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Joy of Division: John Doxapatres’ Commentary on Hermogenes’ On Issues and the role of Porphyry’s Isagoge in the Byzantine Rhetorical Curriculum

Byron MacDougall

Between the late second and the early fourth century CE, two treatises with a special focus on processes of division (διαίρεσις) were composed that would become, each in its own way, staples of Byzantine school curricula for over a thousand years. The *Περὶ στάσεων* of Hermogenes of Tarsus, a technical treatment of *stasis* or “issue” theory, was incorporated by the fifth century into the five-part *Corpus of Hermogenes*, which in turn would serve as the standard sequence of textbooks in the Byzantine rhetorical classroom.¹ In that Byzantine tradition, the work can be referred to alternatively as “the treatise on division” for its discussion of how to divide a given stasis into its so-called

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¹ For the formation of the *Corpus of Hermogenes*, which included besides the two genuine works by Hermogenes (*On Issues* and *On Forms of Style*) also the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonios and two treatises (*On Invention* and *On the Method of Force*) falsely attributed to Hermogenes, see Patillon 2008, v–xxiii, and Kustas 1973, 5–26; on the rationale behind the choice of Aphthonios to introduce the corpus, see Kennedy 2003, 89. For an overview of *Corpus of Hermogenes* in the Byzantine rhetorical curriculum, see Riehle 2021, 300–301, as well as Papaioannou 2017.

κεφάλαια or “heads of argument”.² The other treatise with a focus on division was Porphyry’s *Isagoge* or “Introduction”, which was canonized, largely thanks to the Alexandrian Neoplatonists in Late Antiquity, as the introductory text in the logical curriculum, and hence to philosophy as a whole. It would retain this status throughout the Byzantine period, when it was treated as a “quasi-member of the *Organon*”.³ While offering an account of the “five predicables” (πέντε φωναί) of genus, species, difference, property, and accident, the *Isagoge*’s most decisive contribution to Byzantine philosophical culture (and to philosophy more generally) was its treatment of how a genus is divided into species through the addition of specific differences, and how those species are further subdivided into sub-species, a process immortalized visually in the *Arbor Porphyriana* diagrams that accompany the *Isagoge* and its Latin translations in both the Byzantine and Western traditions.⁴ Thus, generations of Byzantine students received training in two types of division, with one treatise on division meant for the rhetorical classroom and the other for the philosophical classroom, all neat and tidy.

Or was it so neat and tidy? This paper turns to an unedited Byzantine commentary on Hermogenes’ *On Issues* to show that the border between those classrooms, and indeed between the two respective treatises on division themselves, was more porous than we might imagine. Scholars since George Kennedy have drawn attention to the philosophical underpinnings of stasis theory and its focus on division and definition in general, and to Hermogenes’ logically inflected language in particular—he refers explicitly for example in the second sentence of the proem to the process of division from genera into species and differentiates it from

² See also Heath 1995, 61 on how, despite the traditional title being *On Issues* (περί στάσεων), “there is good reason to suspect that Hermogenes himself would have called it *On Division*”.

³ Erismann characterizes the *Isagoge* as a “quasi-member of the *Organon*” in Erismann and MacDougall 2018, 43. For general background on the role of Porphyry in the logical curriculum see Erismann 2017.

⁴ For a brief overview of tree-diagrams in Byzantine manuscripts (though with no mention of Hermogenes) see for example Safran 2020, 370–371; for Byzantine diagrams in general see also Safran 2022. For a helpful introduction to diagrams in manuscripts of the *Corpus of Hermogenes*, see especially D’Agostini, (forthcoming), and D’Agostini 2024.

his own focus on division of a *stasis* into its heads of argument—and it is such features as these which helped attract the notice of Neoplatonist commentators like Syrianos in the first place.⁵ We know as well that Porphyry himself was deeply interested in rhetoric more broadly and *stasis* theory especially, and its potential for teaching the methods of definition and division, since he is said to have written a commentary on another work of *stasis* theory, namely that of Hermogenes’ second-century contemporary Minucianus, a work which was eventually eclipsed by the former’s treatise on the same topic and which no longer survives except in fragments.⁶

Thus the philosophical background to *stasis* theory on the one hand, and the interest on the part of philosophers like Porphyry and Syrianos in handbooks of *stasis* theory for teaching dialectical methods like division and definition on the other, have long been familiar to scholars.⁷ Receiving less attention however is the fact that the *Isagoge* and *On Issues* do not just overlap in their concern with division—however dif-

⁵ Kennedy 1980, 182. See also Heath 2003a, 154, on how *stasis* theory had been constructed around the three questions, familiar from the dialectical tradition, of if a thing exists; what it is; and what kind it is; see also Valiavitcharska 202, 492n28 on how Aristotle’s predicables, which later received definitive treatment in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, formed the philosophical background to *stasis* theory to begin with.

⁶ For Porphyry’s commentary on Minucianus, see especially Heath 2003a, as well as e.g. Kennedy 1980, 183 and Pepe 2018, 88. In addition to the testimony of the Suda that he wrote a commentary on Minucianus, Porphyry is also said by other sources to have written, variously, a “handbook” of rhetoric (τέχνη) or a “handbook on issues” (ἡ περὶ τῶν στάσεων τέχνη); Heath 2003a, 143–144 suggests that these different testimonies may all refer to one and the same work, the commentary on Minucianus’s work on issue-theory. Incidentally, this lost commentary by Porphyry seems to have inaugurated the commentary tradition on technical rhetorical treatises, *tout court*; see Heath 2003a, 146. Despite his interest in *stasis* theory, Porphyry seems however never to have responded specifically to Hermogenes himself, for whatever reason; see *id.* 148.

⁷ For the place of division and definition among the traditional dialectical methods in the philosophical classroom, see Lloyd 1988, 8–11. Porphyry and Syrianos were far from exceptional in being Neoplatonists who were invested in *stasis* theory; for example a certain Metrophanes of Eucarpia, described by Syrianos as a Platonist, wrote about issues and authored a commentary on Hermogenes; see Heath 2003a 144. For Minucianus’ lack of formal definitions that would satisfy the specifications Porphyry himself outlined in the *Isagoge*, and how this represented one reason for his ultimate eclipse by Hermogenes, see Kennedy 1980, 183–184.

ferent their approach to division might be—but each treatise explicitly refers to the logical methods of division (διαιρέσις) and demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) in its very first sentence. As we will see, such formal parallels can be multiplied. While today scholars of Porphyry on the one hand and Hermogenes on the other might not feel compelled to juxtapose the two texts against one another for philological purposes, the same cannot necessarily be said for their Byzantine counterparts. Thus, in the commentary on the Περὶ στάσεων in question, namely that of John Doxapatres (11th century), we find the two treatises being read against one another as a matter of course.⁸ In addition to the textual parallels between Porphyry and Hermogenes that Doxapatres calls attention to, his commentary offers more evidence of how the relationship between rhetoric and logic had been reversed since Late Antiquity, when philosophers like Porphyry and Syrianus grew interested in using treatises on stasis theory by Hermogenes and other rhetoricians like Minucianus as training for logic.⁹ With Doxapatres and other Middle Byzantine rhetorical commentators, it is the rhetoricians who are interested in using Porphyry and the *Organon* as training for rhetoric.¹⁰

I. *Stasis* theory, Hermogenes, and the Commentary tradition

Before turning to Doxapatres and his commentary, it will be useful to review Hermogenes' work on *stasis* theory itself, as well as the long

⁸ For Doxapatres see e.g. Hock 2012, 127–132; Kustas 1973, 25n2 suggests that his name meant he was a monk. Very little is known about him, except for the fact that he was an extremely prolific commentator on the *Corpus of Hermogenes*: in addition to the *On Issues* commentary discussed here, we also have a commentary on Aphthonios's *Progymnasmata*, edited in Walz *Rhetores Graeci* (RhG) II 1835, as well as commentaries on the *On Invention* and *On Forms of Style*. The latter two, like the commentary on *On Issues*, remain unedited, with the exception of their *prolegomena* which were published in Rabe 1931: for that of *On Issues* see lxxvi–lxxxix and 304–318 (= *Prol.* no. 20); *On Invention* civ–cvi and 360–374 (= no. 27); and *On Types of Style* cxiv–cxv and 420–426 (= no. 33); Rabe's edition of Doxapatres' *Prolegomena* to Aphthonios also supercedes that of RhG II, see xlviii–liii and 80–155 (= no. 9). See Rabe 1931, L for the admiration later generations held for Doxapatres' work.

⁹ See above n. 7.

¹⁰ For the merging of philosophy and rhetoric in middle Byzantine education, see especially Valiavitcharska 2020.

tradition of commentaries that grew up around it.¹¹ Essentially, stasis theory deals with identifying which kinds of arguments are to be used in a given situation in forensic or deliberative oratory, depending on what the precise “issue” or στάσις at contention is. Hermogenes did not of course invent stasis theory, which can be traced back to Hermagoras of Temnos and the second century BCE, but it was in his own period that it came to be more fully elaborated by rhetorical theorists during what was after all the high-water mark of the Second Sophistic.¹² Hermogenes’ treatise was thus at first just one of many, and we see him engaging enthusiastically in what were vigorous ongoing debates about the finer points of stasis theory. However, by the time of the formation of the *Corpus of Hermogenes*, his own work had long secured its position as *the* definitive treatment.¹³ The goals of his treatise, and of stasis theory more generally, are first as mentioned above to identify for any given scenario or “question” (ζήτημα) in a forensic or deliberative rhetorical setting what the precise “issue” (στάσις) is, and second to divide one’s approach to tackling the question into the “heads” of argument (κεφάλαια) that go with its particular *stasis*. Hermogenes’ treatise begins by outlining the *staseis*—which earlier had been limited to as few as five but by his own day had reached the canonical number of thirteen¹⁴—and showing how by asking a series of questions we can identify the stasis of the question at hand. Thus, if the parties do not agree on the facts of the case, the stasis is conjecture (στοχασμός); if the facts themselves are not in dispute but their correct classification is, the stasis is definition (ὅρος); if the parties agree on both the facts and their characterization, but disagree on how to qualify either aspects of the acts involved or the law or laws in question, the stasis will fall under the umbrella groups of “logical” (λογικαί) or

¹¹ For the Greek text of Hermogenes, I cite Patillon 2009. For English translation and commentary see Heath 1995.

¹² Heath 1995, 19–20.

¹³ See for example Pepe 2018, 92–93.

¹⁴ In the commentary tradition, Minucianus is credited with being the first to establish the canonical number of thirteen, but according to Heath 2003a, 153, “this is unlikely to be true”.

“legal” (νομικαί) staseis, respectively, and so on and so forth.¹⁵ Some of the staseis, including conjecture and definition, have sub-staseis or sub-species (εἶδη) of their own, which are treated in turn. The procedure can thus be likened to the dichotomous keys in field guides that amateur naturalists use to identify species of trees and other flora.

After outlining the method for identifying the stasis, Hermogenes then proceeds to the division of the “headings” or “heads” of arguments (κεφάλαια) that are to be used for each stasis, usually indicating for each head whether it is used by the prosecution or defense or both. These “headings” represent different kinds of arguments or argumentative strategies, and they are often shared between multiple staseis. Furthermore, several headings share their name with a particular stasis, and in these cases the heading represents the key argument in that stasis, with the heading thus lending its name to the stasis.¹⁶ For example, if we have identified that the stasis is definition, then the headings around which each party will construct their arguments are: the “presentation” (προβολή) or outline of the case itself; “definition”—here the eponymous heading (ὅρος), proposed by the defense to show that the act does not meet the strict definition required; a counterdefinition (ἀνθορισμός), proposed by the prosecution, which follows up with “assimilation” (συλλογισμός) that assimilates the defendant’s act to the prosecution’s counterdefinition; “legislator’s intention” (γνώμη νομοθέτου), in which both sides claim that their account of whether the act meets the definition in question accords with the intent of the lawmaker; “importance” (πηλικότης), in which the defense stresses the virtuous significance of their act as a mitigating factor; “relative importance” (πρός τι), in which the prosecution downplays whatever mitigating significance the defense had cited; and so on and so forth.¹⁷

¹⁵ For helpful visualizations of this scheme, which more or less reproduce the diagrams of the staseis that were often included in the Byzantine manuscripts themselves, see Heath 1995, 71 and Patillon 2009, xliii.

¹⁶ See especially Heath 1995, 26.

¹⁷ IV.1.1–5. For the involved sequence from definition to relative importance, I follow here the essential treatment of Heath 1995, 103. Note that Patillon includes only in the critical apparatus Heath’s final heading for definition, “common quality” (ποιότης κοινή).

Hermogenes' system is thus highly technical and full of specialized vocabulary, and partially for those reasons required the attention of a long series of commentators—many of whose works are available in modern editions thanks to the indefatigable efforts of Michel Patillon—with the earliest surviving example belonging to the second half of the fourth century (probably) with Sopatros.¹⁸ To be dated shortly thereafter, at the end of the fourth according to its recent editor Patillon, is a commentary by a certain Eustathios.¹⁹ There followed the commentary by the Neoplatonist Syrianos, the teacher of Proclus, who also wrote a commentary on the other genuine surviving treatise of Hermogenes, *On Forms of Style*,²⁰ and another by a Marcellinus, probably of the fifth century and generally identified with the author of a well-known *Life* of Thucydides.²¹ The commentaries of Marcellinus and Syrianus together with a third commentary attributed to a “Sopatros” (convincingly shown by Heath to have been a different work than the Sopatros of our earliest extant commentary on the *Περὶ στάσεων*) were mined to produce the composite work dubbed the “Dreimänner Kommentar” by Hugo Rabe, who dated its compilation to the sixth century; of the three only the commentary of Syrianos was transmitted independently, though the sections of the Dreimänner Commentary attributed to Marcellinus and “Sopatros” have now been collected and published in separate editions.²²

¹⁸ For a helpful overview of the Late Antique commentaries on the *Περὶ στάσεων*, see Pepe 2018, as well as Heath 2003a, 146; and Patillon 2009, lx–lxxiv. For Sopatros's commentary on the *Περὶ στάσεων*, first published in abridged form in C. Walz (ed.), *Rhetores Graeci V* (1833), see now Patillon 2019b. For Sopater's as “almost certainly the earliest extant commentary”, see Heath 2003b, 13. For the difficult problem of whether the commentator on Hermogenes in *RhG V* is to be identified with the Athenian rhetorician Sopatros who was the author of a *Division of Questions*, see e.g. Heath 1995, 245.

¹⁹ Patillon 2018.

²⁰ Rabe 1892–1893; see now Patillon 2021.

²¹ Patillon 2023.

²² Rabe 1907. For the text see C. Walz (ed.), *Rhetores Graeci IV* (Stuttgart 1833) 39–846. For an essential treatment of the formation of the *Dreimänner Kommentar*, see Heath 2003b, 27–29 and 32–34. Heath argues that the sections of the *Dreimänner Kommentar* attributed to “Sopatros” were in fact taken from a separate composite commentary, which itself was made of extracts from the fourth-century Sopatros commentary (edited in abridged form in *RhG V*), another commentator named John,

Add to these the commentary attributed to a George of Alexandria, the first half of which survives and which is likely datable to the first half of the fifth century, and we can fill out a cool half-dozen Περὶ στάσεων commentators from before the seventh century whose works can be consulted in modern editions.²³ In other words, exegetical activity on Hermogenes' treatise on division was exceptionally intense from the fourth through the sixth century, and it has been insightfully observed that in this period rhetoricians invested their creative energies in participating in this ongoing discussion about Hermogenes rather than authoring new handbooks on stasis theory of their own.²⁴

When, in the ninth century, evidence for active engagement with the *Corpus of Hermogenes* reappears, new generations of commentators thus had a long tradition of exegesis to look back to.²⁵ Largely unedited or only partially edited, the surviving mass of middle Byzantine (9th-12th century) commentaries on the *Corpus* attests to continuous interest in the *On Issues* in particular. This can be seen for one in the copying of important manuscripts, such as the two oldest witnesses of the so-called P-scholia: copied in the tenth and eleventh centuries (*Paris. gr.* 1983 and 2977, respectively), these manuscripts, which likely derive from a lost ninth-century archetype, preserve an extensive compilation of scholia

and further unknown sources. Heath refers to this separate composite commentary as “Deutero-Sopatros” (dubbed “Pseudo-Sopatros” by its recent editor, Patillon), and suggests that its compiler was by coincidence also named Sopatros (hence the attribution in the *Dreimänner Kommentar*), and goes so far as to identify this Deutero-Sopatros with an Alexandrian sophist named Sopatros known to have been a teacher of Severus of Antioch. For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that Heath's scheme yields three “Sopatroi”: the author of the “Division of Questions”; the author of the Hermogenes commentary printed in *RhG V*; and the homonymous compiler of the latter whose work was in turn extracted to form the Sopatros sections of the *Dreimänner Kommentar*. Those “Sopatros” sections of the *Dreimänner Kommentar* are now available in a separate edition like those assigned to Marcellinus: Patillon 2022. For the pedagogical approach of the triple commentary see now Valiavitcharska 2020, 489-498.

²³ For George “Monos”, see Patillon 2019a.

²⁴ Pepe 2018, 101.

²⁵ For the study of Hermogenes in the ninth century, see especially Valiavitcharska 2020.

on the entire *Corpus* that was probably put together in Late Antiquity.²⁶ Furthermore, this period also saw the production of new commentaries. Besides Doxapatres, it has been suggested that John of Sardis (ninth century), author of the oldest surviving commentary on Aphthonios' *Progymnasmata*, is also to be identified with a surviving anonymous commentary on the *On Issues*;²⁷ Doxapatres himself refers to an *On Issues* commentary by a predecessor of his, the poet, polymath, and soldier John Geometres (late tenth century), which however does not survive;²⁸ a commentary copied in a tenth-century manuscript (*Paris. Supp. gr.* 670; Diktyon 53405) by a certain Neilos the Monk has been attributed, albeit tendentiously, to the famous monk, Saint Neilos of Rossano;²⁹ and finally John Tzetzes, himself a careful reader of Doxapatres, produced a commentary on the *On Issues* as part of his massive set of commentaries on all the constituent works on the *Corpus of Hermogenes*.³⁰ Doxapatres' still unedited commentary on the *On Issues* thus represents a key point in this wider network of exegetical activity, and the following discussion is offered in the hopes of showing what closer engagement with these still largely unfamiliar materials can offer for the study of middle Byzantine education and literary culture more generally.

II. Doxapatres' *On Issues* Commentary and Vienna, *Phil. gr.* 130

Of foundational importance for our understanding of Doxapatres' commentary are the studies by Stephan Glöckner on its most important witness, a fourteenth-century manuscript now in Vienna (*Vind. Phil. gr.* 130; Diktyon 71244), identified by the siglum Wc.³¹ It was Glöckner

²⁶ For the *On Issues* sections of the P-scholia, see the edition by Walz 1833 in *Rhetores Graeci* 7, 104–690. For extensive discussion of the treatment of *On Issues* in the P-scholia, see Valiavitcharska 2020.

²⁷ See below note 39.

²⁸ Glöckner 1908, 26–27.

²⁹ For discussion and bibliography see Patillon 2018, XL as well as Chu 2023, 189.

³⁰ For Tzetzes as a close reader of Doxapatres, see Pizzone (forthcoming), and below, note 35.

³¹ Glöckner 1908–1909.

who showed that the commentary attributed in Wc to Doxapatres represents a composite work, which can be divided into four sections. In the first section (ff. 84v–119v), the only one in which Doxapatres features abundantly, as Glöckner was able to show through comparison with other witnesses, his commentary is interspersed among material from two other sources in a kind of triple commentary.³² In addition to Doxapatres, this includes a second, anonymous commentator whose entries are prefaced in red ink as belonging to “the other commentator” (ἐτέρου ἐξηγητοῦ); and finally a set of what were originally marginal scholia in one of the earlier commentaries that were used to produce the triple commentary. In Wc, comments of this third type are preceded by the label ἄλλως (“otherwise”).³³ In the second section (ff. 119v–143v), the labels ἐτέρου ἐξηγητοῦ and ἄλλως are not found, nor can the material be identified with Doxapatres, with minor exceptions. In the third section (ff. 143v–162r), the triple-commentary structure resumes, but here instead of Doxapatres we have material from Tzetzes’ commentary on the *On Issues*.³⁴ Finally, like the second section, the fourth section (ff. 162r–170v) lacks any identifying labels, and again as with the second section its material is not drawn from Doxapatres.³⁵

For identifying these different sections and how their source material varies, of crucial importance was the fact that Glöckner was able to control Wc against two other witnesses to Doxapatres’ commentary: *Vat. gr.* 1022 (Vt), in which the *On Issues* commentary, though incomplete, is also attributed to Doxapatres and which in addition to Doxapatres also features material labeled as belonging to the “other commentator” (ἐτέρου ἐξηγητοῦ), as in Wc’s “triple commentary”; and *Vat. gr.* 106 (Ve), a thirteenth-century manuscript whose anonymous *On Issues* commentary represents a condensed version of the Doxapatres material in Wc, and which also features some of the third source of Wc’s triple

³² Glöckner 1909, 3; see also Rabe 1931, lxxxix.

³³ Glöckner 1909, 23–24.

³⁴ As Pizzone (forthcoming) demonstrates, Tzetzes also left extensive notes on Doxapatres’ commentary on Aphthonios in the antigraph of Wc that were in turn copied into the margins of Wc itself, and reveals himself throughout as a careful reader of Doxapatres.

³⁵ Glöckner 1909, 11–20.

commentary (i.e., those labeled ἄλλως in Wc, though they lack any such indication in Ve), but not the “other commentator” that accompanies Doxapatres in Vt and Wc.³⁶ Finally, Glöckner showed that the scribe of Wc, before switching from the “other commentator” back to Doxapatres in the first section of the commentary, almost always marks the end of the non-Doxapatres material with a small cross.³⁷ His observations made it possible to isolate virtually all of the sections of Doxapatres’ commentary that are transmitted in Wc.

The codex itself consists of 170 folios of oriental paper, and was dated by Hunger to the first half of the fourteenth century.³⁸ The collection, which consists entirely of rhetorical content related to the *Corpus of Hermogenes*, begins first with Doxapatres’ *prolegomena* (titled ὁμιλῖαι or “lectures”) on the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonios (f.1v–7v), followed by Aphthonios’s text itself surrounded by commentary (f. 8r–83v); then an excerpt from Sopatros’s commentary on the *Staseis* (f. 84r–84v = *RhG* V.79–83); and finally the commentary on the *On Issues*, together with the text of Hermogenes (f.84v–170v). Rabe showed that as with the *On Issues* commentary, the section on Aphthonios also takes the form of a triple commentary, divided between Doxapatres, the “other exegete” (ἐτέρου ἐξηγητοῦ), and material designated “other” (ἄλλως).³⁹ He also suggested that the manuscript would have once been part of a massive, complete set of the *Corpus of Hermogenes* together with commentary, with Wc representing the only surviving volume.⁴⁰

³⁶ Glöckner 1909, 8–11. Glöckner also showed that the *stasis* commentary in what is otherwise the most important manuscript for all of Doxapates’ other works (*Vat. gr.* 2228 = Vδ) corresponds instead fully to the “other commentator” of Wc’s triple commentary.

³⁷ Glöckner 1909, 5 n. 5.

³⁸ Hunger 1961, 238. Glöckner 1908, 7 and Rabe 1931, lxxvi, 304 had dated it to the 13th or 14th century.

³⁹ On the basis of two other manuscripts (*Vat. gr.* 1408 and *Coisl. gr.* 387), Rabe 1928, iii–xi identified the “other commentator” in the *Progymnasmata* commentary with John of Sardis, and also suggested that the incomplete *On Issues* commentary ascribed to “the other commentator” (ἐτέρου ἐξηγητοῦ) in *Vat. gr.* 1022 (Vt) and Wc is also the work of John Sardis; see Rabe 1931, lxxxix–xc; as well as Valiavitcharska 2020, 487n4 and Hock 2012, 10–13.

⁴⁰ Rabe 1909, 1020. Rabe cites the example of *Vat. gr.* 2228, also a copy of the *Corpus of Hermogenes* plus commentary, which was so large that it was divided into two

With pages measuring 240-245mm x 155-160mm, and the space of the text taking up most of that at 190-205mm x 125-135mm, and with an average of around 50-60 lines of commentary per page in the *On Issues* section, the first impression given by the appearance of the commentary is that of dense sheets of tightly written text. This impression is relieved only by blocks of space, stretching out from the inner margin of the page and taking up roughly half (though occasional ranging from one-third to two-thirds) of the width of a full line of commentary text, that accommodate a few lines of the text of Hermogenes at a time, sometimes as few as one or two lines and sometimes as many as 18 or more (f. 108r; 21 lines on f. 154r). Most pages have one of these blocks, some two or even three (ff. 101v and 119v), and others have none at all, in which case the entire face of the page is filled with commentary. As far as I can tell, on a given page the commentary text is written by the same hand as the block of Hermogenes text, with an exception on f. 94r, where the hand of the commentary changes half way down the page, and the four-line block of Hermogenes text is written by the first scribe, which supports the assumption that the scribe, taking his cue from his exemplar, first determined how many lines of Hermogenes he wanted to accommodate on a given page, and after blocking off the corresponding amount of space and copying the Hermogenes lines, proceeded to fill up the rest of the page with commentary. At least once more the hand changes, again to the extent I can judge, between ff. 138v and 139r, which also marks the beginning of a new quire.⁴¹ The discussion that follows relies on my transcription of the manuscript, based on the photographic reproduction available online at the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek.⁴²

parts, the first of which consists, like the Vienna manuscript, of Aphthonios and *On Issues*, in 190 folios, almost exactly what the total folio count of the Vienna manuscript would have been before the loss of several folios.

⁴¹ Glöckner 1909, 8.

⁴² https://digital.onb.ac.at/RepViewer/viewer.faces?doc=DTL_7935686&order=1&view=SINGLE (last accessed 7/22/2024).

III. Doxapatres' Commentary and Porphyry's *Isagoge*

Even taking into consideration only those works of Doxapatres that have already been published—namely the Aphthonios commentary and the *prolegomena* to Aphthonios as well as to the commentaries on *On Issues*, *On Invention*, and *On Forms of Style*⁴³—Doxapatres' interest in incorporating Porphyry's *Isagoge* into his exegesis already makes him stand out. For example, throughout all of the 33 rhetorical *prolegomena* collected and edited by Rabe, Porphyry is cited by name in connection with the *Isagoge* a total of eleven times—and six of those are in Doxapatres.⁴⁴ One such instance features in the *prolegomena* to the *On Issues* commentary. Most of these *prolegomena* are missing from Wc because of folia that have fallen out, and Rabe edited them based on Vt (*Vat. gr.* 1022). In the passage in question, which involves a discussion on why the works of the *Corpus of Hermogenes* are read in a particular order, Doxapatres notes that just as a body is prior to its shape and other accidents, so the *On Invention* (which discusses the structure of a speech) is ordered before *On Forms of Style* (which deals with a speech's stylistic elaboration). He then adds, notably, that “substances are prior to accidents, as we have learned in Porphyry's *Isagoge*, when he says that ‘prior to the accident is that in which the accident occurs’” (ὅτι δὲ πρῶται γίνονται αἱ οὐσίαι τῶν συμβεβηκότων, καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ Πορφυρίου Εἰσαγωγῇ μεμαθήκαμεν ἐν αὐτῇ εἰπόντος ἐκείνου πρῶτον εἶναι τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τοῦ συμβεβηκότος).⁴⁵ By addressing his audience in such a way, Doxapatres suggests that together they are able to treat the *Isagoge* as a common point of reference, and as a textbook he can assume they have studied on their way to working through the *Corpus of Hermogenes*. As we will see again and again in the unedited commentary itself, this manner of quoting explicitly from Porphyry's *Isagoge* in order to provide explanations or parallels for the structure and thought of Hermogenes is characteristic of Doxapatres' method.

⁴³ See above n. 8.

⁴⁴ Porphyry is cited on two other occasions elsewhere in Rabe's collection of *prolegomena* (Rabe 1931, 181.14 and 293.16), but in connection with his rhetorical commentary on Minucianus.

⁴⁵ Rabe 1931, 309.14–17.

IV. Doxapatres reading Hermogenes alongside Porphyry

We can begin with an entry of Doxapatres on the very first two words of Hermogenes' treatise, and it will be helpful to quote Hermogenes' first sentence in its entirety, as Doxapatres will have much to say about it that interests us here:⁴⁶

πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων, ἃ τὴν ῥητορικὴν συνίστησι καὶ τέχνην ποιεῖ, καταληφθέντα τε ἐξ ἀρχῆς δηλαδὴ καὶ συγγυμνασθέντα τῷ χρόνῳ, σαφῇ τε τὴν ὠφέλειαν παρεχόμενα τῷ βίῳ κὰν ταῖς βουλαῖς κὰν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ πανταχοῦ, μέγιστον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδείξεως (I.1).

There are many important elements which constitute rhetoric as an art. These have of course been grasped from the beginning, and set in order by practice over time, and their practical usefulness, both in deliberative and in judicial contexts and everywhere else, is manifest. But the most important, in my view, is concerned with division and demonstration.

Doxapatres seizes upon Hermogenes' first two words—πολλῶν ὄντων—and immediately compares them to what Porphyry does in the *Isagoge*:

εἰ δὲ πάλιν εἶπῃ τις διὰ τί οὐκ εἶπεν “ὄντων πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων”, ἵνα τὸ ὄν προταγῇ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπου καὶ τῷ Πορφυρίῳ ἐν τῇ πέντε φωνῶν πραγματεία προετάγη τῶν ἄλλων; λύσις· ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἐκεῖνον μὲν τὸ ὄν εἰκότως προετάγη ὡς καθολικωτάτῳ φιλοσόφῳ ὄντι, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο φιλοκαθόλῳ τυγχάνοντι, οἱ δὲ ῥήτορες οὐ τῶν καθόλου, τῶν μερικῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἀντέχονται. (f. 86r ll.39–42)

Furthermore, if someone should ask why he didn't say “there being many great things...” [i.e., ὄντων πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων instead of πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων], so that “being” should precede the other words—which Porphyry also placed before the other words in his treatise on the five predicables—we shall reply that “being” was understandably placed first by that philosopher, as he was most universal

⁴⁶ For the Greek text see Patillon 2009, 1; translation from Heath 1995, 28.

and for that reason happened to favor universal statements. But it is not universals that rhetors embrace, but rather the particulars.

What is Doxapatres talking about here when he says that “being” was understandably placed first by the philosopher? He is not referring to any metaphysical interest on the part of Porphyry in being *qua* being, as one might be tempted to think; this does not have to do with Porphyry alluding briefly, early on in his treatise, to the vexed question of the ontological status of universals. Instead, Doxapatres is talking quite literally about the very first word in the *Isagoge*, which just like Hermogenes’ treatise begins with a genitive absolute of the verb “to be”. However, unlike Hermogenes, Porphyry puts the participle for the verb “to be” first:⁴⁷ Ὅντος ἀναγκαίου, Χρυσασόριε... (“It being necessary, Chrysaorius...”). In other words, when it comes to discussing a relatively minor point related to word choice and order at the beginning of Hermogenes’ treatise, Doxapatres’ go-to comparison is the very beginning of Porphyry’s treatise. Why, for Doxapatres and his readers, might it seem a natural or helpful procedure to read the respective proems of these two treatises against one another? We can get some purchase on this question by considering how Porphyry’s first sentence continues after those opening two words:

Ὅντος ἀναγκαίου, Χρυσασόριε, καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ γνῶναι τί γένος καὶ τί διαφορὰ τί τε εἶδος καὶ τί ἴδιον καὶ τί συμβεβηκός, εἷς τε τὴν τῶν ὀρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν καὶ ὅλως εἰς τὰ περὶ διαιρέσεως καὶ ἀποδείξεως χρησίμης οὔσης τῆς τούτων θεωρίας, σύντομόν σοι παράδοσιν ποιούμενος πειράσομαι διὰ βραχέων ὥσπερ ἐν εἰσαγωγῇς τρόπῳ... (Busse 1.3–8)

It being necessary, Chrysaorius, even for a schooling in Aristotle’s predication, to know what is a genus and what a difference and what a species and what a property and what an accident—and also for the presentation of definitions, and generally for matters concerning division and <demonstration>, the study of which is

⁴⁷ For Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, I cite the text of Busse 1887, 1.3–8; translation taken (with some adaptation) from Barnes 2003, 3.

useful,—I shall attempt, in making you a concise exposition, to rehearse, briefly and as in the manner of an introduction...(tr. Barnes 3, with angular brackets marking an adjustment of my own to the translation)

Porphry says that the subject of his work, that is, the five predicables, besides being necessary for understanding Aristotle's *Categories* and the process of forming definitions, is also crucial "generally" for the dialectical methods of division (διαίρεσις) and demonstration (ἀποδείξις). These last two terms are of course the same two methods that Hermogenes singles out in the first sentence of his treatise as representing "the most important" element of rhetoric (μέγιστον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς διαίρεσεως αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδείξεως). If it occurs to Doxapatres to compare Hermogenes' introductory proem with that of Porphyry's, that might be because they not only begin with strikingly similar formulas, but they also foreground their focus on the same processes of division and demonstration. Doxapatres takes it as a given not only that we are already familiar with the *other* great treatise on division—that of division not of political questions into so-called κεφάλαια but of genera into species—but that these two treatises can be read against one another with profit. Indeed, the formal parallels between the respective introductions of these treatises—the opening genitive absolutes and the explicit references to the division and demonstration—seem striking enough to me that I am tempted to think that the parallels themselves played an active role in encouraging the interconnected use of the two treatises, both with respect to Doxapatres and more broadly.

Furthermore, Doxapatres' *explicit* reference to Porphyry's *Isagoge* in this entry can underscore for us the significance of his *implicit* use of Porphyrian material in other comments of his on this same first sentence of Hermogenes. Thus, the commentary tradition had long been concerned with why Hermogenes seems not to define rhetoric at the beginning of his treatise.⁴⁸ In contrast, Doxapatres argues that Hermogenes does indeed define rhetoric, but that he does so periphrastically, by first

⁴⁸ See Heath 2003a, 149 for how the commentators had also drawn attention to Minucianus' similar failure to offer a clear definition of rhetoric.

hinting at the well-established definition of “art” and then adding language that specifies the rhetorical art in particular.⁴⁹ He then proceeds to show how Hermogenes’ words can be unpacked so as to yield a proper definition of rhetoric, and the language Doxapatres uses to describe his approach is noteworthy (f. 86r ll. 13–15):

ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν σύγκειται,
ἴδωμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὁρισμῷ, ποῖον μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ γένος,
ποῖαι δὲ αἱ συστατικαὶ διαφοραί.

Now, since every definition is composed of a genus and constitutive differences, let us see in the present definition of rhetoric what the genus is and what the constitutive differences are.

What Doxapatres means by this is that we define something, say a species like “human being”, by identifying its genus (in this case, “animal”) as well as the “difference” or quality that distinguishes it from other members of the same genus, which for humans as opposed to other animals is “rational”. Thus, the (simplified) definition of human is “rational animal”. This approach to producing definitions derives from Porphyry’s *Isagoge*:

ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ αὐταὶ <sc. διαφοραὶ> πῶς μὲν ληφθεῖσαι γίνονται
συστατικά, πῶς δὲ διαιρετικά, εἰδοποιοὶ πᾶσαι κέκληνται. καὶ
τούτων γε μάλιστα χρεῖα εἰς τε τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰς
τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς...(ed. Busse 10.18–19

Since, then, the same differences taken in one way are found to be constitutive and in one way divisive, they have all been called specific; and it is they which are especially useful both for divisions of genera and for definitions (tr. Barnes 10)

The influence of the *Isagoge* meant that the process of forming definitions from genera and differences became part of the standard Byzantine

⁴⁹ See also Heath 1995, 61 on how Hermogenes’ first sentence “alludes to the common definition of art”.

intellectual toolkit. However, Doxapatres' terminology here is noteworthy, especially how he specifies that "constitutive" (συστατικά) differences, when added to genera, yield definitions. The term "constitutive difference" does not appear, for example, in the commentaries of Sopatros or Syrianus on Hermogenes, nor in the composite "Dreimänner" commentary. It appears once in the so-called P-scholia, where however it is used in a more general discussion and not in order to analyze the actual text of Hermogenes' treatise.⁵⁰ Again, Doxapatres' implicit use of Porphyrian material here should be considered in the light of his explicit reference to the proem of the *Isagoge* in an entry for this same sentence of Hermogenes. This is the first of several explicit invocations of the *Isagoge*, and that does set Doxapatres apart. Whenever Porphyry is cited by name in the commentaries of Sopatros, Syrianos, the "Dreimänner Kommentar", or the P-scholia, it is exclusively in reference to Porphyry's statements regarding *stasis* theory in his Minucianus commentary—never to the *Isagoge*.

After the *proemium*, Hermogenes' subsequent treatment of the classes of "person types" (πρόσωπα) that can potentially play a role in a declamatory theme based on *stasis* provides Doxapatres with his next occasion to cite Porphyry's *Isagoge*. The fifth item in Hermogenes' catalogue consists of composite types of hypothetical persons, for example the "rich young man" (νέος πλούσιος). Hermogenes says that one or the other of these labels on their own wouldn't offer much potential for building a declamatory theme around, but when combined they do. Doxapatres finds noteworthy the language Hermogenes uses to refer to "one or the other" of the two labels:

“τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον” [= St. I.5.10]: τρία τινὰ περίκεινται ἀλλήλοις· θάτερον· ἑκάτερον· ἕκαστον· ὧν τὸ μὲν θάτερον, ἐπὶ ἑνὸς· τὸ δὲ ἑκάτερον, ἐπὶ δύο· τὸ δὲ ἕκαστον, ἐπὶ πολλῶν λαμβάνεται· ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ καταχρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος, ἐν τῇ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν πραγματείᾳ· ἐν τῷ, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι γένος χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῶς συμβεβηκότων· ἃ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ὁποῖον τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται ἕκαστον ὧν

⁵⁰ RhG 7.396.31.

κατηγορεῖται [= Busse 3.17–19]⁵¹· τῷ ἑκάστον, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκάτερον· ἐν
ἐκείνῃ τούτῳ χρησαμένου. (f. 94v ll. 9–13)

“for one of the two”: A certain three words are related to one another: *thateron* (“one of the two”), *hekateron* (“each of the two”), and *hekaston* (“each one”). Of these, *thateron* is used with respect to one entity; *hekateron* with respect to two; and *hekaston* with respect to many. Sometimes however we use these words in an improper sense, just like Porphyry does in his treatise on the five predicables. For in saying “the fact that they are predicated in answer to the question ‘What is it?’ separates genus from differences and common accidents, each of which is predicated of the things they are predicated of in answer not to the question ‘What is it?’ but to ‘What sort of so-and-so is it?’”⁵², Porphyry has used *hekaston* instead of *hekateron*.

In other words, Doxapatres says Hermogenes uses ἐκάτερον loosely instead of θάτερον; he compares this to how Porphyry used the word ἑκάστον in a loose or improper sense, since in the passage in question (according to Doxapatres’ reading of Porphyry) it refers to “each” of precisely two subjects (differences and common accidents), for which we might expect ἐκάτερον instead. The fact that Doxapatres explicitly cites Porphyry, not in reference to division or definition or anything else having to do with logic, but rather to offer a parallel for a question of semantic usage, is itself significant. For Doxapatres and his audience, the text of the *Isagoge*, in various points of detail, can serve as a common point of reference. Again, it represents a textbook whose material can be presumed to have been absorbed before the stage in the rhetorical curriculum when *stasis* theory is taught.

The next moment where Doxapatres turns to the *Isagoge* to explain Hermogenes’ authorial moves is more involved, and shows the former engaging with some of the finer points of the Porphyrian method of forming definitions. This comes after Hermogenes has gone through his catalogues of classes of “persons” (πρόσωπα) and “acts” (πράγματα)

⁵¹ Note that Doxapatres’ text of Porphyry differs here slightly from Busse’s edition.

⁵² The translation here has been adapted from Barnes 2003, 5 to account for the fact that Doxapatres takes ἑκάστον differently than Barnes does.

that lend themselves to *stasis* treatment in declamations (I.5–7 and I.8–12, respectively). He then proceeds to outline the characteristics that a given question must feature in order to be considered a ζήτημα συνεστώς, a “valid question” or “a question with issue” (I.13). Doxapatres refers to this set of characteristics—the lack of any of which renders a question “invalid” or “without issue” (ἄσυστατον)—as Hermogenes’ κανών or “rule”. Doxapatres breaks down each of the elements of the “rule”—the question must have persuasive arguments on both sides; a verdict can in fact be rendered, etc.—by showing how they differentiate valid questions from particular varieties of “invalid” or “nearly invalid but still practiced in declamation” questions. The word order of Hermogenes’ rule is such that, according to Doxapatres, it differentiates valid questions from the various kinds of invalid and nearly invalid questions in no particular order, with, for example, kinds of invalid question followed by a kind of nearly invalid question, then by another kind of invalid question and a second nearly invalid question, then other kinds of invalid questions, and so on. Doxapatres here notes that one might reasonably wonder why Hermogenes did not define valid questions in such a way that he first differentiates them from what they are further removed from—namely the invalid questions—and then from what they are more closely related to, the nearly invalid questions. This is, after all, how one is taught to produce definitions, according to the hypothetical argument that Doxapatres rehearses. Take for example a long-form definition of human: “animal, rational, mortal”. The first item, animal, is the genus to which humans belong, and which sets humans and other animals apart from what is furthest removed from them within the larger category of all living things in general, such as plants. The second item, rational, distinguishes humans and other rational beings (i.e., angels) from what is more closely related to them, namely the mute beasts, like horses. The third item, mortal, distinguishes humans from what we are closest to, namely rational but immortal animals (angels). Doxapatres responds to this hypothetical argument by noting that in presenting the essential characteristics of a valid question, Hermogenes is not offering a proper definition, but that even if he were, even the definitions that

Porphry himself presents in the *Isagoge* aren't necessarily formulated in such a fashion:

ἐροῦμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κύριος ὁ ὀρισμός· ἀλλὰ κανὼν τίς ἐστι μᾶλλον τὰ ἴδια τοῦ συνεστῶτος ζητήματ<ος>⁵³, παριστῶν· ἄλλωστε, οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀρισμοῖς πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸ τοιοῦτον γίνεσθαι· αὐτίκα γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν ταῖς πέντε φωναῖς τὸ γένος ὀρισάμενος καὶ εἰπὼν αὐτὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἶδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον [= Busse 2.15-16]· καὶ διὰ μὲν τοῦ κατὰ πλειόνων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων αὐτὸ διαστείλας· διὰ δὲ τοῦ διαφερόντων τῷ εἶδει, ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ιδίων· διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων· διὰ δὲ τοῦ κατηγορούμενον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσημάντων φωνῶν· οὐ πάντως ἀπὸ τῶν πορρωτέρων καὶ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγγυτέρων τὸ ὀριστικὸν ἐχώρησε· τῶν γὰρ διαφορῶν πλέον τοῦ ιδίου συγγενειαζουσῶν τῷ γένει, οὐκ ἀπὸ τούτων πρῶτον, καὶ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ιδίου αὐτὸ διεῖλεν· ἀλλ' ἔμπαλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ιδίου πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν· καὶ τῶν ιδίων· καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον συγγενειαζουσῶν τῷ γένει· ἢ αἱ ἀσημαντοὶ φωναὶ ...⁵⁴ πρῶτον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν· καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· καὶ τῶν ιδίων· καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων διέστελε τὸ γένος· καὶ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσημάντων φωνῶν. (f. 100v ll.48–56)

We will reply that the definition here is not a proper one, but rather a kind of rule that presents the properties of a valid question. Moreover, even when it comes to proper definitions themselves, there is not every necessity that such a thing be done. Thus take for example Porphyry himself in the *Five Predicables*, when he defines genus and says that it is predicated of multiple things that differ in species in answer to the question “What is it?”. Here in saying “of multiple things”, he differentiates genus from the individuals <sc. because an individual cannot be predicated of multiple things>; in saying “that differ in species”, he differentiates it from species and properties; in saying “in answer to the question “What is it?”, he differentiates it from differences and accidents <sc. which are predicated in answer to the question “What

⁵³ ms ζητήματα.

⁵⁴ One word here is illegible.

sort of thing is it?”>; in saying “predicated”, he differentiates it from meaningless sounds. Thus the act of definition did not necessarily proceed from what is further removed and later from what is more closely related: for although *differences are more closely related to genus than property is*⁵⁵, he did not divide genus from differences first, and later on from property, but the reverse, dividing it from property first and then later from differences. Furthermore, although individuals, species, differences, properties and accidents are more closely related to genus than meaningless sounds are <...>, he first differentiated genus from individuals and differences and species and properties and accidents, and then later from meaningless sounds.

Once again we see here Doxapatres walking his audience through a granular analysis of Porphyry’s text in order to provide a parallel for the way Hermogenes structures his own material: Porphyry’s definition of genus is not formulated in such a way that it distinguishes genus first from what is furthest removed from it and later from what is more closely related to it, so there is no reason to expect Hermogenes’ “rule” of what constitutes a valid question—whether or not the rule counts as a proper definition—to be so formulated either.

After providing his “rule” for what constitutes a valid question, Hermogenes says that he will outline the invalid questions according to their various types or “species” (εἶδος). Here once again Doxapatres explicitly compares Hermogenes’ approach to Porphyry in the *Isagoge*, and how after defining genus he then immediately proceeded to outline the very things that had been differentiated from genus through the latter’s definition:

“εἰρήσεται δὲ κατ’ εἶδος” (I.13.11): ἐπειδὴ διέστειλε τὰ συνεστῶτα ζητήματα, διὰ τοῦ κανόνος ἀπὸ τε τῶν ἀσυστάτων· καὶ τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀσυστάτων, ὑπισχνεῖται τὸν κανόνα διασαφῆσαι· ἐκ τοῦ παραδείγματος θεῖναι τούτων· ὧν τὸ συνεστῶς, διεστέλλετο ζήτημα· τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν Πορφύριον ἐγνώμεν, ἐν τῷ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν

⁵⁵ The text is most likely corrupt at this point, since Doxapatres’ argument requires him here to say instead “for although differences are *not* more closely related to genus than property is...”.

βιβλίῳ ποιήσαντα· κακείνος γὰρ ἐν ἐνείνῳ ὀρισάμενος τὸ γένος· καὶ εἰπὼν γένος εἶναι “τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἶδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ κα[τα]τηγορούμενον” [= ed. Busse 2.15–16]· καὶ διαστείλας αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν παρακειμένων, ἤγουν τῶν ἀτόμων· καὶ τοῦ εἶδους· καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου· καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, μετὰ τὸν ὀρισμὸν, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ τούτων διαλαμβάνει· δεικνύων τίνα ἐστὶ ταῦτα· ὃν ὁ ὀρισμὸς τὸ γένος διέστειλεν. (f. 101v ll.44–49)

“will be said according to species”. Now that he has used the rule to distinguish valid questions from both invalid questions and nearly invalid questions, he promises to clarify this rule by providing examples of the things that he was just distinguishing from valid questions. We know that Porphyry did this same thing as well in his treatise on the five predicables. For he too first defines genus there by saying that genus “is what is predicated, in answer to ‘What is it?’, of several items which differ in species”,⁵⁶ thus differentiating genus from the other terms in question, namely individuals, species, property, and accident. Then, after supplying the definition, he discusses those terms as if giving a summary⁵⁷, thereby indicating what these things are that the definition has distinguished from genus.

Thus, Doxapatres takes the organizational strategy of this section of Hermogenes—first the rule of valid questions, then an outline of what is excluded by that rule—and directly compares it to what Porphyry does when he first defines genus and then offers a brief treatment of the terms differentiated from genus through that definition.

After outlining the various “species” of invalid question, Hermogenes then offers an overview of three kinds of the “nearly invalid” questions that are still however used in declamatory practice (I.22-24). In an extended section of commentary on the opening sentence of this section (I.22.1-2), Doxapatres turns once again to the proem of the *Isagoge*, this time to offer a comparison and a possible answer for why Hermogenes chose to offer the “rule” for valid questions and then the

⁵⁶ tr. Barnes 2003, 4.

⁵⁷ This refers to *Isagoge* ed. Busse 2.17–3.8.

outlines of the types of invalid and nearly invalid questions, in that particular order:

ῥητέον ἕτερόν τι, πρὸς λύσιν τοῦ ἀπορήματος· φαμέν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπεὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐδόκει τὰ ἀσύστατα τῶν συνεστώτων πρ<οτ>ακτέα εἶναι· διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν νομοθετικὴν πρῶτον ἀναιρεῖν τὰ κακά· καὶ οὕτω ἀντεισάγειν τὰ χρήσιμα· τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον τὰ συνεστώτα τῶν ἀσυστάτων, διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον τάξιν, τὰ ἐντελέστερα τῶν ἀτελεστερῶν, προτάττει· θέλων ἀμφοτέρας τηρῆσαι τὰς τάξεις ὁ τεχνογράφος, κατεμέρισε τὸν, περὶ τῶν συνεστώτων λόγον· καὶ τὸν μὲν κανόνα αὐτὸν προτάξας· τὴν δὲ μέθοδον μετατάξας, τὰ ἀσύστατα μέσα ἐτήρησε· πῇ μὲν τὰ συνεστώτα τῶν ἀσυστάτων προτάττων· πῇ δὲ καὶ ἔμπαλιν ποιῶν· καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν προοιμίῳ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν ἐποίησε· κἀκεῖνος γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ· ἐπειδὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸν σκοπὸν ἐδόκει δεῖν προτάττεσθαι τοῦ χρησίμου· τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, τοῦ σκοποῦ· καταμερίσας τὸ χρήσιμον· τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ τέθεικε· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸν σκοπὸν· φησὶ γὰρ οὕτως· ὄντος ἀναγκαίου Χρυσασόριε· καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν· ἰδοὺ ἐν τοῦ χρησίμου μέρος· εἶτα ἐπιφέρει τὸν σκοπὸν· τοῦ γινῶναι τί γένος καὶ τί διαφορά· εἶτα πάλιν καὶ τὸ λείπον τοῦ χρησίμου λέγει· εἷς τε τὴν τῶν ὀρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· [= Busse 1.1-3] ὅπερ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἐν τῷ πέντε φωνῶν βιβλίῳ ἐποίησε, τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ἑρμογένης ἐν τῷ παρόντι ποιεῖ· πῇ μὲν τὰ συνεστώτα τῶν ἀσυστάτων· πῇ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀσύστατα τῶν συνεστώτων προτάττων. (f. 104v ll.36-46)

Something else should be mentioned as a solution to the problem. Thus we say the following: since some believe the invalid questions should come before the valid questions, because the legislative approach to ordering also first gets rid of the bad and then introduces the good in its place, while others believe the opposite and that the valid questions should come before the invalid ones, since the philosophical approach to ordering puts the more perfect before the less perfect, our expert, in wanting to adhere to both principles of ordering, split up his account of the valid questions, putting first the rule itself then afterwards the method for valid questions, and then keeping the invalid questions in the middle. Thus in one way he puts the valid questions before the invalid questions, while in another way he does the reverse, and just like Porphyry does in the introductory part of the Five Predi-

cables, so too does Hermogenes here. For there <sc. in the *Isagoge*> as well, since some people think the goal of a work should come before its utility, while others think the utility should come before the goal, so Porphyry divided up the discussion of utility, and put part of it before the goal, and another part after the goal. For he says the following: “Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, even for instruction in Aristotle’s *Categories*”—behold here one part of the utility, and then he adds the goal—“in order to know what a genus is and what a difference is”—and then in turn he adds what is left of the utility—“and for the production of definitions” and so on. Thus, what Porphyry did in his treatise on the five predicables is the same thing that Hermogenes does in the treatise at hand, in one way putting the valid questions before the invalid ones, and in another the invalid questions before the valid ones.

This requires a bit of unpacking. Doxapatres first says that Hermogenes was faced with two competing principles for how to order his treatment of valid questions and invalid questions, one a so-called “legislative”⁵⁸ approach to ordering that would first dispose of the bad (in this case the invalid questions) before dealing with the good (the valid questions), and a “philosophical” one that would move instead from the more perfect (the valid questions) to the less so (the invalid ones). Doxapatres’ take is that Hermogenes gets to have his cake and eat it too, in that he actually breaks up his overall treatment of the valid questions into the “rule” or κανὼν that outlines their required characteristics (I.13) and then the longer μέθοδος or method for identifying the *stasis* of any given valid question (II.1-17), with the treatment of invalid and nearly invalid questions being inserted in the middle (I.14-24). Thus, as Doxapatres puts it, from one point of view Hermogenes has ordered the valid questions before the invalid questions, and from another point of view he has done the reverse. Then, as a parallel to Hermogenes’ compositional strategy of breaking up his treatment of valid questions, Doxapatres turns once again to the proem of the *Isagoge*. Here, in referring to Porphyry’s introductory discussion of the “utility” (τὸ χρήσιμον) and “goal” (ὁ

⁵⁸ The idea here seems to be that lawmakers first enact legislation delineating *illegal* activities before dealing with laws related to legal activities.

σκοπός) of his work, Doxapatres is drawing on the formulaic language used in the tradition of *prolegomena* of commentaries on works in the philosophical and rhetorical curriculum.⁵⁹ These *prolegomena* posed a standardized set of questions that were to be answered before studying the work in question, and these inquired for example into the title of the work in question as well as its “utility” and “goal”. Doxapatres says that the phrases in Porphyry’s proem that refer to the “utility” of the work—useful for learning the *Categories* and for producing definitions—are interrupted by a phrase that identifies the actual goal of the work, namely to learn what a genus and the other predicables are. Once again, we see Doxapatres referring his audience back to the *Isagoge* and to Porphyry’s individual phrases in order to shed light on Hermogenes.

The last bit of Doxapatres to be examined here comes from one of his subsequent comments on Hermogenes’ outline of “nearly invalid questions”. Although it does not cite the *Isagoge* explicitly as in the previous examples, it is nevertheless revealing for how Doxapatres approached a key section of Hermogenes’ treatise through a Porphyrian lens. In the lemma in question, Hermogenes has finished listing his eight types of invalid questions (I.14-21), and he proceeds to discuss an intermediate category between invalid and valid questions, the so-called “nearly invalid questions” that are nevertheless still practiced in declamation (ἕτερα ἐγγὺς μὲν ἀσυστάτων, μελετώμενα δὲ ὅμως, I.22.1-2). He lists three different types of such questions, namely the “ill-balanced” (τὸ ἑτερορρεπές), the “flawed in invention” (τὸ κακόπλαστον), and the “prejudiced” (τὸ προειλημμένον τῇ κρίσει). At this point Doxapatres notes that as with the types of invalid questions, which began with the “one-sided” (τὸ μονομερές), here once again Hermogenes begins with the more invalid and proceeds to the less so. He notes that one might plausibly ask why Hermogenes didn’t reverse direction in his listing of the “nearly invalid but still practiced” questions, and begin instead with the more valid ones, since these questions occupy a middle ground between absolutely invalid and valid questions, and presumably Hermogenes could have just as easily begun with the more valid among

⁵⁹ See Mansfield 1994.

the “nearly invalid but still practiced” questions, had he wanted to. Doxapatres responds that such a choice was not in fact available to him, since the qualifiers “more” and “less” can be used of the invalidity of questions but not of validity, so one cannot speak of beginning with the “more valid” questions when treating the “nearly invalid but still practiced questions” (in other words, when it comes to stasis, invalidity admits of degrees, but validity does not). He follows up with a comment on Hermogenes’ approach to the valid questions that is telling:

ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀσυστάτοις ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνεστῶσι τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι· πρῶτον γὰρ, πάντα ἐπίσης συνίστανται· καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἥττον· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀσυστάτοις· τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἀσύστατον· τὸ δὲ ἥττον· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν συνεστῶτων, οὐ δι’ ἀπαριθμήσεως ἐστίν· ἥς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἴδιον· ἀλλὰ διὰ διαιρέσεως μᾶλλον τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν γενῶν εἰς εἶδη (f.105r ll. 20-25)

We shall answer that while among the invalid questions there is a first and a second, among the valid questions there is no such thing. For first of all, they are all equally valid, and one is not more valid and another less valid than the other, as among the invalid questions one is more invalid and another less so. Secondly, his treatment of the valid questions is not conducted through enumeration, a property of which is to have a first and a second, but rather through division, namely that of genera into species.

What Doxapatres means by the final remark here is that in the upcoming section of *On Issues*, where Hermogenes gives an overview of how to determine the stasis of a given question (a section of the treatise that Hermogenes and his commentators refer to as a μέθοδος, II.1-17), his procedure is to identify the types of *stasis* by dividing them as genera into species—in other words, the type of division learned in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. It is important to distinguish this section or “method” of *On Issues* from the rest of the treatise (sections III-XII), in which Hermogenes fulfills the goal of the treatise he had announced in the proem, namely to teach the division of the political questions, once their stasis has been identified, into the corresponding “heads” of argument. *That*

is the kind of division that Hermogenes says his treatise is about, but Doxapatres pointedly observes that the “method” of classifying *staseis* in the preceding section (II.1-17) in fact represents an exercise in the *other* kind of division, the Porphyrian kind. This division of the *staseis* into their genera and species is reflected in the diagrams that often accompany the text of the *Περὶ στάσεων*, which, as Valiavitcharska has pointed out, strikingly recall the *Arbor Porphyriana*, the classic visualization of how a genus is divided into its constituent species based on the addition of specific differences.⁶⁰ Hermogenes had begun his treatise by announcing that he was concerned not with the division of genera into species, but of the political questions into their heads of argument (I.2). However, users of the *Περὶ στάσεων* like Doxapatres recognized that in classifying the *staseis* themselves through the method provided in the first part of the treatise, Hermogenes was for all intents and purposes concerned with the division of genera into species, and they approached the teaching of Hermogenes accordingly.

If the formal and thematic parallels between the respective proemia of the *Isagoge* and *On Issues* that were outlined earlier in this paper hint at an invitation for users of the two treatises to read them alongside one another, then that is an invitation that Doxapatres readily accepts throughout his commentary. The two treatises on division were anchors of the Byzantine curriculum, and in the *Isagoge* teachers of rhetoric had an ideal tool for framing Hermogenes’ “method” of classifying the *staseis* by dividing them as genera into species. Beginning with the very first four words of Hermogenes’ text, Doxapatres finds it useful to refer again and again to Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in order to explain Hermogenes’ language, ideas, and the organization of his material. The *proem* of the *Isagoge* in particular has been internalized so thoroughly by Doxapatres that he quotes from it twice in order to explain Hermogenes’ choice of words and the order in which he wrote them; from later on in the *Isagoge* he twice quotes Porphyry’s definition of a genus; and he even cites

⁶⁰ Valiavitcharska 2020, 490. See especially *BNF Paris gr.* 1983 f. 10r, available here: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10723839j/f16.item#> (accessed: 7/22/2024). For a more detailed study of the rhetorical diagrams in this famous manuscript see also Valiavitcharska, forthcoming.

Porphyry for the simple purpose of providing philological support for Hermogenes' loose use of the adjectival pronoun ἐκάτερον instead of ὅατερον. When Doxapatres analyzes definitions in Hermogenes' text, he does so by identifying what component of a given phrase represents the genus and what part the specific difference, following precisely the procedure Porphyry outlines in the *Isagoge*; when he turns to Hermogenes' *methodos* for classifying the *staseis*, he identifies it explicitly as an example of division from genera into species, and indeed it is in the form of an *Arbor Porphyriana* that this method is visualized in texts of the Περί στάσεων, both Byzantine and modern.⁶¹ It is clear that for users of Doxapatres' commentary, whether teachers or students, Porphyry's *Isagoge* is expected to be a helpful point of reference, and that is worth lingering over.

In Late Antiquity (and much more recently)⁶², philosophers commenting on the *Isagoge* famously argued over whether the treatise was meant to be an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories* specifically, or to logic and/or philosophy more generally. Doxapatres' commentary shows clearly that in its Byzantine afterlife, in addition to the role it played in the philosophical curriculum, Porphyry's "Introduction" also served to introduce something else altogether—the rhetorical curriculum and the *Corpus of Hermogenes*. In a recent discussion of an unedited, anonymous Byzantine commentary on Porphyry, we learn that the anonymous commentator explicitly says that the *Isagoge* is studied in order to learn the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonios, not the other way around.⁶³ As Doxapatres' commentary suggests, it seems that the same could be said of the relationship between Porphyry and Hermogenes as well.

⁶¹ For the Byzantine diagrams see above n. 60; for their modern counterparts see e.g. Patillon 2009, xliii and Heath 1995, 71.

⁶² See Barnes 2003, xiv–xvi.

⁶³ MacDougall 2017, 742–743.

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