Introduction

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A short history of the Lund Intelligentsia project

WHEN THE SOVIET EMPIRE COLLAPSED IN I989, THE INTELLECTUALS and intelligentsias of Central and Eastern Europe were actively engaged in achieveing revolution not with violence and bloodshed, but with ideas and words, voiced with the help of peaceful crowds of people demonstrating for their human rights. The former dissident writer Vaclav Havel, who became the first free president of post-war Czechoslovakia in 1989, has come to personify the stength and persistence of humanistic and humane values. There were other similar examples. In Lithuania the first free president, Vytautas Landsbergis, was a professor of musicology, and in Estonia the writer Lennart Meri became first foreign minister and later president. While many other political and economic factors played their vital part, still the traditional role of the intelligentsia as challenging autocratic and tyrannical power structures seemed to have born fruit. This was a remarkable achievement.

The involvement of the intelligentsias in fundamental political change was symptomatic of the optimism which marked the exit from the Cold War both in the West and in Central and Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, and in the Baltic countries, belief in a national culture was confirmed; in perestroika Soviet Union and, after 1991, in the Russian Federation, the intelligentsia saw its role renewed in the need to fill the post-Soviet cultural vacuum with a valid Russian identity. In the West, certainly amongst those of us professionally involved with the cultures of Central and Eastern Europe, there was a surge of inspiration when we realised that human ideas and human beliefs could achieve fundamental change, firstly in the dismantling of the Soviet political and economical system, secondly by challenging the crass commercialism and materialism so prevalent in the West. Human values for human people and societies held good and were clearly a factor to be reckoned with. A euphoric mood arose whereby it became apparent not

only that Russia and Central Europe needed the West but also, vice versa, that Russia and the countries of Central Europe had something which could enrichen Western culture.

It was in this spirit that the research project of which we hereby present the final volume was conceived. At the first meeting, 'The New Role of the Intelligentsia in Central and Eastern Europe', which took place in September 1993, the question of the intelligentsia in politics was addressed. With active intelligentsia politicians such as Zuzana Szatmary from Bratislava, Jan Sokol from Prague and Jerzy Jedlicki from Warsaw, we discussed the issue of the intellectuals' crucial relationship to power.[1]

The next round took place in January 1996 when a selected group of scholars was invited to a symposium in Lund devoted to 'Common Roots in Disparate Cultures: Historical Perspectives on the Potentiality for Mutual Understanding between the Intelligentsias in Eastern and Western Europe'.[2] From the start we focused not only on the intelligentsias in their respective countries but also on the idea of Europe as a common forum where different intelligentsias—each involved in forming a distinct culture—neverthelesss drew on a common stock of values and ideas, inherited from Ancient Greece and Rome, from Christianity, medieval culture and the Renaissance, from the Enlightenment, Romanticism and modernity to the present day.

By the time a grant was awarded from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the scope of the project had been narrowed to 'The Intelligentsia as Creators of Social Values in Russia and Poland during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries'. Essentially the focus was the same and attention to dialogue between East and West as an all-European concern was always paramount. By concentrating on Russia and Poland it was natural to focus on the collective identity implicit in the term 'intelligentsia', the grammatical singularity of which points to a more cohesive group than does the corresponding term 'intellectuals' common in other European cultures. A new border became important, that is the border between Russia and Poland. Furthermore the question of cultural identity in Russia and Poland became integrated with the tension

[1] The proceedings from the symposium were printed in 199$ as *Intelligentsia in the Interim. Recent Experiences from Central and Eastern Europe* (= Slavica Lundensia 14).
[2] This meeting was financed by a planning grant from The Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR).

between tradition and modernity. Although we actively sought interdisciplinary collaboration, the approach to the Russian and Polish intelligentsias was idealist, rather than materialist, valuable contact with sociologists notwithstanding. The concern was with the values and ideas which the intelligentsias elaborated and generated rather than with the sociological make-up of these people as a class. The project was stimulated by an awareness of the acute need for new identities in a united Europe following the fall of the iron curtain. This concern resulted in the symposium 'Constituting and Reconstituting Central and Eastern Europe: Cultural Representations in the Dialogue between Central, Eastern and Western Europe' (January 1999).[3] The two following symposia were concerned with single cultures, Poland and Russia respectively: 'Sweden and Poland: Nations and stereotypes' was held in October 1999, and 'The Kaleidoscope of Russian Thought at the Turn of the Last Century' in May 2000.[4] In November 2001 a conference on film throughout Central and Eastern Europe was co-arranged with the Student Film Union in Lund and Folkets bio: 'New Identities in Film: Contemporary Cinema from the Other Europe'. The conference was offered as a broader meeting for the University at large and the town of Lund, and we were able to show a series of new films representing the search for new national and cultural identities in the Balkans, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia.

The final conference, 'The Intelligentsias of Russia and Poland: the Intelligentsias as Creators of Social Values in Russia and Poland during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', took place in Lund on 21-25 August 2002.[5] Plans for a broad international meeting proved fruitful and we were successful in making many new

[3] The proceedings were published in 1999 as *Through a Glass Darkly: Cultural Representations in the Dialogue between Central, Eastern and Western Europe* (= Slavica Lundensia 19).
[4] The proceedings were published in consecutive volumes of *Slavica Lundensia: Sverige och Polen: Nationer och stereotyper* (= Slavica Lundensia 20, 2000); *On the Verge: Russian Thought between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (= Slavica Lundensia 21,2001).
[5] The abstracts were published in 2002 as *The Intelligentsias of Russia and Poland. The Intelligentsias as Creators of Social Values in Russia and Poland during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Abstracts from the Conference Held at Lund University, August 22-25, 2002* (= Slavica Lundensia Supplementa 1). Cf. Оксана Саркисова, «Камо грядеши?». Интеллектуальная одиссея в отстутсвии Итаки. Пост-путевые заметки о конференции «Интеллигенция России и Польши как создатель социальных ценностей в XIX и XX веках», *Новое литературное обозрение* 57 (2002).

contacts with a wide range of scholars, not least from the Russian Federation. Thus the conference, final from the organisers' point of view, has initiated a broader network.

From the beginning an interdisciplinary approach was encouraged. The majority of scholars represented in this volume are affiliated to faculties of the humanities, to departments of history, intellectual history, religious history, history of arts, history of science, philosophy and Slavonic studies. We are happy for the participation of a select number of sociologists.

A new Europe?

In the following I take the opportunity to reflect personally on some aspects of the subject that are addressed in the papers offered in this anthology. I begin with the question as to whether it is correct to assume that, roughly coinciding with the new millennium, a new Europe has emerged. It is a fact that the political map of Europe has been radically changed during the past fifteen years and obviously there are more adjustments to come. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the recognition of several new nation states, the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and finally the expansion of the European Union to include many of the former Central and Eastern European states—these all constitute drastic changes. Interestingly though, as STEVEN SEEGEL shows, the question of a new Europe is not new at all since the concern with how maps are drawn and how communities are imagined connects to a 'very old and seemingly timeless debate about which nations "belong" to Europe, Western civilization, etc.* (p. 28). The European community that we imagine is very much in flux. Using modern terminology, Seegel applies the term 'performative ethnicity' to the early nineteenth-century Polish emigre Joachim Lelewel, demonstrating thereby the continuity of the connection between identity and territoriality.

If the sharp border between East and West physically expressed by the Iron Curtain has been removed, then a crucial and in part imaginary dividing line seems to have been moved eastwards with Belarus and Ukraine now occupying a middle zone. Amongst these papers there are several that address the historical cross-cultural rivalry between Russia and Poland in the lands of the former Rzeczpospolita, as for example the papers by VALERIJ EVAROUSKIJ (EVO-rovskij) and MICHAIL DOLBILOV. AS the European continent becomes more and more equated with the European Union, the fate

of Russia, seemingly pushed ever further to the east, becomes a matter of concern; FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN addresses the question of the construction of a European identity in post-Soviet Russia, referring to an affinity construction which the author clearly sees as desirable.

The ubiquity of the intelligentsia

It would be well-nigh impossible to find a definition of the intell-gentsia to encompass the breadth of material and concepts put forward in this anthology. No attempt is made to do so. The question of definition is of course addressed by several of the contributors, not least in the comprehensive opening article by ANDRZEJ WALICKI, who traces the introduction of the term in the nineteenth century and makes important distinctions between the Russian and the Polish intelligentsias:

> We shall see, nonetheless, that the word 'intelligentsia' did not acquire the same connotations in Poland and in Russia. In both countries membership in the intelligentsia had an ethical component, requiring conscious commitment to public welfare. In Poland, however, this commitment was identified, as a rule, with national patriotism, whereas in Russia it necessarily involved social radicalism and political opposition, (p. 3)

Neither do I attempt to answer the question as to whether the intelligentsia has survived, or indeed will survive, the transition of Russia and Eastern Europe from dictatorship and planned economy to at least some form of democracy and market economy. In the playful title of her book *Dead Again*, Masha Gessen refers to the frequent certification of the death of the intelligentsia in history.[6] KRZYSZTOF STALĄ refers to a similar debate in Poland (p.378). What is quite certain, however, is that the concept of the intelligentsia continues to be meaningful, both for those who consider themselves to belong to the group and for those who use the concept to trace meaning and continuity in the cultural histories concerned. Indeed it would hardly be feasible to describe the cultures of Poland and Russia without recourse to the concept, either in the past or in the present. For authors JONATHAN SUTTON and Krzyzstof Stala, the responsibility of the current intelligentsias in Russia and Poland

[6] Masha Gessen, 1997, *Dead Again: the Russian Intelligentsia After Communism*, London New York.

respectively is in no way diminished. Sutton, whose studies take us to 2002, presents to the current Russian religious intellgentsia an agenda for action, thereby implying his belief in the intelligentsia as an important agent on the current cultural and indeed socially political scene, whereas for Stala the search of the Polish intelligentsia today for new moral sources is a matter of course. A conclusion from these papers might be that for those writing about Poland and bringing their stories up to the present day (WALICKI, STALA, NINA WITOSZEK & ANDREW BRENNAN) there is faith in the existence and significance of the Polish intelligentsia, not to mention an implicit identity with the same. Those scholars who trace the history of the Russian intelligentsia to the present day seem to be less confident in the survival of the group.[7]

Values

As Walicki so clearly shows, the concept of the intelligentsia is associated with a concern for all-human values as well as with responsibility and moral commitment to society at large. This normative aspect of the intelligentsia phenomenon is explicitly or implicitly expressed by all authors. Beyond this, several papers are directly concerned with values in the sense of basic human needs that cannot be measured quantitatively. In his article, which considers the greater aspects of Russian history during the twentieth century, political as well as cultural, GEOFFREY HOSKING introduces the notion of *trust* as a basic aspect of society:

> It could be hypothesised that one function of the intelligentsia is to provide us with the ideas, the narratives and the symbols which generate and sustain the pre-conditions of trust at the various stages of social development, and in the various forms of human community, (p. 231).

It is often claimed that Russian society is held together by morality rather than by law. Given this stereotype, not least in Russian philosophy of law, ANITA SCHLÜCHTER examines the debate at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century and shows that this opposition did not constitute a simple and categorical truth. In an analysis of the contemporary situation, INNA NALE-

[7] For a series of discussions about the discourse on the intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia and the discipline known as *intelligentovedenie*, see: Kerstin Olofsson, 2004, *Rysk kulturdebatt under perestrojkan och den postsovjetiska perioden* (= Research Reports, Södertörns Högskola, 2004:3), Huddinge.

TOVA similarly shows that, contrary to expectation, a higher education and religious belief do not occur in inverse proportion to one another. Naletova quotes data suggesting that, on the contrary, 'it would be hard to find an educated person in Russia not, in one way or another, interested in, or touched by, traditional Russian beliefs' (p.365).

Sutton goes straight to the heart of the matter with the subtitle of his paper, 'Towards responsibility and engaged reflection'. Sutton quotes prominent Russian commentators who regret 'the absence of a feeling of mutual responsibility' (p. 370), and himself proposes a number of concrete social issues where the involvement of a religious intelligentsia is needed. These issues range from 'secularization and its effects' to 'the military intervention in Chechnya' and 'HIV/AIDS prevention and education' (pp. 372-3). Stala takes up the dilemma facing the current Polish intelligentsia as they need to reconsider and redefine their moral positions at the beginning of the new century.

Some articles are concerned with tolerance and intolerance between social groups, across cultural borders and within state administration, SERGEJ MICHAL'ČENKO tells the sorry story of discrimination in Polish-Russian interrelationships at the Imperial University of Warsaw 1869-1915; MICHAIL DOLBILOV discusses stereotyping of the Pole in Russian public discourse as a strategy of Russification; EUGENE AVRUTIN presents the antisemitics of state adminstration with regard to Jews who wished to convert to Orthodoxy in late imperial Russia.

The intelligentsia as generating social values was at the centre of our conference. All the articles in this volume, even those that do not directly address the intelligentsia as such, manifest, implicitly if not explicitly, a normative approach to the intelligentsia which is generally understood to be on the right side and doing good rather than harm. In other words the value of the intelligentsia itself as a social force is affirmed.

In a category of its own, NINA WITOSZEK and ANDREW BREN-NAN'S article posits a grand thesis, namely that the dissident tradition of the Eastern and Central European intelligentsias heralds a new humanism, 'a resurrection of values central to the European Renaissance' (p. 394):

> Like their forebears in the earlier Renaissance, Eastern European thinkers flaunted the concept of human dignity against the authoritarian regime, (p. 396)

Disenchanted with abstract Reason and utopias, these thinkers gave new birth to concepts of personal integrity and human dignity, and they argued for the sense of moral order which accrues from memory and historicity.

Words

Traditionally the main realm of the intelligentsia's activity has been the written word, and the status of writer has been privileged both in Russia and in Poland. Belinskij writing his diatribic open letter to Gogol' in 1847 formulated what was to become the classic view of the writer in Russia:

> Only in literature is there life and forward movement, despite the Tatar censorship. That is why the title of writer is so respected among us; that is why literary success comes so easily even to those of limited talent. The titles of poet and writer have long since eclipsed the trumpery of epaulettes and fancy uniforms in Russia... [The public] sees in Russian writers its only leaders, its protectors and saviours from the darkness of autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality, and therefore although it is always prepared to forgive a writer a bad book, it will never forgive him a harmful one.[8]

That Belinskij's attitude to literature was reaffirmed in the Soviet era is assumed by several scholars (see, for example, MARK SANDLE, p. 306); Hosking devotes a section of his paper to the Soviet situation in the 1960s when literature made a 'crucial contribution to the revival of the intelligentsia' (pp. 240-3). Several scholars quote writers and poets in support of important cultural ideas, IRINA KUPCOVA discusses the First World War and the crisis in the mentality of the art intelligentsia from the point of view of literary prose writers and poets such as Kuprin, Andreev, Sologub and Zinaida Hippius.

When individual writers are incorporated into a cultural identity it is not necessarily because of their specifically literary och fictive qualities but because they express ideas which are valued and accepted by the community at large. In this sense, although their

[8] Quoted from *A Documentary History of Russian Thought: from the Enlightenment to Marxism,* translated and edited by W. J. Leatherbarrow & D.C. Offord, (Ann Arbor, 1987), p. 134.

writings may have been made availabe because of being considered 'merely fiction', they share the role of thinkers and philosophers. A writer presented with consistent significance in this collection is Adam Mickiewicz (see for example Walicki, pp.7-8). For Evar-ouskij, the rivalry between the Polish and the Russian traditions for dominance in Belarus are personified in the writers Mickiewicz and Michail Kojalovič (pp. 57-8). Stala's article on the Polish intelligentsia and modernity is structured around 'the two opposing attitudes of cultural revisionism and traditional conciliation' (p. 381), personified respectively by two writers — the two being Witold Gombrowicz and Czesław Miłosz.

The written word obviously remains the primary source for the study of the intelligentsia in a historical perspective. The majority of articles draw their conclusions with reference to and quotations from published writings and archival documents. Studying their writings, CATHERINE EVTUHOV presents the life stories and ideas of three lesser known writers from the nineteenth century, P.I. Mel'nikov, A. S. Gaciskij and V.V. Dokučaev; ALAN P. POLLARD uses as his chief source the memoirs of V. K. Debogorij-Mokrievič stating that '[b]y narrating only the events he witnessed, he achieved a high level of authenticity. One reason for the accuracy of his recollections was his writing them down fairly soon after the events.' (p.122)

The significance of the word was always an important factor in the role of the intelligentsia. On the one hand the intelligentsia saw itself as giving voice to the illiterate people. Conversely the intelligentsia could be accused of taking power through the word. The struggle of one language against another as an expression of a struggle for power is evident in the themes addressed by Michal'čenko and Dolbilov. NIKOLAJ BOGOMOLOV presents the journalistic mission of the Russian minority journal *Svoboda* in Poland, its purpose being not just to amuse and give neutral information, but to give minority Russians an inside orientation allowing them to become 'written into' the national and international politics of Poland (p.217).

Working closely with his late colleague, sociologist Gennadij Batygin, EDWARD ŚWIDERSKI claims that Soviet intellectuals, i.e. knowledge-producers, were really elements (sociomorphs) which formed a so-called textual, or imagined, society:

> What in the Soviet context counted as knowledge, or science, turns out... to be 'literature'. Unlike science, literature is characterized as lacking empirical truth value, for which reason it is qualified not as cognition but as 'artistic project', the result of which may be called 'textual society', (p. 333)

By stretching the idea of 'literature' to an entire textual society, Swiderski exceeds its conventional meaning.

While words are of paramount importance, the articles in this volume show a significant interest in non-verbal activity, JULIE HANSEN discusses how the Russian symbolist poets strove towards a synthesis with visual art, creating a Russian Symbolist iconography.

Deeds

Whereas values, ideas and words belong to the traditional sphere of the intelligentsia, the group is less often thought of as comprising men—or women—of action. An aspect of the intelligentsia's contribution to social values which emerges from this volume is a recognition of a number of lesser known people who worked slowly but steadily to achieve social change.

In his 'revised approach to the intelligentsia', Seegel considers Joachim Lelewel's early-nineteenth-century cartography and shows how Lelewel's geographical imagination contributed to the idea of a collected nation. Closely connected is the work of education: Michal'čenko discusses the effect of the conflict between Russian and Polish interests.in determining the academic programme of Warsaw Univerity (1869-1915); Schlüchter focuses on a debate within an academic dicipline, Philosophy of Law, at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Hosking demonstrates how scientists from the 1960s contributed to the revival of the intelligentsia and gives special attention to Andrej Sacharov as bearing paradigmatic significance (pp.243-6); Edward Swiderski considers the creation of social values by Soviet scientists, primarily sociologists. Hosking further highlights the role of the environmental movement from the 1960s to the 1980s as an intelligentsia contribution to changing values as well as to practical political outcomes.

Another area of intelligentsia activity is located within politics proper and concerns opposition within official government policy and its adjacent state administration. Official imperial policy is studied by Michal'čenko, whilst Dolbilov examines the Russificat-

ion of the Empire s western region; Eugene Avrutin pursues the question of state administration with its difficulties for the Jewish intelligentsia. Evtuhov studies three cases of the provincial intelligentsia within the regional adminstration of Nižnij Novgorod (1838-91). She concludes:

> This provincial intelligentsia espoused a rich spectrum of beliefs about society ... and were extremely passionate about their dedication to things local and their search to know everything possible about them; in contrast to our usual assumption of an intelligentsia in opposition to the prevailing regime, they adopted a variety of positions ranging from total dedication to state service to open conflict or resistance. Their efforts resulted in the creation of a local history, statistics, ethnography, and anthropology, as well as their dissemination through a local press and through regional museums. (P-95)

Turning to the Soviet period, ANDREJ KVAKIN examines the lessons to be learnt from the administation of the expulsion of intellectuals, in 1922, on the so-called philosophical steamboat, 'как многоаспектное явление с пролонгированными последствиями' (p. 216). Concerning the issue of Bolshevism, NATALIJA REŠETOVA looks at the Don intelligentsia, particularly the cossacks, showing how the Don territory became a southern centre for the anti-Bolshevik forces (p. 177). OKSANA SARKISOVA takes as her subject the first professional organisation of cinema, The Association of Revolutionary Cinematography (ARRK). In the 1920s cinema enjoyed the support of the Bolshevik Party but Sarkisova shows how filmmakers were trapped between their sense of professionality and the changing ideological demands of the time. Finally, Mark Sandle follows the drafting of the Third Party Programme (1952-61) and demonstrates that this was conducted not only within the official political leadership, but with the cooperation of individual members of the independent intelligentsia.

Two articles examine the hierarchical interplay between leaders and people: GALINA JANKOVSKAJA traces the dilemma for a category of artists in the late Stalinist period and examines how the need to earn one's living competed with ideological allegiances; she concludes that the practicalities of assuring an everyday existence were stronger than ideological adherence (pp. 283-4). Posing the provocative question: 'Are the Russian masses European?', SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN turns to the post-Soviet position and questions to what extent the policies launched by the leaders to enable Russia's

inclusion in a European 'we', noticably democracy and market economy, are merely dictated from above or whether they are actually embraced by the masses.

Negotiating cultural ambivalence

Pollard refers to Debogorij-Mokrievič's ambiguous national identity; with a Russian father and a Polish mother he became an outsider 'victimized by his Polish classmates on one side and his Russian teachers on the other' (p. 123). My conclusion is that the articles in this collection share in one way or another a common theme in that they trace how groups and individuals within the Russian and Polish intelligentsias have attempted to negotiate cultural ambivalence. On the outer circle there is, for example, the ambivalence of Russia's relationship with Western Europe, or the Polish ambivalence in the pendulum-swings between traditionality and modernity. The next circle includes relationships between two nations or two communities, between Russians and Poles, between patriates and expatriates, between centres and peripheries of power. But ambivalence works dynamically in all cultural identities creating paradoxes even on an individual level. The following examples illustrate my point:

1) Seegel's thesis is that Lelewel was able to visualise his own Polish nation- and state-building project, while failing to see that he thereby encroached on smaller nations:

> Lelewel was limited in his vision by an inability to envisage the replication of nation-building movements among smaller and more 'ethnographic' peoples during the early nineteenth century, and while he remained pro-Semitic and 'multicultural'... he did not perceive the perennial continuities or social construction of these other imagined communities, (p. 27)

2) Belarus, argues Evarouskij, situated on the territory of former Rzeczpospolita, and, before that, of Kievan Rus', has been a multicultural society:

> Тем не менее, разрушение этого феодального конгломерата поставило вопрос о разделе его наследства, переосмыслении приспособления его для решения возникших новых проблем размежевания некогда единого этноса, того сложного процесса, который в случае с Беларусью до сих пор не нашел своего достойного разрешения. (P-49)

3) Evtuhov sums up one of the dilemmas of the provincial administration:

> To all appearances, Mel'nikov promoted two contradictory sets of values: on the one hand he stood definitively for local self-definition and self-affirmation; on the other, he epitomized the type of a loyal and enthusiastic state servitor *(revnostnyj änovnik),* contributing to the annihilation of the very diversity he himself sought to encourage, (p.85)

4) TATJANA KUDRJAVTSEVA'S article on Fazil' Iskander picks up the similar question of the cultural ambivalence of non-Russian writers in the Soviet era. Iskander chose to write his novels and stories in Russian rather than his native Abkhazian. In a literary analysis of the novella Trine Ol'denburgskij', Kudrjavtseva shows that in fact Iskander exploits his cultural bilingualism in order to parody 'a discourse in which Russianness is conveyed as the Soviet cultural norm' (p. 288).

A number of authors in the volume describe the work of the intelligentsia as nation-building, particularly with reference to Poland and the lands of the former Rzeczpospolita. The modern concern with national identity, including the notion of imagined community, performative ethnicity (Seegel) or a constructivist theory of change (Splidsboel-Hansen) lies side by side with more traditional historical methods of reconstruction. Seegel synthesises newer concepts with traditional in his somewhat sad conclusion:

> For the case of Joachim Lelewel, who at least had a spatial answer to his own infamous rhetorical question, *'Polska, ale jaka?',* memory and territoriality ultimately underscored and perhaps undermined his own imaginitive conception of nationality and identity, (p. 29)

WITOSZEK & BRENNAN are concerned not with the question of national identity, but with a posited transnational shift away from the impasse of modernity and back to the values of the Renaissance. This leads them to challenge the very concept of 'imagined communities':

> The memorialist approach runs counter to the fashionable notion of 'invented tradition', which presupposes a mechanical, passive view of cultural transmission and the infinite malleability of man. It

> implies moving from 'imagined communities' to 'remembering communities', (p.402)

Witoszek and Brennan's thesis is nothing if not visionary, however the question as to whether the Russian intelligentsia is included in the intelligentsias of Central and Eastern Europe is not clarified.

Let us recall Walickis initial distinction between the intelligentsias of Poland and Russia—a commitment identified with 'national patriotism' on the one hand, and with 'social radicalism and political opposition' on the other—a distinction which is generally corroborated by the other authors. Hosking states that '[i]n Russia, for various reasons, the sense of nationhood has been relatively weak' (p.232). But if Russia has not been concerned with its sense of nationhood as such, then it has been all the more taken up with its relationship to Europe. The need for Russia to establish a relationship to a realigned Europe is as pressing today as was Peter the Great's need to place Russia on the European map. The point is that the energy and passion of intelligentsias is directed not to what is conceived as self-evidently in existence, but to what is desired, it is change or the negotiation from one set of values to another which is the dynamic force of both intelligentsias, the Polish and the Russian.