

Jag vill tro att detta skulle vara ett resultat av betydelse. Dessa tjänstemän i de centrala myndigheterna har större betydelse än de flesta andra (t.ex. i ett urval som innehåller alla Sveriges kommuner, men också befattningshavare längre ned i de statliga myndigheterna).

Det skulle då också gå att antyda en mera logisk länk mellan läget i tjänstemannavärlden 1999 och det som försvarsmakten resp. ÖCB redovisar till statsmakterna 2001. De centralt verksamma tjänstemännen, särskilt i försvarsmaktens högkvarter, implementerade mera. (Själva ÖCB som myndighet är däremot ett exempel på motsatsen.)

Jag vill gärna säga att jag tycker att det är intresseväckande förutsättningar som Birgitta Rydén valt att forska kring – totalförsvaret, anpassningsprincipen och implementering. Säkerhetspolitisk forskning finns det mycket av, med internationella kopplingar i ämne och metodval. Försvaret har inte alls väckt samma intresse, vilket är svårförståeligt. Doktorander och seniora forskare har mycket att hämta här, i nutid inte minst! Det kan spela stor roll för den ämnesmässiga utvecklingen och för den akademiska försanthållningen vid utbildningen i totalförsvaret och i övrigt givetvis.

Anpassningsprincipen och dess omvandling till politik och faktiskt förvaltningsarbete är synnerligen välvalt som ett akademiskt studieobjekt. Detsamma gäller ett implementeringsperspektiv. Det är dock en än mera komplex materia som författaren valt, än det som klassikerna Pressman – Wildawsky valde i sin epokgörande undersökning. (Som försvarsminister verkade jag också ha vissa svårigheter åtminstone initialt att greppa den *diskurs* som denna, som jag tyckte, välmotiverade politik kläddes i.)

Jag menar att det mest värdefulla i Birgitta Rydéns avhandling ligger i studieobjekten. När det gäller analysen av den offentliga doktrinen har jag uppfattningen att den borde ha fått ett annat slut för år 2001 på grundval av det som de centrala myndigheterna i dialogen med statsmakterna presterade.

Den stora och ambitiösa enkätundersökning som Birgitta Rydén arbetat med har varit starkt styrande för hela avhandlingen. Författaren operationaliserar fram en realistisk tolkning av hu-

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vudresultaten, dvs att ungefär hälften av handläggarna år 1999 implementerade medan resterande hälft inte implementerade; jag är mera tveksam till om den benägenheten hade så mycket med större politiska perspektiv att göra. Min gissning är att en kategorisering kring centrala respektive perifera (i organisatorisk mening) handläggare hade givit ytterligare nyanseringar av undersökningens resultatredovisning.

Björn von Sydow

HANS BLIX: *Disarming Iraq*. Pantheon Books, New York 2004.

This is a timely and important book, above all else an eminently sensible one. It provides a step-by-step account of the disarmament process in Iraq under Hans Blix, the story of how an international civil servant with considerable experience in weapons inspection left what he thought was to be his retirement, and very shortly found himself in a starring role on a global stage. Confronted with an inherently complicated and delicate situation, he did his best with skill, perseverance and honesty. For a reasonable and detached view of the inspection process as it played out in Iraq from 1999 to 2004, it would be hard to beat Blix, and this volume deserves to be considered a classic case study in international politics, worthy of inclusion in course syllabi the world over.

Blix's account is a good example of the proposition that, in international politics, it is almost impossible to separate micro forces from the macro. At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's, America was the only Superpower left standing. It enjoyed an enormous lead over potential rivals in every realm—military, economic, scientific, and cultural. By 2003, the American defense budget was greater than the next 23 countries combined. Alone among the Powers, America could and did project a massive military presence on every continent and every ocean.

This American Hegemony (not quite an empire, or was it?) coincided with the latest wave of

globalization, which had been made more extensive and rapid by the digital miracles of the Information Revolution. Paradoxically however, as America became more powerful it became simultaneously more vulnerable, inheriting most of the antagonisms generated by its predecessors, the Western colonial powers, who had dominated and humiliated non-Western dependencies for several centuries. Nowhere was this anti-Western hostility expressed in more radical forms than by a variety of fundamentalist Islamist movements who blamed the modernism, secularism and imperialism of the West for the decline of Islamic power that had been taking place since the inception of the modern period.

George W. Bush had ascended to the Presidency while professing modest, even "humble" ambitions in the field of foreign affairs and nation-building, perhaps a fitting posture for a man with limited prior acquaintance of the external world. All this was abruptly and radically changed by the terrible events of September 11, 2001. The Soviet enemy, now de-demonized by the end of Communism and the restoration of Russia, was replaced by al Qaeda as the enemy of choice. War was "declared" on terrorists, not by Congress, as the Constitution required, but by the President. Afghanistan was invaded, the Taliban government dismantled, and al Qaeda dispersed (but not eliminated). What is not quite so clear is why, at the same time as the war in Afghanistan was being waged, plans were being prepared, as early as November, 2001 to invade Iraq, if Robert Woodward's book *Plan of Attack* is to be believed. There is an abiding irony embedded in this decision to attack Iraq, since that country seems to have had few, if any, connections with Osama bin Laden and his followers.

The United Nations had devoted considerable attention to Iraq ever since the end of the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in 1991, maintaining an embargo and inspection regime of varying effectiveness during the 1990's and into the new century.

Hans Blix, who had retired as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1997, was asked by Kofi Annan to head a new body, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),

which was created by the Security Council in December, 1999 to perform inspections in Iraq. Blix provides in this volume a useful detailed summary of international inspection regimes in Iraq, including not only UNMOVIC, but its predecessor UNSCOM (UN Special Commission), as well as the relevant work of the IAEA.

He is especially informative in his discussions of the mutually dependent relationships between UN inspection agencies and various national intelligence services, notably those from the United States. The sensitive balancing act required of the UN in this "piggy-back" relationship was to be in a position to receive nationally developed intelligence e.g. putative locations of weapons sites, without becoming a mere puppet of the national agency. As we shall see, an appreciation of just how much feedback a UN inspection agency should give to the national intelligence service was crucial to the UN's reputation for independence and consequently to the legitimacy of UN decisions.

The advice that Blix gave to inspectors in the pre-war context reflects a cultural sensitivity that could be just as equally applicable to occupation authorities after a war: "Inspectors, I believe, should avoid humiliating the inspected." or "Inspectors are not occupiers and should neither shoot nor shout their way in."

As it turned out, Blix and ElBaradei, the current Director-General of the IAEA, along with their inspectors, were at the center of pivotal events leading up to the American invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Caught between a George Bush bent on invasion and an Iraqi government intent on evasion, it is difficult to see how Blix could have improved his performance under the circumstances.

For years Iraq had stonewalled all efforts of the UN to establish whether or not it still possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which it was known to be developing or to possess as late as the first Gulf War launched by the elder Bush in 1991. Matters came to a head in November, 2002, when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 in a last-ditch effort to obtain greater Iraqi cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. Impatience with the Iraqi dilata-

tory practice of "cheat and retreat" had begun to approach its outer limits.

At the same time, American impatience was already showing a pronounced inclination toward military invasion, with or without UN endorsement. It was also transparently obvious that, in the choice between invasion or inspection, American officials had very little confidence in inspection or inspectors. Vice President Dick Cheney, the *eminence grise* of the warhawks, made no effort to hide his disdain for inspectors: "A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his [Saddam's] compliance with UN resolutions."

The concept of preemptive war, or anticipatory self-defense, as it once was known by international lawyers, made its American debut in the document "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" in the Fall of 2002. It stated that "we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends..."

Blix himself was not immune from the suspicion early on, even before the inspection process had played itself out, that Bush had made up his mind to attack Iraq and remove Saddam from power. This suspicion seems to have been confirmed recently by Robert Woodward, the top investigative reporter of the *Washington Post*.

It is not easy to determine what precisely motivated this decision to invade, whether it was filial piety, or a modern Manichaeic vision of a world divided into Good and Evil, or the desire to fashion Iraq into a democratic (and pro-American) wedge with which to create a democratic Middle East, or the simple desire to assure access to Iraqi oil, or an idealistic urge to free the world of an odious despot, or to deny to terrorists any access to Iraq as a base for the spread of terrorism, or to ensure that no Iraqi WMD would fall into the hands of terrorists.

Whatever the original motivation may have been, (probably mixed, one suspects,) the proclaimed reasons just before the war were quite specific: the continued presence in Iraq of WMDs, and the presumed links between Saddam and Osama. These were the only conceiv-

able reasons for any fear that Saddam may have posed an immediate threat to the national security of the United States, and hence the only ones capable of invoking the self-defense exception to the rule in International Law (and the UN Charter) that force must not be used against the territorial integrity of another state. These were also the only grounds for war likely to have obtained the approval of the American Congress and the British House of Commons, to say nothing of the American public. One suspects that the cry for regime change would scarcely have sufficed at that time, even if it was advanced repeatedly after the war when it became gradually apparent that there were no WMDs to be found in Iraq.

Blix, Kofi Annan and a number of others at the UN strenuously attempted to continue the inspections. Although in the beginning Blix had harbored suspicions that there might actually be some undisclosed WMDs, he became less convinced as the inspections proceeded. He pleaded for more time to ascertain whether Iraq had in fact already disarmed. One curious circumstance, the Iraqi posture of avoiding active assistance to the inspectors' labors, became more and more tiresome, and in fact raised a serious question: if you have nothing to hide, why not be more cooperative?

Like most of the Europeans, Blix—as he says—did not exclude the use of force against Saddam as a last resort. Furthermore, he was well aware that the American show of force in late 2002 and early 2003 was helpful in pressuring the Iraqis to produce better cooperation and evidence of disarmament.

But the American military buildup had created a seemingly unstoppable momentum towards war, which finally came in March, 2003. Had the inspection process been a gallant but total failure? Perhaps not. In his Chapter 12, "After War: Weapons of Mass Disappearance", Blix makes a good case for a greater efficacy of the inspection process than the outbreak of war would suggest. The American government, after defeating Saddam, expended enormous resources in an effort to find the supposed caches of WMDs. He comments, with a touch of irony: "Moreover, the absence of prohibited items was most likely a

result of the regime of inspection, eradication and monitoring by the UN, supported by military pressure from the US and the UK. The UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it."

It should be apparent to all but the most hardened supporters of the American-British invasion that the intelligence on which the decision to invade had been based was in fact deeply flawed, hardly a "slam dunk", to use what Woodward claims was George Tenet's expression (borrowed from the game of basketball). It also seems reasonable to contend, as Blix does, that national intelligence services often tell their masters what they believe their masters want to hear, and the masters themselves frequently endow the intelligence with meanings that support their policy objectives. But, as Blix suggests, "Nevertheless, when the decisions are about war and peace, one would expect the governments of the most powerful and well-equipped states to have mechanisms and procedures in place to ensure some quality control over the material that experts prepare for them. One would expect that these governments themselves, at the very least, would examine the materials with critical minds and common sense."

Without so much as an "I told you so," Blix has written, in great detail, what amounts to his own vindication—not in a self-serving way, but as an account of how such decisions are and ought to be made. The book suggests to the reader a series of perceptions that seem obvious, but which often are honored by the Great Powers more in the breach than in the observance. It's enough to make Oxenstierna's renowned letter to his son look like a very contemporary piece of advice.

One perception suggested by a close reading of this book is the point that statesmen should be guided by a sense of realism when they attempt to ascertain what are essentially matters of fact, and that they should apply a well developed critical judgment in evaluating the facts on which the lives and fates of many human beings will hinge. That is perhaps no more than another way of saying that one should see what is there and not what one wants to see. One should be especially wary of a faith-based foreign policy, for faith alone is not likely to change the facts on the ground. One

should also realize that in this Age of "Spin", when even the meaning of the word "is" has been hotly disputed, truth is a matter to be ascertained and not a tool to be manipulated. Blix says it well: "—the fact that Saddam Hussein's regime was one of the most brutal that the world had seen and had long been a danger to the region did not justify any twisting of observations or uncritical attitude to evidence."

Like most legally trained persons, Blix knows how to evaluate evidence, weigh it, refuse to accept it on faith, but to take it at its probative value. Concerning a summation of one American formulation that had dismissed the inspectors' labors as irrelevant and inadequate, Blix says: "The witches exist; you are appointed to deal with these witches; testing whether there are witches is only a dilution of the witch hunt." Complicating his work from the beginning was one "curious assumption" (common to most situations where one is compelled to prove a negative), that the Iraqi failure to prove the destruction of WMDs could easily be taken by many as proof that they existed. On this point, he cites with approval a line of Donald Rumsfeld to the effect that "The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence."

One of the enduring mysteries of the inspection-invasion choice is why the Iraqi government persistently refused to extend its enthusiastic cooperation to the inspectors when there was so much at stake. Compliance would have been easy, and the alternative presented a grim prospect. Blix speculates that this exercise in foot-dragging may have been a product of pride, or that since Saddam knew that the Americans really wanted to force him out, he had very little incentive to cooperate fully with the inspectors, or that it was the product of a colossal bluff designed to make Iraq's military capabilities appear more formidable than they really were (like posting a "Beware of the Dog" sign when you don't have a dog,) or that it resulted from a simple fear of permitting the inspectors to move about freely and thereby expose conventional Iraqi military secrets.

Blix was certainly quite aware that very large matters of legitimacy, both for the UN and for the use of armed force, were riding on the suc-

cess of inspections. The crucial variable involved was the timing of any enforcement action against Iraq. As it transpired, arms replaced diplomacy prematurely – the army assembled could not be kept waiting in the desert and the war was on.

Both national and international order rest on a sometimes delicate balance of force and consent, or to express the problem philosophically, Hobbes and Locke almost always require each other's company. The heart and soul of International Law, imperfect as it may be, is the consent of nations to limit their own sovereignty, a consent given on the premise that ultimately order is preferable to chaos. One is left with the uncomfortable impression that the Lone Superpower failed to understand the importance of the Security Council in conferring legitimacy, and in the end began more and more to look and act like the Lone Ranger.

Blix's style reflects his training in legal analysis. He is judicious and patient in his examination of evidence. He comes off as an honest professional doing a good job under demanding circumstances at an important juncture in the life of nations, altogether what the French would call *un homme serieux*. His firmness belies the hawkish animadversions of "softness." He defends himself with grace, wit, and an absence of whining from the attempts that were made to discredit his efforts. In the end Blix got it right and

the world's greatest Superpower, with practically limitless resources at its disposal, did not. One is reminded, metaphorically at least, of the old French aphorism that "In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is King."

In March, 2003, the policy of containment by inspection gave way to war and regime change. The result has been, as Blix says in his summation: "A combined UN and IAEA inspection force of fewer than 200 inspectors costing perhaps \$80 million per year was pushed out and replaced by an invasion force of some 300,000 personnel costing approximately \$80 billion per year." In his concluding words, which take on an added poignancy amid the violence which persists today in Iraq, a year after the war was declared officially over, he maintains that there was another option in the Spring of 2003, even for states with a preference for immediate armed action and that was "to heed the Council's requests for more time for inspection. Support by the Security Council for preemptive armed action would have given the armed action legitimacy. Instead, a greater price was paid for this action: in the compromised legitimacy of the action, in the damaged credibility of the governments pursuing it, and in the diminished authority of the United Nations."

*Joseph B. Board*