# Drafting the Third Party Programme: the intelligentsia and the de-Stalinisation of Soviet ideology, 1952-61

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## Introduction

THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAMME was unveiled at the 22nd Congress of the cpsu in October 1961. Its bold claims —that communism would be built by 1980, the USA surpassed in key economic fields—seemed to herald a shining vista of progress, opportunity and abundance for the USSR. It was the most high-profile ideological statement of the post-Stalin era, and appeared to signify the victory of Chruščev and his group in the battle with the Stalinists, although events after 1964 show that this was not the end of the war. The programme marked a significant departure from some of the fundamental tenets of Stalinist orthodoxy (although not to the extent that some have claimed). However, the importance of the programme lies not in its overblown rhetoric or ideological innovations. The process of drafting the programme was an important part of the reconstitution of the Soviet intelligentsia as a significant force after the death of Stalin. This paper will outline the story of the drafting of the Third Party Programme, highlighting the struggles between elements within the intelligentsia and the political leadership, and also the conflicts within the intelligentsia itself. In the process of renewing Soviet ideology, the intelligentsia began the struggle for greater intellectual autonomy in its dealings with the Soviet state. In the course of this struggle, the relationship between knowledge and political power in the Soviet state was transformed, paving the way for the reforms carried out after 1985.

## Dismantling the 'citadel of dogmatism'

The Soviet state expended huge amounts of energy to control ideas. The existence of an 'official' ideology—Soviet Marxism-Leninism—highlights a central point for understanding the mechanism of power in the USSR: in the absence of a democratic means of legitimation, ideas were paramount. The doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin were used to rationalise the rule of the CPSU,

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to explain the direction in which history was moving, and to provide a basis for the policies of the Soviet state. The state built an apparatus to spell out the meaning and detail of its ideology, and also to ensure that these ideas were known and accepted by the Soviet people, through a massive programme of dissemination, agitation and propaganda. Knowledge, of all different hues, was completely subordinate to the diktat of the official ideologists. This apparatus—a sort of politico-ideological complex, akin to the military-industrial complex in the USA —employed huge numbers of intellectuals, writers, propagandists in order to carry out its tasks. One of their functions was to keep the ideology pure, to silence discrepant voices, to track down any heretical ideas and imprison them before they could foment trouble. Not for nothing did Georgij Smirnov liken this politico-ideological complex to a mediaeval castle, terming it a 'citadel of dogmatism'. This obsession with the purity of the ideology resulted not only in a high degree of control over ideas and knowledge, but also over those engaged in this process: the intellectuals.

Given this high degree of control exercised over knowledge, ideas and intellectuals, the process by which new ideas were introduced into the official ideology was a highly complex, politicised one. The debates and discussions generated during the post-Stalinist ideological renewal between 1952 and *1961* set in motion forces which began to undermine this 'citadel of dogmatism'. Gradually the first signs of a more autonomous intelligentsia growing up within the Soviet politico-ideological complex could be discerned. The main site of this struggle was the Party Programme.

## The place of the Party Programme in Soviet ideology

The role of the Party Programme in Soviet ideology was clear-cut: to set out the long-term objectives of the Party leadership at any given moment.[1] Expressing these objectives in a set of specific policies and doctrines created a whole set of problems though.[2] The central problem lay in demonstrating progress towards communism without either mythologising the reality of Soviet society, or distorting the fundamentals of orthodox Historical Materialism. This imposed contradictory demands upon the framers of the Party Programme of 1961.[3]

[1] There were three Party Programmes prior to the 1991 version (although in reality there were four, as the revised edition of the 1961 programme was very different). The first Party Programme was drawn up at the 1903 Congress of the KSDLP. The Programme had two sections: a minimum and a maximum. The former described the immediate tasks facing the Social-Democrats, while the latter explored the more long-term goals of the Party. There was some dispute at the Congress over this division. Many delegates were critical of the programme, arguing that it was not distinctively socialist enough. In line with subsequent practice though, the emphasis was upon the immediate tasks facing the Party: the overthrow of the autocracy and the creation of a Democratic Republic in Russia. The Programme did not look beyond the socialist revolution.

The second Programme was adopted in 1919 and was concerned with the tasks of constructing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. This Programme was to last until 1961, when Chruščev issued the Third Programme, which proclaimed that the USSR had entered the stage of the Full-Scale Construction of Communism. This Programme boldly claimed that a communist society 'in the main' would be built by 1980. The revised version was issued in 1986. For a good introduction and analysis of these different versions, see S. White, 1989, Introduction, in: idem (ed), *Soviet Communism: Programme and Rules,* London, 1-20.

[2] For a fine analysis of the problems of adaptation in Soviet Marxism-Leninism see A. B. Evans, Jr., 1990, Conclusion, in: S. Woodby & A. B. Evans, Jr. (eds), *Restructuring Soviet Ideology: Gorbachev's New Thinking,* Boulder, Colo.

[3] For the English translation of the 1961 Programme see J. F. Triska(ed), 1962, *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules,* San Francisco. This also contains the changes that were made from the draft version. The final version of the 1986 Programme was printed in *Pravda* 7 March 1986, pp. 3-8. A translation can be found in White, *Soviet Communism,* 41-113.

The content of a Party Programme was shaped by a number of conflicting pressures. It had to be both present-oriented and future-minded: outlining the current tasks facing the Party and the people, while at the same time demonstrating the historical progress that had been made towards their projected goal. Secondly, the Pro-gramrne had to be detailed enough to be of value in shaping Party policy, and to be as realistic as possible to prevent a gap emerging between the picture painted of Soviet society and the experiences of the Soviet people. Yet this tendency had to be restrained: to be too specific would leave the Programme vulnerable to subsequent falsification, undermining the scientific validity of the ideology.[44] In addition, after 1945 it also had to be a document that set out the pleading role of the **USSR** in the international socialist camp, and yet was relevant to the national requirements of building communism at home.[5]

[4] This was one of the accusations which was subsequently levelled at Chruščev's 1961 Programme. The bold and optimistic prognoses which were outlined became an embarassment for subsequent leaders as economic slowdown and *zastój* gradually set in in the 1970s. In fact, the 1961 Party Programme was removed from public circulation, to prevent the population from comparing the reality with the predictions.

[5] This point has been made by the following authors: S. Meiklejohn Terry, 1989, Theories of socialist development in Soviet East-European relations, in: idem (ed), *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe,* New Haven, 224-39; also Terry L. Thompson, 1988, Developed socialism: Brezhnev's contribution to Soviet ideology, in: idem & Richard Sheldon (eds), *Soviet Society and Culture,* Boulder, Colo., 206-35. Both these works are cited in A. B. Evans, Jr., 1993, *Soviet Marxism-Leninism: the Decline of an Ideology,* Westport, Conn., 7, endnote 10; Evans discusses this point ibid., 5.

The specific shape of each of the Programmes was conditioned by a complex politico-ideological context.[6] Each of the documents bore the imprint of the dominant political figure at the time of its conception. However, the Programmes were also an arena in which disputes between ideologues and *apparatčiki* were played out. Having to display a concern with the periodisation of the transition from capitalism to socialism to communism meant significant input from Party ideologues and those concerned with upholding the purity of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Yet the simultaneous concern with the immediate practical tasks took the Programme into the sphere occupied by individuals and departments concerned with policy formulation and implementation.[7] The struggles over specific sections of the Programme (e.g. agriculture, housing) reflect ongoing disputes within the bureaucratic hierarchy and demonstrate the wider political and departmental interests involved in the processes of drafting, discussing and amending the Party Programmes. In this sense, the Programme was not just a doctrinal and ideological statement, but also an indicator of the correlation of forces within the Party, and an expression of the dominant values of the leadership. The Party Programme was a key document in Soviet ideological discourse. The process by which the Third Party Programme was conceived, devised, discussed, drafted and finally published illustrates the manner in which the intelligentsia began to play a more central role in Soviet intellectual life, of their struggle for autonomy and the conflicts and pressures which surrounded their work.

[6] The central place of the Party programme in Soviet discourse means that it was shaped by a variety of political and ideological factors. Indeed, it is indicative of the interesting point made by Michael Waller that the Soviet state had a politico-ideological complex which was engaged in the production and dissemination of ideology. This 'fusion' of the political and ideological arenas meant that the whole process of ideological change was intensely politicised in the USSR. See M. Waller, 1988, What is to count as ideology in Soviet politics, in: S. White & A. Pravda (eds), *Ideology and Soviet Politics,* London, 21-42.
[7] R. Schlesinger, 1961-2, The CPSU Programme: historical and international aspects, *Soviet Studies* 13, 303-4.

It is important to locate the drafting process within the wider context of the intellectual renewal that began in 1954. As de-Stalini-sation took hold, ideology also came under scrutiny. The path to be steered was riddled with pitfalls. How could the Stalinist approach be repudiated without undermining the legitimacy of the system? This was particularly acute in the case of ideology, which was the sole means by which the CPSU rationalised its rule. This intellectual renewal embraced a wide spectrum of practices, including art, poetry, literature, academic subjects —economics, philosophy, law—and ultimately the official ideology.

The underlying tension between repudiating Stalin's legacy and promoting change emerged most clearly in the literary field. With the death of Stalin, the parameters of acceptable criticism expanded, *as* did the number of politically acceptable topics. There were no uniform patterns during this period. Literary 'thaws' would be followed by 'freezes', followed by a further 'thaw'. The roots of these oscillations lie only partially in the ambiguities of de-Stalinisation.[8] The twists and turns of state policy also reflected the divisions within the Union of Soviet Writers (usw): some individuals wished to explore new ideas, forms and conventions; many remained conservative proponents of Stalinist 'socialist realism'. The institutional relationship between the usw and the Central Committee (cc) Secretariat, publishing houses and editors of journals and newspapers was a constantly changing one. The publication of various pieces was the outcome of a complex series of individual negotiations between these actors, within a broad intellectual atmosphere established by the Party. Lastly, literary policy was at the whim of the impulsive Chruščev. He is reported on one occasion to have shaken the First Secretary of the usw by the lapels after literary output went beyond the limits Chruščev wished to set for it.[9]

The trouble for the political leadership and for the heads of the politico-literary-ideological complex was attempting to keep anti-Stalinist literature within a framework that did not attack the system itself. Although the themes of socialist realism still dominated, new works and writers began to challenge this orthodoxy. The flagship of the literary renaissance was *Novyj mir* (a monthly journal) under the editorship of Aleksandr Tvardovskij. He published a

[8] John L.H. Keep, 1995, *Last of the Empires: a History of the Soviet Union, '945~'99i,* Oxford, 120-31.
[9] John Garrard & Carol Garrard, 1990, *Inside the Soviet Writers' Union,* New York, 78.

number of works—including Solzenicyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovicb — and* although he was dismissed in 1954, he was reinstated in 1958. Ehrenburg published his short novel *The Thaw,* outlining the contrasting fortunes of two writers: a defender of orthodoxy and a non-conformist. New poetry by Evtušenko and Voznesenskij explored the boundaries of the acceptable. Political satire—albeit directed at party-identified targets—mushroomed as the number of legitimate subjects increased.

These halting moves in literary policy heralded a deeper dissatisfaction with the orthodox Stalinist interpretation of Soviet Marx-ism-Leninism. It became clear that the Stalinist ideological formulae were no longer appropriate as an expression of the world-view of the new leadership, and had ceased to be of use in resolving the problems that Chruščev et al. faced. The aim was to purge Soviet history, philosophy and literary policy of its Stalinist dogmas and to breathe new life into the ideological basis of party rule, legitimising the reforms undertaken by Chruščev at home, and consolidating the leading position of the **USSR** in the international socialist camp. Between 1952 and 1958 intellectual renewal gathered pace. The new leadership set about producing new tomes to express the evolving world-view of the post-Stalinist regime. A new philosophy textbook— *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* ('Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism') —was produced. A new *History of the **CPSU*** replaced the infamous Stalinist *Short Course.* The culmination of this process came in 1958 when the leadership began to draw up the new, Third Party Programme. The story of its compilation is itself an interesting tale.

## The drafting of the Third Party Programme: the 'standard' story

The standard story, dominant in the west prior to 1985, runs like this. The 16th Congress of the Party in 1930 was due to have revised the Programme, but no formal decision was taken. The question was then shelved until 1939 when the 18th **CPSU** Congress decided to form a commission (composed of ***26*** people—including Chruščev—and under the leadership of Stalin) to revise the 1919 Programme. Apart from an oblique reference by Malenkov in 1947, nothing was heard of the work of this commission. In 1952 another commission was formed, again headed by Stalin (although,

interestingly, Chruščev was dropped from the membership) which ***was*** to produce a draft for the 20th Congress. Once more it failed to foduce anything.

At the 20th Congress in 1956, Chruščev proposed that a new Programme be drawn up for the next Congress. No details of the commission's membership were published and no information on the Programme was released during 1956-9. It was not until June 1961 that a draft of the new Programme was submitted to the c c for approval. After a period of nation-wide discussion, the Programme was adopted at the 22nd Congress in October 1961.

**Revising the standard story**

Material emerging since the collapse of communism has begun to fill in some of the 'gaps' in this story, and also to amend this time-table somewhat. According to N. Barsukov, writing in *Dialog* in 1991, the work of the 1939 Commission was renewed in March 1946 under the direction of Andrej Ždanov.[10] In 1948 a final variant of the draft was prepared (along with a twenty-year economic plan). In this draft it was stated that, 'The All-Union **CP** has as its aim in the course of the next 20-30 years to construct a communist society in the **USSR**.' With the postponement of the 19th Congress, the draft was archived. The work of the 1952 commission, accord-ing to Barsukov, was to be guided by Stalin's work *Economic Prob-lems of Socialism.* The death of Stalin, and the upheavals surround-ing de-Stalinisation prevented this commission from beginning its work. However, the 1956 decision began to be effected in 1958, when the cc created a group of specialists (under the guidance of Ponomarev and meeting in the Sosny health resort just outside Moscow) to begin work on the theoretical part of the Programme. In June of that year, a series of tasks and thematic topics were circulated by Otto Kuusinen to various scientific institutes, government departments and social organisations to prepare different parts of the Programme. For example, E. S. Varga and S. G. Strumilin were given responsibility for producing economic estimates for the development of socialism and capitalism.

[10] Н. Барсуков, 1991, Коммунистические иллюзии, *Диалог 1991:* J, 75-83. In the discussions surrounding the party programme drawn up under Gorbačev in July 1991, there appeared a number of pieces revisiting the Chruščev party programme. As Gorbačev was in the process of abandoning the Utopian and teleo-fogical elements of Soviet ideology at this time, so the retrospective pieces on Chruščev's programme focused on the problematic Utopian elements.

In September 1958, the decision was taken to convene the (extraordinary) 21st Congress in January/February 1959. The draft which had already been prepared was taken out of discussion for a while, so that the theses and economic plans outlined by Chruščev at the 21 st Congress could be fully elaborated. Once the stance of the Party had been decided, the Programme could take these into account. The content of the Programme was thus under constant revision in the light of the changing political and economic priorities of the Chruščev leadership. The 1959 Congress was an important point in the evolution of the new Programme. As the Programme began to focus upon the task of the full-scale construction of communism, so the Congress emphasised the full and final victory of socialism in the **USSR,** thus opening the way to begin the transition to communism.

Immediately after the 21st Congress in March 1959, the Programme Commission was convened to examine the latest variant. In July 1959, a series of commissions and sub-commissions were created to work on different aspects of the Programme, and by the end of that year a revised draft had been created. The Programme Commission forwarded this version to the cc. They examined the draft and introduced some major amendments. Most notably, the cc commissioned extensive statistical materials concerned with the future performance of the Soviet economy. At the end of i960, the document was sent back to the various sub-commissions for polishing and final amendments. Chruščev outlined a brief description of its contents at the June 1961 cc plenum, where various participants suggested further amendments. The draft was published on the 30 July, and this formed the basis for the nation-wide discussion in the summer of 1961. An extensive public debate ensued. Party members and ordinary people were given the opportunity to discuss various aspects of the Programme, send in criticisms and interestingly suggest amendments and alternatives. The leadership created 22 working groups—including political theory, property, equality, work and so on—to sift through the proposals and if possible or desirable work them into the draft. Chruščev estimated that 82 million people took part, although there is little way of verifying this figure.

Public discussion and consultation had little impact upon the final draft. The Party kept strict control over the process. In the section dealing with the theoretical part of the Programme, over 800 proposals were received, none of which were included. After the

nation-wide consultation had been completed, the final draft was approved at a cc plenum in October 1961, and passed at the 22nd Congress later that month.

**Assessing the drafting of the Programme I:**

**intellectuals, individuals and the struggle to change the official ideology**

Analysing the drafting process allows us to lift the lid on the rather murky life of the party ideologist and his work, shedding a little light on the convoluted and complex manner by which new ideas were incorporated into the official belief-system. At the heart of this process lie significant individuals. This has been overlooked somewhat in scholarly analysis of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. The ideas themselves have been analysed in the most minute detail, without due regard being given to the people and the various departments, committees and agencies involved in their production and dissemination. Reference to significant individuals is important as it locates Soviet Marxism-Leninism and its development within the material, human and intellectual context out of which it arose.

What has become clear from examining how the different ideological documents of this period were composed is that individuals exerted enormous influence over the final outcome. The values, outlook, contacts and personal influence that individuals had within the politico-ideological hierarchy were critical in shaping any new ideological statement. The drive to renew the ideology after 1956 led to the creation of intellectual or creative collectives to undertake these projects. The composition of these collectives, and so the character of the work produced, was shaped to a large extent by the figure who headed the collective. This is best exemplified by the contrast between the *History of the CPSU* and the philosophy text-book. The latter was headed by Otto Kuusinen, the old Bolshevik ideologist who returned to the Praesidium after the defeat of the anti-Party group. Kuusinen was a crucial figure in selecting and sheltering young, reform-minded intellectuals. Initially, the membership of the editorial collectives were selected by the department of propaganda, and were, in Arbatov's words, composed of the 'ideological high priests and their underlings'.[11] Kuusinen was dissatisfied with the people assigned to him, and began a search for a new, more dynamic team. This ability to circumvent the official

[11] See Г. Арбатов, 1991, *Затянувшееся выздоровление: свидетельство современника,* Москва, JO-2.

procedures in order to acquire the 'right' people enabled Kuusinen to shape the final document in line with his own values to a great extent. How did he go about achieving this?

Kuusinen sought out various figures. He had been at *Novoe vremja* in the 1950s as a secret member of the editorial board (writing under the name N. Bal'tijskij) and there he noticed Georgij Arbatov.[12] Fedor Burlackij was recruited from the apparatus of the International Department.[13] Other members of the philosophy working-group included well-known figures (E. S. Varga, S. G. Strumilin, P. N. Fedoseev) as well as relative newcomers. The work seems tame by the standards of perestrojka; but measured against Stalinist orthodoxy, the innovations were significant, particularly in the field of politics, where a new view of the state was developed.[14] In comparison, the new history of the CPSU was drawn up by a far more conservative grouping, and the outcome was far less innovative and striking. Indeed the two collectives often dined in the same hall during the preparation of the materials and exchanged, in Bur-lackij's words 'caustic remarks'.[15] This, in microcosm, reflects the wider struggle between conservatism and reformism in the ideological sphere, a struggle played out in the editorial boards of many journals, as well as the departmental meetings within the apparatus. Kuusinen was equally influential in the drafting of the Third Party Programme, seeking out innovative thinkers, writing letters to Chruščev, criticising bits of the draft he was unhappy with and generally orchestrating the process in numerous subtle ways.

So, individuals mattered. But changing the ideology was almost always a messy, complex, conflict-ridden business. Some of the memoir material that has emerged since *glasnost'* has shed light on the conflicts that accompanied the drafting of the document. The process appears to have been a rather elaborate dance, full of minor conflicts and rivalries amongst different individuals within the drafting commission, all attempting to assert their authority and to

[12] G. Arbatov, 1989, America also needs perestroika, in: S. Cohen & K. van den Heuvel (eds), *Voices of Glasnost,* New York, 308. Arbatov was scathing of the old textbook, calling it 'bullshit'.
[13] Burlackij's reminiscences are contained within his fascinating piece «После Сталина» in *Новый мир* 1988 : io. This is translated in *Soviet Law and Government* Winter 1989/90, 5-80. Burlackij also has a piece ('Démocratisation is a long march') in Cohen & van den Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost,* 174-96.
[14] Бурлацкий, После Сталина, 34-6, is a fascinating account of the way in which a new idea was developed and incorporated into the official ideology.
[15] Ibid. 36.

have their perspective inserted into the final document. Individuals were constantly being moved from section to section, receiving Instructions from their direct superiors about what to emphasise, two examples are of particular interest in illustrating the diverse pressures brought to bear upon the members of the Programme Commission.

The first concerns the principle of compulsory cadre turnover. This brought forth a storm of protest. At least ten different formulations were put together, and Chruščev was forced to retreat under the pressure of the lower ranking cadres, who saw this as a threat to their position and privileges. The final procedure was unrecognisable from the first suggestion advanced by Chruščev. This is a clear demonstration of the ability of lower-ranking officials to exert pressure and force the leadership to accede to their views. It also shows the constantly shifting political context in which ideological discussions and changes took place. This was no highly detached, formal process.

The second issue pertains to statistical material on the country's economic development, and on economic competition in the world arena. Burlackij recalls,

> A. F. Zasjad'ko had come to one of the meetings with the proposal to include *[the statistical material,* M.S.] in the Programme. The members of the working group were emphatically against this proposal. The report which Zasjad'ko had prepared on the matter within the working group struck both our leadership and all the rest of us as frivolous and unscientific. The estimates on the growth rates of the Soviet and us economies were in fact taken out of thin air: they represented wishful thinking rather than reality. But he easily put an end to the discussion ... he opened the first page of a type written book and pointed to an annotation 'include in the programme' with the familiar signature of the First Secretary.[16]

In this instance, the political diktat of the General Secretary prevailed, overriding both the detailed analytical research of scholars engaged in an analysis of the us economy, and those who counselled caution in making bold predictions (one of whom, interestingly, was Kuusinen himself). But in spite of the opposition of almost all those involved in the working group on comparative economic performance, Chruščev—via Zasjad'ko—triumphed.

[16] Ibid. 55.

It is clear from these insights that there were a peculiar set of complex pressures exerted upon those involved in this process. The outcome was a mass of compromises and delicate negotiations between competing interests and significant individuals. It is little wonder that it took three years to draw up the document.

Lastly, it also throws light upon the degree of control over the official ideology that the 'citadel of dogmatism' exerted. The personal and political interests of the ideological establishment centred on the defence of the orthodox interpretation of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, and this was often played out as a struggle between individuals. For example, Burlackij was prompted by Kuusinen to argue for a shift in the Soviet view of the state towards an All-People's State and away from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. It was not easy for Kuusinen to get these ideas adopted, involving a struggle with the guardians of orthodoxy within the ideological apparatus. Burlackij also cites an interesting account of the way in which Suslov made comments upon and altered the materials being prepared by the consultants in the International Department:

> Our group of consultants was especially amused by his comment on whether to write 'Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism', or 'Marxism-Leninism-proletarian internationalism'. Every time we wrote 'and' Suslov would strike it out and insert a dash, since after all the one could not be counter-poised to the other. Marxism-Leninism is proletarian internationalism.[17]

This, in microcosm, brilliantly illustrates the struggle involved in 'creatively developing' Marxism-Leninism. The degree of ideological control exerted by the guardians of orthodoxy extended to the microscopic oversight of all ideological statements. The struggle to change or defend the existing ideology was played out between individuals, between working groups, and between departments. It occurred via a thousand pen strokes, corrections and scribbled notes in the margins of documents as they were constantly refined and redrafted.

[17] Ibid., 65.

**Assessing the drafting of the Programme II: the rise of the reformist intelligentsia and the power of knowledge**

The impact of the drafting of the Third Party Programme on intellectual life and the intelligentsia in the post-Stalinist era wrought significant changes in the relationship between knowledge and power in the Soviet state in three ways. Firstly, it began to undermine the grip of the 'citadel of dogmatism' over intellectual life, creating the basis for the emergence of a more autonomous, pluralistic intelligentsia within the party-state hierarchy. Secondly, the Party became increasingly dependent upon various sections of the intelligentsia both in its ideological and theoretical work, and in detailed policy-formation. Thirdly, this period sowed the seeds that only really began to come to the surface after 1985: the architects and designers of perestrojka started their journey to prominence in this era. Let us unpack these three ideas a little more.

The Secret Speech, de-Stalinisation, and the cultural and intellectual thaw that followed were an important catalyst in loosening the grip of the guardians of orthodoxy over intellectual life. The atmosphere was far more conducive (within selected areas) to fostering more innovative thinking. The intellectual renewal which Chruščev hesitantly set in motion opened up limited opportunities for more creativity and innovation amongst the intelligentsia. Certain groups of intellectuals were now able to think in more unorthodox ways, although without being able openly to express heretical opinions. An intellectual space had begun to open up between unthinking conformity and open dissent. From this point onwards we can begin to see the growth and development of a heterogeneous 'official' intelligentsia, notwithstanding the growth of open dissidents in the following decade. A place for 'within-system' opposition had been created.[18]

The crucial factor was that this new atmosphere was institutionalised under Chruščev. The state began to create a series of new institutes that quickly earned reputations as centres of innovative and creative thought. Not only did they foster a sense of autonomy, but they also became havens, secure places at times of retrenchment, partially sheltering individuals from the intrusions of the ideological guardians. These did not encompass every area of intellectual

[18] The question of which group—dissidents or within-system critics—played a greater role in the changes after 1985 has aroused some controversy, both amongst Soviet and western scholars.

life. Two fields in particular stand out. Economic reform meant that the leadership was forced to encourage innovation amongst its economists, in order to break the stranglehold of Stalinist orthodoxy, and explore new ways of approaching the Soviet economy. Secondly new approaches were required in order to study the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. It was in these fields —economics and international relations—that creative centres first began to emerge. Interestingly, many scholars chose to work in these fields because they offered the greatest degree of intellectual autonomy. Nikolaj Smelev recalled how the choice of economics was a process of elimination in the 1950s: there was hardly 'any law to be studied, Philosophy had been frozen. History hardly existed. And I wanted to write literature not study it.[19] Two economic centres are worthy of note. Under Chruščev, Akademgorodok just outside Novosibirsk in Siberia was created in 1957. This was a collection of 22 scientific institutes, concentrated in one area. It developed into something of a haven for younger, more radical and innovative scholars. The geographical position of Akademgorodok, far from Moscow, meant it was relatively free of direct Party supervision. The most well-known members of this community of scholars were Abel Aganbegjan and Tat'jana Zaslavskaja, who both joined the Institute of Economics and Industrial Organisation in the early 1960s.[20] The second group was formed at The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (**IMEMO**). This institute was created in the mid-1950s, under the directorship of A. A. Arzumanjan, and quickly became, in Arbatov's words, an 'incubator' for economists, international relations scholars, and foreign policy specialists.[21] The grip of the citadel of dogmatism on intellectual life and the intelligentsia had begun to be weakened.

This loosening of controls was accelerated by the conscious actions of the leadership to extend the scope of discussion and consultation in policy-making. The intelligentsia benefited from the growing reliance of the leadership on the need for expertise. It became evident by the 1950s that the analytical capacity of the apparatus had dwindled substantially. The bureaucracy was dominated by careerists who avoided responsibility, were intellectually con-

[19] N. Shmelyov, The rebirth of common sense, in: Cohen & van den Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost,* 141.
[20] Арбатов, *Затянувшееся выздоровление,* 63-75.
[21] See T. Zaslavskaya, Socialism with a human face, in: Cohen & van den Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost,* 115-17.

formist, highly resistant to change and ill-equipped for the challenges of de-Stalinisation.[22] The imperatives of economic moderni-sation, the challenge of post-Stalinist social policy and the new international commitments in Eastern Europe required levels of analysis that the apparatus could not meet. The party elite initiated the process of soliciting expert contributions in these areas, but without shifting control of policy outside of the apparatus itself. It waas in the process of discussing policy alternatives after 1953 that it became possible for institutes outside of the narrow party-state hierarchy to develop some autonomy. This was deepened by the drafting process, which relied heavily on expert contributions in various fields. This opened up the politico-ideological complex to influence from 'the outside'.[23] Ideological renewal paved the way for young intellectuals to be drawn into the politico-ideological hierarchy.[24]

- The fate of these 'young intellectuals' is itself a momentous story. Many of the architects of perestrojka first came to prominence as a result of this period of intellectual renewal. Perhaps the most important section was the consultant group set up by Jurij Andropov in 1961 as part of the cc Department for Relations with 'Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries.[25] This .Department had been created when the International Department was split in 1957. Andropov was a protege of Kuusinen, and one can trace a direct line between Kuusinen, Andropov and Gorbačev[26]. This group of consultants was drawn into the ideological apparatus proper, having input into the discussions and policy-formation and making contacts with Party officials at all levels.

In 19 5 8, in Prague, the journal *Problemy mira i socializma* under the editorship of Aleksandr Rumjancev was founded. For Georgij Arbatov (a prominent member of the Gorbačev 'brains trust' after

[22] G. Arbatov, 1992, *The System: an Insider's Life in Soviet Politics,* New York, 142-8.
[23] See Jerry Hough, 1979, *How the Soviet Union is Governed,* Harvard, 422-4, for details on the role of consultants in the cc apparatus.
[24] A fascinating insight into the process of drafting the 1961 Party Programme can be foundin Барсуков, Коммунистические иллюзии.
[25] The work of this department has been mentioned in several sources. See for example Арбатов, *Затянувшееся выздоровление,* 79-85; and idem, America also needs perestroika, 309. The most detailed account can be found in Бурлац- кий, После Сталина, 18-80.
[26] For an account of the relationship between Andropov and Kuusinen, see J. Steele & E. Abraham, 1983, *Andropov in Power,* Oxford, 45-7, and Z. Medvedev, 1984, *Andropov,* Oxford, 31-2.

1985), the significance of this journal lay not in the ideas and concepts elaborated, but in the theoretical and political preparation it provided for the journal's cadres. Many of these individuals played a crucial role, providing an 'intellectual bridge' between the 20th Congress and perestrojka, and a 'barricade' preventing the re-Sta-linisation of the system. The list of figures recruited by Rumjancev included Arbatov himself, G. Sachnazarov, K. Brutenc, Ju. Karja-kin, V. Zagladin, G. Gerasimov.[27]

Control over knowledge had begun to be yielded by the state. Once yielded, it proved almost impossible to retrieve, although this did not prevent the state from frequent attempts to restrict the limits of intellectual acceptability after 1964. The politico-ideological complex gradually saw the scope and extent of its powers reduced by the growing autonomy of departments and groups involved in the production and dissemination of ideas and policies. The futility of an intelligentsia staffed primarily by people of unthinking conformity had become clear to the post-Stalin leadership. The dilemma for those involved in the supervision of the ideology was how to exercise control whilst encouraging (selective) creativity and specialisation to provide expertise. This accounts for the constant oscillations and shifting boundaries of the acceptable and unacceptable. But by encouraging input from 'experts' and opening up the recruitment of intellectuals to more creative, innovative thinkers, the state had let slip a key component of its armoury of social controls. The genie had escaped.

## Conclusion

The period between 1961 and 1985 saw the development of a much more pluralistic, heterogeneous intellectual landscape. This fragmentation of intellectual life—with a variety of dissidents, liberal reformers, Russian nationalists, environmental campaigners, and village prose writers—arose out of the state-sponsored ideological renewal which took place between 1952 and 1961. During the extended process of drafting the Third Party Programme, the Soviet state began to relinquish control over its ideological production and stimulated the emergence of critical, innovative and creative voices amongst its own ranks. This rebirth of the intelligentsia—as critics, moral guardians, heralds of change, proponents of reform—came

[27] Арбатов, *Затянувшееся выздоровление,* 75-9.

from within the politico-ideological complex itself. The Soviet state had created those who were both to revolutionise it, and eventually to bury it.