York: The Free Press.
- Holsti, Ole R. (1976). 'Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively.' In Axelrod, Robert et al.: *Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press.
- Homans, George C. (1967). *The Nature of Social Science*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
- Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.) (1982). *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, Morton A. (1957). *System and Process in International Politics*. New York: John Wiley.
- Katz, D. (1973). 'Patterns of Political Leadership.' In Knutson, Jeanne N. (Ed.): *Handbook of Political Psychology*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Kohlberg, L. (1969). 'Stage and Sequence. The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization.' In D. Goslin (Ed.): *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*. New York: Rand-McNally.
- Lane, Robert E. (1981). 'Markets and Politics. The Human Product.' In *The British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 11, pp. 1-16.
- Lasswell, Harold D. (1948). *Power and Personality*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Maslow, Abraham H. (1943). 'A Theory of Human Motivation.' In *Psychological Review*, Vol. 50, pp. 370-392.
- Maslow, Abraham H. (1962). *Toward a Psychology of Being*. Princeton, M. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
- Maslow, Abraham, H. (1971). *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- McClelland, David C. (1951). 'Measuring Motivation in Phantasy.' In Guetzkow, Harold (Ed.). *Groups, Leadership and Men*. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press.
- McClelland, David C. et al (1953). *The Achievement Motive*. New York: Irvington Publ. Inc.
- McClelland, D. C. (1961). *The Achieving Society*. Princeton, NJ.: Van Nostrand.
- McClelland, D. C., & David G. Winter (1969). *Motivating Economic Achievement*. New York: Free Press.
- McClelland, David C. (1970). 'The Two Faces of Power.' In *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 24, pp. 29-55.
- Milbrath, Lester W. & M. L. Goel (1977). *Political Participation. How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company.
- Mills, C. Wright (1940). 'Situational actions and vocabularies of motive'. In *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 5, Dec., pp. 904-913.
- Nettl, J. P. (1967). *Political Mobilization*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Putnam, Robert (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Riesman, David et al (1955). *The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the Changing American Character*. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
- Rotter, Julian (1966). 'Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement.' In *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. 80, 1, pp. 1-28.
- Schutz, Alfred (1970). *On Phenomenology and Social Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Seligman, Lester G. (1980). 'Review of James MacGregor Burns: Leadership.' In *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, pp. 153-156.
- Shaver, Kelly G. (1975). *An Introduction to Attribution Processes*. Cambridge Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1976, orig. 1947). *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1985). 'Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science'. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79, pp. 293-304.
- Sjöbäck, Hans (1988). *The Freudian Learning Hypothesis*. Lund: Lund University Press.
- Stenelo, Lars-Göran (1980). *Foreign Policy Predictions*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Stone, W. F. (1981). 'Political Psychology: A Whig History'. In S. L. Long (Ed.): *The Handbook of Political Behavior*. Vol. I. New York: Plenum Press.
- Strum, Philippa (1979). 'Leadership Unexamined. Studies of the American Presidency 1948-1979.' Mimeo paper presented at the World Congress of The International Political Science Association: Moscow.
- Stuart, Douglas T. (1981). 'Politische Führung.' In Lippert, E. & Wakenhut, R. (eds.): *Handwörterbuch*

- der Politischen Psychologie*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Tingsten, Herbert (1963). *Åsikter och Motiv. Essayer i statsvetenskapliga, politiska och litterära Ämnen*. Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers
- Tsebelis, George, (1990). *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. Berkeley & Oxford: University of California Press.
- Tucker, Robert C. (1981). *Politics as Leadership*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Welch, I David et al (1978). *Humanistic Psychology. A Source Book*. Buffalo, N. Y.: Prometheus Books.
- White, Robert W. (1959). 'Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence.' *Psychological Review*, Vol. 66, 1, pp. 297-333.
- Winter, David G. (1973). *The Power Motive*. New York: The Free Press.
- Winter, David G., & A. J. Stewart, (1977). 'Content analysis as a technique for assessing political leaders.' In Margaret G. Hermann & Thomas W. Milburn (Eds.), *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*. New York: Free Press.
- Wolfenstein, Eugene Victor (1967). *The Revolutionary Personality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
-