

The non-Bolshevik intelligentsia of the Don in 1917 and the early 1920s

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INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING the intelligentsia of the Don with attention to the interactions of the intelligentsia with Revolution and Power are of considerable interest. Such a study allows us to examine the social and political conduct of the non-Bolshevik intelligentsia in 1917-19 and to analyse the reasons for its rejection of the Bolshevik revolutionary experiment in Russia as well as the reactions of the Soviet government to this position. At the beginning of the period under investigation the term 'intelligentsia' was used both in a wide (cultural) and a narrow (ideological) sense. Here it is of importance to take two things into account: firstly, the public perception of the concept and, secondly, the process of the intelligentsia's self-identification. Not only the regional Don intelligentsia (and that of the Cossacks in particular) but also the Russian intelligentsia as such is investigated in this paper.

The Don territory played an important role in the Russian revolution. The social and political processes in this original region, understood within the context of the All-Russian events, had quite a few characteristic features. The region lay at the crossroad of interests of a variety of political forces, all of which tried to establish their connection with it. After October 1917 the region played a vital part in the political struggle and became a southern center for the anti-Bolshevik forces. From the fall of 1917 until the beginning of 1920 it alternated under the control of White and Red regimes. Under such extreme conditions the intelligentsia was able to compare the policies of the struggling sides, while protesting against violence, social experiments, and the destruction of culture.

A brief characterisation of the Don intelligentsia

First of all, we must give a brief characterisation of the particular features of the Don intelligentsia. In 1917 the intelligentsia and the white-collar workers of the Don and the Northern Caucasus constituted only a small part of the population: 2.0% or *c.* 200,000 people.¹ The Don intelligentsia was not provincially isolated, instead its

¹ А. И. Козлов, 1984, Некоторые вопросы общественно-экономического развития и социального состава населения Дона и Северного Кавказа накануне Октября, *Социально-экономическая структура населения Дона и Северного Кавказа*, Ростов-на-Дону, 23; idem, [1978], Социально-экономические, политические отношения и классовая борьба на Юго-Востоке Европейской России накануне Октября. (Doctoral diss. (Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора исторических наук), Rostov State University), 269-71.

formation was influenced by the processes of migration. Migration in fact increased in the period of World War I and the **1917** Revolution and the social make-up of the intelligentsia changed as a consequence. This is why one can speak about the 'stationary' and the 'moving' groups of the Don intelligentsia. Thousands of intellectuals moved from the central and other parts of Russia to the Don region, and among the reasons for this southeast-oriented wave of intelligentsia migration were the threat of repression and starvation, and the loss of employment as a result of the destruction of industrial production and the army. There were also political reasons including the will to put up a military struggle against the Bolsheviks.

Among this escaped intelligentsia there were prominent state, social, and political leaders, scholars and writers. It is a remarkable fact, for example, that in 1915 Rostov-on-the-Don (henceforth: Rostov) received its first university, which had been evacuated from Poland ² as a consequence many prominent scholars of the former Warsaw University actively participated in the cultural and sociopolitical life of the Don area. When legal political activity became impossible in the center of the country, representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, in the persons of many party leaders, went to the Don area.

There were, in the industrial port city of Rostov, some ten thousand military officers, while in the regional capital of Novočerkassk there were, at the beginning of 1918, more than sixteen thousand officers and cadets.³ The more active part of the newly arrived (*priUaja*) intelligentsia influenced the Don political and cultural situation considerably.⁴ After the war against the Bolsheviks was lost, however, many representatives of the intelligentsia, including practically all the leaders of the Cossack intelligentsia, escaped into emigration.

² On which see S. I. Michal'čenko's paper above.

³ В. Н. Шапошник, 1980, *Северо-Кавказский военный округ в 1918 г.*, Ростов-на-Дону, 20.

⁴ Александр Дроздов, 1921, *Интеллигенция на Дону*, in: *Архив русской революции* I, Берлин.

The professional structure of the Don intelligentsia was similar to that of the Russian intelligentsia as a whole. The professional intelligentsia may be divided into four groups. The first group 'Included those who were engaged in industrial and agricultural production, and in trade and transport; the second consisted of cultural and ideological 'workers'; state servants and military intelligentsia *can be put in the third group, and in the fourth—students of secondary schools and high schools.

The Don intelligentsia was multi-national. The national groups—for example the Russian (*russkaja*), the Armenian, and the Jewish intelligentsia—mutually influenced each other, and at the same time they kept and developed their peculiarities. Those who thought of the Cossacks as a nation distinguished two groups within the Cossack intelligentsia: 'pure' Cossacks, i.e. the leaders of the Cossacks, 'the brains' and 'the flesh of the Cossacks' flesh' on the one hand, and, on the other, 'the Russian intelligentsia of Cossack extraction', who were brought up not in their own traditions but in those of 'official' Russia. This was 'by blood a Don intelligentsia yet in spirit and aspirations deeply Russian'.⁵ It adopted the 'liberal' aspects of the Russian *intelligent* and looked at its own masses with preconceptions and tendentiousness. Moreover, it was blamed for misunderstanding the essence of the Cossacks' struggle during the 'Russo-Cossack war', as well as during the 'national war' with the Great Russians for the emancipation of the Don from Russia.⁶ Differences within the Cossack intelligentsia influenced the interrelations of participants of the White movement as well as the political climate as a whole.

The experiences of the intelligentsia between the revolutions of 1917 and in the period October 1917-19

Studying the experience of the inter-revolutionary intelligentsia is of singular interest for an analysis of the early Civil War. It cannot be doubted that the intelligentsia had become activated and increas-

⁵ *Трагедия казачества. (Очерк на тему: Казачество и Россия). Годы 1917-1919*, pt i (Прага, Г933), 1,2, 159.

⁶ *Ibid.*; И.Ф. Быкадоров, 1992. in: *Казачество. Мысли современников о прошлом, настоящем и будущем казачества*, Ростов-на-Дону 1992, 94-104; В. Ва-загов, 1924, О проблеме казачьей истории (мысли по поводу письма Донского Войскового атамана от 7-го августа 1924 г., *Казачий столх* (Прага) 2-3 (1924), 3; [В.А.Харламов], 1923, Чествование памяти Донских героев. Речь Председателя Донского Войскового Круга В. А. Харламова, *Казачьи думы* (София) 1923: i, 4.

ingly politicized under the influence of Russian socio-political events. In the pre-Revolutionary years its main part took little interest in politics: no more than 2-3 % of the intelligentsia appear to have had party membership at the beginning of 1917,⁷ but February 1917 would force a considerable part of the non-political intelligentsia to identify its social aspirations.

At the time there were sixteen different political parties in the Don region. The Constitutional Democratic (or Kadet) Party was the most active one. It 'had been created and was kept up mainly by the Russian intelligentsia'.⁸ In the Don region it was supported in part by professors, lawyers, and by senior bureaucrats. On the eve of October 1917 there were more than ten Kadet organizations with more than one thousand members in Rostov, Nachičevan'-on-the-Don, Novočerkassk, and other cities and *stanitsas* (Cossack communities); the most numerous party, that of the Socialist Revolutionaries, attracted the attention of the urban and rural democratic intelligentsia; the intelligentsia also constituted a considerable part of the Menshevik Party. The high degree of politicization of the intelligentsia taking form made it possible for different parties to create youth and students factions. Practically all the unions established at that time acquired a political character. In this situation the members of the Young Intelligentsia Union emphasised that they should set themselves to intellectual development but not to political activities. Very often persons of similar minds would remain merely 'a group of sympathizers' (*gmppa sočuvstvujuščich*) and would not join any party or union. Others were not ready to adopt the ideas of the Revolution or take upon themselves any unusual 'mental and nervous efforts'.⁹

For certain categories of the intelligentsia military-industrial committees became centers of socio-political life, meetings, and the discussing of reports on urgent problems.¹⁰ Thus, the Novočerkassk military-industrial committee (**ВПК**) united all the city's intelligentsia, and in it 'scholars, technical and intellectual forces'¹¹

⁷ О.Н. Знаменский, 1988, *Интеллигенция накануне Великого Октября (февраль-октябрь 1917 г.)*, Ленинград, 19.

⁸ И. А. Малиновский, 1918, Памяти товарища А. Р. Колли, и февраля 1918 г., *Приазовский край* (Ростов-на-Дону), 13 (26) Мая 1918.

⁹ Архив редких изданий Научной библиотеки Ростовского государственного университета: П.М. Агеев, Воспоминания. 1917 год (typescript), 19, 21, 26-7.

¹⁰ Государственный архив Ростовской области (*henceforth*: GARO), f. 91, op. 3, d. 24, i, fos. yr-v, br-ir; *Приазовский край* 12,24 September 1917.

¹¹ К. П. Каклюгин, 1923, Организация власти на Дону в начале революции, *Донская летопись* (Вена) 2, 65.

actively cooperated. The slogan 'War till final victory' was very popular with the intelligentsia. The so-called *oboroncy* countered with the slogan 'Peace without annexations or contributions'. Russia's transition to democracy promised the intelligentsia new possibilities in the socio-political sphere, in the organization of new "structures of power from local to central levels. A most authoritative group of representatives of the Don intelligentsia participated in the All-Cossack Congress held in Petrograd in March 1917 and the State Conference held in Moscow on 12-15 August 1917.¹² Clergy and parishioners delegated representatives to the first Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (*Pomestnyj Sobor*), a significant event in Russian spiritual life, which began its sessions in Moscow on 15 August 1917 and re-established the patriarchate, abolished since the times of Peter the Great.¹³ The intelligentsia had great hopes for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.¹⁴ Qualified specialists participated in the Don regional commission and in municipal and district commissions for the organization of elections for the Constituent Assembly. This was a good opportunity for the intelligentsia to compose programs and to discuss the problems of a new state order. In the main, the representatives of the intelligentsia were to be found in the Kadet Party and among the Cossack candidates.¹⁵

After the February Revolution, the Cossacks recognized the Provisional Government but reclaimed their right to choose their own Ataman and to have their own Parliament—the Military Circle (*Vojskovej Krug*). In June 1917, the Don Cossack Parliament elected General Kaledin Ataman of the Don. Mitrofan Petrovič

¹² Государственное совещание 12-15 августа 1917 года. (Стенографический отчет), Москва • Ленинград 1930, 310-29; Агеев, Воспоминания, 29-31; Приазовский край 6 August, 1917.

¹³ GARO, f. 527, op. 3, d. 714, fos. iir-i2r; Приазовский край 8-13 August 1917. —Pavel Vladimirovič Verchovskoj, (1879-1943 or 1944), a Professor at the Don University, who was invited to the Moscow Council by the Most Holy Synod, later wrote: 'The Lord has sent us our Great Master, Father and Preacher, the Most Holy Tichon, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia' (П. В. Верховской, 1919, Патриарх Тихон, Ростов-на-Дону, 3).

¹⁴ И.А.Малиновский, 1917, Учредительное собрание, Приазовский край 13 August 1917.

¹⁵ GARO, f. 855, op. i, d. 108, fos. 108-109^; d. 123, fo. ir-v, Air-v, 6\$-v, 97, i jir-v, gobr-v; К. П. Каклюгин, 1923, Войсковой атаман Каледин и его время, Донская летопись г, 122-4; Ю.К.Кириенко, 1976, Крах калединщины, Москва, 70.

Bogaevskij, a teacher and historian, 'the Demosthenes of the Don',¹⁶ was the Ataman's assistant. He noted that 'the general level of the Circles was fairly intelligent (*intelligentnyj*)'.¹⁷ The intelligentsia played an important role in the regional government of the Don Cossacks and its departments. To begin with the government included Kaledin, Bogaevskij, and fourteen regional representatives.¹⁸

After March 1917 the intelligentsia took an active part in organizing such new power structures as the Don Executive Committee in Novočerkassk or the Civil Committee in Rostov, headed by Vladimir Feofilovič Zeeler, a lawyer and leader of the Don Kadets. The Don Executive Committee consisted mainly of non-Cossacks and was first led by A.I. Petrovskij, a barrister affiliated with the Kadet Party. Following Kaledin's election the Committee considered itself the leader of the non-Cossack population.¹⁹ Numerous executive committees—roughly three hundred by the beginning of May 1917—sprang up in different cities and stanitsas.²⁰ In addition, a large part of the newly elected members of the democratic municipal dumas (at times half of them) had a high level of education.²¹ In August 1917 the Provisional Government unwarrantedly accused General Kaledin of being a supporter of General Lavr Georgievič Kornilov and the organizer of a Don Cossack uprising. Bolshevik threats led to the strengthening of the idea of statehood and the tendency to organize local powers.²² The SouthEast Alliance, a political and economical union of the Don, Kuban', and Terek Cossacks, formed on 20 October 1917,²³ was initiated by the

¹⁶ Д. Дмитриевич, 1919, Студенческая боевая дружина, *Донская волна* (Ростов-на-Дону) 1919:19, 1.

¹⁷ М. П. Бogaевский, 1919, Ответ перед историей, *Донская волна* 1919:25,12.

¹⁸ Hoover Institution Archive (Stanford), Н.Ф. Акаемов, [1930], Калединские мятежи; Агеев, Воспоминания, 5, 42.

¹⁹ И GARO, f. 649, op. i, d. 295, fos. 2-4, вг-в, 297; Акаемов, Калединские мятежи; Каклюгин, Организация власти, 74-81; Ю.К.Кириенко, 1988, *Революция и донское казачество*, Ростов-на-Дону, 34-8; Д. М. Чернояров, 1923, Очерки революционной жизни на Дону, *Донская летопись* 2,40-1.

²⁰ Кириенко, *Революция и донское казачество*, 36; Козлов, Социально-экономические, политические отношения, 351-2, 358.

²¹ GARO, f. 649, op. i, d. 319, fos. 1-7; d. 373, fo. 1; *Приазовский край* 22 March; 12, 19,25 July; 3, 6, 8 August; 7, 10, 21 September; 3 November 1917.

²² Агеев, Воспоминания; Акаемов, Калединские мятежи.

²³ Gregory Porphyrievich Tschebotarioff, 1964, *Russia: My Native Land*, New York • London • Toronto, 145-6; В. А. Харламов, 1923, Юго-Восточный Союз в 1917 году, *Донская летопись* 2;idem, 1995, *Казачий депутат Государственной Думы (1906-1917)*, Санкт-Петербург, 148-57; В.В.Добрынин, 1992, in: *Казачество. Мысли современников*, 147.

Cossack intelligentsia and was in fact a preventive measure against 'the expected excesses of the Revolution'.²⁴ In the early Civil War period this Alliance became one of the first anti-Bolshevist centers in the area.²⁵ The President of the Military Circle, Vasilij Akimovič Charlamov,²⁶ became President of the Southeastern Alliance government. He wrote that there was a pressing need for concerted action and the closing of ranks 'for the struggle with upcoming anarchy'.²⁷

Representatives of the intelligentsia participated in the Don Economic Meeting instituted by the Ataman and the government in November 1917, in the Don Senate, which was the highest tribunal, and in the Don Civil Council organized in December 1917. The fact that Cossacks took upon themselves all the functions of governmental power, creating their own legislation and establishing their own tribunals, played an important role in setting up anti-Bolshevik resistance in the Don region.

The regional government of the Don Cossacks refused to support the Council of People's Commissars and declared its territory independent and free from Soviet power until such time as a permanent legal order might be established in Russia. The intelligentsia expressed its negative attitude towards the Bolsheviks' seizure of power at the meetings of the Novočerkassk and Rostov city dumas on 26 and 28 October 1917. Here, even the opinions of those political opponents, the Kadets and the Mensheviks, coincided. The positions of the speakers were clearly and firmly expressed in words such as: 'Subordination to the "bandits" is out of the question,' or 'Bolsheviks are unacceptable for Rostov.' Organizing strong local powers was proclaimed to be the only possible way to save the country.²⁸

At first, the Cossack leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement were hoping to prevent fratricidal war and tried to negotiate with Lenin's government.²⁹ However, they soon ceased to count on any

²⁴ Харламов, *Казачий депутат*, 148.

²⁵ А. В. Венков, 1995, *Антибольшевистское движение на Юге России на начальном этапе гражданской войны*, Ростов-на-Дону, 33.

²⁶ Vasilij Akimovič Charlamov (1875-1957), teacher of history, deputy of the State Duma, President of the Don-Kuban' Committee of the Zemstvo Alliance, member of the Kadet Party.

²⁷ Харламов, *Казачий депутат*, 149.

²⁸ GARO, f. 694, op. i, d. 285 a, fos. yr, 8r-2or; Черныяров, *Очерки революционной жизни*, 53-6, 60.

²⁹ *Вольный Дон* 29 November 1917.

peaceful options, considering that Bolshevism had completely lost its ideological nature and transformed into anarchy. At the beginning, the concentration of anti-Bolshevik forces was bound up with serious complications because it created apprehension and displeased parts of the population. General Michail Vasil'evič Alekseev arrived at Novočerkassk on 2 November 1917 and initiated the formation of the White Army. There was a lack of necessary means, and it was not easy for him even to feed his first five hundred officers and cadets and provide them with clothes.³⁰ The Don government did not render any assistance to his organization, and the Don Ataman Kaledin asked that it be removed from the region and act as secretly as was possible.³¹ 'The sympathetic intelligentsia was, as everywhere, dumb and helpless,' Anton Ivanovič Denikin was to write later.³²

When, in the middle of November 1917, the Bolshevik forces advanced into the Sal'skij *okrug*, Kaledin undertook decisive measures and declared martial law in the Don region. In late November 1917 there was a first attempt to establish Soviet Power in Rostov. It became a severe test for the first volunteers. General Kaledin refused to be the one who started fighting the local Bolsheviks; he let them begin in order to have the moral right of defense.³³ The Rostov front was under the direct leadership of the Don Ataman who asked General Alekseev to help him put down a Red Guard uprising. The local Bolsheviks remained in power for some days, but on 2 December 1917 they were overthrown by the Cossacks and volunteers, who were met and greeted enthusiastically by the Rostovites. The intelligentsia thanked the Don Ataman for 'getting rid of the aggressors'³⁴ and presented him with flowers. From that moment on, which may be considered as the beginning of the Civil War in the region, Kaledin permitted the creation of White troops, which was in line with the intelligentsia's view of things. 'Alekseev's organization' began its legal existence and, in December 1917, became known as the Voluntary Army.

³⁰ А. П. Богаевский, 1993, 1918 год, in: *Белое дело. Ледяной поход*, Москва, 19; А. С. Лукомский, 1993, Воспоминания, in: *Белое дело. Генерал Корнилов*, Москва, 220.

³¹ А. И. Деникин, 1991, Очерки русской смуты, *Вопросы истории* 1991:7-8, 119, 121 ; Лукомский, Воспоминания, 220-1.

³² Деникин, Очерки русской смуты, 121.

³³ Я.М. Лисовой, 1918, Три недели в атаманском дворце, *Донская волна* 1918:4, 7.

³⁴ Чернояр, Очерки революционной жизни, 53-6, 60.

Despite this the Whites were lacking in volunteers in 1917. They 'fought heroically but their strength was dwindling. Loyal to the idea of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly and to retaining the democratic achievements of the Revolution, Kaledin did not declare mobilization in order to fight the Reds.³⁵ He hoped that the Cossacks would soon change their minds and defend the Don from the Bolsheviks. The organizers of the anti-Red forces also continued to adhere to the democratic voluntary basis of army recruitment. The majority preferred to be neutral in this situation. Several thousand Don officers were very slowly joining the struggle.³⁶ Many generals, field-officers and senior officers hesitated in their political choices, a great number of potential fighters bided their time.³⁷ In contrast, the reaction of the young was very quick and more open. A handful of officers and students, mainly youth, who in most cases had had no battle experience or even military training, stirred to action right away.

To begin with, the anti-Bolshevik detachments were spontaneous compositions of volunteers, operating as partisan units. They constituted an irregular 'small army of young partisans (*deti-Jjarti-zany*)³⁸ Thus, the Don Cossack Captain Vasilij Michajlovič Cerne-cov's first partisan unit, which consisted of some five hundred young officers and students, successfully fought the Reds and set an example for other partisan units created at later stages.³⁹ Ivan Grigor'evič Pavlov, a Cossack student and representative of the Kotovskaja stanitsa at the Military Circle, initiated the formation of the Students' All-Cossack Union (later: Stanitsa) at the Don University in Rostov on 6 November 1917. To begin with there were some hundred members in the Stanitsa. They supported the Don government and believed that the government would save the Don and revive Russia.⁴⁰

On 8 November 1917 about one thousand students held a meeting at the Don Polytechnic Institute in Novočerkassk. The students declared the Bolsheviks a 'criminal non-state element' and decided

³⁵ Г.В.Марченко, 1996, *Дорогой чести. Генерал Каледин: военная и государственная деятельность А. М. Каледина*, Москва.

³⁶ А. И. Деникин, 1993, *Борьба генерала Корнилова, Белое дело. Генерал Корнилов*, Москва, 77.

³⁷ И. А. Поляков, 1962, *Донские казаки в борьбе с большевиками*, Мюнхен.

³⁸ П.Х. Попов, 1918, Из истории освобождения Дона. (Записки походного атамана), *Донская волна* 1918:14,2.

³⁹ E.g. General E. F. Semiletov's and Colonel F. D. Nazarov's partisan units.

⁴⁰ Е.Н. Авилов, 1919, Студенческая станица, *Донская волна* 1919:9,7-9.

to support the Don government in its struggle against them. They sent a delegation to the Don Ataman and the government putting themselves at their disposal. The Rector Petr Petrovič Suščmskij, Kaledin, and Bogaevskij shared the students' patriotic burst but tried to persuade them to continue their studies and promised that the government would call them if necessary.⁴¹

Very soon the students organized the 'Fighting students' squad for the struggle against anarcho-Bolshevism' (*Boevaja studen-českaja dmžina dlja bor'by s anarcho-bol'shevizmom*), which consisted of two companies. Michej Grebennikov became the head of staff. On behalf of the HQ they appealed to the intelligentsia to take up arms. Students of institutes of higher education, pupils of secondary schools from seventeen years of age, and persons engaged in intellectual labor were admitted into the fighting squad; women were accepted for the sanitary detachment. The squad was at the disposal of the Military government; it had the latest weapons and equipment and included motorists.⁴² In November-December 1917 several participants of the squad took an active part in putting down a Red Guard uprising in Rostov.⁴³ Others were on garrison duty at Novočerkassk. When the railroaders refused to supply cartridges and rations to the Rostov front, students equipped thirteen locomotive crews and resumed railway traffic. Later these 'partisans from the intelligentsia' had the opportunity to carry on patriotic propaganda among the Cossacks.⁴⁴ The Don students were caring for numerous wounded especially at the Rostov railway station, the most difficult area for doctors; members of 'The Scientific and Labor Society of Male and Female Medical Students at the Don University' (*Naučno-trudovoe obščestvo studentov medikov i*

⁴¹ Алексей Двухженев, 1918, Донское студенчество и Дон (воспоминания студента-дружинника), *Донская волна* 1918:14, 10.

⁴² *Вольный Дон* i December 1917; *Сборник материалов по новейшей истории донского казачества со времен Русской революции 1917 г.*; Документ по. 3: Из истории студенческого движения на Дону, *Донская летопись* 2 (1923), 304-5.

⁴³ М. Т. Гребенников, 1924, Донское студенчество и большевики. (К семилетней годовщине — 8 ноября 1917 г. - 8 ноября 1924 г.), *Казачий стлох* i (1924), 4-5.

⁴⁴ On 9 December, 1917 the squad set out to Millerovo in support of the units disposed there. The Reds were near Čertkovo and sent their agitators to Millerovo station but were opposed by the students. Around forty members of the squad began to carry on patriotic propaganda among the Cossacks, explaining Kale-din's and Bogaevskij's democratic form of government. The students had some partial success. This activity was not safe, however. At Glubokaja station the crowd beat some students. Despite this the 'partisans from the intelligentsia' did not lose their high spirits (Двухженев, Донское студенчество, 10-12; Дмитриевич, Студенческая боевая дружина, 3).

mediček Donskom universitete) actively participated in a special sanitary detachment, formed in December 1917, and in twenty-four-hour duty at the distribution centre for the wounded.⁴⁵ The story of this Society, headed by the student Aleksej Nikolaevič Uspenskij, gives an interesting example of how the aims of the associations of the intelligentsia were transformed during the Civil War. The objectives of the original Society had been to create favorable conditions for study, rest, and the publication of books and lectures.⁴⁶

Parts of the civil intelligentsia mobilized in January 1918, when informed of the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly and the murder by Red Guards in the Mariinskij Hospital of Andrej Ivanovič Šingarev and Fedor Fedorovič Kokoškin, two Kadet leaders and delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Hundreds of engineers, lawyers, teachers, and others took part in the meetings and made common cause with the Don Government and the Voluntary Army. Representatives of the Rostov lawyers visited General Alekseev and confirmed that they were ready to support the Army. Partisan detachments, civil squads, self-defense groups, and public order squads were organized. After Ataman Kaledin's suicide on 29 January 1918, the new Ataman, General Anatolij Michajlovič Naza-rov, declared a general mobilization of all Cossacks—but without result. The recruitment of seminarists for the Infantry of Jesus' (*Iisovapecbota*) was yet another—desperate—attempt at increasing the number of defenders of the Don.⁴⁷

In February 1918 the Rostov Volunteers' Regiment or Students' Batalion was included in the Voluntary Army. It was created by General Aleksandr Borovskij on 19 January and consisted of more than 200 pupils from Rostov secondary schools. There were many examples of the organization of parties, performances and the collection of donations for wounded people and war victims by different groups of the Don intelligentsia. Some charitable unions and funds were established as well.

⁴⁵ Архив уголовных дел Управления Федеральной Службы Безопасности Российской Федерации по Ростовской области (*henceforth: AUD*), d. 14852, vol. 1-2.

⁴⁶ Departments of the Society were led by prominent and distinguished scholars such as Professor Aleksandr Andreevič Žandr (1855-1920), honorary chairman of the society, and Professor Zinovij Vasil'evič Gutnikov (1857-1920).

⁴⁷ Виктор Севский, 1918, Атаман *post scriptum*, *Донская волна* 1918:4, 1-4.

The Bolshevik forces gained an advantage in early February, and the Volunteers began their Ice March from which they would be back only 74 days later. During those 74 days of Soviet experience the intelligentsia suffered severely. The post-February time had already provided examples of the terrifying sadism of 'revolutionaries' and their massacre of officers, but after October violence spread to include all categories of the intelligentsia. Bolsheviks and their supporters were responsible for the murder of thousands of people without trial.⁴⁸

In mid-May 1918, General Petr Nikolaevič Krasnov was elected Ataman. Krasnov utilized the Cossack intelligentsia, although generally considering the intelligentsia his political opponents. The latter was not represented in the Military Circle for the Salvation of the Don (*Krug Spaseniya Dona*), which adopted a series of Fundamental Laws for the independent state of the Great Host of the Don (*Vsevelikoe Vojsko Donskoe*). Krasnov cooperated with the German Army but resisted the subordination of the Don Army to Denikin. There was considerable opposition within the Russian intelligentsia to the politics of Krasnov's state, an opposition which was directed by Charlamov and by Krasnov's successor (from February 1919), General Afrikan Petrovič Bogaevskij.⁴⁹ Later, E.N. Cirikov was to express the thoughts of many of his contemporaries

⁴⁸ Hoover Institution Archive, Russia. PosoPstvo (France), box 28, folder 8, Особая Комиссия по расследованию злодеяний большевиков, состоящая при Главнокомандующем Вооруженными Силами на Юге России, дела 25, 27-32, 34-36,40,42; А. С. Локерман, 1918, *74 дня Советской власти. (Из истории диктатуры большевиков в Ростове-на-Дону)*, Ростов-на-Дону, и, 12, 50-1; Виктор Севский, 1918, Семь расстрелянных, *Донская волна* 1918: i, 8-10; idem, 1919, Последние дни М. П. Богаевского. (В Ростовской тюрьме), *Приазовский край* i (14) October 1919; Ю. Г. Фелытинский (ed), 1992, *Красный террор в годы Гражданской войны: по материалам Особой следственной комиссии по расследованию злодеяний большевиков*, Лондон.— The Don Ataman, General Anatolij Michajlovič Nazarov, the President of the Military Circle, Evgenij Vološinov, the former President of the united Don Government, Mitrofan Petrovič Bogaevskij, and many officers were the first victims. During the first day of Soviet power in Rostov 168 people were shot. Among them was the prominent physicist Professor Andrej Robertovič Kolli, who was called a 'general', 'Kadet', 'millionaire', and 'counterrevolutionary' and blamed for keeping bombs. Red Guards hunted down 13-16-year-old boys as participants of the White Army.

⁴⁹ Ю.Д. Гражданов, 1993, Казачья интеллигенция Юга России в белом движении. (К теории проблемы), *Поиск новых подходов в изучении интеллигенции: проблемы теории, методологии, источниковедения и историографии. Тезисы докладов межгосударственной научно-теоретической конференции. Иваново, 11-14 сентября 1993 г.*, Иваново, 349-51.

when he stated that the aspirations of the Cossack intelligentsia for arliaments of its own' had weakened the movement for the restoration of an All-Russian state.⁵⁰

The Voluntary Army—an army of the intelligentsia

Thus, despite the universally adopted standpoint of Soviet historiography, viz. that the nobility and the bourgeoisie formed the base of the White Armies, modern scholars need to concentrate on the active participation in them of the intelligentsia; a handsome majority of this intelligentsia were youths and utterly indigent people who gave their lives in a struggle for their beliefs. It is obvious that research into the moods of the intelligentsia and their attitudes to participation in the Civil War will provide a better understanding of the main aspects of the sharp cultural split in the Russian society of the time.

Contemporaries of the events called the Voluntary Army an army of the intelligentsia, and the intelligentsia certainly considered the White movement to be a zone of its influence and ideological substantiation. It created the particular spiritual and intellectual atmosphere of the movement and disseminated its ideas by means of party meetings, professional conferences and the press.

There can be no doubt that the White movement had its roots in anti-Bolshevism. The leaders of the Voluntary Army had proclaimed its aim to be—attractive as this was for the intelligentsia—resistance to 'anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion'⁵¹ and adherence to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The White movement found response in the intelligentsia of various political aspirations, united for the purpose of establishing an alternative to Bolshevik power.

To these common objectives were added many collective and personal motives. The first volunteers and partisans defended historical, 'crucified' Russia, the distinctive traditions of the Cossacks, and Don independence. Their choices during the Civil War were not due to material goals. Those who rejected violence against the people and their country gathered around the banners of the White movement. Many of them recognized neither the power of the monarch nor that of a 'small group of usurpers'. On the other hand,

⁵⁰ Е. Чириков, 1927, По поводу анкеты, *Казачий слух* 12 (1927), ix. — *Evgenij Nikolaevič Čirikov* (1864-1932)—prosaist, dramatist and publicist.

⁵¹ Деникин, Борьба генерала Корнилова, 78.

there also were monarchists, who viewed military dictatorship as a transitional stage from anarchy to order. They hoped to raise the people's spirits by means of organizing a wide political and religious-educational advocacy based on the idea of monarchism. This fact can help to explain the contradictions existing between different participants of the White movement, between the ideals of democracy and restoration.

It is important to note that from the very beginning this 'army of the intelligentsia' protested against the destructive 'darkness' of the people and advocated Russian culture and national wealth. The youth—pupils and students—introduced high moral principles and defended values such as the Motherland, freedom, law, and culture. Party intellectuals aimed at solving a number of practical problems by means of the White armies. The Kadets thus aspired to restore the organization and legal order of the state ('the Party's soul is a United Russia'), which had been destroyed by the Bolshevik terror, first in the Don territory and then in the rest of Russia. The leaders of the Whites set their hopes on the Russian Orthodox Church in the conviction that the authority of the Church might help the army. For them, future Russia could not be imagined without the Orthodox Church.

The attitude of officers toward participation in the Voluntary Army was ambiguous. The wartime officers, or the 'new officers', differed from the Russian regular officers, the majority of whom had been lost before the Revolution. During World War I the depleted ranks were refilled by means of accelerated training of those mobilized to the army at military schools. According to Sergej Petrovič Mel'gunov, the wartime officers were a 'mixed conglomeration, which included all the shades of the Russian intelligentsia'.⁵²

Since some officers considered that in fighting in the Voluntary Army they served their perishing native country, a patriotic impulse is evident; but many officers took a neutral stand with regard to the Voluntary Army. In their opinion, officers were called on to protect their native Russia rather than merely protect separate territories of the country. Officers who had gone over to the Red Army became 'enemies to the end' of the officer-volunteers. The latter could approve of service in the Red Army only in exceptional cases. The

⁵² «пестрый конгломерат, включающий все оттенки русской интеллигенции» (cited in В.М.Воинов, 1994, *Офицерский корпус белых армий на востоке страны (1918-1920)*, *Отечественная история* 1994:6, 58).

remaining 'mass of Lenin's officers' was considered a category of selfish people who wished only to save their own lives and to win for themselves a carefree existence and high wages. It was these officers who were considered to have ruined Russia.⁵³

The intelligentsia and the people

One of the traditional themes of the intelligentsia's analysis was 'The intelligentsia and the people', a theme which was also central in the thinking of the intelligentsia on the subject of the Civil War.⁵⁴ Generations of the intelligentsia were brought up on the idea of the people's emancipation from suppression. The Revolution showed that the people remained a 'sphinx' to the intelligentsia who sincerely regretted being out of touch with the masses and the fact that their relationship had become strained.

The intelligentsia considered the people to be infected by the disease of Bolshevism and it was disappointed in a people whose minds had temporarily gone blank. The intelligentsia demonstrated a negative attitude towards the people's 'deepening of the Revolution' (*uglublenie revoljucii*) and participation in Bolshevik violence. Whilst trying to 'oppose the raging popular elements',⁵⁵ it hoped that the people influenced by the 'Bolshevist infection' and suffering from that 'contagious disease' and 'madness' would recover. Meanwhile the intelligentsia did not agree to reconcile itself to 'the role of hunted-down game'⁵⁶ which the armed revolutionary masses had in store for it. It was forced to defend itself against its own people.

Strategies of the intelligentsia in the early 1920s

The main strategy of the intelligentsia in the early 1920s was survival, even though it considered its most important task to be serving the Russian people by way of knowledge and experience.

⁵³ М. Дроздовский, 1918, Россия или комиссария. (Письмо в редакцию), *Приазовский край* 26 May (8 June) 1918.

⁵⁴ Максим, 1918, Лебединая песня М. П. Богаевского, *Донская волна* 1918: 19, Ю. Богаевский, Ответ перед историей, 10-13.

⁵⁵ Харламов, *Казачий депутат*, 148.

⁵⁶ Entry on 'Партизаны донские' in: Г. В. Губарев & А. И. Скрылов (eds), 1968, *Казачий словарь-справочник 2*, San Anselmo, Calif., 260.

In January 1920 Soviet power was established in the Don region. The worst apprehensions of the intelligentsia regarding the development of the revolution came true. The pragmatism of Soviet policy with regard to the intelligentsia was clear from the beginning. Side by side with appeals for collaboration began the arrests and executions of the intelligentsia.

The authorities started to use military-revolutionary methods in dealing with the so-called 'bourgeois' intelligentsia or 'old specialists' in order to control and regulate the professional activities of the intelligentsia. The Bolsheviks cultivated anti-bourgeois public moods and followed the socialist tradition of a broad interpretation of the word 'bourgeois'. The nation was contaminated by Bolshevik propaganda, which nicknamed 'bourgeois' everything and everybody that was cultured and educated. Members of the intelligentsia and whole parties were dubbed 'counterrevolutionary' or 'enemies of the people' who must be suppressed. This was very useful for widening the class struggle. According to their own propaganda the Party and the authorities were forcing the intelligentsia to work for the benefit of the Socialist Revolution and the people.

In accordance with the decrees and resolutions of the central and local authorities, the intelligentsia were registered and mobilized for the needs of socialist modernization. At first the Military-Revolutionary Committees —and later different special committees with the Militia of workers and peasants, the Don Cheka and various military organs—participated in organizing mobilization campaigns. In 1920 and in the first half of 1921 a maximum number of registrations and mobilizations of intelligentsia took place in the Don region. A distinction can be made between two different types of mobilization: 'labor' and 'special'. 'Labor' mobilizations were aimed at using 'bourgeois' and 'parasitic' elements. 'Special' mobilizations were directed towards meeting the lack of qualified specialists first of all in industry and agricultural production, but also of scientists, engineers, doctors, veterinarians, lawyers, actors, etc. Mobilizations were held for the fulfillment of several campaigns such as the All-Russian census of the population (1920), the electrification of the Don region, the eradication of illiteracy, and so on. Officers of the tsarist Army and the White Armies were on a 'special' register. Those who did not obey registration and mobilization orders were dubbed 'labor deserters' and were punished according to wartime laws.

The repressions were of a socio-class nature and reflected the 'most destructive tendencies in the relation of Bolshevik power with the intelligentsia. It amounted to organized violence. Lenin's suggestion of shooting clergymen and liquidating 'incorrigible bourgeois intelligents' or of the 'ruthless military suppression' of capitalists and their 'lackeys —our bourgeois intelligents' was tantamount to an order for active measures. Feliks Edmundovič Dzeržinskij held that the All-Russian Cheka (včĕk) must have a *delo* (dossier) for each *intelligent*.

In the early 1920s the intelligentsia still occupied a position between Reds and Whites. Chekists outlined the underground activity of the White organizations, consisting of White officers, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Monarchists, Anarchists, and Kadets under the flag of the Salvation of Russia.

During the first six months of 1920 the Don Cheka disclosed more than 15 so-called counterrevolutionary organizations. In May a number of leading Don Mensheviks headed by Boris Stepanovič Vasil'ev were arrested. They were accused of 'counterrevolutionary' actions and of participation in the work of the White authorities. Without open trial they were sentenced to imprisonment and forced labor. The members of the medical philanthropic organization 'The White Cross' were also considered 'counterrevolutionaries' and arrested.⁵⁷ The leaders and participants of 'The Scientific and Labor Society of Male and Female Medical Students at the Don University' were sentenced to imprisonment and hard labor, and some of them—to death. The former president of the society, A. N. Uspenskij, as well as the distinguished Professors Zandr and Gutnikov, were sentenced by the Don Cheka and shot on 1 August 1920. Fortunately Professor Ioannikij Alekseevič Malinovskij, who was going to share this sentence, was sent to Moscow and sentenced to i j years of labor camp.⁵⁸

In July 1921, 257 people were arrested as members and fighters of the so-called 'Salvation Army of Russia' (*Armija spasenija Ros-sii*). Among them were professors, doctors, engineers, and priests. Fifty-eight people were shot; a prominent scholar, former Professor

⁵⁷ GARO, f. R-97, op. I, d. 743, fos. 69 r-73v.

⁵⁸ AUD, d. 14852, vol. 1-2; d. 12411; GARO, f. R-97, op. i, d. 792, fo. 132Г; Н.А. Решетова, 1999, Малиновский И. А.: ученый и общественный деятель, *Третий этаж* (Ростов-на-Дону) 1999:2, 88-99. On Zandr and Gutman cf. above, fn 46.—*Ioannikij Alekseevič Malinovskij* (1863-1932), Professor of Russian Legal History, mayor of Rostov in 1917, deputy of the city дума, member of the Kadet Party.

Verchovskoj, who had become a priest and the head of Rostov Cathedral, was sentenced to death twice, but in the end he was only imprisoned.⁵⁹

The Bolsheviks legalized murder in the name of the interests of the state and the people. When the great hunger broke out the authorities ordered the confiscation of the church treasury. During this campaign tens of clergymen were shot without trial. Bishop Arsenij (Smolenec) and a group of seven clergymen and twenty-nine Rostov citizens were sentenced by the Don Revolutionary Tribunal in August 1922. Bishop Arsenij was sentenced to capital punishment, but the sentence was subsequently changed to ten years of imprisonment⁶⁰

With the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) the regime started a new type of repression of so-called *specy*, accused of 'economical counterrevolution'; several trials of some forty specialists each—lawyers, economists, engineers, and others—were organized in Rostov in the first half of the 1920s.⁶¹ The representatives of the educated classes also passed through hardships and many of them did not survive the difficulties.⁶² Forced evictions and requisitions had become a widespread phenomenon, and Don scholars and scientists were frequently evicted from their homes or lost some of their rooms.⁶³

⁵⁹ AUD, d. 53951, vol. 1-11; *Советский Юг* (Ростов-на-Дону) 27 July 1921; 26 August 1922.

⁶⁰ *Советский Юг* 29, 30 July; 8,12,15,16,23-31 August; 1 September 1922; *Трудовой Дон* (Ростов-на-Дону) 27-29 July; 22-27, 30 August; 1 September 1922; *За Христа пострадавшие: Гонения на Русскую Православную Церковь, 1917-1918*; *Биографический справочник* bk i, Москва, 106-7; Bolesław B. Szcześniak (ed and transi), 1959, *The Russian Revolution and Religion: a Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1922. With Introductory Essay, Appendices, and a Selective Bibliography*, Notre Dame, Ind., 91,157, 247.

⁶¹ GARO, f. r-1852, op.I, d. 107, fo. 152?--; *Советский Юг* 5 January; 12 April 1921; 17-18 October 1923 5 February; 21, 23-25, 27-30 May; 18-20 July; 17 November 1924; *Трудовой Дон* 10 May; 3-4 June 1922; 5 February; 20 May 1924.

⁶² Hoover Institution Archive, American Relief Administration, Russian Unit, box 24, 98,220; Новочеркасский Филиал ГАРО, f. R-65, op. i, d. 123, fos. 5^r 7^r. 37^r 39^r, 42^r. 46^r-46^r; *Известия ДГУ* 1921, bk 1, 5-8, 156-60; *Советский Юг* 8 March; 10,12 February 1921; 14 February 1922); *Трудовой Дон* 11 March 1922.

⁶³ GARO, f. u-46, op. i, d. 8, fos. 187V, 100v, 249v; *ibid.* d. io.fo. io^r-v; GARO, f. R-97, op. i, d. 97, fo. 18-187--^; *ibid.* d. 792, fos. 132r. 136r. 157Г, 174r-178r, 179V, 185Г, i86r, 263r.276r.

In 1921-2 famine struck in many parts of Russia including the Don region. In 1920-3 tens of prominent scholars and scientists died of starvation and illness.⁶⁴ While the Soviet Government could provide no effective help in such extreme circumstances, Western aid played a critical role in famine relief. The American Relief Administration, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the American Red Cross, the Nansen Mission, the Catholic Mission, the Italian Red Cross Mission, the Swiss Red Cross Mission, the European Student Relief, Workers' International Famine Relief Committee, the Swiss and Italian Committees for the Relief of Children, and other organizations operated in the Don region. They fought hunger, cared for sick children and adults, and also helped the Don students, scholars, scientists, and doctors.

The evolution of the intelligentsia

Thus, the mutual relations of 'the Intelligentsia and the Revolution' are characterized by a dynamic development, moving from support by most of the intelligentsia for the February Revolution and bourgeois transformations to opposition to October and rejection of the socialist experiment. Several tendencies can be discerned in the development of the intelligentsia in 1917: on the one hand a differentiation and in some cases polarization of views and positions with regard to political events; on the other, a new stage of consolidation based on participation in political parties, professional unions, cooperative movements, military-industrial committees, as well as in literary and publishing activities. After February 1917 the intelligentsia was to benefit from a unique new situation in Russian sociopolitical life, one of much-increased personal initiative and creative work. This was a time for decisive actions in the interests of the nation.

The specific interactions between the intelligentsia and the authorities included, on the one hand, the intelligentsia's adjusting itself to authority and entering into the structures of power, the preservation of a critical attitude towards authority in general (neither government received unquestioning support from the intelligentsia), a sharp and steady hostility towards Bolshevik authority;

⁶⁴ Andrej Michajlovič Terne, Fedor Fedorovič Zigel', Venedikt Viktorovič Kuri-lov, Nikolaj Nikolaevič Mari, Dmitrij Ivanovič Ivanovskij, Ivan Osipovič Godlevskij, Pavel Il'ič Mitrofanov, Aleksandr Dmitrievič Murinov, Nikolaj Vasil'evič Parijskij, Konstantin Vasil'evič Charičkov, Nikolaj Semenovič Us-penskij, and others

on the other hand, it included the suppression of the intelligentsia's oppositional stance by both the Red and the White sides and the employment by both authorities of methods of compulsion. While it seemed as if the intelligentsia's ambitions for power had been achieved, it also appeared that, striving to solve urgent, socio-economic problems, the intelligentsia had forgotten about the important political disagreements which prevailed between its various groups. Furthermore, the intelligentsia was prone to hold political meetings, a circumstance which was detrimental to its professional and social activities, that is to providing the population with bread, coal, and regulated wages. Political events had destroyed mutual understanding.

In the early Civil War period, the intelligentsia attempted to hold Russia steady on the path of democratic state construction, aspiring to retain the successes attained during the Revolution and to return losses. The aspirations of the defenders of the ideals of February 1917 and of the supporters of the local powers came into collision with the 'introduction' of socialism. This conflict shaped the Don events. In the early 1920s the intelligentsia was under pressure from Soviet power, which used 'hard' methods such as repressions and mobilizations; and the Bolsheviks excluded the intelligentsia from the politico-ideological sphere. In 1917 to the early 1920s it was evident that the evolution of the intelligentsia and the intelligentsia's involvement in the revolution were moving in opposite directions.

