

Conservative Voting and the Church: The Religious Dimension in the Electoral Geography of the Conservative (Moderate) Party in Sweden 1921–1998

Martin Lindström

Introduction

In the beginning of the 1990s no less than three doctoral theses were presented concerning the ideology and the ideological development of the Swedish Conservative (Moderate) Party. Torbjörn Aronsson's "Konservatism och demokrati. En rekonstruktion av fem svenska högerledares styrelsedoktriner" (1990) was the first. The second was "Fosterlandet främst" by Jan Hylén (1991), and the third "Folkhemskapitalismen" (1992) by Stig-Björn Ljunggren. The conclusions drawn by these three authors differ to a very important extent. The conclusions of Aronsson and Ljunggren are essentially that there has been no transformation of the party ideology in a liberal direction during the twentieth century. Conservatism is still the prevailing ideology of the Moderate party, according to these two authors. In contrast, the conclusions of Jan Hylén are that the ideology has been almost completely transformed. The ideology was formerly characterised by a conservative collectivism with a pessimistic view of man's capabilities that traced its foundations in traditional Christian religion. During the twentieth century this basically conservative ideology was gradually transformed into an ideology permeated by liberal individualism and an optimistic view of man's capabilities, according to Hylén. This political science debate has been discussed in a previous article (Lindström 2000). The analysis in this article of the theoretical and methodological frameworks of these three theses led to the conclusion that Jan Hylén's framework is the most sufficient for the study of such a secular process as the ideological transformation of the political programme of a major political party.

The most fundamental condition for the analysis of conservative as opposed to liberal traits in the ideology of a political party must be a theoretical framework and an analytical instrument that include both these concepts as clearly defined and separate entities. Conservatism represents a particular problem on the borderline between traditional metaphysical belief systems and, on the other hand, the inherent secularised and action-oriented characteristics of modern political ideologies. Modern ideologies differ from former traditional belief systems that were characterised by religiously and metaphysically anchored thoughts in several ways. First, modern ideologies try in their language

to adhere to the modern scientific and rational tradition of the Western world. Second, modern ideologies are totally worldly. They only deal with material realities as opposed to the spiritual and metaphysical dogmas of traditional religions. Traditional religious thinking dealt with the hierarchical relationship between God and man. This metaphysical dimension disappears in modern ideologies. Third, modern ideologies are action-oriented. Their aim is to use science and modern political thought in order to change the material realities of society. They include an ideal of perpetual change, a dynamism, in contrast to the rather static religious dogmas of traditional society (Boudon 1989, pp. 20ff.; di Palma 1991, pp. 55ff.; Habermas 1970, p. 99; McClellan 1986, pp. 2ff.). Russel Kirk has defined conservatism in a distinct way that adheres to the discussion concerning the borderline position between traditional religious belief systems and modern ideologies:

First, conservatives generally believe that there exists a transcendent moral order, to which we ought to try to conform the ways of society...

Second, conservatives uphold the principle of social continuity...

Third, conservatives believe in what may be called the principle of prescription. "The wisdom of our ancestors" is one of the more important phrases of Burke: presumably Burke derived it from Richard Hooker...

Fourth, conservatives are guided by their principle of prudence. Burke agrees that in the statesman, prudence is chief among virtues. Any public measure ought to be judged by its probable long-run consequences, not merely by advantage or popularity. Fifth, conservatives pay attention to the principle of variety. They feel affection for the proliferating intricacy of long-established social institutions and modes of life, as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity of radical systems...

Sixth, conservatives are chastened by their principle of imperfectibility. Human nature suffers irremediably from certain faults, the conservatives know. Man being imperfect, no perfect social order ever can be created (Kirk 1982, pp. XV-XVIII).

Conservatism thus seems to be a political ideology that partly remains anchored in traditional religious belief systems. However, as the process of secularisation gradually proceeds, conservatism may be expected to be gradually transformed into a variant of the liberal ideology, or at least an ideology much closer to liberalism than before (Lindström 1997).

Aronsson acknowledges the particular metaphysical traits of the cosmology of the conservative ideology. However, already in the theoretical framework he adds that there has also been a secularised variant of conservatism ever since the French revolution. This addition partly obscures his theoretical framework. It gives a picture of conservatism as an unchanged ideology with different secularised and metaphysical variants over the past 200 years. Hylén's theoretical and conceptual framework is very elaborate and completely fullfills the condition stating that the concepts of liberalism and conservatism should be defined as mutually separate and exclusive entities in the analysis. Hylén has elaborated an analytical instrument that consists of four parametres, four scales with a purely liberal, individualist and optimistic (when it comes the view of the nature of man) extreme as opposed to a conservative, collectivist and pes-

simistic extreme at the other end of the four parametres/scales. The theoretical framework elaborated and used by Ljunggren does not seem to live up to this condition. Already from the outset, Ljunggren defines three different variants of conservatism that form the basis of his analytical instrument. The pure concept of liberalism, as defined by Hylén, is completely neglected by Ljunggren. One of the three concepts used by Ljunggren, the liberal conservative form of conservatism, also represents an unfortunate mix of the two pure and mutually exclusive liberal and conservative concepts (Lindström 2000).

However, we must also specify what we mean when we say *the ideology of a political party*. Do we mean the ideological principal statements made by the party leader (s)? Do we mean the ideology that can be observed by studying the work of its politicians in the practical political work within the national (Riksdag), regional or local parliaments? Do we mean the political attitudes of its party members, supporters and voters? Aronsson's study includes only the statements of the party leaders concerning certain issues. Ljunggren's study concerns both the party leaders and statements by the rest of the party organisation. Hylén's study concerns the party leaders, the party organisation and the practical political work in the Riksdag. None of the studies concern the voters or the supporters of the party. The social geographer Peter J Taylor has defined three types of electoral politics. Taylor defines two spheres of politics: "the politics of power", a sphere that concerns the leadership of the party and its party program and policies, and, on the other hand, "the politics of support", a sphere that concerns the attitudes and opinions of those who support and vote for the party. The two spheres "politics of power" and "politics of support" should normally be related to each other in a way whereby the politics of the party leadership, the politicians and the party organisation are congruent with the attitudes and opinions of those who vote for the party, i.e. "congruent politics". When the politics of the leadership of the party differ from the opinion of the voters and supporters, the relationship between the party leadership and the voters is disconnected, i.e. "disconnected politics". Finally, Taylor defines the unfortunate hypothetical state in which the politics and policies of the party leadership are completely opposed to the opinion of the party's traditional voters and supporters, i.e. "contradictory politics". The ideal state is of course always a state of "congruent politics", i.e. a complete congruence between the "politics of power" sphere and "the politics of support" sphere within the party (Taylor 1989, pp. 228ff.).

The parties in Western Europe have traditionally been stable and the relationship between the policies of the party leadership and the attitudes of the voters have mostly been characterised by a state of "congruent politics". The question that emerges is whether the electoral support for the Swedish Conservative (Moderate) party has changed in a way that would imply a shift from a mainly conservative, traditionalist and Christian electorate towards a more secularised and liberal electorate or not. Hylén's conclusions that imply such a shift would be supported if significantly higher proportions of traditionalist Christian voters that go to the morning services on Sundays in church formerly supported the party but have ceased to do so. Aronsson's and Ljunggren's conclusions

would be supported if this relationship between Christian beliefs and voting for the Conservative (Moderate) party have remained unchanged.

There has been a profound process of secularisation in Swedish society during the twentieth century. This in a deeper sense cultural transformation has of course also affected the minds of the population. The composition of the electorate of the Swedish Conservative (Moderate) party has in fact even been transformed to a higher extent than the average Swedish population. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the electorate of the party still went to morning service in church to a much higher extent than the rest of the population. No less than 51 % of the persons that went to morning service four times per month or more stated in an opinion poll in 1955 that they would vote for the Conservative party. Even among persons that went to morning service 1–3 times per month the proportion of conservative voters was significantly higher than among those who did not, 16 % compared to only 11 % (Gustafsson 1965, p. 335). Särilvik has also described the importance of religion for the political parties in the 1950s and the 1960s. The non-socialist parties often defended the church and traditional Christianity, often in opposition to the Social Democrats and the Communists. The Liberal (People's) party was firmly established among the members of the free churches during this period, while the Conservative party was strongly supported by the active members of the Swedish Lutheran State Church. In the 1968 election to the second chamber of the Riksdag the Conservative party obtained 16 % of the votes among the voters who went to morning service in church at least once a month, 13 % of those who went a couple of times a year, 9 % among those who went more seldom and only 5 % among those who never went to church (Särilvik 1974, pp.415ff.). In the 1980s and the 1990s there were no such differences between the electorate of the Moderate (before 1969 Conservative) party and the rest of the population (Holmberg 1987, p. 206; SCB 1994, p. 164).

Individual level survey data thus seems to confirm the hypothesis that could be based on Hylén's conclusions. Individual level survey data clearly indicate that there has been a transformation of the support for the Swedish Conservative (Moderate) party in a secularised and liberal direction, even compared to the average of the total Swedish electorate. The aim of this article is to investigate the long-run secular consequences of this process on the geography of electoral support for the party. The focus of this article is thus on the area level (i.e. municipalities) of analysis rather than the individual level. This will be further discussed in the following sections.

Political behaviour, electoral geography and party regionalism

The inclination to vote for a specific political party in a two-party or a multi-party system may be determined by several different factors. In many countries in Western Europe social class has been the strongest determinant of the voting behaviour of the electorate. In Sweden the voting pattern has been determined by social class to an even more prominent extent than in many other European

countries. Non-manual employees and self-employed persons have traditionally voted for the Conservative (Moderate) party or for the Liberal (People's) party. Peasants have traditionally voted for the Agrarian (Centre) party and manual workers for the Social Democratic party and the Communists (see e.g. Lewin 1972; Särilvik 1965, p. 169; Särilvik 1969, p. 278; Holmberg 1981, pp. 298ff.; Elvander 1980, pp. 311ff.; Przeworski and Sprague 1986, p. 115; Holmberg and Gilljam 1987, pp. 178ff.; Oskarsson 1990, pp. 216ff.). Although voting by social class has become somewhat weaker in recent decades, social class still remains the strongest determinant of party preferences in contemporary Sweden. However, there are also other factors that determine voting behaviour. Lipset and Rokkan have stressed both ethnic and religious differences as important determinants of voting behaviour (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, pp. 13ff.). The religious divisions concern both different confessional segments of the population and the division between religious as opposed to secularised, agnostic segments of the population of modern Western society (Lijphart 1974, pp. 228ff.). Sartori has described these conflict dimensions as one ordinary left-right (social class), one secular-denominational, one authoritarian-democratic and one ethnicity-integration dimension (Sartori 1976, p. 336).

The geographical patterns of electoral support for political parties has been studied in Sweden since the 1950s by e.g. Sven Rydenfelt in his doctoral dissertation "Kommunismen i Sverige" (1954), Carl-Gunnar Jansson in "Mandatfördelning och regional röstfördelning" (1961), Gösta Carlsson in "Partistyrkeförskjutningar som tillväxtprocesser" (1963), Leif Lewin in "The Swedish electorate 1887-1968" (1972), Göran Gustafsson in "Partistyrka och partistyrkeförskjutningar" (1974) and Lars Ricknell in "Politiska regioner. Studier i regionindelningsproblematik" (1976). The common trait of most of these studies is the investigation of the variations in voting patterns that cannot be explained by the social class distribution of the voters in different geographic areas (Rydenfelt 1954; Jansson 1961; Gustafsson 1974; Ricknell 1976). The concept of political region has been thoroughly discussed by these authors. Party regionalism or political region has often been defined in the following way:

A specific social structure determined by economic-technological circumstances, variations within the framework of this structure determined by cultural, ethnic and religious circumstances, sense of community and belonging within the collective of citizens, interests and values within the collective that could result in stable deviations from the national political pattern (Ricknell 1976, p.33).

Religion is thus one of the factors that may explain variations between areas in the geographic distribution of the votes for a political party that cannot be explained by the social class distribution of the voters in the areas. Religion may have been of smaller importance than social class in determining voting behaviour in Sweden during the twentieth century, but it was certainly not without importance. Rydenfelt states that he was surprised by the great importance of religion as a determinant of voting behaviour:

When we started this investigation in 1947 the religious conditions were one of the explaining factors that we expected not to matter. During the process of the investigation we have been forced to revise this notion.

Despite the ongoing process of secularisation there are big areas in our country where religion is still a living reality that deeply affects the apprehension and values of people, and consequently their social and political behaviour. Even when the economic conditions are similar, the political sympathies in these areas are completely different from the political sympathies in religiously indifferent areas. This pattern can only be understood when the religious structure is taken into account (Rydenfelt 1954, pp. 209f.).

Carl-Gunnar Jansson also found that the average number of people that went to morning service in the Swedish Lutheran State Church was highly positively correlated with the proportion of votes for the Conservative party, to some lesser extent with the proportion of votes for the Agrarian (Centre) party, to almost no extent with the proportion of votes for the Liberal (People's) party and highly negatively correlated with the proportion of votes for the Social Democratic party and the Communists (Jansson 1961, pp. 218ff.).

Other more recent political science authors have denied the importance of religion on Swedish electoral geography. Sten Berglund, Bo Hallin and Ingemar Wörlund state that religion as expressed by membership in the free churches can not add any explanatory value to the geographic variations in the electoral support for the Social Democrats and the Communists in the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten during the period 1917–1936 (Berglund, Hallin and Wörlund 1986). In another chapter of the same book Wörlund also states that there were no correlations at the geographic area level between the membership in the free churches and the electoral support for the Liberal (People's) party in the county of Västerbotten, one of the most prominent strongholds of the Liberal (People's) party (Wörlund 1986, pp. 202ff.).

The strong positive correlation between the proportion of party members and the electoral support for the same party have been reported in these and other studies (e.g. Albinsson 1986, pp.41ff.). However, such correlations are not surprising, given the fact that the members and the voters are recruited from the same population that either generally feel sympathy for the ideology of the party or feel antipathy for the party. Back and Berglund (1978) also claimed that the strong support for many decades of the twentieth century for the Conservative party in the constituency of southern Älvsborg county was due to the organisational and recruitment work of the party in this constituency during the period 1912–1921. The authors do not at all discuss the possibility that the high proportion of both conservative party members and conservative voters of the whole population could have been caused by the same structural factor (confounder). Such a confounder could for instance be the fact that the constituency of southern Älvsborg county is situated in the very heartland of the old religious revival areas within the Swedish Lutheran State Church in western Sweden. In contrast, these characteristics were described by Rydenfelt:

The county of Älvsborg can be characterised as old fashioned conservative, a trait that is expressed both politically and religiously. The southern part of the county has accordingly been the constituency in Swedish elections with the highest pro-

portion of conservative voters, and the county contains some of the most religious areas in Sweden (Rydenfelt 1954, pp. 111f.).

In the 1920s the Conservative party received its strongest electoral support in the most religiously traditionalist municipalities in Sweden, e.g. the northernmost Laestadian municipality of Karesuando, in which the party obtained 94.1 % of the votes in 1921, 100.0 % in 1924 (!) and 92.3 % in 1928, the Schar-tauan municipalities Kåringön in the county of Gothenburg and Bohus (88.0 % in 1921 and 92.2 % in 1928) and Tölvsjö in the southern part of the county of Älvsborg (87.8 % in 1921 and 82.8 % in 1928), and the High-Church municipality of Kalvsvik in the county of Kronoberg (89.8 % in 1921 and 91.7 % in 1928).

There is thus strong support for the notion that there has formerly been a strong positive correlation between voting for the Conservative party and religious affiliation to the Swedish Lutheran State Church. Individual data also suggest that this positive correlation has disappeared in recent decades. The following analysis will investigate the profound impact of this transformation on the electoral geography of the Swedish Conservative (Moderate) party.

Material, methods and the ecological fallacy

The data investigated in this study depict characteristics of geographic areas (ecological units) rather than characteristics of individuals. The geographic areas analysed are the Swedish municipalities after the municipality reform in 1973/1974 that reduced the number of municipalities in Sweden from approximately 1,000 to 278 (the number of municipalities analysed in this article):

The population size of these municipalities became rather even, to the extent that no less than 171 of the 282 blocks of municipalities (1964) had a population of between 7,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, 95 a bigger population and only 16 a smaller population (Gustafsson 1988, p. 22).

Although some minor revisions of the number of municipalities have been made after 1973/1974, the election results for the Conservative (Moderate) party in the elections to the national parliament (Riksdag) have been easily accessible for the elections to the Riksdag in 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Division of the municipalities has been derived from the division used by Jan Carlsson in his thesis "Region och religion" (1990). In order to make the election results prior to 1973/1974 comparable to these results, the election results in the elections to the second chamber of the Riksdag in 1921, 1928, 1940, 1948, 1958 and, finally, the first election to the one chamber Riksdag in 1970 have been aggregated from the pre-1973/1974 municipality divisions (major revisions in the number of municipalities occurred in 1951/1952, 1967 and 1973/1974. This has been done by using Per Andersson's book "Sveriges kommunindelning 1866–1993" (1993).

The strength of the practise to attend morning service in the Swedish Lutheran State Church was analysed by Jan Carlsson in "Region och religion" (1990) after adjustment for the socioeconomic structure of the population of

the municipalities, measured as the age composition, professional composition (in agriculture, industry, construction, trade, public administration and communication), the proportion of the population in the active workforce aged 20–49 with jobs and the proportion of the population in densely populated areas in the municipalities.

The study period 1921–1998 was chosen because the 1921 election to the second chamber of the Riksdag was the first election with equal right to vote for both men and women.

The system with proportional elections has been revised two times since it was installed in 1911. In all national elections to the second chamber of the Riksdag from 1911 until 1948, the d'Hondt quotient was used to distribute the seats among the contesting parties. This meant that the number of votes for the party were divided by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc. until all the seats within a particular constituency were distributed. From 1952 until 1968 another method to distribute the seats within the constituencies was used in the national elections to the second chamber of the Riksdag, by which the number of votes for the political parties were divided by 1.4, 3, 5, 7 etc. until all the seats within each constituency were distributed among the contesting parties. From the national election of 1970 and onwards this quotient system has been used with the addition that 40 (from 1976 and onwards 39) seats in the one chamber Riksdag have been distributed at the national level to the contesting political parties in order to make the distribution of the seats among the political parties (all parties with more than 4 % of the total number of votes) proportional to their number of votes in the whole country (von Sydow 1989, pp. 24f., p. 51, p. 120, p. 284; Cotteret and Émeri 1983, pp. 56ff.). These minor changes to the proportional election system that has been used in Sweden since 1911 described above have most probably not had any impact on the voting behaviour in Sweden.

The post-1973/1974 municipalities were analysed by Jan Carlsson in his thesis "Region och religion" (1990) in order to investigate the strength of the religious tradition within the Swedish Lutheran State Church in all the 278 municipalities in Sweden during the period 1970–1982. One of the most important measures of religious tradition is the proportion of persons that attend morning service on Sundays. These proportions were assessed in all municipalities in Carlsson's thesis. Furthermore, adjustments were conducted by a multivariate regression analysis for the socioeconomic structure (age composition, professional composition, the proportion of population in the active workforce with jobs among those 20–49 years and the proportion of the population living in densely populated areas within the municipalities during the 1970s). The municipalities were divided into quintiles according to the strength of the religious tradition (attending morning service in the Swedish Lutheran State Church on Sundays) adjusted by socioeconomic structure.

The division of the 278 municipalities into quartiles according to the strength of religious tradition was then used for the analysis of the electoral geography of the Conservative (Moderate) party 1921–1998. The strength of the party (percentage of all votes cast) was assessed, and compared to the percentage of all votes for the party at the national level in the same election. The lower

quartile limit (25 %), the median (50 %) and the upper quartile limit (75 %) measures were analysed within each of the five religious tradition quintiles. The time trends concerning the relative strength of the party compared to the national average for the period 1921–1998 was assessed for each of the quintiles of municipalities regarding religious tradition. The Conservative party for instance obtained 30.1 % of the votes in the southern constituency of Älvsborg in the national election to the second chamber of the Riksdag in 1940 compared to the national average 18.1 %, which meant that the relative strength of the party in this constituency was $30.1/18.1 = 1.66$ compared to the national average in 1940.

It may be argued that it is hard to draw any conclusions concerning causality at the individual level, i.e. the relationship between religious traditionalism and ring-wing voting, from analyses at the ecological (geographic area) level of analysis. The association at the ecological level could theoretically be caused by certain municipalities having both certain segments of the population that vote conservative to a high extent, and other segments of the population that uphold the religious tradition to a high extent without voting for the Conservative party, and other certain municipalities having lower proportions of both these independent segments of the population. This problem of inference from ecological studies to causal relationships at the individual level is called "the ecological fallacy" (Schwartz 1994). However, in our case we already know that there formerly were high positive associations at the individual level of data analysis between voting for the Conservative party and religious traditionalism in Sweden.

Religious traditions within the Swedish State Church and the process of secularisation

The process of secularisation has been a long-time process over centuries in the Western world. In Sweden, as in other countries, the process of secularisation and the division of the former unity of Christianity may be regarded as two aspects of the same phenomenon. The authorities in Sweden occasionally proclaimed reforms that strengthened the secularisation process. In contrast, the authorities were always opposed to tendencies of division of the State Church or breakouts from it. After the reformation in 1527 the number of clerical holidays was significantly reduced. King Gustav III further reduced the number of clerical holidays after his coronation in 1772. This was done as a consequence of the prevailing mercantilistic ideology of the time in order to increase the number of work days during the year (Malmstedt 1994). In 1726 the Swedish Riksdag decided that all other denominations than the Swedish Lutheran State Church should be illegal, i.e. the "Konventikelplakatet" (1726–1858) (Carlsson and Rosén 1980, p.95). However, the hermnhutic parishes in Stockholm and Gothenburg were granted dispensation from this law from 1783/1785 and onwards. Furthermore, foreign citizens acquired the right to practise their religion in Sweden in 1781, and persons of mosaic denomination were permitted to live

in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Linköping from 1782 and onwards (Ibid, pp. 167f.). Public offices were opened for persons of other denominations in 1870, wedding couples were granted the legal possibility to choose either church or lay weddings in 1908, and total religious freedom was granted in 1951 (Ibid, pp. 336ff.).

The movement of revival within the Swedish Lutheran State Church began in the late eighteenth century as a theologically traditionalist reaction against the secularisation tendencies that were partly strengthened by the reforms decided by the central authorities as a consequence of the mercantilistic and the enlightening ideologies. In western Sweden the priest Henrik Schartau (1757–1825) became the leader of this movement. This revival movement was mainly anchored in the counties of Gothenburg and Bohus, Halland, Älvsborg (especially the southern part of this county), Kronoberg (western part) and the parts of Scania neighbouring Halland and Kronoberg. Smaller strongholds existed in the town of Skanör and Falsterbo in the southwest of Scania and in the southeastern part of the county of Östergötland (Kindabygden). This revival movement still exists, and it generally has retained the same geographic strongholds (Gustafsson 1965, pp. 313ff.).

Another traditionalist revival movement was the Laestadian in the northern part of Sweden with its most important strongholds in Tornedalen and Gällivare. The founder of this movement, Lars Levi Laestadius, was vicar in Kareuando, the northernmost parish in Sweden. Even the Laestadian revival movement still exists, and has also retained its traditional geographic strongholds (Ibid, pp. 313ff.).

Both the Schartauan and Laestadian revival movements were theologically very conservative and traditionalist. Both Schartau and Laestadius stated that the faithfulness and the respect for the King and the traditional authorities were important for a true Christian. A true Christian should also avoid the temptations of modern life and scientific inventions (Ibid, pp. 313ff.).

In the counties of Skaraborg, Kronoberg, Kalmar and Östergötland there has also been a long High-Church tradition that still exists. Furthermore, a both theologically and politically conservative Low-Church tradition emerged during the nineteenth centuries in the county of Kalmar in southern Sweden, and in the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten in the northernmost part of Sweden. Carl-Olof Rosenius travelled in northern Sweden in the mid-nineteenth century, and the Low-Church movement "Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelsen" was founded in 1856 with its strongholds in the northernmost parts of Sweden (Carlsson and Rosén 1980, pp. 392ff.).

In contrast to these theologically and politically conservative religious movements within the Swedish Lutheran State Church, the free churches emerged during the nineteenth century. The Swedish "Community of Baptists" was founded in 1848. Paul Petter Waldenström left the Low-Church movement "Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelsen" in 1878 and founded "Svenska Missionsförbundet" that already from the start had a much more liberal standpoint in theological matters. The organisation of this revival movement also had a much more democratic structure. It had its strongholds in Svealand in the mid-

dle of Sweden, and in southern Norrland (Ibid, p. 392). In 1913 the Pentecostal movement was founded as a breakout from the Baptist movement. The Pentecostal movement retained its stronghold in the major cities throughout the twentieth century (Ibid, p. 393).

The free churches had their strongholds in the county of Jönköping, and in Svealand (mid-Sweden) and in southern Norrland (counties of Gävleborg and Västernorrland) (Lundkvist 1974). They were mostly politically allied with the Liberal party, and during the period 1923–1934 when the Liberal party was split into one secularised and one religious party, they supported the religious liberal party. From 1934 they supported the Liberal (People's) party (Back and Berglund 1978, p.28), and in more recent decades also partly the new Christian Democratic party (KDS).

These geographic patterns of different religious traditions have remained unaltered during a very long time period. The theologically conservative and traditionalist regions have remained the religious strongholds within the Swedish Lutheran State Church, and they e.g. still retain the highest proportions of persons that attend morning service in church on Sundays. Viktor Rundgren was the first author who described these patterns in 1897. He found the highest proportions of persons that attended morning service in the State Church on Sundays in the dioceses of Skara, Växjö, Lund, Gothenburg and Kalmar, lower proportions in the diocese of Härnösand (including Luleå at that time), and lowest in the dioceses of Stockholm, Uppsala, Strängnäs, Västerås and Karlstad in the middle of Sweden in 1890 (Rundgren 1897, p. 67). A similar pattern was described by Nils Lövgren for the period 1901–1910: 1) a religiously highly traditionalist area in western Sweden that included the dioceses of Gothenburg, Skara, and the counties of Växjö and Kalmar, 2) a geographic area with a very weak religious tradition within the Swedish Lutheran State Church in Uppland, Södermanland, Västmanland, Närke and Värmland in Svealand in mid-Sweden, and 3) the rest of Sweden with a level of religious traditionalism between these extremes (Lövgren 1912, pp. 75ff.). Very similar and unaltered geographic patterns have later been described by Lundman (1942), Brilioth (1947), Gustafsson (1957) and Carlsson (1990) for different time periods during the twentieth century.

The geographic area patterns of religious traditionalism have thus remained unaltered during the entire twentieth century. Another author, Thorleif Pettersson, concludes that

It is important to note that these regions are defined by historical processes and that they were evident as distinct "entities" already at the beginning of the twentieth century ... Thus, the regions pre-exist such regional divisions as can be made on the basis of present-day variations in church-commitment (Pettersson 1988, p. 26).

The latest investigation concerning the geographic patterns of the strength of the religious tradition within the Swedish State Church is Jan Carlsson's thesis "Region och religion" (1990). Carlsson examines several different measures of religious tradition and religious activities. The study period in the thesis is 1970–1982, and the geographic areas are the post-1973/1974 municipalities.

The proportion of the population that attend morning service in church on Sundays has been the most commonly used marker of religious tradition in the literature, which is the reason why this marker is used in this article. Adjustments were made in the thesis in a multivariate linear regression model for sociodemographic factors such as the age composition, professional composition (agriculture, industry, construction, trade, public administration and communication), the proportion of the population in the active workforce with jobs among those aged 20–49 years, and the proportion of persons within each municipality living in densely populated areas.

The correlations in religious traditionalism (measured as the proportion of the population attending morning service) between different years are very high. The correlation between the 1970 and the 1975 measures for all municipalities is 0.87, between the 1975 and the 1980 measures 0.90, and between the 1970 and the 1980 measures it is 0.80 (Carlsson 1990, p. 51).

Carlsson divides the municipalities into quintiles according to the degree of religious tradition measured as the proportion of the population attending morning service in the Swedish State Church. The two quintiles with the lowest level of religious traditionalism have been impossible to separate from each other by reading the maps in Carlsson's thesis, and my personal contacts with Carlsson have revealed that the original data is lost. The two quintiles with the lowest levels of religious tradition within the State Church measured as the proportion attending morning service in church are thus analysed as one group of municipalities instead of two.

Figure 1 shows that the municipalities with the highest level of religious traditionalism during the period 1970–1980 were found in the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten in the northernmost part of Sweden, in the counties of Gothenburg and Bohus, southern Älvsborg, Halland, Kronoberg and Kalmar, in a few municipalities in the western part of the county of Jönköping and in the municipality of Kinda in the county of Östergötland in southern Sweden. Finally, a few municipalities around the Lake Siljan in the county of Kopparberg in Svealand in mid-Sweden also belong to this quintile.

Figure 2 illustrates that the municipalities in the second quintile with the second strongest religious tradition are situated in the northernmost counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten, in the county of Kopparberg and in the southwest of Sweden in the counties of Skaraborg, Älvsborg, Halland, Kronoberg, Kalmar, Östergötland and northern Scania.

Figure 3 shows that the municipalities in the third, "medium traditionalist", quintile are rather unsystematically scattered over the whole country.

Finally, the fourth and fifth quintiles are observed in western Västerbotten, in the counties of Jämtland, Västernorrland and Gävleborg in northern Sweden, in the counties Värmland, Örebro, Västmanland, Uppsala, Stockholm and Södermanland in the middle of Sweden, and in Scania in the southernmost part of Sweden.




Figure 1–4. Municipalities divided into quintiles according to proportion of the population that attended morning service in the Swedish Lutheran State Church on Sundays in 1970–1998.


The geographic pattern of electoral support for the Conservative party 1921–1998

In the following, the relative strength of the Conservative (Moderate) party in the municipalities are compared to the national average as a quotient. If the party acquires 25 % of the votes in a particular municipality and the national average is 20 % of the votes for the party, then the quotient is $25/20 = 1.25$. This means that the party is 25 % stronger in that municipality compared to the national average.

Figure 5 shows that the Conservative party had two principal strongholds in the national election to the second chamber of the Riksdag in 1921. One of these strongholds was the vast majority of all the constituencies in Götaland in the south and southwest of Sweden, i.e. the vast majority of municipalities in the counties of Gothenburg and Bohus, Halland, Älvsborg (especially the southern part of the county of Älvsborg), Skaraborg, Kalmar, Blekinge and most of the counties of Östergötland and Jönköping, with the exception of Scania in the southernmost part of Sweden. The second major stronghold was the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten in the northernmost part of Sweden, especially the coastland from Umeå and Luleå to Haparanda, and the municipalities in Tornedalen. It should be noted that these two major strongholds almost completely coincide with the most religiously traditionalist areas in the previous section of this article. A few municipalities around Stockholm were also stronger in the electoral support for the Conservative party than the national average in this election (25.8 %).

Figure 6 shows that the pattern of 1921 had become somewhat eroded in 1948, but still remained principally the same. The municipalities in the counties of Gothenburg and Bohus, Halland, southern Älvsborg, Skaraborg, Kronoberg and Kalmar, and parts of the counties of Blekinge and Östergötland still remained above the national average in this national election to the second chamber of the Riksdag. In the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten in northern Sweden fewer municipalities remained above the national average in electoral support for the Conservative party than in 1921. In a few municipalities in the Stockholm area and in Scania the electorate also voted for the Conservative party to a higher extent than the national average in 1948 (12.3 %).

Figure 7 shows that in the first election to the new one chamber Riksdag in 1970 the former major stronghold in the electoral support for the Moderate (Conservative) party in the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten in the northernmost part of Sweden had completely disappeared. The major stronghold in the south of Sweden remained, but had been somewhat eroded compared to the election in 1948. A big number of municipalities in the counties of Gothenburg and Bohus, Älvsborg (especially the southern part), Skaraborg, Kronoberg and Kalmar, and some municipalities in the counties of Jönköping and Östergötland still supported the Moderate (Conservative) party to a higher extent than the national average (11.5 %). However, the electoral support for the party had now grown in other municipalities to the extent that a greater



Figures 5–8. Electoral strongholds (proportion of votes above national average) for the Conservative (Moderate) Party in the elections to the Riksdag in 1921 (national average 25.8 %, 1948 (12.3 %), 1970 (11.5 %) and 1998 (22.9 %).

number of municipalities in the counties of Stockholm, Uppsala, and in Scania now supported the party.

Finally, in figure 8 the geographic patterns of above average electoral support for the Moderate (Conservative) party in 1921 and 1948 are completely erased from the political map of Sweden in the election of 1998. Almost nothing remains of the two major strongholds of the elections of 1921 and 1948, only a few scattered municipalities in the former major stronghold of the south. Instead, the counties of Stockholm, Uppsala, eastern Västmanland, and the northeast of Södermanland contain many municipalities that are above the national average result of the party (22.9 %). Most of the municipalities in Scania were also above the national average of the party in the national election of 1998, making this the second major stronghold besides the Stockholm area in 1998.

The quintile of municipalities with the strongest degree of religious tradition within the Swedish Lutheran State Church during the period 1970–1980 almost completely overlap the stronghold municipalities of the Conservative (Moderate) party in 1921 and 1948. Table 1 shows that the the median, upper quartile and lower quartile values of relative strength of electoral support for the party have been gradually weakened during the 1921–1998 period. The upper quartile value of relative strength in electoral support for the party in this quintile with the highest degree of religious tradition declined during the whole study period from 1.90 in 1921 to 0.95 in 1998, the median value declined from 1.52 in 1921 to 0.81 in 1998, and the lower quartile value of electoral support declined from 0.92 in 1921 to 0.75 in 1998.

Table 2 shows that in the second strongest quintile of municipalities regarding religious traditionalism, the upper quartile limit value of relative strength in the electoral support for the Conservative party also continuously decreased

Table 1. Relative strength for the Conservative (Moderate) Party (upper quartile limit, median and lower quartile limit) compared to the national average in the quintile of municipalities with the highest level of religious traditionalism.

Year	Upper quartile limit	Median	Lower quartile limit
1921	1.90	1.52	0.92
1928	1.68	1.35	0.95
1940	1.45	1.18	0.86
1948	1.46	1.13	0.90
1958	1.24	0.98	0.82
1970	1.25	1.08	0.78
1973	1.09	0.92	0.74
1976	1.05	0.90	0.72
1979	0.98	0.88	0.76
1982	0.98	0.86	0.75
1985	0.97	0.88	0.69
1988	0.91	0.82	0.64
1991	0.91	0.79	0.63
1994	0.95	0.81	0.65
1998	0.90	0.78	0.63

Table 2. Relative strength for the Conservative (Moderate) Party (upper quartile limit, median and lower quartile limit) compared to the national average in the quintile of municipalities with the second highest level of religious traditionalism.

Year	Upper quartile limit	Median	Lower quartile limit
1921	1.41	1.19	0.75
1928	1.40	1.15	0.83
1940	1.18	0.92	0.64
1948	1.24	1.00	0.70
1958	1.20	0.99	0.77
1970	1.21	0.96	0.76
1973	1.07	0.94	0.70
1976	1.09	0.95	0.68
1979	1.11	0.96	0.69
1982	1.09	0.92	0.66
1985	1.08	0.94	0.77
1988	1.05	0.88	0.71
1991	1.06	0.88	0.68
1994	1.09	0.89	0.71
1998	1.04	0.84	0.69

compared to the national average during the period 1921–1998 from 1.41 in 1921 to 1.04 in 1998. The median value among these municipalities in this quintile also decreased from 1.19 in 1921 to 0.88 in 1998, and the lower quartile limit value from 0.75 in 1921 to 0.70 in 1998.

Table 3 shows that in the third quintile with a medium level of religious traditionalism, the upper quartile limit of relative strength in the support for the Conservative party decreased from 1.24 in 1921 to 0.95 in 1998. On the other hand, the median value in this quintile remained almost unaltered during the whole 1921–1998 period, and no difference between 1921 (0.81) and 1998

Table 3. Relative strength for the Conservative (Moderate) Party (upper quartile limit, median and lower quartile limit) compared to the national average in the quintile of municipalities with the medium level of religious traditionalism.

Year	Upper quartile limit	Median	Lower quartile limit
1921	1.24	0.81	0.54
1928	1.09	0.75	0.60
1940	1.00	0.81	0.53
1948	1.06	0.80	0.59
1958	1.10	0.89	0.65
1970	1.09	0.87	0.56
1973	0.91	0.77	0.58
1976	0.97	0.78	0.59
1979	1.03	0.79	0.60
1982	1.04	0.81	0.65
1985	1.03	0.82	0.65
1988	0.97	0.76	0.60
1991	0.91	0.78	0.64
1994	0.95	0.78	0.64
1998	0.93	0.73	0.67

Table 4. Relative strength for the Conservative (Moderate) Party (upper quartile limit, median and lower quartile limit) compared to the national average in the quintile of municipalities with the second lowest and lowest levels of religious traditionalism.

Year	Upper quartile limit	Median	Lower quartile limit
1921	0.90	0.64	0.41
1928	0.91	0.66	0.49
1940	0.90	0.70	0.46
1948	0.89	0.64	0.46
1958	0.93	0.71	0.53
1970	0.98	0.69	0.49
1973	0.97	0.68	0.47
1976	1.06	0.71	0.46
1979	1.09	0.76	0.47
1982	1.09	0.79	0.52
1985	1.14	0.77	0.55
1988	1.16	0.73	0.50
1991	1.17	0.77	0.54
1994	1.12	0.76	0.53
1998	1.12	0.76	0.56

(0.79) could be observed. A third pattern could be observed for the lower quartile limit of relative strength in the electoral support for the Conservative party within this medium quintile of religious traditionalism, because it increased during the period from 0.54 in 1921 to 0.65 in 1998.

Table 4 shows that in the aggregate of the fourth and the fifth quintiles of religious traditionalism (lowest level of religious traditionalism) among the municipalities, the relative strength of the electoral support for the Conservative party increased throughout the whole spectrum of relative results. The upper quartile limit value of relative strength in electoral support increased from a relative strength of the party compared to the national average from 0.90 in 1921 to 1.15 in 1998, the median value from 0.64 in 1921 to 0.76 in 1998, and the lower quartile limit value from 0.41 in 1921 to 0.53 in 1998.

Finally, table 5 shows the five quintiles of religious traditionalism regarding the median values of relative strength of the electoral support for the Conservative party throughout the period 1921–1998. The quintile with the highest degree of religious traditionalism had the highest median value in 1921, the next quintile with the second highest degree of religious traditionalism the second strongest median value of relative strength of the electoral support, and so on in a highly coherent pattern of ordinally decreasing median values. The pattern of convergence of the median values of the quintiles is obvious. Hardly any differences between the quintiles of religious traditionalism regarding the median strength of the electoral support for the party compared to the national average remained in the 1980s and in the 1990s.

The observed patterns could of course theoretically be due to other social and economic changes in the different quintiles of municipalities analysed in this investigation. However, it can be observed from e.g. table 5 regarding the development of the median values of party strength that one major leap in the process of evening out of the differences occurred during the 1970–1982 pe-

Table 5. Relative strength for the Conservative (Moderate) Party (median) compared to the national average in each of the quintiles of municipalities according to religious traditionalism.

Year	Highest quintile of religious traditionalism	Second highest quintile	Medium quintile	Two lowest quintiles
1921	1.52	1.19	0.81	0.64
1928	1.35	1.15	0.75	0.66
1940	1.18	0.92	0.81	0.70
1948	1.13	1.00	0.80	0.64
1958	0.98	0.99	0.89	0.71
1970	1.08	0.96	0.87	0.69
1973	0.92	0.94	0.77	0.68
1976	0.90	0.95	0.78	0.71
1979	0.88	0.96	0.79	0.76
1982	0.86	0.92	0.81	0.79
1985	0.88	0.94	0.82	0.77
1988	0.82	0.88	0.76	0.73
1991	0.79	0.88	0.78	0.77
1994	0.81	0.89	0.78	0.76
1998	0.78	0.84	0.73	0.76

riod. Johansson and Schmidt drew the following conclusion regarding the increase in the support for the Moderate (Conservative) party during the period 1973–1982:

The biggest increase for the Moderate party can be localised to the commuter municipalities with increasing population and a stable non-socialist tradition (Johansson and Schmidt 1983, p. 34).

The decline in the relative strength of the party may thus hypothetically have been due to low population growth as a less benevolent determinant for the electoral support of the party.

However, the empirical evidence does not seem to support this notion. Table 6 shows that the population change in the first quintile of municipalities with the highest degree of religious traditionalism had a higher proportion (30 %) of municipalities with a large increase in the population (10 % or more) during the period 1971–1981 than all the other quintiles. Correspondingly, the proportion of municipalities with a decrease (< 0 %) in the population during the 1971–1981 period was lowest in the first quintile group with the highest degree

Table 6. Different rates of population growth 1971–1981 in the municipalities (%) within each quintile of municipalities according to religious tradition (Johansson 1982).

Quintiles of religious tradition	Population growth 1971–1981.			Sum
	>10 %	0–10 %	< 0 %	
Highest	30 %	42 %	28 %	100 %
Second highest	24 %	43 %	33 %	100 %
Medium	28 %	40 %	32 %	100 %
Lowest two quintiles	27 %	36 %	37 %	100 %

of religious traditionalism. It was in fact lower than in any other quintile group of municipalities. The population change in the first quintile group with the highest degree of religious traditionalism had the largest proportion of municipalities with a strong increase in the population and the lowest proportion of municipalities with a decrease in the population, which means that this social and economic factor cannot explain the decrease in the relative strength of the Moderate (Conservative) party in this quintile group during the 1971–1981 period.

The decreasing variation between the median values in table 5 could also hypothetically be explained by a decrease in the statistical variation expressed as the standard deviation (SD) of the party strength during the 1921–1998 period. However, although the standard deviation in the relative strength of the electoral support for the party decreased during the whole 1921–1998 period from 0.54 in 1921 to 0.34 in 1998, and from 0.42 in 1970 to 0.36 in 1982, this decrease in standard deviation is not at all sufficient to explain the large decrease in variation of the median values of the quintile groups that are ordinarily ranked according to the degree of religious traditionalism.¹

In conclusion, neither changes in the social and economic structure within or among the municipalities, nor a general decrease in the standard deviation in the relative strength of electoral support for the Conservative (Moderate) party can explain the decreasing differences and the convergence of the relative strength of the electoral support for the Conservative (Moderate) party during the 1921–1998 period. The hypothesis concerning a change in the geographic area variations in the electoral support for the Conservative (Moderate) party that is caused by a change in the religious dimension of the electoral support for the party thus seems highly plausible.

Discussion

The geographic pattern of the strength of the electoral support for the Conservative (Moderate) party in Sweden has been largely transformed during the twentieth century by a long-term trend. This secular trend in the geographic pattern of electoral support is closely associated with the process of secularisation and liberalisation of the electorate of the party that has been even more profound than the secularisation and liberalisation of the general Swedish electorate. Formerly the geographic strongholds of the party were concentrated to the northernmost counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten, where the Laestadian revival movement was prominent within the Swedish Lutheran State Church in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and in the south and southwest of Sweden (with the exception of most municipalities in Scania), where the Schartauan revival movement also was prominent within the Swedish Lutheran State Church. Today the strongholds of the party are concentrated to the most urbanised and modern areas of Sweden, the Stockholm region, Scania and Gothenburg. This transformation from a religious conservative to a more modernist, secularised and urbanised electoral support observed at both the geographic area and individual level of analysis has also taken place within the

party leadership and among the politicians of the party, a process that has been described by Jan Hylén in "Fosterlandet främst?" (1991).

Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, the general modern view that man's behaviour is motivated almost solely by economic motives, i.e. "homo economicus", may be questioned. The Swedish professor of economic history, Eli F. Heckscher, made the following statement concerning economic as opposed to other determinants in the study of the Medieval ages:

It has to be confessed, that idealistic motives dominated all aspects of society during the peak days of influence of the Catholic Church ... it is misleading to emphasise for instance the economic preconditions of the crusades – in fact, the economic motives are emphasised most strongly concerning a period when they were of least importance (Heckscher 1904, p.182).

It may be argued that the socioeconomic model still is of interest in this paper, since the process of secularisation and even the split into different denominations are closely associated with the economic and social development of society. However, the perceptions of the voters and their motives are the focus of interest here.

Second, both short- and long-term processes should be taken into consideration when human behaviour, e.g. voting behaviour, is studied. One example is Göran Gustafsson's "Partistyrka och partistyrkeförskjutningar" (1974) that investigates the residuals of the geographic area patterns in the Swedish elections of the 1960s (1960–1970) that cannot be explained by the social and economic composition of the populations within the areas. The changes in the patterns of relative strength for the Conservative (Moderate) party are very small for the Conservative (Moderate) party during this period, according to Gustafsson:

For the Conservatives the change patterns are almost entirely and along both dimensions of strength such that the transition rates cannot have been according to "the transition model"; the levelling of regional differences is not as evident for this party as for the other bourgeois parties (Gustafsson 1974, pp. 293f.).

Gustafsson's results and conclusions concerning the 1960–1970 period are completely correct from both the statistical and political science point of view. However, he seems to have studied a time period, the 1960s, that constitutes maybe the only exception to the evening out patterns observed for the whole 1921–1998 period in this article. Furthermore, the political strategists within the Conservative party during the 1930s did not either comprehend the secular trend described in this article that was already evident in this decade:

For the Swedish Right the 1930s was a difficult time period. The headwind was hard and stubborn. In every election the representation in the Riksdag was weakened. Among the Conservatives this was called the "eternal retreat". The setbacks felt even more bitter since nothing was spared in the efforts to make the propaganda of the party more efficient and personal (Anderson 1956, p. 336).

It seems to be evident that the efforts to propagate for an increasingly more capitalist and liberal political program must have made it harder to retain the slowly eroding traditionalist electorate of the party.

Third, the secularisation process means that the size and importance of the bourgeois, non-socialist electorate has been eroded and weakened. This may be one explanation for the weak support for the non-socialist parties in Sweden

during recent decades (with the exception of the election to the Riksdag in 1991). This phenomenon has been observed to an even greater extent in other countries, e.g. France:

Entre 1945 et 1988, d'une élection à l'autre, la droite modérée a beaucoup reculé. Aujourd'hui, elle n'est plus majoritaire dans aucun département (Ysmal 1993, pp. 118f.).

Some specific areas for further research may also be derived from the results of this article. First, the breakthrough of the Agrarian Party on the electoral arena during the 1910s and 1920s was geographically rather uneven and occurred at different points in time. The breakthrough came almost immediately in the counties of Malmöhus and Gotland, two counties that were weaker in religious tradition, while the Conservative (Moderate) party retained its strongholds in the countryside in for instance the counties of Älvsborg (especially the southern part), Gothenburg and Bohus, Kronoberg and Kalmar for very long periods, counties that were very strong in religious tradition within the Swedish Lutheran State Church throughout the twentieth century. Second, even the geographical patterns of the Social Democratic and Communist parties may be studied in the same way as I have investigated the Conservative (Moderate) party in this article. In the case of the Social Democrats and the Communists the hypothesis would be the completely opposite: the recruitment of party members and voters for these two secularised socialist parties would probably have been hindered by a strong religious tradition within the Swedish Lutheran State Church.

One of the most important results of the profound secularisation and liberalisation of the Conservative (Moderate) party is that the struggle between those who defended traditional society and those who wanted to change society in an individualist, modernist, liberal and secularised direction has been completely won by the modernists. The foundations of traditional society were the beliefs in Christian religion, the Church, the traditional authorities and the traditional family. Traditional society entailed only little room for the freedom of the individual, and the room for self-fulfillment was limited. Now society is permeated by individualism and a modern commercial materialism. This development seems to be in accordance with the ideology of the new political and commercial elites:

The elites' attitude to religion ranges from indifference to active hostility (Lasch 1995, p. 215).

However, the modern commercial and political elites have not rebuilt any tenable norm or ethical system of their own.

Postmodernism repudiates much of what modernism stands for, but it is still rooted in the modernist ideal of individuals that have made themselves free from conventions, built their own personalities and live their own lives (as Oscar Wilde would have said) as if life was a piece of art (Ibid, p. 190).

The Moderate party is now a conformist part of this modernist liberal, secularised and individualist society both at the ideological, party leadership, politician and voter levels.

Note

1. The standard deviation (SD) is not a perfect and optimal measure of the degree of variation, since the distribution of the values of relative strength of electoral support is not strictly Gaussian. However it is an acceptable and reasonable approximation.

References

- Albinsson, P, 1986. *Skiftningar i blått. Förändringar i Moderata Samlingspartiets riksortsorganisation 1960–1985*. Lund: Lund Political studies 46.
- Anderson, I, 1956. *Arvid Lindman och hans tid*. Stockholm: Norstedts.
- Andersson, P, 1993. *Sveriges kommunindelning 1866–1993*. Mjölby: Bokförlaget DRAKING.
- Aronsson, T, 1990. *Konservatism och demokrati. En rekonstruktion av fem svenska högerledares styrelsedoktriner*. Stockholm: Norstedts.
- Back, P-E, Berglund, S, 1978. *Det svenska partiväsendet*. Stockholm: AWE/Gebbers.
- Berglund, S, Hallin, B, Wörlund, I, 1986. "Politisk tradition. En studie i oförklarad varians" in *Svensk partiregionalism*. (Eds.) Berglund, S, Dellenbrant, J Å. Malmö: Liber Förlag.
- Boudon, R, 1989. *The analysis of ideology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brilioth, Y, 1946. *Svensk kyrkokunskap*. Andra reviderade upplagan. Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag.
- Carlsson, G, 1963. Partistyrkeförskjutningar som tillväxtprocesser. *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 66: 172–213.
- Carlsson, J, 1990. *Region och religion*. Lund: Lund University Press.
- Carlsson, S, Rosén, J, 1980. *Svensk historia. Del 2*. Stockholm: Esselte Studium.
- Cotteret, J-M, Émeri, C, 1983. *Les Systèmes Électoraux*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Di Palma, G, 1991. Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society. Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe. *World Politics* 44: 49–80.
- Elvander, N, 1980. *Skandinavisk arbetarrörelse*. Stockholm: Liber Förlag.
- Gustafsson, B, 1957. *Svensk kyrkogeografi*. Lund: Gleerup.
- Gustafsson, B, 1965. "Det religiösa livet" in *Svensk samhällsstruktur i sociologisk belysning*. (Ed.) Dahlström, B. Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget/Norstedts.
- Gustafsson, B, 1988. *Den tysta revolutionen. Det lokala välfärdssamhällets framväxt. Exemplet Örebro 1945–1982*. Stockholm: Gidlunds.
- Gustafsson, G, 1974. *Partistyrka och partistyrkeförskjutningar. Förändringar i svenskt väljarbeteende under 1960-talet belysta genom data på kommunnivå*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Habermas, J, 1970. *Towards a Rational Society*. London: Heineman.
- Heckscher, E F, 1904. Ekonomisk historia. Några antydningar. *Historisk Tidskrift*: 167–198.
- Holmberg, S, 1981. *Svenska väljare*. Stockholm: Liber Förlag.
- Holmberg, S, Gilljam, M, 1987. *Väljare och val i Sverige*. Stockholm: Bonniers.
- Hylén, J, 1991. *Fosterlandet främst? Konservatism och liberalism inom Högerpartiet 1904–1985*. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridikförlag.
- Janson, C-G, 1961. *Mandattdelning och regional röstfördelning*. Stockholm (Thesis).
- Johansson, L, 1982. *Kommunal servicevariation*. Rapport från Kommunaldemokratiska forskningsgruppen. Kommunaldemokratiska kommittén, Ds Kn 1982: 2.
- Johansson, L, Schmidt, S, 1983. *Stabilitet, variation och förnyelse. Partipolitisk struktur i kommunerna 1973–1982*. Lund: Kommunfakta förlag.
- Kirk, R, 1982. *The Portable Conservative Reader*. Harmondsworth and New York: Penguin Books.
- Lasch, C, 1995. *The Revolt of the Elites—and the Betrayal of Democracy*. New York: Norton.
- Lewin, L, 1972. *The Swedish Electorate 1887–1968*. Stockholm. Almqvist och Wicksell.
- Lijphart, A, 1974. "The Netherlands: Continuity and Change in Voting Behaviour" in *Electoral Behaviour. A Comparative Handbook*. (Ed.) Rose, R. London: Collier-MacMillan Publishers.

- Lindström, M, 1997. Tage Lindbom och konservatismen. *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 100: 145–175.
- Lindström, M, 2000. The Ideology of the Swedish Conservative (Moderate) Party: An Interpretation of the Political Science Debate of the Early 1990s. *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 103: 329–343.
- Lipset, S M, Rokkan, S, 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives*. London: Collier MacMillan.
- Ljunggren, S-B, 1992. *Folkhemskapitalismen. Högers programutveckling under efterkrigstiden*. Stockholm: Tiden.
- Lundman, B, 1942. *Sveriges religiösa geografi*. Lund: Gleerups.
- Lundkvist, L, 1974. *Politik, nykterhet och reformer*. Uppsala: Uppsala universitet.
- Lövgren, N, 1912. "Gudstjänstlif och församlingsvärd" in *Vår kyrka. Från början af tjugonde århundradet. Periodvis skildrad. Tiden 1901–1910*. Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans centralråd för evangelisation och församlingsarbete.
- Malmstedt G, 1994. *Helgdagsreduktionen. Övergången från ett medeltida till ett modernt år i Sverige 1500–1800*. Göteborg: Historiska institutionen.
- McClellan, D, 1986. *Ideology*. Stony Stratford: Open University Press.
- Oskarsson, M, 1990. "Klassröstning på reträtt" in *Rött Blått Grönt*. (Ed:s) Gilljam, M, Holmberg, S. Stockholm: Bonniers.
- Pettersson, T, 1988. *Det kyrkliga livets utveckling 1975–1986*. Uppsala: Religionssociologiska institutet, Religion och Samhälle: 5.
- Przeworski, A, Sprague, J, 1986. *Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ricknell, L, 1976. *Politiska regioner. Studier i regionaliseringsproblematik*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen (Thesis).
- Rundgren, V, 1897. *Statistiska studier rörande Svenska kyrkan*. Örebro.
- Rydenfelt, S, 1954. *Kommunismen i Sverige*. Lund: Gleerups.
- Sartori, G, 1976. *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schwartz, S, 1994. The Fallacy of the Ecological Fallacy: The Potential Misuse of a Concept and its Consequences. *American Journal of Public Health* 84: 819–824.
- Särilvik, B, 1965. *Party Politics and Electoral Opinion Formation: A Study of Issues in Swedish Politics 1956–1960*. Göteborg: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen.
- Särilvik, B, 1969. *Voting Behaviour in Shifting "Election Winds". An Overview of the Swedish Elections 1964–1968*. Göteborg: Scandinavian Political Studies.
- Särilvik, B, 1974. "SWEDEN: The Social Bases of the Parties in a Developmental Perspective" in *Electoral Behavior. A Comparative Handbook*. (Ed.) Rose, R. London: Collier MacMillan Publishers.
- Taylor, P, 1989. *Political Geography*. New York: Longman Scientific and Technical.
- von Sydow, B, 1989. *Vägen till enkammarriksdagen. Demokratisk förfatningspolitik i Sverige 1944–1968*. Stockholm: Tidens Förlag.
- Wörlund, I, 1986. "Folkpartiet i Västerbotten. En studie av ett liberalt styrkefäste" in *Svensk partiregionalism*. (Eds.) Berglund, S, Dellenbrant, J Å. Malmö: Liber Förlag.
- Ysmal, C, 1993. "Où sont passés les électeurs de droite?" in *L'Histoire, Special. La droite 1789–1993. Les hommes, les idées, les réseaux*. Pas 3.

Public Statistics:

- Riksdagsmannavalen 1921–1968 (SCB).
Allmänna valen 1970–1998. Del 1 (SCB).
Allmänna valen 1994. Del 3. Specialundersökningar (SCB).

Personal Communication:

- Personal communication on the telephone with vicar Jan Carlsson in August and December 1996, and with professor Göran Gustafsson in August 1996 and January 1997.