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A Plague on Both Your Houses

How Left and Right Undermined Moral Motivation in the Swedish School System

Johan Wennström¹

Abstract

The potential for institutional arrangements such as financial incentives and other market mechanisms to undermine intrinsic, moral motivation among both “producers” and “consumers” of tax-financed welfare services is demonstrated by two new studies (Wennström 2016a; 2016b). These studies show that the promotion of NPM-like ideas by various left-wing and right-wing agents after 1968 led to the erosion of a professional ethos among Swedish teachers, and that an ill-designed school voucher reform in Sweden, implemented under the banner of NPM, has encouraged moral hazard on the part of schools. This essay presents the main findings of these studies and situates them within a broader literature on the relationship between markets and morality, the problems caused by making the logic of the market economy into a universal model for human affairs, and the potential for ideological ecumenism between the left and right.

Introduction

As the 1980s became the 1990s, the provision of public services in Sweden underwent a transformation from what it once was when the Social Democratic welfare state was at its apogee,² “a public monopoly with standardized services and very little scope for individual preferences and choice” (Millares 2015: 209), to a more market-based regime (see, e.g., Molander 2017). Sweden subsequently became one of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to have gone furthest in implementing market-oriented reforms in the public sector (Hood 1995; Bergh 2014). Thus, Sweden

1 The author is thankful to Elin Wahlborg, Magnus Henrekson and Johan Tralau for their helpful comments on this essay and to *Stiftelsen Millennium* for its support.

2 Broadly speaking, the 1960s to the 1980s (Lindvall & Rothstein 2006).

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stands out as a particularly clear example of what Christopher Hood (1991: 3) in a landmark article described as “the rise of ‘New Public Management’” (NPM).

Hood’s term—NPM—referred to an effort to correct the perceived shortcomings of the “old” public management model, both in moral terms and at a practical level, through the use of (a particular perception of) private-sector norms and techniques (Hood 1991; Dunleavy & Hood 1994). In one variant or another, this agenda became widespread among Western countries after the late 1970s. Anglo-Saxon nations such as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand became the first to adopt NPM, and other countries later followed their lead (Barzelay 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). The public sector reforms that were implemented typically included the following seven elements (Hood 1991; 1995): hands-on professional management; explicit standards and measures of performance; output controls coupled with rewards and incentives; disaggregation of units in the public sector; competition in the provision of public services; stress on private-sector styles of management practice; and discipline and parsimony in resource use. Taken together, these measures amounted to a radical “normative model for public administration and public management”, maintaining that government should adopt the values of business administration (Denhardt & Vinzant Denhardt 2000: 551).

By the early 1990s, this “striking international [trend]” (Hood 1991: 3) had decisively reached Sweden, as NPM, or NPM-like,³ measures were then being introduced in core areas of welfare provision (see, e.g., Hasselbladh 2008; Jordahl & Öhrvall 2013; Lewin 2014; Millares 2015). For example, according to Hood (1995: 98), “doctrines of ‘pay for performance’ took a strong hold” in Sweden.

Since Hood’s seminal article that established the term NPM more than 25 years ago, a large field of scholarship on the nature of NPM and its practical impact on public administration in different countries (including Sweden) has emerged (for a comprehensive review, see Christensen & Laegrid 2010). Within this field, one of the most recurring themes has been the ideological underpinning of NPM, and the almost invariable practice in the literature has been to assume that only neoliberal ideas inspired NPM reforms. An emblematic example of this paradigm is Stephen P. Osborne’s (2006: 382) labeling of NPM as “a child of neoclassical economics”. In sum, the focus has been on technical and ideological aspects of NPM, while the bulk of the literature has been blind to an arguably more important facet of the development toward NPM, namely, the moral dimension of the market-oriented reforms of the public sector.

The limited literature that exists on the ethical consequences of NPM tends to focus on how to create administrative doctrines that do not foster undesired unethical behavior in public servants, e.g., corruption (see Maesschalck

3 A term capturing measures similar to but not necessarily identified as NPM.

2004). An investigation of the impact of NPM on other ethical aspects seems to be lacking. However, two new studies offer such an analysis: “A Left/Right Convergence on the New Public Management?” (Wennström 2016a) examines the effects of NPM-like ideas on the professional ethos of Swedish teachers, and “Marketized Education: How Regulatory Failure Undermined the Swedish School System” (Wennström 2016b) explores the effects of school competition in Sweden on knowledge attainment and the perceived value of education among parents and pupils. Together, these studies demonstrate the potential for institutional arrangements such as financial incentives and other market mechanisms to undermine intrinsic, moral motivation among both “producers” and “consumers” of tax-financed welfare services.

My studies (particularly Wennström 2016a) also show from where the values and ideas that underpin NPM as a normative model for public administration might have originated. The political prehistory of NPM is an underexplored subject in the mainstream NPM literature because of the almost invariable assumption that only neoliberal ideas inspired NPM reforms. However, in line with Mats Alvesson’s and Jörgen Sandberg’s (2011) call for “assumption-challenging research”, my studies demonstrate that the antecedents of NPM date back to the 1968 movement and that both the left and the neoliberal right have contributed an ideological basis for NPM reforms in Sweden (and most likely in other countries as well).

This essay will present the main findings of my studies and situate them within a broader political science and economics literature that studies the relationship between markets and morality and analyzes the problems of making the market economy into a universal model for human affairs (e.g., Röpke 1960/1998; Sandel 2012; Nootboom 2014; Bowles 2016). As the two studies show that both the left and right have paved the way for NPM reforms in Sweden, this essay will also situate their findings within a body of literature related to the left–right political spectrum in political science.

Markets and Morality

It has been the assumption of many political scientists that “behavior is motivated solely or predominantly by the rational maximization of self-interest” (Arnhart 2012: 222; see also Lundquist 2010). In similar fashion, the acquisitive and self-interested “economic man” represented for many decades the dominant view of human behavior in economics (Bhidé 2010; Hodgson 2013; Nootboom 2014). With Gary Becker as the pioneer, economists commonly used this abstraction as a universal explanation for all human activity. Becker himself (1964; 1976) applied it, for example, to marriage, family relations, and education. Likewise, Gordon Tullock (1976) found the concept of “economic man” pertinent to understanding the motivation of public servants. This focus

on self-interestedness—partly influenced by discussions in biology about how to explain evolution, particularly Richard Dawkins’s (1976) notion of “the selfish gene” (see Gowdy & Seidl 2004)—excluded the issue of morality from the understanding of human action in economics (Hodgson 2013), and increasingly in other social sciences as well.

However, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the study of morality, and as scholars from a variety of fields, including economics and political science, have demonstrated, people “are not just interested in absolute gains” (Hibbing & Alford 2004: 63). Most individuals in fact do not behave as “economic man”, but have strong moral and social preferences, as revealed by a host of studies involving the Prisoners’ Dilemma and other types of experimental scenarios (see e.g., Hibbing & Alford 2004; Bowles 2016). Indeed, people have both the ability and the inclination to suppress selfish behavior in order to form complex societies that presuppose human cooperation (Haidt et al. 2008). They also strive for meaning and satisfaction in their work and their endeavors, which have little to do with shortsighted material gain (Csíkszentmihályi 1992). And public servants—to stay with the example of Tullock (1976)—are often willing to put service to others before sheer self-gain because of an intensely felt “sense of mission” (Wilson 2000) and a commitment to a “professional ethos” (Reeder 2006). Such moral sentiments are neither skin-deep nor culturally subjective. Rather, they are biologically based and universal (Haidt 2012),⁴ and have arguably played a significant role in the course of human evolution (Hodgson 2013).

Yet, despite what has been established about the limits of self-interest, it is recognized in the literature on morality and ethics that moral sentiment can be both strengthened and undermined by institutional arrangements (MacIntyre 1981; Sellman 2011).⁵ The German economist Wilhelm Röpke was an early observer of this phenomenon. While emphasizing the benefits of the market economy, he also noted that “[m]arket and competition are far from generating their moral prerequisites autonomously” (Röpke 1960/1998: 126). In fact, Röpke suggested that markets may have a morally adverse effect on individuals and society, and thus argued for “a sound political and moral framework” (Röpke 1942/1992: 181) to constrain them. He also warned of allowing the standards of the market to spread to traditionally nonmarket activities and realms, as he believed them to be morally corrosive (Röpke 1960/1998).

Röpke’s views anticipated later research findings. There is now a large number of studies offering empirical evidence in support of the existence of “crowding out” (see Frey & Jegen 2001), as the debilitating effect on morality of market mechanisms, such as financial incentives, is commonly termed. The classic

4 Moral foundations theory (Haidt 2012) is elaborated on in the next section.

5 This is further discussed under the heading “Institutional Theory”.

illustration is Richard Titmuss's (1970/1997) study, comparing the voluntary British system of blood collection favorably with the American one, in which payments were then made. Additional examples of how markets have entered areas traditionally governed by nonmarket norms and thereby undermined people's sense of moral obligation and responsibility are offered by Michael J. Sandel in his book *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets* (2012).

Samuel Bowles (2016) provides further insight into the relationship between markets and morality. His book *The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives Are No Substitute for Good Citizens* describes experiments that not only confirm that moral motivations may be crowded out by financial incentives, but also reveal the cognitive processes involved. According to Bowles (2016: 95), such incentives "cause ethical reasoning to recede in people's minds". To individuals with preexisting social preferences, incentives may signal that a particular situation corresponds to the market setting, in which we deal with each other in an impersonal, arm's-length way, as suggested by Alan Fiske's (1992) relational models theory, and cause them to "disengage morally". The influential power of names (e.g., "sellers" and "buyers") has been confirmed in many experiments, but incentives alone can provide powerful psychological frames that reduce the salience of moral values and offer justification for immoral behavior (Bowles 2016).

These findings have clear implications for the NPM model. These implications remain largely unexplored in the mainstream literature. Therefore, and considering that financial incentives and other market mechanisms are already widely used in the Swedish school system, the moral consequences of such institutional arrangements appear to be an important research topic. The next section takes us into the literature on the political conflict between the left and right, in which issues of morality may also play a role.

The Left and Right

In political science, the left-right political spectrum represents the standard understanding of political thought and behavior. As Will Kymlicka notes in his introductory chapter in *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (2002: 1–2): "Our traditional picture of the political landscape views political principles as falling somewhere on a single line, stretching from left to right. According to this traditional picture, people on the left believe in equality, and hence endorse some form of socialism, while those on the right believe in freedom, and hence endorse some form of free-market capitalism. [...] [It] is often thought that the best way to understand or describe someone's political principles is to try to locate them somewhere on that line."

While the narrowness of this traditional view in terms of points of conflict between the left and right has often been criticized, Kymlicka (2002: 2–3)

highlights another feature of the conventional left–right political spectrum that is still widely considered relevant, namely, the suggestion that “different theories have different foundational values: the reason that right and left disagree over capitalism is that the left believes in equality while the right believes in freedom. Since they disagree over fundamental values, their differences are not rationally resolvable”. [...] This feature of the traditional picture has remained largely unquestioned, even by those commentators who reject the traditional left–right classifications.” A large body of research in political science corroborates Kymlicka’s propositions.

The latter perspective—that the left and right have different “foundational values”—has for example been highly influential in various studies in political science and political history in Sweden. A classic illustration is Leif Lewin’s (1967) study of the “planned economy debate” in Sweden from the 1920s until the 1960s, in which he points to the formation of two distinct political blocs that would redraw the political map into a socialist and a non-socialist wing; one championing state intervention, and the other one adhering to freedom of industry and freedom of the individual. Another example is Kristina Boréus’s (1994) study of the neoliberal “right-wing wave” during the 1970s and 1980s, in which she identifies clear ideological (and also linguistic) distinctions between left and right. In her study of the historiography of the Social Democratic Party, Åsa Linderborg (2001) draws similar conclusions in a chapter on the neoliberal response to the Social Democrat description of both its own and Sweden’s history. More recently, in an additional study on NPM taking an ideological approach without regard to issues of morality, Matilde Millares (2015: 210) has attempted to “clarify the political cleavages discernible between the two main political opponents in Swedish politics, the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party” in the discussion of welfare reforms. Her hypothesis is that what might appear as an ideological convergence of the left and right over the issue of individual choice in the provision of public services since the 1990s, conceals the real and underlying ideological differences that remain largely unchanged between the two political camps.

However, must the left and right always disagree because of their different “foundational values”? In recent years, scholars from adjacent fields have offered perspectives that challenge the traditional political science view of what it means to be on the left and right, respectively. For example, the economist-philosopher Thomas Sowell (2007: 8) suggests that, “[s]ocial visions differ in their basic conceptions of the nature of man”, but the two principal visions of man that Sowell outlines are not easy to locate on the conventional left–right axis. The “constrained vision” sees man as limited by a fixed human nature, and believes that what is important is to produce moral and social benefits *within* that constrained vision. From another point of view, which Sowell calls the “unconstrained vision”, man is seen as stymied and corrupted by social

institutions that should be reformed. As arguments over human nature in later years have illustrated (Pinker 2002; Dreger 2016), these visions appear to be able to exist both on the left and on the right side of the political spectrum.

The moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2012) argues that human morality consists of a number of basic “moral foundations” or “taste buds”, something that has implications for people’s political opinions. These foundations are (somewhat simplified): care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. A sixth moral foundation, liberty, has also been suggested (Iyer et al. 2012). According to this literature, American liberals tend to endorse care, fairness and liberty, while U.S. conservatives endorse all the moral foundations (with an emphasis on loyalty, authority and sanctity). Similar results have been reported among students in Sweden (Nilsson & Erlandsson 2015); yet it is plausible that actors on what is conventionally seen as the left and the right side of politics could endorse the same moral values and, thus, similar policies. Indeed, social policy debates in recent decades, e.g., conflicts concerning immigration, marriage, and military conscription, seem to reflect such convergence.

Against this background, it seems relevant to explore the political prehistory of NPM, and see whether or not neoliberal ideas alone inspired NPM reforms in the Swedish school system as has generally been assumed. However, before I present the findings of my studies in more detail, I will introduce some theoretical concepts that have been useful in my analyses.

Institutional Theory

Douglass North famously defined institutions as “the rules of the game in society or [...] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990: 3). More recently, Geoffrey Hodgson (2006: 7) has expanded the definition of institutions to encompass durable social structures that serve not only as constraints but also as enablers of behavior with the “capacity to change aspirations” of agents. Institutions have regulative, normative and cognitive elements, involving formal rules, moral norms, and values (Scott 1995; Palthe 2014).

In Wennström (2016a), I study a case of institutional change. This is the replacement of teachers’ “professional ethos”, an institution of normative and cognitive character, by NPM, a model of public administration that involves both formal rules and normative principles, as the regulator of behavior in the Swedish school system. As suggested by the historical institutionalist school in political science, ideas have causal properties that can explain institutional change (Blyth 2002; Tønder 2010). In my analysis, I therefore focus on ideas about teaching and education from both the left and right that might have paved the way for NPM in the school system. Ultimately, these ideas reflect wider beliefs on the left and right side of the political spectrum about

institutions and how they are supposed to work. Consequently, they are relevant to analyze in an attempt to explain institutional change.

In Wennström (2016b), I build on those aspects of institutional theory that pertain to the functioning of markets and the creation of incentives for actors in the market, and thus study the relationship between formal rules and moral norms. Economists, particularly of the institutional economics school, have argued that markets cannot and should not be left alone but require appropriately designed institutions to function efficiently (Hodgson 2013; Nooteboom 2014). Since institutions shape moral habits (Ratnapala 2006), they are needed to restrain the negative effects that markets may have, such as the “crowding out” of intrinsic, non-material values and moral conduct from areas in which markets are allowed to operate and to make markets work as well as they can. A lack of appropriately designed, constraining institutions may ultimately lead to moral hazard (Kasper et al. 2013).

“Appropriately designed” is the key term here, because institutional arrangements may also create incentives for morally hazardous behavior, as has been discussed by, among others, the Icelandic economist Thráinn Eggertsson (2005), drawing on Assar Lindbeck’s (1995) study of hazardous welfare-state dynamics. Hence, we must study the effects of institutions. This is the analytical lens that I use in Wennström (2016b) in examining the institutional framework of the Swedish school choice system, and the incentives it created for teachers, administrators, school owners, parents and pupils.

Thought Collectives and Thought Styles

The hypothesis presented in Wennström (2016a) is that ideas from both sides of the political spectrum have paved the way for NPM in the Swedish school system, which, as stated above, is in keeping with an historical institutionalist explanation of institutional change. To explore this hypothesis I make use of the biologist Ludwik Fleck’s (1935/1979) theory of *thought collectives* and associated *thought styles*, which has previously been applied in political-theoretical research in, for example, a study of the development of the neoliberal movement by the historian and philosopher of economic thought Philip Mirowski (2013). A similar, but not identical, approach as Fleck (1935/1979) is also taken in a recent study of the impact of the 1968 movement on the Swedish Lutheran Church, in which Johan Sundeen (2017) describes influential “opinion collectives”. Although Thomas Kuhn, in his preface to *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962: VII), recognized that Fleck “anticipated many of [his] own ideas” about scientific communities and paradigms, Fleck’s contributions to epistemology were largely forgotten until the 1980s (Sady 2016). Today, however, Fleck’s ideas are applied in various fields, e.g., philosophy and history of science and medicine (Sady 2016).

According to Fleck, new knowledge and new ideas do not arise in individuals alone, but within communities of individuals who interact with each other. Fleck calls these communities “thought collectives” and views them almost like orchestras, in which individual instruments work together in harmony, but instead of symphonies, thought collectives produce collective “moods” and modes of thinking.

Thought collectives can arise in various sectors of society, e.g., within science, religion or politics, and transgress all kinds of social boundaries, including national borders and the barriers of national languages. In fact, according to Fleck (1935/1979: 107), thought collectives do not even presuppose personal relations, because the “printed word, film, and radio all allow the exchange of ideas within a thought community”, which he believes the migration of ideas within the world of fashion clearly demonstrates. What people within a thought collective instead have in common is a certain way of thinking, a “thought style” in Fleck’s terms. However, the “individual within the collective is never, or hardly ever, conscious of the prevailing thought style, which almost always exerts an absolutely compulsive force upon his thinking and with which it is not possible to be at variance” (Fleck 1935/1979: 41). Thought collectives influence institutions and social values, and can exist during both shorter and longer periods of time. At times, entire epochs live under the influence of a certain thought style (in conformity with Kuhn’s paradigms).

In Wennström (2016a), in keeping with Fleck’s theory, I group sources that share ideological beliefs into thought collectives centered around the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party, which I schematically call “Left” and “Right”. (When grouping my sources—consisting mainly of books—I relied on their rhetoric, the ideological content of their arguments, and the authors’ political self-labels.) Inspired by Fleck’s (1935/1979) ideas about “the intercollective communication of thoughts”, I wanted to explore, and potentially uncover, ideological connections between the left and right. The next section summarizes the result of this approach and of the analysis in Wennström (2016b).

A Left/Right Convergence on the New Public Management? The Unintended Power of Diverse Ideas

In Wennström (2016a), I explore the political prehistory of NPM. Previous literature argues that only neoliberal ideas inspired NPM (Savoie 1994; Greenaway 1995; Rhodes 1996; Ventriss 2000; Ranson 2003; Marobela 2008; Leicht et al. 2009; Bevir 2010; Boston 2010; de Vries 2010; Lorenz 2012; Guerrero-Orozco 2014); even in case studies of countries where left-wing or Social Democratic

governments have applied NPM reforms, scholars claim that neoliberal ideas have been highly significant causal forces (Mascarenhas 1993; Johnston 2000; Dale 2001; Robertson & Dale 2002; Lewis 2004). Keeping in mind that NPM is a set of market-oriented strategies for public-sector reform, it is perhaps not surprising that this assumption regarding the ideological roots of NPM has been made. However, the introduction of NPM in the Swedish school system suggests that this is a myopic view that neglects the involvement of the left. My study demonstrates that the antecedents of NPM, in fact, date back to the 1968 movement, and that both the left and the neoliberal right contributed to the rise of NPM in the Swedish school system by weakening intrinsic motivation among teachers.

In the 1960s, the left claimed that teachers performed an authoritarian style of teaching, to the detriment of children's learning and well-being. Moreover, it was suggested that teachers have personal political agendas that need to be curbed by employing NPM-like techniques, such as financial incentives, increased demands on documentation of what goes on in the classroom, and limiting the teachers' professional autonomy. This critique neglected a well-established ethos among teachers, which emphasized such virtues as duty, fervor, and self-sacrifice, and which was considered the reason why they could be trusted to perform to the best of their abilities with little or no explicit top-down monitoring. Nevertheless, translated books by, among others, the left-wing pedagogues Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner (1969), the socialist theorist Paulo Freire (1970), and the Austrian anarchist Ivan Illich (1971) that claimed that this was the case influenced public debate and public policy at the highest level in Sweden.

The works and ideas of these thinkers were congruous with the school-reform ideas of the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats, too, favored techniques in line with NPM principles to monitor the teachers' work. Together with the public-sector trade unions, the Social Democrats also denounced public-sector ethics and teachers' professional ethos in favor of a more materialistic view of work. The main purpose of such rhetoric, and of new legislation that eroded the imperative for public-sector employees to view their jobs as a vocation, was likely to increase identification among electoral groups in the middle class with the Social Democrats' political agenda. However, ultimately, it contributed to weakening the public-service ethos of teachers and other public servants even further. Yet, a further factor was important to pave the way for NPM in the Swedish school system, and this was a parallel right-wing assault on intrinsic motivation among teachers.

During the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, a neoliberal criticism of the public sector emerged in many Western countries. The school of public choice economics, whose ideas were imported into the Swedish public debate, crystallized this criticism in its claim that public servants are "budget-maximizing"

bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971), motivated solely by material gain. Therefore, they must be controlled with NPM methods (Tullock 1976). In a book about choice reforms that greatly influenced the Swedish right, Milton and Rose Friedman (1980) specifically applied the public choice theory about the motivations of public servants to teachers. For purely selfish reasons, the Friedmans argued, teachers had acquired power over education while parents and pupils had lost theirs. Consequently, a voucher reform in the school system (i.e., steering through financial incentives) was needed to force teachers to work in the interests of the “consumers” of education services. Directly inspired by the Friedmans, such a reform was advocated by Sweden’s largest center-right party, the Moderate Party, during the 1980s and enacted by the party in 1992.

After this joint assault by the left and right on teachers, their professional ethos was largely dismantled and the way for NPM to enter the school system was thus cleared. As teaching in Sweden became less of a vocation and more of a regular job, there was a need for NPM to replace the old management principles based on professional ethics and intrinsic motivation that were no longer viable.

Marketized Education: How Regulatory Failure Undermined the Swedish School System

In Wennström (2016b), I explore the effects of Sweden’s school choice reform on knowledge attainment. Introduced in 1992, the reform is unparalleled internationally in its market liberal design. It allows private actors such as foundations, parental cooperatives and for-profit firms to establish independent schools that operate on the same terms as public schools and are funded through a voucher scheme similar to the one proposed by Milton Friedman more than 60 years ago (1955). The reform was meant to encourage choice among pupils and competition among schools, as its architects in the Swedish Moderate Party, and its supporters in the free-market right generally, believed that this would increase the level of knowledge in both independent and government-run schools.

Previous studies on the effects of school competition in Sweden on educational outcomes seem to have confirmed the belief that both independent and public schools would benefit from a school choice reform (Ahlin 2003; Björklund et al. 2004; Sandström & Bergström 2005; Böhlmark & Lindahl 2015). Concentrating on easily measured outcomes, i.e., teacher-assigned grades and the results of Swedish “standardized” tests, which are also graded by the students’ own teachers, they find that the expansion of independent schools after 1992 has improved the results in both independent and public schools. However, as my study demonstrates, these results are impossible to reconcile with the decline of Sweden’s results in international standardized tests. The fact that Swedish grades have improved dramatically since the late

1990s while results in objectively graded international assessments of knowledge among Swedish pupils have continuously deteriorated instead provides clear evidence of the existence of grade inflation in both independent and public schools.

My study suggests that this phenomenon should be understood as a consequence of school competition in Sweden, or, more precisely, as a “hazardous adjustment” of behavior (Lindbeck 1995) on the part of schools, parents and pupils to the lax institutional framework of the school choice system. From its inception, the framework has allowed for competition based on phenomena that are unrelated to educational quality, including grading and material and other hedonic rewards.

The center-right coalition government that enacted the 1992 reform introduced the independent schools into a debilitated institutional setting that had been inherited from the previous Social Democratic government, which had decentralized the school system to the municipal level and replaced the old regulatory agency with a new body that denounced regulation of schools. The remaining impediments to grade inflation were then weakened or eliminated by the Moderate Party, which was the party in charge of education policy within the coalition government. Where there had previously been a common core curriculum, schools and pupils were now in effect allowed to decide for themselves on the importance of teaching a knowledge-based curriculum. And where there had previously been standardized tests carrying high stakes for the pupils, teachers were now given full autonomy to assign grades.

As discussed under the heading “Markets and Morality” above, economists, particularly of the institutional economics school, have argued that markets cannot and should not be left alone; markets require appropriately designed institutions to function properly (e.g., Hodgson 2013). Since institutions shape moral habits, they are needed to limit the negative effects markets may have. However, regulation of the (quasi) market for school competition in Sweden was never seriously considered. It was more or less just assumed that market forces would improve the quality of education. But combined with the nature of the quasi market, in which the only way for schools to boost profits is to attract more students, and an evolved preference for inflated grades among parents and pupils, the above-mentioned changes to the school system made it rational for both independent and public schools to compete in dimensions other than educational quality. Instead of an institutional framework that encouraged behavior beneficial to the purpose of the institution, the center-right government created a framework that provided incentives for unsound competition, inviting comparison with the hazardous incentives and lack of appropriate regulation that spawned the U.S. financial crisis of 2008 (Posner 2009; Rajan 2010).

These shortcomings could potentially have been rectified when the Social Democrats returned to government in 1994. However, they, too, believed that

competition between independent and public schools would improve the quality of education and did not take any major steps to reform the system. Furthermore, the Social Democrats introduced a policy that was conducive to making grades a tool for selection into higher levels of education only and not also a motivational incentive to promote diligence and hard work. This resulted in the moral aspect of education being substantially played down and grades being reduced to a kind of currency, the main purpose of which was to get ahead of others. This probably played a part in creating a preference for high grades in return for little effort among parents and pupils together with changing social norms regarding the value of education, and the market setting itself, which Bowles (2016) suggests can create a “moral disengagement” in the minds of consumers.

Concluding Discussion

In two studies I have demonstrated the potential for institutional arrangements, such as financial incentives and other market mechanisms, to undermine intrinsic motivation among both “producers” and “consumers” of tax-financed welfare services in the realm of education in Sweden. The studies have, in addition, investigated the political prehistory of NPM. While the prevailing and intuitive view has been that only neoliberal ideas inspired NPM (a term that passed into general usage in the early 1990s), Wennström (2016a) showed that its antecedents date back to the 1968 movement. Both the left and right contributed to the introduction of NPM in the Swedish school system by weakening moral motivation among teachers.

Beginning in the 1960s, the left claimed that teachers performed an authoritarian style of teaching and had personal political agendas that needed to be curbed by, for example, financial incentives, increased documentation requirements, and limiting the professional autonomy of teachers. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, the right suggested that public servants, including teachers, were “parasitic”, budget-maximizing bureaucrats (Coyle 2011), who needed to be controlled. According to the right, competition and choice reforms in the public sector, e.g., a voucher reform in the school system, would force government employees to work in the interests of the “consumers” of public services.

Both political camps denounced, and ultimately dismantled, traditional public service ethics and the teachers’ professional ethos. This paved the way for NPM in the school system as other management principles—already sketched out by the left and right—were needed in the absence of intrinsic motivation, which used to be considered the reason why public servants, e.g., teachers and police officers, could be trusted to perform to the best of their abilities with little or no explicit top-down monitoring. Today, there are tight controls on

teachers and monitoring through documentation, which has reduced the share of work time at school spent on teaching to barely a third. The process that I describe matches the philosopher and political theorist Michael Oakeshott's (1962/1991: 41) observation in *Rationalism in Politics*: "First we do our best to destroy parental authority (because of its alleged abuse), then we sentimentally deplore the scarcity of 'good homes', and we end by creating substitutes which complete the work of destruction."

In Wennström (2016b), I explored the effects of one of the measures proposed to supervise and discipline teachers, namely, the Swedish school voucher reform of 1992, on knowledge attainment and the perceived value of education among parents and pupils. The free-market right had suggested that school competition for vouchers would simultaneously bring teachers under control and increase the level of knowledge among pupils. However, the paper showed that during the same time period in which Sweden's results of international knowledge assessments deteriorated, grades rose sharply, which provides clear evidence of grade inflation. The analysis also showed that the likely cause of this is school competition, because the lax institutional framework of the Swedish school choice system has from its inception allowed for competition based on aspects that are unrelated to educational quality, including grading and material and other hedonic rewards. As in the case presented in Wennström (2016a), a main finding is that the left and right share a responsibility for creating the incentives for grade inflation in the Swedish school system.

Although different in subject matter, both studies have examined the undermining of morality by financial incentives and other market mechanisms in the Swedish education system. To summarize the results, the first paper demonstrated how the promotion of NPM-like ideas by the left and right after 1968 led to the erosion of the teachers' professional ethos; and the second paper showed how an ill-designed school voucher reform, implemented under the banner of NPM, has encouraged moral hazard on the part of the schools and further reduced the teachers almost to mere grade givers.

The contributions of the two studies are as follows. First, they demonstrate an ecumenism between strands of ideas and collectives of agents that can be schematically called "left" and "right", which has almost invariably been overlooked in political science because the conventional left-right spectrum is still the standard model for understanding political thought and behavior. Though the left and right have perceived themselves to be in ideological disagreement, their ideas and arguments regarding the motivation of public servants, and teaching and education, have been surprisingly similar, only clothed in different language. Thus, the left and right have unknowingly steered in the same direction, and that is in the direction of NPM. This observation should open many research avenues not only regarding the introduction of NPM reforms in

other welfare sectors and other countries, but also regarding radical shifts in other political areas in which the left and right have contributed an ideological basis for policy.

Second, building on the previous point, my studies show that there is indeed a political prehistory to NPM. This prehistory has been underexplored in previous research as it has been too easy to assume that neoliberalism alone inspired NPM. However, as shown, left-wing ideas were also important. Future studies might reveal more about the left's contributions. Such a research endeavor could perhaps start from an interesting parallel to NPM provided by Wilhelm Röpke in his work *A Humane Economy* (1960/1998: 95) that seems to lend support to my hypothesis: "The role of competition in the market economy is to be mainspring and regulator at one and the same time, and it is this dual function which is the secret of the competitive market economy and its inimitable performance", Röpke wrote, and against this background he argued that the reason why attempts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to create a "socialist market economy" would be unsuccessful, was that only one of the two pillars on which the market economy rests is feasible in a system of government planning. This is competition as a stimulant to performance improvement, because taking full advantage of competition presupposes free market prices, independence of firms and private ownership.

As Röpke tells us, in former Yugoslavia, public enterprises were "decentralized" and broken up into independent and competing units to raise productivity. However, because the other function of competition—the function of selection of products and firms—was not present, competition was reduced to simply a "psychological technique", ultimately unable to accomplish what the real market economy does by utilizing the dual nature of competition. "[It] remains a serious weakness in any collectivist economy that competition can, at best, fulfill only one of its functions, and even that less than optimally", Röpke wrote (1960/1998: 97).

Without further comparison, NPM in fact shares traits with the attempts in the old planned economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to utilize market mechanisms. NPM reformers, too, imagine that the market economy is reducible to a "technique" and that competition and other market principles can be seamlessly adopted by the public sector as stimulants of performance. The strategies that Hood (1991) lists as the seven elements of NPM then become a kind of prosthesis for phasing out failing practices in the absence of selection by competition (as in the real market economy).

Perhaps we find not only further antecedents of NPM in Röpke's argument, but also the root causes of what my studies are concerned with, which is the undermining of morality in the market-oriented school system. In hybrid systems lacking genuine competition such as NPM, "the carrot and the stick are ruthlessly applied" (Röpke 1960/1998: 96), and this leaves little room for ethics.

As the Dutch economist Bart Nooteboom (2014: 58) has observed on this subject, “[i]f one is told what to do one will wonder less what is right to do.”

Yet, and this is the third and final contribution of the two studies, it is clear that public administration systems that have adopted market-oriented reforms presuppose certain kinds of moral behavior in order to function in accordance with the principles underlying these institutions. Without its professional ethos, teaching has ground to a halt, and in the absence of an appropriate framework that encourages moral habits there is now school competition in other dimensions than educational quality. Hence, now that NPM is in place, careful consideration should be given to how moral norms and principles can be preserved and reinvented in the NPM setting. Future reforms of tax-financed service production must also reckon with the manner in which institutions and incentive structures affect behavior, and avoid unintended immoral outcomes.

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The VDP-triad in Ideational Analysis

Toward a general theory of ideological thought-content in social and political communication, debate, thought and language – beyond the concepts ‘ideology’, ‘culture’, ‘belief-system’, ‘discourse’ and ‘policy’

Part II

Mats Lindberg

Preface

This article is Part Two of a longer essay with the aim to propose a unified analytical framework, or a general theory, of ideological thought content. As we saw in Part One (in *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 2018:2) I suggest that all social and political communication and language consists of three basic kinds of thought: values (V), descriptions (D) and prescriptions (P). These are connected in quasi-logical sequences of *practical reasoning*. On these grounds I propose the *theoretical model* of the VDP-triad. I also present an attached *analytical scheme* for content-oriented idea-analysis, involving two basic levels of ideological thought, the fundamental level (of philosophical principles, world-views or human nature) and the operative level (of practical analyses of the situation and practical suggestions for action). My general method is presented as that of *reconstructive theoretical synthesis*, drawing on earlier theories and concepts of the ideational phenomenon in society. Part One consists of Chapter One ‘Bringing ideas back in’ (Sections 1–7) and Chapter Two, ‘Encircling the proposed general theory’ (Sections 8–14).

Part Two, here, moves from hypotheses and preliminaries to actual, constructive theoretical work. Chapter Three is titled ‘The three main concepts of ideology in the prevailing knowledge situation; and the three main concepts of discourse’. This chapter contains a critical investigation of the three main theoretical traditions in contemporary social science regarding the ideational phenomenon in society, each with a concept of ‘ideology’ of its own. In Section 16 we find the sociological knowledge tradition and the concept of ‘culture’ where

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'ideology' is seen as a sub-variant of 'culture'. In section 17 we find the political science knowledge tradition and the concept of (plural) 'political ideologies' in parties and organizations on the input side of the political system. In section 18 we find the Marxist tradition with the bipolar notion of 'the (dominating) ideology in society', including the Foucauldian concept of a (dominating) 'discourse'. (I thus include Foucault and the Foucauldians in the Marxist family tree.) In Section 19 I turn to the concept of 'discourse' as it is used in linguistics. Especially I focus on the way the social scientific concept of 'ideology' is included in, and related to, the linguistic concept of 'discourse' in the research programme Critical Discourse Analysis/Critical Discourse Studies. Later, in Chapter Four, Section 20, we will brush against some more conceptualizations in other, approach-bound terminologies regarding social and political ideas.

I must stress the point that in Chapter Three *I only investigate the theoretical concept* of 'ideology' as it is defined respectively in these traditions. Consequently, I will not engage into a presentation of the general achievements of these traditions (which might appear unusual or awkward). Despite this explicitly stated narrow conceptual focus, my critical scrutiny certainly will make some readers disappointed, or even irritated. I imagine that many readers are occupied by the view – as the only interesting one – which of these grand theoretical traditions is the best in a perceived paradigmatic struggle over how to do social science and ideational analysis. But such a broad critical assessment of their merits or shortcomings is not my errand here (although I have heaps of material to draw on). I am instead *searching for building bricks* to use in my reconstructive, synthesizing elaborations, as well as supportive or non-supporting views and conceptualizations. (See Part One, Section 7, where an outline of my method is presented.) In these investigations both usable and unusable building-bricks are found in all three of these traditions.

I must also warn the reader that I will put in-grown and beloved paradigmatic concepts under the microscope. As we know, we are all emotionally fond of our socialized paradigms (Kuhn 1962), often not even aware of them as something specific or alternative, seeing them as the natural (comfortable as well as comforting) ways of thinking and acting. (In this way paradigms in the academic world are similar of ideologies of the social and political world; legitimating the established modes of thoughts and habits by way of their pet, ingrown certainties.) So, any sociologist, political scientist, Marxist or discourse analyst should be prepared for a perhaps disturbing review of their own socialized or appropriated paradigmatic conceptions. However, some readers will still find some rewarding new-think, or some new perspectives, beyond ingrown, habitual horizons; at least I hope so.

Chapter four, 'Working towards the general theory' (Sections 20–22) is a kind of bridge between the critical explorations of the prevailing knowledge situation in Chapter Three and the actual construction of the proposed general

theory. In Chapter four we meet a flower-bed of analytical concepts used in various empirical approaches, like ‘belief-system’ or ‘policy’ (Section 20). I show a possible way how these concepts might be integrated in my general view of ideological thought-content, or to put it the other way around, how the concept of ideological thought-content would be possible to use in any of these approaches. After that we meet (Section 21) the underlying assumption of communicative actions and interactions as the anchorage for my conceptualization and theorizing (see also Part One, Section 8; and Section 16 here in Part Two). We also meet the underlying assumption of language (Section 22), where the (ordinary) social and political language in communicative actions is proposed to be generically *dialogical*, *dialectical* or *argumentative* (see also Part One, Section 14; and Section 29 here in Part Two). Chapter five, at last, is titled ‘Proposing the general theory’ and is doing exactly that. In the Sections 23–28 all building-bricks and connective fittings that have been brought forward so far in the foregoing chapters are assembled, ending up in the VDP-triad as the backbone of my proposed general theory. Section 29 is a comment on the intricacies of the methodological use of the VDP-triad, the procedure of *interpretation* in the process of *discerning and describing* the three basic kinds of thought involved in social and political communication and language. Then follows Chapter six, the conclusion (Section 30), where I summarize the perceived merits of my proposed general theory, suggesting it as ‘The strong alternative’ among other, available theoretical alternatives.

Chapter Three: The three main concepts of ‘ideology’ in the prevailing knowledge situation; and the three main concepts of ‘discourse’

15. THREE MAIN THEORETICAL TRADITIONS REGARDING IDEOLOGY

In the social sciences, there are three main theoretical or conceptual traditions which handle the general phenomenon of ideas, consciousness and thought in society.¹ Each of them has developed a theoretically anchored concept of ‘ideology’ of its own, which in turn is related to other concepts of the respective theories; especially concepts like ‘politics’, ‘state’, ‘political action’, ‘power’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘social consciousness’ or ‘political order’. The three main theoretical and concept-generating traditions are: 1) The General Social Theory, or theoretical Sociology, of Talcott Parsons, with an indirect entry to ‘ideology’ from the concepts of ‘action-orientations’ or ‘culture’; 2) the political

1 Here I do not enter the realm of psychology although every theory of society of course must rely on a theory of the psychological level.

science knowledge tradition of ‘political theories’ or ‘political ideologies’, often standing for themselves as self-evident, idealistic concepts or conceptual starting points; and 3) the Marxist tradition (together with neo-Marxist and post-Marxist variants and outflows) where ‘the Ideology’ has a central standing as one of two main parts of the ‘superstructure’ (the other is ‘the state’) in the ‘historical materialist’ theory of society.² *When the term ‘ideology’ is used in social scientific research, irrespective of disciplinary affiliation, the term refers to the conceptualization in one or the other of these three theoretical traditions.*

This fact is for example visible in the case of contemporary Linguistics. When the ‘critical’ linguists of the 1980s and the 1990s were founding the research programme Critical Discourse Studies/Critical Discourse Analysis, some researchers borrowed their concepts of ‘ideology’ and ‘power’ from the sociological and the political science traditions (like Teun van Dijk), and some borrowed it from the Marxist tradition in a broad meaning (like Norman Fairclough or Ruth Wodak).³

The three main theoretical traditions concerning ideas in society, I hold, differ so much that their respective uses of the term ‘ideology’ must be regarded as three different concepts; although there of course are points of connotative (intentional) or denotative (extensional) overlap. This conceptual diversity – as three different ways to comprehend the ideational phenomenon in society – must be discussed, and indeed overcome or bypassed in some way, if it at all shall be possible for me here to construct a *general theory* of ideological thought-content. One way to overcome these differences is to scrutinize these three theoretical traditions and look for strong and suiting building bricks in my constructive effort, while dismissing weak or unfruitful ones. My reconstructive method was presented in brief outline above (see Part One, Section 7), and will be displayed in the actual theory-constructive work below.

16. GENERAL SOCIAL THEORY

16.1 *General characteristics*

The first theoretical tradition is *general social theory* or general theoretical sociology (commonly called simply ‘social theory’), which we briefly met above. This tradition was synthesized and reconstructed by Talcott Parsons in

2 I will (mainly) place the often referred to work *Ideology and Utopia* by Karl Mannheim (1936 [1929]) in the Marxist tradition (notwithstanding Mannheim’s later intellectual development); both his concept of ideology and his pronounced sociology of knowledge are close to, or even a development of, basic conceptions of Marx’.

3 We will return to this soon, also to the later, explicit reorientation of Norman Fairclough, and the more reluctant reorientation, as it seems, of Ruth Wodak.

his important *The Structure of Social Action* (1937)⁴ continuing from (among others) Max Weber's 'interpretative sociology' and Weber's concept of 'meaningful action' as the foundational concept of all social theory. Parsons calls his theory the 'action frame of reference'.⁵ After this work, Parsons went further from the synthesized 'action frame of reference' and formulated his theory on *The Social System* (1951) with its remarkable companion volume, edited together with Edward Shils and others, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951). Since then a long series of subsequent works have appeared, refining and developing the initial formulations on 'the social system'.

Social systems, as proposed by Parsons, are made up of 'meaningful', that is, intentional 'actions and interactions'. What makes the intentions 'meaningful' (following Weber) is not only that they have a meaning for the acting individuals, but also that that the intentions can be 'understood' by the other acting and interacting individuals in society, thus establishing the connections of meanings and communicative interactions which make up 'the social system'. In a lucid account of Parsons' basic notions, the Swedish sociologist Hans Zetterberg re-named them as 'communicative actions' to express the central role of communication, intentional thought and meaningfulness in all action and interaction making up society (1962: 49–54).⁶

From these fundamental conceptual elements of 'meaningful' or 'communicative' actions and interactions, all the common basic concepts of contemporary social theory, as used in all social scientific disciplines, are constructed and derived; such as 'social system', 'institution', 'social structure', 'power', 'communication', 'culture', 'socialization', 'beliefs', 'attitudes', and the like, as well as 'political system' or 'economic system'. Parsons' following works, through four decades, involving psychology and social psychology as well as history, politics and economics,⁷ established a hitherto unsurpassed paradigmatic position of a

4 *The Structure of Social Action, Vol I-II* (1937), is a thorough theoretical synthesis of the views on action and society in the works of Émile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Alfred Marshall and (not least) Max Weber; also including a side-kick chapter on Karl Marx and Georg Simmel. This work is generally regarded as the foundational theoretical work in modern sociology.

5 Parsons 1937, Vol. 2: 635–649. See Weber 1972 [1921]: Ch. 1: 1–2.

6 I mention this because of the influential work of Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action* (1984 [1981]), working himself out from Parsons and paraphrasing the title of Parsons and Shils (1951). In this work, Habermas uses the term 'communicative action' in a more value-loaded way. For Habermas this term signifies honest, truthful and deliberative communication among persons free from constraints and power-relations, unlike instrumental or deceitful communication, which is the instrument of power. Here I use 'communicative action' in Zetterberg's neutral way, referring to all kinds of social and political 'meaningful actions' in the Weber-Parsons tradition.

7 The first of these, and the most important, are *The Social System* (1951) and the anthology edited together with Edward Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951), closely followed by *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953), also edited together with Edward Shils. These three works form a platform which is continuously worked upon, and worked out of, in the decades to come. Some final works are Parsons and Platt 1973 and Parsons 1977.

truly *general* frame of reference or general social theory.⁸ The theory eventually lead up to the four-function paradigm of culture, politics, economic production and human reproduction as the four basic, institutionally differentiated sub-systems of any society.⁹

However, since Talcott Parsons introduced such a strong general theory of society, *all* theorizing after this break-through, also in Political Science, became dependent on, or indirectly related to it. Parsons' advancements were disseminated not only through sociology, but through all social scientific theorizing. This dependence is highly visible in the paradigm-setting development of Political Science of the 1950s and 1960s, called 'the systems approach' or 'the behavioural approach' (see Part One, Section 8), with basic concepts like 'political system', 'political structure', 'political institutions', 'political culture', 'political symbols', 'political power', and the like.¹⁰ Especially the studies of 'political behaviour' or 'political culture', with the focus on 'beliefs' and 'attitudes', owe much of their elementary theoretical foundations to the Weber-Parsons tradition.¹¹ In the modernized Political Science after the Second World War, though, there was no single paradigmatic outstanding figure like Talcott Parsons in sociology. We find, instead, a generational network (of the 1950s and the 1960s) at the top, involving theorists like Harold Laswell, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Karl Deutsch or Robert Dahl.¹²

8 Talcott Parsons' paradigmatic role for the discipline of in Sociology, due to his works mentioned in the foot-note above, is outstanding; flanked mainly by Robert Merton and Edward Shils. For some works discussing or expressing the significance of Parsons in general social theory, see e.g. Savage 1981; Alexander 1983/Vol. 4; Layder 1994; Luhmann 1995; Holmwood 1996; Zeitlin 2001; Greenstein 2002; Hedström 2005: 35–66; Münch 2010. See also Habermas 1984 [1981]: Ch. VII. Besides, the title of Habermas' grand work, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984 [1981]), seems to be a direct reference to the title of Parsons and Shils eds. *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951); as a continuing discussion along the track of the original 'action frame of reference'. Parsons' general theory is fundamental also for the later theoretical development of (neo- to post-) Marxist social theory, critically building further on, or adding to, Parsons' basic advancements. See e.g. Poulantzas 1968: 37–119; Habermas 1984 [1981]: Ch. VII; Giddens 1984: xiii–xvi; Alexander ed. 1985: 7–50; Layder 1994: 13–33; Archer 1995: 6–12.

9 On this point I really vulgarize Parsons' intricate, abstract theoretical structure (!). The reader may forgive me! But with my choice of terms I want to point to an interesting parallel to the four-aspect view of society in traditional Marxist social theory with, 'ideology' and 'politics' as the 'superstructure', and 'economic production' and human 'reproduction' as the 'base'. The main difference between the two general theories, though, apart from the concept of 'communicative action', is that Parsons views the sub-systems as *relatively autonomous* in principle, and in principle equal in causal or explanatory weight, while the Marxist tradition always posits the economic system as *a priori* the most important part in the explanation and understanding of society.

10 See e.g. Easton ed. *Varieties of Political Theory* (1966: Chs I, IV and VII). For the substantial affinity of this paradigm-setting development in Political Science with the tradition of general social theory and Parsons, see e.g. Lasswell & Kaplan 1950: 1–15, 74–141; Easton 1953: Ch. 4; Easton 1965a: 1, 15; Easton ed. 1966: Ch. IV; Easton 1990: 3–154.

11 See e.g. Converse et.al. *The American Voter* (1960: 3–41, 188–194); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1965:11–14). The perceived (coming) theoretical importance of Parsons' (and Shils') general theory of action, is vibrating already in the concluding comment in Berelson et al., *Voting* (1954: 304–04, n 31).

12 The contemporaneous situation about 1960 in the discipline is, in my opinion, instructively described by Robert Dahl (1963 [1961]), as we saw. Personally, I think that David Easton is the most sharply thought-through theorist of this generation (still unsurpassed in my opinion), followed by Harold Lasswell; especially regarding the issue how to construct a general social theoretic base for the discipline; launching

16.2 The concepts of 'culture' and 'ideology'

In Parsons' general social theory the concept 'culture' or 'cultural system' pictures a system of 'action-orientations' of the members of a social system, those which I also term 'action-guiding thoughts'. Such *action-orientations* are: 1) empirical views, cognitions and beliefs of the surrounding situation (whether practically experienced, assumed, or imagined by the collectivity or the individual in question); 2) basic value orientations; 3) habitual norms of conduct in the collectivity; together with 4) shared linguistic and cultural symbols of the collectivity in question. These three kinds of action-orienting thoughts, together with language and symbolic forms which express them or carry them forward, make up the 'culture' in every 'social system', whether large or small.¹³ As we see, these three kinds of 'action-orientations', embedded in language and cultural symbols, are similar to the three *thought dimensions* which make up the backbone of my proposed concept of 'ideological thought-content'. In the empirical political sociology which followed in the tracks of the sociological and social-psychological 'general theory of action' – in political science called 'behavioral studies' or 'electoral studies' – these three thought-dimensions were termed 'beliefs and attitudes', 'values' and 'norms'. I will keep, though, the terminological usage of political theory or political philosophy, terming them values (V), descriptions (D) and prescriptions (P) (see Part One, Section 5). Parsons' notion of three kinds of action-orientations has been very important for me in my reconstructive efforts, as a direct support for the tenability of the central core of my reconstructive synthesis.

For Parsons, the 'culture' is socialized into the members through language learning, symbolic habituation, rituals and the transmission of customs between generations. Moving further, an *ideology* is a sub-kind of 'culture'. 'Ideology' is defined as the orientations that are shared by the members of a social group or a whole society:

An ideology, then, is a system of beliefs, held in common by the members of a collectivity, i.e. a society, or a sub-collectivity of one... (Parsons 1951: 349).

The function of such an ideology is to hold the social collective together, legitimate the normative order of the system and ensure that the structure of the social interactions and relations (including status distinctions and power), which make up the social system, prevails.¹⁴

Although Parsons mentions the possibility of 'a counter-ideology' or a

an analytical and empirically oriented *political theory* grounded in a general analytical and empirically oriented general theory of society.

13 See Parsons, *The Social System* (1951: 3–45); or Parsons & Shils eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951: 3–29).

14 In the basic work by Parsons, *The Social System* (1951), a whole chapter, Ch. VIII, is devoted to 'Ideology'; see especially pp. 348–351.

‘sub-culture’, the concept ‘culture’, when it is used by sociologists or social anthropologists since 1900, is most often used in a holistic sense, such as ‘the culture of the society’ or ‘the culture of the organization’.¹⁵ It seems as if the concept loses its excitement without the implicated holistic ring. For example, even S.M. Lipset, in his *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, comparing the ‘cultural similarity’ of the US and Canada, speaks of the ‘similar value orientations’ which are imbued in the ‘national identity’ of these two countries; as if the culture of a nation were a holistic entity, and implying that society is some kind of homogenous entity, like in the anthropological origins of this concept.¹⁶ This holistic connection of homogenous society and monolithic ‘culture’ is strong in the sociological tradition, and has its roots especially in the continuing influence of thought of Emile Dürkheim, where the cohesion of society is due to what Dürkheim terms ‘the religion’. Dürkheim’s, and others’, intellectual frames on this point are carried forward in the sociological tradition as a notion of the dominant ‘culture’ which upholds the social cohesion and order. This conceptual connection becomes evident in all discussions on the subject, which seem to move between the polarity of cultural ‘coherence’ and ‘incoherence’ or cultural ‘monopoly’ or ‘pluralism’.¹⁷ In his influential work *Ideologie und Gesellschaft* (1974) (*Ideology and Society*), influential at least in the German-speaking world, the Dürkheimian sociologist Eugen Lemberg speaks of ideology as a ‘*glaubens-, Werte- und Normensystem*’ (a belief-, value- and norm-system), dominating society just like religion did in the old societies. And under the surface of pluralist ideologies in the modern society,¹⁸ Lemberg still finds ‘a basic fund of commonly acknowledged values and norms, on which the existence and functioning of this society depends’.¹⁹

Whatever terminology is used, and whatever (half-hearted) *caveats* surround them, there still seems to be a holistic bias or ring when the term ‘culture’ is used. Counter-cultures, sub-cultures or contesting cultural variants will in cultural sociology or anthropology be treated as anomalies or exceptions, appearing (or made visible) as deviances or displacements against the background of the assumed dominating, prevailing ‘culture’.²⁰ It is symptomatic that it is in

15 See e.g. Parsons 1951: 348–351. See also e.g. the classic *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, by Edgar H. Schein (1995: 8–15). And for the general use of the concept of ‘culture’, see e.g. the fine collection of social-anthropological essays in *The Interpretation of Cultures* by the renowned Clifford Geertz (1973).

16 Lipset 1968: 31–33, 62–63. On the anthropological heritage, see e.g. Münch and Smelser (eds.) 1992: ch. 1.

17 See Münch, R. & Smelser, Neil J. (eds) (1992) *Theory of Culture*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, Chs. 1–6; for short Smelser’s contribution in Ch. 1, ‘Culture: Coherent or incoherent’.

18 See e.g. his *Ideologie und Gesellschaft* (1974 [1971]) who speaks of the religion, or the ideology in a society, as a ‘*glaubens-, Werte- und Normensystem*’ (a belief-, value- and norm-system), and raises the question of ideological ‘monopoly’ or ‘pluralism’. Lemberg 1974 [1971]: 6, 49–52, 319–28.

19 Germ. orig.: ‘...einen Grundstock aus allgemein anerkannten Werten und Normen, auf denen die Existenz und das Funktionieren dieser Gesellschaft beruht’ (Lemberg 1974: 52).

20 On this point I may be too critical. See e.g. Schein 1995: 14–15, struggling with the holistic rings of the

the political science use of the concept 'culture', as in 'political culture', that the necessity of a pluralistic use of the concept first comes to the fore and is problematized. This, of course, is due to the ingrown 'idea-struggle hypothesis' (as I termed it in Part One, Section 8) among political scientists. In the early political science works on 'political culture' in the 1960s, as by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, this pluralist conception had to work its way through the heavy monolithic or holistic ring of the concept 'culture' as it was earlier used in sociology or anthropology.²¹

16.3 Critical conclusion regarding general social theory

Bringing the treads together, I conclude that the concept of 'culture' in the tradition of Parsons' general social theory (and the ensuing concept of 'ideology' as a specific kind of 'culture') is first *inclusive*; it involves all kinds of culture or ideology, in posh clubs as well as street gangs. Secondly, the concept is *neutral*; no specific culture is, by definition or connotation, regarded as either good or bad. Thirdly, the concept is *holistic* (or monolithic), at least there is a pronounced tendency in that direction, implying as default that every social system, whether large or small, is held together by an all-embracing 'culture' or an 'ideology' consisting of a set of shared and socially meaningful 'action-orientations', and where deviances or sub-cultures are regarded as (temporary) anomalies.

In the synthesizing and reconstructive elaborations here, I will embrace the sociological, Weberian-Parsonian, conception of the fundamentals of all society and social life, the theoretical notion of 'communicative actions and inter-actions'. I will explicitly anchor my elaborations there and connect them to their parallel conceptualizations in political science. They will make up the anchoring ground of my theory, as we saw (see Part One, Sections 7–8 and Section 21 below). (By the way, Weber's theory of 'meaningful actions' and Parsons' theory of 'communicative actions and interactions', with the concept of a 'cultural system' which is transmitting meaningful symbols and language-use between generations, since long precede the saying of the 'language turn', that 'language' or 'discourse' is constitutive of social action and social structures, or society as a whole; most often proclaimed to be original or a theoretical novelty. See Part One, Section 6 and 8.)

Regarding the inner structure of societal ideas, ideologies or cultures, I will especially acknowledge Parsons' three kinds of 'action-orientations' (value standards, descriptive beliefs respectively prescriptive norms) as fruitful, as

concept 'culture'.

21 See e.g. the theoretical discussion in the paradigm-setting works on 'political culture'; Almond and Verba 1965 [1963]: 11–14; and in Verba 1965: 513–14, 525–26, where the authors are struggling with the immanent holistic ring of the concept 'culture', trying to erect a pluralistic and idea-struggle perspective.

a direct support for the central tenet in my general theory, the VDP-triad. (I remember I was highly satisfied when I found out about them, looking for support or suggestions in the prevailing knowledge situation.) The inclusive and neutral use of the concepts ‘culture’ or ‘ideology’ is also supportive of my general view of how to conceptualize on these matters. On the other hand, I regard the (tendentially lingering and protracted) monolithic or holistic view of ‘culture’ or ‘ideology’ as unfruitful. In its place I will posit an explicit pluralistic view, borrowed from political science, with its ‘idea-struggle hypothesis’ (as I have termed it).

17. THE POLITICAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE TRADITION

17.1 General characteristics

The study of social and political ideas and ideologies has a venerable standing in the Political Science knowledge tradition.²² It is brought together and presented in the long row of textbooks on *Political ideologies*, *Political Theory* or *Political Thought*; most often used in the first semester of the undergraduate level syllabus.²³ In the Political Science knowledge tradition, the concept of ‘political ideology’ (‘ideology’ written by me with a lower case ‘i’) is pluralistic, inclusive and neutral (as I already indicated in Part One, Section 9). When the term ‘political ideologies’ is used, it mainly refers to the ideas and idea-systems found in political parties (and organisations or movements) and their platforms; including their respective idea-traditions of theorists, ideologists and iconic political leaders.²⁴ The analytical distinctions of ‘inclusive–restrictive’ respectively ‘neutral–pejorative’ are invented in the prominent and comprehensive work by Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (1976). Seliger systematically makes the case that that a fruitful concept of ideology must be inclusive and neutral; and not restrictive and pejorative as in the Marxist tradition, as well as in various other influential definitions through the history of this term.²⁵ I must add that Seliger’s work,

22 For the case of the US, see Merriam (2009 [1903]). For the case of Europe, see Tingsten 1931.

23 One early influential work, referred to as a standard work of its time, was Janet, P., *Histoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapports avec le Morale*, Vol. 1–2 (1887). In modern Political Science, this text-book tradition restarts with G.H. Sabine, *The History of Political Theory* (1937) (4th ed. Sabine & Thorson 1974) which has been paradigmatic for a whole genre of later text-books, such as Schmandt (1960); Heywood (2007) or Ball & Dagger (2011). For eminent Swedish contributions, see Björklund (1970) or Larsson (2008). See also the magnificent recent works by von Beyme (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), who really makes a whole new turn of the tradition, with his impressive depth and detail.

24 Ball and Dagger 2011 is an eminent typical case, especially in their narrative from Hobbes and Locke and onwards to contemporary Green ideology and the bouquet of feminist, racial, native or sexual identity Liberation ideologies. Charles Merriam (1903) and Herbert Tingsten (1931) already used the combination of party platforms, important theorists and iconic leaders to construct the images and ideal-type stereotypes of the main political theories/ideologies in the US 1770–1900, respectively Europe 1880–1930.

25 See Seliger 1976: 25–170. From the beginning there was a pejorative ring to the term ‘ideology’, as when

in my opinion, still is the most thought-through contribution on these matters. Most of his achievements are included in my efforts here; for example, the analytical distinctions of above, basic in my elaborations, as well as the earlier mentioned distinctions of ‘fundamental’ respectively ‘operative’ levels of ideological thought (see Section 9 above and 24 below).

As we see, we meet the term ‘ideologies’ in the plural. The modern political science knowledge tradition relies on a paradigmatic pluralistic view of politics and political ideas.²⁶ The discipline has left the bipolar political ontology of vertical hierarchy behind; as between rulers and the ruled, monarchy and the subjects, oppressors and oppressed or dominating and dominated social classes. Instead there has emerged a systematic, analytical, basic view of politics as constant struggles of *contending established elites* and their followers as well as between factions inside the established elites.²⁷ This view implies that the organized working class of the 1890s or the anti-colonial movements of the 1960s are also regarded as consisting of elites and their followers, as well as involving factional conflicts and counter-elites (and their followers).²⁸ Political life, thus, is paradigmatically regarded as continuous political power struggles, with attached *idea-struggles*, propaganda and debate, aiming at influence and control over the state or various specific policy-areas regarding the allocation of values for the society. From this analytical perspective, it is an open, empirical question if, and to what extent, any one contending party, organization or elite-network receive influence or even power over the state or some policy area.²⁹

In Robert Dahl’s words there might, in specific historical situations, appear a ‘reigning ideology’ to the extent that the leading circles in politics, law and

Napoleon lamented of his left-wing contemporaries as utopian ‘ideologists’; and when Marx half a century later continued this word-use in his critique of ‘the German ideology’, that is the illusionary (left-Hegelian) philosophizing of his time. The pejorative stance is also continued in Karl Mannheim’s influential work *Ideology and Utopia* (1936 [1929]) (mainly elaborating on the Marxist view). It is also found in the ‘totalitarian school’ of the 1950s and 1960s, for example Hannah Arendt, where communism and fascism was seen as ‘ideological’ modes of thought, contrary to the rationality of the liberal or conservative traditions.

26 This is the traditional view in the disciplinary tradition, from Aristotle and onwards. For modern Political Science, see e.g. Bentley (1908); Michels (1962 [1911]); Key (1958 [1942]); Lasswell & Kaplan 1950; Duverger (1954); Dahl (1984 [1963]); Lipset & Rokkan 1967; or Hague, Harrop & Breslin (1992).

27 Today we would perhaps speak of ‘elite-networks’, a suggestive, analytical concept suggested by sociologist Michael Mann in his *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1* (2012 [1986]: 1–33). In my opinion Mann’s general view is very close to that of Robert Dahl in his *Modern Political Analysis* (1984 [1963]: 8–61), both working out from a Weberian view of politics.

28 See especially Lasswell 1948: 7–38; Lasswell & Kaplan 1950: 16–28, 55–102; Easton 1953: 266–306; Friedrich 1963: 83–93, 145–46; Dahl 1984 [1963]: 19–76; Duverger 1964: ix–xiv, 3–5; Easton 1965b: 38–47, 271–272, 332–336; Hague, Harrop & Breslin 1992: Ch. 6–10.

29 Easton 1965b: 332–36; Dahl 1984 [1963]: 50–61. This might be called a ‘Weberian’ view of politics and history, as the intriguing Michael Mann holds; see Mann 2012, Vol. 1–4 and Mann 2011. But the view is older, going back to political theorists like Hobbes, Machiavelli, Livius or Thucydides, although not always systematically elaborated. On this grand historical perspective in political science see e.g. Finer 1997, Vol. I–III, especially Vol 1: 1–94.

administration in a society share a fairly cohesive 'set of ideological doctrines'. But even in those situations there is always opposition and idea-struggle:

It would be highly unrealistic...to assume that a reigning ideology is a unified, consistent body of beliefs accepted by everyone in a political system (Dahl 1964: 56).

And when C.J. Friedrich analyses the political system in the US in his work *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (1950) he states that political life in the US is: '...not a state of stable equilibrium but a moving one which continuously adjusts itself to the shifting balance [of power] of these groups as they evolve' (quoted in Easton 1953: 273). And in Easton's account, the concept of a 'dynamic' or 'moving' equilibrium seems possible to trace back to the epic Arthur Bentley in *The Process of Government* (1908) or the highly influential Charles Merriam in his *Political Power* (1934) who speaks of 'a moving general equilibrium'. Now, Easton himself is critical of the metaphor 'equilibrium', however moving or dynamic it is conceived to be. He rather suggests a view of politics as a constant 'process of change' with constantly shifting strengths between the contending social and political forces 'in which an equilibrium never obtains, although there is a tendency towards it' (Easton 1953: 280, 293–306). Be this as it may. The discussion shows that the political science knowledge tradition since long displays a *pluralistic* view of politics, where the contending forces are involved in *struggles of power* and influence and the corresponding *pluralistic idea-struggles*.³⁰

The pluralistic view is most visible in the studies of political parties and their various ideologies.³¹ This pluralist, conflictual, idea-struggle view is so natural and self-evident today in the discipline, that it hardly has a name. I will label it '*the idea-struggle hypothesis*' for short (see Part One, Section 2 and 9) not forgetting that cooperation, alliances, coalitions and relative consensus also may occur, as an outflow from any underlying conflict structure and power structure.³²

In this basic pluralistic view, there is an empirically open and historically contingent question regarding which one (or which ones) of the contending actors and contending idea-systems will come out as prevailing in the political system, and thus influence or dominate the structured (and sometimes less structured)³³ relation of the state to the rest of society.³⁴ However, since politi-

30 See Dahl 1984 [1963]: 54–56; Easton 1965b: 271–74, 334–40.

31 See the following classic works, forming a shared view of the discipline: Merriam 1903; Merriam 1920; Tingsten 1931; Duverger 1954; Key 1958; Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Duverger 1974.

32 The conflict-consensus perspective, as 'the Janus-face of politics', is classically argued for in Duverger 1964. See also Friedrich 1963: 83–93, 145–146; Dahl 1984: 70–76.

33 Gunnar Myrdal introduced the analytical distinction between 'soft' respective 'strong' states, where a soft state is a state whose commands and rules are not followed or not penetrating the rest of the society.

34 Of course, the other sub-systems of society (as the economy, the family or the culture) must always be

cal dominance and social power is almost always a question of coalitions or compromise between contenders, in the view of political science as we saw, the actually prevailing mode of thought or modes of thought in a political system seldom resembles any of the pure, stylized, ideal type 'political ideologies' of the textbooks. This is perhaps disappointing for the student of politics with the learned ideologies as a dowsing instrument of political understanding. However, most ideological patterns in empirical, real life politics rather display a mixture of elements resembling those of the ideal-types. Moreover, this mixture often resides on historical layers of past re-orientations, past compromises or past coalition-necessities, often called the 'ideological development' of a party or an organization or even of 'the ideology' itself; as when classical social democracy once came to embrace (most of) the capitalist market economy, or the liberal tradition came to embrace (most of) the welfare state or 'public interventions' in 'the private sphere'. Hence the need for a more open basic concept in the study of ideas of politics and society – and there are no other ideas³⁵ – than the conventional 'ideology'. On this point I have suggested the concept 'ideological thought-content' (in social and political communication and language-use) as the basic analytical concept (Part One, Section 9). The start from this open concept (a 'minimal definition' some would say) makes it possible to discover, and analytically make room for, the mix of ideological elements we always meet empirically in real life political communication and language-use; while still allowing the analytical use of *the traditional ideal-types* as tools for classification and understanding in the analysis of the empirical material. (I have repeatedly stated that the traditional set of comprehensive ideologies of the text-books must be regarded as stylized *ideal-types*, which have been sifted out of the empirical and historical material in a long text-book tradition as we saw. Thus they are analytical tools and not 'real' entities (see Part One, section 9)³⁶.

taken in consideration in political analysis and political understanding. Politics and government never exercise total control in the society but stand in a reflexive relation to these other systems, although having the final word in their *formal, juristic institutionalisation* through *authoritative legislation and regulation* (which in turn also never can add up to total control). In the Parsons-Easton tradition this reflexive relation between the political system and the other social domains is envisaged as a reciprocal feed-back process. In the Marxist tradition Nicos Poulantzas introduced the term 'the relative autonomy of the state' in his path-breaking and tradition-breaking work *Political power and social classes* (1974 [1968]).

35 This must be pointed to again and again. In the older, idealistic philosophy of history and society ideas seemed to exist as explanative factors with an existence of their own, residing in Plato's world of ideas or in Hegel's phenomenology, or even as some God-given religion. This idealistic strand has repercussions even into our own days, where many anglo-saxon hand-books still treat ideologies as self-evident starting points or given entities, as if they exist in some heaven by themselves or as such. A similar idealistic or pseudo-idealistic (religious) view is also found in Eugen Lemberg's influential (in the German-speaking world) *Ideologie und Gesellschaft* (1974).

36 See also the presentation in Lindberg 2017.

17.2 The morphological inner structure of (ideal type) political ideologies

From the basic starting-point of a pluralist ‘idea-struggle hypothesis’, the political science knowledge tradition has recognized about a dozen main ideal type comprehensive ‘political ideologies’ in Europe since the time of the French Revolution 1789; with variants and derivations.³⁷ I will highlight the importance of viewing them as stylized *ideal-types*; there were never such text-book species in real political life. (It is quite similar to the coloured birds in the ornithological hand-book, for example ‘large tit’ or ‘buzzard’, which are nothing more than a pedagogic, stylized ideal-type pictures of handbook species. In reality, what we term ‘species’ only exists an empirical spread of similarities, narrow or wide, which is involved in constant evolutionary change.) The classificatory array of stylized, ideal type ideologies, and the historical and empirical research supporting it, delivers an important background-knowledge for me, which above was mentioned as my laboratory. When the ideal-type ideologies are presented in the text-books, though, they are presented in a comparative fashion, compared as entities of the same kind. Thus, a common frame of reference is needed, displaying the basic, common kinds of ideational elements. As a result, a general morphology, or a *common inner structure* has emerged in the handbooks, and this common inner structure is fundamental for my proposed general theory (as put forward also in Lindberg 2017) (see Part One, Section 3 and 5).

The notion of a common (morphological) inner structure of political theories or ideologies, has developed reluctantly in the history of the political science knowledge tradition. In its most developed form it displays the three-tiers or thought dimensions in a systematic way: values (V), descriptions (D) and prescriptions (P). The three-tiered morphology is present *in statu nascendi* in works from the 1930s and the 1940s, where one early pioneer is Herbert Tingsten who distinguishes three basic kinds of political ideas: ‘value-judgements’, ‘judgements of reality’ and ‘political proposals’. He also implies a logical connection between them, a logical pattern which establishes the action-motivating and action-guiding force of the ideologies (Tingsten 1966 [1939]: 5; 1941: 9). Regarding the three-tiered inner structure, Tingsten is decisively more clear and more developed than his contemporaries George H. Sabine (1937: vii–viii) or Michael Oakshott (1950 [1939]: xi–xxiii), who nevertheless grope for a common morphology or inner structure. Sabine speaks of: a) ‘certain judgements of facts’, b) ‘valuations and predilections’ and c) some ‘logical

37 In the over-view made in Feliks Gross ed., *European Ideologies. A Survey of Twentieth Century Political Ideas* (1948) twenty-seven various political ideologies are presented and analysed; from Communism and Democratic Socialism via Fascism, Nationalism and Nazism to Pan-Slavism, Zionism, Catholicism and Pacifism. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (2013) some twenty substantial political ideologies of our time are presented and analysed. The highly accurate Swedish text-book *Politiska ideologier i vår tid* (*Political ideologies in our time*) by Reidar Larsson (2006) presents and analyses sixteen contemporary political ideologies in a common analytical frame.

compatibility' between the ingredient elements. Oakshott is more diffuse in his search for 'the more important elements which composes the doctrines'.³⁸ Moving further in the disciplinary history on this point, the ideational elements of the three-tiered model was further developed by analytical language philosopher Arne Naess and his political science associates in *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity* (1956), although still in a *statu nascendi* and not reaching a complete picture.

The development towards the VDP-triad reaches a peak, though, in the eminent political theorist Arnold Brecht's influential work *Political Theory. The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought* (1959). Brecht is the one who first of all – with full control over the conceptual history and contending understandings of political theory of the twentieth century – explicitly and systematically introduces the elements V, D and P and their logical connection as an argumentative sequence, making up an action-guiding and action-directing logical whole (Brecht 1959: 117–35). In this way he presents a solution to the so-called Humean problem of the 'the logical gulf between in and ought',³⁹ the problem that a normative 'ought-statement' (P) never can be logically derived from (only) a descriptive 'is-statement' (D). While introducing the major premise of a value-statement (V), in fact a higher-level ought-statement, the logical problem is solved. (See Sections 24, 25, and 26 below.) The systematic, logical sequence of V, D and P presented by Brecht, however, is not alone in its time – which novelties in scientific development seldom are.

The three-tiered model is found in the 1950s in the development of analytical linguistic philosophy; and I will add that there are close contacts between philosophy and political science, especially regarding issues of ordinary language respectively analytical language-use (see Part One, Section 14).⁴⁰ If we move to the discipline of practical philosophy, we find some con-

38 An exception from this tradition is the contemporary British ideology theorist Michael Freeden. When Michael Freeden speaks of 'the morphology' of the political ideologies he suggests as the common inner structure of all ideologies that they contain: 1) core concepts, 2) adjacent concepts and 3) peripheral concepts (see Freeden 1996: 75-79). In my opinion, Freeden's morphology seems rather meager, hardly a morphology at all, rather expressing the levels of 'fundamental' respectively 'operational' thought in my theory, which still are richer or more substantial concepts (see Section 23–28 below). Unfortunately, there is no space here for a closer critical assessment of Freeden's contribution. Another point of critique is the fact that he delimits his concept of 'ideologies' to party-ideologies, following the conventional view in political science. In part One, Section 3, I have argued for the unfruitfulness of this conceptual delimitations, and I will return to it immediately below.

39 This problem seems to be framing all modern (enlightenment and post-enlightenment) discussions on value-theory in moral and political philosophy. For its first appearance, see Hume (1978) [1740]: 468–70.

40 For this connection see Védung 1982, close to Stephen Toulmin's work on argumentation (Toulmin 2003 [1958]); J. L. Austin's work on 'performative sentences' (Austin 1975) and Arne Naess' works on semantics and interpretation (Naess 1966). In a more general sense, the close connection of Philosophy and Political Science is demonstrated by the remarkable Series *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, initially started by Peter Laslett in 1962, and comprising seven volumes up to 1977; then there is the sub-discipline of *political philosophy*, which seem to be shared equally between philosophers and political scientists.

temporaneous, very influential parallel works, in principle supporting the position of Brecht. First, we find Michael Hare's *The Language of Morals* (1954) which puts forward a solution to the Humean 'logical gulf between is and ought' similar to Arnold Brecht's, while introducing a higher level 'ought-sentence' as the major premise in the logical sequence. Secondly, we find Stephen E. Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument* (Toulmin 2003 [1958]) with the similar three components in his theory of argument, although the three components are arranged in a slightly different way. A similar view can also be found in David Gauthier's work *Practical Reasoning* (1963), in which the label '*practical reasoning*' itself is introduced in the title of the book, which has the telling sub-title: *The Structure and Foundation of Prudential and Moral Argument and their Exemplification in Discourse* (Gauthier 1963). It is from Gauthier I have borrowed the term 'practical reasoning' as basic in my theoretical construct.⁴¹

In Swedish Political Science the three-tiered VDP-model, and the notion of the argumentative sequence of *practical reasoning*, became a standard analytical model about 1970 in the 'Uppsala-School' of idea-analytical political science, as I called it; following Herbert Tingsten and Arnold Brecht (see Part One, Introduction and Section 5). As examples I will highlight the widespread Swedish handbook *Politisk teori* (Political Theory) (Björklund 1970 [1968]: 28–31) or the dissertation by Sverker Gustavsson on the principled debate on university policy (1971: 14–19) or Evert Vedung's dissertation on the debate on the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905 (1971: 48–51). The argumentative tiers of the VDP-triad and the notion of 'practical conclusions' also appear as a carrying tenet in the systematic handbook by Vedung, *Det rationella politiska samtalet* (1977: 160–166), translated into English as *Political Reasoning* (Vedung 1982: 200–02). In the English-speaking world today, varying terms and conceptualizations of similar three-tiered views are commonly established in the handbooks on political ideologies (see e.g. Heywood 2007: 11–15; Ball & Dagger 2011: 4–11). However, these conceptualizations are not as logically sharp as the mentioned Uppsala-school, including Arnold Brecht, which are close to analytical linguistic philosophy; and they usually lack the pointed notion of *practical reasoning* and the deep anchorage in language philosophy, for example the fundamental works of Hare, Toulmin and Gauthier.⁴² (See further section 22 and 24–25 below.)

41 This specific term is not used by Brecht (1959: 126–30) and only brushed against in Vedung (1982) in spite of the fact that they establish the relations between values, descriptions and prescriptions as logical conclusions; quite like Hare, Tomlin and Gauthier. Vedung uses the term 'practical conclusion' (Vedung 1982: 200–01).

42 The early establishment of the three-tiered structure in Scandinavian Political Science is, I think, due to the close contact between *analytical language philosophy* and political science (e.g. the Uppsala school of Axel Hägerström, respectively, the Oslo-school of Arne Naess). Due to these close contacts a language-philosophical awareness was introduced in the discipline which made it natural to differentiate between

As the reader already knows (see Part One, Introduction and Section 5) I will borrow the *three-tiered model* with its V, D and P as the basic elements, as well as the notion of *practical reasoning*, from the Uppsala school of idea-analytical political science as well as the works of Arnold Brecht, R.M. Hare, Stephen Toulmin and David Gauthier. I also borrow these notions from the tradition of political theory and the study of political ideology more generally, and will place them centrally in my proposed general theory.⁴³

17.3 Limitations in the Political Science paradigm (1): the concept of 'political ideologies' confined to the input side of the political system

However, there is a problem with the concept 'political ideologies' as it is normally used in Political Science. As we saw (see Part One, Section 3), the concept refers to ideas and idea systems of parties, organizations and movements. Hence 'ideologies' reside solely on the 'input side' of the political system. This means that the extension and the empirical application of the concept 'political ideology' is delineated. The action-guiding thoughts and ideas on the 'output side' of the political system are not called 'ideologies', which would be logical. Instead they are given special names and are studied in specific analytical approaches. We find, for example, 'public policies' (in government and administration), or 'policy doctrines' or 'regimes' (in international politics). Furthermore, when speaking of the political thoughts and ideas of citizens and representatives, the common concepts of the discipline are not 'ideologies' but 'beliefs and attitudes', or 'belief-systems' or 'political culture'; as if 'ideology' was a too systematic and principled concept to be used for the political thinking of the common citizen. All in all, the term 'political ideologies', when normally used in the discipline, is limited to the thought and language of parties or organizations.

In my view, this is an unfruitful terminological and conceptual delimitation and diversification. I would rather try to follow the example of Robert Lane (1962) or Angus Campbell and his associates (1960) in the attempt to keep the conceptual worlds 'ideology' respectively 'beliefs' or 'belief-systems' together.⁴⁴ But I also want to include the usual concepts used on the output

value-statements and descriptive, respectively, prescriptive statements in political language. Tingsten, at least, remained in close contact, in his student years, with the radical philosophical and political views of Axel Hägerström, and the Humean as well as Neo-Kantian 'Uppsala-school' in (analytical) Philosophy. And Arne Naess, as an analytical language philosopher himself, founder of 'the Oslo school', had a close contact with political science and political thought, as in his work of 1956.

43 I have been lecturing for thirty years on political theory and political ideology, and always presented the VDP-triad as a forceful analytical tool to use in all analysis and criticism of political and social ideas. Among later works on *practical reasoning*, I especially appreciate Richardson 1994. See also Walton 1990.

44 Lane, *Political Ideology. Why the American Common Man Believes what he does* (1962: 1-16); Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (1960: 188-215).

side of the political system, most prominently the concept of ‘public policy’ and its cousins. The reasons are manifold. First, this diversity as such, in my opinion, includes a logical anomaly. Why should action-guiding thoughts be termed ‘ideologies’ when held by a political party, but ‘beliefs’ when held by its supporters? And why should action-guiding thoughts be termed ‘ideology’ when a political party suggests a legislative measure, but ‘policy’, ‘programs’, ‘reforms’ or a ‘regime’ when this same thought-content is adopted by a decision-making institution and implemented by an administrative body? Secondly, this terminological diversification brings about a fragmented view of politics, which hampers comparisons between various parts of the political system and the possibility of comprehensive over-views concerning overall ideological stability or change. Thirdly, the terms ‘beliefs’ or ‘policies’ are more technical in tone than ‘ideology’, which seems to erase the often dramatical, society-transforming performance of citizen beliefs and policy measures; thus, making us miss the importance of the cultural or institutional changes that are going on. Fourthly, this terminological diversification hampers communication and discussion among researchers, as if they sat at ‘separate tables’ (Almond),⁴⁵ which in general impedes ‘the growth of knowledge’ (Popper).⁴⁶ Increasingly detailed, approach-bound fragments risk being produced in this ‘normal science’ (Kuhn),⁴⁷ cementing a partitioned and fragmented view of the central aspect of all politics: the preservation and change of the institutions of the society, and their attached power relations and allocations of values. Ironically it was the fragmentation of the discipline that once impelled David Easton to suggest the comprehensive analytical frame of ‘the political system’ (Easton, 1953: Chs. 1–2), which he later developed in his grand tetralogy.⁴⁸

Contrary to this fragmented view, following the general view of both Talcott Parsons and David Easton, *I regard all political thought and language to be of the same basic kind*. Consequently, they ought to be theorized and conceptualized from that assumption of ontological sameness. This objective requires a synthesized *general theory* of ideological thought-content. (As declared above, the elaboration of such a general theory is the task here; see Part One, Introduction and Section 5.)

In real life, to support my argument, the ideological dramas and struggles in political life are not confined to parties and organizations on the input side

45 I refer to Gabriel Almond’s opening chapter “Separate Tables. Schools and sects in Political Science” in his *A Discipline Divided* (1980).

46 I refer to the title of Karl Popper’s *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (1963), and to the title of Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (1970), involving the famous Kuhn–Popper controversy.

47 Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962).

48 The tetralogy, unique and outstanding in the discipline in its continued focus on basic analytical theory on the aspects of politics and political life, consists of the works Easton 1953, 1965a, 1965b and 1990.

of the political system. Ideas and idea-struggles permeate all parts of the political system. They are directly visible in the public debate, in diverging value-patterns and ideological beliefs among elites, and the comparative different views among the citizens; this plurality and variety is demonstrated by a long empirical research tradition.⁴⁹ Added to this is the fact that ideological conflicts and idea-struggles also are imbued in central and local government, and in the administrative bodies of public policy formation and implementation; as well as in the judiciary, the military and the police. We can take the USA under Trump as an obvious example, where it is open for everyone to see how different parts of the government and the administration, at both federal and state level, as well as the judiciary and the police, have diverging ideas and ideologies, guiding their (informal and formal) actions to the brink of open, factional conflict. But this contemporary US situation is not exceptional; only its acute scale and visibility. Instead, a similar ideological diversity and conflict, in various parts of the political system, is common in all societies and in all times. This is amply demonstrated in many empirical studies, as in Robert A. Levine's systematic *The Arms Debate* (1963),⁵⁰ Theda Skocpol's daring *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) or Bo Rothstein's beautiful, comparative case-study of Swedish educational respectively labour market policy in *The Social Democratic State* (1998 [1986]). The empirical examples are legion (we met some already in Part One, Section 1). My conclusion is that we need a widening move to a *general theory* of ideological thought-content which must be useable in analyses of action-guiding thoughts and ideas in *all parts of the political system*, that is, all its institutions, structures, actors and processes; not only on the input side. This is one good reason for my already expressed intention to leave the concept '(political) ideology' aside, with its delimitation to the thoughts and ideas of parties and movements. Instead I will propose, as we saw, the concept 'ideological thought-content'. This concept is free to refer to the action-guiding thought-content of all messages, communications and language-use, and all the 'communicative actions and interactions' that make up the 'political' system;⁵¹ found in public or social media, in private conversations or official documents, in parliamentary debates or administrative bodies.

49 See e.g. Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960; Lane 1959; Lane 1962; van Dyke 1995; Durham 2000; Almond, Appleby & Sevan 2003; Inglehart & Norris 2003; Hartman 2015.

50 Levine's outstanding work has been especially interesting for me, as it is one early empirical study on policy that systematically uses the three tiers of VDP as the basic analytical grid in the analysis of positions and policies in the discussions on rearmament/disarmament in the US (of nuclear weapons) in the early 1960s.

51 For the well-known definition of which communicative actions and interactions are to be considered as 'political', and thus be possible to regard as a 'political system' (instead of 'economic', 'cultural' and so on), see Easton 1953: Ch. IV-V; Easton 1965a: 47-50.

17.4 Limitations in the political science paradigm (2): the delineation of 'politics' and the borders of 'the political' aspect of society

As we saw above, I will not confine the concept of 'political ideologies' only to be entities of the 'input side' of the political system. Consequently, I will include all communication and language-use also of 'the output side' in the connotation-denotation of my concept 'ideological thought-content'. However, my generalizing effort does not stop there. In the conventional and common picture of 'the political system' in the discipline, the 'political' is confined to the formal institutions of government and its surroundings (like political parties, lobby groups, mass media or the public administration). This delineation prevails as a paradigmatic convention, similar to Thomas Kuhn's classic account of how scientific paradigms work (Kuhn 1962), in most cases unconscious or invisible for the participant researchers socialized into the paradigmatic views.⁵²

If we go back to the general social theory of Talcott Parsons, which I have made the anchoring ground of my proposed general theory, it is obvious that every 'social system', whether large or small, has a 'culture'; and every social group, whether large or small, has an 'ideology' of 'action-orientations' (empirical views, value-orientations and regulative norms) holding the group together and giving it a relatively unified outlook and view of themselves and the world.⁵³ This broad view would make it possible, in principle, to apply the concept of 'ideological thought-content' also to social domains and fields other

52 In my opinion, this limitation of the concept 'the political' to the formal institutions of the government, and the political life surrounding them, is *not* due to a thorough theoretical elaboration or a critically derived theoretical conception. Instead of elaborated theory we find a prevailing *political ideology*. We get an *ideological conception* instead of a *theoretical concept*. In this case a liberal-conservative, or a republican-conservative, view is at work, as I see it, that involves an institutionalist, formal, juristic view of the actual or desired borders of the political sphere; an ideological conception imbued in many quarters of the political science community. (For the general role of ideology in the knowledge system of scientific research, see Bunge 1983: 197.) In the classic *bourgeois ideology* (according to Jürgen Habermas) the 'political sphere' is equal to the 'public sphere', as contrasted to 'the private sphere', where the public sphere has the mentioned delineation. (This cultural and conceptual history is comprehensively demonstrated and critically illuminated in Jürgen Habermas' impressive work, *The structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989 [1962]). This contention of mine, regarding the ideological delineation of the political in much political science, counts for the fact that this liberal-conservative delineation, paradoxically, does *not have much elaborated theoretical support*, nor much explicit theoretical argument. The subject is avoided. It is a tacit ideological stance. In contrast, the subject is discussed and elaborated on from the left-liberal or progressivist point of view. This is done in the most serious, theoretically argued works of today, on the fundamental concepts of political science, that is, the works of Lasswell & Kaplan 1951 or Easton 1953 and 1965a, or Dahl 1984 [1963]. In these works a *wider (!)* connotation of the concept 'political' is proposed, as we will see soon. This does not mean that ideology is not informing the works of Lasswell or Easton; like so many sociologists or economists of their generation they were (left liberal or social democratic) progressivists. But they had the good taste to state their value-standpoint clearly (not making it invisible) and to critically and analytically elaborate on the theory and basic concepts of political science (instead of tacitly relying on some prevailing conventions). And this makes all the difference.

53 See Part One, Section 8 above, and especially Parsons, *The Social System* (1951), Ch. I and VIII; Parsons & Shils 1951: 3–29. See also Section 21 below.

than the ‘political system’, as this is narrowly understood in the conventional wisdom.

17.5 Limitations in the political science paradigm (3): following Lasswell, Easton and Dahl against the conventional wisdom

The paradigm-arguing political science of the 1950s, creating the action-theoretical ‘behavioural revolution’, did not remain inside this narrow understanding of ‘the political’. Consequently we need not go all the way to Talcott Parsons and theoretical sociology to find a broader understanding. A broader view of the political aspect, defined as all power processes in society, or all authority structures, was theoretically developed and argued for already by Lasswell and Kaplan in *Power and Society* (1950). In fact, they defined political science as the study of power practices and power processes wherever they occur (Lasswell and Kaplan eds. 1950: xiv–xix, 74–102). A similar broadening view of ‘the political’, but perhaps not as broad as Lasswell and Kaplan’s, at least more precise, was argued for by David Easton in his classic, paradigm-setting works of 1953 or 1965. His views, however, are most often used as pro-arguments for the narrow definition of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, allegedly confined to the processes of ‘authoritative allocations’ by the government or the state. But this is only a half-true or misleading reading. In contrast, in these very works, Easton termed the many smaller social systems or organizations in society as ‘para-political’ and attributed a power-political character to them.⁵⁴ This conceptual widening was explicitly argued for *against* the conventional, narrow definition of politics in the discipline. In his own words in his early work *The Political System* of 1953:

Wherever we find a group of people, whatever their purposes or form of organization, there we usually encounter maneuvering for positions and power. We speak in this sense about politicking within a group...the power struggle of a fraternal organization... (Easton 1953: 127–28).

And in his influential and widely read *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965a) he states:

Like the more inclusive society of which they are part, groups do make allocations that are accepted by their members as binding. In such subgroups as families, churches, or fraternal organizations we find constitutions, competition for control among dominating or aspiring elites, and pressure groups or factions... For this reason, examination of the structures and processes...in

54 See e.g. 1965a: 50–56.

organizations and other groups can be quite helpful in shedding new light on the structures and processes of the more inclusive political system (Easton 1965a: 51).

From an analytical point of view, I have always found it reasonable to accept Easton's suggested view that even smaller social systems or sub-fields of society can be regarded as 'political', that is, as involving power practises and authoritative, that is, binding allocations of values.⁵⁵

A similar view on the extension of the political aspect is held by Robert Dahl in his widely-read hand-book on the foundations of the discipline, *Modern Political Analysis* (1984 [1963], all over the world. In this work he calls 'business firms', 'government agencies' or 'religious associations' small 'political systems', quite like David Easton. He thus does not invent a special name for them, as Easton's 'para-political', but is content to speak of them as 'hierarchal systems' or 'authority structures' (Dahl 1984 [1963]: 54-55). Consequently he will also widen the concept of 'democracy', as a critical ideal-type for empirical analyses, to apply even to these smaller systems and organisations. This is suggested in his thought-provoking minor classic *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (1985) where he investigates the right to democracy within firms; in the title paraphrasing his earlier, epic work *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956).

This view of a broader delimitation of the political aspect of society is also supported by the theoretical strands of neo-Marxism and neo-feminism, which points to the 'political' character of the seemingly 'private' organizations or social fields, such as in capitalist industrial work or the patriarchal family.⁵⁶

In my opinion, this view implies – directly following Lasswell, Easton and Dahl – that families, churches, unions, organizations, business firms, as well as political parties and administrative bodies of government, might also involve, not only a dominating 'culture' or an 'ideology', in the vein of Dürkheim's sociology and Parsons' general social theory, but also *factions and contending elites* as well as *ideational diversity and idea-struggles*. Thus, it seems wise to

55 The fact that Easton discusses the proper subject-matter of the discipline political science as limited to 'the authoritative allocation of values for a whole society' does not hinder me from observing that he also recognises 'authoritative allocation of values' in smaller social systems or organizations, hence attributing also to these a 'political' dimension or aspect. That all these points of 'authoritative allocation' may conflate to 'an overall political structure' is discussed both in Easton 1953 and Easton 1990. The latter work also includes highly informative critical assessment of Nicos Poulatzas' theory of the state in *Political Power and Social Classes* (1976 [1968]), a grand stance of structural Marxism (connected to Parsonian general social theory as well as Weberian political science) turning the table in the Marxist discussion for a long time to come.

56 See my reference to Habermas in a footnote immediately above. Remember the slogan of radical feminism: 'The private is political!' However, most works in the Marxist or the feminist traditions (since the latter is theoretically closely related to the first) are stuck in the holist or monolithic view of 'the culture' or 'the ideology', in line much sociological theory, as presented above. They thus propose the image of a 'dominating culture' or a 'dominating ideology' also in these smaller social systems, and do not propose the basic empirically open notion of a pluralist idea-struggle *a priori*. See Sections 16 above and 18 below.

view these smaller social systems from an *empirically open*, conceptually neutral and inclusive perspective where it is empirically possible that they may be dominated by a single mentality, mindset or belief-system, but also, that they may involve different goals, principles, views or policy ambitions. I will keep the term ‘para-political’, though, to indicate the subordinated and regulated character of these smaller social systems or organizations. They are all actual or possible targets of government legislation and regulation, and concerning ideology they may display their own, *field-specific ideologies* as I have termed it (as noticed in Part One, Section 1 above).⁵⁷

Power-struggles and idea-struggles, thus – in this perspective – are possible in principle both in the over-arching ‘political system’ relating to authoritative governance for the whole society, and in the subordinated ‘para-political’ organizations or the smaller social fields of society. But if conflict and power is possible in the ‘para-political’ social systems, so are of course also the other side of politics: cooperation, democratic procedures, compromise and win-win-games. Accordingly, it would be possible in principle to use my analytical concept *ideological thought-content* both in the larger political system as well as in the smaller ‘para-political’ social systems. *Ideological thought-content*, as I conceive of it as VDP-triads, ought to be found alike – and on equal footing from the analytical point of view – in the communication and messages in parliamentary debates, government decisions, public policies, political parties, trade unions, lobby-groups, media-houses, business firms, churches, voluntary organizations, social media debates, or in the everyday conversations in families or among friends. An example: family culture, gender roles and parenting are continually debated all around the globe, within families and among relatives; we find many contrasting spontaneous family-ideologies or propagated family-doctrines in everyday talk, world-wide. On the other hand we may also find the same kind of family-ideologies and family-related idea-struggles, with the same basic values, descriptive images and prescriptions, in the legislative institutions and processes in many countries, regarding legislation on family-related violence, divorce, inheritance, custody and children’s rights. Consequently, *the ideological thought-content* in these debates, at different levels of society, ought not to be analysed and interpreted as *different kinds* of thought. From the point of view of *action-guiding thought* they ought to display the same basic thought dimensions; that is values (V), descriptive images (D) or suggested lines of action (P). The thoughts or ideas appearing in everyday family discussions, respectively in various public or social media, or in parliamentary sessions or legislative bodies, could thus reasonably be analysed from the point of view of *a unified analytical framework*, or, a *general theory*, that is, of the

57 The analytical distinction between ‘comprehensive ideology’ respectively ‘field-specific ideology’ is originally developed in Lindberg 2017: 90–1.

ideological thought-content involved. The only difference between them, as I see it, is the *position* of these communicative actions, situated in *different institutional structures and processes* of the main 'political system' and the surrounding 'para-political' systems in 'the total structure of the situation' (Easton 1953: 171–199) or 'the overall political structure' (Easton 1990: 134–151).

17.6 Critical conclusion on political science

There are two achievements in the political science knowledge tradition that I find especially valuable and useful. First, the concept of political pluralism and 'the idea-struggle hypothesis', which I consider to be two important basic assumptions, added to the basic anchoring of my effort in general social theory. Secondly, it is in the political science knowledge tradition that we originally find attempts at systematic investigation into the inner structure of political theories and ideologies 'out there', in the search for common morphological traits. (Parsons is surely on the way, but with him we find a general social theory and not the further steps in the direction of the inner structure of political thought and language.) The three-tier model is an important contribution, which is fundamental in my reconstructive synthesis, as the theoretical model of the VDP-triad (see Part One, Section 5, and Sections 23 – 26 below).

However, as we saw, there are some shortcomings in the political science paradigmatic conventions. From the point of view of reconstructing a *general theory* of ideological thought-content, I find the conventional delimitation of the concept 'political ideology' in the Political Science knowledge tradition too narrow for my purpose. I must make a conceptual broadening in two steps, leaving conventional conceptual limitations in political science behind. First, this broadening involves the abandoning of the conventional concept of 'political ideology'. This has a conventional limited extension, as we have seen, to mainly political parties and organizations and thus to the input side of the political system. When I propose the concept of 'ideological thought-content' this concept is given a wider extension, referring to all communicative actions and interactions of the whole political system, that is, also the output side. This step is possible from the assumption that all political thought and language, and all political communicative actions, are *of the same basic (ontic) kind* over the whole political system; following the general theory of the political system, as it was elaborated in David Easton's works. (This does not contradict the fact that communicative actions in the political system, writ large, are performed in different institutional settings or processes which may make them differ in linguistic style, or with different political bias or inclination which may make them differ in political ambition, content or propagandistic twist.)

Secondly, this broadening involves a further step. If my widening ambition is aiming at a really *general* theory, my proposed theory should be applicable also to all other – 'para-political' – social domains and fields of society. After

all the thought and culture in all parts of society is equally *action-guiding*, as we saw, and equally involved in, or related to, the preservation of, or modification of, the *institutional and cultural configurations of society*. My second step, thus, is based on the general social theory tradition, exemplified by Parsons, where a ‘culture’ and an ‘ideology’ may be found in all social domains and fields, whether large or small. However, as we also saw, I want to add some elements from the political science knowledge tradition to Parsons general social theory: a) the basic pluralist assumption even regarding these small, ‘para-political’, systems; b) the notion that these smaller, ‘para-political’ systems also carry both ‘power processes’ and ‘politicking’, which makes c) the basic assumptions of ‘the idea-struggle hypothesis’ necessary and fruitful in ideational analysis of all social domains or fields of the whole society. My concept ‘ideological thought-content’, thus, should be possible to use not only in the whole political system, but in all social domains and fields in the whole society as well.

A final word: If the reader returns to my illustrative examples of the application of my proposed general theory (Part One, Section 5) she will notice that I deliberately chose examples from different corners of the social and political world (including *The New Society of Homeless Cats in Huddersfield!*) to illustrate the generality of my proposed theory.

18. THE MARXIST THEORY TRADITION

18.1 *The traditional Marxist concept of ideology, up to 1970*

The Marxist theory tradition regarding society and history relies on a proposed general social theory, ‘the materialist conception of history (and society)’ formulated about 1845–48 by Marx and Engels.⁵⁸ The proclaimed width and depth of this social theory later challenged theorists like Max Weber (in the 1910s) and Talcott Parsons (in the 1930s) to critical encounters and continuing efforts to overcome the Marxist challenge.⁵⁹ One of the basic concepts of the Marxist general theory is ‘the Ideology’ (written by me with a capital ‘I’). This is one of the two main parts of the ‘superstructure’ of society; the other being the juristic and political superstructure, or ‘the state’. The Ideology delivers all

58 The prevalence of theoretical variants inside the Marxist tradition, or family of traditions, indicates that any alleged ‘Marxism’ is seldom the same as the actual thinking of Karl Marx himself (of 1848 or 1867). They are most often situation-bound and debate-bound interpretations and developments made by adherents in some later period. The ‘orthodox Marxism’ of the party programme of the German Social Democracy of 1891 is one illustrative case, as is also the ‘scientific philosophy’ of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union from the 1930s, systematized during the 1950s. On these shoulders some variants of ‘Western Marxism’ occurs, starting with the ‘critical theory’ of the Frankfurt school (Horkheimer and Adorno), as envisaged by Perry Anderson (1976).

59 Irving Zeitlin terms the whole classical sociological tradition since Weber a ‘debate with Marx’ ghost’ (Zeitlin 2001: 194–398). See also Lindberg 2013.

the thoughts and identities necessary to reproduce as well as legitimate the class-based socio-economic 'structure' (or 'basis'), which are considered as the 'real' social relations, in contrast to the 'imagined' social relations of ideological thought. The prevailing Ideology in a capitalist society is thus a constituent part of the reproduction of capitalist, socio-economic institutions and class relations (Chesnokov 1969: 337–372; Althusser 1971: 8, 20–23, 44–51, 54–57; Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 21–22; 168–170).

The legitimating function of the 'Ideology in society' is accomplished since the Ideology endows the social subjects, especially the working class, with a 'distorted thought' or a 'false consciousness' making the class-society appear equal and fair (Lukacs 1923); hides the alienation and subordination in capitalist society (Marcuse 1964); makes the existing (capitalist) social and political order seem natural and commonplace (Milliband 1969; Ch. 7–8); installs an 'imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (Althusser 1971: 36); installs in a social group 'a representation of their social relations' that 'conceals from itself its own truth' by 'laying down the dividing line between the thinkable and the unthinkable' (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 21–22) or imposes 'an apprehension of the established order as natural...through the disguised and thus misrecognised impositions of classification and of mental structures...adjusted to social structures' (Bourdieu 1991 [1977]: 169).⁶⁰

Unlike the 'pluralistic and idea-struggle hypothesis' of Political Science, as I have termed it, the Marxist 'dominant ideology thesis' (as it has been called) relies on a bipolar fundamental political theory of dominant and dominated classes.⁶¹ Thus, the Marxist concept of 'the Ideology' is by default *monolithic*; 'the dominating ideology' – which is 'the ideology of the dominating class', or of 'the hegemonic faction' of the dominating class – is, by definition an single or sole mode of thought permeating society (Althusser 1971: 20–23). It is also *holistic* in the sense that it permeates the mind and thought of all individuals, moulding their subjectivity and identity as communicative individuals in the social relations of the class-based society (Althusser 1971: 44–45; Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 167–170). (On this point, by the way, the Marxist concept of Ideology' is rather close to the tendentially holistic concept of 'Cultural System' of Parsons' general social theory, although it is systematically involved in a conflict-perspective on society with dominating and dominated classes.) Furthermore, the Marxist concept of Ideology is also *restrictive*, since only the dominating and system-supporting ideas, by definition, make up 'the Ideology of society'. It is

60 For a knowledgeable and incisive presentation of the Marxist concept of 'Ideology', see e.g. Seliger 1977. Another excellent overview is the West-German Projekt Ideologie-Theorie in their *Theorien über Ideologie* (1979) (Theories of Ideology), with W.F. Haug as *primus motor*. See also Larrain 1979 or McLellan 1995.

61 For a presentation and critique of 'the dominant ideology thesis' in the Marxist tradition, see e.g. Abercombie, Hill and Turner 1980; see also the appreciating view of Abercombie et al. in van Dijk 1998: 179–99. For a critique of the fundamental 'pejorative' aspect in Marxist ideology theory, see Seliger 1977.

also from the beginning *pejorative*, that is, not neutrally used. And it is pejorative in a double sense. On the one hand, ‘the ideology of society’, by definition, supports an unequal society and an unjust class-rule. On the other hand, it succeeds in this function by delivering, by definition, a ‘distorted thought’ or a ‘false consciousness’. Thus, ‘the ideology’ is something negative, something that must be ‘revealed’ in ‘ideology critique’ and if possible be substituted by a more liberating or accurate consciousness.⁶²

In the Marxist tradition, therefore, oppositional political ideas, whether of left-wing political parties or liberating social movements, are, by definition, excluded from the concept of ‘the Ideology’. As we saw, the expression ‘the Ideology of society’ refers only to the dominating ideas, supportive of the dominating class. Marxists or post-Marxists, thus, seldom speak of ‘communist ideology’, ‘feminist ideology’, ‘anti-racist ideology’ or ‘ecologist ideology’ as Political Science does. They rather speak of ‘communist theory’, ‘feminist theory’, ‘anti-racist theory’ or ‘ecologist theory’. This language-use is quite logical, since ‘Ideology’, by definition, is a system-legitimizing, oppressive or distorted thought; while ‘theory’, especially Marxist theory or leftist ‘critical theory’, is regarded as the carrier of liberation and truth. Consequently the prominent Herbert Marcuse in his works (1964; 1969) speaks of ‘legitimizing ideology’ versus ‘critical theory’.⁶³

The intellectual development of the Marxist theory of ‘Ideology’ reached a peak during the early 1970s, during the ‘Marxist watershed’ in the social sciences and the humanities; from Herbert Marcuse’s ‘critical theory’ of the 1960s to Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ of the 1970s. The consensual political climate of the 1960s (inspiring ‘the end of ideology’ thesis by conservative and liberal observers) was critically ‘revealed’ as in fact a pro-capitalist smokescreen. As a web of illusions it was hiding the economic and social inequality of capitalist society, as well as simultaneously expressing the interests of ‘monopoly capital’, which was regarded as the hegemonic faction of the capitalist class.⁶⁴ The social sciences themselves, in turn, were criticised as being components parts of this ‘dominating Ideology’; viewed as directly supportive of, and concealing, the existing capitalist system and the existence of the dominating capitalist class-rule.⁶⁵

62 See e.g. Marcuse 1964 and 1969, regarding ‘ideology critique’ and the liberating role of Marxist ‘critical theory’.

63 The most read philosophical argument for this position, of the time, was probably Herbert Marcuse’s highly influential works (1964) and (1969); being a prominent member of the Frankfurt School since 1932. See also Habermas’ influential essay (1968), once a student at Horkheimer and Adorno, from 1964 holder of Horkheimer’s chair in Frankfurt. Both Marcuse and Habermas became main inspirators of the ‘critical’ student movement of 1968 and formulated the accompanying ‘critical theory’ among left-inclined students and social researchers. (I know for I was there!)

64 See e.g. Nicos Poulantzas (1973 [1968]); Baran and Sweezy 1966; Ralph Miliband (1969). For the case of Sweden, see e.g. my own work from my student years, Dahllkvist (1975).

65 As an engaged outflow of this ideology-critical spirit in the universities, see the disciplinary over-view in Blackburn (ed.) *Ideology in Social Science. Politics, Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, History* (1972).

18.2 From 'Ideology' to 'Discourse'; after 1970

In 1970 the influential French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser wrote a theory-developing essay, *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1971 [1970]), which became a classic departure in the ensuing, crucial discussion of the Marxist theory of ideology. For Althusser Ideology is 'a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (p.36), thus supporting the continued reproduction of the socio-economic structure of capitalism (p. 22–31). Althusser asked where, and how, the 'ruling Ideology' could perform this function, and focused on the established institutions of schools, churches, media and organizations, which he in an extended meaning termed 'ideological state apparatuses' (p. 14–22).⁶⁶ Althusser launched a social-psychological communicative mechanism, which produced the ideological socialization and education. He explained the existence of any 'ruling ideology' in terms of the 'interpellations' that the 'ruling ideological formation' – propagated by the 'ideological state-apparatuses' – made vis-à-vis the individuals as social subjects; hence installing a specific pattern of system-reproducing thought in the population (p. 44–51).⁶⁷ This was a vibrant new formulation in Marxist ideology theory, a great step forward, that was to have many unforeseen consequences, for example in the works in ideology theory by linguist Michel Pécheux and sociologist Göran Therborn, which we will meet below.

Some years later, Althusser's collaborator Michel Pécheux further developed the idea of the 'interpellations' of the ruling ideology. It was done in the work *Language, Symbols and Ideology* (1982 [1975]). To Althusser's concept of 'the ruling ideological formation' Pécheux added 'language' and the corresponding concept of 'discourse', especially the concept of 'the ruling discursive formation'. With this term, Pécheux referred to the existence of a specific vocabulary and phraseology into which the subjects were socialised or habituated which of course contained a specific conceptual and ideological thought-content. In this way Pécheux further specified the 'interpellating' mechanism, by adding the accompanying mechanism of language learning and language understanding (Pécheux 1982 [1975]: 97–115). With Pécheux's contribution, the Marxist theory of ideology, in the Althusserian vein, was made more empirically plausible and theoretically more precise. He also opened the door for the conception that a dominating ideology is born out of a struggle with dominated ideologies, on this point working further from Althusser. In my view this combination of Althusser and Pécheux was a real scientific progress in the Marxist ideology theory.

66 To be somewhat captious, though, there is not much in this essay which is not already said about ideology in capitalist society in the work of Ralph Milliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969: Ch. 7–8), especially not regarding the alleged 'state apparatuses'.

67 This essay titled *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1971 [1970]) (Swed. transl. 1976) is actually an extract from a more comprehensive manuscript, recently published in English with the title *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*. (Althusser 2014).

Furthermore, Pécheux seemingly borrowed the term ‘discursive formation’ from Michael Foucault, an old companion in the ‘structuralist’ circle where Althusser was a prominent figure. The term ‘discursive formation’ is originally (as far as I can see) used by Foucault in *The Archaeology of knowledge* (1972 [1969]: 41–43, 120–121, 130–32), especially in chapter three, ‘The Description of Statements’, where Foucault tries to clarify his theoretical position. However, in this work the concept ‘discursive formation’ does not refer to the social or political ideology in a society. Instead it is a concept designed for the *history of knowledge and scientific ideas*, following in the tracks of the discontinuous French epistemology; Foucault mentions Georges Canguilhem and Gaston Bachelard but first and foremost Louis Althusser and his concept of ‘epistemological breaks’ (Foucault 1972 [1969]: 4–6). Foucault thinks of a ‘discourse’ as a ‘set of statements’, forming a (dominating) rule-bound convention of how to think or speak, or not think or speak, in an academic discipline or a knowledge-using social field. As a concept in the history of knowledge it connotes a ‘knowledge regime’, similar of the concept ‘paradigm’ proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962).⁶⁸

Now, what makes the language philosopher Michel Pécheux important, is that he, in his innovative work 1975, simply transfers the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive formation’ from Foucault’s field of *history of science* to Althusser’s field of *social and political ideology*. In the ideological field, following Althusser, the ‘ideological formation’ was regarded as a discontinuous and self-contained mode of thought and language, quite parallel to Foucault’s ‘discursive formation’ in the history of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, in Pécheux’s work the concept ‘ideological formation’ of Althusser was amalgamated with the concept ‘discursive formation’ of Foucault. Thus, Pécheux made a significant contribution – yes, can be seen as the originator – to the formidable, later success of the term ‘discourse’ in the social sciences, including history

68 The discontinuous view of scientific development was very important for Althusser’s view of Marx, based on Marx’s discontinuous view of history as a sequence of historical ‘modes of production’, with a subsequent discontinuous development of ideology, philosophy and science, based on epoch-making ‘upheavals’, ‘ruptures’ or ‘breaks’, parallel to the great social and political revolutions, signalling the main epochs and the new ‘modes of production’ in history. In the circles around Althusser, where Foucault also thrived at times, Michel Pécheux himself, together with Michel Fichant, presented and developed the discontinuous view in their small but precise *Sur l’histoire des sciences* (1969); translated into Swedish as *Om vetenskapernas historia* (1971); written the same year as Foucault’s *Archaeology*. (For a presentation of the French, discontinuous epistemology in relation to Marxism, see Dominique Lecourt, (1975) *Marxism and Epistemology. Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault*. See also Mary Tiles (1984) *Bachelard: Science and Objectivity*, Cambridge University Press.) This epistemological development in the Althusserian circle of the 1960s, was similar to (although not so precise and comprehensive) the contemporaneous ‘historical’ and ‘critical’ epistemological revolution in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science, where Thomas Kuhn’s view on ‘scientific revolutions’ (Kuhn 1962) was a formidable starting point, initiating a central discussion with Karl Popper. Kuhn’s view was more pointedly discontinuous than Karl Popper’s ‘historical epistemology’ or ‘evolutionary approach’ (Popper 1972). For an over-view of these discussions in the theory of scientific knowledge, see the set of remarkable and presumably epoch-making essays in Bunge ed. (1964) as well as in Lakatos and Musgrave eds. (1970).

and the history of ideas.⁶⁹ This is the reason why I think it is correct to speak of an ‘Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian’ concept of discourse; although this concept is most often known under the label of ‘Foucault’ or ‘Foucauldian’.⁷⁰ We may also note that Foucault’s original concept of ‘discourse’ is monolithic or holistic, as I have termed it (see e.g. Foucault 1972 [1969]: 121). His investigations are performed from the a priori assumption that there is, in a social field, one dominating discourse, or that the interesting thing is to discern the dominating mentality or dominating conventions of language-use.⁷¹ Regarding the monolithic or holistic view, Foucault’s concept of ‘the (dominating) discourse’ is quite similar to the old Marxist concept of ‘the (dominant) ideology’ in society (but also to the general sociological concept of ‘the culture’ of a social system). Both rely on a bipolar view of power and subordination. These similarities, of course, made Pêcheux’s task to amalgamate the concept ‘ideological formation’ with ‘discursive formation’ even easier.

From this time on, the Marxist concept of a ‘dominant’, ‘ruling’ or ‘hegemonic’ *Ideology* was connected to, or inscribed into, the concept of a ‘dominant’, ‘ruling’ or ‘hegemonic’ *Discourse*. In the 1980s the term ‘discourse’ successively came to be used with this bipolar, conceptual content – roughly similar to the Marxist ‘Ideology’ – and at the end of the 1980s the term ‘discourse’ was more and more replacing the term ‘ideology’ in the common (left) academic jargon. This important development in Marxist ideology theory has been argued for – or observed – by centrally placed authors.⁷² However, it nevertheless seems to be a half-forgotten story today, in many quarters. (When a view is established

69 The British linguist Norman Fairclough, famous for his contributions to the research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis* (see Section 19 below), labels Pêcheux’s contribution in 1982 [1975] as ‘the French approach to discourse analysis’ and adds that it had been ‘developed on the basis of Althusser’s theory of ideology’ (Fairclough 1992: 13). Fairclough himself is also attempting to combine the linguistic concept of ‘discourse’ with the Marxist concept of ‘Ideology’ (and Marxist social theory in general) (see e.g. Fairclough 1992: 12–13, 30–36, 37–100). However, as will be argued below, he never *amalgamates* the concepts ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ but, as a trained linguistic researcher, keeps them analytically separated. He thus speaks of ‘ideology’ as an inner thought-content *expressed in discourse*, that is, in linguistic interaction or language-use (e.g. Fairclough 2010: 42–45, 56–61). See Sections 18.3 and 19, below.

70 This proposition of mine of course needs a more detailed presentation and demonstration which is not possible here. But just look at the (authoritative) presentation of ‘Foucault’ and his concept of ‘discourse’ in Laura Alba-Juez (2009: 213–214): ‘Meaning is governed by the formative rules of discourse; therefore, it does not originate in the speaking subject’. This could equally have been said by Althusser speaking of ideology, and especially by Pêcheux interpreting Althusser. And further: ‘The acquisition of social identities is a process of immersion into discursive practice and submission to discursive practice’. This also could equally be said by Althusser, and especially in Pêcheux’s development of Althusser. See also the foot-notes immediately below.

71 This is pointed to as an important shortcoming with Foucault by Jørgensen and Phillips in their *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 2002: 13, pointing to the ‘more conflictual picture in which different discourses...struggle for the right to define truth’, eventually to reach ‘hegemony’, put forward in Laclau & Mouffe (1985).

72 For the important connection of Althusser, Pêcheux and Foucault, see the energetic and path-setting argument in Diane Macdonell (1986) *Theories of Discourse*, 1986: 24–59, 83–100. A similar argued connection between the two – although not an amalgamation – is made by Norman Fairclough in *Discourse*

as a paradigmatic commonplace, as we know, the critical history of its origins is often swept aside by a merciful veil of oblivion.) In my view, thus, the most of what is later called ‘Foucault’, ‘Discourse’ or ‘the Foucauldian concept of discourse’, especially in sociology, cultural studies, history and political science, in fact is the mostly unknown presence of the concept ‘ruling ideological formation’ (Althusser) amalgamated to the concept ‘ruling discursive formation’ (Pêcheux); as accomplished by Michel Pêcheux in his mentioned *Language, Symbols and Ideology* (1982 [1975]: 111).⁷³

Interestingly, this Althusser–Pêcheux–Foucauldian concept of ‘Discourse’ (now written by me with a capital ‘D’) is *substantial*. It refers *as such* to the substantial (ideological) thought-content of communication and language-use (the mentality); not the specific linguistic or rhetorical aspect of the language-use in question. The concept ‘Discourse’, thus, following Pêcheux and Foucault is referring to the same phenomena that in the days of Marxist watershed were referred to as ‘Ideology’; or what historians or sociologists commonly speak of as ‘mentality’ or ‘culture’. When the term ‘discourse’ spread to the social sciences including history (as a common, conventional jargon of ‘the language turn’ of the 1990s) this conceptual referring to *inherent ideas* was carried along. Thus, nowadays, the concept ‘sexist Discourse’ commonly refers to the substantial thought-content of sexism (expressed in a specific vocabulary and language-use); ‘racist Discourse’ refers to the substantial thought-content of racism (expressed in a specific vocabulary and language-use); and ‘Islamist Discourse’ refers to the substantial thought-content of Islamism (expressed in a specific language-use). This was pointed to by me in the beginning of this essay (see Part One, Section 6). And when studying ‘right-wing discourses’, as Ruth Wodak does in her excellent study (Wodak 2015), as we also saw, the knowledge-interest is focused on what the discourses ‘mean’, that is, their ‘ideological thought-content’, to use my own terminology. After all, as I said in Part One of this essay (Section 6), the main knowledge-interest of ‘the language-turn’ anyway was to explore *the inherent ideas* of discourse and language.

The Althusser–Pêcheux–Foucauldian notion of ‘Discourse’, thus, has roughly the same conceptual connotations (intentions) as the Marxist concept of ‘Ideology’; inscribed in a bipolar view of power and subordination. This ‘Discourse’ is situated as a part of social and political practice; interpellating the individuals as social subjects. Thus, the prevailing ‘discourse’ in a

and Social Change, 1992: 13, 25–36, 37–61 (we will return to that in Section 19). See also Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*, 1984: 232–237.

73 I am thankful to Thompson 1984, Macdonell 1986 and Fairclough 1992 who once led me to Michel Pêcheux and his innovative work; earlier I had only read his epistemological essay together with Michel Fichant (1969). I regard Pêcheux’s *Language, Semantics and Ideology* (1982) [1975] as the key to the understanding of the allegedly ‘Foucauldian’ concept of ‘discourse’ or ‘discursive formation’, roughly meaning the same as the Marxist ‘Ideology’, later so influential among left academics and social theorists. However, see Section 18.3 and my digression on the three concepts of ‘discourse’.

society or a social field installs in them certain prescribed identities and subjects them to their positions in the social structure, by giving them an imperative or natural, illusionary picture of the social world; hence supporting and maintaining the bipolar and unequal (capitalist) social relations. Although borrowed or imported, the concept 'Discourse' here, has been integrated in social theory and inserted at the same place in the theoretical edifice as the Marxist 'Ideology'; it thus has become a sociological or social scientific concept.

The Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian conceptual novelty and terminological new-speak – moving from 'Ideology' to 'Discourse' – is hence an integral part of the Marxist theory tradition.⁷⁴ This development must be considered a fruitful development of the Marxist theory of Ideology in a broad sense. However, there is one important difference which expands the conceptual room in the edifice (the connotations and the denotations). The concept of the traditional Marxist 'Ideology' concerns the bipolar class aspect of the culture and ideas of *society as a whole*. The concept 'Discourse', as used by and inspired by the historical works of Michel Foucault, is applicable to a greater variety of, as I would say, 'para-political' social systems and bipolar power structures, in a more fragmented view of 'society'. It refers to minor social fields, such as power and subordination between professionals and clients in diverse public institutions (as classically in Foucault 1977) or in the social and discursive fields of race and gender; supporting, concealing or legitimating the power-relations or hierarchies or status allocations of those fields. In this way there is an affinity with the views, although not the terminology, of Pierre Bourdieu's foundational works, and his concepts 'habitus', 'social fields', 'power structures', 'symbolic capital' and 'symbolic power'.⁷⁵ (Consequently, when the Foucauldian concept of 'Discourse', or a Foucauldian-like notion of power and language, is

74 The term 'discourse' is also used by the theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their influential *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985). To make an already long story shorter, I will omit this work from any closer comments here. To make it still shorter I may refer to Jørgensen and Phillips in their *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (2002) which place Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in the tracks of Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucault (p. 1–23), and thus in the Marxist theory tradition. This placing is also evident in Laclau's and Mouffe's own labelling of their work as 'post-Marxist'; and in their maintaining of the 'radical' spirit of Lenin and Gramsci. There is however one more reason to leave this work outside my elaborations here. The 'discourse theory' of Laclau and Mouffe – in spite of the label – is *not* specifically a theory of language or ideology or the ideational phenomenon, but a *social theory* of all components of the whole society; critical of Foucault for maintaining the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. For this judgement of Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical contribution, see Torfing 1999: 1–14; Howarth 2000: 5; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 19; Howarth & Torfing 2005: 8–9.

75 The view of 'social fields' as always permeated by 'power is most convincingly developed in the Marxist sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1977; 1991). The thing is, though, that he does not at all use the term 'discourse' in the Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian way. He rather speaks of 'language' or 'representations' when alluding to what the Marxist tradition names 'ideology' and the Foucauldian tradition names 'discourse'; that is, the relation of thought and language to power and to social practices and social structures. When Bourdieu (not very often) uses the term 'discourse, this term is instead referring to 'conversation' or 'discussion', as in the conventional European educated style and language-use, which will be commented on immediately below in Section 18.3/ (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 21, 168).

presented, references or quotations to Bourdieu are often made.) Thus, a broad new, Marxist or post-Marxist understanding of ideology has emerged, which we will encounter more closely soon (see Section 18.4 and 18.5).

18.3 A digression outside the Foucauldian box. The three main concepts of 'discourse'

Discourse (F). The Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian concept of 'Discourse' (or the 'Foucauldian', for short) is not the only concept of 'discourse' in contemporary academic culture. Instead we find three main uses of the term 'discourse' which I will term (F), (L) and (C) respectively. This conceptual diversity is a source of confusion in many quarters, blurring the strict conceptual and theoretical use of the term. Furthermore, also in many quarters, the 'Foucauldian' concept of 'Discourse', which I here term 'Discourse (F)', is conceived of or presented as the only existing one. Consequently, 'discourse analysis' is conceived of or presented as exclusively a kind of 'Foucauldian' or 'post-structuralist' theoretical and methodological analysis.⁷⁶ From an intellectual point of view this is a narrowing mistake in the understanding of the contemporary knowledge situation. (We will return to this in Section 19.2 below.)

Discourse (L). As we shall see below (Section 19.3), the term 'discourse' since long carries quite another, established conceptual content. It is a basic term in the discipline of linguistics, hence the (L). In linguistics, the concept 'discourse' by birth and habit does not connote any meaning close to the social scientific 'ideology'. Instead it simply connotes pragmatic language-use, as language when it is used in conversation, communication or discussion. Prominent linguist researcher and discourse analyst Teun van Dijk (see Section 19) explicitly defines discourse in the traditional linguist way; as 'coherent and contextually appropriate text and talk', that is, socially well-functioning conversation or communication (Van Dijk 2011a: 3 and 7). (This minimal formulation of 'text and talk' seems to be put forward as an ironic understatement, critically pointing in the direction of the conceptually thicker, Foucauldian use of the term.) In a similar way, critical of the Foucauldian use of the term, prominent American linguist Barbara Johnstone defines 'discourse' as the processes where people use their socialized or otherwise appropriated 'knowledge of language...to do things in the world'. As examples Johnstone mentions: 'exchange information, express feelings, make things happen, create beauty, entertain themselves and others, and so on' (Johnstone 2008: 3). We will come back to the linguistic critique of the Foucauldian concept of 'discourse' in Section 19 below.

Discourse (C). So, we find two basic theoretically defined meanings of the term 'discourse' in contemporary scientific use, the 'Foucauldian' one (F) and

76 For a not always happy presentation on this point, see e.g. Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, discussed as an example of a common, misguiding academic lore in Section 19.2 below. But they are not alone.

the linguistic one (L). However, there is also a third one. That is the use of the word 'discourse' as a colloquial commonplace (C) in age-old educated style. In conventional educated language-use, the word 'discourse' simply means conversation or discussion (see e.g. *Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus* 2007: entry 'Discourse'). As I see it, it is from this old, common word-use that the term once was borrowed into linguistics as the natural choice of word. Besides, there is also a more specific meaning of this older word-use in educated style, that is, as 'learned discussion' or 'systematic deliberation'. This meaning I myself met during my Ph.D. studies when my supervisors spoke of the importance of 'specifying your discourse-connection', that is, clarifying to which scholarly discussion the thesis was supposed to be a contribution.

The conventional meaning of the term in educated style, as conversation or discussion, 'Discourse (C)', is thus used as self-evident in the scholarly European tradition. For example, classic political philosopher Thomas Hobbes speaks of 'discourse' when 'many use the same words to signify (by their connection and order) one another what they conceive of or think of' (*Leviathan*, 1651: Ch. IV, second page). Behaviorist interview researcher Robert Lane speaks of 'political discourse' as the discussion and conversation of political matters in general, or the everyday 'discourse' of his interviewed Americans, meaning simply conversation or talk (1962: 346, 363). Canadian philosopher David Gauthier speaks of 'the structure and foundation of...moral arguments in discourse', by which he means conversation or discussion (Gauthier 1963: the sub-title). Finally, the Marxist sociologist Pierre Bourdieu equally speaks of the 'discourse' of his informants when they use common words in conversation and speaking of familiar everyday events in their social world, but also to signify contesting opinions and discussions about the same social world (1977 [1972]: 18, 168). So much here for the three basic meanings of the term 'discourse'. The first two are theoretical, defined by their place in scientific theoretical or conceptual thought. The third is colloquial. Consequently, the colloquial use of the word, 'Discourse (C)', will not be of interest in the following. But we will return to the linguistic concept of 'discourse', 'Discourse (L)', rather soon (in Section 19, below).

18.4 A thorough theoretical re-orientation of the 1980s in Marxist social theory, back in the direction of the Weber-Parsons tradition

In the second half of the 1970s a broad and many-faceted internal criticism began to evolve inside the now established neo-Marxist academic theory. Theorists like Jürgen Habermas, Nicos Poulantzas, Pierre Bourdieu, Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Göran Therborn, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann, to mention only some prominent ones, entered on a major journey of re-orientation, away from traditional 'historical materialism' and classic Marxist

tenets.⁷⁷ In this great re-orientation these thinkers of course were not alone in what emerged as a whole generational movement in the 1980s.⁷⁸ Although not always clearly stated, the general direction of this re-orientation was a move back towards several theoretical positions of the Weber-Parsons tradition.

For example, the prominent French structural Marxist, Nicos Poulantzas, who was close to Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, had ever since the late 1960s been trying to construct a viable logical consistency between the *general theory* of historical materialism, the *specific theory* of the capitalist mode of production and the *regional theory* of the state and class-based political power. In these constructive elaborations he had used Weberian and Parsonian conceptions.⁷⁹ The Canadian, Marxist political scientist Ellen Meiksins Wood, in a centrally placed critique of this great re-orientation, aptly calls Poulantzas ‘the fore-runner’ of what was later to come (Meiksins Wood 1998 [1986]: Ch. 3).⁸⁰ The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was at the same time involved in a fundamental struggle with all the basic Marxist notions from the point of view of traditional sociology and anthropology. The result was a critical transcending of established Marxist edifices like base and superstructure, structure and practices, theory and practice, as well as language and power; critically envisaging a whole new range of basic concepts, like ‘habitus’, ‘logic of practice’ or ‘symbolic power’ and ‘symbolic capital’. In this way Bourdieu, in my opinion, established a new and fruitful Marxist sociology, paradoxically close to the theoretical floors and halls of

77 See e.g. Habermas (1976) *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus* (Reconstruction of Historical Materialism), translated into English as his (1979) *Communication and the Evolution of Society*. A work that signals the paths that led up to his alternative general social theory in *Theory of Communicative Action* (1984 [1981]); a work that aims at moving further from both Marx and Weber, as well as Parsons and Mead. In the same vein and at the same time Anthony Giddens writes *A contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (1981) followed by a second volume (1985). But critical new-think inside Marxism was already signalled in the late 1960s by Nicos Poulantzas and in the early 1970s, as in Bourdieu (1977 [1972]), or the above mentioned Althusser 1971 [1970] which opened doors leading further into the broader re-orientation.

78 Unfortunately, there is no adequate space here for so many important others in this post-Marxist re-orientation, reaching still widening circles from about 1980 and on. For example, the important contributions of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst in the late 1970’s is not treated here, and most of the others are only superficially presented. Not everyone, however, used the label ‘post-Marxist’.

79 See e.g. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 1973 [1968]: 40) (Swed. transl. 1970: 40). See also Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 1980 [1978]: 9–121, with an Introduction by Stuart Hall.

80 Meiksins Wood, however, is mostly interested in the practical political aspects of this theoretical re-orientation, addressing what happens to issues like ‘socialism’ or working-class power, while I focus on the analytical aspect of Marxist social theory. See also the eminent intellectual biography of Poulantzas by Bob Jessop, *Nicos Poulantzas. Marxist Theory and Political Strategy/* (1985), pointing to the continuous problematizing of basic Marxist theorems, both analytical and practical, in Poulantzas’ works. A similar assessment of Poulantzas’ central role is put forward by Ted Benton in *The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism. Althusser and his Influence* (1984: Ch. 7). Perhaps it is very apt to name Poulantzas as the ‘fore-runner’ (fore-running the great Marxist re-orientation of the 1980s with a decade or so) as argued in the highly knowledgeable Meiksins Wood 1992 [1986]: Ch. 3. As we see, all these works are written at the same time, a signal that something important was in the air.

Parsons' social theory.⁸¹ And from the side, thinkers like Michel Foucault of the 1970s or Jeffrey Alexander of the 1980s spurred this broad re-orientation by suggesting alternative answers to the internal Marxist critical questions.

The central problematic points of discussion and critique were a set of concepts and theorems in the Marxist general theory of society and history, which together offered a formidable – allegedly invincible – closed conceptual system. What was critically problematized now was nothing less than the theoretical connections between: a) the dominating technology (industrial machinery) and its relation to the ruling mode of production (the capitalist economic system); b) the economic class-structure of this system and its relation to the political domination of the capitalist class, or of some faction of it; c) the role of ideology in the political hegemony of the capitalist class, or some faction of it; d) the existence of an exploited, dominated class (the working class) and its possibilities for revolutionary, system-transcending organization and political action. Other points of discussion were: e) the issue of determinism and the issue how structures determine thought and action, and f) the teleological view of a unidirectional historical development, moving from feudalism, via capitalism, to a future socialist society. One pivotal point among these factors was the causal connection between the socio-economic structure and the political and ideological super-structure.

In his *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973 [1968]), Nicos Poulantzas, of the Althusser school, had put forward the heretic argument that politics and the state is not a mechanic reflex of the economy, but rather *relatively autonomous* from the socio-economic structure. In this alleged 'politicism',⁸² Poulantzas, was working further from the notion of 'hegemony' put forward in the 1920s by the classic Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, or the contemporaneous notions of state power and politics of Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca or Robert Michels. In this view, Poulantzas came quite close to the traditional views of the political science knowledge tradition, where the political system is a *relatively autonomous* sub-system of society, as in the analytical theory of David Easton (high-lighting the relations of the political system and its 'environments') or Talcott/ Parsons' general social theory (high-lighting the reciprocity between the four main sub-systems of society). The issues raised by Poulantzas, however, were deadly serious for the Marxist theorists with their view of *the economy* as the principal causally determining factor in society,

81 This is my very brief and incomplete summary of e.g. Bourdieu 1977 [1972] and 1991 [1977]. Nevertheless, the success of Bourdieu in Marxist circles on the verge of post-Marxism, illustrates the need for the more up-to-date theoretical anchoring of Marxist views in general social theory (Weber and Parsons) that was lingering in the air. 'Habitus', for example, is defined as 'the socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structures' (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 76); which is very close to both the conceptions and the formulations of e.g. Parsons 1951: 1–8.

82 This problematic is the main theme in the incisive theoretical analysis of Poulantzas and his 'politicism' in Jessop 1985: 72–74; Jessop being both an analysing observer and a participant in the re-orienting landslide going on. See also Meiksins Wood 1998 [1986]: Ch. 3–4 on the same issue.

or at least ‘determining in the last instance’, which was the common saying of the Althusser school. The enumerated theorems above concerned the logical cohesion of the whole Marxist theory of society and history.⁸³ From the very beginning in the 1960s the neo-Marxist general social theory had been introduced as a superior alternative to all ‘bourgeois’ social theory⁸⁴ and the corresponding, despised, fragmented ‘positivist empiricism’ of the social sciences.⁸⁵ Because of the closed logical cohesion of the Marxist system, any abandonment or modification of any of the enumerated theorems would cause cracks in the whole edifice. *And in fact, every one of these points was exposed to criticism on a broad front from the late 1970s and onwards.* The result was a slow, but persistent, theoretical re-orientation, accelerating in the first half of the 1980s.

Thus, the once ‘neo-Marxist watershed’ of the 1970s developed into a post-Marxist landslide of the 1980s, one could say. The main thinkers of neo-Marxist analytical social theory gradually took up the theoretical problems pointed to by Poulantzas and moved in the direction of, or into a synthesis with, or into an amalgamation with the once so criticized theoretical positions of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons; seemingly filling up the earlier inimical trenches of the 1970s.⁸⁶ In my view, the various re-orienting moves created several Marx-coloured, neo-Weberian and neo-Parsonian theoretical syntheses, or if you prefer, several Weber-coloured or Parsons-coloured post-Marxisms; for example in the works in general social theory by Jürgen Habermas,⁸⁷ or Anthony Giddens⁸⁸ and Jeffrey Alexander.⁸⁹ Apart from such directly theoretical or philosophical works we can also encounter a new level of empirical work as in macro-sociologist Michael Mann’s grand historical over-views on the sources of social power (Mann 2012 [1986], Vol 1–4; Mann 2011), the sociologist-historian-political scientist Charles Tilly’s broad empirical works on states, revolutions and coercion (starting with e.g. Tilly 1990; Tilly 1993; Tilly 1998), or the

83 I know for I was there! See my own critical contribution to these discussions in Lindberg 2013b [Dahlkvist 1978], regarding the role of ‘class-struggle’ in Marxist theory and the formulation of a non-fatalistic and non-teleological conception of history. See also Dahlkvist 1982 on the same issues.

84 See e.g. the *tour de force* of Göran Therborn (1976) in his *Science, Class and Society. On the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism*. London: New Left Books. Originally written as a Swedish dissertation in sociology in 1974.

85 See e.g. Blackburn, R. ed. (1972) *Ideology in the Social Sciences. Readings in Critical Social Theory*.

86 The inspiration of Max Weber’s view on state and bureaucracy, for example, is visible in Göran Therborn’s vibrant *What does the Ruling Class do when it Rules?* (1978) where V.I. Lenin gets unexpected company in discerning what ruling, governance and system-changing politics may entail.

87 See e.g. Jürgen Habermas in his grand *Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1–2* (1984 [1981]), where he tries to ‘find the level of integration on which the philosophical intentions from Kant to Marx can be made scientifically fruitful today’ and where he treats ‘Weber, Mead, Dürkheim and Parsons as classics’ (1984 [1981]: XLII). For the Weber-Parsons connection, see especially Ch. I, II, IV, VII, VIII.

88 See *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (1981) and *The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (1985).

89 In Jeffrey Alexander’s reinterpretation of the sociological tradition *Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. 1–4* (1982–1983), Talcott Parsons is placed as the peak of the development of general social theory; starting with Marx and Dürkheim and moving over Weber to Parsons

sociologist, former Althusserian, Göran Therborn's theory-critical works (1976; 1978; 1980) together with his global, empirical social analyses (Therborn 2004, 2010, 2014, 2017).

So far as Marxist elements or Marxist experiences remained, which they usually did – especially regarding the depth and the width of the theoretical ambitions, or in the modified conflict-power perspective, moving away from a bipolar class-perspective as the only important power aspect – I will speak of the emerging, resulting positions in the 1980s as 'post-Marxist'. This is the label used by Anthony Giddens himself in his self-estimation (Giddens 1985: 1). The label 'post-Marxist' is also used in the self-estimation by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985: 4).⁹⁰ It is also used by Göran Therborn, as a label, in his later over-view of these re-orientations in *From Marxism to Post-Marxism?* (Therborn 2008: 165).

The general result of the broad re-orientation of the 1980s is the fact that a cohesive, grand Marxist analytical social theory, *is no longer pronounced or wide-spread* in the social sciences. Instead we meet a synthesized or renewed social science and social theory, keeping the width and depth of the macro-oriented Marxist attempts, and with a keen eye to institutionalized conflict and power. One common lingering theorem, though, seems to be the theoretical solution of the central problem of causal determinism and structuralism, haunting already Louis Althusser or Nicos Poulantzas. The solution was termed 'structure-actor theory', a theoretical complex that is in the centre of what I above called Weber-Parsons coloured Marxist theories, or Marx-coloured Weber-Parsons theories.⁹¹ (The structure-actor theory is self-evident in my own view of general social theory, as signalled in the beginning of this essay; see Part One, Section 8; see also Section 21 below). This re-orienting upheaval and dissolution of a cohesive, pointed Marxist theory of society and history is interesting in itself. However, here the interesting thing is that it has also produced *a parallel re-orienting upheaval in the Marxist theory of ideology*. And this parallel move turns out to be supportive of my elaborations here. Thus, we now turn to the re-orienting upheaval of the Marxist theory of ideology.

90 In this work, Laclau and Mouffe are presenting a 'new politics for the left' aiming for 'radical democracy', that is, a new ideological platform for a re-oriented and re-constructed left movement (in a post-industrial society, and after the neo-conservative or neo-liberal wave in philosophy and politics about 1980), leaving the traditional Marxist views behind (whether of classical social democracy of the 1890s or classical Leninism of the 1920s) in which *the organisation of the working-class* (in the industrial society) was seen as the main 'socialist strategy'. Laclau and Mouffe are instead basing their own 'way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it' on a patch-work coalition of 'positive new phenomena', especially 'the new feminism, the protest movements of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, the anti-institutional ecology struggles...the anti-nuclear movement, the atypical forms of social struggles in countries on the capitalist periphery' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 1).

91 For treatments of the structure-action solution to basic Marxist problems, see Giddens 1984; Alexander ed. 1985; Layder 1994 or Archer 1995; for Swedish social science see e.g. Lundquist 1984; Rothstein 1988.

18.5 The re-orienting upheaval of the Marxist theory of 'ideology' in the 1980s

As part of the multi-faceted re-orientation of Marxist (analytical) social theory, several theorists also started to question the holistic or *monolithic* Marxist concept of 'the Ideology in society'. Althusser and Pêcheux had shown the way, although they were not very distinct on this point.⁹² A devastating critique was launched by Abercombie, Hill and Turner in their *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (1980); arguing that this basic historical materialist tenet had very little support in actual history.⁹³ Following similar tracks of criticism, there was a slow but general move among Marxist theorists in the direction of a more pluralistic view of political struggles and a general loosening of the concept of 'the ruling ideology'; this move was also connected to a loosening of the tight bipolar political ontology of a dominating and a dominated class, already envisaged by Nicos Poulantzas. For example, also the political thought of revolutionary parties or oppositional movements started to be included in the concept 'ideology'.

The first theoretically elaborated example of this new orientation as far as I know, can be found in Göran Therborn's *The Power of Ideology and the Ideology of Power* (1980: vii-viii, 2, 124-25).⁹⁴ In this book, Therborn works his way out from Althusser's *restrictive* and *pejorative* concept of 'the ruling ideology', defined as the interpellations and representations necessary for the reproduction of the unequal, capitalist social relations. Instead, Therborn widens its definitional intension (connotation) and extension (denotation) quite dramatically for the time, that is, in the Marxist tradition. In a programmatic formulation he states:

'Ideologies not only subject people to a given order. They also qualify them for conscious social action, including actions of gradual or revolutionary change' (1980: vii).

As we see, Therborn is breaking away from the earlier *restrictive* definition of ideology in Marxist theory. He is explicitly and critically moving to an *inclusive* direction dismissing the determinist structuralism of Althusser's. The reader may easily compare this statement to the one of the political scientist C. J. Friedrich in his hand-book *Man and his Governement* (1963), that ideologies as

92 This means that I think Diane Macdonell in *Theories of Discourse* (1986) is exaggerating the few textual places where she can find support for a more conflict-based picture, in her interpretation of Althusser, Pêcheux and Foucault as idea-struggle theorists. See e.g. Macdonell 1986: 27, 33, 36, 39-41. In my opinion, she stretches the material to suit her argument. Nevertheless, I find her (conflictual and non-monolithic although still bipolar) reconstruction-construction of the Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucault connection both incisive and informative.

93 See also the ensuing works of the same authors (1986) and (1990).

94 However informative and inspiring, the *Theorien über Ideologie* (1979) by Projekt Ideologie-Theorie with Wolfgang F. Haug as primus motor, written in the same time as Therborn's book, does not leave the traditional Marxist *monolithic*, *restrictive* and *pejorative* notion of 'Ideology in society' (see e.g. 1979: 201-204).

such are ‘action-related’, intended *either to change or to defend* ‘the existing political and social order’ (quoted in Part One, Section 9). Therborn is also breaking away from the *pejorative* notion of ideology, viewed as a distorting thought which is legitimating the unequal socio-economic system, moving in a *neutral* direction. In the re-orientated conception of Therborn’s, the concept ‘ideology’, now, can also refer to consciously action-guiding and liberating, reformist or revolutionary ideas (Therborn 1980: vii, 7–11); what is the case in a specific situation, is an empirical question. Following this path, that ‘ideologies’ can be plural, Therborn stumbles into an inevitable logical consequence. He turns out to be one of the first thinkers in the Marxist re-orientation to be really interested in *the general inner structure* of ideologies, the necessity to compare them with a general, morphological frame of comparison.⁹⁵ In his attempts to conceptualize the general inner structure of ideologies he lands in a kind of three-tiered model (Therborn 1980: 15–20), rather similar to the ones we found in Political Science (Part One, Section 5 and 9; Section 17 above). We will return to Therborn’s variant of the three-tiered model below (see Section 24).⁹⁶ Therborn’s book, thus, in my view, evolves into a fruitful programme of a ‘materialist theory of ideology’, as he calls it, breaking away from the main shortcomings in the hitherto closed Marxist notion of the (monolithic and ruling) ‘ideology in society’, opening the door from a bipolar view in the direction of pluralism.

The initial critiques by Abercombie, Hill and Turner (1980) and Therborn (1980) were followed by others in a broad re-orientation in the direction of a *pluralistic, inclusive* and *neutral* use of the concept ‘ideology’ in the Marxist tradition, close to the traditional view in Political Science. This broad re-orientation seems to have been consolidated in about the mid-1980s.⁹⁷

An example of this consolidated turn is the centrally placed anthology, ensembled for an Open University course, Robert Bocoock and Kenneth Thompson (eds.) *Religion and Ideology* (1985). The anthology starts out from Marxist theory as self-evident. But in the first line of the opening page we can read:

‘It is widely appreciated that the study of cultural forms and processes has been greatly stimulated in recent years by a more sophisticated and flexible Marxism... (Bocoock & Thompson eds. 1985: 1).

And they continue their programmatic opening:

95 This is an urge every scientist (since Aristotle) experience in front of a plurality of fairly similar entities in the world, or entities of the same logical class.

96 There we also will meet, briefly, Jürgen Habermas’ version of the three-tiered model.

97 A signal of the width and depth of this re-orientation, at this time, is the seminal work of John B. Thompson *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (1984).

'Whereas the older, economic Marxism relegated religion and other cultural phenomena to the category of mere epiphenomena – part of the superstructure determined by the economic base – recent Marxist-inspired debates about ideology and culture have allowed a higher degree of *relative autonomy* to such phenomena' (Bocock & Thompson eds. 1985: 1, my italics).

Continuing the argument, the editors also proclaim to have found 'a bridge' between the Marxist tradition and the classical sociological accounts of ideology, culture and religion with Dürkheim and Weber (p. 4). This remark illustrates my general view of the Marxist re-orientation of the 1980s, which I presented as moving in the direction of the general social theory of the Weber-Parsons tradition.

In the same vein, the renowned Marxist anthropologist and culturalist Stuart Hall, who in 1982 still argued for the traditional Marxist or 'critical' concept of ideology,⁹⁸ four years later, in 1986, presents a *pluralist, inclusive and neutral* use of the concept as self-evident. In an accompanying reader to the one above in the same Open University course, titled *Politics and Ideology* (Donald and Hall, eds. 1986), Hall formulates a view of ideology (together with James Donald) which not only moves forward from the criticism of Abercrombie, Hill and Stears (1980) respectively Göran Therborn (1980) but has in fact ended up quite close to the position of traditional political science:

'This volume is devoted to the analysis of political ideologies...In this collection the term ideology is used to indicate the frameworks of thought which are used in society to explain, figure out, make sense or give meaning to the social and political world...The *positive* function of ideology is to provide the concepts, categories, images and ideas by means of which people make sense of their social and political world, form projects...and act in it. The *negative* function refers to the fact that all such perspectives are inevitably selective' (Donald & Hall eds. 1986: ix-x).

As we see, also these are words that equally could have been written by Carl J. Friedrich as quoted above, or any of the political scientists writing on political ideologies, which I have presented above as representing the main-stream position on ideologies in that discipline (see Part One, Section 9; Section 17).

Another example of this ongoing re-orientation of the mid-1980s is Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their *Hegemony and socialist strategy* (1985). On the way to an idea-struggle, although bipolar, view of political life,⁹⁹ they launch a critique of the 'unitary subject' in Marxist theory with a unitary, cohesive working class. This critique also involves the subsequent dismissal of the notion of a unitary capitalist class and a unitary, dominating bourgeois ideology; taking support in the analyses of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's basic conceptions

98 See his 1985 [1982].

99 Although they would rather use the term 'discursive struggle'.

from the 1920s, of ‘the power bloc’ and political ‘hegemony’ of an alliance of bourgeois forces. (This alternative view, as we saw above, had already been suggested in Nicos Poulantzas’ discussions on Marxist political theory, in fact developing Antonio Gramsci’s basic conceptions.)¹⁰⁰ If I read Laclau and Mouffe from the point of view of analytical and factual political theory,¹⁰¹ they introduce an idea-struggle view on ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, explicitly cutting the moorings to the determinist, class-divided political theory of proletariat and bourgeoisie (see Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 80–85). Furthermore, their view of ‘the political’ is anchored in a specific social ontology. It is a kind of *enlarged or widened Foucauldian view*, as I see it.¹⁰² All society and politics consists of politicized language-games all the way down, envisaging a way-out politicized picture – some would say idealistic – of the (discursive) construction of all society. Apart from the bipolar view of discourse and power, this position is, in my opinion, a mirror reflection of the traditional political science outlook of politics and the political system, as I presented it above, relying on an ontology of ‘actions and interactions’ all the way down, which include linguistic actions. On this point Laclau and Mouffe (unknowingly or unconsciously) simply come very close to the Weber-Parsons or the Bentley-Lasswell-Easton social theory traditions of ‘communicative actions’, performed in and acting on structures, situations and extra-societal environments, like biology or ecology (see Sections 16 and 17).¹⁰³

However, Laclau and Mouffe’s rather traditional notions of politics and are couched in an unnecessarily mystifying Hegelian language, that is, mystifying compared to the normal lucid prose of British Marxism or the main stream social sciences. In the political science knowledge tradition (Part One, Section 9; Section 17 above) there is a long tradition of research on (struggling) social and political *organizations* and *ideologies* (in plural), or on empirically shifting *attitudes* and *beliefs* (in plural) among the citizens. Laclau and Mouffe instead speak of ‘the plurality of the social’, or ‘the unsutured character of all social identity’, or ‘the multiplicity out of which antagonisms emerge in society’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 166–167); meaning roughly the same things.

100 See his *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973) [1968]: 57–98, 255–324) or in his *State, Power, Socialism* (1980) [1978]: 49–62, 251–65).

101 That is, *not* from the point of view of *political ideology*. It is only the possible traits of analytical theory in their work that is of interest for me here. These traits must be sifted out of their ideological project. Their work is namely explicitly and mainly written as an *ideological intervention* with an ideological aim; a contribution to a ‘socialist strategy’ or ‘left wing thought’. See Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 1–5. Because of my one-sided reading, their work may seem more one-sidedly scientific than it really is.

102 See e.g. Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105–108; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 18–20.

103 How far these two basic social ontologies are close to one another or differ is not possible to go into here. But remember, that from the traditional Marxist position, Weber and Parsons once were criticized for ‘idealism’, since their theory was allegedly based on *the autonomy* of culture and ideology, as an autonomous causal factor in society. The same criticism of ‘idealism’, losing sight of the socio-economic structure, has been launched against Laclau and Mouffe from a traditional Marxist point of view; see e.g. Meiskins Wood 1998 [1986]: 47–74.

Where political scientists speak of political struggles or idea-struggles, Laclau and Mouffe speak of ‘antagonistic articulatory practices’. And where political scientists speak of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ or a ‘moving balance’ (Easton 1953: 266–306) between social and political forces, or a temporarily ‘reigning ideology’ (Dahl 1984 [1963]: 55), Laclau and Mouffe speaks of ‘a field of articulatory practices’ where ‘the elements have not yet crystallized into moments’ in the processes of ‘emergence of hegemony’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 134).

In a more pedagogic language Jørgensen and Phillips, presents the view of Laclau and Mouffe in the following way. Admittedly Laclau and Mouffe are said to:

‘...follow Foucault’s conception of discourses as relatively rule-bound sets of statements...which delimit...what can and cannot be said (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:13).

On the other hand, Laclau and Mouffe differ from Foucault in that they do not assume the existence of only one dominating discourse:

‘instead, they operate with a more conflictual picture in which different discourses exist side by side or struggle for the right to define truth’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 13).

And Jørgensen and Phillips conclude regarding Laclau and Mouffe:

‘So, a keyword of their theory is discursive struggle. Different discourses – each of them representing particular ways of talking about and understanding the social world – are engaged in a constant struggle with one another to achieve hegemony, that is, to fix the meanings of language in their own way. Hegemony, then, can provisionally be understood as the dominance of one particular perspective’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 6–7).

The ‘hegemony’, thus, emerges out of a ‘discursive struggle’. We can notice the view of politics and society as a continuing idea-struggle. However, since their concept of ‘discourse’ and ‘hegemony’ is framed in a Foucauldian bipolar view of subjectivity and language, their concept of ideology and discourse is still *pejorative* and structurally determinist¹⁰⁴ (with the added ring of Foucauldian bipolar pessimism) as something that structures, constrains and delimits rather

104 The alleged paradox that the ‘post-structuralist’ theory of Foucault or Laclau and Mouffe I ‘structuralist’, that is structurally determinist, dissolves as soon as we understand that we are speaking of two kinds of ‘structuralism’. (This is seldom noticed by the way.) The first is ‘structuralist’ *linguistic theory*, with for example de Saussure, pointing to an established language structure in a society. The second is ‘structuralist’ *social theory*, as with some sociologists and foremost the Marxist variant, pointing to how the economic structure determines the ideological superstructure, which in turn structures the thoughts and actions of the individuals in society. It is thus possible to be a ‘post-structuralist’ in the realm of language, but anyway be a structuralist in the realm of social theory; as both Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe are, where the (hegemonic) discourse ‘structures’ the mentality and ideology of the ‘subjects’.

than enables, enriches and makes possible. (See e.g. Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105–122; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 13.)

This leads me to the conclusion that Laclau and Mouffe (1985), as they manifestly proclaim, are leaving the economically determined view of ‘the political’ in the older Marxist tradition, where the bourgeoisie stands against the proletariat. A remnant though, of the Marxist bipolar view of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ is the peculiar, pejorative view of discourses as mainly constraining or delimiting. Apart from that remnant, Laclau and Mouffe – regarded from an analytical point of view – seems to be moving in the direction of the traditional position of the (pluralist) political science knowledge tradition, which we saw was based on ‘actions and interactions’ (all the way down) and constant political and ideological struggles (Part One, Section 9; Section 17). This judgement of mine, though, may be miles apart from the expressed self-conception and ideological ambition of Laclau and Mouffe.¹⁰⁵ My judgement, though, is confirmed by Chantal Mouffe’s later work *The Return of the Political* (1997 [1993]), where the affinity (in principle) with the political science tradition is unmistakable; although not consciously conceived of.¹⁰⁶

18.6 The dissolution of a cohesive Marxist theory of Ideology

We can see a development among Marxist theorists, moving away from the *monolithic, restrictive* and *pejorative* concept of a legitimating and concealing ‘dominant Ideology’. This move has ended in a position that is very hard to distinguish from the general traditional political science pluralistic and inclusive view of ideologies and idea-struggles (see Part One, Section 9; and Section 17 above). This placed the Marxist theorists in a dilemma. If the *pluralistic, inclusive and non-pejorative* view was accepted, there logically would follow

105 Laclau and Mouffe’s pluralist move and their dismissing critique against ‘the unitary subject’ is directed mainly against Leninist and Stalinist political theory (or Soviet Marxism-Leninism). In this narrow, dust-filled battle-field, the political science knowledge tradition is not visible, or seemingly not even known of. However, there are so many similarities that would have needed a closer discussion; for example, Lasswell’s and Kaplans’ *Power and Society* (1950) or David Easton’s theories of ‘the political’ (1953; 1965a; 1965b; 1990); or Robert Dahl’s theory of ‘the reigning ideology’ in a political system as an outcome of political and ideological struggles (Dahl 1984 [1963]: 55); or Martin Seligers works on the concept of ideology (1976; 1977). They also ignore Abercombie, Hill and Turner (1980) and Göran Therborn (1980). In Chantal Mouffe’s later work *The Return of the Political* (1997 [1993]) the direct affinity with the positions of Lasswell, Easton or Dahl regarding ‘the political’ is obvious. It is perhaps not unfair to speak of Laclau and Mouffe’s self-conception as self-deception here, even if it may seem improperly disparaging. Their view of society, as build-up of discourse and discursive struggles all the way down, is proclaimed as a dazzling novelty, while it mostly seems to be echoing old commonplaces from the Weber-Parsons or Lasswell-Easton traditions.

106 This affinity is obvious, both in the factual, analytical views, and in the normative moves, approaching traditional democratic theory. However, this affinity with political science, of course, is not manifestly expressed or consciously discussed. She prefers to put forward her views as novelties, found in isolation or along the lonely post-Marxist road. Her actual ignorance of the political science tradition can be seen in her unsuspecting and superficial treatment of the political views of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, or in her seemingly fragmented knowledge of democratic theory, as it has developed during the last century.

two devastating consequences. First, the former Marxist grand theme of ‘distorted knowledge’ logically boils down to the empirically open position, held for example by Carl J. Friedrich, namely that ideologies ‘may or may not be very true or appropriate’ (1963: 69). Secondly, the former grand project of ‘ideology critique’, revealing the legitimating function of the dominant ideology, logically boils down to the empirically open method of rational ‘idea-criticism’, close to the critical programme once launched, for example, by the Swedish political scientist, Herbert Tingsten (1941: 1-27). As we remember (See Part One, Sections 4, 10 and 12) Tingsten introduced an idea-critical programme with the aim to engage in *rational criticism* of the conceptual set-up, the factual propositions and the logical coherence of any political message or idea-system. These two logical possibilities, however, eventually became actualities in Marxist circles from the mid-1980s and on, in their move towards the political science tradition. As a prominent example, we will soon meet the highly influential Marxist researcher, Norman Fairclough. Having held the Marxist banner flying for decades in a row of prominent works, Fairclough later, in 2012, actually made that double ‘turn’ in his intellectual development: on the one hand to the political science knowledge tradition in general, and on the other hand, to the position of rational idea-criticism in a dismissal of functional ‘ideology critique’ (see Section 19.6 below).

We stand in front of a re-orienting self-criticism, which has resulted in the upheaval and dissolution of a cohesive, specifically Marxist ‘theory of Ideology’. Instead, the original Marxist problematics of power and ideology, power and culture, or power and language has been transferred into and transformed within a spread of academic fields or approaches. This is visible in several works and anthologies from about 1985.¹⁰⁷ One field, however, where a fairly original Marxist problematic of power and ideology continued to thrive, was the linguistic research programme of *Critical Discourse Analysis*, founded in 1991. This research programme is so theoretically interesting – regarding the concepts of ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’ – that it deserves a section of its own (Section 19 below).

18.7 Critical conclusion of the Marxist theory tradition for my elaborations

Taken together, there are not many fruitful propositions to be won from the original Marxist *monolithic, restrictive* and *pejorative* position of a dominant or ruling ‘ideology in society’. As we remember I am out to elaborate on a theory of the (action-guiding) *inner structure* of social and political thought-content. The Marxist focus, though, was on the outer, general *functional* aspect

107 See e.g. Thompson 1984; Laclau & Mouffe 1985; MacDonell 1986; Alexander and Seidman eds. 1990; Abercombie, Hill & Turner 1986; and *Ibidem* eds. 1990; Bourdieu 1991; Gane & Johnson 1993; MacLellan 1995.

of ‘the ideology in society’; and the theoretical research, like the achievements of Althusser or Pêcheux, centred around the problem of making the hypothesis of a system-supportive ‘ruling Ideology’ tenable and valid. If the Marxist theorists came close to *the inner structure* of ‘the ideology in society’, it focused on the problem how thought and language was used in the system-reproducing practices; as in Bourdieu’s theory. Having renounced political pluralism from the outset, the Marxist tradition consequently never produced any *comparative* account of various ideologies, or produced any *classificatory* theory of which (plural) ideologies that in fact have been prevailing, say, in Europe since the French revolution (or in any other parts of the world); which was the main concern of the Political Science tradition regarding ideologies, as we saw. In the traditional paradigm of the Marxist theory of ideology, consequently, the theoretical problem of *the comparative inner structure of the now plural ideologies*, and to explain their respective action-guiding force in different directions, was never even posed; that is, until the general inner structure was noticed by Therborn (1980). However, this track was never actually followed up, but was seemingly left to political science theorists like Martin Seliger (1976) or Michael Freeden (1996; 2012). Thus, there was never an urge to investigate comparatively into the inner structure of, say, feminist ideologies compared to patriarchal ones; or how the inner structure of liberal ideologies is built-up compared to conservative ones; or how radical Islamist ideologies are built-up compared to moderate ones; nor to put the analytical-methodological question with which *analytical frame* or *general theory* such analyses could be performed. The classificatory and comparative knowledge-seeking urge was simply missing.

After the great re-orientation in the 1980s, and the acceptance of an *inclusive* view of *plural* ideologies, Marxist social researchers, in my opinion, instead sufficed to rely on the accumulated knowledge of the political science knowledge tradition and its classificatory, comparative knowledge of the ‘political ideologies’. This was the case, as we saw, when James Donald and Stuart Hall edited the reader *Politics and Ideology* (Donald & Hall 1986). It is also the case when the Marxist political theorist Terence Ball a few years later started to co-write the successful and highly informative text-book *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (Ball & Dagger 2011), largely following Sabine & Thorson’s classical hand-book *A History of Political Theory* (1974 [1937]). This leads to the disappointing conclusion that the Marxist tradition on ideology, from the beginning to the end, seems to *have nothing specific to offer* to my analytical, reconstructive elaborations here about the *inner structure* of ideological thought; compared to what is already produced by the Parsonian concept of ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ or the political tradition about ‘political ideologies’.

However, there are three main points where the Marxist tradition in a general way has been inspiring and is supportive of my project. The first

regards general social theory, where the Marxist insistence of *the institutional structure or configuration of society* is important for my conception (largely similar to, although more pointed than, the Weber-Parsons or the Bentley-Lasswell-Easton traditions). The second regards *the basic conflict perspective* of the Marxist social theory tradition (both in its class-based version with Althusser and Poulantzas and its wider hierarchy-version with Foucault and the later Bourdieu). The conflict perspective on ideologies – however blunt it was formulated in the original conception of a monolithic, ruling or hegemonic ideology – has been generally supportive of, and has sharpened, the conflictual aspect of the *idea-struggle perspective*, which I have borrowed from the political science knowledge tradition. And after the post-Marxist re-orientations of the 1980s it seems logical to widen the conflict perspective from the bipolar view of one dominating ruling ideology, dominating and subjecting all society, to a view of a plurality of conflicting ideologies, used by social agents in idea-struggles. Consequently, it would even be possible to appreciate the notion that such idea-struggles never really reach ‘equilibrium’ or ‘hegemony’, but instead always are in a state of *constant struggle and change*, as David Easton argued in *The Political System* from the early 1950s (1953: 266–306.)

Thirdly, my attempt, of course, is also nurtured by the Althusser-Pécheux-Foucauldian insistence – including that of Pierre Bourdieu (1991: Ch. 3) and Margareth Archer (1995: Ch. 3–5) – on the connection between ideology and language in relation to the prevailing social structure. As we saw, the view of the important role of ideas and language for maintaining or changing the institutional configuration of society is also in affinity with the theory of ‘communicative actions and interactions’ of the Weber-Parsons respectively the Bentley-Lasswell-Easton traditions; not to mention the basic view in the now boringly repeated quotation by Carl J. Friedrich (1963: 89) of political ideologies as ‘action-related systems of ideas’ aiming to ‘change or defend’ the social and political order.

From the perspective of analytical and factual theory, thus, there is *nothing* in the Marxist tradition – after its great re-orientation and dissolution, as of above – *that hinders* the continued development of my proposed general theory, as it was outlined above (see Part One, Sections 5, 8 and 9) and will be more comprehensively formulated below (Chapter four, Sections 20–22, and Chapter five, Sections 23–28); neither regarding the anchoring of my general theory in general social theory (the Weber Parsons tradition), nor regarding the inner, action-guiding structure of social and political thought (borrowed from Parsons as well as the political science tradition on ideologies) sketched as a triad of connected (ideology-specific) values, descriptions and prescriptions (modelled from the Uppsala-school in idea-analytical political science, sharpened by Arnold Brecht).

19. THE SPECIAL CASE OF 'IDEOLOGY' IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS/CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES

19.1 A successful research programme

This chapter started with the assertion that there are three main theoretical traditions regarding the concept of 'ideology': Talcott Parsons' general social theory, the Political Science knowledge tradition, and the Marxist general theory of society and history. I also stated that *when the term 'ideology' occurs in social scientific studies, it is always connected to one or the other of these three theoretical traditions* (Section 15 above). In a remarkable and paradoxical way, the Marxist concept of 'Ideology' came to be resurrected in the 1990s, in a rejuvenated and revitalized form, in the linguistic research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA). In the British linguist Norman Fairclough's hands, for example, the Marxist concept of 'Ideology' was given this second chance, some years after it had been abandoned or transformed in the common Marxist re-orientation of the 1980s.

This research programme – with its double labelling as also (*Critical Discourse Studies* (CDS) – was inaugurated in 1991 as a joint programme with linguists Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak as the leading figures. The two labels CDA and CDS have been used simultaneously by the founders of this programme. However, the double terminology signals a ring of difference over the connection to Marxism and 'critical theory', and especially to the Marxist concept of 'Ideology'. On the one hand, Norman Fairclough is outright Marxist in his conception of ideology, as a concept to use in linguistic discourse analysis. Teun van Dijk, on the other hand, is outright critical of the Marxist concept of ideology, and suggests another concept, more in line with general sociology and political science. Consequently, van Dijk is mostly avoiding the Marxist-coloured label of 'Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA). Instead he indicates an opposing view by putting brackets around the term 'critical', as in '(Critical) Discourse Studies'. With these brackets he is not dismissing the task for any social scientist of being critical,¹⁰⁸ only that the broad study of discourse and the use of language in social and political communication involves more than that. Consequently, he sometimes omits the word 'critical' simply use the label 'Discourse Studies'. This is also the title of his paradigm-setting anthologies, titled *Discourse Studies. A multidisciplinary Introduction* (1997; 2011), which are parts of a series of authoritative anthologies edited by van Dijk since the 1980s, which makes him the central intellectual and paradigmatic figure in the development linguist discourse studies (see van Dijk ed. 1985; 1997; 2011).

As an example of the subtle differences that are involved this double standard of labelling – signalling two different theoretical concepts of 'ideology in discourse' – we can observe the title of van Dijk's anthology (2011) which is

108 See e.g. his 1984; 1987; 1988 and especially his 'CDA is NOT a method for Critical Discourse Analysis' (2013).

Discourse Studies. A multidisciplinary Introduction. This comprehensive, authoritative anthology contains 18 chapters from diverse researchers and disciplines. However, the chapter 17 of this anthology, with Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak among the authors is instead entitled ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak 2011). With this naming and framing, *Critical Discourse Analysis* is positioned as a specific variant or an alternative approach in *Discourse Studies*, presented as the Marxist cousin. And this is no coincidence. The same title of their chapter, and the same positioning as a specific variant of discourse studies, is also found in the preceding anthology of 1997 with the same title. We will soon return to this.

19.2 ‘Discourse’ as a generic theoretical concept in linguistics

Before going closer into the matter how two different concepts of ‘ideology’ came to be introduced in linguistic studies of discourse, I must make a general, introductory note about the term ‘discourse’ as it traditionally is used in the discipline of linguistics. I stated above that the Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian concept of ‘Discourse’ [discourse (F)], differs from the concept of ‘discourse’ in linguistics [discourse (L)]. The former is a basic concept in a specific variant of *social theory*, while the latter is a generic concept in *linguistic theory*; and as I see it, this makes all the difference (see Sections 18.2 and 18.3 above).¹⁰⁹

As we saw above, the ‘Foucauldian’ (in fact Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian) concept of ‘Discourse’, as commonly used in many quarters of the humanities and the social sciences today, is a substantial concept, roughly meaning the same as the Marxist ‘Ideology’. Every specific ‘Discourse’ or ‘Ideology’ is installing, suggesting or legitimating bipolar power-relations supportive of some specific social structures or institutional configurations. Quite like the Marxist notion of ‘Ideology’, the Foucauldian ‘Discourse’ determines or structures the mode of thought of the participants, laying down ‘the rules for what can be said and cannot be said’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 13). This is the same notion as in the concept of ‘Ideology’ in traditional Marxism, where the parallel formulation would be ‘the rules for what can be thought (of) and cannot be thought (of)’. Consequently, as we saw above, and for reasons of its evolutionary conceptual history, I assigned the Foucauldian concept of ‘discourse’ or ‘discursive formation’ to the Marxist family-tree.

In the linguistic tradition, however, the concept of ‘discourse’ has quite another starting point, and no similarity to the Marxist concept of ‘Ideology’. Instead, as I signalled above (Section 18.3), the concept ‘discourse’ in linguistic

109 Above I introduced the spelling of the Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian concept of ‘Discourse’ [discourse (F)] with a capital ‘D’, in a parallel with the Marxist concept ‘Ideology’, which written by me with a capital ‘I’. Consequently, I write the linguistic concept of ‘discourse’ [discourse (L)] with a lower case ‘d’, parallel to the concept ‘ideologies’ in political science which I write with a lower case ‘i’. The capital letters I let signal the typically Marxist *monolithic, restrictive and pejorative* conceptual content of the respective terms.

theory – discourse (L)¹¹⁰ – is a generic, abstract theoretical concept of the linguistic discipline; meaning simply ‘conversation’ or ‘discussion’, or written or spoken communication. It is thus a priori open and empty regarding ideological thought-content, or any other thought-content. Of course, there exists no ‘discourse’ in the meaning of conversation or discussion that does not concern some topic or substantial issue. But the topic or substance is *not included in the definition of the concept* (in its core intension or connotation) which is centring on pragmatic language-use as such. The term ‘discourse’ in linguistic theory, thus, simply means any pragmatic language-use in communication, conversation or discussion, among people with a knowledge of the use of language. As such the concept ‘discourse’ is as open and empty as the other basic, generic concepts in the discipline like ‘morphology’ (of words), ‘grammar’ (of sentence-construction), or ‘pragmatics’ (of sentence-use).¹¹¹ The core meaning of the concept ‘discourse’ in linguistics – discourse (L) – is thus, as expressed in van Dijk’s understatement, nothing more than ‘coherent and contextually appropriate text and talk’ or ‘meaningful and appropriate text and talk’ (van Dijk 2011a: 3, 7). In this understatement, van Dijk is obviously aiming at all the fuzzy or mystical uses of the term ‘discourse’, including the Foucauldian, thick concept. In other works, which we will come back to soon, van Dijk is more outspoken in the critique of the Foucauldian concept [discourse (F)]. The thin, minimal definition of the concept of ‘discourse’ in linguistics is also stated, or used as the self-evident conventional terminology, in most authoritative hand-books of linguistic discourse analysis, or in hand-books of general linguistics as a science.¹¹²

19.3 The displacement or invisibility of the linguistic concept ‘discourse’ in the social sciences.

The thing looks different from the point of view of the social sciences, as well as history and the history of ideas and learning. There, the bipolar Foucauldian concept of ‘discourse’, involved in power and subordination is either used as a commonplace, or is manifestly argued for, as the only existing notion of ‘discourse’ (see e.g. Jörgensen & Phillips 2002); the conceptual content of the term may also be very diffuse or blurred. In many, but not all, presentations of

110 For the labels ‘discourse (L)’, ‘discourse (F)’ and ‘discourse (C)’, see Section 18.3 above).

111 For these basic concepts in the discipline, see e.g. Levinson 1983: 1–35; Yule 2010. On this point, I of course speak as a novice, although I had a thorough training in grammar during my four-year studies of Latin in high-school, and some general linguistic inputs in my student years, during a semester of English language and literature, and a semester of (analytical) philosophy, at Uppsala University.

112 For the concept of ‘discourse’ in the discipline of linguistics (beyond or before the Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian use of the term), see e.g. Brown & Yule 1983: 27–35; McCarthy 1991: 9–11; Coulthard 1992: 1–34; Fairclough 1992: 3; Simpson 1993: 1–8; van Dijk 1997a: 1–6; van Dijk 1997b: 1–4; de Beaugrande 1997: 35–62; van Dijk 1998: ix, 6; Chilton 2004: 16; Johnstone 2008: 2–5; Yule 2010: 142–51; Birner 2013: 4–5.

Discourse Analysis or *Discourse theory*¹¹³ the distinction between the Foucauldian concept of ‘Discourse’ [discourse (F)] and the concept ‘discourse’ in linguistics [discourse (L)] is not even known of. The term is thus often used with a fundamental ambiguity. This ambiguous use gets even easier through the fact that social scientists – used to the sociological concept of ‘culture’, the political science concepts of ‘political ideologies’ or the Marxist concept of ‘Ideology’ (see Section 15 above) – understands the term ‘discourse’ in the light of their respective theoretical pre-understandings. This makes them attribute a social-theory conceptual content to this term, close to ‘culture’, but most often a Foucauldian version, close to the Marxist ‘Ideology’. Consequently, when social scientists meet the term ‘discourse’ in linguistic works [discourse (L)] they understand it as the Foucauldian concept [discourse (F)]. However, a similar misunderstanding can also be seen from the side of linguistic researchers. When they meet the Foucauldian social-theory concept ‘Discourse’ [discourse (F)], they can’t help understanding it as the linguistic ‘discourse’ [discourse (L)], according to their self-evident disciplinary pre-understanding. The commonplace term discourse is thus an unfortunate bridge between two conceptual worlds where the same term ‘discourse’ (here being a homonym) is misunderstood by either side,¹¹⁴ hence causing confusion and terminological ambiguity.¹¹⁵ Thus, the presentation by my colleagues Göran Bergström, Linda Ekström and Kristina Boréus (Boréus & Bergström eds 2017: Ch.8) is well-suited and timely; pedagogically differing between a ‘narrow’ (the linguistic), a medium narrow (the linguist Marxist Norman Fairclough) and a ‘broad’ (the post-structuralist and post-Marxist Laclau and Mouffe) concept of discourse. However, I think the authors are too generous, not presenting these concepts as basically different, originating and prevailing in different disciplinary traditions of research. (As the reader has noticed, I have chosen a more pointed and stylized, theory-critical and concept-historical narrative.)

Thus, in the social sciences, we find the (often vague) impression that the

113 The terms ‘discourse theory’ or ‘theory of discourse’ is an invention in the Foucauldian or post-structuralist camp (see Macdonell 1986), especially used by the followers of Laclau and Mouffe like Jacob Torfing (1999) or Howarth and Torfing eds. (2005). This labelling, I think, is a continuation of the Marxist tradition, where the parallel terms ‘ideology theory’ or ‘theory of ideology’ is used. Hence the follower and developer of the Foucauldian and post-structuralist view, David Howarth, spares the label ‘discourse theory’ exclusively for Laclau and Mouffe, to contrast them from earlier thinkers. Or in his own formulation: ‘By contrast, Laclau and Mouffe’s approach...I shall simply call discourse theory...’ (Howarth 2000:8). See also the explicit use of ‘discourse theory’ as connected to Laclau and Mouffe, following Howarth and Torfing, in Boréus and Bergström 2017: 213, 225.

114 This ‘bridge’ can be explained as a *logical intersection* between the connotations-denotations (intension-extensions) between the two different concepts; where the similar (homonymic) terms on each side are mistaken to signify the conceptual content of the one’s own concept. This ambiguity is experienced by me in many conversations, it could also be demonstrated by referring to literature, which would take us too far. So, the reader may take my stated view above as a hypothesis to critically follow up.

115 This ambiguity is taken up by Teun van Dijk in his introduction 1997a. We will return to that.

Foucauldian concepts 'discourse' and 'discourse analysis' are commonplace, or even the only existing ones. However, this impression might also be the result of deliberate intentions. A common information strategy in presentations from inside the Foucauldian position, or from the post-structuralist camp of Laclau and Mouffe, is to pretend as if *all discourse-analysis in fact is Foucauldian*. Thus, the alternative conceptual content of the term 'discourse' in the discipline of linguistics is pushed aside as a bygone stage of thought, as maybe the first step of a cumulative stair-case; or made invisible or diminished as narrow. Consequently, the specificity of *linguistic discourse studies*, as well as the specificity and importance of *linguistics as a science*, is wiped out in the same move. The aura of disciplinary authority is won, since the 'discourse analysis' of the own (contested or alternative) paradigm can be pictured as the only existing or the paramount position of 'discourse analysis'. In some cases, the 'discourse theory' of Laclau and Mouffe is in fact presented as the most consequently developed 'discourse analysis'.¹¹⁶

This may need some further explanation. The first and most obvious example is Laclau and Mouffe themselves, in their influential *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985) where 'discourse' is defined as 'a structured totality' of substantial meanings, 'close to...the concept of "discursive formation", formulated by Foucault' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105). In these formulations, and the whole argument of the book, [Discourse (F)] is the only one present, as if Foucault is the sole inventor of the concept.

Another is Diane Macdonell in her early and vividly argued *Theories of Discourse. An Introduction* (1986) where 'discourses', following Foucault, are conceived as substantial sets of statements that concerns 'certain objects and puts forward certain concepts at the expense of others' (Macdonell 1986: 3). From this starting point she takes the road over Althusser, Pêcheux and Foucault to state that:

'individuals exist as subjects because they are subjected, held to and dependent on something of an imaginary identity...ideologies have a material existence, discourses are part of the ideological sphere, and ideologies are practices that subject.' (Macdonell 1986: 101).

Here 'discourses' are 'practices that subject', and 'discourses' are defined as bipolar ideologies in the vein of Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucault. The concept of 'discourse' is firmly placed in the Marxist tradition by Macdonell, as a concept close to 'Ideology' in the developing Marxist social theory.

The same view of 'discourse', as a concept in social theory and not in

¹¹⁶ The intricacies of this information strategy, as I called it, of course needs a closer presentation, which there is no space for here. See however: Torfing 1999: 1-80; Howarth 2000: 1-13, 100-101; or Howart & Torfing 2005:1-16; Jørgensen & Phillips (2002: 1-18) is also a case in point.

linguistic theory, is also displayed among the direct ‘post-structuralist’ followers of Laclau and Mouffe. When they present the ‘discourse theory’ of Laclau and Mouffe, ‘discourse’ is defined in the above mentioned, substantial, Foucauldian way, as sets of substantial and meaningful statements. Thus, ‘discourse’ is defined as a basic concept in a critically transformed and transcended Marxist *social theory*, although of course also with some typical Marxist remnants (see Torfing 1999: 11–13; Howarth 2000: 3–5; Howarth & Torfing 2005: 1–13), especially the structurally determinist and pejorative view of power and subordination.

This imperialistic social-theory use of the concept ‘discourse’ (if I may say so) is also clearly stated in Marianne Jørgensen’s and Louise Phillips’ text-book, *Discourse Analysis. Theory and Method* (2002), widely read at least in Scandinavia, where we can read:

‘Michel Foucault has played a central role in the development of discourse analysis...The majority of contemporary discourse analytical approaches follow Foucault’s conception of discourses as relatively rule-bound sets of statements...that delimit what is possible to say’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002 12–13).

As we see, they (rightly) point to the fact that the ‘Foucauldian’ concept of ‘discourse’ is a substantial concept, signifying a ‘set of (substantial) statements’ with an ideological, that is thought-steering function. But they also (wrongly) hold that ‘the majority of contemporary discourse analytical approaches’ are Foucauldian or follow Foucault’s main conceptions. This is a blatant formulation of the position that the Foucauldian, substantial conception of ‘discourses’ is the only one, or that the concept of ‘discourse’ as it is used in the academic world today, is Foucauldian.

19.4 The linguistic reactions to the Foucauldian concept of ‘discourse’

Looked upon more strictly from the point of view of linguistics, the Foucauldian use of the term ‘discourse’ is a deviating new-speak. This strict view is demonstrated and argued for in the wide-spread text-book by prominent American linguist Barbara Johnstone *Discourse Analysis* (2008). Barbara Johnstone pedagogically explains the meaning of the concept of ‘discourse’ as it is used in the tradition of linguistic theory:

‘To [linguistic] discourse analysts, “discourse” usually means actual instances of communicative action in the medium of language...”Discourse” in this sense is usually a mass noun. Discourse analysts typically speak of *discourse* rather than *discourses*, the way we speak of...*music*...or *information*...’ (Johnstone 2008: 2–3).

In strict linguistic terminology one can speak of ‘discourse’ but not of

‘discourses’, Johnstone holds. In my words here, the linguistic concept of ‘discourse’ is a *generic* theoretical concept, and not a specific one. And Johnstone continues in a deepening follow up:

‘Calling what we do “discourse analysis” rather than “language analysis” underscores the fact that we are not centrally focused on language as an abstract system. We tend instead to be interested in what happens when people draw on the knowledge they have about language...to do things in the world: exchange information, express feelings...and so on’ (Johnstone 2008: 2–3).

For Barbara Johnstone, thus, the term ‘discourse’ is defined as conversation, discussion or ‘*actual instances of communicative action*’ among people, and nothing more. ‘Discourse’ is both the source and the medium for transmitting – and training – ‘the knowledge they have about language’.

This has a special significance for the newspeak, spreading from the ‘Foucauldian’ use of the term, which she finds unfruitful and narrowing, as well as disturbing the logical strictness of linguistic terminology:

‘Scholars influenced by Foucault...sometimes use “discourse” in a related but somewhat different sense, as a count noun. “Discourses” in this [Foucauldian] sense can be enumerated and referred to in plural. They are conventional ways of talking that both create and are created by conventional ways of thinking. *These linked ways of talking and thinking constitute ideologies* (sets of interrelated ideas) and serve to circulate power in society. In other words, ‘discourses’ in this [Foucauldian] sense *involve patterns of belief* and habitual action *as well as patterns of language*’ (Johnstone 2008:3; my italics and square brackets).

Johnstone explicitly singles out the Foucauldian concept of ‘Discourse’ as something diverging and peculiar. To understand the issue even better, here, we should read Johnstone’s remarks in the light of Michel Pécheux’s contribution, which we met above (Section 18.2); as we remembered he amalgamated the concepts ‘ideological formation’ and ‘discursive formation’. And we should also read it in the light of Foucault’s own works, where a ‘discourse’ is a ‘set of statements’ and thus a concept which involves ‘patterns of belief and habitual action’, as Johnstone says, closely linked with ‘patterns of language’. The concept of ‘discourse’ in the traditional terminology of linguistics, thus, does not as such, in its core intension, ‘involve patterns of belief’, as Johnstone says. Following Johnstone and other linguistic researchers, I may conclude that in linguistic theory, it is logical to keep *the discursive aspect of social or political communication* (‘patterns of language’) *analytically distinct from the ideological aspect of communication and language-use* (‘patterns of belief’).¹¹⁷

117 As the observant reader remembers, we brushed upon this theme already in the beginning of this essay

The same view on the concept 'discourse' in linguistic theory is envisaged by Teun van Dijk. He takes up the issue of the ambiguity of the term in the introduction to the anthology *Discourse as Structure and Process. (Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction. Volume 1)* (van Dijk ed. 1997a). In a direct confrontation with the spreading of the Foucauldian concept he states:

'Unfortunately, the ambiguity does not stop here. Above we have already encountered another use of 'discourse' (as in 'the discourse of liberalism') which is not limited to language use or communicative interaction, but which may rather also refer to ideas or ideologies...' (van Dijk 1997a: 4).

We can see that from the linguistic point of view it seems weird speak of 'the discourse of liberalism' or 'liberal discourse'. To use the term 'discourse' as a dummy for 'ideas' or 'ideologies' is a strange newspeak, since the systematic terminology of linguistics uses the term 'discourse' for language-pragmatics in social interaction, as '*language use or communicative interaction*', to quote van Dijk. And van Dijk continues regarding the Foucauldian use of the term:

'...it is obvious that it makes the term even more fuzzy than it already is, and many discourse analysts will therefore avoid it' (van Dijk 1997a: 4).

To avoid the ambiguity of the term, the analytical distinction between 'discourse' as the use of language in communication ('patterns of language' in Johnstone's words), and the ideological thought content expressed in language ('patterns of belief' in Johnstone's words) must be held on to. From a strict linguistic point of view, it is logically impossible to speak of 'discourses' as ideologies. But it is very possible to speak of a piece of discourse and its inherent or expressed ideological thought-content; thus, discourse *and* ideology. This distinction makes 'ideology', and its relation to discourse, an important and interesting research object (see e.g. van Dijk 1998).

This analytical distinction is pointed to also in a later work by van Dijk. In the chapter 'Discourse and Ideology' in his anthology *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (2011) he discusses the phenomenon of ideology in social or political discourse. About the relation between the inner thought-content ('patterns of belief') and the outer discursive linguistic form ('patterns of language'), the structures of vocabulary, pragmatic sentence construction and so on, he states:

'Since ideological discourse is, by definition, based on underlying ideologies, such discourse often shows some of the structure of these ideologies...This does *not* mean that, methodologically speaking, we may circularly derive ideologies from discourse and discourse from ideologies...' (van Dijk 2011b: 387).

And he continues:

‘Hence, the structures and contents of ideologies are different...from the ways they are used or expressed in discourse and other social practices. Indeed, we shall see below that discourse structures and ideological structures are only indirectly related...’ (van Dijk 2011b: 387).

Which leads to the methodological consequence, that:

‘...the identification and interpretation of discursive structures and strategies as the expression and reproduction of group ideologies...[will]...focus on the ways ideologies are being expressed, performed and (re-) produced by text and talk’ (van Dijk 2011b: 394).

So much so. The concept ‘discourse’ in linguistic theory is argued to be analytically distinct from the concept ‘ideology’; discursive structures and strategies are *analytically distinct* from ideological structures and strategies. This position is supportive of my view of the necessity to elaborate a specific concept of ‘ideological thought-content’. It is also supportive of my view of the elusive, context-bound, action-guiding *social and political language* and the necessity to stress the problem of *interpretation*.¹¹⁸ There simply is no obvious or direct connection between discursive structures or ideological structures, to use van Dijk’s vocabulary, or between the vocabulary and grammar on the linguistic surface and the inner, intended meaning; it all depends (which I brushed upon in Part One, Section 5 and 6, and will return to in Section 29, below).

The use of the concept ‘discourse’ in linguistic theory is thus concentrated on how, for example, *racist ideas* (or sexist, nationalist, liberal, Islamist or populist ideas) *are expressed* in discursive forms (as argued already in Part One, Section 6). Admittedly, a discursive language-use with a racist (sexist, nationalist, liberal, Islamist or populist) message will be using some specific linguistic forms, especially a specific vocabulary and model stereotypes, schemas or scripts. But from the strict linguistic theory of language, thus, one should not speak of a ‘racist discourse’ or a ‘sexist discourse’, and not even ‘the discourse of liberalism’, as van Dijk suggested above. To be strict, one should rather speak of ‘a discursive event (text or talk) involving a racist message’ or ‘a discursive event (text or talk) involving a sexist message’.¹¹⁹ For, if we are to take Johnstone and van Dijk seriously, we should not speak of ‘a’ discourse as ‘a set of substantial statements’ in the Foucauldian style. As a linguistic concept in linguistic theory

118 Of course, interpretation must always be viewed as a ‘double hermeneutics’ as Anthony Giddens calls it, that is, first the members of a social life-world have to interpret what is communicated among them, secondly the researcher or analyst has to interpret what is said (Giddens 1984: xii-xxvii; see also Naess 1966: 9-36).

119 On this point, see my general remark in Part One, Section 6 and Section 18.3 above.

the term ‘discourse’ (as a generic concept, or ‘a mass noun’, as Johnstone says) instead should be kept clean of any pre-defined substantial thought-content. This basic linguistic stand-point is probably the reason why Teun van Dijk, as I mentioned initially, time after the other is dismissing the Marxism-laden label CDA and rather suggests the more minimal and open notion of simply *Discourse Studies* or just *Discourse Analysis*, whether ‘critical’ or not (see the title of van Dijk ed. 1985; van Dijk ed. 1997; van Dijk ed. 2011; see also the sharp argument in van Dijk 2013).¹²⁰

19.5 Discourse and ideology. The birth of a linguist research-programme, originally lacking a concept of ideology

Now, let us return to the early 1980s and the early 1990s in the discipline of linguistics and thus the concept of ‘ideology’ as it is conceived from a linguistic point of view; as analytically distinct from ‘discourse’. The young British and Australian ‘Critical Linguists’, forerunners to the research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis* once had this extraordinary, Marxist-inspired idea in the late 1970s; following the general ‘Marxist watershed’ of other disciplines. They wanted to engage in studies of social and political language with the aim to ‘critically’ reveal how the inherent power-legitimizing ‘ideology’ was present in language-use and ‘discursive forms’. Thus, they wanted a change in the old ‘formal’ discipline of linguistics; with its ‘formal’ paradigm of morphology (word forms), grammar (sentence construction) and pragmatics (sentence use). For these ‘critical’ linguists it was not sufficient merely to work in the direction of ‘social linguistics’, pointing to the class-based differences of vocabulary and language-use between social segments. They wanted to continue from a ‘social’ to a ‘critical’ linguistics, pointing to the hidden ‘exercise of power’ which was imbued in the dominating language-use in public media or official language (Hodge & Kress 1991 [1979]; Fowler et al. 1979).¹²¹

With their back-ground in the discipline of linguistics, these first ‘critical linguists’ lacked a concept of ideology. Thus it is easy to understand why they, as also the linguists of the later *Critical Discourse Analysis*, had to turn to the social sciences to borrow the notion of ‘critical theory’ and the necessary, substantial social science concepts like ‘ideology’, ‘power’, ‘social structure’ and ‘social practice’, thereby making a fundamental *social scientific turn*, as I called

120 See his blunt statement on this point in van Dijk 2013, a statement that I gladly would have commented on if there had been place here. With this move he also seems to liberate the attitude of being ‘critical’ from its exclusive Marxist or Foucauldian reverberations, opening for the kind of ‘rational criticism’ as I presented above in Part One, Sections 4, 10, 12 and 13. In Lindberg 2017 I introduced as a meta-methodological basic notion, the three epistemic modes of ‘descriptive’, ‘critical’ and ‘normative’ analysis of ideas and ideological thought-content; where ‘critical’ is presented in two main versions, as *rational criticism* after Socrates or Kant, or as functional *ideology critique* in the footsteps of Marx.

121 For this intellectual history, see Hodge & Kress (1991 [1979]): xi-xi; Fowler et al. 1979: 1–2, 185–90; Simpson 1993: 5–8. These works were my own entry into this avenue of research.

it above (see Part One, Section 6).¹²² They were now in the position to introduce a new perspective in the analysis of conversation, discussion or actual communication in society, especially the news media; and it should perhaps be pointed to that they all upheld the analytical distinction between ‘discourse’ as spoken or written pragmatic language-use, and ‘ideology’ as the expressed or suggested thought-content.

Many of these linguists, following their ‘critical’ ambition, chose the Marxist theory tradition for extra-disciplinary support and conceptual input. For example, the prominent linguist Norman Fairclough, in all his early original works, such as the influential and creative *Language and Power* (1989) or *Discourse and Social Change* (1992) borrows his concept of ‘Ideology’, and his critical concept of ‘power’, from the Marxist tradition, in the suite of Althusser, Pêcheux, Foucault or Gramsci.¹²³ In this conceptual use, Fairclough keeps an analytical distinction between ‘discourse’ as language-use and ‘ideology’ as the expressed thought-content; he may speak of ‘the ideas expressed in discourse’. Another important linguist of this research programme, Ruth Wodak, with her German-speaking background, had her social science connection point in the ‘critical theory’ of the Frankfurt School, but also to the Marxist notions of Fairclough, and the Marxist social theory of Pierre Bourdieu.¹²⁴

Inside the joint research programme of CDS/CDA, however, there was also an alternative connection point to the social sciences (as hinted already in Part One, Section 6). The prominent theorist Teun van Dijk – the primus motor of this research programme (empirically, theoretically and socially) as we saw – followed another theoretical track. This is especially apparent in his work *Ideology. A Multi-Disciplinary Approach* (1998) or in the chapter ‘Discourse and Ideology’ in his anthology *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (2011b). To find a concept of ‘ideology’ to start with, he seemingly – or merely by convention in the common paradigm of sociology or social psychology – turns to the general social theory of Talcott Parsons. With the notion of ‘group ideology’, as the connecting cement of any social system, he in fact restates the concept of ideology found in Parsons basic work as ‘the social representations shared by members of the group’ (van Dijk 1998: 8) (compare Parsons formulations in Section 16, above).¹²⁵ But he also gains initial inspiration and support from the political science knowledge tradition. On a pivotal

122 See for this narrative, Simpson, *Language, Ideology and Point of View* (1993: 5–8). As a typical example from these years, which is still readable and informative, see Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, *Language and Control* (1979), especially Ch. 10.

123 See Fairclough 2001 [1989]: 1–4, 10; Fairclough 1992: 12–100. See also Fairclough 1995: 86–96; 2003: 9, 218; 2010: 39–44. However, in a still later work, after all his impressive *oeuvres*, Fairclough abandons the Marxist concept of ideology and changes his notion of ‘critical’ and ‘criticism’ in the direction of the Political Science knowledge tradition. (See Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, to which we will soon return.)

124 See her positioning in Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak 2011: 360–61; Wodak & Meyer eds. 2016: 6–12,

125 See Van Dijk 1998: 3, 8–9. The relevant passages from Talcott Parsons are found in Parsons 1951: 349–51.

point he quotes Martin Seliger's comprehensive and central work *Ideology and Politics* (1976). Van Dijk borrows Seliger's definition of 'ideology', where ideology is defined as set of:

'beliefs and disbeliefs expressed in value sentences, appeal sentences and explanatory statements' (van Dijk 1998: 321, n. 7).¹²⁶

Here we meet the typical political science notion of the three tiers of ideological thought. This common inner structure of ideological thought is later pictured by van Dijk as:

'the (possibly biased, misguided) *knowledge* of a group, but also its shared *evaluations*, according to the basic community *norms* and *values* (van Dijk 2011b: 388).

As we see, van Dijk's notion is an echo of Parsons three main action-orientations, as of above. It is also the view of the political science knowledge tradition, from Herbert Tingsten of the 1930s to Martin Seliger of the 1970s; refined in my own concepts of V, D and P. Van Dijk also touches on a kind of *practical reasoning* in the relation between descriptive knowledge, chosen goals and practical action; which we saw was central in the political science knowledge tradition on this point (Section 17 above; see Sections 23 and 24 below).

However, van Dijk has not simply borrowed the main traits of his concept of 'ideology' from sociology and political science, as two of the three main theoretical traditions regarding ideology (Section 15 above). In several following works he has also made lasting contributions to the theory of ideology, from a point of view of the linguistic concept of discourse.¹²⁷ And on top of that, in his works, especially *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998), there is a criticism, both open and implicit, of the third main theoretical tradition, the Marxist concept of ideology. He is especially critical of the notion of a dominant or ruling ideology in society, 'the dominant ideology thesis', a point where he follows the criticism of Abercombie, Hill and Turner (1980) which we brushed upon above (see Van Dijk 1998: 3, 8–9, 179–85; van Dijk 2011b: 381).

We thus find two main theoretical conceptions of 'ideology' within the research programme CDA/CDS. The one is Marxist or Marxist-inclined, exemplified by Norman Fairclough, and the other is connecting to traditional sociology or political

126 Van Dijk 1998: 3–4, n. 7, p. 321. See also van Dijk 2011b: 382–84 with direct reference to the Political Science knowledge tradition regarding ideologies. In van Dijk 2009 the connection to the Weber-Parsons tradition, or to Lasswell and Kaplan, is obviously present, but without direct quotations, for example on p. 5.

127 I am sorry that there is no space here to introduce and scrutinize the ideology-theoretical efforts of Teun van Dijk in his series of theory-developing works 1998, 2008a, 2008b, 2009 and 2014.

science, exemplified by Teun van Dijk.¹²⁸ As far as I know, however, the main figures of this programme, as Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough or Ruth Wodak, have over the years, at least up to 2012 or so, refrained from direct, internal theoretical criticism of each other.¹²⁹ This, I think, has been contributing to their success, but also to some diffuseness of their common ground. In my opinion some of these differences is underlying the vibrant text in van Dijk's multilayered article *CDA is NOT a Method for Critical Discourse Analysis* (van Dijk 2013).¹³⁰

19.6 A stunning re-orientation in the Marxist strand of the research programme

However, this pattern of two theoretical strands in the joint research programme CDS/CDA has dissolved in recent years; that is, the Marxist strand has been dissolved. This is perhaps due to the general dissolution and depreciation of Marxist social theory which had its way in the mid-1980s, as we saw. Interestingly and remarkably, the ever-creative and ever-productive Norman Fairclough has explicitly abandoned his once so pronounced Marxism. (Whether this is in pursuit of the broader self-criticism within Marxist theory, or an autonomous critical re-orientation by Fairclough himself, is not clear to me right now.) In a courageous work *The Critical Analysis of Political Discourse* (2012), Norman Fairclough, together with Isabela Fairclough, adopts a wholly new beginning in the analytical approach of *Critical Discourse Analysis*. They not only put forward a criticism of the old Marxist collaborator Ruth Wodak, they also, and more importantly, directly places their programme within the political science knowledge tradition. In this move they start with Aristotle (who else) and continues with influential British political scientist Colin Hay in his *Why we hate Politics* (2007) and the authoritative British handbook *Introduction to Politics* (2009) edited by R. Garner, P. Ferdinand and S. Lawson (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 17–34). As a 'framework for analysis and evaluation' the authors even place the thought-figure of 'practical reasoning' in the centre as the central analytical tool, borrowed from the argumentation theory of philosopher Stephen Toulmin (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 35–54). This is close to the three-tiered model of political thought which is in the centre of my elaborations here, and which I above extracted from the political science knowledge

128 The actual position of Ruth Wodak on these issues is more complicated, being a little of this and a little of that, and perhaps also accepting the Foucauldian 'ambiguity' as criticized by van Dijk. As a productive researcher, she seems more interested in doing the work on the shop-floor, that to polish and sort the many tools in her tool-box.

129 In Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 21–25) there is an open criticism of the theoretical position of Ruth Wodak.

130 The blunt statement by Teun van Dijk (2013) is seemingly directed against the use of the label 'Critical Discourse Analysis' by researchers and students as a specific and coherent *method*. But I think one also should read it as an internal criticism of the 'critical' strand in the research programme he once was the initiator of, where the 'critical' attitude is reified into a 'critical method' or into a compound critical 'theory and method'; as we have met e.g. in the subtitle of Jørgensen & Phillips 2002.

tradition. In this move they end up in the same position as the earlier Brecht (1959) or Björklund (1970) and the Uppsala school of idea-analytical political science (see Part One, Section 5; and Section 17, above) thus, in fact, standing ever deeper anchored in the Political Science knowledge tradition than they seem to be aware of themselves.

But Norman Fairclough is not alone along this track. Even Ruth Wodak seems to be abandoning, or weakening, her earlier affiliation to the Marxist concept of ideology and the ‘critical theory’ of the Frankfurt School. In the recent and impressive work, *The Politics of Fear. What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (2015), she is using a broad array of theoretical notions. In the main aspects of analysis she is also close to the analytical procedures of ordinary content-oriented idea-analysis, as it is conceived of and practised in the political science knowledge tradition.¹³¹ In her theoretical array (eclectic as it seems, though) she even uses Toulmin’s argumentation theory, already introduced by Fairclough and Fairclough in their notion of practical reasoning (see Wodak 2015: 50–54). The ‘ideology critical’ element also seems to have given place to a mainly content-oriented descriptive, understanding and interpretation of the ideology the right-wing parties and organizations;¹³² what I would term the ‘ideological thought-content’. Regarding the concept of ideology, Wodak also seems to be leaving the Marxist horizon, and is moving in the direction of van Dijk and the late Fairclough, that is, abandoning the *restrictive* and *pejorative* Marxist concept of ‘ideology’ and rather leaning to an *inclusive* and *neutral* concept, as in the political science knowledge tradition (Wodak 2015: 7–8, 27–29). How far this seemingly new attitude will take her is yet too early to tell, at least from my present, limited knowledge.

The move away from the general Marxist heritage on ‘Ideology’ in CDA, is also visible in another aspect. In the mentioned *Political Discourse Analysis* (2012) the two Faircloughs discuss the concepts of ‘critical’ and ‘criticism’. On this point the authors abandons the Marxist notion of ‘ideology critique’, that is, the typically Marxist functional analysis used to ‘reveal’ the class character, or the hidden power-exercise in ideological discourse. This view of ‘ideology critique’ was still present in the joint presentation of *Critical Discourse Analysis* in 2011 together with Ruth Wodak (Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak 2011: 357–61). But now the Faircloughs associate themselves with the *rational idea-criticism* of the political science knowledge tradition (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 69–81).¹³³ The rational idea-criticism is congenial to an epistemic programme of *rationalist political understanding* combined with a pluralist view of politics, and implies a critical stand – in principle – toward *any*

131 See Vedung 1982: 27; Lindberg 2017: 95

132 In Lindberg 2017 I propose a tripartite typology of epistemic attitudes or modes in the content-oriented study of social and political ideas: descriptive mode, critical mode and normative mode (Lindberg 2017: 94–98).

133 See Vedung 1982: 27; Lindberg 2017: 95.

political ideology or political message; a position which I presented above as developed by, among others, Herbert Tingsten or Evert Vedung in the Uppsala school of idea-analytical political science, and expressed in many works of the discipline (see Part One, Sections 4, 10, 12 and 13; or Section 17 above).

19.7 The story of the concept 'ideology' in linguistic discourse studies

Norman Fairclough (and perhaps Ruth Wodak), and thus the whole research programme of CDS/CDA seems to have ended up in the position where Teun van Dijk from the beginning had placed his notion of 'ideology', that is, in the traditions of Sociology and Political Science. Over the years van Dijk has continued to develop this conceptual component (missing in traditional linguistic theory), since so much discourse in society is 'ideological' in a social and political sense.¹³⁴ And from early days, he, quite like the others, came to be interested in issues like prejudice and racism on a societal level, and how the news media were spreading ideological views.¹³⁵ His continuing attempts to develop a theory of the inner structure of ideology, from the linguistic point of view, must be considered as an important contribution to the general knowledge of both political science and sociology, which were van Dijks original theoretical starting-points regarding ideology.

To conclude. The Marxist concept of 'Ideology' seems to be dissolved in the research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis*. As far as any remnants of the Marxist concept of 'Ideology' remain they are subject to the same internal criticism as in the general Marxist re-orientation of the 1980s. And as far as I can see, the same criticism is valid also for the Foucauldian, or rather Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian concept of 'ideological-discursive formation'. The strict concept of 'discourse' in linguistic theory simply is more open and fruitful when it comes to studies of social and political language and communication, keeping the linguistic aspect clean, while still allowing for an ideological thought-content as a specific element. What is left is, thus, the concept of 'ideology', as it has been developed by van Dijk in his work *Ideology* (1998) and onwards to 'Discourse and ideology' (2011b). And the notion of pluralist 'political ideologies' comes with the package of the political science re-orientation of Norman Fairclough in *Political Discourse Analysis* (2012), a view that seems to inform also Ruth Wodak in her later works. But this does not mean that the possibility of being 'critical' is abandoned. Only that the Marxist concept of functional 'ideology critique', as we saw, is replaced by the notion of *rational idea criticism* – as of Herbert Tingsten (1941) or the political science knowledge tradition more generally – regarding the possibility of rational and scientifically based semantic (concept-critical), logical, empirical or moral criticism (see Part One, Sections 4, 10, 12 and 13).

134 Especially in van Dijk 1998 and 2011b. But also in his 2008a; 2008 b; 2009; and 2014.

135 See his early works 1984 and 1987.

Taking a wider view in conclusion, the original position of Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak of the early 1990s might be regarded as a kind of last bulwark of a specific Marxist, or ‘critical theory’ connected, conception of ideology; that is, as both *restrictive* and *pejorative* or involved in a bipolar view of power and subordination. After all, this conception had a late arrival in linguistics, coming on a broad front about 1990, some twenty years later than in sociology, for example. In a similar way the re-orienting abandoning of the Marxist heritage also have occurred some two decades later.¹³⁶

19.8 Critical conclusion of linguistic (critical) discourse analysis

Thus, *nothing* in the research programme of Critical Discourse Analysis/Critical Discourse Studies remains *that hinders*, or constitutes an argument against, my continued effort to develop my proposed theory of *ideological thought-content*. On the contrary, my efforts seem to be on a similar track, broadly speaking, as that of Teun van Dijk and the recent re-orientation of Norman Fairclough.

On top of that, my own understanding of social and political language has of course benefitted a lot from the encounters with the tradition of CDA/CDS and the linguistic concept of ‘discourse’. It has induced me to move deeper into the realms of general linguistics (as in the recent works of Vyvyan Evans)¹³⁷ and to re-assess (and re-appreciate) my earlier connection to language philosophy (from Ogden & Richards 1922 to Naess 1966 and Austin 1975). All in all, since my theoretical elaborations are anchored in the general social theory of ‘communicative actions and interactions’ (Parsons 1951), or the political science tradition from Arthur Bentley’s ‘language activities’ (1908) or Harold Lasswell’s ‘language of politics’ (1949 and 1950), this renewed, deeper understanding of language and the ‘functions and strategies of discourse’ (van Dijk 2011b and 2013) has been, and will continue to be, of imminent importance in my continued work.¹³⁸

In return, I hope that *the general theory of ideological thought-content*, proposed here, might offer at least some theoretical contributions to the further development of the multidisciplinary research approach *Discourse Studies*. After all, my proposed theory is a synthesized reconstruction of sifted and stylized conceptual building-bricks from *social science*; especially regarding the

136 The prevailing radical spirit of Marxism and post-Marxism, though, is upheld by the followers of Laclau and Mouffe. But as we saw Laclau and Mouffe were *never* a part of the linguistic research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis*, but rather an outflow of Marxist social theory, gone post-Marxist with the help of Foucault. And besides, their Foucauldian kind of radicalism was early getting thin, apart from internal inconsistencies and shortcomings, as when Chantal Mouffe (1993) moved in the direction of political science views.

137 See Evans 2009, 2014 and 2015.

138 See Part One, Sections 6 and 14; as well as Sections 22 and 29 below.

concepts of sociological ‘culture’ and political science ‘ideologies’ (with critical side-kicks from the Marxist ‘Ideology’ and the Foucauldian ‘Discourse’. Below we will also meet some more parallel concepts, like ‘beliefs’, ‘policies’ ‘regimes’ and the like. As we saw, neither ‘critical’ linguistics nor the research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis*, nor the broader, multidisciplinary *Discourse Studies*, have a concept of ‘ideology’ of their own, since they emerge out of a disciplinary tradition without an ingrown concept of ‘ideology’ of its own. Since Teun van Dijk has worked extensively on such an ‘external’ concept of ideology over some decades (van Dijk 1998; 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2011b; 2014) I have no intention to say much in addition. Rather I regard my proposed general theory here – dismissing the term ‘ideology’ in favour for *ideological thought-content* – as a supportive counter-point from the social science quarters, reconstructed and systematized from the main theoretical traditions on the ideational phenomenon in society (see Part One, Sections 5 and 9, and Sections 23–28 below).

Chapter Four: Working towards a general theory

20. THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS

20.1 Overlapping concepts in various empirical approaches, mainly in political science

There has been a long journey through the three main theoretical traditions regarding the concept of ideology, and the corresponding two main concepts of ideology in the research programme *Critical Discourse Analysis/Critical Discourse Studies*. In this theory-critical and concept-critical overview I have piece by piece sifted out some building bricks for my theoretical synthesis as fruitful or possible to develop further, while at the same time putting some building bricks aside as unfruitful or inadequate. On that basis I will continue my synthesizing elaborations toward the VDP-triad, as it was suggested as hypothesis in Part One (see Sections 5, 8 and 9). However, there are some empirical approaches in the study of social and political ideas, mainly in political science, that must be considered before moving further.

Let us move from the three main theoretical traditions to some empirical approaches. I have already indicated that the study of social and political ideas or action-guiding thought is carried through in several parallel or contending approaches in the social sciences, especially in Political Science, and that all of them have developed their specific, approach-bound terminologies. Above I called this a conceptual diversification and fragmentation. Hence, we can meet

terms like: 'idea',¹³⁹ 'ideology',¹⁴⁰ 'doctrine',¹⁴¹ 'culture',¹⁴² 'creed',¹⁴³ 'belief system',¹⁴⁴ 'opinion',¹⁴⁵ 'frame',¹⁴⁶ 'regime',¹⁴⁷ 'operational code',¹⁴⁸ 'policy',¹⁴⁹ 'program',¹⁵⁰ 'mentality',¹⁵¹ 'mindset'¹⁵² or 'political myth'¹⁵³; all of them signifying social and political ideas.

Each of them is involved in research trying to get hold of the *action-guiding thought-content* involved in the processes of communicative interactions; either in the general debates and messages permeating all social and political life, or in specific organizations, institutions or processes of the political system (as indicated above). Thus, each one of these approach-bound concepts has a rationale of its own, since specialized and detailed knowledge is always important; and I have great respect for the research in many of these approaches. However, fruitful as each of these approaches may be, their research-guiding concepts together make up a thicket instead of a tidy garden. Like over-abundantly flourishing plants, they encroach onto nearby flowerbeds or spread their seeds all over the place; sometimes causing crossbreeding, which in some cases is fruit-bearing, but in many other cases is sterile. As research-guiding concepts, they partly or wholly overlap, and are sometimes only vaguely defined in their connotations (intensions) or denotations (extensions).¹⁵⁴ All in all, a common terminology and a common theoretical base for understanding and explanation is lacking. I will give you some examples.

The term 'political doctrine' is often synonymous with the term 'political ideology'. On the other hand, the concept 'doctrine' in foreign policy displays the same conceptual elements as the concept 'policy' in most other policy-fields (consisting of a fairly consistent set of situational analyses, identified and framed problems, stated policy-ends and an over-view of available

139 See e.g. Berman 1998; Müller 2011; Israel 2012.

140 See e.g. Lane 1962; Schurmann 1966; Van Dyke 1995; van Dijk 1998.

141 See e.g. Oakshott 1950 [1939].

142 See e.g. Almond & Verba 1966 [1963]; Kavanagh 1972; Schein 1992; Münch & Smelser eds. 1992.

143 See e.g. Myrdal 1944: lxxviii–lxxix on 'The American creed'; see also Sutton et al. 1956.

144 See e.g. Ranney & Kendall 1956: 470–487.

145 See e.g. Lippman 1922; Lane & Sears 1964.

146 Goffman 1974; Johnston & Noakes eds. 2005; Jämte 2013: 66–88.

147 Krasner 1983; Vedung & Brandel 2001: 17, 400–416; Vedung 2002.

148 See e.g. Leites (1972) [1951].

149 See e.g. Stone 2002 [1988]; Sabatier (ed.) 1999.

150 See e.g. Fischer 1995: 27–68.

151 See e.g. Vovelle 1990. *Ideologies and Mentalities*, Chicago University Press.

152 See e.g. Strozier, Terman & Jones 2010.

153 See e.g. MacIver 1947: 2–12; Lasswell & Kaplan 1950: 116–125.

154 The terms 'connotation' and 'denotation' are synonymous with 'intension' and 'extension'. See Ogden and Richards 1922: 1–23; Vedung 1982: 68–72 [1977: 59–112]; Bunge 1998, Vol. One: Ch. 2.2–2.3; Sartori 2009: 97–150.

policy-means, and so on).¹⁵⁵ Speaking of the concept ‘policy’, the question may be asked what in fact differentiates the kinds of ideas involved in a ‘policy’ from the kinds of ideas involved in an ‘ideology’, other than the scope of, or the institutional position in, the political system. Turning to the concept ‘regime’ (as in ‘international finance-political regime’ or ‘environmental policy regime’) this often has the same connotation as ‘policy’ or ‘doctrine’; although ‘regime’ most often includes the institutions of the policy field in its conceptual meaning. Besides, there is in my view no actual difference between ‘belief system’, ‘ideology’ or ‘culture’, since they all refer to roughly the same inherent kinds of ideational elements – such as values, norms, beliefs, attitudes or world-views – even if the concept of ‘culture’, admittedly, sometimes also includes patterns of habitual actions and interactions, which the other two seldom include.

And on top of this we arrive at the Marxist greenhouse where we meet the traditional ‘(ruling, dominant or hegemonic) Ideology’ (in the Marxist sense, with a capital ‘I’), and the developed ‘(ruling, dominant or hegemonic) Discourse’ (in an Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian sense, with a capital ‘D’). More specific hybrids in the Marxist greenhouse do not need to be presented here.

20.2 A possible common referent


A fragmented or divided knowledge situation should always be a matter of some worried concerns. It blocks knowledge-seeking communication and halts the growth of knowledge. However, most of these alternate concepts – in one way or another – seem to refer to a common general ideational phenomenon. Many concepts can thus be said to have a common referent ‘out there’ in the social world (or share at least some overlapping ‘core intensions’). This common referent ‘out there’ can be expressed in the terminology of the general social theory of communicative actions and interactions (as presented above), namely, as *social and political action-guiding thought-content*. Hence, all the concepts mentioned above are in fact, in my opinion, reducible to this conceptual core. The Political Science ‘ideologies’ consist of action-guiding-thoughts involved in, or related to, the institutions of society; the sociological ‘cultural system’ also consists of such action-guiding thoughts; a ‘belief-system’ in political sociology or political science behavioural studies consists of ‘beliefs and attitudes’, combined with ‘values’ and ‘norms’, which all are action-guiding thoughts; and the same goes for the Political Science concepts of ‘policies’, ‘doctrines’, ‘regimes’, ‘creeds’, ‘frames’, ‘myths’ or what have you. To express

155 At the same time one can, curiously enough, say ‘policy-field’ but not ‘doctrine-field’, which suggests some deeper-lying difference between ‘policy’ or ‘doctrine’ which I cannot go into here.

my hypothesis of a possible common referent (or overlapping core intensions), I have put together Figure 1.

As can be seen in Figure 1, I have with some hesitation admitted some concepts from the Marxist greenhouse, placed in brackets. In my opinion, even the main concepts in the Marxist family ('dominant Ideology' or 'hegemonic Discourse') ought to be possible to reduce to the *action-guiding thoughts* of the Weber-Parsons tradition; especially since the great re-orientation in the Marxist tradition, moving in this theoretical direction, has demonstrated the need for a new micro-theoretical base of subjectivity, will and action (see section 18 above). However, I urge the reader to regard this contention of mine as a rather loose conjecture in need of closer scrutiny, and I will add some comments on it below.

Figure 1. The hypothesis of a basic common referent of the various, approach-bound, concepts regarding social and political thoughts or ideas



As I see it, the phenomena that these different concepts refer to:

- a) exist in the same social and political world (of actors, interactions, social systems, and social structures),
- b) consist of the same social and political substance (action-guiding thought content), and
- c) consequently, ought to be possible to comprehend within a unified theoretical frame.

In my view, there is *an obvious common nature in all social and political thought and language*, as it is involved in the communicative actions and interactions that make up society and its institutional order. This is a realist

hypothesis of mine, guiding my efforts in the following. Hence it is both possible and necessary to suggest and propose a *general theory of ideological thought-content* (see Part One, sections 5, 8 and 9).

20.3 Complications on the road to a common understanding

Nevertheless, my reduction to a basic common referent 'out there' is of course not innocent, and some may find it highly controversial. I explicitly think of society and politics in the tradition of mainstream empirical sociology (Weber, Parsons) and mainstream empirical political science (Bentley, Lasswell, Easton); both traditions developing a parallel common general social theory, respectively of the political system, based on the fundamental common concepts of *communicative, meaningful actions* and its correlates (as presented above in Part One, Section 8; and below in Section 21). Moreover, my hypothesis of a basic or elementary common referent 'out there', referred to by all mentioned approach-bound concepts, is based on a dialogical assumption that perhaps is too daring. It presumes that the proponents of the various approaches find it fruitful, or can accept, to communicate in the theoretical language of (at least a light version of) the Weber-Parsons and the Bentley-Lasswell-Easton 'general theory of action' as a *lingua franca*, which thus could be used in all quarters of the social sciences.

This presumption (or hope) of a possible *lingua franca* is perhaps no problem within the sociological and the political science knowledge traditions; although it sometimes seems as if this common theoretical foundation is forgotten both here and there. The situation is more complicated, perhaps, for the Marxist family; with the lingering bipolar, conflictual view of dominating and dominated social positions (classes, gender, ethnicities, sexual identities). Furthermore, the connected determinist (or structuralist) view on molded subjectivity and framed mindsets of the subordinated social agents, is still lingering in the concepts of 'dominating Ideology' or 'hegemonic Discourse'. However, it all depends on how Marxist-inclined researchers relate to the comprehensive self-criticism and the great re-orientation that occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s regarding action, ideology and power. I think especially of how they relate to Jürgen Habermas (1984 [1981]); Jeffrey Alexander (1982, 1983); Anthony Giddens (1984; 1985) or Margaret Archer (1995, 2000). I also think of how the broad historical sociology of Michael Mann is received and conceived of by the (former) Marxists. Mann is outspokenly Weberian, although in close contact with the Marxist heritage, and from this platform he has produced an impressive work of power in society and history (Mann 2012 [1986], Vol 1-4; commented upon in Mann 2011). I also think of how the global empirical sociology of Göran Therborn is viewed by the (former) Marxists (Therborn 2004, 2010, 2014, 2017). Both Mann and Therborn have moved beyond the constraining trenches of the 1970s; seemingly working beyond the dividing line between Marxist and Weberian general social

theory; or beyond the distinction between the allegedly ‘positivist’ Weberian or Parsonian social theory and the alleged ‘critical’ Marxist theory. The same move away from a closed Marxist realm, although in a more specialised field of inquiry, we met above with the former Marxist proponent of *Critical Discourse Analysis*, Norman Fairclough (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). And as I conjectured, perhaps also Ruth Wodak (Wodak 2015) is now perhaps re-orienting her theoretical understanding of ideology and ideology critique. With some luck, then, also the (former) Marxists could be comfortable in communicating on the suggested terminological ground.

In the light of a possible theoretical *lingua franca* of the Weber–Parsons and the Bentley–Lasswell–Easton traditions, I will argue for *the possibility of, and necessity for, a unified general theory of social and political action-guiding thought content*. This action-guiding thought content I have termed ‘*ideological thought-content*’, for short, as far as it is involved in or related to the institutional configuration of society (see Part One, Section 5, 8 and 9). However, this unified analytical frame or general theory requires (at least) two theoretical assumptions, before it can be stated in a stable, theoretical language of its own.¹⁵⁶

21. THE SOCIAL THEORY ASSUMPTION: THE ANCHORING OF MY PROPOSED GENERAL THEORY

I have suggested that the general social theory of communicative actions and interactions is possible to use as a common frame of reference throughout all social sciences. Consequently I will use it in my theoretical elaborations as the theoretical anchorage of my theory (signalled already in Part One Section 5 and 8). My first assumption, thus, is that ideas and idea systems – thoughts expressed in words and sentences; words and sentences expressing thoughts – shall be regarded as action-guiding thoughts in social and political interactions, and as such they are *constituent parts of the institutions and the social structures that any society consists of*. This is an elementary theorem in the *general social theory*, presented above (see Part One, Sections 8; and 16 above). Since the institutions of society are built-up of patterned communicative actions and interactions, the preservation or change of institutions implies preserved, respectively changed, patterns of interactions, which in turn implies preserved, respectively changed, patterns of *action-guiding thoughts and language-use*; down to the detailed preserved or changed *meanings of single words* in specific vocabularies.

¹⁵⁶ Concerning theoretical language, Mario Bunge states: ‘Every science builds an *artificial language* of its own that includes signs borrowed from ordinary language but is characterized by signs and sign combinations introduced along with the peculiar ideas of that science’ (Bunge 1998 [1967], Vol. I: 52).

In this essay the concepts of ‘ideas’ and ‘ideologies’, as we saw above, are viewed as older, preliminary terms, which I not totally will dispose of. With the word ‘ideas’ I connect to older idealistic philosophy of *action-guiding thought*; and with ‘ideology’ I connect to the meaning, used since the Enlightenment, of (utopian) idea-systems outlining *possible institutional futures*, especially in political science. While connecting ‘ideas’ or ‘ideologies’ to the conceptual world of twentieth century general social theory, of the Weber-Parsons tradition, it is possible to reformulate the general meaning of these older concepts in a more theoretically strict way for scientific usage. As we saw, the connection of the older word-use to contemporary general social theory was also found in the works of Lasswell and Kaplan or David Easton in the political science knowledge tradition, as well as with Talcott Parsons in his *General Social Theory*.¹⁵⁷ Thus, in the conceptual frame of this contemporary general social theory, the terms ‘ideas’ and ‘ideologies’ (as suggested here) are translated to ‘action orientations’ or ‘action-guiding thought’. As such they are involved in or related to social and political *institutions*, whether informal or formal.¹⁵⁸ Hence the terms ‘ideas’ or ‘ideologies’, as I use them here, do *not* refer to *all* action-guiding thoughts, only to those which are ‘social and political’, that is, those which:

- a) Are involved in established institutions and social structures (on different levels in society), as habitual or prescribed action-guiding thoughts; although often contested by some actors.
- b) Are related to processes of institutional or structural preservation or change, thus manifestly expressing varying values, goals, situational analyses and principles from the point of view of a plurality of actors, forming ever occurring ideological contestations or idea-struggles.
- c) Are addressing the problems and possible problem-solutions emerging from, or relating to, the functioning of institutions in society, especially regarding the preservation or change of the power relations and allocation of values, which are accompanying the prevailing institutional configurations, and involved in all ideological contestations or idea-struggles.

157 It shall be noted that both Laswell and Easton theorize about the phenomenon of ideology in the (for the discipline of the time) new terms of action-theory. See Lasswell 1936: 29–51; Lasswell & Kaplan 1950: 103–141; Easton 1965b: 332–340. See also Parsons 1951: 326–383.

158 The terms ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ in general social theory refer to the *degree of institutionalization*; from loose networks or temporary cooperative ensembles to tight, formal organizations (like armies, business enterprises or bureaucracies). In Political Science, however, we meet a different use of the terms. The term ‘formal institutions’ refers to “the institutions of government”, while parties and media are considered ‘informal’. The formal-informal distinction is not of specific importance in my own efforts. I include it just to show that ideas and ideologies, as I use these terms (as action-guiding thoughts), may be involved in all kinds of institutions and hence in all kinds of institution-erecting, institution-maintaining and institution-changing practices and interactions.

22. THE LANGUAGE ASSUMPTION: THE ARGUMENTATIVE CHARACTER OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

My second assumption is that all social and political communication in text or talk is through and through *dialogical*, *dialectical*¹⁵⁹ or *argumentative*. All social and political language is involved in communicative actions and interactions, that is, in institutions and cultural conventions. And these are erected respectively prevailed or reformed in continuing communicative activity, including debates and idea-struggles. Thus, every social and political statement, discourse or message (involved in or related to the institutional configuration of society) can be viewed as a direct or indirect *argument* in an ongoing *latent or manifest debate*, that is, on the preservation or reform of institutions or cultural conventions, as well as of the language-use itself.

This *generically dialectical or argumentative character* of all social and political language has emerged from the very beginning of language in the communicative interactions of human social life.¹⁶⁰ The generically argumentative character can also, and directly, be observed in the age-old discipline of political or civic rhetoric in ancient Greece, which teaches the techniques to present an argument and win a public debate; a knowledge-power tradition that is known from Isocrates, via Aristotle to Cicero in Rome.¹⁶¹ The argumentative character of all political language is presented with great insight by Michael Oakshott in his essay 'Political Discourse' in the influential work *Rationalism and Politics and other essays* (1991 [1962]), comparing Plato and Aristotle and their view on political argument.¹⁶² Furthermore, Arnold Brecht presents the predicament of *all political theory* and political science of today as a predicament of creating convincing, science-based *political arguments* against totalitarianism (Brecht 1959: 3–14). There is also a common image of all social and political thought as *an inner dialogue*, that bears all the traits and components of a public debate (since all our thought and language in depth is social) as argued by Michael Billig in *Ideology and Opinions: Studies on Rhetorical Psychology* (1996).¹⁶³ In addition to all this, the generically argumentative character of social and political thought and language can be observed in detail in the grand adversative

159 In the sense of the antiquity, as opposing arguments.

160 See e.g. Chilton 2004: 1–15; Streeck, Godwin & LeBaron 2006: 1–28; Enfield & Levinson 2006: 39–152; Evans 2014: 229–258; Evans 2015: 252–312. See also Billig 1996: 1–19.

161 See e.g. Kennedy 1994: 11–29; Crowley & Hawhee 1999: 21–29, 75–89; 168–175; Schreiber 2003: 1–10.

162 In his fine essay "Political Discourse" Michael Oakshott makes a critical comparison between Plato's and Aristotle's respective views on political argument, in favour of the latter (Oakshott 1991 [1962]: 70–95). See also Crowley & Hawhee 1999: 165–175 on Aristotle's reasoning in politics and the concept of 'enthymeme', which is also central to Michael Oakshott. In Aristotle's, and Oakshott's view, 'politics' is a science about human and practical ends, and thus cannot be an exact science, like mathematics, physics or biology. In consequence, *reasoning in politics* cannot be exactly founded but must be seen as 'practical', hence based on unstable or inexact knowledge. This is the reason why I term the logical sequences of practical reasoning, central to my proposed theory here, 'quasi-logical'. See Section 25 and 26 below.

163 For this point, see especially Billig 1996: 1–19, 31–80. See also Hobbes 1968 [1651]: Ch. III-IX.

idea-struggles in European history, about the Reformation, the French revolution or the modern welfare state.¹⁶⁴ Finally, you can add all the accumulated knowledge of persuasive political language and political propaganda of our own last century, really displaying the dialectical, argumentative and rhetoric character of political language; from Harold Lasswell's classical *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927) and onwards.¹⁶⁵

This old contention of *the argumentative character of social and political communication and language* has recently even reached Critical Discourse Analysis. As I see it, one reason for this late arrival has been the hindering Marxist concept of 'Ideology', and 'critical theory' more generally, which as we saw was focusing on the *outer*, societal function of 'the ideology' and not on its morphological, inner structure. However, in the re-orienting recent work *The Analysis of Political Discourse* (2012), presented above (Section 19.3), Norman and Isabela Fairclough turn to the inner structure and introduce *practical reasoning* as central in political thought and discourse. In that connection they also introduce Stephen Toulmin's argumentation theory as a major analytical tool.¹⁶⁶ For them, the introduction of practical reasoning in the analysis of political discourse is an important new insight (!), that ought to be included in the methodological arsenal of *Critical Discourse Analysis*:

Here we claim that argumentation, and practical argumentation in particular, is the primary activity that is going on in political discourse, and the analysis of argumentation can make a major contribution in strengthening textual analysis in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 86).

This formulation is both encouraging and to a degree also disappointing. From the point of view of Aristotle's view on rhetorics and sound political argument, as a fundament in the political science knowledge tradition (as envisaged in Sabine & Thorson 1974 [1937]; Friedrich 1963:1–23; or Oakshott 1991 [1962]), it

164 See e.g. the analysis in Naess et.al 1956, regarding the epic debate between Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine on the French revolution of 1789. See also Kelley 1981; Israel 2012; Levin 2014; Prothero 2016; or on more contemporary debates, Lewin 1967; Müller 2011.

165 See e.g. Lasswell 1927; Chakotin 1939; Lasswell & Leites eds.1949; Edelman 1977; Fredriksson 1982; van Dijk 1984; Klemperer 2000 [1947].

166 For a presentation of Stephen Toulmin, the originator of many theories of the structure of argument, see Kristina Boréus in Ch. 3 of Boréus & Bergström 2017. For my own slightly diverging view on how to view the basic argumentative pattern in political thought and language, see Ch. 4 of the same work (Lindberg 2017). Moving closer to the realities of political thought and language, I propose a two-level view of political argument in my analytical scheme (see Section 27 below). The notion of the two levels is lacking in Toulmin's model, where the two are instead inter-mingled (fundamental values are presented as immediately warranting operative goals) and thus blurring the actual inner structure of ideological thought. This criticism of Toulmin also applies to Boréus 2017 and Fairclough & Fairclough (2012). In this work I elaborate a slightly different paradigm of practical reasoning, the VDP-triad (see Part One, Section 12; Section 25, 26 and 27 below).

is comforting that the notion of political language as argument is introduced even in linguistic discourse analysis. The disappointing aspect is how stubborn the influence of the bipolar Marxist conception of power and ideology has been (and the subsequent notion of a functional 'ideology critique' instead of a content-oriented rational criticism) with its focus on the *outer legitimating function* of ideology and discourse, blocking the way to the action-guiding inner structure of social and political thought.

Be this as it may. With the support of all this established knowledge among prominent researchers, I feel quite confident of the assumption of *the argumentative character of social and political thought and language*. I am also confident in making this assumption one of the fundamentals for the elaboration of my general theory. But I still want to widen the extension of my theory from the realm of 'the political system' to *all* social and political communication and language, in all social domains and fields (see my criticism of political science on this point in Section 17 above).

In my view, (based on the political science knowledge tradition, language philosophy and the literature mentioned above), the *argumentative character* of social and political thought and speech is present and visible in three main ways. *First*, it comes with the *meanings of single concepts* (that is, the actual, practical word-meanings). In the very definitions of political concepts there are mutually excluding *distinctions* and *cognitive partitions* into classes of objects that take on a dialogical or dialectical character; for example, 'modern' as distinct from 'traditional', 'liberal' as distinct from 'conservative', 'secular' from 'religious', 'the raw' from 'the cooked', the *halal* from the *haram*, the good from the evil, the female from the masculine, and so on. ('All definition is negation', said Spinoza.)¹⁶⁷ As we see, conceptual distinctions like these are directly connected to, or emerge out of, the historical idea-struggles in political life.

Secondly, the argumentative character of political communication and language becomes visible in *the inner argumentative structure* of idea-systems or rhetoric narratives. Idea-systems like, for example, feminist or patriarchal ideology, are basically built up as *arguments* for the feminist, respectively the patriarchal, standpoint.¹⁶⁸

Thirdly, the argumentative character becomes visible in *the outer argumentative relation* between contending idea-systems and their inner argumentative structures. In this outer relation, a pro-argument of for example feminist thought is directly or indirectly met by a contra-argument found in patriarchal thought (and *vice versa*). Idea systems (ideologies) are thus built up as if both

167 The semantic propositions of the extension of sets, sub-sets and the universal set have long since been elaborated in detail in any hand-book of set theory and formal logics. For their place in general linguistics, see e.g. Lakoff 1987: 5–156; Evans 2009: 193–213; Evans 2015: 154–251.

168 This view is obvious in the hand-book tradition on political ideologies in the political science knowledge tradition, touched upon at the end of Section 9, in Part One.

were trying to be optimally convincing in the pro-arguments of attack; while at the same time leaving no gaps in the contra-arguments of defense.¹⁶⁹

The basic (direct or indirect) *argumentative character of social and political thought and language* – residing in the word-choice, rhetoric narrative or sequences of argument – surrounds and permeates the basic ideational factors of my proposed general theory; the three thought-dimensions of V, D and P which consequently are factors of argumentative sequences (see Sections 24, 25 and 26, below).

Chapter Five: Proposing the general theory

23. THE META-THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION

My suggested general theory consists of three parts. First, the *theoretical anchoring* in general social theory (the macro-aspect) and in the general theory of action (the micro-aspect); based on *communicative interactions*. To this theoretical anchoring is attached the assumption that all social and political thought and language (in this communicative interaction) is *generically argumentative* in character. This double theoretical anchoring was presented above.

Secondly, my general theory includes the elaboration of a *morphological theoretical model* – the VDP-triad – of the inner structure of social and political thought. Like all models in factual science,¹⁷⁰ this one is projected to represent the characteristics of some (hypothesised) object ‘out there’. In this case it is the (hypothesized) *inner structure* of the action-guiding thought-content, suggested to be inherent in all social and political communication and discourse around us; manifestly or latently argumentative as we saw. In this model, the inner structure is proposed to consist of three elementary dimensions of thought: values, descriptions and prescriptions, arranged in an argumentative pattern of practical reasoning (which will be presented in greater detail just below).

Thirdly, my general theory includes a *two-level analytical scheme*, conceptually based on and developed from the theoretical model.¹⁷¹ The

169 See Naess 1966: Ch.5 (Swed. edn. 1970); Vedung 1982: Ch. 2, 4, 6 (Swed. edn. 1977); Billig 1996: 2.

170 A model is always the connecting conceptual link between the larger theory and the more detailed conceptual scheme and conceptual operationalization. We must not forget, however, that in all factual science (such as the social and cultural sciences, for example) the model hypothetically *represents* a suggested – conceptually imagined or pictured – *object or pattern*, hypothetically existing ‘out there’ in the cultural, social or political ‘world’. See in this regard Bunge 1973: 91–113; Bunge 1998/I: 470–479, 511–527, 561–573.

171 ‘Theory’, ‘model’ and ‘conceptual scheme’ make up three levels of sophistication in the standard repertoire of scientific research. When social scientists speak of a ‘theory’ they most often mean a ‘theoretical model’ in a strict meta-scientific terminology (supposed to be modelling some aspect of the

analytical scheme is intended to inform and guide empirical case studies as well as comparative or generalizing studies (whether the method of content-analysis is qualitative or quantitative). The theoretical model, together with its accompanying two-level analytical scheme, is intended to be used to discern and interpret the ideological thought-content in social and political communication and language; laying the ground for the further explanation and classification as well as content-oriented criticism and critical analysis of the three tiers of the practical argument (as suggested in Part One, Sections 4, 10, 12 and 13).

24. THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

The proposed theoretical model concerns the general inner structure – the general synchronic morphology¹⁷² – of social and political action guiding thought. I have stated that all social and political action-guiding thought consists of three basic thought-dimensions (or kinds of ideas); expressed in various vocabularies and language-use and various grades of grammatical accuracy (for this see Section 29, below). First, ideals, values, goals or ends (V). Secondly, orienting descriptions and cognitive beliefs (D), of the situation and its structures and actors, including the evaluative attitudes to the cognized objects. Thirdly, prescriptions, recommendations, practical proposals, rules or norms (P).¹⁷³ These three basic kinds of social and political ideas are reconstructed out of several research traditions. However, we do not meet a unified terminology in these research traditions. Similar to the diversified terminologies we met above (Section 20), we meet an untidy flower-bed of terms referring to the three basic kinds of ideas making up the inner structure of action-guiding thought. Also, on this point, a synthesizing conceptual sifting and terminological choice is necessary. Assessing this diversity, I nevertheless find an over-whelming

social world) unlike 'empirical model' which is the theoretical model translated into operational terms and procedures of empirical observation. So, if/when I have carelessly said 'theory' in my text, I more exactly have meant "theoretical model" (unless otherwise stated). See Kaplan 1964: 46–64; 258–357; Bunge 1973: 91–92; Bunge 1998, Vol. One: Ch. 7.1, 8.1; Gregor 2003: 1–15, 123–146; Sartori 2009: 97–150. Much fruitful social science has been performed with a rather simple conceptual analytical frame guiding investigation and understanding; for example a one-dimensional conceptual scheme of two or three analytical concepts (such as centralization-decentralization, or micro-meso-macro), or with a two-dimensional two-valued scheme (as in a four-field table like 'modern-traditional' combined with 'christian-muslim'). Here I attempt something more elaborate.

172 As I have already mentioned, my notion of 'the inner structure' and 'the morphology' differs in almost every aspect from the parallel suggestions of Michael Freeden, as they are proposed in Freeden 1995 and 2013. A demonstration of these differences, not to mention an evaluative assessment of the achievements, respectively, shortcomings of Freeden's attempt, cannot be pursued here for lack of space.

173 In this formulation, I try to involve all kinds of analytical terms regarding the three basic kinds of action-guiding thought (ideas) found in the literature. In my synthesizing effort, my proposed theory is bound to adopt a synthesizing *terminology* regarding these three dimensions of thought, as will be attempted immediately below.

support for my general view; the view that social and political action-guiding thought is built up from three elementary ideational factors or dimensions of thought.

First, we meet the conceptualizations the political science tradition in the study of ‘political theories’ and ‘political ideologies’ (sometimes in close contact with Analytical Philosophy) which was my first laboratory in the sifting out of the three basic kinds of ideas, values (V), descriptions (D) and prescriptions (P); which is my chosen terminology (see Section 17.2 above). However, the terminology (or the underlying language philosophy) of various hand-books is not always very clear, as in George Sabines classical work (1937) or the later text-books.¹⁷⁴ As we saw, Herbert Tingsten is more specific and clear compared to Sabine, when he speaks of ‘evaluations’, ‘value judgments’ or ‘value premises’ (V) on the one hand; and ‘judgments of reality’ or ‘conceptions of reality’ on the other (D) (close to the Uppsala-school of Analytical Philosophy and Axel Hägerström). Tingsten also regards them as being combined in a logical argument, ending up in ‘directives for political action’, as an echo of Aristotle’s *enthymeme* or practical reasoning (Tingsten 1939: 5–6; Tingsten 1941: 9–10). Two decades later the German-American political theorist, Arnold Brecht, speaks of ‘values’ (V), (descriptive) ‘is-statements’ (D) and (normative) ‘ought-statements’ (P) (Brecht 1959: 126–30). Stefan Björklund speaks of ‘values’, ‘descriptions’ and ‘norms’ (Björklund 1970: 28–31). Sociologist Eugen Lemberg, with a historical and anthropological theory of political ideologies, speaks of ‘values’, ‘conceptions’ and ‘norms’ (Lemberg 1974: 6, 321).¹⁷⁵ Martin Seliger speaks of (among other synonyms and variant concepts) ‘value judgements’, ‘statements of facts’ and ‘prescriptions’ (Seliger 1976: 102–108). So much for the Political science knowledge tradition on the inner structure of political thought and ideology. (And here I refrain from quoting works in linguistic philosophy – like Hare 1954, Toulmin 1958 and Gauthier 1964 and their followers – which support the three-tiered model of political science.)

Secondly, we meet the tradition of empirical (social psychology inspired) ‘behavioral’ political studies, or ‘electoral studies’, centering on the concepts of ‘political culture’ or ‘belief system’. This research tradition presents us with some other terms referring to the three basic kinds of social and political thought. Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes in their classic work (1960) speak of generalized ‘values’, ‘goals’ or ‘preferences’ (like my V:s); of ‘cognitive structures’ of ‘beliefs and attitudes’ (like my D:s); and of ‘political motivations’

174 See e.g. Sabine & Thorson 1973 [1937]: vii. See also Heywood 2007: 11–15; Ball & Dagger 2011: 4–11. More strict but not strict enough, is Adams 2001:4.

175 Germ: *Werte, Vorstellungen, Normen*.

(like my P:s) (Converse et al. 1960: 42–44, 188–94). In an equally classic work, using personal, deep interviews, Robert Lane, among other properties of an ideology, speaks of ‘values of life’ (V); ‘beliefs’ and an ‘empirical theory of cause and effect in the world’ (D); and finally, ‘programs of reform’ (P) for ‘the defence or abolition of important social institutions’; all arranged as ‘an argument’ (practical reasoning) with the intention ‘to persuade and counter opposing views’ (Lane 1962: 14–15). And from quite recent ‘behavioral’ studies of belief-systems and cultural values in the world, based on the *World Value Survey*, Poppa Norris and Ronald Inglehart simply (in the social psychologist tradition of electoral studies) refer to the three dimensions of ideological thought as ‘values, beliefs and norms’, that is V, D and P (Inglehart & Norris 2003:8; Norris & Inglehart 2011: 15).

Thirdly, the tradition of Talcott Parsons and general social theory itself, is founded on the notion of basic ‘action-orientations’. These basic action-orientations are of three basic kinds, as we saw above (see Section 16.2): value orientations (V), empirical views and beliefs (D), and norms of conduct (P).¹⁷⁶ In the tracks of Talcott Parsons we also find studies of ‘culture’ and ‘political culture’. The Political Scientist, Gabriel Almond, together with Sidney Verba, holds that a political culture, following Parsons, consists of, first, ‘value standards’ and ‘affective orientations’; secondly ‘cognitive orientations’; an thirdly ‘evaluative orientations’; shortened to ‘affect’, ‘cognition’ and ‘evaluation’ (Almond and Verba 1966 [1963]: 12–15). In my view these distinctions are not very clear; nevertheless, they are circling around the three basic kinds of orientation found with Parsons. When the Swedish sociologist Hans Zetterberg wishes to present Parsons’ three basic orientations of ‘communicative actions’ he uses a more clearly stated terminology, perhaps inspired by Tingsten and Hägerström, and speaks of: ‘valuations’ (V), ‘descriptions’ (D) and ‘prescriptions’ (P) (Zetterberg 1962: 49–51). And in a quite recent work on general social theory, Peter Hedström is somewhere on the same track and uses the terms ‘desires’; ‘beliefs’ and ‘opportunities’, where the two first are direct equivalents to my V:s and D:s, while the third one is more diffuse, although containing the P:s (Hedström 2005: 34–45).

Fourthly, we also find the three dimensions of thought in studies of public policy. One early and influential work, which is very clear about the ‘parts of a policy argument’ or ‘the structure of a policy position’, is Robert A. Levine’s *The Arms Debate* (1963). First, Levine holds, there are ‘value judgements’ or simply ‘values’ or ‘goals’; secondly ‘an analytical picture of the world’, or just ‘analyses’ or ‘descriptions’; thirdly, there of course must be ‘policy-recommendations’

176 See Parsons, *The Social System* (1951: 3–45); or Parsons & Shils eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951: 3–29).

or just 'recommendations'. These three are said to be connected in 'a coherent chain of logic', which will 'arrive at the recommendations' (Levine 1963: 12–33). A similar view of the inner structure of policies is found in Lennart Lundqvist's comparative study of environmental policy in Sweden and the USA. The 'policy-content' (as the thought guiding policy-actions) of any public policy is said to consist of: 'policy goals', 'perceptions of reality' and 'recommendations for policy change' (Lundqvist 1982: 22–24). And in the study of the imbued patterns of thought and action in public administration, James March and Johan P Olsen, in their influential *Rediscovering Institutions* (1989), hold that such patterns or 'rules of appropriateness' consist of, first, imbued 'values and preferences'; secondly, clusters of 'beliefs' or patterns of 'cognitions'; and thirdly of emerging 'rules' or 'norms', regarded as 'reasons for action' (March & Olsen 1989: 39–43).

Fifthly, the theorists of the great re-orientation in Marxist theory also suggest three kinds of ideas as the inner structure of action-guiding thought. In Jürgen Habermas' social theory, all communicative actions are of three kinds: 'expressive speech-acts' which are parallel to value-judgements or goal-statements (V); 'constative speech-acts' which are parallel to descriptions or cognitions (D); finally, 'regulative speech-acts', which are parallel to norms, prescriptions or imperative statements (P) as of above (Habermas 1984 [1981]: 309). In Göran Therborn's critical reconstruction of the Althusserian concept of ideology, he suggests three kinds of ideas as the thought-content of all social or political ideologies (unwittingly being close to the topoi of Aristotle, as it seems): first, thoughts of 'what is good' (V); secondly thoughts of 'what exists' (D); and finally thoughts of 'what is possible and impossible'. Therborn also adds that these three basic kinds of ideas form 'a logical chain of significance', suggesting the notion of practical reasoning (Therborn 1980: 18). And in Norman Fairclough's re-orientation away from a Marxist concept of ideology (together with Isabella Fairclough) we meet the three tiers of practical reasoning – couched in the terminology of Toulmin's argumentation theory – as the basic inner, argumentative structure of all 'political discourse'.

Having such broad support from all over the social scientific field (!) I feel very confident in placing the three-tiered model as the backbone of my general theory. However, as we saw, some synthesizing terminological sifting was necessary, ending up in my chosen terms V, D and P for the three basic dimensions of thought.

25. THE ARGUMENTATIVE SEQUENCE OF PRACTICAL REASONING

Values (V), beliefs (D) and norms (P), involved in or related to the preservation or change of the institutions of society, normally comes to the individual through socialization and cultural learning, including the learning of language. They are also transmitted by formal education in schools, universities or voluntary organizations.¹⁷⁷ In every society and its political system, and in every 'para-political' social sub-system, there normally exists at least one already given and established *cultural system* or institutionalized *religious or political ideology*; as we saw, however, a plurality of cultures and idea-systems is the rule, hence the subsequent diversification and contestation in the realm of culture or politics. Any such cultural system or institutionalized ideology carry the inherent three-tiered structure of values (V), descriptive beliefs (D) and prescriptive norms (P), expressed in various vocabularies relating to action with varying degrees of grammatical accuracy and with varying degrees of critical consciousness regarding the choice of words and meanings.

The three basic kinds of social and political thoughts, or ideas, do not however appear one by one in a neat logical order in the minds of social and political actors. In real thinking in real life, the three kinds of action-guiding thought are intertwined, admixed or intermeshed or; as thoughts usually are.¹⁷⁸ The thing does not get easier if we add the linguistic level with its three aspects; the morphological (word-aspect), the grammatical-syntactical (sentence-aspect) and the pragmatic (discursive aspect).¹⁷⁹ A manifestly stated sentence may include both a strong evaluation and a direct description, signalling the underlying presence of a strong value standard. Furthermore, the triadic sequence of a practical argument is often incomplete. One of the three basic thoughts may be verbally missing while at the same time being latently suggested; perhaps assumed by the speaker to be self-evident for the hearer. For example, in debates on foreign policy and re-armament, the basic *values* of national interest or safety for the country are seldom manifestly stated. They lie latently present in the common understanding as basic preconditions for the debate, although they in fact, in thought and association of both speakers and hearers, are equally present and obvious as the explicitly outspoken arguments (see e.g. Levine 1963: 12–13).

177 For Talcott Parsons (1951: 5–7, 326–28; 1973: 8–10) 'the cultural system' is prevailing as a distinct 'sub-system' beside or over the emerging individuals and the organizing collectives of the society. It exists in and through institutionalized symbols (including language) carried by and transmitted further by a set of 'core institutions', like schools, universities, churches and organizations or the scenes of literature, music and art with a relatively autonomous structural existence of its own. Speaking of structure, the structural Marxist Louis Althusser (1970) in similar vein speaks of schools, churches and organizations as 'ideological state-apparatuses', carrying 'the dominant ideology' of society.

178 See e.g. Kahnemann 2011. I will not go deeper into the psychological aspect of action-guiding/action-accompanying thought, however important that aspect may be. Instead I will remain in the territory of inquiry into the research traditions sketched above.

179 See e.g. Birner 2013; see also Yule 2010: 66–155.

Because of this many-faceted linguistic diffuseness, there is a constant need for an *analytical framework* to discern the three basic dimensions of thought in a text or a speech, whether manifest or latent, and to break apart the intertwined evaluative, descriptive and prescriptive thought-dimensions residing in the various, and perhaps incomplete, linguistic expressions. Thus, there is a need for an elaborate *theoretical model* and an elaborate *analytical scheme* as tools in this separating, clarifying and reconstructing process. In some rare cases, though, the three dimensions of thought are more orderly or systematically arranged; as in systematically presented party-platforms, well-argued public investigations, or in sophisticated intellectual discussions.¹⁸⁰ In such cases the interpretative and analysing work is, by far, more easily pursued (see Section 29, below).

The three-tiered inner structure of social and political communication, thought and language is the central proposition of my general theory. But in this general theory is also included another proposition, which has been suggested several times already, *the proposition that the three basic kinds of thought are combined in a specific pattern, the sequence of practical reasoning.* Even this proposition is reconstructed and synthesized out of the knowledge traditions mentioned above, especially the Political Science studies of political theories and ideologies, as we saw. We have brushed against it from the beginning in several examples; as when we met *The Huddersfield Society of Homeless Cats* or the young couple debating household responsibilities (see Part One, Section 9).

The role of practical reasoning in action-guiding-thought is thought of as follows. Taken one by one the three basic kinds of social and political ideas or thoughts are void of action-guiding force. The value ‘peace’ (V), for example, cannot as such say anything about how to act until we introduce a situational account. What is also needed is a descriptive image (D), whether truthful or not, for example: ‘The enemy is threatening us. A war is imminent’. Depending on the evaluation of different lines of actions (D), a prescription (P) may be launched, for example ‘Strengthen our defensive forces!’ But in turn, even such an outspoken prescription (P) is neither (argument-logical) possible nor understandable (by the language-community in question) unless the description of the situation (D) is combined with the value (V) of safety or security. And in that way a *practical argument* emerges out of the discursive dialogue, ending up in the action-guiding force of the combined argument:

If you want peace (our common cherished value) (V), and facing the imminent attack by our enemies (as is witnessed by many honest men) (D), we must unite, dear citizens, and contribute to the strengthening of our defensive forces (P).

¹⁸⁰ See e.g. my own mini-analysis of the extraordinarily systematic and clear party-platform of the British Women’s Equality Party of 2015 (Lindberg 2017).

Thus, the *action-guiding thought-content* emerges out of the combination of values, descriptions and prescriptions ordered in a – manifest or latent – argumentative sequence of practical reasoning.

26. THE VDP-TRIAD

I will suggest, therefore, that the inner structure of action-guiding social and political thought and language includes some inner derivative reasoning (Tingsten 1939: 5–6) or a ‘coherent chain of logic’ (Levine 1963: 32). This inner logic forms a kind of ‘practical argument’ ending up in one or more ‘practical conclusions’, to use the terms of Evert Vedung in his *Political Reasoning* (Vedung 1982: 200–02; Swed. orig. 1977: 163–64). As an actual inner logic of political thought, it is specifically elaborated by Arnold Brecht (1959: 128–130), as we saw, and it is elaborated by David Gauthier as a general structure of thought in practical situations and practical problems (1963: 24–49, 95–99). It is eventually established as self-evident in all political thought on the text-book level in Political Science (that is, in no need of any further supportive argument), as we also saw, by Stefan Björklund in his *Politisk teori* [Political Theory] (1970: 28–31).¹⁸¹ From the title of David Gauthier’s work (1963), I have borrowed the term *practical reasoning*.

The notion of *practical reasoning*, as the kernel of political argument and political reasoning, had a long intellectual history – starting with Aristotle, of course and his *enthymeme*¹⁸² – before it became established and re-formu-

181 I have personally asked Stefan Björklund about the source of his idea that the triad is self-evident; he gives no clues or references about this in the book. Björklund just answered in his typical laconic prose: ‘I thought it was self-evident’ (!). However, I happen to know that Arnold Brecht had a strong standing at the Department of Government (Skytteanum) in Uppsala; I personally went to a seminar on this work in 1970 held by Evert Vedung. The triad was also explicitly present as a theory of the inner structure of political thought in the generational dissertations Vedung 1971: 48–51 and Gustavsson 1971: 14–19. And of course, the basic structure of Herbert Tingsten’s idea-analysis and idea-criticism, as well as Axel Hägerström’s earlier language-philosophical position regarding value-statements and descriptive statements, common in Uppsala’s intellectual landscape of the time, points in this direction. Above I spoke of this as ‘the Uppsala-school of idea-analysis’ (Section 15.2). In that way, Björklund’s statement of the self-evidential character of the triad might be justified. Björklund, though, makes a sweeping hint about David Hume and his criticism of Natural Law, and his subsequent distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, which in turn had been important for both Tingsten, Hägerström and Brecht. The same inspiration from Hume, which also may have influenced Björklund, is held by George Sabine, who in his basic hand-book on the *History of Political Theory*, lectured on by Björklund, presents his own general analytical perspective in political theory to Hume’s criticism of Natural Law; see Sabine & Thorson 1973 [1937]: viii, 549–557. See also, *ad fontes*, Hume 1978 [1740]: 1–13, 468–70.

182 However, we are not speaking of an Aristotelian ‘practical syllogism’ which is another thing, a pattern of causally explaining a practical course of action. Instead the notion of *practical reasoning* emerges out of Aristotle’s concept of *enthymeme*, meaning the kind of arguments used in practical philosophy, based on *phronesis*, that is, the kind of argument and knowledge we (as responsible citizens acting with virtue) can use in Ethics, Economics or Politics. As we remember, Aristotle does not consider these three branches of knowledge as exact sciences, since they regard issues where we cannot have exact knowledge, and where the ingoing premises and the knowledge claims are generically uncertain since they regard insecure generalizations. For the concept of *enthymeme*, see e.g. the extremely valuable essay ‘Political Discourse’, Oakshott 1991 [1962]: 70–96. See also, elementary, Crowley & Hawhee 1999:

lated in contemporary Political Theory and Practical Philosophy.¹⁸³ It is also the mother's milk of my *alma mater*, in my intellectual training in the idea-analysis and idea-criticism of 'the Uppsala school of idea-analytical political science' (see Section 17.2 above) at Uppsala University in the late 1960s, where Herbert Tingsten was seen as the intellectual master, from where I borrow it and have inserted it here, in the theoretical model of my general theory (Björklund 1970: 28–31; Gustavsson 1971: 14–19; Vedung 1971: 48–51).¹⁸⁴

The general pattern of *practical reasoning* is central to the generically *argumentative character* of social and political thought and language, which I held above as a basic assumption for my synthesizing and reconstructive theoretical effort (Section 20). In a sequence of *practical reasoning* the value (V) and the description (D) are regarded as argumentative-logical *premises*, while the prescription (P) is regarded as the (practical) *conclusion*.¹⁸⁵ The prescriptions (P) in turn are practical proposals, recommendations, rules or norms. If manifestly stated, they are formulated as 'imperative sentences' of school-book grammar, such as: 'Abolish the death penalty!', 'Give voting-rights to women!', 'Introduce mandatory public health insurance! As we see, these imperatives can easily be translated into authoritative legislation, intended to change the institutional or cultural configuration in society. The *specific direction* and the action-guiding and action-directing *capacity* of such triadic combinations of ideas or beliefs, is thus made up of two basic parts: 1) the specific meaning or thought-content of the component *three kinds of ideas*, and 2) their specific combination in argumentative-logical sequence of *practical reasoning*.

168–173. For the concept of *Phronésis* see Aristotle's *Ethics*, Ch. VI, on 'Intellectual Virtues'; presented and rejuvenated in Flyvbjerg 2001: 3–4, 53–65.

183 For the notion of *practical reasoning* as a combination of values, descriptions and prescriptions, see e.g. Tingsten 1939, 1941; Hare 1954: 44–49, 163–171; Naess et.al. 1956: 176–181; Anscombe 1957: 56–87; Toulmin 2003 [1958]: 87–105; Brecht 1959: 117–135; Hampshire 1959: 90–168; Gauthier 1963: 24–49; Levine 1963: 12–30; Björklund 1970: 28–31; Seliger 1976: 102–121; Vedung 1982: 101–206. For more modern philosophical works on this concept see Walton 1990: 3–68; Richardson 1994: 22–46; Audi 2001. See also the allegedly 'new' paradigm of 'political discourse analysis', discussed above, introduced in linguistic 'critical discourse studies' by Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 35–77.

184 As an analytical frame, *avant les lettres*, the VDP-triad is used as a (latent but paradigmatically imbued) analytical frame in a generational series of dissertations in Uppsala, after the master Herbert Tingsten (1939, 1941, 1973 [1941]). See especially Vedung 1971: 48–51 and Gustavsson 1971:14–19. It is explicitly stated in Björklund 1970: 28–31 and later in Vedung 1982: 200–02 [1977: 163–64]. (All of these authors – in gratitude – being teachers, colleagues and friends; see section 3 above.) The 'behavioral' tradition of 'values', 'beliefs and attitudes' and 'norms' I came to know during my many years at the Political Science department at Gothenburg University (also in gratitude, as mentioned above in section 3), with its eminent tradition of behavioural electoral studies, initiated and developed by Jörgen Westerståhl, Bo Särilvik and Sören Holmberg.

185 As we are speaking of *enthymeme* in the ordinary political language (see the foot-note on Aristotle above), the inherent logic need not be exact in a formal sense. It suffices that that the 'ordinary' speakers and hearers regard them as arguments. Nor need the arguments be true in a scientific sense. It suffices that the speakers and hearers of the ordinary 'life-world' hold them as true. Thus, I use the terms 'quasi-logical conclusion' or 'argumentative-logical conclusion' or borrow the term 'practical conclusion' from Vedung, as above.

The emerging prescription (P) is grammatically an imperative statement – with an exclamation-mark and all – or may also be termed a ‘directive’ speech-act without this explicit grammatical sentence-construction. Thus, the directing prescription (P) may be either ‘locutionary’ (manifestly outspoken) or ‘illocutionary’ (latently understood); to use the concepts of linguistic philosopher J. L. Austin.¹⁸⁶ The imperative sentence or the ‘directive speech-act’ (expressed in several grammatical forms) is universally understandable in all languages around the world; as it is asking, commanding, requiring, calling upon, claiming, commending or demanding (and so on) that a specific act, or line of actions, be undertaken.¹⁸⁷ I will lift up the imperative sentence or derivative speech-act and posit it as *the basic mechanism of the action-guiding and action-directing force* in social and political communication and language. It is the conclusive end-point (P) to which 1) the stated values or goals (V) (as the major premise), and 2) the (biased or evaluative) descriptions and explanations (D) (as the minor premise) argumentatively and logically lead.¹⁸⁸

I will illustrate the argumentative pattern of the VDP-triad with an example fetched from the elementary text-book (from my time as a young student) where the triad, as far as I know, is explicitly stated as self-evidential for the first time at the hand-book level in political analysis (Björklund 1970: 28–31) (mentioned above). Björklund places the triad centrally in all political thought and language.¹⁸⁹ It is thus central as an analytical perspective in all political understanding and explanation.¹⁹⁰ Björklund’s example relates to the arguments from one side in the public debate about a local government reform

186 See Austin 1975 [1962]: 121–164; Searle 1969: 22–71. The thing with Austin (1962), as with Gauthier (1963) (having Austin as his supervisor), is that they philosophize about *ordinary language* and not about ‘correct’ or ‘scientific’ language; hence they are supportive of my efforts here, as I am searching for the inner structure of social and political ‘ordinary’ language; or the ‘object language’ of all social sciences (see Part One, Section 14 above).

187 See e.g. Levinson 1983: 39–41; Clark 1996: 133–140; Yule 2010: 134–35; Birner 2013: 191–200.

188 This language-philosophical aspect – the role of the imperative statement or the directive speech-act as a general *mechanism* in the theory of action in social or political theory – is originally pointed to by me here (as far as I know). It is for example not observed by Hedström in his ‘DBO-theory’ in ‘analytical sociology’; although he investigates ‘mechanisms’ to explain social action (Hedström 2005: 34–42). Since he does not include ‘practical reasoning’ in his explanative DBO-model, he misses the final, concluding point in the minds of the actors, as I see it, that is, the prescriptive statement (P) as the *practical conclusion* which implies or directs a specific line of action. Hedström merely lets ‘desires’ (D) and ‘beliefs’ (B) and ‘opportunities’ (O) (similar to the V and the D in my proposed theoretical model) be the only action-guiding aspects; seemingly forgetting the prescriptive or directive thought-dimension as the argumentative-logical *conclusion* from the others, and its ‘imperative’ or ‘directive’ dimension of thought and language.

189 Hence, one can regard this work of mine as a widening and rejuvenating reconstruction of the basic position of the Uppsala school and Björklund’s self-evidential formulation, which I once met as a young student in the first semester of Political Science studies and have lived with since then; both in teaching and research.

190 As an analytical and critical attempt, though, actual formal logics can of course be used as a critical instrument ‘to make implicit ideas explicit’ and to find ‘unsuspected assumptions under the surface of propositions’, as argued in Brecht 1959: 128.

in Sweden in the 1960s. It is somewhat reformulated here, although I keep Björklund's framing of the VDP-triad as a logical argument:

V: 'Citizens ought to have the greatest possible democratic influence on local government'


D: 'The old and small municipalities offer better possibilities for local democratic influence than the suggested new large ones';

P: 'Keep the old and small municipalities!'

In this example, the prescription (P) derives from the value of local democracy (V). But how do we get from the value (V) to the prescription (P)? As we can see, the action-motivating force inherent in the initial value (V) – again – is as such void of direction. What is needed – again – is a specific descriptive assertion (D) of some kind, to situate and orient the actor to comprehend the actions needed to fulfill the value. In this case the descriptive assertion (D) says (whether true or not) that the old and small municipalities offer better democratic possibilities than the suggested new large ones. If this description is *held as true* by the actors, the practical argument logically leads to the practical conclusion (P): to keep the old and small municipalities.

In the example above, we met a sequence of practical reasoning in its most simple form. It illustrates the general formal sequence of practical reasoning. This general formal sequence can be presented as a quasi-logical (or pragmatically reasoned) logical deduction. This simplified sequence makes up the proposed *theoretical model* in my general theory (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The theoretical model of action-guiding thought, the V-D-P triad. Presenting a simple case of practical reasoning as a quasi-logical, pragmatic, argumentative deduction



Source: Elaborated from Björklund [1968] 1970: 28–31; Brecht 1959: 117–135; Seliger 1976: 102–121; Vedung 1971: 48–51; Gustavsson 1971: 16–19; Vedung 1982: 181–205. One could also write: (V, D) → P.

I have stated that all social and political communication and language consists of V's, D's and P's. However, in real life, these are not always well-ordered or

systematically arranged as we saw. We can think of the V's, D's and P's in a document, speech, debate or media flow as floating around rather freely; at first sight in a seemingly non-structured way. Donald Trump's 'Make America Great Again!', discussed above (in Part One, Section 9), is only one example. To discern the three kinds of ideas, and the combining pattern of practical reasoning we need a *theoretical model* as our analytical frame. This makes it possible to discern and separate the ingoing ideational elements in the social and political (directly or indirectly institution-related) speech-acts. Using the model, we may interpretatively reconstruct the carrying argument and its elements in the thought-content under investigation; and, thus, reconstruct the inherent action-guiding force as a *practical argument*, with a concluding imperative or directive statement (P), whether manifest or latent.

27. THE FUNDAMENTAL, RESPECTIVELY OPERATIVE, LEVEL IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

In empirical studies of political theories and ideologies of the Political Science knowledge tradition, we find an important, and long established fact. Any comprehensive social and political ideology involves, on the one hand, a level of social or political philosophy, regarding the views of history and society, the end of government and social order, and of human nature. On the other hand, it involves a level of practical or concrete situational analysis, often ending up in a political program or a policy recommendation. Statements on the fundamental level serve as argumentative warrants or convincing support for statements on the operative level.¹⁹¹ This general empirical result from the Political Science knowledge tradition can be widened to the proposition that all social and political thought and language – not only in party platforms – involves (at least) two main *levels of thought*. On the one hand, the *fundamental level*, close to philosophical world views and fundamental moral values or ideals; on the other hand, the more concrete and *operative level*, close to practical problems and practical goals. This distinction is argued for or used in several works.¹⁹²

Up to now we have been speaking of the 'values', 'ideal' and 'goals' as one dimension of thought in action-guiding thought and language (V). However, the distinction between the fundamental and operative level demands a

191 Schurmann 1968: 21–22 uses the terms 'pure' and 'practical' ideology. Seliger 1976: 175 uses 'fundamental' and 'operative' (the latter work, by the way, can be viewed as the still unsurpassed basic work in the theory of political ideology). Lewin 1967: 77 and Larsson 2006: 15 use 'principles' versus 'everyday politics' or 'practical action'. Apter 1964: 16 uses 'fundamental beliefs' and the thought of 'more mundane actions'. See also Lindberg 2017.

192 See e.g. Tingsten 1973 [1941]: 66; Hacker 1961: 5; Apter ed. 1964: 16; Lewin 1967: 70–75; Schurmann 1968: 17–45; Seliger 1976: 175–197; Heywood 2007:13.

subsequent differentiation inside this dimension. I suggest that we make a distinction between values or ideals on the fundamental level (as normative or moral principles), and specified goals or end-states on the operative level (as practical objectives). I will consequently speak of a principal difference between values on the fundamental level (V) and goals on the operative level (G). The distinction between the fundamental and the operative level is analytical, hence context-bound in practice, and the levels themselves may have sub-levels.¹⁹³

Values are like general compass directions, they have no definite end-station. The value 'Health', for example, is a value which as such has no limit. You cannot have too much of 'Health'; it serves as a general compass direction. The same goes for moral or political values like 'Justice', 'Freedom', 'Equality', 'God's Will' or 'Nature'. (For a still valid survey of the main basic values in twentieth century political thought, see the classical enumeration and analysis in Brecht 1959: Ch. VIII.) *Goals*, on the other hand, are specified end-states, which can be reached; often also operationalized into even more specific 'objectives'. For example, the specified goal 'a BMI about 20–25' (G) is situated on the operative level of thought. Having this goal, the agents become interested in detailed descriptions of the most effective means or methods (*Dme*) to reach this goal. On the operative level, this specific goal (G), and these specific means-ends descriptions of efficient methods (of diet and exercise) (*Dme*), will accordingly lead to quite specific prescriptions (P) of how to act to reach the stated goal. We can thus use the term 'GDP-triad', referring to the argumentative-logical pattern of practical reasoning on the operative level; being the operative or concrete version of the VDP-triad.

Consequently, values and goals appear in chains, from fundamental to operative levels of thought. The operative goal (G) of BMI 20–25 is derived as one of the aspects of the more general value 'Health' (V) on the fundamental level of thought. The chain consists of argumentative-logical connections between levels, since the fundamental values are supportive as warrants for more concrete goals. Similarly, general principles for action (prescriptions) (P) on the fundamental level ('Take care of your health!') can serve as goal-statements (G) on the operative level, in need of further specification, for example in the direction of 'Diet!' or 'Exercise!' as more specified prescriptions (P) on the operative level.

The distinction between the fundamental and the operative level, though, does not only concern values and goals, it also concerns descriptions (D) and prescriptions (P). On the *fundamental* level we find philosophical, ideological

193 In a way, it would have been equally possible to speak of 'higher' or 'lower' levels of abstraction.

or religious *descriptive assumptions* of human nature (optimistic or pessimistic) or of the view of history, society and the state. (proposed to be in progress or decline) (*Dfund*). We can also meet generalized *descriptive accounts* of the role of the family (bringing emotional security respectively neurosis) or of the global market (welfare-bringing respectively poverty-bringing). On the *operative level*, on the other hand, we find more practical and concrete descriptions, informing of practical states, issues, problems or possibilities (*Dop*). Descriptive accounts of bodily health on a fundamental level can be combined with concrete descriptive accounts of detailed aspects of health on the operative level, regarding diet and exercise for example, down to minute expositions of biochemical mechanisms, all leading to ever more specified prescriptions (*Pop*) to reach the operative goals or objectives, in ever more specified actions, like eating the perfect blend of amino acids or exercise in a perfect blend of bodily movements. Lifting our eyes a bit, we can conclude: All ideological thought-content, in any social and political communication and language, may fruitfully be analyzed using these two levels of thought.¹⁹⁴ What we need, though, is a handy analytical scheme.

28. THE TWO-LEVEL ANALYTICAL SCHEME OF IDEOLOGICAL THOUGHT CONTENT

If we combine the two levels of thought (fundamental and operative) with the already known three basic kinds of ideas (values, descriptions and prescriptions), we can construct a six-field table which makes up the *two-level analytical scheme of ideological thought content*. Our three basic kinds of ideas will then be doubled, existing on both the fundamental and on the operative level. Consequently, the scheme can in principle handle a VDP-triad on the fundamental level and a VDP-triad on the operative level (or should we say a 'GDP-triad' since we may term the value-dimension on the operative level for 'goals' or 'objectives'). (There is some terminological inconsistency here, that must be accepted by the reader so far.) The scheme thus can handle the all so common connections between fundamental and operative triads as *derivative chains of VDP-triads*.¹⁹⁵ (See Figure 3)

194 See e.g. my illustrative mini-analyses of Women's Equality Party and His Holiness Pope Francis' speech before the UN General Assembly in 2015, where the concepts fundamental and operative are put to analytical use (Lindberg 2017).

195 On this point my contention differs from the argumentative models of S. Toulmin, who does not make an explicit distinction between the two levels, even if he brushes against it, in his relation of goals and values. See Toulmin 2003 [1958]: 87–105, for example presented by Boréus 2017b. Confer also the Toulmin-connection in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 85–92.

Figure 3. The two-level analytical scheme of ideological content, and the possible six main kinds of action-guiding social and political ideas

	Values	Descriptions	Prescriptions
Fundamental level	Moral, social, cultural or political values (<i>Vfund</i>).	a) <i>Philosophical assumptions</i> of human nature, history or society, held to be true (<i>Dfund</i>). b) <i>High level evaluative-descriptive generalizations</i> ; of the state or the market, or other general institutional complexes (<i>Dfund</i>) (held to be true or valid).	<i>General principles</i> of social and political action (<i>Pfund</i>) (as suggested in the traditions of social and political philosophy, theory and ideology) (held to be valid or appropriate).
Operative level	Concrete situation-specific or problem-specific goals (<i>Gop</i>).	Concrete descriptive or evaluative accounts of the (imagined) situation or of the objects of the <i>situation</i> , or of the (imagined) issues, problems or possibilities of the situation (<i>Dsit, op</i>), or of the means-ends <i>mechanisms</i> or methods (<i>Dme, op</i>) (held to be true or valid).	Concrete, situation-specific or problem-specific or means-ends specific <i>prescriptions</i> for action (<i>Pop</i>) (held to be valid or appropriate).

Comment: See the text above on the relation between values and goals, also of the 'double exposure' quality of descriptive statements being simultaneously both descriptive assertions and evaluative assessments, containing so called 'value-loaded' descriptive terms. The difference between *descriptions of situations* and *descriptions of possible lines of action* is as old as Aristotle's *topoi* (see e.g. Crowley and Hawhee 1999: 82–89); but is reconstructed and introduced here by me here as *Dsit* and *Dme*.

The two-level analytical scheme can on the one hand be used to discern and identify ideas of the six possible kinds. It can also be used to clarify the composition of a systematic and complete *idea system*. Such a system may not only consist of one single VDP-triad of practical reasoning, but a combination of triads from both the fundamental and the operative levels of thought; and maybe even sub-levels of these two main ones.¹⁹⁶ For example, the American narrative of 'how the West was won' is full of values, descriptions, evaluations and conclusive norms and moralities, displayed in numerous novels and films. This

196 See as an illustration e.g. the mini-analysis of the party platform of Women's Equality Party in UK 1915 in Lindberg 2017: 108–113.

narrative is often used as a background for the argumentative defense of the Second Amendment of The Constitution of the United States, regarding the inalienable right of every American to carry a gun. Taken together such a broad narrative *cum* morality consists of a complex web of ingoing elementary ideas (V's, D's and P's) as well as several VDP-triads on both the fundamental and the operative level; all contributing to the over-arching argument.

The thing with my analytical frame (for the analysis of ideological thought-content) is that it makes it possible to *discern what kinds of ideas and combinations of ideas that are present in a text, and consequently which kinds that are not present*. Some texts may involve only descriptions and prescriptions, keeping the value implicit. Some texts involve statements only on the fundamental level, while other texts involve ideas and statements only on the operative level.¹⁹⁷ The scheme shall be regarded as a fishing-net or a metal-detector; all the six kinds of ideas may not be found at the same time in a single text; thus, only the present ones may be caught and discerned. Moreover, some ideas, or chunks of ideological thought-content, may be *implicit*, as we saw above. They are possible to extract by logical analysis using the VDP-triad as an analytical tool, which often is a powerful method, as we saw was suggested by Arnold Brecht. But implicit or assumed ideas in a text may also be found in another way: in adjacent texts of the author or in adjacent texts in the surrounding discursive situation. For example, in *The Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels we find rather few sayings about the basic ideas of socialism or communism; but we find them all in the surrounding discursive situation, in texts of both adherents and enemies to Marx and Engels. Most often, though, we find ideas or thoughts from both levels, or even several levels, which we saw was possible in principle, whether manifest or latent in the verbal flow. Which kinds of ideas we will find, and in which combinations, is an empirical question.

Having stated this, I must add that the analytical scheme is useless without a thorough *contextual and substantial knowledge* of a) the source material under investigation, of b) the surrounding political situation of political conflict or cooperation, as well as c) the conflicting or consensual ideas and arguments of the surrounding discursive situation or debate. Taken together, the scheme is supposed to be filled with substantial ideas from the source material under investigation. Moreover, a comparative and classificatory scheme (or theory) of the substantial ideas inherent in the situation is needed; *it is only through comparison and classification a political understanding may emerge at all*, as all understanding in any field of knowledge. If such a scheme (or theory) is not available, it must be constructed and

197 See as an illustration e.g. the mini-analysis of His Holiness Pope Francis' address in the UN General Assembly in 2015; in Lindberg 2017: 114–116.

underpinned, however preliminarily, in a continued scientific effort in the growth of knowledge. We have a reasonable good classificatory knowledge of the main *comprehensive* social and political ideologies and idea-traditions since the French revolution, as I pointed to above. But the systematic comparative and classificatory knowledge of ideas and idea-struggles in specific policy-fields (like family-policy, environment, education, public sector, local government and so on) or of smaller social institutional fields (lifestyle, family, work-places, trade-unions, or churches) is still waiting for more systematic and synthesizing ideational research.

Finally, the connections and similarities of ideational streams and strands in the over-all social development(s) – as in catching *der Zeitgeist* or the ‘spirit of the times’ in a non-idealistic, that is materialistic, behavioralistic and empirical way – is still an underdeveloped direction of research, hopefully inspired and facilitated by the proposed general theory here.

29. LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION. THE METHODOLOGICAL USE OF MY PROPOSED GENERAL THEORY

My proposed theory starts out from a hypothesis of three dimensions of thought in social and political communication; the value-dimension, the descriptive dimension and the prescriptive dimension. In real life, the three basic kinds of thought are of course expressed in ordinary *language-use* in the communicative actions of social and political actors; mediated or not. Thus, we can only reach the inherent thoughts through the interpretation and analysis of words and sentences in the diversified *linguistic source material* which we are so well acquainted with in the cultural and social sciences. Consequently, in empirical analyses of the inherent ideas in social and political communication, the linguistic utterances in the source material function as *empirical indicators of the inner thought-content*.¹⁹⁸ The use of linguistic utterances as *empirical indicators* of the inner thought-content, thus, is a meta-methodological fundament for all *interpretative and analytic efforts* in the cultural and social sciences. Interpretation – the old art of hermeneutics – is thus the basic meta-method in the humanities and the social sciences, even in quantitative surveys

198 In analytical philosophy of the 20th century there, of course, emerged a focus on the *sentences*, the words and the phrases carrying forward the thoughts; one could consequently speak of value-sentences, descriptive sentences and prescriptive sentences. In contrast, contemporary semantics and linguistics is much more aware of the complex relation between thought and linguistic expressions in pragmatic (ordinary language) discourse. For linguistics in general on this point, see e.g. Yule 2010; Birner 2013. For semantics and language-use, see Evans 2009, 2014, or 2015. A similar awareness of the complex relation between words and their meanings have a long history in the political science knowledge tradition in its relation to (ordinary) political and ideological language, viewed as ‘ideology’, ‘propaganda’ or ‘myth’, as is seen in Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 103–141; Naess 1966: 7–36; Edelman 1977; Vedung 1982: 99–122, Swed. orig. 1977: 59–112; Fredriksson 1982. See also, for different approaches illustrating this complexity, van Dijk 1984: 143–52; Bourdieu 1991: 107–116; Fairclough 2003: 9–16.

or quantitative content-analysis, to reach the inner ideational worlds of the social and political actors.

This fact becomes especially obvious in empirical opinion research or electoral research, based on surveys; or in studies based on *The World Value Survey*.¹⁹⁹ In electoral or opinion research, the interview persons are induced to react to – and state their attitudes to – linguistic statements about situational objects or events in the surrounding world, such as political leaders (approved of, or not), or policy proposals as well as policy outcomes (approved of, or not), or held values (approved of, or not). So, empirical investigations of social and political ideas start from the assumption that the three basic kinds of ideas – values (V), descriptions (D) and prescriptions (P) – are not directly accessible as such. They can only be *interpreted* by the analyst out of *linguistic expressions* included in the primary source material. In this endeavour we have – on the shoulders of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic hermeneutic tradition, and the hermeneutic tradition of Schleiermacher and Dilthey – developed a set of specialized interpretative and analytical methods described in our hand-books as ‘textual analysis’, ‘documentary analysis’, ‘interpretative method’, ‘qualitative idea-analysis’, ‘quantitative content-analysis’, and the like.²⁰⁰ The general methodological problem thus is: *What is the connection between the empirical indicator (the utterance) and the inner thought content (the idea) in social and political language?*²⁰¹ *What is the method to reach a truthful interpretation, and what are the supporting techniques to make interpretations trustworthy in the eyes of others?*²⁰² In my discussion here, I presuppose that such interpretation can be both possible and felicitous, and that the inner thought-content has been (hypothetically) discerned and described in the face of the rhetoric, the ambiguous word-use and the misleading discursive forms involved in much social and political communication.

In real life, the three dimensions of inner thought involve variants and sub-classes. In the first dimension (V) we not only meet foundational values

199 For the latter, see Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris & Inglehart 2011.

200 See for example Esaiasson et. al 2005; Boreéus and Bergström eds. 2017; see also Stausberg and Engler eds. 2011.

201 In this widely used methodological practice of *interpretation* (of social and political linguistic utterances), the social and cultural sciences seem to vindicate the truth of linguist Vyvyan Evans’ stated position that ‘human languages and human minds are inexorably connected; and...symbiotic’ (Evans 2014: 228; see also Evans 2015: 9–34). Textual interpretation was earlier developed to a sophisticated methodology in the old *sacred hermeneutics* of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic theological traditions. See e.g. Jensen 2007.

202 However, there is no space here to go into the techniques and tricks, and the basic difficulties, of interpretation as a methodological procedure. I must continue under the general presupposition that the analyst is a fully competent *interpreter* of social and political communication; at least regarding the source material of her own field of speciality. For the semantic fundamentals of interpretation, see e.g. Ogden and Richards 1922: 15–16, 48–76; Evans 2009: 252–278. For the fundamentals of *interpretation* as a social scientific method, see Hirsch 1967: 169–184; Vedung 1982 [1977]: 99–122. See also Ricoeur 1981; Mantzavinos 2005.

or ideals, but also more concrete and practical goals, ends or objectives, as we saw. We are not always as lucky as in the study of a tidy, systematic party platforms where we can find a specific heading of 'Basic values' and another heading of 'Concrete objectives'.²⁰³ More complicated, though, are the *varying linguistic possibilities* used in text and talk to express a cherished value or goal. They can be stated in short slogans, or emerge as moralities of longer narratives or parables. A simple fact prevails: *There is no stable or manifest grammatical form for value-statements or goal-statements in social and political pragmatic discourse.*

Values or goals, thus, must be discerned and interpreted out of a thousand, possible pragmatic types of expression. The trained interpreter, though, knowledgeable of her research-object and her source-material, soon will discover the most common types of expression used by an actor-author in: 1) a *text* (the commonly occurring vocabulary and phraseology), or the expressions residing in 2) a *system of texts* from the same actor-author, or in 3) the *intertextual discursive context* of argument and debate; or in 4) the surrounding *cultural configuration* with its general language-use and its various sub-languages.²⁰⁴

An even larger kind of complexity is met in the second dimension, descriptions (D), although I cannot delve into all these complexities here.²⁰⁵ Suffice to say we meet descriptive statements and descriptive accounts both on the fundamental level (as in a world-views, views of history or views of human nature) and on the concrete and empirical operative level (as concerning the number of car accidents per day in London, or the number of cases of domestic violence per month in Stockholm, or the number of illegal immigrants per annum in the USA).

Another complexity is 'the double exposure character' of descriptive statements, as I have termed it.²⁰⁶ As I see it – based on both language philosophy and empirical studies of political ideologies and political language (as well as my own empirical and practical experience) – *all descriptive thoughts and statements* in political and ideological language (concerning social and political situations, objects or events) are normally both 'cognitive' and 'affective' ('designative' and 'appraisive', 'descriptive' and 'evaluative') at the same time. As linguistic vehicles they carry both 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' in the same descriptive account or utterance. Very often we meet them in so called value-loaded words,

203 See my mini-analysis of the impressively systematic and clear party platform of the British Women's Equality Party; Lindberg 2017: 108–13.

204 A fine example, involving all these aspects, is the 'great debate' between Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine on the French Revolution and the issue of universal human rights. A subtle analysis of the connection between ideological thoughts and sentences in this debate is found in Arne Naess et al. 1956: 177–180, 184–185. This 'great debate' is also comprehensively presented and analyzed in Levin 2014. See elementary on Paine and Burke, Ball & Dagger 2011: 57–58, 95–101.

205 I hope to make sense of most of them in a larger, subsequent work. Some are hinted in Lindberg 2017.

206 See Lindberg 2017.

but there are many more rhetoric or discursive ways this double exposure character can be expressed. Examples are: ‘The civil war in Syria has caused great damage and much suffering’; ‘the policy suggestions of the new administration are disappointing’; ‘only a tiny few were rescued from the terror attack’. Although formulated in plain indicative sentences, no reader can avoid experiencing the evaluative thought-content, or the self-evident value-loading of these ‘descriptive statements’ or ‘indicative sentences’; even ‘illocutionary’ normative practical implications may be lingering in them. Most descriptive statements (D) in social and political language carry forward this double-exposure character; both cognitively orienting the agents of the situation and its objects, on the one hand, and expressing an evaluative attitude to them, on the other. Consequently, we find this double exposure character of descriptive statements also in – yes, especially in – political debates or in the ideologies of party platforms; giving all descriptions and explanations a suggestive and normative character. Thus, I sometimes use the term ‘descriptive-evaluative’ statements, since they are the *typical* descriptive kind of statement (D) in social and political ordinary language; biased and value-loaded, or rhetorically modulated, to achieve an effective and persuasive communication effect.²⁰⁷

But it is equally self-evident that the linguistic possibilities to express such double-exposure descriptions-evaluations are legion; the possibility to express evaluative attitudes through seemingly innocent, ‘illocutionary’ descriptive statements are in fact a rhetoric art as such.²⁰⁸ Thus there exist *no stable or manifest grammatical form for descriptive-evaluative (cognitive-affective) statements either*. The analyst simply must build up a *context-specific and language-specific competence*; close to the linguistic competence and substantial knowledge and horizon of the involved agents; both speakers and listeners.²⁰⁹ This competence normally consists of a considerable textual and contextual reading of both secondary literature and primary sources, before it is possible to grasp all the inner references²¹⁰ and all the cognitive associations (‘cognitive

207 This may sound controversial to some readers, since the term ‘descriptive’ commonly has been used in academia as the opposite of ‘affective’ or ‘evaluative’. Now I will put them in the same category (D), as orienting accounts of the surrounding world. But we are speaking of the normal language-use in ordinary language. In analytical language, of course, such duality or ambiguity must be systematically avoided and counteracted. See classically e.g. Myrdal 1944: 1030–1070. We will return to this issue more in detail later.

208 This fact has been known and theorized on since the Antiquity. See e.g. Crowley & Hawhee 1999: 44–104; Aristotle is especially observant on these possibilities among demagogues and rhetoric schools, as analyzed in Schreiber 2003. See also Naess 1966 [1970]: Ch. VI; Fredriksson 1982: 23–64. The Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten, famous for his comprehensive idea-analyses and idea-criticisms, holds that *descriptions* or ‘judgements of reality’, value-laden or not, play ‘*the main role*’ in political thought and language (Tingsten 1966 [1939]: 9–11; 1941: 3–27).

209 See Naess 1966: 9–18.

210 See e.g. Ogden & Richards 1927 [1922]: 9–15; Ricoeur 1981: 176–181.

models')²¹¹ involved in descriptive–evaluative accounts.²¹² The same pattern of a floating relation between the inner meaning and the outer words and sentences we also meet in prescriptive statements of the third dimension of social and political thought (P).

*So, it is the contextual situation more than the literal word-use that determines the meaning of statements in social and political thought and speech.*²¹³ As we also saw above, all social and political language is inherently and generically *argumentative*, so the place in the *argumentative situation* (the debate as part of a social and political situation) also determines much of the inner meaning. Furthermore, the argumentative *position* in the VDP-triad of a message – not the grammatical construction, remember Austin's 'illocutionary speech-acts' – decides whether a linguistic expression is to be regarded as a value-argument (expressing a value), a description (expressing a factual or empirical argument) or a prescription (expressing a recommendation, perhaps indirect or illocutionary).²¹⁴

All in all, the connection between words and their meanings in social and political language (being a kind of ordinary language), as well as the connection between uttered (grammatical) sentences and (thought of) statements in the mind, is loose and pragmatically contingent.²¹⁵ The meanings of the various vocabularies, phraseologies and stereotypes in politics, media and everyday life are socially and culturally context-bound.

More precisely, social and political thought and speech (and their ideological

211 See e.g. Evans 2009: 43–46, 100–111.

212 I really should know! My doctoral dissertation *Att studera Kapitalet. Första boken [Studying Capital. First book]* (2013 [1978]) was on Karl Marx' *Das Kapital*, studied in the original German of various manuscripts by Marx' hand. I started out from the perspectives of the three main Marxisms of the 1970s (the Soviet Marxism-Leninism, the West-German *Ökonomiekritik*, and the French Althusser-school). Each school had constructed different conceptual meanings of the basic terms in Marx' text and had developed school-bound, diverging terminologies. So, what Marx 'really meant' kept me occupied for some five or six years of textual interpretation.

213 This is the point argued for already in Ogden & Richards 1927 [1922]; indirectly it is also the foundation for the Political Science understanding of the diverse vocabularies of the main political theories or ideologies; as in Sabine and Thorsson 1973 or Ball & Dagger 2011. For this contention, see also Fowler et al. 1979: 185–190; Lakoff & Johnson 1980: Ch. IV; Evans 2009: 193–213; Evans 2014: 229–258; Yule 2010: 112–155; Streeck, Goodwin & LeBaron (eds) 2011: 1–26; Birner 2013: *passim*. When I speak of 'statements' I include both the inner thought and the uttered sentence; otherwise the two terms 'thought' and 'sentence' function perfectly well to express the two sides of the issue.

214 A typical 'illocutionary' speech-act is the seemingly indicative sentence: 'There is a black bull in the field'. See Austin 1975 [1962]: 94–132.

215 The coupled doublet of 'sentence and statement' is parallel to the doublets in general semantics of 'term and concept', 'word and meaning' or 'symbol and idea'. (See e.g. Ogden & Richards 1922:11; Sartori 2009: 97–150; Evans 2009: 95; Evans 2014: 242–243.) This double character of all language, consisting of culturally and socially context-bound 'vehicles' and 'semantic structures' (following Evans' terms) immediately asks for *interpretation*. In the language pragmatics of specific social fields, or of specific textual genres, the dimension of meaning receives a still greater specificity, which demands still more specialized contextual knowledge. Just try to follow the commentators in a sport you are not acquainted with; for example, cricket, American foot-ball, dressage or figure skating.

thought-content) exist in *different genres* of political language and in *different institutional settings*. Different institutional settings in turn involve different vocabularies and language-uses which are structured by the setting to be situationally or institutionally appropriate (in expressing values, descriptions or prescriptions regarding the various issues, problems or events of the situation or the institution). Apart from professional, specialized languages in a political system (among lawyers, civil servants and academic experts) we also can distinguish different levels of political language, corresponding to the different levels of institutionalized authority. In the one end of the authority-ladder the language is more solemn or sober (as in legislation or official documents), at the other end the language is more vernacular or popular (as in party propaganda, the tabloid press or in the social media). These institutionalized differences are commonplace for students of political science, where a close knowledge of the characteristics of these diverse source materials are part of the basic, disciplinary training.

In these different kinds of institutionalized social-settings *specific political languages* have emerged and are used. The value statements (V), the descriptive statements (D) and the prescriptive statements (P) come in different clothing, parlance and rhetoric phrasing. Metaphors and stereotypes differ. The contextual knowledge and the interpretative skill of the analyst, though, is equally much demanded when interpreting a high-brow official language as a low-brow vernacular one. It is not a simpler task – *in principle* – for the analyst to interpret the political thought-content in the tweets of the newly elected president of the USA (of 2017), than to interpret the political thought-content of the United States Constitution (of 1789). The possibility of a hopefully truthful interpretation all depends on *the contextual and textual knowledge of the analyst*; which is the same as her cultural, social, political, emotional and intellectual closeness to, acquaintance with – *and knowledge of* – the research object; the text, the systems of texts, the surrounding intertextual situation and debate as well as the language-conventions of the time and the social, cultural and political contexts.

To sum up. All around us are streams of communication in text and talk, involved in contextual communicative actions and interactions. We can think of them as streams full of interesting and valuable fish; ponds, rivers or oceans full of diffuse utterances or more clearly visible V's, D's or P's. Their exact thought-contents or their connections may also be diffuse or random at first sight, and the eventual combinations into triads of practical reasoning may be hard to grasp at the first look, or even after a second or third close textual reading (as every researcher knows, having worked with interpretation of a textual material). But with the theoretical model of the VDP-triad, and the accompanying two-level analytical scheme, you may have a strong fishing net where at least the bigger fish might get stuck in the meshes.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

30. THE STRONG ALTERNATIVE

I have tried to develop a unified analytical frame, or a general theory of ideological thought-content, anchored in the general social theory of communicative actions and interactions, as well as a view on social and political communication and language as basically adversative, dialogical, dialectical or *argumentative*. The theory consists of a *theoretical model*, the VDP-triad, with an accompanying *analytical scheme*. These are intended to be analytical tools in the discerning, interpreting and laying bare of *the ideological thought-content* in social and political communication and language; as far as this is involved in or related to the institutional or cultural configuration of society. The theory is content-oriented and morphological, not explanative or functional. The *ideological thought-content* is proposed to consist of *three basic kinds* of action-orientations, or action-guiding dimensions of thought (values, descriptions and prescriptions), combined in argumentative-logical sequences of *practical reasoning*; thus, forming VDP-triads. From the point of view of the researcher, such underlying ideas are found in all the usual linguistic *primary source material* of our sciences. However, the methodological issues of practical interpretation and analysis (whether in qualitative or quantitative studies), or the need for a classificatory typology as a basic, analytical instrument, will not concern us here. Suffice to say, it is rather impossible to accomplish an analysis of the *ideological thought-content* in social and political communication and discourse without an appropriate general theory as an analytical frame; hence my immediate task and ambition here.

The proposed unified analytical frame, or general theory, of the VDP-triad, is developed in the normative perspective (my explicitly and transparently stated value-standpoint) of *rational political understanding* and the possibility (in principle) of *rational idea-criticism* (presented in Part One, Sections 4, 10, 12 and 13).

I am prepared to call my proposed general theory *the strong alternative*. I consider it 'strong' in several respects compared to the alternative analytical concepts or approaches in the prevailing knowledge situation. In my work I have not only relied on my earlier knowledge and intuition as a researcher and supervisor.²¹⁶ I have also relied on explicit meta-theoretical criteria for fruitful theory development and theory assessment, as these are formulated in main works in the philosophy of science.²¹⁷

216 For the role of intuition in scientific efforts, see Mario Bunge's views in the remarkable booklet *Intuition and Science* (1962).

217 For a comprehensive presentation of such criteria, see Bunge 1998, Vol Two: 388–400.

Firstly, I consider my theoretical proposal 'strong' relating to some formal and methodological criteria of a felicitous theoretical construct:

1. It is formulated with (attempted) *linguistic clarity*, with a clear, simple word-use and stipulative definitions of the basic theoretical terms. This clarity is fundamental for the critical assessment and critical discussion by others, being the hallmark of the scientific attitude; at least it has been my serious intention.
2. It is based on a principled *semantic view*, separating between *terms* and *concepts*, and between *analytical language* and *object language*. This of course is a part of the criterion of linguistic clarity above.
3. It is based on a thorough assessment of the prevailing *theoretical knowledge situation*, with its existing, contending theoretical alternatives, regarding the conceptualization of the ideational phenomenon in society. On this ground of theory-critical assessment I have proposed a (hypothetical) general theory of ideological thought-content; hopefully more theoretically strong and fruitful than the other ones. In this methodological procedure I am applying the most basic, general tenet of the scientific attitude and method; the inquiry into *die bisherige Lage der Forschung*, or the present state of the art in a research-field (see Bunge 1998, Vol. 1: 8–12; Popper 1972: 106–90).
4. It has a strong and explicitly stated extra-scientific or practical usefulness. It is intended to be used in *content-oriented descriptive idea-analysis*, necessary for the *rational political understanding*, so important in a democratic society. But it is also intended to inform the pursuit of *rational idea-criticism*, necessary in democratic conversation and deliberation. By analytically separating the value-dimension (V), the descriptive dimension (D) and the prescriptive dimension (P) from each other, it will be possible to pursue a rational critical scrutiny of: a) *the moral validity* (Are the chosen values or goals desirable or righteous?) (viewed from the transparent point of view of the analyst, of course) b) *the empirical validity* (Are the descriptive assertions or the evaluative assessments truthful, that is, based on truthful data and valid methodological procedures?) and c) *the internal logical validity* (Do the chosen values and descriptions in fact lead up to the suggested prescriptions? Will the suggested prescriptions arguably lead to the achievement of the chosen goals?). As we see, such rational idea-criticism presupposes the clear analytical distinction between the three basic kinds of social and political ideas V, D and P.

Secondly, I consider my proposed theory 'strong' on substantial theoretical grounds:

5. It is anchored in a strong theoretical construct on a higher, more abstract level than itself, as its *genus proximum*. It is thus a logical sub-class of this more abstract theory, and thus possible to theoretically identify and criticize. This more abstract theory, as we saw, is the general social (analytical and empirical) theory of communicative actions and interactions in the Weber-Parsons respectively the Bentley-Lasswell-Easton traditions.
6. It is a reconstructive synthesis, knitting together elements from various disciplines and approaches, thus transcending each of their respective paradigmatic horizons, as novel thinking in the growth of knowledge. A) From the study of political theories and political ideologies comes the basic hypothesis of the three-tiered model and the general pattern of practical reasoning. B) From the general social theory and the broad concept of 'culture' as something involved in all social domains or fields, comes the hypothesis that the three-tiered model should be possible to apply to all communication and language in all parts of society; not only to the actions and fields of the political system. C) From the general view on politics, in historical and empirical Political Science, comes the basic assumption of political pluralism and the idea-struggle hypothesis, which is the foundation for the view of social and political communication and language as basically adversative, dialectical, dialogical or argumentative.
7. Critical relation to political science (1). Being a synthesis, the proposed theory of ideological thought-content is more general, and overarching compared to other concepts in political science, like 'ideology', 'belief system' or 'policy'. And from a scientific point of view, any theoretical concept that is more general (and thus able to unify the knowledge or the understanding of a field or territory of research) is preferable to the more limited and specific conceptualization.
8. Critical relation to political science (2). Especially, my proposed theory of ideological thought-content overbridges the divide between the 'separate tables' of the qualitative (historical and hermeneutical) tradition in the study of 'political ideologies', and the quantitative (behavioural and explanative) study of 'beliefs and attitudes'; offering a unifying analytical frame, or a unified general and analytical language, facilitating both communication and theoretical understanding between researchers of either sides of this divide; making possible a fertile cross-breeding of scientific ideas.

9. Critical relation to political science (3). Cross-cutting the qualitative-quantitative divide, the proposed theory makes it possible to theoretically unify the whole array of diversified and overlapping approach-bound concepts in political science; concepts like 'ideology', 'belief system', 'political culture', 'policy-ideas', 'regime', 'doctrine', 'frame', and the like. Some of them may have a *raison d'être* of their own; still they may benefit from the conceptions of my unifying, general theory.
10. Critical relation to general social theory. Compared to the holistic or monolithic ring of the concept of 'culture' in Parsonian social theory, my proposed theory offers a pronounced *pluralist* and *idea-struggle* alternative, while keeping other parts of the Parsonian general social theory, as we saw.
11. Critical relation to the Marxist notions of ideology. The same conceptions of pluralism and idea-struggle is offered against the Marxist (Althusser-Pêcheux-Foucauldian) bipolar, conflictual notions a 'dominating ideology' or 'dominating discourse', focusing on the *outer function* of ideology and discourse to legitimate the power and the subordination. Consequently, as we saw, there has been no real interest in the *inner structure* of social and political thought. And lacking a pluralist view, there has been no need to develop a comparative, common frame for the analysis of such an inner structure. As a result, there was not much to gain from the Marxist tradition on this point for my purpose. The same negative result regards the Marxist strand of *Critical Discourse Analysis*, for example in the paradigm-setting works of Norman Fairclough; before his re-orientation.
12. Critical relation to the Marxist re-orientation of the 1980s. For 'critically' inclined researchers, whether in sociology, political science, history or linguistics, who are following in the tracks of the great Marxist re-orientation of the 1980s (in the direction of a pluralist, inclusive and neutral definition of 'ideology' and thus are abandoning the bipolar and pejorative concepts of a 'dominating ideology' or a 'hegemonic discourse') my proposed theory can offer a, so to say, 'strong' alternative in three respects. A) It is keeping the broad and fundamental society-constituting view inherent in the Marxist tradition. B) It is adding the explicit, sound theoretical anchoring in the Weber-Parsons respectively the Bentley-Lasswell-Easton theoretical traditions of communicative actions and interactions, which in my view is compatible with the tenets of a scientifically comprehended 'historical materialism' as in the works of Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu or Michal Mann. C) It is finally offering a theory of the common *inner structure* of social and

political thought, the elaborated VDP-triad *cum* practical reasoning. As we saw, prominent Marxist figures in general social theory, like Jürgen Habermas or Göran Therborn, were on this track already about 1980. And in *Critical Discourse Analysis*, the former Marxist analyst, Norman Fairclough, moved in this direction in 2012. Finally, about being ‘critical’, my theory is explicitly intended to make a *rational criticism* possible.

Being an argued effort in the growth of scientific knowledge, I am of course aware of many shortcomings in the general theory proposed here. If my proposed theory will turn out fruitful in the eyes of the reader, or in future research, is quite another question.

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Översikter och meddelanden

Vem bestämmer över Svenska Akademien?

Kungen, konstitutionen och de offentligrättsliga korporationerna

I kölvattnet av avslöjandena med anknytning till Svenska Akademien från hösten 2017 kom akademiens ställning i förhållande till kungen att diskuteras. Mot denna bakgrund anordnade Juridiska fakulteten i Lund seminariet *Vem bestämmer över Svenska Akademien? Kungen, konstitutionen och de offentligrättsliga korporationerna* den 17 maj 2018. De följande bidragen bygger på presentationer vid seminariet.

Som en bakgrund skisserar Martin Sunnqvist, jur. dr i rättshistoria, och Henrik Wenander, professor i offentlig rätt, akademiens ställning i juridiskt perspektiv. De menar att exemplet Svenska Akademien aktualiserar äldre diskussioner om så kallade offentligrättsliga korporationer som en mellanform mellan offentliga och privata organ. Vidare anser de att det inte finns något tydligt rättsligt stöd för att regeringen skulle ha möjlighet att ändra akademiens stadgar. Däremot ger den historiska utvecklingen och akademiens särpräglade ställning stöd för att kungen också enligt dagens konstitutionella system har utrymme att agera mot akademien.

Nils Gustafsson, fil. dr i statsvetenskap, tar i sitt bidrag fasta på den tydliga ambitionen i 1974 års regeringsform att frånta kungen all formell makt. Han anser att beslut från äldre tider inte bör ses som ”tidskapslar från enväldet som det demokratiska samhället inte rör på”, och att det därför borde vara en uppgift för regeringen att besluta om Svenska Akademiens stadgar. Han uppmärksammar dock att möjligheterna för riksdag och regering att ingripa mot kungen kan vara begränsade. Slutsatsen blir därmed att monarkin tycks ha kvar mer makt än vad vi tidigare har trott.

Med fokus på akademien som juridisk person uppmärksammar Jakob Heidbrink, docent i civilrätt, i sitt bidrag att det utanför de statsrättsliga tankar som ligger till grund för 1974 års regeringsform inte finns någon tydlig skillnad mellan privata och offentliga organ. I förhållande till gamla organisationer såsom Svenska Akademien kan grundlagens kategorisering dessutom inte göra anspråk på att passa den historiska utvecklingen. Mot denna bakgrund har kungen – utan kända protester från riksdag och regering – kunnat etablera en ny konstitutionell praxis. Frågan om akademiens ställning i förhållande till kungen visar att den svenska konstitutionen kanske inte är så modern som man tidigare har föreställt sig.

En offentligrättslig korporation under Monarken?¹

Svenska Akademien och kungen i juridiskt perspektiv

Martin Sunnqvist & Henrik Wenander

1. Inledning

Under hösten 2017 och våren 2018 kom Svenska Akademien och dess ställning att uppmärksammas. Bakgrunden var den turbulens i akademien som förekom efter det att anklagelser om grova brott och oegentligheter hade förts fram i massmedier. I anslutning till att kungen uttalade som sin ”bestämda uppfattning att Monarken disponerar över de stadgar för Svenska Akademien som min företrädare Gustav III fastställde” (pressmeddelande 2018-04-11) fick frågorna om akademien en konstitutionell dimension. Sedermera fattade kungen beslut med denna lydelse:

Svenska Akademiens stadgar förtydligas på följande sätt.

En ny bestämmelse, XI a §, införs med följande lydelse:

Ledamot äger utträda ur Akademien. Anmälan därom görs skriftligen till Akademien.

Akademien äger besluta att ledamot som under två år inte deltagit i Akademiens arbete ska anses ha utträtt.

(Hovprotokoll nr 6/2018.)

Kungens åtgärd var överraskande eftersom den tydliga utgångspunkten i svensk statsrätt är att kungen inte ska utöva någon offentlig makt. Svårigheten är här

1 Artikelns utgör en bearbetning av vårt anförande vid det av oss organiserade seminariet *Vem bestämmer över Svenska Akademien? Kungen, konstitutionen och de offentligrättsliga korporationerna*, Juridiska fakulteten vid Lunds universitet den 17 maj 2018.

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dock bland annat att Svenska Akademien, grundad 1786, är en mycket gammal institution. Akademiens grundläggande reglering är – bortsett från den nu genomförda stadgeändringen – densamma nu som då. Det är givet att samhället och den konstitutionella och samhällsliga situationen har förändrats fundamentalt sedan dess. Bland annat har grundlagarna från Gustav III:s tid – 1772 års regeringsform (RF) och 1789 års förenings- och säkerhetsakt – ersatts med 1809 års RF. Denna har i sin tur har avlösts av 1974 års RF, som bygger på en idé om demokrati grundad på folksuveränitet samt på en tydlig uppdelning mellan allmänna och enskilda organ. Det är därmed inte givet vilken ställning en akademi av detta slag ska ha i dagens juridiska landskap. Äldre tiders diskussioner om mellanformer mellan allmänt och enskilt, ”offentlighetsliga korporationer”, kan då åter bli aktuella för att hantera frågor om akademiens ställning.

I denna översikt undersöker vi vilken rättslig ställning Svenska Akademien har och hur beslut rörande akademien kan fattas. Metoden bygger på identifiering och värdering av juridiska argument utifrån de ramar som framgår av lagstiftningen och mot bakgrund av uttalanden i förarbeten och framställningar inom rättsvetenskap.

Bidraget är disponerat så, att vi först redogör för det statsrättsliga läget när Akademien inrättades och sedan går vidare till relevanta delar av rättsutvecklingen under 1809 års RF och förändringarna med 1974 års RF. Vi fäster särskilt avseende vid skillnaden mellan ”allmänt” och ”enskilt” och diskuterar vilka möjligheter regeringen respektive kungen har att ingripa. Slutligen gör vi en sammanfattande bedömning av rättsläget.

2. Akademiens inrättande – situationen 1786

År 1786, när Gustav III inrättade Svenska Akademien, gällde 1772 års RF. Det finns därför anledning att se närmare på vilka befogenheter olika statsorgan hade enligt den regeringsformen (se för en modern utgåva *Sveriges konstitutionella urkunder* 1999).

Enligt 2 § ägde Konungen ”styra rike sino, som Sveriges lag säger, han och ingen annan”. Enligt 4 § skulle rikets råd ”råda Kongl. Maj:t i rikets angelägna värf och ärender, då de af Kongl. Maj:t derom rådfrågas”. De skulle råda, men inte regera. Det var enligt 8 § kungen som hade den avgörande beslutsmakten. Dock skulle vissa formföreskrifter iakttas. Enligt 12 § skulle alla ärenden utom justitieärenden, ärenden om nåd, tjänstetillsättningar och förläning av adelskap föredras för kungen i kabinettet eller på en av divisionerna av rådkammaren. Kungens hov stod dock enligt 30 § under hans enskilda disposition. Fram träder alltså en bild av att det fanns vissa ärenden som kungen kunde avgöra helt på egen hand, medan det fanns andra ärenden som skulle avgöras efter föredragning i rådet.

1772 års RF och 1789 års förenings- och säkerhetsakt fortsatte att gälla i

Finland efter år 1809 och fram till självständigheten. Eftersom det inte finns någon nämnvärd samtida svensk litteratur från den tid då dessa grundlagar gällde kan det vara intressant att se hur de tolkades i Finland. Det måste då tas hänsyn till att riksrådets medverkan i beslutsfattandet enligt 1772 års RF hade upphört genom förenings- och säkerhetsakten. Statsrättsprofessorn R. F. Hermanson (1846–1928) diskuterade i sina föreläsningar om den finska statsrätten ”monarkens” ställning. Han skilde mellan monarkens regeringsrättigheter och personliga rättigheter. Till regeringsrättigheterna hörde bl.a. meddelandet av föreskrifter, medan hållandet av ett hov hörde till de personliga rättigheterna. (Hermanson 1917 I: 63 ff.) Att kungens egen lagstiftningsmakt inte uttryckligen var reglerad i 1772 års RF innebär emellertid att det är svårt att dra gränsen mellan den och kungens personliga beslutsmakt; en analys blir lätt anakronistisk om den görs utifrån 1809 års tydligare begreppsbildning (jfr nedan under avsnitt 3).

Grundandet av Svenska Akademien, och även Vitterhetsakademien, har behandlats utförligt av Henrik Schück (1855–1947), litteraturhistoriker och akademiledamot (Schück 1935: 73 f.). Å ena sidan framstår grundandet av dessa akademier som ett utflöde av kungens styrande makt efter föredragning i riksrådet, en motsvarighet till vad som senare kom att kallas ”Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet” och som nu motsvaras av ”regeringen”. Schück skriver att “[d]en 20 mars [1786] föredrog Gustav III saken i rådet och stiftade då två akademier.” Men om man utgår från vad som enligt Schück står i akademiens handlingar blir bilden en annan. I Vitterhetsakademiens handlingar skrevs, enligt Schücks citat: ”... täcktes Hans Kongl. Maj:t begifva sig i des rådkammare och de in pleno församlade herrar rikens råd tillkännagifva sit nådiga beslut ...”. I Svenska Akademiens handlingar antecknades: ”Den 20 Martii 1786 behagade konungen begifva sig till rådkammaren och för de församlade herrar rikets råd tillkännagifva inrättningen af en akademi ...” Detta tyder mera på att kungen hade fattat beslutet om inrättande av akademierna självständigt, inom ramen för den personliga kungliga beslutsmakten, inte som ”Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet”.

Vid denna tid fanns inga regler som möjliggjorde för enskilda att upprätta juridiska personer. Det fanns inte heller någon föreningsfrihet eller näringsfrihet. Aktiebolag inrättades genom kungligt privilegium, som t.ex. Allmänna änke- och pupillkassan år 1783. Den utgör idag ett ömsesidigt livförsäkringsbolag. Även en säregen institution som Jernkontoret, grundat år 1747 som en sammanslutning där delägarskapet tillräknas järnbruk eller tackjärnshyttor, kan nämnas i sammanhanget. Jernkontoret är ett exempel på att en institution kan fortsätta att verka utan att det är alldeles klart vilken av dagens juridiska kategorier den kan hänföras till. Att dessa organisationer krävde statens acceptans tyder på att det i den delen är fråga om beslut inom ramen för den beslutsmakt som senare kom att kallas ”Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet”. Eftersom begrepps-bildningen i 1772 års RF var otydlig var det emellertid inget som hindrade att

kungen inom ramen för den personliga beslutsmakten inrättade akademierna och att han som "Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet" gav dem privilegiet att fungera som juridiska personer (och för den delen också gav dem rätt till vissa inkomster på statens bekostnad).

Gustav III hade inte bara personligen svarat för utformningen av akademiens organisation (Schück 1935: 60 ff.) genom att själv skriva stadgarna (Bachman 1963: 97 f.), utan han ingrep också själv i akademiens arbete när så behövdes. Han hade själv utnämnt tretton ledamöter. När akademien skulle välja återstoden fanns bara tio ledamöter i staden och tre förväntades inte dit på lång tid. Gustav III gav dispens från bestämmelsen och inval kunde ske. Denna dispens gällde bara de två första valen, men även det tredje, när den sextonde ledamoten skulle väljas, genomfördes med färre än tolv röstande. Gustav III var närvarande och invände inte. Händelserna resulterade i att Gustav III den 14 september 1786 förklarade att sekreteraren skulle anmoda de frånvarande att insända sina röstsedlar, "hwilken utväg konungen äfven för framtiden til iagtagande faststälte" (Schück 1935: 105 f.).

Även Karl XIV Johan gjorde ett liknande ingripande. Enligt III § i stadgarna ska akademiens direktör och kansler utses genom lottning. Detta ställde till vissa olägenheter, och Schück omtalar att "1829 bestämde ... Karl Johan, att även dessa ämbetsmän skulle väljas" (Schück 1935: 103). I den del av Akademiens historia som omfattar perioden 1824–36 behandlar Schück händelsen närmare (Schück 1937: 31 ff., jfr även 423). Schück skriver att akademien beslöt att "hos konungen, sin höge beskyddare" föreslå den ändring i III § att direktör och kansler skulle väljas i slutna omröstning. Kungen biföll förslaget, och det får anses framgå att det inte var Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet utan kungen i egenkap av beskyddare som fattade beslutet.

Ett säreget drag i Svenska Akademiens stadgar (se Schück 1935: 539 ff. eller *Svenska Akademiens handlingar*) är beskyddarskapets utformning. Det har, till skillnad från många andra beskyddarskap, inte bara en ceremoniell funktion. Enligt stadgarnas XIV § ska ett val av ny ledamot underställas beskyddaren. Endast om den föreslagne vinner beskyddarens nådiga bifall är personen behörigen vald. Akademiens offentliga sammankomster hålls enligt XXV–XXVI §§ på dess högtidsdag eller då en ny ledamot för första gången ska inta sin plats i Akademien, eller, på särskild befallning av beskyddaren. Även i detta avseende har således beskyddaren en beslutsbefogenhet i förhållande till akademien.

3. Utvecklingen under 1809 års RF

I och med 1809 års RF förändrades de rättsliga förhållandena genom den nya grundlagens maktindelning mellan kung och riksdag. Samtidigt är det möjligt att se ett visst mått av kontinuitet. Statsrättsprofessorn Nils Herlitz (1888–1978) menade att 1772 års RF utgjorde en grund till den fördelning av

lagstiftningsmakten som sedan kom att gälla enligt 1809 års RF, nämligen den egenheten att konungen hade ett eget lagstiftningsområde. Detta följde enligt Herlitz inte uttryckligen av 1772 års RF men tolkningsvis och med stöd av praxis vid följande riksdagar (Herlitz 1930: 112 ff.).

Enligt den nya regeringsformen skulle konungen "allena styra riket". Dock skulle han i regeringsärenden få underrättelser och råd av ett statsråd, bestående av ministrar och andra statsråd (4, 5 och 7 §§ i 1809 års RF). Sådana beslut fattades under beteckningen "Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet", redan på den tiden ofta informellt omnämnd som "regeringen". Hit hörde inte minst regeringens roll som deltagare i lagstiftningen, antingen samfällt med riksdagen eller ensam (87 och 89 §§).

Vid sidan av dessa ärenden, där kungen alltså beslutade "i statsrådet", räknade grundlagen med att det fanns ärenden för den verkställande makten som inte utgjorde regeringsärenden och som sålunda utövades genom personlig kungamak. På detta sätt hade kungen befälsrätt över armé och flotta (14 §) och stod hovet under kungens "enskilda styrelse" (48 §). Också frågor om utdelning av ordnar och medaljer liksom ärenden rörande det kungliga huset (kungafamiljen), ansågs vara sådana som kungen skulle besluta om utan att höra statsrådet (Malmgren, Sundberg & Petré 1968: 13). Sedan år 1809 har grundlagsregleringen sålunda gjort en tydlig åtskillnad mellan å ena sidan kungens lagstiftningsmakt och regeringsmakt och å andra sidan kungens personliga beslutsmakt.

4. 1974 års RF och Torekovskompromissen

Genom den totala författningsreform som resulterade i 1974 års RF förändrades kungens roll i grunden. Också förhållandet mellan allmänna och enskilda organ kom att påverkas av den nya grundlagen.

En stötesten i de politiska förhandlingarna var frågan om kungens roll och om Sverige överhuvudtaget skulle förbli en monarki. I samband med Grundlagberedningens sammanträde i Torekov 1971 nåddes emellertid en överenskommelse – den s.k. Torekovskompromissen – mellan de deltagande politiska partiernas representanter (Stjernquist 1971: 377). Beredningen konstaterade i sitt betänkande: "De av statschefens funktioner som har sin grund i kungens traditionella ställning som innehavare av regeringsmakten kan inte förenas med ett parlamentariskt system [...]. Av särskild betydelse är att statschefens roll vid regeringsbildningen förs över till riksdagen och dess organ. Statschefen blir sålunda inte innehavare av någon politisk makt. Statschefen bibehåller däremot enligt beredningens förslag sin ställning som symbol för riket och sina representativa uppgifter." (SOU 1972:15, 80.)

I propositionen med förslag till ny regeringsform anförde chefen för justitiedepartementet, socialdemokraten Lennart Geijer (1909–99): "Statschefen

bör inte tilldelas någon som helst befogenhet, som innebär att han kan utöva makt.” Dock skulle hovets ställning som organisation utanför den statliga förvaltningen inte förändras, och kungen skulle också behålla sin rätt att som överhuvud för kungahuset fatta vissa beslut (prop. 1973:90, 172 ff.). I den vidare riksdagsbehandlingen godtog Konstitutionsutskottet regeringens förslag avseende statschefen utan närmare kommentarer (bet. KU 1973:26, 18). Möjligen var det dock inte helt tydligt hur långt Torekovskompromissen sträckte sig när det gällde detaljerna. I en reservation till betänkandet uttalade nämligen två moderata ledamöter att deras förslag om att statschefen skulle medverka vid promulgation av lagar och expedition av beslut av större vikt kunde rymmas ”inom ramen för den träffade överenskommelsen (Torekov-kompromissen)” (bet. KU 1973:26, 116 f.). Svenska Akademien och kungens förhållande till den nämndes inte särskilt i förarbetena till den nya grundlagen.

Den genomförda förändringen av regeringsformen innebar att de uppgifter som hade legat hos Kungl. Maj:t delades upp mellan regeringen och de högsta domstolarna samt även till viss del kammarrätterna. Dock kvarstod vissa befogenheter för kungen personligen i fråga om hovet och kungahuset (se om det senare 5, 7 och 8 §§ successionsordningen). Också behörigheten att dela ut ordnar kvarstod hos kungen – genom Kungl. Maj:ts Orden – enligt regleringen i ordenskungörelsen (1974:768) (Bramstång 1999), om än med kraftiga begränsningar.

Det är därutöver tänkbart att också annat som tidigare har hört till den kungliga personliga makten och som inte har förändrats genom 1974 års RF fortfarande skulle kunna ligga kvar inom kungens kompetens. I en fortfarande gällande övergångsbestämmelse (punkt 7) till den nya regeringsformen anges nämligen: ”Bestämmelser i äldre lag eller annan författning om Konungen eller Kungl. Maj:t skall gälla regeringen, såvida det icke följer av författning eller i övrigt framgår av omständigheterna att konungen personligen, Högsta domstolen, Regeringsrätten eller kammarrätt åsyftas.”

Regeringsrättens (nu Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens) avgörande RÅ 2002 not. 17 rörde denna övergångsbestämmelse i förhållande till en regel om återställande av försutten tid för ansökningar om introduktion på Riddarhuset enligt riddarhusordningen (SFS 1866:37 s. 1). Domstolen kom fram till att det inte fanns stöd för att hänvisningen till Kungl. Maj:t i detta fall skulle åsyfta Regeringsrätten. Dock uttalade sig inte domstolen om vilket organ som i stället skulle kunna vara behörigt.

5. Skillnaden mellan ”allmänt” och ”enskilt”

1974 års RF innebar också att distinktionen mellan allmänt och enskilt i rättsystemet betonades. Medan äldre rätt hade godtagit att det fanns mellanformer såsom de ovan nämnda offentligrättsliga korporationerna, utgick grundlagen nu från en tydlig dikotomi. Frågan om kategoriseringen som offentlig eller privat

– det vill säga som ”myndighet” eller ”privat organ” – har statsrättslig betydelse i flera avseenden, bland annat när det gäller Justitieombudsmannens tillsyn (13 kap. 6 § RF), regeringens utrymme för styrning och offentlighetsprincipen (se vidare Marcusson 1989: 384 ff.). Regeringsformens systematik bygger på detta sätt på att organ anses som antingen offentliga eller enskilda utan att det ges någon möjlighet till mellanformer (jfr dock möjligheten enligt 12 kap. 4 § andra stycket RF att till annan juridisk person än kommun eller till enskild individ överlämna förvaltningsuppgift). Följden blir, enligt professorn i offentlig rätt Håkan Strömberg (1917–2002), ”att rättssubjekt, som ser ut att intaga en sådan mellanställning, måste pressas in under endera kategorin” (Strömberg 1985: 56).

Här kan de traditionella begreppen ”offentligrättslig korporation” och ”offentlig korporation och anstalt” möjligen bidra till diskussionen. Begreppen ger visserligen inte i sig några tydliga svar på rättsliga frågeställningar utan markerar snarare att det är fråga om mellanformer som avviker från andra associationsformer. De institutioner som finns i gränslandet mellan allmän och enskilt kan dock sägas karakteriseras av följande faktorer.

- De kan inte utan vidare inordnas under de i övrigt erkända associationsformerna.
- De har inrättats, organiserats eller getts stadgar genom handlande av något statligt organ (såsom kungen, riksdagen eller regeringen) och har inte därefter helt frigjorts från statsmakterna.
- De tillvaratar något allmänt intresse.

Kategorin ”offentliga korporationer och anstalter” nämns särskilt i Skatteverkets rättsliga vägledning när det gäller tilldelande av organisationsnummer (Skatteverket 2018). Grunden för tilldelandet av organisationsnummer till offentliga korporationer och anstalter tycks vara att de ingår i kategorin ”annan allmän inrättning som enligt lag eller annan författning står under offentlig tillsyn” (1 § lagen [1974:174] om identitetsbeteckning för juridiska personer m.fl.).

Vissa organisationer har börjat sin existens i gränslandet mellan allmänt och enskilt men har sedan tydligt kommit att omfattas av en av de vanliga associationsrättsliga kategorierna så att de numera entydigt bör betraktas som privata organ. Hit hör Göta kanalbolag (aktiebolag) och Allmänna änke- och pupillkassan (ömsesidigt livförsäkringsbolag). Vissa organisationer kan vidare nu betraktas som ideella föreningar eller som stiftelser. Carl Hemström har argumenterat för att detta gäller flera av de lärda samfunden (Hemström 2001).

Det finns emellertid andra organisationer som inte är myndigheter och som är mycket svåra att hänföra till någon av de vanliga associationsrättsliga kategorierna. Genom att undvika att ”pressa in” dessa institutioner under antingen ”allmänt” eller ”enskilt” kan deras rättsliga ställning analyseras på

ett förutsättningslöst och nyanserat sätt. Det kan noteras att institutioner som t.ex. hovet (Sterzel 1997: 811 ff., Bramstång 1999) och Svenska kyrkan (jfr prop. 1997/98:116) hör till denna kategori, och de kan knappast sägas sakna betydelse i svenskt samhällsliv. När det gäller hovet och Kungl. Maj:ts orden har professorn i offentlig rätt Gunnar Bramstång utförligt ifrågasatt om de verkligen ska uppfattas som kungens privata organisationer; även om de inte är statliga förvaltningsmyndigheter är de kanske någon annan typ av offentlighetsrättsliga företeelser? (Bramstång 1999: 91 ff.) I den nämnda propositionen angående Svenska kyrkan sägs vidare t.ex. å ena sidan att Svenska kyrkan som trossamfund ska få rättskapacitet genom en särskild bestämmelse i lagen om Svenska kyrkan (s. 48) men å andra sidan att regeringen inte får medföra att Svenska kyrkan uppfattas som ett på statligt initiativ nu upprättat trossamfund (s. 41). Enligt riksdagens principbeslut av år 1995 angående ändrade relationer mellan staten och Svenska kyrkan får Svenska kyrkan "själv reglera sina angelägenheter inom ramen för en lag men utan statsrättsligt grundad normgivningskompetens, dvs. utan en på regeringsformen grundad rätt att meddela generellt bindande föreskrifter" (prop. 1997/98:49, 10). Denna typ av oklarheter är enligt vår mening i sig en anledning att fördjupa den rättsliga analysen av detta slags institutioner.

Dessutom har, oberoende av den svenska kategoriseringen, skillnaden mellan allmänt och enskilt betydelse i EU-rätten, på så sätt att staten i vid mening ("det allmänna") på olika sätt omfattas av särskilda krav. Detta gäller bland annat i fråga om regelverket för offentlig upphandling och statsstöd (Bernitz & Kjellgren 2018: 441 ff.). Såvitt känt har varken exempelvis hovet eller Svenska Akademien diskuterats mer omfattande i förhållande till dessa regelverk.

När det gäller offentlighetsprincipen omfattar den endast myndigheter samt vissa i offentlighets- och sekretesslagen angivna andra organ (2 kap. 3 § tryckfrihetsförordningen och 2 kap. 3 och 4 §§ offentlighets- och sekretesslagen [2009:400]). Regeringsrätten (nu Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) har tidigare ansett att Riksmarskalksämberet (som är en del av hovet) och Stiftelsen Riksbankens Jubileumsfond faller utanför tryckfrihetsförordningens myndighetsbegrepp (RÅ 1999 ref. 48 resp. RÅ 2008 ref. 6).

I maj 2018 prövade Kammarrätten i Stockholm ett överklagande av Svenska Akademiens beslut att vägra lämna ut handlingar om dels en advokatutredning som den hade låtit göra, dels dokument som rörde avhopp från akademiens arbete. Den enskilde som hade begärt ut handlingarna anförde bland annat att akademien hade instiftats genom en offentlighetsrättslig författning meddelad av Kungl. Maj:t samt att akademien länge hade betraktats som en myndighet. Akademien ansåg däremot att den utgjorde ett privaträttsligt subjekt som föll utanför begreppet myndighet såsom en privat juridisk person av eget slag ("sui generis"). Kammarrätten konstaterade att Svenska Akademien utgör ett "rättssubjekt av unikt slag och att det inte är helt klart hur detta ska inordnas i ett juridiskt sammanhang." Även om stadgarna var utformade av Gustav III kan de

enligt kammarrätten inte jämställas med en författning i dagens mening. Kammarrätten fann att Svenska Akademien inte "kan anses ingå i den offentligrättsliga statliga och kommunala organisationen" och att den inte utgör en myndighet. Kammarrätten avvisade därför överklagandet (Kammarrätten i Stockholm, beslut 2018-05-29 i mål nr 3982-18). Beslutet överklagades till Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen, som dock inte lämnade prövningstillstånd (beslut 2018-08-08 i mål nr 3291-18).

Även inom processrätten är gränsen mellan "allmänt" och "enskilt" i vissa fall mindre skarp. Frågan om en institution är en juridisk person, och i så fall vilken typ av juridisk person, kan ställas på sin spets om institutionen ska föra talan vid domstol. Enligt 11 kap. 2 § rättegångsbalken kan, utöver fysiska personer, bolag, förening eller annat samfund, stiftelse eller annan sådan inrättning, samt kronan (staten), kommun eller annan sådan menighet uppträda som part. I 10 kap. 1 § samma balk regleras vid vilken domstol talan mot dem kan föras. Som en särskild kategori identifierades i förarbetena till balken (som tillkom under 1809 års RF) "rättssubjekt av delvis enskild och delvis offentlig natur, t.ex. universitet, akademier, hushållningssällskap" (NJA II 1943: 98).

Universiteten ansågs vid denna tid inte vara statliga myndigheter, och de kunde alltså inte föra talan som kronan (staten). I stället ansågs de vara fristående rättssubjekt. Detta hängde samman med att universiteten i sina statuter, och ännu i 1956 års gemensamma universitetsstatuter (SFS 1956:117), angavs stå "under Kungl. Maj:ts beskydd" och åtnjöt "oförkränkt den egendom samt de inkomster, rättigheter, förmåner och friheter" som lagligen tillkom dem (2 §). Detta ändrades i och med 1964 års universitetsstadga (SFS 1964:461). Med undantag för stiftelsehögskolor och andra särskilda organisationsformer utgör universiteten därefter statliga förvaltningsmyndigheter under regeringen (Marcusson 2005:17–28). Även hushållningssällskapens ställning och verksamhet har förändrats (se prop. 1965:100 och 1967:74).

Akademierna har emellertid inte omreglerats på motsvarande sätt. I nu aktuell kommentar till rättegångsbalken (Fitger m.fl. 2018, kommentar till 11 kap. 2 §) anges att de akademier som avses med motivuttalandet "torde vara Svenska akademien, Musikaliska akademien och Akademien för de fria konsterna". Att just de tre akademierna räknas upp torde ha ett samband med det som noteras i nästa mening i kommentaren, nämligen att enligt 51 § lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk en domstol på talan av myndighet som regeringen bestämmer kan meddela vitesförbud. Som sådana myndigheter har regeringen utsett de tre nämnda akademierna "som alltså i sådant fall för talan såsom 'myndighet' på det allmännas vägnar". Det ska noteras att kommentarförfattarna har satt ordet myndighet inom citationstecken, vilket får uppfattas som att de har velat markera att de tre akademierna inte är myndigheter i vanlig mening utan "rättssubjekt av delvis enskild och delvis offentlig natur". Dessa akademier kan alltså anses vara privat organiserade organ som

på ett visst område – jfr numera 12 kap. 4 § andra stycket RF – har tillerkänts en myndighetsfunktion (Wennersten 2014:180 ff., se också angående Kungl. Musikaliska akademiens myndighetsutövning rättsfallet RÅ 1981 2:8.)

Det finns emellertid fler akademier. Utrymmet här medger inte en närmare analys av rättsställningen för var och en av dem. Det kan dock nämnas att två av dem, Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien och Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitetsakademien, hade underliggande myndigheter, såsom Stockholms Observatorium respektive Riksantikvarieämbetet och Statens historiska museer. Under tidigt 1970-tal, medan 1809 års RF fortfarande gällde, fick de en ändrad ställning på så sätt att myndigheterna flyttades bort från akademiernas huvudmannaskap (se prop. 1973:59 och prop. 1974:28). Det krävdes riksdagsbeslut och, beträffande Vetenskapsakademien, avtal mellan staten och akademien. Beträffande dessa två akademier är det tydligt att de inte är en del av staten (kronan) utan är från staten självständiga rättssubjekt som kan uppträda som part i egenkap av att de är ”annat samfund” eller ”annan sådan inrättning”.

Beträffande åtta lärda samfund² gjorde professorn i civilrätt Carl Hemström (1931–2011) en rättsutredning år 2001 (Hemström 2001). Han kom där fram till att de i de flesta avseenden närmast liknar ideella föreningar, även om det kan argumenteras för att någon av dem har sin medelsförvaltning i stiftelseform. Gemensamt för dem är att stadgarna i något skede har fastställts av Kungl. Maj:t och beträffande några av dem har stadgarna även tagits in i SFS (se beträffande Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund SFS 1921:475 och 1965:545 och beträffande Kungl. Vetenskaps-Societeten i Uppsala SFS 1906:60 och 1969:524.). Regeringen har år 1994 fastställt stadgar för Kungl. Gustav Adolfs Akademien för Svensk Folkkultur, och i några senare fall har regeringen fastställt stadgar men för framtiden överlåtit åt respektive akademi att själv ändra stadgarna (år 1997 beträffande Kungl. Fysiografiska Sällskapet i Lund och Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhället i Göteborg, jfr till den sistnämnda SFS 1906:12 s. 1 och 1997:1331.). Beträffande Kungl. Musikaliska Akademien har emellertid regeringen år 2000 fastställt stadgar, och stadgeändringar ska även fortsättningsvis underställas regeringen för fastställelse (www.musikaliskaakademien.se).

Även inom skatterätten finns en specialreglering när det gäller bl.a. akademier. Enligt 7 kap. 16 § inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229) är ”akademier” skattskyldiga bara för inkomst på grund av innehav av fastigheter. Samma reglering gäller för bl.a. ”allmänna undervisningsverk”, studentkårer och arbetslöshetskassor. I 17 § samma kapitel finns samma reglering för bl.a. Nobelstiftelsen och en del andra stiftelser som verkar i ett allmänt intresse, däribland också

2 Kungl. Fysiografiska Sällskapet i Lund, Kungl. Gustav Adolfs Akademien för Svensk Folkkultur, Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala, Kungl. Skytteanska Samfundet, Kungl. Vetenskapssamhället i Uppsala, Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhället i Göteborg samt Kungl. Vetenskaps-Societeten i Uppsala.

Jernkontoret, så länge kontorets vinstmedel används till allmänt nyttiga ändamål och utdelning inte lämnas till delägarna. I 15 § samma kapitel finns en annan specialreglering beträffande bl.a. "sådana domkyrkor, lokalkyrkor eller dylikt som hör till Svenska kyrkan" och som är av stiftelsekaraktär och "hushållningssällskap med stadgar som har fastställts av regeringen eller den myndighet som regeringen bestämt". Det som karakteriserar de organisationer som nämns i dessa bestämmelser är att de finns i gränslandet mellan allmänt och enskilt och tillvaratar ett väsentligt allmänintresse (se SOU 1995:63, 219 ff.). När det gäller akademier framhöll departementschefen i förarbetena till en föregångare till den nu gällande regleringen att den sedan länge gällande skattefriheten för akademier skulle bibehållas. Det fanns inte anledning att göra en uppräkningslista av vilka dessa akademier var, för eftersom "en akademi i författningstextens mening åtminstone i regel torde vara utrustad med något slag av offentlig sanktion, bör givetvis icke en förening enbart genom att beteckna sig såsom akademi komma i åtnjutande av skattefrihet" (prop. 1940:134, 48).

6. Regeringens möjlighet att agera

När det gäller regeringens möjlighet att agera rättsligt gentemot Svenska Akademien är det möjligt att tänka sig att kungens (Kungl. Maj:ts) behörighet att ändra stadgar och eventuellt ingripa på annat sätt skulle ha övergått på regeringen genom 1974 års RF.

Dock finns det ingen bestämmelse i grundlag, lag eller förordning som ger uttryckligt stöd för regeringen att ändra akademiens stadgar eller annars besluta om akademien eller dess medlemmar. Om akademien betraktas som ett helt privat organ krävs det stöd i lag för ett sådant ingrepp (jfr angående ingrepp i föreningsfriheten 2 kap. 20 § första stycket 1 RF och artikel 11 i europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna, och därutöver 8 kap. 2 § första stycket 1 RF angående krav på lagform för associationsrättsliga regler).

Det står vidare klart att Svenska Akademien inte är en förvaltningsmyndighet under regeringen. Regeringen har därmed inte heller på denna grund någon möjlighet till styrning i sin roll att leda den statliga förvaltningsorganisationen (12 kap. 1 § RF). I 12 § förordningen (1996:1515) med instruktion för Regeringskansliet framgår att förvaltningsärenden och lagstiftningsärenden fördelas mellan departementen på det sätt som anges i bilagan till förordningen, samt att det av bilagan också framgår till vilka departement myndigheter och andra organ hör. I bilagan nämns inte Svenska Akademien uttryckligen, men under Utbildningsdepartementet upptas "akademier samt vittra och lärda samfund som inte hör till något annat departement" (punkt 7.3). Omnämmandet av sådana akademier med mera bör dock inte uppfattas som att dessa organ nödvändigtvis ingår i den statliga organisationen eller står i

något lydheidsförhållande till regeringen. I förteckningen finns både aktiebolag, stiftelser och internationella organisationer (såsom Finsk-svenska gränsälvskommissionen och Nordiska investeringsbanken). Snarast rör det sig här om en arbetsfördelning av vilket departement som hanterar frågor om olika organ, i den mån regeringen överhuvudtaget har rättsligt utrymme att agera.

Ett ytterligare möjligt stöd för regeringen att agera kunde vara den allmänna uppgiften att styra riket (1 kap. 6 § RF). Dock är denna bestämmelse främst att betrakta som en hänvisning till andra mer specifika regler i regeringsformen om regeringens uppgifter avseende bland annat normgivningsmakt, budgetarbete, internationella överenskommelser och styrning av förvaltningen (8, 9, 10 resp. 12 kap. RF; se prop. 1973:90, 230). Visserligen har Konstitutionsutskottet konstaterat att regeringen har ett ansvar att agera till följd av denna bestämmelse, men det har då handlat om situationer av omfattande kriser för landet och dess befolkning (bet. 2005/06:KU8, 38 ff.). Turbulensen i Svenska Akademien rör inte en sådan typ av situation.

Den tidigare nämnda övergångsbestämmelsen (punkt 7) till den nya regeringsformen skulle slutligen kunna tänkas ge stöd för regeringens rätt att agera. Det finns dock ingen författningsbestämmelse om stadgeändring som utpekar "Konungen" eller "Kungl. Maj:t" som behörig att ändra stadgarna. Det är därför svårt att se hur regeringen med stöd av punkt 7 i övergångsbestämmelserna skulle kunna ingripa genom stadgeändring eller andra åtgärder mot Akademien. Visserligen finns exempel på att regeringen även under 1974 års RF har beslutat om kungliga akademiers stadgar, såsom när den år 2000 fastställde Kungl. Musikaliska akademins stadgar. Detta kan dock rättsligt sett förklaras med att Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet år 1971 – alltså fortfarande under 1809 års RF – hade fastställt stadgarna i en tidigare version. På så sätt etablerades ett rättsläge där sådana beslut skulle fattas av Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet. Rätten att ingripa mot Kungl. Musikaliska Akademien gick genom 1974 års RF sedan över till regeringen (jfr Strömberg 1985: 53). Däremot tycks Kungl. Maj:t i statsrådet inte ha gjort något motsvarande ingrepp i Svenska Akademien under 1809 års RF. Det är därför svårt att göra en analogi mellan behandlingen av de båda akademierna.

7. Kungens möjlighet att agera

Bakgrunden till att kungen ansåg sig ha möjlighet att agera finns återgiven i några uttalanden av hovrättspresidenten Fredrik Wersäll, tillträdande riksmarskalk. Enligt en artikel i Dagens Juridik den 20 april 2018 har Fredrik Wersäll tillsammans med f.d. justitiekanslern och hovrättspresidenten Johan Hirschfeldt granskat frågan om Svenska Akademiens stadgar med anledning av den kris som akademien befinner sig i. Fredrik Wersäll har enligt artikeln uttalat sig på följande sätt.

”Vår analys är att när Gustaf III inrättade Svenska Akademien 1786 så var det en förlängning av kungamakten som den såg ut på den tiden [---]. Han gav sig själv och sina efterträdare inflytande över Akademien genom att han ställde sig själv som dess beskyddare och bland annat behöll rätten att säga nej till inval av ledamöter. Däremot står det ingenting i stadgarna om formerna för att ändra dem. Det tolkar både jag och Johan [Hirschfeldt] som att avsikten i vart fall inte var att ge akademien själv möjlighet att ändra stadgarna. Och om det inte var kungen som skulle ha den möjligheten, vem skulle det då vara? Jag kan inte se att de finns någon åtgärd sedan 1786 som skulle inneburi att regeringen skulle ha fått den här makten – det har den heller aldrig gjort anspråk på. Det inflytande som kungen hade 1786 i det här avseendet, det bör kungen fortfarande ha kvar.” (Dagens Juridik 2018-04-20.)

Fredrik Wersälls uttalande får förstås som att punkt 7 i övergångsbestämmelserna inte aktualiseras, eftersom det inte finns någon författningsbestämelse som pekar ut ”Konungen eller Kungl. Maj:t” som behörig att besluta om stadgeändringar och som nu skulle läsas som att den syftar på ”regeringen” (se också vår slutsats ovan i avsnitt 6). Därtill kommer argumentet att kungen har en aktiv roll i förhållande till akademien genom inflytandet på invalen, och det har såvitt känt aldrig under 1974 års RF gjorts gällande att denna behörighet enligt punkt 7 i övergångsbestämmelserna skulle ha övergått till regeringen. Motsvarande inflytande har kungen, såvitt känt, inte i förhållande till några av de andra lärda samfunden.

Att Karl XIV Johan ändrade sättet för utseende av akademiens direktör och kansler har redan nämnts (ovan avsnitt 3). I Gustav III:s öppna brev om inrättandet av akademien angavs att han ”af Konungslig Makt och Myndighet” inrättade ”ett Samhälle af Aderton Herrar och Män”. Genom att år 1914 bifalla invalet av Selma Lagerlöf i Akademien ändrade Gustaf V i realiteten, men inte formellt, kravet på att ledamöterna skulle vara ”herrar och män”. Detta talar också för att kungens beskyddarskap av Svenska Akademien innefattar en del personliga beslutsbefogenheter för kungen, däribland den nu aktuella stadgeändringen.

8. Avslutande analys

Enligt vår mening finns det ett antal institutioner som inte på något meningsfullt sätt kan pressas in under antingen ”allmänt” eller ”enskilt”. Håkan Strömberg har träffande uttryckt det som att ”rättsordningen företer en variationsrikedom, som är svår att infoga i juridiska kategorier” (Strömberg 1985: 57, se även 63). Det rör sig om sinsemellan skilda typer av institutioner, som dock alla karakteriseras av att de finns (eller har funnits) i gränslandet mellan allmänt och enskilt. Litteraturen om dem är mycket knapphändig, men i de fall de har diskuterats har de som framgått ibland som en samlingsbeteckning kallats ”offentligrättsliga korporationer” eller ”offentliga korporationer och anstalter”.

Vad gäller då enligt vår mening beträffande Svenska Akademien? Först kan noteras att det står klart att den inte är en förening och inte heller en stiftelse. En förening karakteriseras av att ett antal personer slutit sig samman för att i organiserade former arbeta för ett gemensamt ändamål och antagit stadgar (Hemström 2011: 22). Stadgarna utgör på så sätt ett grundläggande avtal mellan medlemmarna. Svenska Akademien har inte grundats genom att medlemmar avtalat om att sluta sig samman och kan inte betraktas som en ideell förening. En stiftelse bildas genom att egendom avskiljs för att varaktigt förvaltas som en självständig förmögenhet för ett bestämt ändamål (1 kap. 1 § stiftelselagen [1994:1220], jfr även 11 kap. 1 och 3 §§ i samma lag; jfr också 3 § lagen [1994:1221] om införande av stiftelselagen). Svenska Akademien har inte bildats för att förvalta en självständig förmögenhet för ett bestämt ändamål. Att Akademien senare har fått anslag och ekonomiska medel i olika former påverkar inte detta. Inget hindrar att medel insamlats i stiftelseform med t.ex. en ideell förening som destinatär (jfr Hemström 2001: 10 f.), men det innebär inte att den ideella föreningen som sådan blir en stiftelse. Motsvarande gäller beträffande akademien (jfr Strömberg 1985: 53 angående att stiftelser som förvaltas av akademi för vilken konungen fastställt stadgar var undantagen från tillsyn enligt lagen [1929:116] om tillsyn över stiftelser). Svenska Akademien är alltså inte heller en stiftelse. Eftersom akademien inte är en ideell förening kan den inte själv ändra sina stadgar eller upplösa sig, och eftersom den inte är en stiftelse kan dess stadgar inte ändras genom permutation hos Kammarkollegiet enligt permutationslagen (1972:205) eller 6 kap. stiftelselagen.

Akademien faller för övrigt utanför permutationslagens tillämpningsområde även på den grunden att den lagen enbart omfattar ”bestämmelse, som enskild meddelat i gåvobrev, testamente, stiftelseförordnande eller liknande handling” (1 §). Även om Akademiens stadgar skulle anses som en ”liknande handling” – vilket skulle vara en mycket långsökt tolkning – är den inte meddelad av ”enskild”. Om det är fråga om en ”liknande handling” anses frågan om permutation av förordnanden som har gjorts av staten eller kommun alltså jämt ankomma på regeringen (se Lind & Walin 2018 samt NJA II 1972 s. 774). Det kan emellertid ifrågasättas om regeringen verkligen har tillräckligt lagstöd för sådana åtgärder (se ovan under 6).

När det gäller frågan om vem som får agera ligger det enligt vår uppfattning som framgått närmast till hands att det just beträffande Svenska Akademien är kungen som har behörigheten att ändra stadgarna (se ovan avsnitt 7). Här kan noteras att stadgeändringen gjorts i hovprotokoll, som normalt tar upp ärenden som har med hovet att göra men som torde kunna fungera som form även för andra beslut av konungen personligen (jfr Bramstång 1999: 99). Intressant är också att det är fråga om ett ”förtydligande”, vilket anger att det är fråga om en kodifiering av något som redan gällt, samtidigt som den nya bestämmelsen har ett innehåll som i flera avseenden är nytt.

Stadgeändringen föranleder också frågan vad som ska ske om Akademien inte kan uppfylla kravet i stadgarnas XII § på att minst 12 ledamöter ska samlas till inval av ny ledamot och kungen inte heller ger dispens, vilket Gustav III gjorde vid några tillfällen (se ovan avsnitt 2). Då kan ingen ny ledamot väljas in och akademien tynar i så fall långsamt bort. Men upphör den att existera som juridisk person när den sista ledamoten avlider, och utser i så fall kungen likvidator? Eller fortsätter den juridiska personen att existera, och vem är i så fall dess ställföreträdare? Hur förfars med egendomen (jfr Jägerskiöld 1970: 204 ff.)?

Slutligen: kan riksdagen agera i frågan? Att stifta en lag om Svenska Akademien eller en "lag om akademier och andra offentligrättsliga anstalter och korporationer" är inte omöjligt. En sådan lag måste då vara utformad på ett generellt sätt och inte enbart ta sikte på något visst konkret fall (Holmberg & Stjernqvist m.fl. 2012, kommentaren till 8 kap. RF under rubriken "Kravet på generell giltighet", jämför 12 kap. 3 § RF).

Eftersom kungen enligt vår uppfattning är behörig att agera mot Svenska Akademien, som nu har skett, skulle sådan lagstiftning dock kunna innebära en reglering av statschefens uppgifter. Som professorn i konstitutionell rätt Fredrik Sterzel har framfört (Sterzel 1997: 810 f.) finns det goda skäl att anse att reglering av kungens uppgifter ska ske i grundlag. I så fall skulle en sådan reglering av Svenska Akademiens verksamhet möjligen rent av kräva grundlagsändring.

Turbulensen i Svenska Akademien och kungens ingripande har som framgått aktualiserat grundläggande strukturer i den svenska konstitutionella ordningen som tidigare har varit mer eller mindre bortglömda. Även om exemplet Svenska Akademien är särpräglad, finns det därför anledning att även i fortsatt forskning och debatt behandla den aktuella innebörden av de förändringar som skedde genom 1974 års RF. Detta gäller såväl avseende kungens rättsliga ställning som betydelsen av distinktionen mellan allmänt och enskilt.

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3 Vi vill tacka f.d. kammarrättspresidenten Nils-Olof Wentz som tillhandahållit oss denna promemoria.

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Några anmärkningar om kungens roll för Svenska Akademiens stadgar¹

Nils Gustafsson

Bakgrund

Under några veckor i april 2018 stormade det kring Svenska Akademien. I spåren av anklagelserna om sexuella övergrepp som framkom i artiklar av journalisten Matilda Gustavsson i DN i november 2017, och därefter avslöjanden om jäv och läckt information, gjordes en advokatutredning (Gustavsson 2017; Lindkvist 2018). I samband med att den blev färdig och diskuterades i Akademien hoppade snabbt flera ledamöter av, den ständiga sekreteraren Sara Danius avgick från sin post, flera akademiledamöter talade ut i medierna, och en knytblusdemonstration anordnades utanför Börshuset till stöd för Sara Danius. (TT/SVD 2018a; Grönberg & Grönlund 2018; TT/SVD 2018b)

Akademien ansåg tidigare att ledamöter satt på livstid oavsett om de ville gå ur eller ej, varför de avhoppade ledamöterna inte kunde ersättas förrän de avgått med döden. Eftersom flera ledamöter sedan tidigare slutat delta i Akademiens arbete (exempelvis författaren Kerstin Ekman, som redan 1989 lämnade Akademien efter bråket kring Salman Rushdie), närmade sig Akademien snabbt ett tillstånd där de inte längre skulle vara tillräckligt många – minst tolv – för att uppfylla stadgarnas krav för att kunna välja in nya ledamöter. I sista hand kunde utdelandet av Nobelpriset i litteratur, detta för Sveriges internationella anseende så viktiga evenemang, hotas. Förutom alla andra problem upplevde Svenska Akademien att man hindrades från att agera av sina stadgar, intakta sedan grundandet 1786.

I samband med denna snabba händelseutveckling trädde plötsligt kungen in som en *rex ex machina* och lät i ett pressmeddelande den 11 april meddela att "[d]et är min bestämda uppfattning att Monarken disponerar över de stadgar

1 Författaren skulle vilja tacka Jan Teorell, Jakob Heidbrink, Henrik Wenander och Martin Sunnqvist för värdefulla synpunkter. Delar av innehållet i denna text presenterades på ett seminarium på juridiska fakulteten vid Lunds universitet den 17 maj 2018.

för Svenska Akademien som min företrädare Gustav III fastställde” (kungahuset.se 2018a). Detta ledde till glädje bland en del och skepsis bland andra (TT/SVD 2018c; Schultz 2018; Gustafsson 2018). Den avgående hovrättspresidenten och tillträdande riksmarskalken Fredrik Wersäll hävdade med enfasett att kungen i själva verket var den ende som kunde ändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar (Lindqvist & Lenas 2018). Men till och med Wersäll tillstod att det inte var helt självklart vad som gällde (ibid). Möjligen kunde frågan prövas rättsligt, men man finge då också ställa sig frågan om det funnes någon som överhuvudtaget hade rätt att väcka talan.

Den 2 maj meddelade hovet slutligen att kungen hade ändrat Svenska Akademiens stadgar och infört en bestämmelse om rätt till utträde för ledamöter (kungahuset.se 2018b). Däremot infördes ingen bestämmelse om hur stadgarna ändras eller vem som har rätt att göra det (Hovprotokoll 6/2018). Själva beslutet meddelades ”i underdånig föredragning inför H.M. Konungen” i ett så kallat hovprotokoll, som upptar ”den svenske monarkens beslut i ärenden som rör Kungliga Hovstaterna” (Bramstång 1999), vilket annars oftast rör sig om medaljer, titulärhertigdömen och liknande ting.

Efter detta klagande utträdde fyra ledamöter formellt ur akademien, medan ytterligare fyra endast avstod från att delta i akademiens verksamhet. Då de kvarvarande tio ledamöterna uttalade en förhoppning om att snabbt kunna välja in nya ledamöter, förklarade hovet snabbt att det i stadgarna fortfarande stod att det krävdes tolv ledamöter för att göra det, och kungen avsåg inte att göra några ytterligare stadgeändringar (Grahn & Farran-Lee 2018). I skrivande stund (slutet av augusti 2018) har tre avhoppade men inte avgångna ledamöter indikerat att de möjligen skulle kunna tänka sig att medverka i att välja in nya ledamöter (da Silva 2018). Utdelandet av nobelpriset i litteratur har skjutits upp. Det är svårt att veta vad framtiden har i sitt sköte. Det är dock uppenbart att kungen har spelat en viktig och något förvånande roll i händelseförloppet.

I denna text ska jag försöka presentera och diskutera de olika argument som har förts fram kring frågan om vilket förhållande Svenska Akademien står till kungens person, staten och andra tänkbara aktörer. Detta kräver ett utredande av många små detaljer kring gamla institutioner, historiska förhållanden och föråldrade organisationer i det svenska samhället. Det är inte utan att jag har känt mig lite som den skinntorre forskaren Casaubon i George Eliots roman *Middlemarch*: ”*this dried-up pedant, this elaborator of small explanations about as important as the surplus stock of false antiquities kept in a vendor’s back chamber*” (Eliot 1996 [1874]: 202).

Anledningen till att det ändå finns intresse att försöka förstå detta skeende har att göra med att den sätter fingret på flera intressanta principer som har samband med kungens ställning i det demokratiska Sverige efter regeringsformen 1974. I korthet kan man säga att kungens agerande i relation till Svenska Akademien är ett förhållandevis mycket kraftigt utflöde av kungamakt efter

Torekovskompromissen, vars innebörd som bekant var att kungen fräntogs all offentlig makt och samtliga politiska funktioner, sånär som på ordförandeskapet i Utrikesnämnden och i regeringsskifteskonselj, öppnandet av riksmötena, och mottagandet av utländska ambassadörer (Stjernqvist 1971).

Kungens uppgift efter den nya regeringsformen blev att fungera som en symbol för riket och inte dess styresman. Denna förändring följde på en lång utveckling där kungen gradvis hade förlorat inflytande till riksdag och regering genom införandet av parlamentarismen i början av 1900-talet. Denna reella förändring hade dock inte fått någon motsvarighet i författningen, vilket exempelvis gjorde att det ända fram till 1969 års partiella författningsreform hette att kungen ägde att allena styra riket (jfr Herlitz 1970: 24).

Sverige är i många avseenden en mycket republikansk monarki. I andra konstitutionella monarkier har statschefen betydligt fler formella funktioner, som till exempel att formellt utnämna regeringen, underteckna lagar, läsa upp regeringsförklaringen i parlamentet etc. Utöver de begränsningar som finns lagreglerade för statschefens uppgifter finns även en konstitutionell praxis enligt vilken kungafamiljen avhåller sig från att göra politiska uttalanden, vilket förutsätts i grundlagspropositionen (prop. 1973:90, s. 113). Kungen fick genom 1974 års regeringsform formellt rösträtt, men i linje med en långt gången strävan att förhålla sig politiskt neutral utnyttjas inte denna rösträtt.

Mot bakgrund av statschefens väldigt återhållna befogenheter ter det sig alltså märkligt med det plötsliga framflyttandet av positionerna i samband med historien kring Svenska Akademien.

Jag har inte tidigare i min forskargärning sysslat med författningen specifikt, men såvitt jag vet det är det inte någon annan statsvetare som diskuterat sakfrågan, och jag dristar mig därför till att göra ett försök. Detta kan kanske sättas i förbindelse med den bristande återväxten bland de svenska författningsforskarna. De flesta andra som uttalat sig offentligt i frågan är jurister, men även deras meningar har gått isär. Juristerna har dessutom naturligt nog tenderat att tolka frågan utifrån ett juridiskt perspektiv, medan man ur ett statsvetenskapligt perspektiv också bör rikta sökarljuset mot maktfrågan.

Vad är en kunglig akademi?

Svenska Akademien är en kunglig akademi. Ordet akademi går tillbaka på Platons Akademi i antikens Aten. Under renässansen startades med detta höga föredöme akademier först i Italien och under de följande århundradena runt om i Europa. Den äldsta ännu existerande akademien är *Academia dela Crusca* [sic], som grundades 1583 i Florens, en språkligt orienterad akademi som bland annat utarbetade den första italienska ordboken år 1612 (Engwall 2015). Med *Academia dela Crusca* som förebild grundades *Académie Française* 1635, som i sin tur gav Gustav III inspiration till att instifta Svenska Akademien. Andra

svenska akademier som grundades under 1700-talet var bland annat Kungliga Vetenskaps-Societeten i Uppsala (1710), Kungliga Akademien för de fria konsterna (1735), Kungliga Vitterhetsakademien (1754), Kungliga Musikaliska Akademien (1771) och Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien (1796). I dagsläget finns det 18 kungliga akademier (ibid).² De har alla gemensamt att de har kungen som beskyddare och vid någon tidpunkt har fått kunglig stadfästelse för sina stadgar. Detta kan tyckas vara en tydlig indikation på akademiernas nära anknytning till den offentliga förvaltningsrymden, men det bör kommas ihåg att någon föreningsfrihet inte existerade under Gustav III:s regim: att få kungligt beskyddarskap och stadfästelse var en garant för att verksamheten inte skulle förbjudas (jfr. Hemström 2001).

Svenska Akademien grundades alltså av Gustav III 1786. Stiftelseurkunden utgörs av ett kungligt brev som kungen lät sin statssekreterare läsa upp i Riksrådet den 20 mars (Svenska Akademien 1786). Kungliga brev är handlingar som innehåller direktiv och föreskrifter av olika slag (SAOB *kunglig*, tryckår 1938). En sentida efterföljare kan sägas vara våra dagars regleringsbrev (Wikipedia 2016). Det kungliga brev där Gustav III grundar Svenska Akademien liknar andra typer av kungliga beslut från tiden. Det inleds med hans vanliga titulatur (Vi Gustaf, osv.) refererar till kungens regering, hans omsorg om landets försvar men också om vetenskap och kultur. Längst ner på brevet hänger det stora rikssigillet, inneslutet i en silverkupa. (Svenska Akademien 1786). Det står alltså utom tvivel att Gustav III grundade Svenska Akademien som svensk regent och inte i någon annan funktion. Detta kan tyckas trivialt, men är en viktig anmärkning eftersom det i debatten har framförts att kungen inte grundade akademien i egenskap av regent utan som ”monark”, vilket möjligen kan ha föranlett ordvalet i den nuvarande kungens ovannämnda uttalande (Bergström 2018).

2 De kungliga akademierna är följande:
 Kungl. Akademien för de fria konsterna
 Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien,
 Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien
 Kungl. Musikaliska Akademien
 Kungl. Örlogsmannasällskapet
 Svenska Akademien
 Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademien
 Kungl. Skogs- och Lantbruksakademien
 Kungl. Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien
 Kungl. Gustav Adolfs Akademien för svensk folkkultur
 Kungliga Fysiografiska Sällskapet i Lund
 Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund
 Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala
 Kungliga Samfundet för utgivande av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia
 Kungliga Skytteanska Samfundet
 Kungliga Vetenskapssamhället i Uppsala
 Kungliga Vetenskaps- och Vitterhetssamhället i Göteborg
 Kungliga Vetenskaps-Societeten i Uppsala

Gustav III hade ett stort kulturintresse och grundade ett antal kulturinstitutioner varav många finns kvar än idag. Hans aktiva kulturpolitik hade också en förvaltningspolitisk aspekt: genom sina akademireformer anpassade han äldre organisatoriska skikt i det kungliga kansliet (SOU 2009:16, s. 98). Akademierna kom att fungera som institutioner för konst och vetenskap med en långt gången frihet trots täta band till statsmakten (ibid: 123). Under århundradena övertog riksdag och regering gradvis ansvaret för den statliga kulturpolitiken (prop. 1974:28, s. 282). Akademierna som en sorts blandform av statlig myndighet och fria institution pågick fram till och med 1960- och 1970-talet, då man överförde de rena förvaltningsuppgifterna till statliga myndigheter. Konsthögskolan och Musikhögskolan i Stockholm drevs av respektive akademier in på 1970-talet. Kungliga Vetenskapsakademien drev Naturhistoriska Riksmuséet fram till 1965. Riksantikvarieämbetet sorterade under Vitterhetsakademien fram till 1975.

Kanske kan startpunkten till denna modernisering återfinnas i den så kallade Sellingaffären. Under 1950-talet försökte Vetenskapsakademien att få bort en professor på Naturhistoriska Riksmuséet, Olof Selling, genom att förklara honom som sinnessjuk. Historien uppmärksammades bland annat av Vilhelm Moberg och Herbert Tingsten och kom att bli ett av exemplen på rättsröta som förekom i debatten. Diskussionen kring Sellingaffären ledde till att man från politiskt håll uppmärksammade den ålderdomliga konstruktionen av Vetenskapsakademien och reformerade den och förtydligade rågången mellan privat och offentligt. (Wijkander 2017)

Denna utveckling fullföljdes med den utredning som ledde fram till 1970-talets kulturpolitik (SOU 1972:66). I denna föreslogs att de kungliga akademiernas statliga uppgifter så kultur- och utbildningsområdet skulle utföras av myndigheter, varefter akademierna skulle få en friare roll (ibid: 407; SOU 2009:16, s. 168). Utredningen föreslog också att man skulle gå ännu ett steg längre: de kungliga akademierna fick sina stadgar ändrade genom beslut av Kungl. Maj:t (dvs regeringen enligt 1809 års regeringsform med den konstitutionella utveckling som skedde gradvis under 18- och 1900-talen som innebar att den exekutiva funktionen övergick från kungen till statsråden). Utredningen föreslog att akademierna skulle göras helt självständiga även i detta avseende.³

”F n är berörda akademiers stadgar – med undantag av Svenska akademiens – fastställda av Kungl Maj:t. De reglerar akademiernas sammansättning och arbetsformer i detalj. Deras tjänstemän har statligt reglerade befattningar. I ett läge då en akademi inte längre fullgör statliga myndighetsfunktioner, finns det ingen anledning att verksamheten regleras på nuvarande sätt. Det förekommer numera inte, att Kungl Maj:t fastställer stadgar för organ endast för

3 Jag skulle vilja tacka Carl-Johan Kleberg, fd generaldirektör på Statens Kulturråd och en av författarna till utredningen, för att han har gjort mig uppmärksam på detta.

att ge ett slags allmänt godkännande av verksamheten. Endast Svenska akademien intar en i förhållande till statsmakterna helt oberoende ställning. Även om de andra akademierna kommer att få statliga bidrag för sin verksamhet bör de få förmånen av samma oberoende ställning som Svenska akademien genom att deras verksamhet och personal inte regleras av statliga bestämmelser." (ibid: 408).

Som kan utläsas ur det ovanstående citatet var anledningen till att man inte omorganiserade Svenska Akademien att akademien inte hade fått sina stadgar fastställda av Kungl. Maj:t enligt 1809 års regeringsform utan av Konungen enligt 1772 års regeringsform, samt att man inte uppfattade att SA fullgjorde några statliga myndighetsfunktioner. Så hade dock inte alltid varit fallet: bland annat fungerade Svenska Akademien under en period som styrelse för Kungliga Dramatiska Teatern och hade fram till början av 1900-talet som uppgift att utdela statliga författarstipendier (SOU 2009:16, s. 98; 111).

Omorganisationen av de kulturella akademierna fullbordades genom 1974 års kulturproposition (prop 1974: 28 s. 231). Kungl. Maj:t och, efter införandet av 1974 års regeringsform, regeringen fortsatte dock att godkänna de kungliga akademiernas stadgar. I propositionen angavs att akademierna hade "betydelsefulla uppgifter för att fritt och obundet främja utvecklingen inom resp. sektor" men att man inte avsåg att presentera generella förslag: "Sådana frågor får aktualiseras allt eftersom särskilda förslag som berör deras verksamhet läggs fram." (ibid: s. 484) Exempelvis fastställdes Kungliga Vetenskapsakademiens stadgar av regeringen senast år 2006.

Eventuellt kan detta sammanhålla med den bevekelsegrund som Vitterhetsakademien angav i sitt remissvar på SOU 1972:66): "Vitterhetsakademien framhåller att akademien även i framtiden kommer att vara i behov av den speciella offentlighetsrättsliga ställning akademien erhållit genom att dess stadgar är fastställda av Kungl. Maj:t." (prop 1974:28, s. 236). Här framstår det alltså som att det är själva den offentliga sanktionen i form av kunglig stadfästelse av stadgarna som ger den offentlighetsrättsliga ställningen. Varför Vitterhetsakademien önskade behålla denna ställning framgår inte av sammanfattningen av remissvaret. Kanske hade det att göra med skattetekniska skäl, vilket jag återkommer till nedan.

När Konstakademien år 2010 informerade regeringen om att stadgarna behövde uppdateras, lär den ha fått svaret att akademien själva bör svara för beslut om sina stadgar och införde en paragraf med den lydelsen (muntlig uppgift 180508 från Olof Granath, dåvarande ständig sekreterare för Konstakademien).

Av detta kan man få uppfattningen att de kungliga akademierna numera anses vara helt privata organisationer. Uppfattningen stärks av ett uttalande i prop. 2008/09:154 om kårobligatoriets avskaffande:

De offentliga organ som enligt regeringsformen finns, vid sidan av de beslutande församlingarna, är myndigheter. Myndigheter är regeringen, domstolarna och förvaltningsmyndigheterna. Enligt 11 kap. 6 § regeringsformen lyder de statliga förvaltningsmyndigheterna som huvudregel under regeringen. Organ som är organiserade privaträttsligt är inte offentliga organ, även om de i vissa fall kan ha ålagts offentliga uppgifter. Regeringsformen skiljer alltså mellan offentliga organ och privaträttsliga sådana. Några "blandade" organ finns inte enligt regeringsformens definitioner.⁴ (prop. 2008/09:154 s. 18)

Mot detta talar att akademierna inte är ideella föreningar, stiftelser, aktiebolag, eller någon annan etablerad privaträttslig organisationsform (jfr Schultz 2018). De följer inte de regler och lagar som är förknippade med dessa. Det är bland annat därför som de saknar redovisningsskyldighet. I SCB:s register listas de som "offentliga korporationer och anstalter". I denna kategori ingår även bland annat hushållningssällskap, Advokatsamfundet, och några andra organisationer med lång historia och i vissa fall uppgifter av offentlig karaktär. Intrycket av "blandform" styrks av att de kungliga akademierna ingår i en katalog av organisationer som är befriade från inkomstskatt (SFS 1999:1229 7 kap 17§). I ett förtydligande från Skatteverket framgår att "det torde krävas att den har någon form av offentlig sanktion från samhället för att uppfylla kraven i inkomstskattelagens mening (prop. 1942:134 s. 48). Att bara kalla sig för akademi medför inga skatteprivilegier." (Skatteverket 2018). Kanske är det denna offentliga sanktion som föranledde Vitterhetsakademien i det ovan refererade remissvaret att begära att Kungl. Maj:t även i fortsättningen skulle godkänna dess stadgar.

Till detta kommer även andra åldriga privilegier. Svenska Akademien har som bekant ett kungligt uppdrag att utarbeta en svensk ordbok, med vilket man har sysselsatt sig under drygt 230 år. I skrivande stund har man kommit till ordet "vret" (SAOB.se). Arbetet finansieras med hjälp av ett kungligt privilegium som ger akademien utgivningsrätten på Post- och Inrikes Tidningar, som är Sveriges officiella tidning och där bland annat information om konkurser måste publiceras. Utgivningen är numera genom avtal utlagd på Bolagsverket, som kompenserar akademien med ca 14 miljoner kronor årligen (prop. 2005/06:96).

Trots den anomali i den svenska organisationsfloran som Svenska Akademien utgör, och trots regeringens uttalande i kårobligatoriepropositionen,

4 Paradoxalt nog skulle en konsekvent tillämpning av denna tolkning leda till att Hovet måste betraktas som en privaträttslig organisation, eftersom Kungliga Hovstaterna inte är en myndighet, en domstol eller en beslutande församling. Detta var förmodligen inte grundlagsfädernas avsikt.

måste man nog ändå påstå att Svenska Akademien är en kunglig akademi, och att de kungliga akademierna är en sorts förvaltningsrelikter grundade av statsmakten för att fullgöra offentliga uppgifter med en långt gången frihet, och att de trots 1900-talets förvaltningspolitiska reformer inte kan ses som helt privaträttsliga organisationer utan har en tydlig koppling till staten.

Får kungen ändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar?

När vi nu kommer till frågan om vem som har rätten att ändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar kan vi alltså konstatera att akademien grundades genom ett kungligt beslut år 1786 som ett led i Gustav III:s strävanden att inrätta en struktur för den statliga kultur- och forskningspolitiken. Regeringen fann inte någon anledning att ändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar i samband med reformerna på 1900-talet eftersom man redan hade fråntagit akademien alla offentliga förvaltningsuppgifter (uppenbarligen betraktades inte ordboksarbetet som en sådan). Däremot hade ansvaret för samtliga övriga akademier övergått från kungen personligen genom 1809 års regeringsform till Kungl. Maj:t och därefter genom 1974 års regeringsform till regeringen.

Detta är en självklarhet: i övergångsbestämmelserna till den nu gällande regeringsformen framgår att "Bestämmelser i äldre lag eller annan författning om Konungen eller Kungl. Maj:t skall gälla regeringen, såvida det icke följer av författning eller i övrigt framgår av omständigheterna att konungen personligen, Högsta domstolen, Regeringsrätten eller kammarrätt åsyftas." (SFS 1974:152).

Av övergångsbestämmelserna (RF öb 1974 6p) framgår också att äldre författningar som inte meddelats enligt lag äger fortsatt giltighet. Som Strömberg (1989: 53) uttrycker det: "Dessa övergångsbestämmelser har bevarat giltigheten hos talrika av Kungl. Maj:t beslutade förordningar, kungörelser, reglementen, stadgor osv, som gäller ämnen vilka numera faller inom lagområdet. Sådana författningar behåller sin giltighet tills vidare, trots att de numera skulle ha beslutats i form av lag eller med stöd av bemyndigande i lag."

Hade Svenska Akademiens stadgar ändrats någon gång under 1800- eller 1900-talen hade det således varit uppenbart att stadgarna idag hade varit regeringens ansvar. Med tanke på regeringens inställning till de kungliga akademierna sedan 2010 hade en framställan från Svenska Akademien om att ändra sina stadgar eventuellt resulterat i att regeringen hade informerat om att akademien själv kunde ändra sina stadgar. Om den hade varit förmögen att göra detta under sitt nuvarande tillstånd är svårt att säga.

Att kungen hävdar att det är han och ingen annan som kan ändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar framstår alltså som häpnadsväckande. Argumentationen som har framförts från hovets sida kan sammanfattas med följande intervjuat i tidskriften Dagens Juridik från Fredrik Wersäll:

Vår analys är att när Gustaf III inrättade Svenska Akademien 1786 så var det en förlängning av kungamakten som den såg ut på den tiden, säger Fredrik Wersäll, till Dagens Juridiks systerpublikation *Legally Yours*.

– Han gav sig själv och sina efterträdare inflytande över Akademien genom att han ställde sig själv som dess beskyddare och bland annat behöll rätten att säga nej till inval av ledamöter.

– Däremot står det ingenting i stadgarna om formerna för att ändra dem. Det tolkar både jag och Johan [Hirschfeldt] som att avsikten i vart fall inte var att ge akademien själv möjlighet att ändra stadgarna. Och om det inte var kungen som skulle ha den möjligheten, vem skulle det då vara?

– Jag kan inte se att de finns någon åtgärd sedan 1786 som skulle inneburi att regeringen skulle ha fått den här makten – det har den heller aldrig gjort anspråk på. Det inflytande som kungen hade 1786 i det här avseendet, det bör kungen fortfarande ha kvar. (Dagens Juridik 2018)

Argumentet att inrättandet av Svenska Akademien var en ”förlängning av kungamakten” har berörts ovan. Gustav III var enväldig kung 1786 och inrättade akademien i egenskap av regent, en uppgift som övertagits av regeringen. Svenska Akademien gavs en officiell funktion i samhället med stor självständighet och var inte avsedd att vara monarkens privata lekstuga, även om kungar fram till åtminstone Oscar II flitigt använde sin rätt att påverka invalet av ledamöter (uppgift i *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon*, artikel om Oscar II). Att, som Wersäll argumenterar, kungen gav sig själv och sina efterträdare makten över Akademien kan inte tillmätas någon större betydelse, eftersom Gustaf III även gav sig själv och sina efterträdare makten över regeringsmakten som helhet i samband med statskuppen 1772, vilket ju efterföljande konstitutionella reformer framgångsrikt har undanröjt.

Om man ska försöka tolka Wersälls argument skulle alltså beslut som fattats före 1809 och därefter inte ändrats av Kungl. Maj:t utgöra en sorts tidskapslar från enväldet som det demokratiska samhället inte rör på. Även om man kan tycka att lösningen med kungens ingripande i fallet med Svenska Akademien är en praktisk och snabb lösning som tycks respekteras av samtliga parter, inklusive regeringen, är detta en exempellös utvidgning av kungamakten under den gällande regeringsformen.

Wersäll anger dessutom som ett argument att kungen är akademiens beskyddare. Att stå under kungligt beskyddarskap betyder dock inte kompetens att ändra organisationers stadgar. Som sagts tidigare är kungen beskyddare för de övriga 17 kungliga akademierna samtidigt som regeringen eller akademierna själva uppenbarligen har mandat att ändra sina stadgar. Kungen är även beskyddare för bland annat AIK och Orphei Drängar.

I en välskriven artikel i Dagens Juridik ger tingsfiskalen vid Uppsala tingsrätt Daniel Bergström mer detaljerade argument för kungens kompetens i denna fråga (Bergström 2018). Han anför att regeringsformen inte innehåller något förbud för kungen att utöva makt i andra sammanhang än de som tydligt har överförts från Kungl. Maj:t till regeringen, dvs vad gäller styret av myndigheter eller normgivningsmakten. Som exempel anføres Kungliga Hovstaterna, som inte är en myndighet och som kungen bestämmer över självständigt trots att verksamheten är skattefinansierad. Bergström menar att de kungliga akademierna är knutna till kungen som person, som konung eller "monark", och inte som statschef.

Bergström gör därvid misstaget att han omnämner de kungliga akademierna i klump: som tidigare visats är det regeringen som råder över de andra akademierna och inte kungen. Svenska Akademien utgör ett särfall på grund av sin speciella historik. Vad än kungens förhållande till de andra akademierna kan vara, vore det alltså ett annat förhållande som han tänks ha till just Svenska Akademien. Även här är det alltså tidskapselargumentet som skymtar fram: alla kungens gamla rättigheter och privilegier som inte uttryckligen övergått till regeringen genom 1974 års regeringsform skulle kvarstå. Om detta tidskapselargument ska anses vara giltigt kan man med viss bävan spekulera i vad som kommer att hända nästa gång någon kammarherre kommer och viftar med ett papper med Gustav III:s eller Karl XII:s namn på.

Påståendet att kungen och ingen annan kan ändra akademiens stadgar kan för övrigt enkelt prövas genom att föreställa sig att Sverige hade blivit en republik under 1970-talet och att en svensk monark således inte hade funnits tillgänglig i den nu uppkomna situationen. Frågan är då om verkligen Gustav III:s döda händer hade dragit ner Svenska Akademien i graven eller om man kanske ändå inte hade ansett att frågan låg i den hypotetiskt republikanska statsledningens händer. Man kan jämföra med Svenska Akademiens förebild, Franska Akademien, där samtliga de befogenheter som enligt stadgarna tillkommer kungen numera har övergått till republikens president (Statuts de l'Académie Française (1816), Art. 17).

Hur hanteras en monark?

Kungens befogenheter bestäms av lag och konstitutionell praxis (Sterzel 1998). Jag har här gett uttryck för uppfattningen att konstitutionell praxis i detta fall innebär att regeringen har den relevanta beslutskompetensen. Det har helt enkelt inte förekommit tidigare att kungen som person snarare än som regent har tagit beslut om organisationer av den typ som akademierna tillhör. Tidskapselargumentet saknar giltighet: avsikten med 1809 och 1974 års regeringsformer var inte att låta små reservat av personligt envælde finnas kvar. Monarken saknar normgivningsmakt: den tillkommer endast riksdag och regering (Strömberg 1989: 30).

Men den uppkomna situationen pekar på ett ytterligare problem: när kungen skriker in finns det ingen som kan stoppa honom. I sin intressanta uppsats om statschefens ställning i 1974 års regeringsform pekar Fredrik Sterzel (1998) på att regeringen saknar normgivningsmakt gentemot kungen: det är därför som regeringen inte kan begära en redovisning av vad hovet använder apanaget till. I föreliggande fall hade regeringen inte kunnat komma med kontraorder och krävt att kungen skulle ta tillbaka sitt uttalande om Svenska Akademien.

Hade riksdagen kunnat göra något? Fredrik Sterzel uttryckte för egen del stor tveksamhet och ansåg att riksdagen i så fall först måste besluta om en grundlagsändring för att ge sig själv befogenhet att lagstifta mot kungen. ”Det förefaller riktigtast att hävda, att riksdagen saknar befogenhet att då tillgripa lagstiftning, men samtidigt upprepa författningsutredningens ord i ett annat sammanhang: Det tjänar knappast något syfte att spekulera över vilka situationer som här teoretiskt kan tänkas uppstå” (ibid.: 75f).

Jag har i denna text spekulerat över en situation som uppstått rent praktiskt. Händelseutvecklingen verkar antyda att den svenska monarkin inte är fullt så avlövad som vi har trott. Om detta innebär ett prejudikat för en kungamakt som på eget bevåg utökar sina befogenheter, kanske med hjälp av tidskapselargumentet, är det en potentiellt sett riskabel väg framåt. För att värna 1974 års regeringsforms portalparagraf bör i så fall kungens befogenheter begränsas ytterligare lagstiftningsvägen. I sista hand återstår annars alltid republikhotet.

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Svenska Akademien som en blandning av gammalt och nytt

Jakob Heidbrink

Inledning

Innan jag kommenterar argumenten från Gustafsson och Wenander & Sunnqvist bör jag klargöra vad jag här menar med begreppet *offentligrättsliga korporationer*. Begreppet är helt tydligt bildat i anslutning till det tyska begreppet *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*, och kärnan i detta begrepp är att det ska röra sig om en association av personer på grundval av stadgar över vilka dessa personer inte själva disponerar. Stadgarna ska vidare ha emanerat från den offentliga sfären. I det tyska sammanhanget är exempelvis universiteten ännu sådana *Köperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts*, sådana *offentligrättsliga korporationer*.

En offentligrättslig korporation agerar alltså självständigt på grundval av stadgar som det allmänna eller någon annan offentlig part givit den. Det innebär att konstruktionen omsluter både offentlig och privat rätt: själva stadgarna är offentligrättsliga, medan verksamheten genom korporationens medlemmar bedrivs så att säga privat, alltså enligt eget skön. Detta utesluter i och för sig inte att verksamheten som utövas i sin tur kan vara reglerad: när allt kommer omkring, är också en näringsidkares handlande i förhållande till konsumenter offentligrättsligt reglerat, utan att vi för den skull påstår att näringsidkaren agerar offentligrättsligt.

Alltså sammanfattningsvis: när jag här talar om en *offentligrättslig korporation*, talar jag om en sammanslutning av personer (vars närmare sammansättning självfallet kan växla över tid) på grundval av stadgar som härrör från den offentliga sfären och över vilka stadgar medlemmarna (eller ledamöterna, om man föredrar det begreppet) inte disponerar. Däremot agerar korporationen på det sätt vilket medlemmarna på grundval av stadgarna bestämmer. Detta agerande kan i sin tur vara påverkat av rättsliga normer, som dock då normalt följer av generell lag.

En boskillnad mellan offentlig och privat rätt?

Henrik Wenander och Martin Sunnqvist menar i sitt bidrag att nuvarande regeringsform utgår från en strikt boskillnad mellan offentlig och privat rätt. Håkan Strömberg, ett av den svenska offentliga rättens stora namn under 1900-talet, har framfört samma synsätt (Strömberg 1985: 49). Läger man en sådan boskillnad till grund för betraktelsesättet, är förstas företeelser som *offentligrättsliga korporationer* inte möjliga: offentligrättsliga korporationer utgör ju figurer som *både* tillhör den offentliga och den privata rätten. Privata medlemmar i en sådan korporation får basen för sitt gemensamma agerande i en offentligrättslig akt över vilken de inte disponerar. Strömberg konstaterar också lakoniskt: ”I nya RF:s begreppsschema finns inte utrymme för andra offentligrättsliga juridiska personer än staten och kommunerna” (Strömberg 1985: 56). Jag noterar detta med viss förvåning: vart har den skandinaviska rättsrealismen tagit vägen? Var finns inställningen att positiva rättsregler går före teoretiska konstruktioner? Från Georg Jellinek i Tyskland till Stig Jägerskiöld i Sverige har mera realistiskt inriktade jurister undersökt boskillnaden mellan offentlig och privat rätt och förklarat att någon sådan inte finns. Även Håkan Strömberg själv skriver i sin nyss citerade skrift att: ”[m]an kan fråga sig om denna skarpa gränsdragning överensstämmer med rättsordningen sådan den faktiskt gestaltar sig, eller om det är en konstruktion som inte ger rättvisa åt rättsordningens irrationella drag” (Strömberg 1985: 49). Oavsett vilka former det kan finnas enligt den föreställningsvärld som ligger till grund för regeringsformen, måste man konstatera att det bortom den strikta statsrätten inte finns någon klar gräns mellan offentlig och privat rätt. I sin i skrivande stund månadsgamla dom i mål T 2196-17 mellan Mälardalens högskola och en amerikansk student hade Högsta domstolen inga problem att inom den offentligrättsligt präglade utbildningsrätten ge en betalande student rätt till prisavdrag med två tredjedelar när utbildningen befunnits vara undermålig: Högsta domstolen tillämpade utan bekymmer en privaträttslig sanktion i en offentligrättslig kontext. Domstolen gjorde detta på ett sätt som närmast förefaller betrakta den offentliga rätten som ett slags *lex specialis*, som ett undantag från den eljest gällande privata rätten.¹

Högsta domstolens nyss omtalade dom står heller inte ensam, utan har föregångare i båda domstolsslagen sedan åtminstone 1982 (RÅ 1982 2:62).² Det finns mål om betalning, om utbildningssektorn och om vård där den sista instansens avgörande vilar på en blandning av privat och offentligt. Mot den bakgrunden verkar det i mina ögon vara fullständigt främmande att med våld försöka pressa in äldre, ännu kvarvarande företeelser i antingen den offentligrättsliga

1 Jfr min kommentar till domen, som i skrivande stund är under publicering och antagligen kommer att tryckas som Jakob Heidbrink, *Ett avtal i gränslandet mellan offentlig och privat rätt*, JT 2018/19 nr 1 s. 134 och tills vidare går att läsa på adressen http://www.jt.se/media/net/net_rattsfall_heidbrink.pdf.

2 Jfr om gränsdragningsproblemen under den gamla regeringsformen från 1809 också Stig Jägerskiölds *Om allmän förvaltningsrätt* (Jägerskiöld 1958).

eller den privata kategorin. 1974 års regeringsform till trots finns enligt min mening ingen som helst anledning att blunda för relevanta rättsliga drag när ett juridiskt fenomen ska klassificeras. Jag är helt beredd att acceptera att företeelser som har sitt ursprung i tiden före 1974 inte går att pressa in under regeringsformens rigida kategorisering.³

Rättsteori: en bekännelse

Till min syn att det visst kan finnas (kvar) företeelser som ligger tvärs över den stipulerade gränsen mellan offentlig och privat rätt bidrar också en allmän teoretisk hållning, nämligen den som tidigare kallades för *rättsgenetisk* och numera med en kanske mera rumsren term kan kallas för *rättsevolutionär*. Mycket kort uttryckt går denna hållning ut på att vi inte kan frigöra oss från historien. Historien är med oss, alldeles oavsett hur mycket vi försöker skaka av oss dess damm. Det innebär att det nya enligt min mening inte kan göra anspråk på att rättvisande kategorisera allt som föregått det: regeringsformens kategorisering kan inte göra anspråk på att passa hela historien. När vi tvingas hantera mycket gamla fenomen som Svenska Akademien är 1974 års regeringsform helt enkelt ingen särskilt lämplig måttstock. Också i nuet måste vi först söka förstå den föreställningsvärld i vilken Svenska Akademien tillkom, alltså historien. Om vi upplever att resultatet av ett sådant sätt att betrakta det gamla blir stötande, kan vi sedan göra något åt det: vi är inte de dödas slavar, men de döda är med oss.

Jag är helt medveten om att detta låter som en juridisk-teoretisk motsvarighet till den politiska konservatismen i den form som Edmund Burke formulerade den: "a partnership not only between those who are *living*, but between those who are *living*, those who are *dead*, and those who are to be born." Det är måhända olyckligt, dels för att jag själv inte uppfattar mig som särskilt konservativ, dels för att det kan tänkas provocera någon som annars kanske skulle lyssna till att stänga sina sinnen för ett rättsevolutionärt synsätt. Men på samma sätt som en modern människas matsmältning inte utan vidare kan hantera stora mängder protein- och kaloririk mat eftersom vår biologi bär på det förflutnas livsvillkor kan inte heller juridiska fenomen förstås endast med moderniteten framför ögonen. Juridiska institut utvecklas och anpassas till nya förhållanden, och en fullständig förståelse kräver att man följer reglernas utveckling över tid.

Man kan också notera att även 1974 års regeringsform numera är snart ett halvsekel gammal. Den som insisterar på att lösa alla rättsliga problem som möter oss idag med regeringsformens numera gamla föreställningsvärld, och

3 En annan sak kan, men behöver inte, gälla avseende företeelser som har sin grund i tiden efter 1974. Även här torde dock den berömda nordiska pragmatism – som inte alltför sällan liknar principlöshet – kunna bjuda på överraskningar. Lagstiftaren är inte känd för att bry sig om teoretiska kategorier.

det dessutom enligt en ganska bokstavlig tolkning av grundlagen, kan dels också betecknas som *konservativ*, även om de normer som då försvaras är yngre än de normer som måhända gällde när Svenska Akademien grundades, och tycks dels förespråka en bokstavlig och oföränderlig tolkning av regeringsformen på samma sätt som dem som förespråkar en *literal interpretation* av den amerikanska konstitutionen. Saker och ting ändras, och även om regeringsformen skulle ha skrivits med en föreställning om att allt måste antingen vara privat eller offentligt, utan mellanformer, finns inget som hindrar oss att hantera materialet på ett annat sätt idag än man kanske hade gjort 1974.

Försöken att kategorisera Svenska Akademien

Nils Gustafsson argumenterar i sitt bidrag med åtskillig styrka för att rätten att ändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar tillkommer regeringen. Hans argumentation vilar dock åtminstone till viss del på att Svenska Akademien, på samma sätt som andra akademier, kan anses ha myndighetsliknande karaktär. Frågan är då vad man menar med *myndighetsliknande*. Veterligen har alla försök att juridiskt avgränsa vad som är en myndighet slagit fel, och är juridiken närmast hjälplös när definitioner i detta avseende ska tas fram. Det är lite som Potter Stewarts berömda uttalande om pornografi i målet *Jacobellis v. Ohio* 378 U.S. 184 (1964):

I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.

Att fråga huruvida Svenska Akademien är "myndighetsliknande" ser alltså inte ut att vara särskilt lovande, åtminstone inte om man ska försöka arbeta med intellektuellt försvarbara kategorier. Försöket att med skohorn stoppa in Akademien i kategorin stiftelse eller privat förening är inte mycket bättre.⁴ Hur man än vrider och vänder på problemet, passar Svenska Akademien inte våra numera invanda kategorier, och då kanske måste man göra det obekväma och acceptera att Akademien inte omfattas av dessa kategorier, utan utgör något annat, något som man inom det svenska juridiska samfundet inte trodde längre fanns, nämligen just en offentlighetslig korporation.⁵

4 Också Nils Gustafsson avvisar ju den tanken.

5 Även Carl Hemström antyder en liknande tanke i ett promemoria från april 2001 som jag fick i samband med seminariet vid vilket detta och andra bidrag har sitt ursprung (Hemström 2001). På s. 4 i promemorian skriver han: "Sammanfattningsvis skulle således de lärda samfunden kunna tänkas vara föreningar eller stiftelser eller offentlighetsliga organisationer *sui generis*. [...] För offentlighetsliga organisationer *sui generis* saknas likaledes generella normer men man synes, då så behövs, i hög utsträckning kunna hämta ledning i näraliggande civilrättsliga modeller såsom föreningar eller eventuellt stiftelser." Sedan utgår Hemström i resten av sin text "som hypotes" ifrån att sådana samfund "om inte särskilda skäl talar

Konstitutionell praxis i vardande

Alldeles oavsett hur man ser på historien, på regeringsformen och hur det "egentligen" borde vara, är ett faktum att statschefen nu på eget bevåg ändrat stadgarna, och att den politiska sfären varit helt tyst om detta. Inte ens från de politiska partierna, än mindre från riksdag eller regering, har det hörts någon som helst protest. Statschefen har åtminstone *tagit* sig en rätt som han kanske inte borde ha haft, men som han nu utan protester utövat.

Till en del har detta säkerligen med tiden att göra: det är valår, och frågan om Svenska Akademien synnerligen mångfacetterad och svår. Det hela liknar en halvrutten och synnerligen het potatis, där en politiker som måste ta hänsyn till olika gruppers meningar och övertygelser riskerar att bränna sig ordentligt när han eller hon försöker ta tag i den. Jag är därför helt övertygad om att statschefens agerande informellt hade förankrats hos ledande politiker. Jag kan också närmast höra en lättnadens suck från Helgeandsholmen.

Frågan är förstas vad detta betyder för Torekovskompromissen och för den svenska konstitutionen. Vad gäller den förra, vill jag notera att den kompromissen i huvudsak är politisk. Den utgör förvisso bakgrunden till nuvarande regeringsform, som bara kan förstås mot bakgrund av kompromissen. Själva kompromissen och de därav följande mera detaljerade reglerna för statschefens beteende i den offentliga sfären är dock inte lagfästa. Formellt sett har statschefen yttrandefrihet i alla frågor på samma sätt som vilken svensk som helst, bland annat, även om i kompromissen ingick att statschefen inte skulle yttra sig i känsliga frågor.⁶ Torekovskompromissen utgör förvisso konstitutionell *praxis*, men inte konstitutionell *lag*. Det fina – eller besvärliga – med *praxis* är att denna kan ändras. Alldeles oavsett vad som följer av Torekovskompromissen, och alldeles oavsett i vad mån Akademiens stadgar "egentligen" hade bort ändras av regeringen, har stadgarna nu ändrats av statschefen utan att någon annan relevant aktör protesterat.

I mina ögon utgör detta en ny form av konstitutionell *praxis*. Kungen har *de facto* normgivningsmakt åtminstone med avseende på Svenska Akademien. Vad detta sedan betyder för de övriga bärande elementen i Torekovskompromissen, får framtiden utvisa. Det är mycket möjligt att politiskt besvärliga problem i den mera perifera sektorn som kulturen nu kan få en lösning genom att statschefen uppmanas agera, eller genom att den helt enkelt agerar: det finns ju nu ett precedensfall att plocka fram om och när en liknande situation uppstår. Kanske kan också i skandalens följd statschefen få ett åtminstone begränsat utrymme att yttra sig i politiskt känsliga frågor. Det får framtiden utvisa.

i annan riktning" är privaträttsliga organisationer, men detta är alltså enbart en hypotes: Hemström tog inte klart ställning i frågan.

6 Till förebyggande av missförstånd vill jag påpeka att jag är stolt (om än enbart betalande) medlem i Republikanska föreningen. Mitt resonemang här är alltså inte resultatet av en monarkistisk grundhållning, utan enbart av en juridisk analys av situationen såsom den nu ter sig för mig.

Men att argumentera med ett "egentligen" är nu för sent. Nu ligger landet som det ligger.

Man kan också undra vad de som nu ännu protesterar tänker sig åstadkomma. Vad skulle hända om nu någon med behörighet därtill skulle konstatera att statschefens agerande saknar juridiskt bindande verkan (hur det nu skulle gå till)? Ska de ledamöter som nu med slutlig verkan avgått återinsättas? Är alla beslut som Akademien framgent fattar ogiltiga till dess den uppfattade ordningen är återställd? Det kan väl knappast heller vara rationellt. Striden om vem som har makten att förändra Svenska Akademiens stadgar har enligt min mening avgjorts, och statschefen har vunnit.

Men frågorna är fortsatt många, och som jag försökt visa, sträcker de sig bortom Svenska Akademien. Kanske är det svenska samhället inte ens i sin juridiska dimension så genommodernt och rationellt som svenskar gärna får för sig. Kanske är också vårt ett samhälle som bär på en hel del bråte och minnesföremål från forna tider.

Jag skulle inte vara överraskad om det visade sig vara så.

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7 Vi vill tacka f.d. kammarrättspresidenten Nils-Olof Wentz som tillhandahållit oss denna promemoria.

Statsvetenskapliga förbundet

Förbundsredaktör: Katarina Roos

Jämställdhetsperspektiv på statsvetenskaplig forskning

I det föregående numret ägnades förbunds-sidorna åt Statsvetenskapliga förbundets jämställdhetskartläggning. Syftet med texten i föregående nummer var att sammanfatta och kommentera några av huvudresultaten för att på så sätt väcka intresse och förhoppningsvis bidra till en ökad spridning av resultaten. Tanken var att det skulle bli en sammanfattande text på förbundssidorna. Rapporten är dock rik på resultat och därför används några av dessa som utgångspunkt även i detta nummer av *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*.

I föregående nummer sammanfattades rapportens huvudresultat med avseende på könsfördelningen inom ämnet, över tid, inom och mellan tjänstekategorier samt inom och mellan institutioner och miljöer vid olika lärosäten. Även om det fortfarande finns skevheter har könsfördelningen över tid ändrats i önskvärd riktning. Men det har gått långsamt och det finns också tecken på att utvecklingen har stannat av. Ökningen av kvinnor i ämnet har framförallt skett underifrån, genom att fler kvinnor kommit in i via forskarutbildningen. Därför är det oroväckande att 27 procent av de kvinnor som disputerade i statsvetenskap under den undersökta tidsperioden 2010–2015 hade lämnat akademien vid tidpunkten för kartläggningen. Motsvarande siffra för män var 21 procent.

Det tema som står i fokus denna gång är jämställdhet i relation till forskning. Först sammanfattas några av huvudresultaten från jämställdhetskartläggningen som rör forskningsfinansiering. Därefter beskrivs ett pågående arbete i en av våra systerorganisationer som rör könsmonster i vetenskaplig publicering.

MERITERING OCH MEDEL

I förbundets jämställdhetskartläggning redovisas andelen forskning som finansieras av externa forskningsmedel bland män och kvinnor i olika tjänstekategorier. Externa medel är en typ av forskningsfinansiering som på goda grunder kan kallas ”finpengar” eftersom de erhålls i hård konkurrens från något av forskningsråden. Som bekant är beviljandegraden låg och ansökningarna är, liksom de goda idéerna, många. Att passera det nålsöga som beredningsprocesserna vanligtvis innebär, betraktas därför som mycket meriterande. Finansieringen kan lägga grunden för den framtida forskningskarriären för mer juniora forskare och är en viktig parameter i karriärutvecklingen för mer seniora forskare. Tjänstekategorin meriteringstjänster är särskilt viktig eftersom de i någon mån berättar något om det framtida jämställdhetsläget inom ämnet. Många i kategorin är sannolikt relativt nydisputerade.

I de två tjänstekategorierna som är i huvudsak forskningsförberedande, forskar (totalt 40 personer) och postdoctjänster (totalt 25 personer) har majoriteten, oavsett kön, extern forskningsfinansiering. Endast omkring en tredjedel finansieras av andra typer av medel. Om vi slår ihop de två tjänstekategorierna är könsfördelningen i det närmaste jämn men männen har externa forskningsmedel i något högre utsträckning (79 procent) än kvinnorna (75 procent). Inom tjänstekategorierna finns intressanta skillnader. Kvinnor utgör en majoritet av de som innehar forskartjänster. Fastän männen är färre till antalet har de högre grad av externfinansiering än sina kvinnliga kollegor. Postdoctjänsterna är färre till antalet än forskartjänsterna. Bara en

tredjedel av postdoktorerna är kvinnor. Männen är både fler och har i högre utsträckning än kvinnorna, extern forskningsfinansiering. Grundorsaken till den skeva fördelningen faller emellertid tillbaka på den ojämna könsfördelningen. I kategorin biträdande lektor är könsfördelningen i det närmaste jämn. Det är en högre andel av kvinnorna i gruppen som har externa medel i jämförelse med männen i samma grupp men eftersom det är en så liten grupp förefaller skillnaderna större än vad de faktiskt är. Det stora flertalet av de anställda är lektorer. I förbundets kartläggning särredovisas visstidsanställda, tillsvidareanställda och lektorer som är docenter. Mönstret är dock detsamma i samtliga tre kategorier. Omkring 38 procent av kvinnorna som är anställda som lektorer har externa forskningsmedel medan motsvarande siffra för männen är 29 procent. 32 procent av de kvinnliga professorerna och 29 procent av de manliga har externa medel. Omkring en tredjedel av befordrade professorer har externa medel, både bland männen och kvinnorna. I gruppen professorer som erhållit tjänst i konkurrens är andelen med externfinansiering högre bland kvinnorna än bland männen. Det är emellertid så få kvinnor i den här kategorin, att en person motsvarar en stor procentuell förändring.

En annan aspekt på jämställdhet i relation till forskning är roll i forskningsprojekt. Kartläggningen visar att en något högre andel av kvinnorna är ledare för forskningsprojekt. En något högre andel av männen deltar som medverkande i forskningsprojekt. Det ska dock inte felaktigt tolkas som att *fler* statsvetenskapliga forskningsprojekt leds av kvinnor än män. Resultaten i kartläggningen tyder inte på att kvinnor missgynnas systematiskt i ansökningsprocessen. Tendensen förefaller vara att kvinnor på mer seniora positioner har högre andel externfinansierad forskning än sina manliga kollegor. De får så att säga

vila på egna lagrar. För meriteringstjänster är mönstret emellertid det motsatta, då andelen med extern finansiering är högre bland männen än bland kvinnorna. Det är rimligt att anta att huvudsökande i projekt ofta är mer seniora och att personer på meriteringstjänster ofta rekryteras till projekt, snarare än att de själva är huvudsökande även om det också förekommer. Sammantaget kan dessa resultat tolkas som att kvinnliga seniora forskare i högre utsträckning måste finansiera sin forskning på egen hand, medan framförallt män som befinner sig i sin tidiga forskningskarriär, tenderar att rekryteras in i forskargrupper av andra mer seniora kollegor.

PUBLISH OR PERISH

Vi lämnar förbundets jämställdhetskartläggning för ett ögonblick och gör en utblick mot ett pågående arbete i en av våra stora systerorganisationer, the American Political Science Association. The APSA Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession samlar kontinuerligt in data för att utvärdera kvinnors situation och karriärmöjligheter inom professionen. Kommitténs arbete och projekt som är knutna till kommittén finns beskrivna på deras hemsida, <http://web.apsa-net.org/cswp/>, där också viss data finns tillgänglig. Professor Jane Mansbridge har bland annat sammanställt ett material under namnet "Graphs that will make you gasp" som ger illustrativa exempel på hur såväl livsvillkor som akademiska villkor skiljer sig åt mellan män och kvinnor. För den som söker undervisningsmaterial är detta en rik källa att ösa ur.

I APSA:s egen tidskrift *PS, Political Science and Politics*, har ett antal artiklar publicerats under temat "Gender in the Journals", i vilka publiceringsmönster med avseende på kön systematiskt granskats. I aprilnumret från föregående år publicerades en artikel i vilken Teele och Thelen (2017) granskat

publiceringsmönster i tio av de mest prestigefulla statsvetenskapliga tidskrifterna.¹ De har undersökt närmare 8 000 artiklar systematiskt under en tidsperiod från 1999 till 2015 ur ett jämställdhetsperspektiv. Att bli publicerad i någon av dessa tidskrifter är mycket prestigefullt. Forskning som publiceras här betraktas per definition som forskning av hög kvalitet. Teele och Thelens resultat är nedslående läsning. Ett genomsnitt för andelen kvinnor bland författarna har beräknats över hela den aktuella tidsperioden. Lägst andel kvinnor bland författarna (18 procent) återfanns i *American Journal of Political Studies*. De övriga tidskrifterna kan delas in i två kategorier. I den ena kategorin utgjorde kvinnor omkring 23 procent av författarna och i den andra kategorin omkring en tredjedel. Siffrorna står inte i paritet med könsfördelningen i yrkeskåren. Kvinnor som grupp är underrepresenterad i samtliga tidskrifter.

Än mer intressant blir det när undersökningseenheten är artikel istället för författare. Teele och Thelen (2017) visar att samförfattade artiklar har blivit allt vanligare i samtliga av de studerade tidskrifterna. Den vanligaste artikelformen är emellertid fortfarande en artikel författad av en man. Även om andelen har minskat över tid utgör de fortfarande omkring 40 procent av artiklarna i de tio undersökta tidskrifterna. Bakom den näst vanligaste typen av artiklar finns en författarkonstellation bestående av enbart manliga forskare. Dessa utgör omkring en femtedel av det totala antalet artiklar. Författarteam där både män och kvinnor ingår utgör cirka 15 procent av artiklarna. Ensamförfattade artiklar av kvinnor utgör omkring 17 procent av artiklarna. Artiklar författade av en forskargrupp bestående av enbart kvinnor utgör endast omkring 3 procent av det totala antalet. Ökningen av kvinnor bland artikelförfattare över tid, har skett genom att kvinnor i

allt högre grad ingår i forskargrupper tillsammans med män. Andelen artiklar författade av enbart en kvinna eller en grupp av kvinnor har varit relativt stabil över tid. Det ska dock tilläggas att det förekom en betydande variation mellan de enskilda tidskrifterna. Att omkring en femtedel av artiklarna består av författarteam bestående av enbart män, kan tyda på att könsskillnaderna beror på att kvinnor har lägre sannolikhet att inkluderas i forskargrupper som publicerar i topprankade tidskrifter. Det finns därtill forskning från andra ämnen som visar att kvinnors kompetens värderas lägre om flertalet av de artiklar som åberopas vid en anställningsprocess är samförfattade, medan det inte påverkar värderingen av mäns kompetens negativt (Teele & Thelen 2017).

Talesättet, *damned if you do, damned if you don't*, ligger onekligen nära till hands för att beskriva det dilemma som kvinnliga forskare riskerar att hamna i.

Den tredje aspekten som Teele och Thelen (2017) undersöker är könsmonster i relation till metodologisk ansats. Kvinnor är överrepresenterade bland författarna till artiklar som har en kvalitativ ansats, medan de är underrepresenterade bland författarna till artiklar som har en kvantitativ ansats. I fyra av de studerade tidskrifterna publiceras nästan uteslutande artiklar med statistisk analys och i dessa är andelen kvinnliga författare som lägst eller bland de lägsta. I flertalet av de resterande tidskrifterna är huvuddelen av artiklarna kvantitativt orienterade även om en stor andel av artiklarna har en kvalitativ ansats. I enbart två av tidskrifterna utgör forskningsartiklar med kvalitativ ansats majoriteten. Det är också samma tidskrifter som har högst andel kvinnliga författare.

I juli numret av *PS, Political Studies and Politics* i år publicerades ytterligare ett antal artiklar under temat "Gender in the Journals",

1 The American Political Science Review (APSR), Perspectives on Politics (PS), American Journal of Political Science (AJPS), Comparative Politics (CP), Comparative Political Studies (CPS), International Organization (IO), Journal of Conflict Research (JCR), Journal of Politics (JOP), Political Theory (PT) och World Politics (WP).

vilka sökte förklara de mönster som framkom i den föregående artikeln från 2017 (Brown & Samuels 2018). Bland annat gjordes fördjupade analyser av reviewprocesserna i fem av de tio tidskrifterna. Forskarna fann inget stöd för att kvinnor systematiskt skulle missgynnas under reviewprocessen i någon av de studerade tidskrifterna.

I genomgången var *American Political Science Review* den tidskrift som hade lägst andel kvinnliga författare av de tio tidskrifterna. Forskarna analyserade två separata årgångar med fyra års mellanrum, vilket betyder att det var två olika redaktionsråd vid de två undersökta tillfällena. Det visade sig att det var ungefär lika hög andel av de insända artiklarna som blev accepterade för publicering, för såväl män som kvinnor. Refuseringsgraden var lika hög för män som för kvinnor. Skevheten bestod i det totala antalet insända artiklar författade av manliga forskare respektive kvinnliga forskare. Sammantaget var det omkring 360 artiklar som var författade och insända av kvinnor. Antalet artiklar av manliga författare var 1250, vilket är 3,5 gånger så många. Telen och Thele (2017) sökte ett samband mellan metodologisk ansats och publiceringsgrad. Den fördjupade analysen av Breuning et. al. (2018) visade, åtminstone vid de två undersökta tidpunkterna, att kvalitativt inriktade artiklar tvärtom accepterades i något högre utsträckning än vad som kunde förväntas utifrån fördelningen i den totala populationen av artiklar. Forskarna fann att de författare som själva varit reviewers hade en fördel som gav högre sannolikhet att få en artikel accepterad i granskningsprocessen. De kunde se att olika typer av studier, t.ex. komparativa studier hade större chans att accepteras vid det ena tillfället än det andra, men resultatet gick inte att tolka till vare sig mäns eller kvinnors fördel. De fann vidare visst stöd för att forskare knutna till framstående forskningsmiljöer hade högre sannolikhet att få en artikel accepterad för publikation. Dessa framstående forskningsmiljöerna är i hög grad befolkad av män.

Mycket tyder på att det handlar om rekrytering till forskarnätverk, och att män generellt sett har större sannolikhet för att rekryteras till sådana. Författarna avslutar med att konstatera att antalet insända artiklar av kvinnliga forskare hade ökat kraftigt (47 procent) mellan 2010 och 2014 (Breuning et. al., 2018). Något som emellertid inte kommenterades i artikeln var att antalet artiklar författade av manliga forskare ökade också under samma tidsperiod, om än i något lägre omfattning (24 procent).

TILLBAKA TILL SVEDALA OCH TANKAR FÖR FRAMTIDEN

Betydelsen av metodologisk inriktning analyserades även i förbundets jämställdhetskartläggning. Nästan tre fjärdedelar av kvinnorna inom svensk statsvetenskap är huvudsakligen kvalitativt orienterade. Drygt hälften av männen arbetar kvalitativt. Närmare en tredjedel av männen, men bara var femte kvinna, arbetar huvudsakligen med kvantitativa metoder. Mönstret känns igen från Teele och Theles (2017) artikel. Vi kan dock inte med säkerhet veta vad det betyder, vilka konsekvenser det får eftersom sambanden inte är vare sig enkla eller entydiga. I dagens mäta-väga-och-jämföra-samhälle där big data är detsamma som goda förutsättningar för big-money, torde dock forskare som är kvantitativt orienterade ha ett visst försprång. Om målet är jämställdhet, bör vi reflektera över vilka normer som produceras och reproduceras i metodundervisningen i statsvetenskap, både på grund och avancerad nivå och forskarnivå.

Det är tydligt att forskande män i högre utsträckning än forskande kvinnor försöker publicera sig i högt rankade, välrenommerade tidskrifter. Vad beror det på? Är det för att män generellt sett har högre tilltro till sin egen förmåga? Är det för att män generellt sett ingår i stöttande nätverk och i forskningsmiljöer som främjar framgång? Är det för att kvinnor generellt sett befinner sig i mer undervisningsorienterade miljöer? Varför fanns det i de tidigare

refererade studierna, gott om exempel på manshomogena forskarteam som publicerat gemensamma artiklar men nästan inga motsvarigheter med enbart kvinnor? Det är lockande att dra slutsatsen att kvinnor både äger problemet och lösningen. ”Om bara kvinnor vågade, ville och stöttade varandra” att satsa på de mest högrankade tidskrifterna, skulle problemet lösa sig. Eller ”om fler kvinnor arbetade med kvantitativa metoder i statsvetenskap” så kommer vi tids nog att nå jämställdhet. Vid det här laget borde vi veta att utvecklingen inte sker av sig själv och att det inte bara är kvinnor som måste vara medvetna om, och ha beredskap att ändra, normer och handlingsmönster.

Metaforen med det läckande röret brukar användas för att beskriva hur kvinnor successivt sorterar ut under karriärvägen. Att, som nämndes i inledningen, en högre andel av disputerade kvinnorna lämnar akademien är ett sådant exempel. I de granskade reviewprocesserna föreföll rören vara täta. Roten till problemen är dock komplexa och har uppstått långt innan reviewprocessen startar. Det handlar om hur vi gör kvinnor till kvinnor och män till män, inom såväl som utanför professionen. Vi måste vara medvetna om de normer som styr vilka som rekryteras till forskningsgrupper, nätverk, och meriterings-tjänster och på vilka grunder det sker. Vem bedöms som kvalificerad och hur värderar vi olika kompetenser mot varandra? Kön spelar roll i sammanhanget. Vi måste vara beredda på att ifrågasätta både våra egna och kollegors normer och föreställningar. Om målet är

jämställdhet och vi vill eftersträva en förändring vill säga.

Om några veckor är det dags för utdelningen av Nobelpriset. Det brukar vara tätt mellan frackarna på scenen vid prisutdelningen. Mest svåråtkomligt för kvinnliga forskare verkar nobelpriset i fysik vara eftersom endast tre kvinnor, av drygt 200 pristagare, har belönats för sin forskning. Däremot finns det genom historien exempel på kvinnliga forskare som gjort banbrytande upptäckter men som inte belönats med ett nobelpris. Däremot har deras manliga kollegor som tillämplat upptäckterna erhållit det åtråvärda priset. Därför är det extra glädjande att professor Jane Mansbridge tilldelades 2018 års Skytteanska pris i statskunskap, vilket kanske är det närmaste nobelpris vi kommer i ämnet. Priset delades ut vid en ceremoni vid Uppsala universitet den 29 september. Motiveringen av pristagaren var att professor Mansbridge ”med skarpsinne, djupt engagemang och feministisk teori har utvecklat förståelsen av demokrati i dess direkta och representativa form”. Majoriteten av de 24 forskare som finns på den prestigefyllda listan av pristagare är män, men gärningen som prisas denna gång kan kanske kompensera något för det.

Med de orden sätter jag punkt för denna gång. I bästa fall har läsningen väckt tankar och reflektioner som kanske kan ge upphov till ett och annat samtal i fikarum, tjänsterum och klassrum.

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Litteraturgranskningar

Litteraturredaktör: Björn Östbring

Christoffersen, Hanne, 2017.
***Likhet i forandring. En begreps-
historisk analyse av Høyres og
Arbeiderpartiets valg- og prinsip-
programmer for perioden 1933–
2013.*** Oslo: Institutt for sosialfag,
Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap,
Høgskolen i Oslo og Akershus.

Anmälan av Kristina Boréus

Hanne Christoffersens mycket läsvärda avhandling *Likhet i forandring. En begreps-historisk analyse av Høyres og Arbeiderpartiets valg- og prinsipprogrammer for perioden 1933–2013* är ett intressant stycke politisk historia om den norska välfärdsstatens väg under 70 år. Den behandlar hur jämlikhetsbegreppet – *likhet* på norska – först var en hävstång för politisk och social förändring för att sedan förlora sin centrala retoriska status. Den begrepps-historiska analysen, inspirerad av historikern Reinhard Koselleck, behandlar jämlikhetsbegreppet i valmanifest och principprogram för Arbeiderpartiet och Høyre.

Fram till krigsslutet kunde Arbeiderpartiet använda ojämlikhetsbegreppet – och referenser till den materiella ojämlikheten mellan samhällsklasser – som sin politiska hävstång. Partiet kunde använda *likhet* som ett framtidsinriktat begrepp i sitt förändringsprojekt. Høyre höll emot med en retorik där nationen som helhet, inte den nation präglad av klassmotsättningar som socialdemokraterna utgick ifrån, var central.

Under efterkrigstiden, fram till slutet av 50-talet, gick så *likhet* från att vara en beteckning för det utopiska, till att vara en benämning på ett tillstånd som i allt högre grad präglade det samtida Norge. Här ser

författaren redan de första tecknen på att jämlikhetsbegreppets centrala ställning började undermineras. Men den verkliga ideologiska vändningen inträffade under decennierna fram till slutet av 1970-talet. Høyre utmanade nu jämlikhetsidealet genom att beskriva jämlikhet som ett hinder för tillväxt. Christoffersen beskriver hur det hon kallar en *smidighetsretorik* växte fram och kunde användas som en utmaning mot en välfärdsstat som beskrevs som baserad på enhetlighet och tröghet. Ord som allsidighet, mångfald och variation kopplades till *ulikhet* och kom att bilda ett semantiskt fält, från vilket jämlikhetskritiken kunde formuleras. *Likhet* kom att kopplas till ett semantiskt fält av ord som ensidighet och uniformitet. *Variasjon* ställdes mot *ensretting* och *ensretting* var kopplat till *likhet*.

Under perioden 1977–2013 tappade så jämlikhetsbegreppet ytterligare och trängdes ut av mångfaldsbegreppet. Ordet *mangfold* kom i norsk, liksom i svensk debatt, att förknippas med människor från olika länder. Men det var inte ur det sammanhanget det kom, hävdar Christoffersen, utan just ur smidighetsretoriken. Mångfald blev till ett grundbegrepp i kosellecksk mening och kom att beteckna något som är gott i sig. Genom sin koppling till smidighetsretorikens semantiska fält kopplades *mangfold* till *ulikhet* och skillnad. Detta positivt laddade paket kunde nu ställas mot *likhet*. När olikhet och skillnad nu betraktades som eftersträvarsvårt och naturligt blev *likhet* något dåligt. Begreppet hade nu också för länge sedan förlorat sin framtidsinriktning.

Jämlikhetsbegreppet förlorade under perioden i såväl ideologisk slagkraft som radikalitet. Det var inte längre visionärt och

framtidssinriktat när en högre grad av jämlikhet väl hade uppnåtts i Norge och begreppet kommit att kopplas till sådant som hindrar mångfald, smidighet och variation. Det blev också mindre radikalt genom att *likhet* alltmör kom att syfta på den liberala jämlikhetsförståelsen – lika chanser – och mindre ofta på strukturell jämlikhet som kräver en samhällsförändring, så som Arbeiderpartiet en gång framställde det.

Den utveckling som beskrivs i avhandlingen liknar den svenska, men skiljer sig också på vissa punkter. Liksom i Sverige bidrog en mer offensiv högerpolitik och en ideologisk omsvängning hos socialdemokratin, till att jämlikhetspolitiken över huvud taget pressades tillbaka. Partiernas förändrade positioner kan också relateras till sociala och ekonomiska förändringar i omvärlden. Användningen av de ord som betecknar jämlikhet påverkades i processen, samtidigt som den förändrade användningen sannolikt också påverkade politiken. Det som hände under den svenska högervägen från slutet av 1970-talet var framför allt att ordet jämlikhet blev mindre vanligt i det retoriska språket hos de politiska aktörer som använde det flitigt under 1970-talet. Dessa ersatte kraven på "jämlikhet" med krav på "rättvisa". Den svenska högern har aldrig varit förtjust i ordet och hade ingenting de behövde ersätta.

En intressant skillnad mellan norsk och svensk politisk retorik kan knytas till själva språkbruket. Medan det svenska ordet jämlikhet har den mer preciserade betydelsen av lika fördelning eller politiskt och socialt lika villkor, rymmer det norska *likhet* både detta och det vi på svenska avser med "likhet". På svenska kan vi lätt uttrycka skillnaden mellan att två syskon är lika och att de är jämlika – nämligen just genom att välja ettdera orden. Naturligtvis går det bra att tala om den skillnaden även på norska, men inte bara genom att välja ett av två ord. Det att det norska ordet *likhet* täcker båda betydelser har också gjort det lättare att manipulera begreppet retoriskt och just ställa det emot variation

och mångfald. Om människor är jämlika på svenska betyder det visserligen likhet på något plan, till exempel att de har ungefär lika mycket pengar till sitt förfogande, men det implicerar ingen annan likhet. *Likhet* däremot kan också betyda just brist på variation. På så sätt ger det norska (och danska) språket större retoriskt spelrum för politikens jämlikhetsmotståndare. På svenska har de inte haft annat val än att undvika ordet jämlikhet.

En annan skillnad mellan länderna är att det i Norge inte verkar ha förekommit en motsvarande satsning som i Sverige av utomparlamentariska aktörer på att knuffa arbetarrörelsens politik bort från jämlikhet. På just denna punkt blir jag nyfiken och hade gärna sett mer om spelet mellan olika aktörer i avhandlingen. Detta är egentligen inte kritik: Christoffersen förankrar i kosellecksk anda de begreppsliga förändringarna i sociala, ekonomiska och politiska samhällsförändringar, vilket ingår i välgjorda begreppshistoriska analyser. Men de enda aktörer man då får syn på är Arbeiderpartiet och Høyre. Inte andra politiska partier som Fremskrittspartiet som onekligen haft stort inflytande på norsk politik. Inte heller arbetsgivarorganisationer och fackliga organisationer som bedrivit sin ideologiska kamp, eller företag och andra intressenter som säkerligen lobbade för sina intressen genom åren. I Sverige satsade dåvarande SAF och Industriförbundet enorma resurser på att möta vänstervägen med en högerväg. Jag har inte funnit någon forskning om motsvarande i Norge och utgår från att här funnits en skillnad mellan länderna.

Hur som helst ger *Likhet i förändring* ett viktigt bidrag till förståelsen av norsk efterkrigspolitik där begreppsförändring och retorisk politik kopplas till social och ekonomisk utveckling. Det kan vara en uppgift för kommande forskning att fylla i hur olika viktiga aktörer drivit olika intressen.

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Ruin, Olof, 2017. *Analys & engagemang. Sex statsvetare under 1900-talet*. Stockholm: Bokförlaget Langenskiöld och Kungl. Vitterhetsakademien.

Anmälan av Benny Carlson

Myrstacken av biografier över politiker, vetenskapsmän, idrottare, skådespelare, författare, målare, musiker och allt mellan himmel och jord växer oavbrutet. Kungl. Vitterhetsakademien har genom åren dragit sina strån till stacken. Under 20-årsperioden 1994–2014 publicerade akademien 17 biografier över "Svenska lärde". En av dessa biografier var statsvetarprofessorn Olof Ruins porträtt av sin far, filosofiprofessorn vid Åbo Akademi Hans Ruin. När akademien 2014 beslöt påbörja en ny serie under den snarlika vinjetten "Lärda i Sverige" ställde sig Olof Ruin återigen till förfogande. Men den här gången blev upplägget annorlunda. De tidigare biografierna var porträtt av enskilda "lärde". Nu skulle det handla om sex professorer i statsvetenskap, eller, som det hette på deras tid, statskunskap. Ruins val föll på professorer vid universiteten i Lund och Stockholm. Han anger två skäl för sitt val av universitetsstäder: Det första, att ett projekt inriktat på fler orter skulle ha blivit alltför omfattande, verkar lite krystat; det hade ju ändå inte behövt handla om fler än sex personer. Det andra, att det är lättare att skriva om miljöer där man själv varit verksam, är högst rimligt. Ruin doktorerade i Lund och var därefter verksam som docent och 1976–93 innehavare av Lars Hiertas professur vid Stockholms universitet.

De sex utvalda är, rangordnade efter födelseår:

Pontus Fahlbeck (1850–1923),
professor i Lund 1902–15.

Fredrik Lagerroth (1885–1974),
professor i Lund 1929–50.

Herbert Tingsten (1896–1973),
professor i Stockholm 1935–47.

Elis Håstad (1900–59),
professor i Stockholm 1948–58.

Gunnar Heckscher (1909–87),
professor i Stockholm 1958–67.

Nils Stjernquist (1917–2000),
professor i Lund 1951–83.

Ruin nöjer sig emellertid inte med att slå sex professorer i en smäll. Han genomför en slags biografigenrens motsvarighet till "Let's Dance" och parar ihop statsvetarna två och två – Fahlbeck med Tingsten, Lagerroth med Stjernquist och Håstad med Heckscher – och bjuder alltså på tre komparativa studier. Med fyra av de sex har Ruin haft personliga relationer, som medarbetare till Tingsten på *Dagens Nyheter*, student under Lagerroth och Stjernquist och samtalspartner till Heckscher.

Motiveringarna till parvalen är följande: Fahlbeck och Tingsten var de första statsvetarprofessorerna i Lund och Stockholm och utgör portalgestalter vid respektive institution. Lagerroth var Stjernquists lärare och den senare efterträdde den förre på professuren i Lund. Håstad och Heckscher var någorlunda jämgamla, den senare efterträdde den förre och båda lämnade sina professurer för politiken och annan offentlig tjänst. Det finns alltså inga egentliga principer bakom parkonstellationerna och med några andra motiveringar hade utfallet kunnat bli annorlunda. Men det spelar kanske ingen större roll. Det går att leverera argument för och emot varje tänkbar konstellation och Ruins val verkar inte orimliga.

Varje par jämförs i ett antal avseenden. De teman som tas upp är emellertid inte uppgjorda enligt en mall lika för alla utan följer ett för varje par specifikt mönster. Vanliga teman är bakgrunden, professuren, synen på forskning, verksamhet utanför professuren och vardagen. Några kliniskt rena parjämförelser kan det förstås inte bli fråga om. De sex utvalda – och åtskilliga statsvetare därutöver

– korsar varandras levnadsbanor lite här och var.

Första paret ut är alltså Fahlbeck och Tingsten. Dessa båda skarpa profiler får det största utrymmet, nära 90 sidor. Fahlbeck kom från en framgångsrik släkt men hans egen familj hade hamnat i ekonomiskt trångmål. Tingsten var sprungen ur bondesläkt men hans egen familj var borgerlig och ekonomiskt stabil. Fahlbeck finansierade sina studier med lån men blev med tiden så ekonomiskt framgångsrik att han kunde donera en kvarts miljon kronor till Lunds universitet (Fahlbeckska stiftelsen) och en halv miljon till Åbo Akademi i Finland. Tingstens far donerade medel till Lars Hiertas fond och möjliggjorde därmed den professur som sonen tillträdde. Fahlbeck disputerade på en avhandling i historia men såg till att statskunskap och statistik 1902 fick en egen professur i Lund, skraddarsydd för honom själv. Han var också ekonomiskt och sociologiskt inriktad och blev därmed en samhällsvetenskaplig vägröjare, en väg som Tingsten också ville hålla öppen. Båda sysslade med USA:s, Englands och Schweiz' styrelseskick. Fahlbeck föredrog den amerikanska modellen, Tingsten den schweiziska. Fahlbeck var katedersocialist, socialt radikal och politiskt konservativ; han satt under 1900-talets första årtionde i riksdagens första kammare. Tingsten fann det ”uppriskande och festligt att byta åsikt” (s. 68); han var i tur och ordning konservativ, liberal, socialdemokrat och liberal för att slutligen, som är allmänt bekant, förfäkta idén om ideologiernas död. Fahlbeck var rojalist, Tingsten republikan. Fahlbeck var tyskvänlig, Tingsten västvänlig. Fahlbeck gjorde ingen större skillnad på vetenskaplig analys och egna värderingar, Tingsten var i myrdalsk anda mer observant på den rågängen. Fahlbeck startade och drev i 20 år *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, Tingsten var i 13 år chefredaktör på *Dagens Nyheter*. Båda gjorde sig bemärkta för ”snabbhet att formulera sig och i temperamentsfullhet i det formulerade” (s. 80).

Andra paret ut är Lagerroth och Stjernquist. De jämförs på dryga 50 sidor. Lagerroth

kom från prästfamilj, Stjernquists far Martin P:son Nilsson var professor i klassisk forn-kunskap och antikens historia; rötterna fanns i båda fallen i Göingebygden. Lagerroth vurmadede för filosofin men disputerade i historia på en 700-sidig avhandling om frihetstidens författning som var kritisk mot Karl XII och utlöste en akademisk strid. Han kom alltså att besätta den professur som Fahlbeck haft. Stjernquist disputerade i statskunskap på en avhandling om den statliga regleringen efter 1809, inspirerad av Lagerroths föreläsningar, och kunde, efter delade meningar bland såväl de sakkunniga som i regeringen (där valet stod mellan honom och Jörgen Westerståhl), efterträda Lagerroth. Lagerroth fokuserade på sin egen forskning, var ”tungrodd och omständlig” (s. 160) och levererade omfattande arbeten inte minst om 1809 års regeringsform. Stjernquist var ”snabbfotad och effektiv” (s. 160) men producerade inte lika mycket; han lade mer energi på att få fram nya forskare, delta som expert i utredningar och administrera, med kulmen som rektor vid Lunds universitet 1980–83.

Sista paret ut är Håstad och Heckscher, som jämförs på närmare 80 sidor. Håstad kom från ett bondehem, arbetade som journalist parallellt med studierna för att försörja sig och behövde sju år för att ta sin fil kand. Han blev emellertid av professorn i statskunskap i Uppsala Axel Bruswitz uppmuntrad att fortsätta med forskarstudier och disputerade 36 år gammal på en avhandling om regeringssättet i Schweiz. Han var dock ingen långsam skribent utan lär ha kunnat skriva 20 sidor om dagen – även hans avhandling var på mer än 700 sidor. Heckscher var son till Eli Heckscher, professor i nationalekonomi och därefter ekonomisk historia. Han fick ekonomiskt understöd hemifrån och var klar med sin fil kand blott 19 år gammal och disputerade på en avhandling om 1809 års författning vid 24 års ålder! (Vid doktorsmiddagen utspelades den legendariska brottningsmatch i frack på nybonat golv vid vilken Tingsten knäckte några revben.) Håstad blev känd som

”mångsysslaren som hinner med mycket”, Heckscher som ”underbarnet” (s. 177) – förhållandet mellan Eli och Gunnar Heckscher påminner för övrigt om det mellan James och John Stuart Mill. Allt gick emellertid inte som en dans för Heckscher. Han gick miste om den professur i Uppsala han bespetsat sig på men blev i stället professor i statskunskap vid Socialinstitutet i Stockholm. Håstad fick Lars Hierta-professuren i Stockholm efter Tingsten och efterträddes så småningom av Heckscher. Håstads undervisning präglades av ”gemyt och trevnad”, Heckschers av ”effektivitet och stramhet” (s. 180). Håstad satt 18 år i riksdagen för högern med socialkonservativ framtoning. Heckscher blev kortvarig (1961–65) högerledare, vilket kan förklaras av hans engagemang för borgerlig samling (tiden var inte mogen för Alliansen), hans position på högerns vänsterflygel och hans intellektuella framtoning. Eller, som Ruin formulerar saken (s. 237): ”Man kunde kanske också säga att Gunnar Heckscher var en person som trodde sig veta bäst.” Håstad slutade sina dagar som landshövding i Uppsala; han blev blott 59 år gammal. Heckscher avslutade sin karriär som ambassadör i New Delhi och Tokyo.

I ett kort avslutande kapitel släpper Ruin sina parkonstellationer och jämför de sex utifrån bakgrund, personlighet, period, väg till professuren, ömsesidig påverkan (som sakkunnig), nätverk, forskningsinriktning (grundlagar, idéer, formella institutioner, aktörer, politik), extramural aktivitet (näringsliv, utredning och administration, offentlig debatt, politisk verksamhet). Detta kapitel gör att ”bilden klarnar” och man slutligen får klart för sig vad som förenar och åtskiljer de sex.

Statsvetenskapen har innehållsmässigt breddats över tid men som framskyntat i den föregående ilmarschen genom Ruins landskap ägnade sig professorerna under större delen av 1900-talet i hög grad åt den svenska författningen och de utländska modeller den liknade eller borde likna. Fahlbeck blickade mot USA, Tingsten och Håstad vurmade för

den schweiziska modellen, Heckscher för den engelska. Lagerroth såg 1809 års regeringsform som fast rotad i den inhemska myllan.

Sammanfattningsvis bjuder Ruins bok på njutbar läsning, inte bara för statsvetare utan också för en bredare läsekrets. Tingstens liv och leverne är för många ganska välkänt. Han står, med Ruins (s. 246) ord, ”i en klass för sig”. Själv råkar jag genom ett intresse för katedersocialism veta en del om Fahlbeck och genom intresse för Heckscher den äldre något lite om Heckscher den yngre. Stjernquist hade jag tidigare mest hört talas om som rektor och Lagerroth och Håstad var för mig, som inte är statsvetare, närmast okända storheter. Ruins bok har därför för min del bjudit på en upptäcktsfärd, som emellertid på grund av de parvisa jämförelserna utifrån varierande teman är mera slingrande än rätlinjig. Men det är kanske just det som gör en upptäcktsfärd spännande – att vandra längs en slingrande stig anförd av en erfaren ciceron.

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Anmälan av Simon Davidsson

Vilka partier för de fattigas talan politiskt? Hur kommer det sig att sådana partier bildas? Varför har USA till skillnad från andra rika demokratier inte något arbetarparti? Statsvetaren Karen Long Juskos nya bok försöker ge svar på dessa frågor genom att kombinera kvantitativ analys med kvalitativ, med särskilt fokus på USA, Kanada, Storbritannien och Sverige. I boken lägger hon fram en teori för hur förändringar i olika samhällsgruppers väljarinflytande (*electoral power*)

på valkrets nivå skapar möjlighet för politiska entreprenörer att utmana etablerade partier.

Long Jusko inleder med att motivera sitt fokus på väljarinflytande och den tredjedel i samhället med lägst inkomster snarare än på röstbeteende hos samhällsklasser eller yrkesgrupper i stort: Väljarinflytande skiljer sig från röstning eftersom olika vals system kan göra att alla röster inte räknas lika. Genom att studera samhällets fattigaste tredjedel behöver hon inte anta någon gemensam social identitet innan det att partier bildas för att forma dessa identiteter. En av hennes poänger är nämligen att dessa sociala identiteter formas av partiföreträdare. Long Jusko argumenterar även för att både medianväljarteori och maktresurs-teori förutsätter en bakomliggande variabel, nämligen den lokala fördelningen av väljarinflytande hos människor, vilka i sin tur kan mobiliseras av partier.

I bokens andra kapitel argumenterar hon emot sociologiska teorier som påstår att partier växer fram mer eller mindre automatiskt ur sociala klyftor. Hon påpekar att befintliga partier och vals system alltid utgör strukturer som begränsar möjligheterna för den som vill bilda ett nytt parti och att mobilisera väljare. Därför måste vi beakta den rumsliga fördelningen av väljargrupper potentiella inflytande, samt förändringen av denna fördelning över tid. Stora men lokalt avgränsade förändringar i väljarsammansättning i vissa valdistrikt ger möjlighet för politiska entreprenörer att bilda partier för att mobilisera väljare. Att förändringen är lokal är viktigt. Det förhindrar nämligen redan etablerade, nationella partier från att anpassa sig eftersom de då riskerar tappa väljare i de distrikt där ingen förändring i väljarsammansättningen har ägt rum. De nödvändiga förändringarna kan uppstå på grund av migration inom eller mellan länder, förändringar i socioekonomiska förhållanden, eller en utvidgning av rösträtten. Long Jusko låter teorin mynna ut i tre hypoteser: policy kommer att anpassas till de fattiga när deras stöd krävs för att vinna val, lokala befolkningsförändringar ökar

sannolikheten för att nya partier bildas, och nya partier ställer upp i val där de fattigas röster har blivit avgörande. I resten av boken redovisar hon stöd för sina hypoteser.

Kapitel tre innehåller en statistisk analys av 15 länder mellan åren 1880 och 2000. Long Jusko visar att det är mer sannolikt att ett nytt parti ställer upp i val i distrikt där lokal migration lett till förändringar i befolkningsammansättningen. De största lokala befolkningsförändringarna ägde rum mellan 1880 och 1930. För att finna starkare stöd för teorin menar hon dock att den lokala nivån, alltså valdistriktet, måste beaktas. Detta kräver mer djupgående fallstudier.

I kapitlet fyra till sju undersöker Long Jusko USA, Kanada, Storbritannien och Sverige mellan 1880 och 1930, under skilda perioder då nya partier lyckades bildas och vinna val. I alla fyra fallen använder hon individdata för att ta fram väljarnas sociala sammansättning på distriktsnivå, matchar denna sammansättning mot inkomstdata, och skattar det lokala väljarinflytandet hos den tredjedel som på nationell nivå har lägst inkomster. Hon mäter sedan den lokala förändringen i denna väljargrups storlek och knyter den till uppkomsten av nya partier (som i varje enskilt fall representerar låginkomsttagare, för Sveriges del studerar hon Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet). Argumentationen bygger på både kvantitativ och kvalitativ analys. Det kvalitativa materialet består främst av tidningsmaterial och partidokument. och analysen ger stöd för tesen att pragmatiska politiska entreprenörer hade information om väljarsammansättningen på distriktsnivå, gjorde strategiska val gällande vilka distrikt de skulle ställa upp för val i, och utarbetade en plattform för att nå ut till just de grupper som de ville mobilisera. Partierna framföddes alltså inte bara ur aggregerade sociala strukturer. Den kvantitativa analysen bygger på data över inkomster och distriktssammansättning, och tjänar till att isolera effekten av förändringar i väljarsammansättning och skatta dess betydelse. Long Jusko avslutar kapitel sju med

att diskutera de svenska Socialdemokraternas motstånd mot införandet av proportionella val i början av 1900-talet. Hon hävdar att proportionella val faktiskt bidrog till att befästa Socialdemokraternas storlek på längre sikt, givet partiets försök att mobilisera väljare brett, både socioekonomiskt och geografiskt. Detta eftersom enmansvalkretsar skulle ha krävt att partiets väljargrupper förblivit geografiskt koncentrerade, vilket inte var fallet.

Efter att ha funnit att politiska entreprenörer reagerade på liknande incitament trots skilda bakgrundsförhållanden går Long Jusko vidare och skattar långsiktiga effekter av förändringar i väljarsammansättning på lokal nivå. Hon medger att detta avslutande kapitel är mer skissartat. Eftersom lokala förändringar i väljarsammansättning ägde rum i jordbruksområdena i Kanada och USA, men inte i industriarbetarområdena i Storbritannien och Sverige, så bildades arbetarpartier i de två senare länderna. Hon visar vidare att låginkomsttagares väljarinflytande varierar mellan stater och att det är positivt korrelerat med sociala utgifter både i USA och i några andra rika demokratier. Partirepresentation spelar alltså roll för policy som gynnar de fattiga. I USA är låginkomsttagare sällan lokalt betydelsefulla, varför politikernas incitament att representera dem är svaga. Det är alltså ingen som för de fattigas talan när deras fördelning i rummet gör dem oviktiga för att vinna lokala val.

En stor styrka i Long Juskos bok är att hon lyckas utnyttja tid och rum, och ta hänsyn till både aktörer och strukturer i sin förklaring av hur nya partier bildas, och att hon undersöker sambandet mellan partibildning och demokratisk representation. Hennes teori beaktar både aktörers motiv och den information de har, och den beaktar hur strukturer, det vill säga exogena förändringar i befolkningsfördelning och socioekonomiska faktorer, utgör begränsningar och skapar möjligheter. Berättelsen övertygar.

Självklart lämnas läsaren med en och annan obesvarad fråga. Long Jusko arbetar

inom ett rationalistiskt aktörs-perspektiv, där partier (det politiska utbudet) skapar sina väljarbaser (den politiska efterfrågan) och där ideologi står tillbaka för elitors pragmatism, men hon diskuterar inte sitt perspektivs begränsningar. Hennes diskussion om betydelsen av socioekonomiska förändringar återkommer inte i analysen i någon egentlig mening, vilket kan leda läsaren till att tro att socioekonomiska förändringar kan tänjas för att förklara varje partibildning som inte kan förklaras på något annat sätt. Medan hon för en kritisk diskussion om sina kvantitativa data saknas det en liknande diskussion om de kvalitativa. Hennes motivering av de fyra fallen (USA, Kanada, Storbritannien och Sverige) är tunn. Den bygger på att dessa fyra länder uppvisar variation vad gäller politiska institutioner, valsysteem och de faktorer som skapade förändring i distriktssammansättning, och tycks inte utgå från resultaten i den kvantitativa analysen. Samtidigt ska det sägas att hon hanterar de fall hon valt mycket väl och att de verkligen är intressanta. Gällande val av fall saknas slutligen en diskussion om negativa fall, det vill säga sådana där någon del i hennes teoretiska kedja fattas och där utfallet inte heller blir det som hennes teori säger. Avslutningsvis vore det intressant att veta mer om hennes resultat kan överföras till en samtida kontext, inte minst i ljuset av framgångsrik partibildning de senaste 30 åren, där exempelvis gröna partier och högerpopulistiska partier lyckats etablera sig i nationella parlament, och den allt trängre politiska arena som Long Jusko nämner. Som hon själv erkänner är hennes avslutande kapitel inte något fullständigt försök att knyta ihop trådarna vad gäller politisk representation av fattiga. Variabler och data här verkar mindre finslipade.

Naturligtvis kan vi inte förvänta oss att Long Jusko svarar på eller diskuterar alla de reflektioner som tagits upp här, och att dessa funderingar väcks är ett tecken på att hennes bok innehåller resultat som är både viktiga och underbyggda, och som är väl värda att bygga vidare på.

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Wolff, Jonathan. 2017. *Varför Läsa Marx Idag?* Göteborg: Daidalos.

Anmälan av Markus Furendal

År 1948 träffades fyra intellektuella i en rökgig radiostudio för att diskutera "Marx i vår tid". Etthundra år hade gått sedan Karl Marx och Friedrich Engels skrev det Kommunistiska Manifestet, drygt trettio år sedan oktoberrevolutionen i Ryssland och blott tre år sedan andra världskrigets slut. Världen stod och vägde mellan olika politiska system, och relevansen hos Marx tänkande var påtaglig. Med Gunnar Helén som moderator anförde dåvarande socialdemokratiska finansministern Ernst Wigforss och litteraturhistorikern Stellan Arvidsson betydelsen av Marx teorier och förutsägelser, med fokus på ekonomi och historia. Den konservativa redaktören Gunnar Unger och statsvetaren och publicisten Herbert Tingsten drev snarare linjen att det som var intressant hos Marx inte var sant, och att det som var sant inte var intressant.

Sjuttio år senare är det nu tvåhundra år sedan Marx föddes och återigen jubileum. Trots att världen förändrats avsevärt inte bara sedan Marx 1800-tal utan också Tingstens och de andras 1900-tal är intresset för vilken relevans Marx har i vår tid beständigt. Varje årtionde verkar någon ställa frågan om Marx betydelse; vad som kan vara värt att bevara, och vad som bör kastas ut. Strax innan tvåhundraårsdagen har Daidalos översatt den brittiske filosofen Jonathan Wolffs bok med

just titeln "Varför läsa Marx idag?". Wolffs svar är nyansrikt: fastän Marx misslyckas med att ge oss tillräckliga skäl för att tro på hans viktigaste teorier utgör hans skrifter ändå den kanske främsta kritiska analysen av kapitalismen och dess tillkortakommanden. På knappt tvåhundra lättillgängliga sidor lyckas Wolff inte bara förklara vad han menar med detta, utan också på ett ovanligt tydligt sätt redogöra för grunddragen i Marx tänkande. Boken är därmed ett välkommet tillskott till utbudet av svenskspråkiga introduktionstexter till Marx tänkande.

Vilka skäl finns det då att läsa Marx idag, med tanke på att världen förändrats i grunden inte bara sedan Marx egen tid utan även radiodebatten 1948? En första anledning är att Marx författat några av de politiska texter som genom historien kan sägas ha påverkat flest människor – ett skäl så gott som något att ge statsvetarstudenter grundläggande kunskap om Marx teorier. Detta resonemang vilar dock på det ofta förbisedda faktumet att Marx själv varken förutsåg eller förespråkade regimer av den typ som gjort anspråk på hans namn. När begreppet marxism började användas i Frankrike mot slutet av hans liv ska han ju till och med ha sagt till Engels att "vad som är säkert är att jag inte är marxist". Med tanke på att hans arbeten främst är analyser av det sena 1800-talets kapitalistiska västeuropeiska ekonomier och att han skrev ytterst lite om hur alternativet kunde se ut eller frambringas är det trots hans inflytande alltså svårt att tillskriva honom ansvar för hur hans teorier vidareutvecklades och missbrukades för att legitimera tyranniskt förtryck långt efter hans död.

Wolff verkar snarare utgå från att ett bättre sätt att utvärdera Marx betydelse för vår tid är att ta fasta på att han och Engels ansåg sig utveckla, eller upptäcka, vetenskapliga teorier kring kapitalismens inneboende utvecklingstendenser. Här är det framförallt två teorier som brukar framhållas. Den ena är historiematerialismen, Marx teori om att olika samhällsformers framväxt och kollaps beror på

hur väl de främjar eller hämmar den ständigt ökande mänskliga produktiviteten. Om handkvärnen ger ett samhälle med feodalherrar så ger ångkvärnen ett samhälle med industrikapitalister, som Marx beskrev det. Det var denna teori som ledde Marx att förutse – inte förespråka – att kapitalismen till slut måste ge vika för kommunism. Den andra är teorin om mervärdet, som enligt Marx visar att kapitalisters profit förutsätter arbetarnas exploatering. Få ekonomer idag tror dock att mervärdeteorin håller, och många filosofer menar att det klarsynta Marx hade att säga om exploatering bör frigöras från hans ekonomiska antaganden. Och även om insikten att samhällets utveckling beror på produktivkrafterna är rimlig pressas redan i radio-debatten historiematerialismens försvarare Arvidsson och Wigforss av ideologikritikern Tingsten att erkänna att andra faktorer behövs för att förklara olika samhällens utvecklingsgrad. En sådan eftergift förändrar dock Marx teori, och Tingsten menar att historiematerialismen till slut kan kokas ner till en trivial insikt, välutvecklad redan hos Aristoteles, nämligen att ”allt beror på allt”.

Wolff medger utan kval att Marx två största teoretiska bidrag står på skakig grund, och tillägger att det lilla Marx skrev om postkapitalistiska samhällen inte heller fungerar handlingsvägledande för oss idag. Han grundar dessutom dessa slutsatser på åsikten, så ofta framförd av kritiker av Marx idéer, att Marx föreställning om människans natur är felaktig. Wolff går dock bortom den vanliga uppfattningen att ett socialistiskt samhälle vore önskvärt men inte skulle fungera på grund av människors själviskhet. Snarare fäster han vikt vid hur Marx överskattat i vilken grad människans produktiva natur skänker en universalitet åt människor (”Proletärer i alla länder, förena er”), och underskattat hur vi till synes ständigt hittar nya grunder för att skilja oss från andra. Wolff påpekar alltså att även om vi övervinner ekonomiska skiljaktigheter återstår kanske filosofiska, religiösa och kulturella motsättningar, och ”liksom rika

familjer finner massor att gräla om, skulle ett samhälle präglad av ekonomiskt överflöd mycket väl kunna vara ett splittrat samhälle.” (s. 161).

Boken sammanfattar och utvärderar idéer från hela Marx författarskap, och Wolff är ständigt både positiv och kritisk. Ungdomsskrifternas iakttagelser kring alienation är ”ansläende”, men Marx visar inte om det är kapitalismen eller arbetsdelningen i allmänhet som är problemets källa. Marx kritik av liberalismens rättighetsfokus är enligt Wolff ett av den politiska filosofins mest betydelsefulla och inflytelserika arbeten de senaste århundradena. Påståendet att rättigheter inte bara skyddar oss mot hot från andra utan också bidrar till att vi uppfattar andra som hotfulla till att börja med, bortser dock från att rättigheter trots allt behövs för att skydda oss mot det fåtal som stjälar eller rånar vid behov och tillfälle. Och trots att dess skakiga grund i mervärdeteorin till synes gör Marx teori om exploatering obsolet, menar Wolff att det beror på att globaliseringen kommit så mycket längre idag än på Marx tid. I vardagligt tal beskriver vi trots allt ofta arbetare i låglöneländer, som idag arbetar under förhållanden lika de som Marx och Engels iakttog i 1800-talets Storbritannien, som just exploaterade. Den relevanta frågan tycks därför inte vara om det är bättre att sakna arbetstillfällen eller ha ett exploaterande jobb under kapitalismen, utan om det är bättre med ett exploaterande arbete än ett arbete i ett samhälle som övervunnit de problem som Marx menade kapitalismen skapade.

Det är just denna typ av kritiska observationer som utgör Wolffs svar på frågan om varför vi bör läsa Marx idag. Även om delar av Marx teorier och förutsägelser har motbevisats av historien eller, som Tingsten påpekar i Karl Poppers efterföljd, inte kan motbevisas och därmed bör betraktas som ovetenskapliga, så finns där mycket värt att bevara. Marx kritiska diagnostiska blick av det sena 1800-talets kapitalism bringade många av dess tillkortakommanden i dagen.

Anledningen till att det som är sant hos Marx inte är intressant är därför kanske att hans kritiska iakttagelser blivit så allmänt vedertagna att det är svårt att se deras originalitet. Och kanske är det andra än Marx själv som får hjälpa oss att värdera huruvida problemen vägs upp av kapitalismens goda och välfärds-höjande effekter eller om de är tillräckligt allvarliga för att söka ett alternativt samhällssystem, och om det ens existerar ett alternativ.

Wolffs bok är därmed både intressant och relevant, trots att "i vår tid" och "idag" betyder något annat än när den ursprungligen gavs ut på originalspråket för 16 år sedan. Hade den skrivits nu hade måhända mindre vikt fästts vid hur Marx tankar låg till grund för den antikapitalistiska rörelse som svepte över världen kring millennieskiftet, för i vårt "idag" finns kanske ingen motsvarande vital strömning baserad på Marx idéer. Istället hade kanske blicken vänts mot hur Marx historiematerialiska tes om produktivkrafternas betydelse för samhällsformen fått ny kraft av det tekniskskifte vi verkar stå på tröskeln till. När maskiner och allt mer kompetent artificiell intelligens inte bara ersätter mänskliga muskler utan också vårt tänkande och kreativitet,

förutsätter rimligen Marx teori att samhället nödvändigtvis omformas på det sätt som krävs för att inhysa dem. Men historien bör lära oss att erkänna kapitalismens fantastiska förmåga att överleva sådana språng relativt intakt. De som exempelvis menar att en villkorslös grundinkomst är det bästa svaret på den eventuella massarbetslöshet tekniskskiftet kan komma att skapa verkar förbise lärodomarna från Marx 1800-tal. Det är trots allt fortfarande de som äger de nya maskinerna som är i bäst position att ta del av värdet de skapar. Om det ändå finns någon förklaringskraft i Marx resonemang om att handkvarnen ger ett samhälle med feodalherrar och ångkvarnen ett samhälle med industrikapitalister, har vi alltså skäl att anta att algoritmer kommer resultera i en ny form av ekonomisk överhöghet. På så sätt är Marx fortfarande relevant för vår tid.

Radioprogrammet "Marx i vår tid" finns tillgängligt via länken <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/76646?programid=1602>.

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