

## The Quality of Government Institute at Göteborg University

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### I. The Quality of Government Problem – A Short Illustration

Just across the street from Virgie Airport on St Lucia—a beautiful island in the Caribbean, but also a pretty poor country with a per capita GDP around 5000 US\$—are two run down sheds from which coffee and food is served. The sheds that can easily be seen from the airport entrance, are in a really bad state. Outside, where people are supposed to eat and drink, there are no real tables or chairs, just broken stools and pallets that have been thrown over. The result of this sad outlook is that hardly any tourists become customers, although many are waiting for their planes to leave and thus have plenty of spare time. However, if you dare to use their service, you will find the local food they serve both cheap and excellent, the women running these small businesses very friendly and service minded and the location, just along the beautiful beach with a postcard view of the ocean shore, absolutely stunning. Lots of tourists travel by this airport, but hardly any of them frequent these two small places to get a cup of coffee, a snack or a meal, probably because they look so run down. Instead, most tourists go to the restaurant inside

the airport building which is quite expensive, very crowded, with no view, lousy service and serves really bad fast food.

If you ask the women who run the coffee shops why they don't make better use of their perfect location, for example by investing in a porch and putting up some chairs and tables to attract more business from the tourist crowd, they will answer in the following way. "Great idea, I've thought about it, but there are two problems. First, although I have been here for twenty years, I don't own this place of land, I'm a squatter, so I can be forced away by the police/government at any time. Secondly, if I did invest and opened a real restaurant/coffee shop, I could probably never afford to pay off the health inspectors." Further conversation reveals that the women don't know if it is at all possible to buy the land or at least get a long-term lease, and they don't know how much they would have to pay in bribes to the health inspectors. It is thus the *uncertainty* of their situation which is caused by lack of *impartiality* in the civil service that hinders them from making better use of the great resources they already have.

There are probably thousands of stories like this from poor or semi-poor countries like St Lucia. Lack of an impartial legal structure that can secure property rights and administrative/political corruption hinders many "micro business people" from making investments that in all likelihood would vastly improve their (and their country's) economic situation (de Soto 2001).

### II. The General Research Theme

This little story serves to highlight a strong recent tenet within comparative political economy: that it is not necessarily

the lack of entrepreneurship or resources in human or physical capital that hinders economic development, but the low quality of government institutions that exercise and implement laws and policies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Clague et al. 1999; Easterly 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003; Hall and Jones 1999; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Rose-Ackerman & Kornai 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). Not being able to predict government action when it reaches you and the lack of accurate information about what government bureaucrats can and cannot do to you are central ingredients in this problem (cf. Evans 2005; Lange 2005). The rapid growth in research on “good governance” and the quality of government institutions in recent years have however not only been concerned with growth and economic development. The “quality of government” factor has also been argued to have substantial effects on a number of important non-economic phenomena, both at the individual level—such as subjective happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Helliwell 2003) and citizen support for government (Anderson and Tverdova 2003)—and at the level of society—such as the incidence of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and democratic stability (Rose and Shin 2001).

The common focus for this research program is centered on this problem of *Quality of Government* (QoG). The central idea is that trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and reasonably competent government institutions is an important, if not the most important, asset for countries, regions and also local governments (de Soto 2001; Berenztein 1996; Kaufmann 2003). Without high quality government institutions, existing resour-

es in physical as well as in human capital will be difficult or even impossible to realize. The effectiveness and sustainability of government initiatives in many areas such as economic growth, environmental protection, social welfare, research and education are all dependent on the existence of government institutions of a reasonably high quality. One central reason for this is that popular support for policies is to a large extent determined by how citizens perceive the quality of the institutions responsible for implementing the programs (Mettler & Soss 2004; cf. Holmberg 1997, Pierre 2000). An example from Latin America is the following statement by a well-informed expert on economic development:

I don't think there is any more vital issue in Latin America right now. . . . It's a vicious cycle that is very hard to break. People don't want to pay taxes because they say government doesn't deliver services, but government institutions aren't going to perform any better until they have resources, which they obtain when people pay their taxes (Rother 1999)

Thus, citizens/voters will refrain from supporting public policies that they either themselves stand to gain from or that they believe are good for their societies because they distrust the government institutions that will be responsible for implementing the policies. It is thus distrust of government capacity, not opposition to the policies as such, that becomes the problem. This focus on the quality of government institutions is also different from some previous studies that points at long-term cultural traits related to the importance of social capital (Putnam 1993). The reason is that social capital, defined as norms about reciprocity and generalized trust in other people, seems to be deter-

mined by the quality of government institutions rather than the other way around (Rothstein and Stolle 2003, Rothstein 2005).

The magnitude of the QoG problem can be illustrated by the following example. According to a conservative estimation by the World Health Organization, 1.3 billion people lack access to sufficient quantities safe water, and nearly 3 billion people are without adequate sanitation. Consequently, 80 percent of all illnesses in the developing world are the result of waterborne diseases. A conservative estimation is that 10.000 people die every day from water and sanitation related illnesses (SIDA 2004, Bosch 2002:273, Cunningham & Saigo 2001:433, Postel 1997:221). This enormous problem is by an increasing number of experts in the area no longer seen as an engineering problem, that is, it is not lack of technical solutions (dams, etc.) or natural supply of clean water that is the main problem. Instead, the problem lies in dysfunctional administrative institutions. More precisely, the problem is seen as caused by lack of adequate institutions for maintenance, pricing and distribution of rights to land and water (Burns & Meinzen-Dick 2000:15, Meinzen-Dick et al 2002, World Bank 2004).

The same line of reasoning can be applied to many other areas, such as treatment of HIV/AIDS and other diseases. It is not a lack of the existence of adequate medical treatment, but dysfunctional government institutions that causes the most suffering and deaths.

It is noteworthy that this interest in policies for anti-corruption and quality of government is a pretty recent phenomenon. Until the mid-1990s, it was common to think of for example corruption as either a minor problem or, in some cases, as serving to "grease" the market and thus

increase economic growth. One noteworthy article that changed this was published in 1995 by Paolo Mauro, in which she by using new available data could show that corruption had a significant negative impact on economic growth. Another change factor was the new interest for the impact of institutions in the disciplines of economy and political science (North 1990, March & Olsen 1989). A third factor was the meeting between neo-classical economics. According to Dani Rodrik, a well-known economist in these contexts, the encounter between neo-classical economics and development,

served to reveal the institutional underpinnings of market economies. A clearly delineated system of property rights, a regulatory apparatus curbing the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior, and moral hazard, a moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social cooperation, social and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts, the rule of law and clean government—these are social arrangements that economists usually take for granted, but which are conspicuous by their absence in poor countries. (Rodrik 1999:1).

It is this "taken for granted" assumption about the existence of efficient government institutions that is theoretical core of this research program. We want to stress that the QoG problem can not be defined solely as the absence of corruption. The reason is that while a high degree of corruption is clearly an antithesis to QoG, the latter encompasses more than just the absence of corruption. Many other practices that are usually not seen as corruption, such as clientilism, patronage, discrimination shall be included in. Other problems for QoG are when administrative agencies are "captured" by the interest groups as well as lack of accountability

and transparency. Nevertheless, one central motive behind this program is a critique of existing research on corruption.

To illustrate the real life importance of QoG across the globe, we intended to have a figure which we have produced from our database here. Unfortunately, the Foundation's website application system does not allow for figures, so readers will either have to use their imagination or to the QoG Institute website (<http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/research/hobbes.pdf>) to get the visual illustration. The data in the figure show the relationship between one of the most widely used indicators of QoG, government effectiveness (Kaufmann et al. 2004), and the so-called *Hobbes index* (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: ch. 10). This index is an attempt to measure how far nations have come from the state of nature, which Hobbes (in *Leviathan*, 1651) described as when life is "short, nasty, solitary, poor and brutish". To capture these life's miseries, the Hobbes index is ranged from 0 to 100 by combining cross-national indicators of the number of deaths per capita (short), the presence of civil liberties (nasty), and media communications (solitary), national income (poor), and the annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war (brutish). Life's miseries are of course determined by a number of factors, which is why the imaginary figure here only presents the relationship once a number of other potential determinants—such as GDP/capita, degree of democracy, legal origin and ethno-linguistic fractionalization—have been accounted for. Even when these variables are controlled for, government effectiveness (QoG) turns out to have a significant effect on the Hobbes index. The conclusion is that by improving the quality of the state's administrative capacity, there is

thus a substantial increase in human welfare to be gained in the world.

### III. Theoretical framework and research aims

#### The inertia of corruption and other forms of low QoG

If the quality of a country's political institutions determines its economic and social development, it is of course paramount to know what causes some countries to have better political, administrative and legal institutions than others. It is also important to understand what sort of policy advice that can be useful for countries that suffers from e.g., systemic corruption. The problem with changing levels of corruption (and other forms of low QoG) is that it seems to be a very sticky problem. In plain language, most empirical research show that "once the system gets their, it stays there". If understood in a game theoretic framework, once corruption becomes systemic and the existence of widespread corrupt practices becomes "common knowledge", we have a case of an extremely robust negative equilibrium. None of the "players" in such a game have reasons to change their strategy (to pay or demand bribes). This is so, even if they all realized that they as a collective stand to loose from ongoing corruption. First, agents at the bottom of a corrupt system, such as the "street level" tax bureaucrat, policemen or doctor, have no incentive to refrain from corrupt practices because even if they as individuals start behaving honestly, nothing will change as long as most of their colleagues do not change their behaviour. This is thus a social trap when individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality. This is probably why large public anti-corruption campaigns seem to have limited

(or even negative) effects because they establish the “common knowledge” that corrupt practices are indeed very common.

However, as shown by cases such as Singapore and Hong Kong, corruption can be successfully fought from above. Strong and determined political leaders can successfully fight corruption. One problem, at least from a normative perspective, is that both these well-known cases, while hugely successful, also comes with some bad news, namely that democracy seems not to be the cure for corruption. Neither Singapore, nor Hong Kong were democracies when their successful campaigns against corruption were launched, and they have not become democracies since. Instead, it was leaders who were isolated from public pressure and opinions that managed to install effective measures against corruption. Empirical research indicates that democracy is curvilinearly related to the level of corruption (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Sung 2004). Curvilinearity is of course not tantamount to a null-effect, but it does indicate that some democracy may at times be worse than none for curbing corruption.

In a comparative perspective, Hong Kong and Singapore are deviant cases since they have had few followers. It seems to be the case that while leaders do have the necessary means for launching successful policies against corruption, they have usually no incentive to do so for the simple reason that they are often the ones who gain most from a corrupt system. Either these gains are direct in the forms of money and power, or such leaders have come to power by making accommodations with corrupt networks whom they then are dependent on for their re-elections.

A difficult question is if measures against corruption are to be seen as part of the specific western liberal ideology or if it has a more universal standing. The first thing to say is of course the obvious, namely that there is no such thing as a country free from corruption. Even countries that score well on the different measures of corruption, such as the Nordic countries, have their fair part of corruption related scandals. Secondly, while it is true that corruption is more pervasive in most developing countries, we agree with Pardahn Bardahn that “it will be wrong to suggest that concern about public corruption is peculiarly Western. In most of the same developing countries, public opinion polls indicate that corruption is usually at the top of the list of problems cited by respondents”. If defined as a break of the principles that public institutions should be guided by the principle of impartiality, there are arguments for understanding corruption as a universal phenomenon (Kurer 2003). This conclusion is supported by several empirical studies that show that also in severely corrupt countries, the majority of citizens clearly distinguish corruption as being morally wrong even if they often, because of the structure of their situation, have to take part in corrupt practices (for an overview see Rose-Ackerman 1999:102ff).

### **The state of anti-corruption research and policy – a critique**

A society faced with the task of addressing systematic corruption and other forms of low QoG needs to ask itself two principal questions. First, what types of structural reforms are necessary in order to reduce these problems? Common suggestions are to create new or to change existing institutions in order to alter incentive

structures for taking or offering bribes. However, such institutions are not easily established and this leads to the second question, namely which type of *processes* are suitable to realize these structural reforms? Given that corrupt patterns do not dissipate easily, what obstacles, like for example institutional inertia and political opposition can be expected and how are they to be dealt with? As we will show below, previous research on corruption has mainly focused on the first, structural, question while the second one about processes, strategies and agents has to a large extent been ignored.

One case in point is William Easterly who suggests two measures to curb corruption. "First, set up quality institutions...Second, establish policies that eliminate incentives for corruption" (2001: 252). Similar suggestions have been put forward by Alence in his *Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa*, which examines how different types of political institutions affect the degree of corruption in 38 African countries. The conclusion is that a combination of electoral competition and institutional checks & balances on executive power has a negative effect on the frequency of corruption. In other words, this strategy suggests that the idea and practise of liberal democracy work counter to corruption (Alence 2004: 163). In *Seed of corruption – do market institutions matter?* Broadman and Recanatini identify that the establishment of a number of market economic institutions are key to change, among others "clear and transparent rules...and a robust competitive environment" (Broadman & Recanatini 2001: 359). Sandholtz and Koetzle, in a comparative analysis, find statistical support for their hypothesis that low levels of corruption correlate positively with the presence

of formal democratic institutions, such as individual liberties and citizen rights, and with informal institutions like democratic norms. Their idea is that formal democratic structures facilitate citizen oversight and control, and that in a culture characterized of democratic values it is against normal behaviour to act corrupt (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000: 37-39).

This list of authors that are content with establishing that institutions which are characteristic for stable democracies with a well-functioning market economy show a relationship with low levels of corruption is very long. We argue that there is an important gap in our knowledge that concerns the dynamics of possible reform processes and questions about possible motives and strategies for agents that are to change a corrupt system. As Hans Blomkvist has asserted, much of the advice emanating from work like the ones mentioned above and from organizations like the World Bank on the importance of action against corruption is based on the presumption of access to the kind of administrative praxis that seriously corrupt countries lack; that is, they presume that the desired end already exists (Blomkvist 2001).

Instead of explaining the causes of corruption, we claim that what authors with this focus on structures have produced is mostly descriptions of how the institutional systems in corrupt and non-corrupt countries differ from each other. In many cases, what is put forward are not so much explanations but descriptions of different institutional settings. In the language about causality, this could be formulated as when the dependent and independent variables are so close as to be identical to one another and that the connection between them is reciprocal rather than causal. In states, which are blessed

with an independent judiciary and a free media, it is obviously quite right that these institutions facilitate political accountability and counteracts corruption. However, in states, which on the contrary suffer from systematically corrupt structures it is likely that the causal mechanism works in the opposite direction, meaning that it is the corruption this type of institutions that are holding back a development towards democratic governance.

Another doubt regards the causal ideas underpinning most of the research on corruption. The conclusion that democratic and market economic institutions work against corruption can be considered correct, but only for countries and systems that *are not* corrupt and have not been so for a long time. In societies where corruption is systemic, it is more reasonable to turn the causal arrow around and claim that it is the corrupt structures that thwart democratic and economic reforms. In the search for universal theories on causes and solutions concerning corruption, many researchers do not recognize the inbuilt inertia of corrupt institutional systems. With the wording of Robert Harris:

...just as a predominantly non-corrupt system will self-correct to deal with corrupt individuals and the legislative or political flaws that facilitated their corruption, so will a predominantly corrupt system self-correct to maintain its corruption following a purge. (Harris 2003: 63)

Statements like “what is needed to reduce corruption is good governance” are certainly quite true but do not suffice as a foundation, neither for a causal theory nor for effective policy prescriptions. As Claus Offe has argued, questions remain on what bring countries into a vicious circle with corrupt institutions and also, in a

corrupt context: “which motives, values, and political forces would actually push forward the reform project... what are the incentives to introduce incentives designed to control corruption or to redesign opportunity structures? (ibid).

An often heard argument is that low QoG and high corruption is related to the size of the public sector. As stated in a recent paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) by Alesina and Angeletos: “a large government increases corruption and rent-seeking” (2005:18). The argument has also been put forward by Tanzi (2000) that in order to reduce corruption, is it necessary to reduce the size of government and its control over the economy and privatize. That the size of government and QoG should not be causally related should have been realized from a quick glance of the data. One finds particularly large governments in the Nordic countries but these countries are also, according to most measures, the least corrupted. That the size of government or how extensive its policies are has little or nothing to do with QoG was actually discovered in one of the first articles in this line of research published by a group of economists (La Porta et al. 1999). Using a wealth of data from between 49 and 212 countries in their search for what determines QoG, they came to the following conclusion: “Finally, we have consistently found that the better performing governments are larger and collect higher taxes. Poorly performing governments, in contrast, are smaller and collect fewer taxes.” (La Porta et al. 1999, 266). However, we cannot but point at that the economists writing this article were quick to add (in the very next sentence) that “this result does not of course imply that it is often, or ever, socially desirable to expand a government of a given

quality, but it tells us that identifying big government with bad government can be highly misleading” (ibid.).

Common for the above presented research is that it does not handle the issue of *how* the reforms against corruption are to be carried out and by *whom*. The knowledge of which types of institutional systems that co-varies with low corruption is certainly important but leaves questions about agency, strategy and sequencing unanswered. Can it, to begin with, be taken for granted that institutional systems can be transferred between countries with the same effects in the new environment? And if this would indeed be possible, is it really a straightforward business to replace old institutions with new ones? If not, what obstacles can be expected underway? In addition, what methods are suitable to overcome those obstacles? Explanations that focus on structural factors provide a comparative snapshot of which institutional environments that foster or hinder corruption, but fall short when it comes to questions of institutional inertia and how honest and efficient institutions can be constructed in an already corrupt system.

In addition, if new institutions have to be created, the question about agency becomes central. Agents at the bottom of a corrupt system have very limited possibilities to establish efficient institutions and agents at the top of a corrupt system usually do not have any incentives to do so. One can define this problem as a social dilemma of the second order, meaning that the establishment of institutions that are effective against corruption is in itself a social dilemma (Ostrom 1998). It seems as if the search for structures that co-varies with low levels of corruption has been at the expense of the attention assigned to what agents there are and which strategies

they can use. If we are to establish a thorough picture of what can become a successful reform process for increasing QoG, research should start to identify different agents' roles and interests. Essential questions are for example what groups can be expected to oppose reforms and how this resistance should be dealt with? Who are likely to support change and how can they best be involved in the struggle against corruption and other forms of dysfunctional government?

**The conclusion that follows from this line of reasoning is the need to focus research in this area more towards agency. This is why most of the sub-projects in the program have different agents in focus, such as new political parties, the entrance of women in the political process, the role of mass media, administrative reformers and international organizations.**

While Quality of Government serves as a common intellectual “focal point” for the research program, the idea is to address this problem from a variety of theoretical and methodological angles. In line with research about “creative research milieus” we are convinced that the optimal strategy for a research program like this is to strive for a relatively strict unity for the research problem, but at the same time to aim at pluralism when it comes to theoretical and methodological approaches. While the QoG problem concerns very serious real world issues, it is also very well suited for integrating the different research traditions in social sciences, such as research in political philosophy, mass opinion, the role of mass media, public policy (in many areas), public administration and political philosophy. While specific research questions and hypothesis will be dealt with in the different sub-projects below, the program will be fo-



cused on three common questions. These are

- **What Is Quality of Government?**
- **How Can Quality of Government be Achieved?**
- **What Do You Get From Quality of Government?**

#### **IV. The Quality of Government Institute 2004-2005**

The Quality of Government Institute at Göteborg University was established in 2004 as a result of a two-year research grant from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. This application is thus intended to secure the future operation of the institute along the lines laid out in our initial research proposals. The initial steps of organizing the institute have involved the following tasks.

##### **A. Building a database**

The initial grant we received from the Foundation has for the most part been used for building a database. We have been able to get funding from other sources for the continuation of this work until 2008. Nevertheless, since the database is central to the program as a whole and to several of the projects, we will briefly describe this part of the QoG Institute.

There are three major problems in relation to available data. One is validity and reliability where there are stark differences in the quality of the available data. We intend to put strong emphasis on links between the theory of QoG, the operationalization of key concepts and specific measurements. The second problem is that available data is scattered, literally, around the world. A special problem is that aggregate and individual level data

sets are usually kept separate. The most interesting aggregate data for our purposes are maintained by organizations like the World Bank, United Nations and Freedom House. Relevant micro-level data is found in large comparative data sets like the Eurobarometer, the Latinobarometer, ISSP, the World Value Survey, ESS and CSES. Merging and aggregating data from many different sources like this is a real challenge, but absolutely necessary if we want to move forward in studying causes as well as the consequences of QoG. The third problem is that most available data sets lack a time dimension: they only observe countries at one or very few points in time. An important challenge will thus be to single out and integrate data sources with longer time-series.

We want to underline that the disorganization of data is a real problem for the advancement of research within this area. This problem has also become an important entry barrier for people who want study in this field, e.g., many PhD-students. One important part of the QoG Institute is to create a generally accessible database of countries over time, where the quality of the data is highlighted and where it is made ready for easy use by scholars within as well as outside the program. At our website ([www.qog.pol.gu.se](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se)) we already make publicly available a national data set with global coverage pertaining to the year of 2002 (or the closest year available). The data set draw on a number of freely available cross-sectional data sources, including aggregated individual-level data, and contains three types of variables: WII (What It Is) variables, that is, variables pertaining to the core areas of the QoG compound (such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, and democracy); HTG (How To Get it) variables, that is, variables posited to promote the

development of QoG (such as electoral rules and forms of government); and WYG (What You Get) variables, that is, variables pertaining to some of the posited consequences of QoG (such as economic and human development, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and satisfied, trusting & confident citizens).

Among the data sets and variables that have been put together are: Governance Indicators (from the World Bank), Corruption Indices (from Transparency International), Democracy Indicators (from Freedom House and Polity, among others), Economic Indicators (e.g., from Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation), Human Rights Indicators (e.g., from Cingranelli and Richards), Bureaucratic Structure and Performance (from Evans and Rauch), Environmental Sustainability Indices (from World Economic Forum), and Aggregated Individual Level Value Indicators (from World Values Survey). The breadth and scope of these data sets indicate how useful the emerging QoG data bank ultimately will be.

We will also gather original data through the use of expert polls on perceived differences in the Quality of Government across countries. Such a poll, administered electronically, will be modelled on one of the large number of corruption perception polls in use nowadays. The idea is thus to ask policy experts within and outside different countries direct questions about for example the degree of impartiality, transparency, accountability and predictability, etc., for government institutions in different areas.

The continuation of the work to build the bank is one of the central purposes of the QoG Institute. Thus, we hope to expand this work in various directions. For one, we plan to provide a longitudinal version of the database, including both cross-

sectional and time-series information. We also plan to provide more detailed information of the respective data sources and their quality. Finally, we aim at providing the data in different data-formats, some for the use of technically specialized academics, others more readily accessible to other possible users, such as students, teachers, journalists and practitioners in the field of QoG.

### **B. International conference and seminars**

In November 2005, the QoG institute launched its first international conference in Göteborg at which twenty-five papers were presented. Participants included leading scholars from the World Bank Research Institute and several leading universities. A complete list of the participants and papers can be found at [www.qog.pol.gu.se](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se).

The Institute has a regular seminar series where the participant researchers as well as guests are invited.

### **C. Presentation of research**

Papers written by participants in the QoG Institute have been presented at international conferences such as the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Session of Workshops. Papers have also been presented at the Weiner Seminar on Inequality at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and at the Leitner Political Economy Workshop at Yale University led by Susan Rose-Ackerman. A presentation is also scheduled for March 2006 at the Workshop in Political Theory at University of Indiana at

Bloomington which is led by Elinor Ostrom.

#### **D. The Organization of the Program.**

The program will be jointly led by the professors Bo Rothstein and Sören Holmberg and is intended to last for six years. During the first three years, funding we have received from other sources will cover the costs for operating the database. The main part of the funding we seek will be directed at the eight projects which are described below. We want to underline that there will be close collaboration between the projects. Several of the post-doc researchers we intend to recruit will work with more than one of the projects. All researchers will work on the same facilities at Göteborg University and have contacts on a day-to-day basis. **The eight projects below describe the organization of the program for the first three years (the full description of these projects can be downloaded at [www.qog.pol.gu.se](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se)).**

##### **Project 1. The Definition and Normative Foundations of Quality of Government**

Principal investigators: Professor Bo Rothstein and Associate Professor Jan Teorell

##### **Project 2. The Good Media and Quality of Government**

Principal investigator: Associate Professor Henrik Oscarsson

##### **Project 3. Trust as a Prerequisite and an Effect of Quality of Government**

Principal investigator: Professor Sören Holmberg

##### **Project 4. International Organizations, Aid and Quality of Government**

Principal investigators: Dr. Monika Bauhr and Dr. Patrik Stålgren

##### **Project 5. Globalization and Risk Societies. The Role of Anti-Corruption Political Parties.**

Principal Investigator: Professor Marie Demker

##### **Project 6. Gender Equality and Quality of Government**

Principal investigator: Associate Professor Lena Wängnerud

##### **Project 7. Administrative Reform, Good Governance and Quality of Government**

Principal investigator: Professor Jon Pierre

##### **Project 8. Policy Effects of Quality of Government**

Principal investigators: Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein

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