

Mats Lundahl

## Papa Doc: Innovator in the Predatory State

Notre Doc qui êtes au Palais National pour la vie, que Votre nom soit béni par les générations présentes et futures, que Votre Volonté soit faite à Port-au-Prince et en Province. Donnez-nous aujourd'hui notre nouvelle Haïti, ne pardonnez jamais les offenses des apatrides qui bavent chaque jour sur notre Patrie, laissez-les succomber à la tentation et sous le poids de leurs baves malfaisantes: ne les délivrez d'aucun mal. Amen.

Ainsi soit-il.

(Jean M. Fourcand: Catéchisme de la Révolution)

Judged by traditional western standards of democracy and economic welfare, Haiti during the past twenty-five years has remained by far the least developed Latin American nation. The extent of popular influence on politics has been nil, and the standard of living of the vast majority of the Haitians has remained precariously low. Quite probably it has decreased.<sup>1</sup> Both these facts are intimately connected with the character of the Haitian state and with the role the government has played in the economy. While orthodox writings in political science and development economics tend to stress the importance of 'positive' action by the polity as being essential for the achievement of democracy and economic progress, in Haiti, we witness a process which runs in the completely opposite direction. The state, both from the political and from the economic point of view, appears as an 'anomaly'. As such, however, it obeys its own inner logic, which must be spelled out explicitly if we are to achieve a proper understanding of the past and present Haitian society.

The key word in any analysis of the Haitian state is 'predatory'. Ever since 1843, brigandage has been the predominant form of power in Haiti.<sup>2</sup> After the fall of Jean-Pierre Boyer from the presidency that year, politics took a peculiar course, whereby a machine was created for grinding out private fortunes. The state successively degenerated up to 1915, which was a year of complete chaos, when the United States occupation of the country took its beginning. While the Americans managed to remove some of the power structures that had contributed to the degeneration of Haitian politics, notably the traditional army and the peasant mercenary troops known as *cacos*,<sup>3</sup> they did not succeed in striking at the root of the trouble — the very objectives of Haitian politics. This failure meant that as soon as the Americans had left Haiti, in 1934, the old tendencies

started to show up again, albeit not as conspicuously as before, and in a slightly different form.

Politics continued in this state up to the year 1957, when François Duvalier — *Papa Doc* — was elected president. Duvalier represented a break with the Haitian political tradition, a break whose motives have been made the subject of a number of different interpretations. According to one view, Duvalier's actions can be explained in psychological or psychopathological terms. Papa Doc was a president who was intent on retaining power for power's own sake and possibly also a maniac who had spent too much time on studying folklore and voodoo and who unfortunately had allowed this to influence his political actions as well.<sup>4</sup> A second interpretation attempts to make Duvalier an indigenous fascist and simultaneously a tool of United States imperialism.<sup>5</sup> Yet others have put stress on the ideological features of his presidency, pointing out that he was one of the two twentieth-century Haitian presidents who did something to promote the masses and that this policy was based on the *négritude* philosophy which he had been instrumental in developing during the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>6</sup>

In the present article we will advance another argument, one which maintains that in order to understand what Papa Doc did it is not enough to examine the power and ideological aspects of his rule. Its economic features must also be analyzed in a historical perspective. Papa Doc was an innovator in Haitian politics, but a limited one, staying within the framework of the predatory state, where one of the most important goals was personal enrichment. Within these limits he developed the predatory state into a full-fledged reign of terror, using sheer violence to create respect for his authority.<sup>7</sup> Despite his own claims to the contrary, he was not a true revolutionary in the sense of setting radically new goals for government action. His innovation rather consisted in creating a state apparatus which allowed the traditional goals: personal fortunes and ruler security, to be reached more efficiently.

Presently we will deal with the character of Duvalier's innovations and with the results that these innovations brought in the economic field. Before we can analyze our subject proper it is, however, necessary to sketch the historical background to Papa Doc's actions, as it emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, up to 1957 — the beginning of the Duvalier era.

### The Creation of a Predatory State in Haiti

The Haitians rose against the French in 1791, and on New Year's Day, 1804, independence was proclaimed. During the colonial period, the economy had been based on large numbers of black slaves working on plantations owned by white *colons* which produced export crops like sugar, coffee, cotton and indigo, under conditions of rigid discipline. In this respect, the wars of independence and the first years as a sovereign nation brought little change. Instead of slavery, a *fermage* system which did not differ substantially from the former mode of production was introduced. The agricultural workers were tied to the

plantations once again in an effort to revive export agriculture in order to buy weapons and other war material from abroad to prevent or meet a French invasion.<sup>8</sup>

This system did, however, not last long. Beginning in 1809, the most important year in Haiti's nineteenth-century history, the *fermage* system broke down. That year, Alexandre Pétion, who was president in the southern half of the country, set the workers free and started to redistribute plantation land to his officers and soldiers. Ten years later, Henry Christophe, king of northern Haiti, did the same.<sup>9</sup> Thereafter, a rapid disintegration took place, so that around 1840 Haiti can definitely be labeled a 'peasant' country: those who tilled the land either owned it or had access to it on fairly easy terms.

In this way, Haiti was saved from sharing the fate of most other Latin American states: that of an antagonistic polarization between vast *latifundios* on the one hand and minuscule *minifundios* on the other, accompanied by exploitation of the poor by the rich in the factor markets. Judged in this perspective, the land reforms and their aftermath constituted a complete success.

In another respect, they were not, because they were to give rise to a perverted political development that continues to plague Haiti to this very date. It can be argued that the land reforms were the direct cause of the creation of the predatory state.<sup>10</sup> The land reforms created an economic vacuum of a very peculiar character — a vacuum which was filled in an even more peculiar way.

Up to 1809, the plantations had constituted the most important source of incomes for the emerging Haitian elite. After that year, the importance of landed incomes dwindled gradually to an insignificant level, as more and more land was redistributed. Marginal agricultural land was in 'unlimited', i.e. completely elastic, supply up to some time during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, the peasants always had access to land at virtually zero cost. Therefore the elite could not squeeze any incomes out of the masses, for example by leasing land to them, other than when the land was of superior quality. Faced with this situation, the elite little by little gave up and withdrew to an urban life.

This, however, made it necessary for the most ambitious social groups to find an alternative way to amass fortunes. That way went via politics. The conquest of political power made for access to wealth by means of taxation, government borrowing and inflationary finance. Politics turned into a mere competition for the spoils of office. Of the 22 governments between 1843 and 1915, eleven remained in power for less than a year. Successful politics was a way to make the best of livings, pure and simple. A monotonously repetitive pattern was established whereby a clique made its way into government via a revolution or a coup, emptied the treasury, sometimes indebting the state in the process, before it was toppled by another revolution or coup, which put the next clique into office, etc., *ad nauseam*.

In this way, a predatory state came into existence in Haiti during the 1843—1915 period. The rulers or cliques holding office during that period all faced a

common dilemma: the choice between incomes and security.<sup>12</sup> An analogy can be made with the theory of clubs. In the predatory state, what the ruler basically is after is income, but in order to extract an income from his office he must of course remain in power, which is not without costs. Thus, the ruler faces a tradeoff between retained income and security. The safer he wants to be, the more income he foregoes. He cannot rule alone but has to recruit a polity (the 'club') which gives him a political and military backing.

If the size of the polity is small, the probability that the ruler will be overthrown by an outside revolution is high. Increasing the size of the polity increases security, but only at a decreasing rate, up to a certain point. The reason for this is that when the size of the polity increases so does the probability that *internal* conspiracies are formed that may lead to a *coup d'état*. On the income side, increasing the size of the polity leads to increased government revenues, e.g. because the ability to tax the citizens increases, but at a decreasing rate. However, at the same time, there are costs connected with recruiting the polity. The ruler must share the government revenue with his backers, and these costs can be expected to increase at the margin. Thus, there is a size of the polity which maximizes the income that the ruler (or the clique) may retain for himself. Beyond that size, ruler incomes fall again.

Since incomes and security cannot be expected to reach their respective maximum values at the same size of polity, other than by pure coincidence, we have a tradeoff between incomes and security. Faced with this choice, most of the 1843—1915 rulers opted for incomes, with the result that the probability that they would remain in office was low. It is in this light we must see the fact that eleven out of 22 were ousted within less than a year.

The American occupation of Haiti, which lasted between 1915 and 1934, put an end to the most turbulent phase of the competition for spoils. The US Marines dissolved the old Haitian army and finished the *cacos* as well, brutally putting down the uprising in 1918 which was led by the legendary Charlemagne Péralte. With a completely American-controlled polity and a puppet government, there was no longer any scope for unhampered fights for office.

This was, however, to last for less than twenty years. The occupation was in reality little better than a stop-gap measure or, rather, an interlude in the development of the Haitian predatory state. The latter was to continue after the departure of the last occupation forces in 1934, but in a different form. Even with the Haitian politicians back in the saddle without American control certain changes which had been effected during the occupation made themselves felt. When the old army had been broken up, the Americans had created a modern constabulary instead — what was to become the *Garde d'Haïti*, the new army, which was to play a decisive role in Haitian politics all the way up to the advent of Duvalier. This role consisted in rendering exogenous the probability that the president would remain in power. It simply became impossible for the head of state to rule without the backing of the *Garde*. The predatory state assumed features of praetorianism, with the army exercising the effective power and

ensuring the safety of the presidents.<sup>13</sup> When the *Garde* decided that time had run out, the president had to leave office.

Hereby, the tradeoff between ruler security and retained income was almost completely gone. However, the *Garde* turned out to be fairly lenient when it came to allowing the presidents to use the government treasury for highly private purposes. This part of the unfortunate nineteenth-century legacy continued to be alive during the presidencies of Elie Lescot, Dumarsais Estimé and Paul Magloire, from 1942 to 1957. These three regimes continued the kleptocrat tradition of the pre-occupation period.

### The Rise of Duvalier

The political atmosphere when François Duvalier was elected president in 1957 was not one to inspire confidence. The American occupation had completely failed to implant the values of Western democracy in Haiti. The so-called Forbes Commission which made the American assessment of the occupation when the decision to withdraw was taken reported that the foundations for a stable democracy were simply not present, that the occupation had done nothing to prepare Haiti for self-determination, and that the most likely outcome of the United States withdrawal would be that of unstable governments facing a constant threat to be overturned.<sup>14</sup>

The commission was right. The first post-occupation president, Sténio Vincent, elected in 1930, while the occupation still was going on, in what quite probably were the fairest elections Haiti has ever seen,<sup>15</sup> did not waste much time in concentrating the political power to his own person and converting the presidency to a dictatorship. Vincent, who was president during a period when the *Garde* still remained outside politics (up to 1938 or 1939), however, failed to obtain United States support for his plan to extend his presidency into a third term. (Already the second had been illegal.) Instead he ensured that Elie Lescot could succeed him, in 1941. Lescot was not more of a democratic constitutional president than Vincent had been. He used the Haitian declaration of war against Japan and Germany, following Pearl Harbor, as a pretext to put the country under a state of siege, to allow him to gain complete control over the budget, to silence all critics, to extend his term from five to seven years, and to fill vacancies in the legislature without holding elections.

In the mid-forties, however, the *Garde* had become a full-fledged political force. In 1946 it decided that Haiti had seen enough of Lescot. The president was overthrown, and a military junta took over for seven months before Dumarsais Estimé was elected president. Estimé's period as president in some ways marked the beginning of something new in Haitian politics.

Traditionally, the Haitian upper classes had identified with France and French culture while strongly neglecting and even suppressing the African heritage. 'Until the period of the United States invasion there is hardly to be found a trace of that ideology which claims that black people are different from

Europeans and that Haitians, who belong to the black race, should look to contemporary Africa as the pattern to be followed', writes David Nicholls in his study of ideas of race and color in Haitian history.<sup>16</sup>

The French-oriented social elite had, however, not been able to capture the presidency other than occasionally. Only six of the 22 presidents between 1843 and 1915 belonged to the elite, the remainder being mainly black or almost black generals.<sup>17</sup> This changed with the American occupation. With the destruction of the traditional army and the creation of the *Garde*, the sinecures characterizing the nineteenth-century army were gone and with them the traditional stepping stone of black prospective presidents. Both the puppet presidents and the heads of state that came after the occupation were light-skinned and belonged to the social elite. When James Leyburn summed up the political and social history of Haiti in his classic *The Haitian People* in 1941, he predicted that 'for the near future it is safe to say there will be no more black non-élite presidents.'<sup>18</sup> The elite could feel secure, thought Leyburn.

He was wrong. In 1946, Estimé, who was black and who did not come from any of the traditional elite families, came into power with the support of the *Garde*, but also backed by a new kind of intellectuals whose political beliefs were strongly ideologically founded.

These foundations dated back to the American occupation and to the 1930s and constituted the ideological contents of the *négritude* movement, a movement of young intellectuals who stressed the African heritage for the first time in Haitian history. *Négritude* was first and foremost a cultural and literary movement. Jean Price-Mars had held a series of lectures during the early 1920s on Haitian folklore and voodoo with special reference to its African roots and spurred by an enthusiastic response had proceeded to develop his themes into a book: *Ainsi parla l'oncle*, published in 1928,<sup>19</sup> where Haitian religious customs were given a scientific explanation.<sup>20</sup>

This cultural and scientific part of the *négritude* movement was paralleled by a literary movement. Haitian literature up to the beginning of the 1920s had been characterized by *l'art pour l'art*, *belles-lettres* and imitation of French romanticism. The French-oriented attitude of the elite was reflected in their fiction writings as well. The occupation triggered a wave of nationalism which prepared the way for an indigenist movement in the 1920s, and the development of a series of works dealing with popular themes and social protest,<sup>21</sup> most famous of which became Jacques Roumain's *Gouverneurs de la rosée*, published in 1944.<sup>22</sup>

The two strands of *négritude* coincided in the interest for anthropology, or ethnology. In their efforts to redefine the Haitian cultural identity, the *négritude* theoreticians turned to the path broken by Price-Mars and others, concentrating on the African heritage and on voodoo and folklore in particular, Roumain and a few others in 1941 founded the *Bureau d'Ethnologie*, but already in the 1930s, 'ethnology' had become a keyword among intellectuals, as is for example very apparent in the writings of a young physician, François Du-

valier, who also nurtured a strong interest in Haitian folklore. Duvalier was one of the founding fathers of the group known as *Les Griots*, in 1932.<sup>23</sup> The group took its name after a traditional African institution: the poet, storyteller, magician, the one entrusted with the myths and customs of the tribe. For the *griots* voodoo was a central feature of Haitian life, whose contents were seen as an expression of racial consciousness and which was tied to the African past. Color was seen as the most important determinant of political life in the country. Politics was a 'class' struggle between the mulatto elite and the black masses, and it was essential for the future of the country that a union was fused between the masses and the emerging middle class from which the *griots* themselves (teachers, lawyers, physicians etc.) came. This was the way to break the alleged mulatto monopoly of political power.<sup>24</sup> A 'revolution' of the black masses was viewed as the logical continuation of the slave revolution against the French.

This type of ideology developed and matured during the 1930s and 1940s, and when Estimé was elected president in 1946 it was allowed to have some influence on the government. Under Estimé black middle class people could get into the bureaucracy. Labor unions were formed and to some extent a social reform legislation was begun. This was very much in line with the ideas of the *négritude* thinkers and the black middle class from which they came, but not genuinely popular.

In spite of his possibly good intentions, Estimé finished office in the same way as Lescot had. During his last year as president he made an attempt to prolong his term in clear violation of the constitution. Finally, after Estimé had sent a street mob into the legislature to intimidate its members to endorse his plan to succeed himself in office, the *Garde* put him out of power in 1950.

Estimé was succeeded by army colonel Paul Magloire, who received a solid backing from the *Garde*, the business community and the *Mouvement des Ouvriers et Paysans* (MOP), headed by Daniel Fignolé, the favorite of the masses in the capital. The black middle class was out of power; the mulatto elite was in, and Magloire paid little attention to mass demands. It also became readily apparent that Magloire intended to stay in power after the end of his legal term. The MOP and other political parties were banned. Labor unions were tolerated only as long as they did not undertake any activities. Newspapers were closed, politicians were arrested, schools and university faculties were shut down. Finally, in 1956, a general strike broke out and Magloire had to resign.

When Magloire had stepped down, ten months of almost complete political chaos ensued. The country saw five provisional governments and no less than thirteen candidates presented themselves for the upcoming presidential elections. Before this number had been narrowed down to three: Louis Déjoie, François Duvalier and Clement Jumelle, with the latter lacking support from any powerful group, bloody street fights between the members of different political factions, armed clashes between police groups and the *Garde*, between different groups within the *Garde*, general and other strikes, mob action and army repression had all taken place.<sup>25</sup>

### The Professed Program<sup>26</sup>

Duvalier had entered politics in 1946, when his fellow *griot* Lorimer Denis had persuaded him to join Figdolé's MOP. This party during the 1946 elections backed Colonel Démosthenès Calixte, since Figdolé himself was too young to run. Calixte was not successful, but Estimé was elected instead. However, in the coalition government formed by Estimé, the MOP was given a certain influence. For Duvalier this meant that he was first appointed Director of Public Health, thereafter, in 1948, Undersecretary of State of Labor and the following year Minister of Public Health and Labor. When Magloire came in, in 1950, Duvalier resigned, and as the new president began to maneuver to centralize power in his own hands, Duvalier in December 1954 went into hiding, staying under cover until Magloire had been forced down.

Duvalier's personal political history was to show up in his 1956—57 campaign for the presidency. Magloire was singled out for a vehement attack, being portrayed as a dictator and oppressor of the Haitian people. Estimé, on the other hand was hailed as a precursor and social reformer, as the person who initiated the 1946 revolution which Duvalier himself was going to continue and bring to its glorious maturity. These two themes, together with those of national unity and improvement of the economic conditions of the masses, constituted the backbone of Papa Doc's campaign program.

Most of the speeches and messages delivered during the campaign smelt strongly of empty rhetoric, appealing to whatever local idiosyncrasies that happened to exist where the speeches were held, coupled with promises to solve local problems. Simultaneously they attempted to amass support from the widest possible circles. To the latter end, his program was deliberately kept vague.<sup>27</sup>

At the inauguration of his campaign, on September 15, 1956, Duvalier presented a program where six of the twelve points were of an economic or social character:<sup>28</sup>

- combat of unemployment, misery and hunger by increased production based on direct state participation in combination with foreign and domestic capital,
- revision of the country's economic and financial statutes by the introduction of more organization and technical work in the administration,
- rehabilitation of the Haitian hinterland by the participation of all the national elites in the direction of state affairs,
- solution of the problems of illiteracy and rural public health in the entire country,
- abolition of the spoils system in order to protect the government employees from the vagaries of politics,
- improvement of the physical living conditions of the Haitian people by the construction of rural and urban popular dwellings.



This program does not give a very coherent or precise impression, and during most of the campaign a simpler message was delivered. Haiti had, with few exceptions, been ruled by useless governments. Estimé's 1946 'revolution' had constituted an attempt to change this fact, and Duvalier, at the head of a new, honest government was the man to continue what Estimé had begun. Hereby, the economic equality of all Haitians would be ensured.

Papa Doc appears to have been perfectly aware of the existence of a predatory state in Haiti:

Because the economic and financial situation in the country has never followed a normal curve in time, because the evolution of our community at more or less equal intervals is brought to a halt by the unleashing of low instincts and personal ambitions, because the country, this mother whose face is clouded by our fratricidal fights, has, alas, always been placed below the passion of clans, classes or groups, sad pages are often added to the imperishable chapters of our glorious history of a colored people selected to have a great destiny.<sup>29</sup>

In a speech in Cap-Haïtien, he criticized government passivity in economic affairs. Only with the 1946 revolution, a new role had been imposed on the state: 'economic duties, a wider responsibility for the productive utilization of human and material resources.'<sup>30</sup> The leader of this revolution was praised for his integration of the middle class and the masses into the national community.<sup>31</sup> Estimé had started Haiti's economic takeoff and had given the country a progressive labor legislation which had conferred an economic and social conscience on the people. Now, Papa Doc could promise the 'consolidation and enlargement of the conquests of the profound revolution of 1946': education, health services, credits to small peasants, improved roads, use of domestic raw materials in industrial production, etc. He spoke about the 'definite triumph of social, political and economic equality' in his battle of reconstruction.<sup>32</sup>

The Haitian governments had traditionally never paid any attention to the masses:

Instead of liberating the peasant from his material and spiritual servitudes, by orienting the entire policy of the Central Administration towards a policy of production, our governments have opted for a practice of extreme taxation of our principal product: coffee. In Haiti, taxes on agricultural products generally have a discriminatory character.<sup>33</sup>

Duvalier promised that his government would make an attempt to break the practice of having 'a budget for external relations which is infinitely larger than that of the Ministry of Agriculture, in a poor, essentially agrarian country.'<sup>34</sup> He pointed out that the land did not even 'respond to the primordial and immediate needs of its ever increasing population' with the result that 'the slightest disturbance caused by natural phenomena' obliged the country to resort to the benevolence and charity of 'our friends abroad.'<sup>35</sup> The economic

stagnation of the provinces could not 'leave any government that cared about its responsibility towards the country indifferent.'<sup>36</sup> The suppression of economic inequalities was held out as a necessity. The structures which kept the living standard at a 'dishonorable minimum'<sup>37</sup> had to be changed. The peasants were to receive a profitable price for their produce. The workers were to have access to jobs corresponding to their vocational abilities. The technicians were to be given possibilities for employing their knowledge and experience in manufacturing. Professionals and traders were to exercise their activities without any fear for a general slowdown of economic life. 'The combat of my government will be that of production', he proudly stated.<sup>38</sup>

Duvalier's future government was depicted as an honest one: 'My program, I reassure, is based on the most scrupulous administrative honesty, the sanitation of public finances, a better fiscal and monetary policy . . .'<sup>39</sup> Taxation was to be based on principles of social justice and 'anachronistic and anti-scientific' methods of public administration were to be abolished in order to secure the restoration of probity and integrity among the civil servants and the end of diversion of funds for the purpose of 'pillage'.<sup>40</sup>

With the backing of the most influential members of the *Garde*, of the black middle class of Port-au-Prince and of the Nord and Artibonite *Départements*, Papa Doc was elected president of Haiti on September 22, 1957, in elections that cannot be considered completely honest but which nevertheless probably reflected popular opinion fairly well.<sup>41</sup> On October 2, he held his first press conference. One of his central themes was political and economic democracy:

The next government will promote national concord and democratic balance, conditions sine qua non of any national renaissance. I will consider it a duty to free the Haitian citizen politically, economically, spiritually, by setting up an economic democracy, the only way for a fair dealing of the national wealth to all classes of society.<sup>42</sup>

In his inauguration speech, on October 22, he envisaged a series of reforms within a constitutional, democratic framework:

The Haitian community finds itself in the presence of a veritable structural crisis which resembles those that dislocated the great empires ( . . . ) when the very existence and substance of a nation is threatened, health cannot and will not come unless a complete reform, a total and radical renovation, is undertaken ( . . . ) In Haiti, health will come through a restoration of the dignity of politics, through a social and economic deepening of the ideology of the Revolution of 1946 ( . . . ) My government will scrupulously protect the honor and the civil rights which constitute the joy of all free peoples. My government will guarantee liberty for the Haitian people ( . . . ) From the rural *section* to the *commune*, from the hamlet to the city, a constant and continuous impulse is necessary, incessant progress for life to regain its meaning ( . . . )

In a world where conflicts are born from contradictions and where the fear of freedom has become a disease, the mission of the Haitian republic is to remain loyal to the consequences of its Revolution and to retain preemtorily the significance of the latter at the same time in the epic of independence and beyond this epic, where my government will

prolong its effects in the different everyday battles which presuppose the complete liberation of the masses: the battle of the peasant against misery and agricultural calamities, the battle of national education against ignorance and assimilation, the battle of the intellectual worker against submission to resignation. Such will be the general policy.<sup>43</sup>

In his first message to the nation as president, the same day, he promised to wage a battle against poverty:

For a long time misery has been identified with the Haitian people. This is an image which must be destroyed. The family budgets ought to show an [acceptable] minimum standard: housing, food, clothing, leisure, all forms of social activities should lead to a life that is constantly improving. The policy of my government cannot be understood without reference to this conquest or this integration. It is the only possible one, the only logical one, the only one which can put the nation on the road to organized prosperity. I have chosen it and I will apply it from the beginning to the end. . . . The present government has no other goal than to satisfy the collective needs of the nation.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, judging from the contents of his campaign speeches and inaugural addresses, there was a possibility that François Duvalier as president of Haiti would break with the political tradition of the country. He did not come from an elite family and did not appear to be associated with the elite in any other way. He had taken part in Estimé's government which had attempted some social reform legislation and his own program, insofar as it could be discerned, pointed in a similar direction. He put great stress on democracy and honesty.

### The Great Purge<sup>45</sup>

Those observers of the Haitian scene who had hoped for positive changes were quickly to be disappointed. As David Nicholls has pointed out, 'The speeches of Duvalier and his supporters during the election campaign of 1956—7 gave scant indication of the policy which he was to pursue during his fourteen years in office. . . .'<sup>46</sup> Papa Doc immediately moved to concentrate the reins of power in his own hands. In this process he broke with traditional Haitian politics, but certainly not in the way the more optimistic students of Haiti had envisaged.

When Papa Doc started his presidency, the traditional Haitian predatory state which had developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century did not exist in its pure form anymore. There was still intense competition for the presidency and the practice of converting government revenues to private income was as strong as ever, but the probability that the president would remain in office was by and large an exogenous variable in the Haitian political equation. The sitting president had to pay strict attention to the opinion of the *Garde d'Haiti* in the ultimate instance. In this sense, Haiti was a praetorian state, where power was monopolized by the military, rather than a predatory one where it was constantly up for grabs by violently contending factions.

Duvalier was to put an abrupt end to this, in his own special way. He did not bring the traditional predatory state back to life. He once more internalized the probability of remaining in power, but he changed the methods for doing so and in the process increased this probability vastly. After fourteen years in office he died a natural death, succeeded as president by his son. When the present is being written (in 1984) the Duvalier family has ruled Haiti for more than twenty-six years — an all-time record in the history of Haiti.<sup>47</sup> Papa Doc after all *did* bring some innovations to Haitian political life, in his reshaping of the polity. Let us proceed to look at the character of these innovations.

As soon as Duvalier had been sworn in as president, he started a political purge. In this, all groups that could possibly constitute or develop into a center of resistance against his rules were crushed completely:

- 1) the political opposition,
- 2) the army,
- 3) the commercial sector,
- 4) the clergy,
- 5) the mass media, the educational system and the labor unions,
- 6) the democratic institutions, the government and the administration.

In addition, with the aid of some luck, he managed to survive a major showdown with the United States.

All this was quite unexpected for most Haitians. Still, with the wisdom of hindsight, it may be contended that Duvalier might have planned these drastic moves. In a campaign speech in Verrettes, he stated:

The enemies of the people are found everywhere in the country. They come from all social categories and are of all colors, and today they still, more than yesterday, make the most cruel plans for putting an end to the lives of the real defenders of the people, by murder if they cannot defeat them by other means.<sup>48</sup>

This view of the political environment was to guide Papa Doc when settling the accounts with those whom he regarded as political threats to his position. Let us examine the aforementioned categories one by one.

### *The Political Opposition*

Duvalier was sworn in on October 22, 1957. Already by December the same year around a hundred political opponents had been jailed without previous trial. About as many had gone into hiding and several had sought asylum in foreign embassies. Daniel Fignolé, having been provisional president for a mere nineteen days, had been ousted by the army and sent abroad already before the elections. Louis Déjoie was soon to follow him. The Déjoie supporters attempted to organize a general business strike among the Port-au-Prince shopkeepers

in October — a popular method to put pressure on the government to step down — but Duvalier's police and irregulars quickly forced the stores to open again.

After the explosion of a bomb factory on the outskirts of the capital at the end of April 1958 (presumably organized by Duvalier) Déjoie and Clement Jumelle were both outlawed. A state of siege was proclaimed. Déjoie had to flee into the Mexican embassy and eventually made his way out of the country to end up in Cuba where he set out to recruit potential *guerrilleros* among the large Haitian population of the Oriente province.<sup>49</sup>

Jumelle fared much worse. He had been forced into hiding immediately after the beginning of Duvalier's rule. After almost a year and a half of hardships in the *mornes*, he emerged, in April 1959, mortally ill with uremia, to die in the Cuban embassy, his two brothers having been shot a few months before.<sup>50</sup>

Abortive, constantly ill-planned guerilla invasions in 1958 and 1959, as well as bomb explosions in various places following Duvalier's almost fatal heart attack in the latter year led to further arrests, beatings and killings and to the torture of hundreds of political dissenters. Repression also accompanied subsequent invasion attempts in 1963, 1964, 1968, 1969 and 1970.

### *The Army*

The army had been internally divided during the 1957 elections, with strong rivalry between different groups of officers. Its professional standards were low. In the words of Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, head of the United States Marine Corps mission to Haiti, it was 'politicized and factionalized' and it 'had degenerated steadily for a quarter century. Its military proficiency was lower than at any time since 1915; it was deeply divided, not only along predictable lines of color and . . . politics, but also on generational lines.' It 'had become no better than a small banana army . . .'.<sup>51</sup>

Duvalier had received his backing from Colonel (later General) Anonio Kébreau, department commander of Les Cayes, who was to emerge as the strongest military towards the end of 1957. It was Kébreau who sent Figolé into exile and who simultaneously imposed 'an iron-handed state of siege'<sup>52</sup> which was to last all the way up to the elections. Quite probably Duvalier would not have made it into the presidency without Kébreau's support, in particular since Kébreau also undertook to purge the army of Déjoie, Jumelle and Figolé supporters, replacing them with loyal *duvaliéristes* instead. Once in power, however, Papa Doc immediately made it clear that the army was no more to interfere in his running the country. Kébreau was dismissed already in 1958, and the entire command of the army was again reshuffled. The Kébreau supporters among the officers were either removed or transferred to remote rural posts while younger, black officers owing their career directly to the president were substituted for them. Later the same year yet another reshuffle took place.

Hereby, the pattern was established which was to continue throughout Papa Doc's entire presidency:

As a deep student of Haitian history and politics, the president was keenly aware of the pivotal role historically played by military kingmakers. In all but a handful of power transfers since 1806, it had been generals who called the turn; and it was Duvalier's determination that, whatever had befallen his predecessors, the FAd'H [Forces Armées d'Haiti]<sup>53</sup> would never end his term.<sup>54</sup>

No army officer (or civilian for that matter) was ever allowed to gain enough independent power to constitute a threat to the position of the chief executive. Periodic reshuffles took place, especially in connection with real or perceived moves by opposition groups, frequently extending down to the lower ranks as well and several times involving the physical extermination of the purged officers. According to Gérard Pierre-Charles, more than 200 officers were removed during Duvalier's first eleven years in power.<sup>55</sup> Finally, all the modern military equipment was concentrated in the basement of the palace where the president could exercise more direct supervision of its use.

In this way, by removing the little professional military competence that did exist when he took over, substituting not only personal loyalty but also more or less total dependency of the new supreme commands on his own person, Papa Doc succeeded in creating an army which was singularly ill-suited for normal military purposes but which on the other hand could be counted upon not to attempt to overthrow his government. In the speech delivered upon having been sworn in as president for life, on June 22, 1964, he declared that his goals regarding the armed forces had been reached:

On the political plane, I have endeavored to harmonize our institutions with our national temper. I have pursued the stabilization of the lines of force of the public cause, keeping the traditions of the country in mind. I have removed from the army its role as arbiter and balancing power in national life, a role which made it oscillate from side to side according to its own interests. I have dedicated myself to amputating its mania for pronunciamientos, putting it at the service of the people. I want to make a popular army out of it, an army convinced of the legitimacy of your revolution, ready to be devoted to the Duvalierist cause. In this perspective, I henceforth assume the effective leadership of the Armed Forces of the Republic.<sup>56</sup>

As far as the latter statement is concerned, Papa Doc was perfectly right. There was nobody left within the ranks of the military who could threaten him.

### *The Commercial Sector*

The Haitian business sector had played an important role in the downfall of Magloire. As we have already pointed out, a business strike was a well established and fairly efficient means to exert pressure on presidents contemplating the extension of their rule beyond the legally scheduled period. The leading spokesmen for the commercial interests were elite members and important businessmen who had strongly backed Déjoie's candidature during the election

campaign. Finally, due to the fact that members of the leading business families traditionally appeared in the higher ranks of the public administration, the business community possessed important informal ways of influencing the Haitian governments as well.

Together, these facts provided Duvalier with enough reasons to decide that business had to be crushed as a politically influential factor. A decree which had been issued by the military government from which Duvalier took over came in handy when the Port-au-Prince shopkeepers attempted their strike in 1957. The police were authorized to open the shops of striking businessmen and hand out the stock of the latter for free, which was precisely what they did, aided by the more violent Duvalier supporters, with the result that the strike weapon was never tried again. Declarations of commercial default and bankruptcy without the prior consent of the government were declared illegal and subject to punishment by the authorities. Finally, as we will come back to below, both Haitian and foreign businessmen were subjected to periodic acts of extortion from the government whenever the latter needed money.

### *The Church*

During Duvalier's first years in office, his government presented a neutral attitude vis-à-vis the Catholic church. This was, however, only due to the fact that the church was not perceived to constitute any *immediate* threat to his rule. In the somewhat longer run, reasons for conflict were not lacking. The Catholic church of Haiti possessed a hierarchy that was almost entirely of French origin and into which native Haitians were admitted only slowly and discretionally. Furthermore, the church had in general supported Déjoie and was hostile to the *négritude* movement because of the strong involvement of the latter with voodoo.<sup>57</sup> The *négritude* theoreticians, on their part, were often critical of the role of the church, especially when it was felt that this contributed to strengthening the European, notably the French, influence over the Haitian nation in general and over intellectual life in particular, at the expense of the African heritage.

This gave enough reasons to Duvalier to regard the Catholic clergy as a threat to his regime. However, he also knew that he stood to gain popularity among the *houngans*<sup>58</sup> and their congregations in rural areas by attacking the church. In 1959 the time had come.

A series of expulsions of important spiritual dignitaries was begun. These, accused of having refused collaboration with the national authorities and of breaking the 'spiritual unity of the nation'<sup>59</sup> were replaced by Haitian, *duvaliériste* priests instead. In 1960, Archbishop Poirier was expelled from the country. Duvalier paid no attention to a declaration issued by the Vatican that anyone involved in the expulsion of bishops were automatically excommunicated. Before that, a mass held in the Port-au-Prince cathedral had been interrupted by Clément Barbot and his *tonton macoutes* who wounded several people with submachine gun fire in the process. The Catholic newspaper *La Phalange* was closed.

The expulsions of Catholic priests continued and were extended to the members of the protestant clergy as well. The well-known patron of Haitian art, Episcopal Bishop Alfred Voegeli and Baptist missionary Wallace Trumbull were both thrown out. In 1962, the papal nuncio was withdrawn. The crowning achievement took place in 1964 when the entire Jesuit order was banned from the country because its members 'had caused trouble and confusion in Haiti and had discredited the country overseas' and were 'plotting to overthrow the government.'<sup>60</sup> Shortly thereafter, the president gathered both the Roman Catholic clergy and the other denominations to receive their unconditional support. 'The result was a cadre of Macoute priests of the type not seen since the days of Dessalines', summarize the Heins.<sup>61</sup> The Catholic clergy had become indigenized and, more important, rendered completely passive in political matters.

Beginning in 1965, peace was made with the church. Duvalier allowed the priests to resume some of the functions that had been suppressed since 1957 and the following year the Holy See sent special representatives to the country. A new, largely Haitian, hierarchy was created, not only on Duvalier's insistence but also as a result of the worldwide change of policy of the Roman Catholic church. Duvalier henceforth was by and large assured the social, economic and political collaboration of the leading members of the clergy.<sup>62</sup>

### *The Mass Media and the Educational System. The Labor Unions*

The mass media were quickly silenced. Foreign journalists began to be expelled as early as in 1957 for what was considered as biased reporting on the country, and all the leading periodicals were either closed or turned into more or less willing tools of government propaganda. Some newspaper offices were demolished. Editors and journalists were jailed and those periodicals which continued to be published had to print government-written material as their own. Journalists and other employees loyal to the Duvalier government were forced upon the papers. From mid-1958, with the exception of the above-mentioned *La Phalange* which was not silenced until later, neither the press nor the radio stations dared to pronounce any criticism against the government.

Censorship was instituted in other ways as well. Mail and cables (both in- and outgoing) were read, and even telephone calls were subjected to control. In 1958 a code was also promulgated that declared that anybody spreading 'false news' would be shot, and the code was made *retroactive* — back to mid-1957. Private wireless transmitters were forbidden.

The educational system was duvalierized. In 1959 and 1960 the strike weapon was tried by the association of the secondary school teachers and the university and high-school students against political interference. In both instances the striking parties won Pyrrhic victories. Their immediate claims were satisfied but the teachers' union was broken up, and the autonomy of the university was totally abolished. The old *Université d'Haïti* was closed and a completely



government-controlled *Université d'Etat* was substituted for it. Both students and professors had to swear strict political loyalty oaths to the president. Imprisonment for parents of striking students was made mandatory. Duvalier supporters took over the teaching positions in the schools, and informers were placed among the students.

The trade unions had the same experience as the students and the teachers. This movement was not a very strong one at the beginning of Duvalier's rule. A certain growth had taken place under Estimé who, however, was strongly opposed to independently acting unions. Under Magloire unions had been suppressed. After Magloire's fall, three groups of unions existed: *L'Union Intersyndicale d'Haïti*, *La Force Ouvrière Paysanne* and *La Fédération Haïtienne des Syndicats Chrétiens*. These unions had managed to keep peace with Duvalier during the first years of his rule, concentrating their demands on specific worker issues instead of on politically sensitive questions. When the UIH, however, chose to back the striking students, union leaders began to be arrested. Towards the end of 1963, after a successful general strike, the UIH was dissolved and a few weeks later the FHSC shared the same fate, while the FOP had been converted into a duvalierist organization. The oppositional trade union leaders were either jailed or forced into exile.

### *The Democratic Institutions, the Government and the Administration*

After only half a year's rule Duvalier had the National Assembly confer extraordinary powers upon him which made it possible to rule by decree, a device that was constantly employed henceforth. Curfews, states of siege and martial law were applied from time to time. In 1959 and 1970 parliamentary immunity was suspended, impeachment of senators was attempted (1959) and arrests of congressmen took place. In 1961, two years before the legal expiration of the parliamentary term, Duvalier dissolved both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies due to some opposition within the Senate. Instead he created a unicameral parliament to which only candidates nominated by the president could be elected. In 1967, another mock election was held to fill the Chamber with Duvalier supporters. Neither the bi-cameral nor the uni-cameral legislature ever acted except on bills proposed by the executive, which were voted without debate. In the late sixties around 25 of the 58 deputies appear to have been *tonton macoutes* or persons having close relations with the *macoutes*.<sup>63</sup>

The judiciary was also put out of working order. The constitution did not permit interference by the executive with the decisions of the courts, but due to the frequent declarations of states of emergency normal justice could easily be dispensed with and military tribunals directly under the president could take over. In addition, the judges of the normal civil and criminal courts were appointed by Duvalier for short periods only.

According to the constitution, Duvalier's term would have expired in 1963, but in connection with the 1961 elections to parliament, Papa Doc managed to

have himself reelected without the knowledge of the voters in what has been qualified as 'a novel ruse in the history of fraudulent elections.'<sup>64</sup> All the ballots with the names of the candidates to the legislature also carried the words *François Duvalier, Président de la République*, at the top, and the morning after the elections Papa Doc declared that he had been reelected for another six years and that 'as a revolutionary' he had 'no right to disregard the voice of the people.'<sup>65</sup> In 1964 this was followed by a declaration 'in response to popular demand'<sup>66</sup> that he would assume the presidency *à vie*. A new constitution was passed by a plebiscite with 2,800,000 votes against 3,234 (where the voters were allowed to cast as many ballots as they wished).<sup>67</sup> Finally, as a climax in January 1971, another popular referendum, after due constitutional amendments, with 2,391,916 votes against 0 elected Duvalier's son Jean-Claude as his successor for life.<sup>68</sup>

Like the legislature and the judiciary, Duvalier's cabinet was to play a completely passive role. Following the same approach as with the army, the cabinet was reshuffled for the first time after a mere six months, and reshuffles were to become a recurrent feature during the years to come. To prevent ministers from obtaining *de facto* independence in handling department affairs, let alone a power base not connected with the president, all of them periodically were, at least, removed from their positions. Not a single one served from the beginning of the Duvalier era to the end without interruption.<sup>69</sup>

The entire public administration, finally, was thoroughly duvalierized. Even though the spoils system had constituted one of the most conspicuous features of the predatory state, it had never been carried to such extremes as it was during the Duvalier regime. Before 1957, with the advent of a new government, a number of 'non-political' positions had been left untouched, at least on the lower levels. Under Papa Doc, even very experienced personnel belonging to this category, who had served continually under a number of administrations, had to leave to be replaced by political supporters of the new regime. According to one source, the majority of the employees in the public administration had to join the *tonton macoutes* or were recruited directly from that group.<sup>70</sup>

### *The Relations with the United States*

Duvalier was not the 'United States candidate' in the 1957 elections (Déjoie was), but the US did not oppose him either, and after having been elected, Duvalier stressed the importance of good relations with that country. He was in a comparatively favorable position as far as these relations were concerned, the obvious comparison after 1959 being the one with Castro's Cuba. The American government was quite sensitive regarding the presence of a socialist regime in the Caribbean and thus presented Duvalier with a benevolent, cooperative, attitude.

This attitude was, however, soon to change, as the character of Duvalier's regime became clear. The United States' economic aid to Haiti constituted a

constant source of friction. Aid funds were being diverted for dubious purposes and 'political' personnel was appointed by the Haitians instead of technically capable people. From the American point of view, the purpose of the aid was wasted. The same was true regarding the military cooperation. Already before the elections, Duvalier had talked about a US Marine Corps mission to train the Haitian army, and such a mission also arrived in 1959. It quickly became apparent, however, that Duvalier did not share Colonel Heintz's views of why the Marines were in Haiti:

Haiti's armed forces are not only the fulcrum of the country's internal stability but also an important agency for progress. Besides police work, they deal with communications, rural medicine service, immigrations, prisons, lighthouse service, the national airline, coast guard, and commercial ship-repair. My job was to help the Haitian military to do these jobs better and at the same time get them back into trim as a fighting force capable of holding off coups at home as well as adventures by Fidel Castro.<sup>71</sup>

Instead Duvalier insisted that the Marines train the *tonton macoutes* as well, for completely different purposes. Heintz refused stubbornly, and the mission left Haiti in 1963. Summarizing his experience, Heintz wrote: 'After four years of ever-increasing obstructionism and, at the last, of overt Duvalierist anti-Americanism, I felt like a doctor transfusing blood into one arm of a failing patient while another M.D. — Dr. Duvalier — had a suction pump on the other.'<sup>72</sup> To these frictions could be added the general discontent of the United States with *tonton macoute* actions, including harassment of American citizens in Haiti.

In 1960, Duvalier chose to try to blackmail the United States into a drastic increase of foreign aid to Haiti (an attempted US \$ 300 million).<sup>73</sup> In the famous *Cri de Jacmel* speech, on June 21,<sup>74</sup> he threatened with converting to the communist bloc. The US was accused of having abandoned its Haitian friends:

I have not wanted to offer to other nations what I have offered the United States of the North and its government. I have called on American capital to develop the economy of the country. I have called on American technology for the organization and reorganization of the institutions of my country; to their economy, my underdeveloped country still is a sure market. But for 33 months my government and its people have lived on promises, smiles, encouragements, recommendations, hesitations, delays and misunderstandings. (...) We need a massive injection of money to reset the country on its feet, and this injection can come only from our great, capable friend and neighbor, the United States (...)

Two great poles of attraction, one situated in the New World, the other in old Europe, lure groups of people and associations of countries to a pilgrimage during which they always lose some pieces of their flesh and suffer lacerations of the soul (...) Observing and living in such an international context, in the era of national independence ... we need solid ground to make a choice.<sup>75</sup>

The United States did not yield to the pressure this time, but pointed out that Duvalier had received US \$ 21.4 million (as gifts) and not a mere 4.3 million, as Duvalier had contended in his speech.<sup>76</sup>

During 1961, relations continued to deteriorate, not least due to the 'elections' that prolonged Duvalier's term in office. The following year, during the OAS meeting at Punta del Este, a decision was to be taken on the expulsion of Cuba from that organization. Haiti held the decisive vote and did not hesitate to use it to squeeze further foreign aid out of the USA. Inside Haiti, Duvalier continued to aggravate the US State Department, by either declaring American ambassadors *persona non grata* or by ostentatiously paying no attention to them.

There was, however, a limit to what the United States was prepared to endure. Eisenhower had been succeeded by Kennedy. The Alliance of Progress was at its height and Haiti under Duvalier was clearly as big a pain in the neck for the Kennedy administration as for example Stroessner's Paraguay. In his endeavor to push liberal, democratic, western-styled democracies in Latin America, president Kennedy hence began to cut down on US aid to the point where only an anti-malaria program and some surplus food distribution remained.

At the same time, relations with the neighboring Dominican Republic under Juan Bosch deteriorated, especially after the 1963 violations of the Dominican diplomatic representation in Port-au-Prince, in sharp opposition to the Latin American tradition of asylum. Things got to the point where Bosch concentrated some 3,000 men of his armed forces on the Haitian border, prepared to cross, while the US sent an amphibious squadron, including a Marine brigade to the Gulf of Gonâve. Simultaneously, the OAS made a vain attempt to bring Duvalier back to the beaten track in the asylum question. In mid-May 1963, Duvalier was prepared to leave the country with his family, if necessary, having received tickets for a Paris-bound jet.

Still, he did not. Tuning down his terror apparatus in the critical moment, he rode out the storm. Anti-US propaganda continued for a few months, and thereafter Duvalier was saved by events outside his influence. In September, Bosch was overthrown and in November, Kennedy was murdered. Slowly, as Lyndon Johnson took over, Haitian-American relations improved. A new American ambassador was appointed in 1964, the former having been recalled during the crisis the year before. US aid money started to flow into Haiti again. From then on, the United States no longer constituted any danger to Duvalier's regime. The storm had calmed.

### *The New Power Base*

In 1965, there was no longer any doubt. François Duvalier was firmly in power. He had skilfully neutralized all sources of actual or potential domestic opposition to his rule, and he had, with a portion of luck, survived the showdown with the United States. During the last six to seven years of his presidency he was free to harvest what he had sown during the first seven. In the last part of the present essay we will deal with that harvest, but before we go on to examine

some of the economics of duvalierism, we must give an account of the base on which Duvalier built his control of Haiti, since, together with the destruction of all opposition, the creation of this base constitutes his main innovation in the Haitian predatory state.

The principle applied was simple and has been hinted at a few times above. No person, military or civilian, was allowed to build anything even remotely resembling an independent power position. All loyalties were to be directed towards a single man: the president himself, and all favors to those sharing the spoils of office with Duvalier were to come from the president. This gave Duvalier a maximum of control over the probability that he would remain in office, and this control in turn gave him maximum freedom in milking the economy for private purposes.

The biggest problem when it came to concentrating power to a single individual was that of obtaining complete control over the army. This was partly achieved by the reshuffles we have described above, but Duvalier was astute enough to create a second praetorian guard, which could be used independently of the regular armed forces, which was to prove an efficient weapon against the army, and which ended by infiltrating and superseding the army completely.

This force was the notorious *tonton macoutes*. These made their appearance almost immediately after Duvalier's rise to power. Headed by Clément Barbot, they were first known as *cagouleurs* (hooded men — after a French fascist organization from the 1930s). From mid-1958 this group was reorganized and formalized in a deliberate (and successful) attempt to outbalance the regular army. The new organization became known as *tonton macoutes*,<sup>77</sup> believed to have numbered around 10,000 (at most 5,000 during the early years) with a hard core of some 2,000 in Port-au-Prince.<sup>78</sup> Dressed in the manner described so vividly by Graham Greene in *The Comedians*: dark (often mirrored) glasses, grey homburg and pistol-bulging pants, when not in blue denim uniforms, a *macoute* was 'an informer, neighborhood boss, extortioner, bully, and political pillar of the regime.'<sup>79</sup>

This paramilitary corps was an efficient terror weapon, 'being wildly arbitrary and capricious',<sup>80</sup> which could be counted upon as a sort of shock troops when it came to dealing with political opponents and keeping the general population quiet. All members had to be sworn in by the president himself and in return, excepting the very lowest-ranking, in principle reported directly to him. Hereby, their loyalty was ensured.

Ironically enough, from the *tonton macoutes* came the only person who to some extent managed to display some power independent of that of Duvalier: the first leader of the corps, Clément Barbot, who during Duvalier's convalescence after his 1959 heart attack, ran the country. That did, however, not last very long. In 1960 Barbot was arrested and in 1963, after having been released and shooting it out with the *macoutes* on several occasions, he and his brother were machine-gunned in their hiding place.

By employing the *tonton macoutes* to control and report on the population, all outside opposition could be neutralized. Barbot's bid for power, however, made it necessary to devise a system of internal control of this group as well. This was done by maintaining competition among the individual members, creating an atmosphere devoid of *esprit de corps* and eminently conducive to mutual distrust and espionage, as well as a secret service within the *macoute* organization itself, largely designed to keep its members under control.<sup>81</sup>

In addition to the *tonton macoutes*, Duvalier relied on two other groups to extend his control over the Haitian population. The first group consisted of the *houngans* — the voodoo priests.<sup>82</sup> These had traditionally played an important role in the local community and had in the past often, but unsystematically, been exploited for political purposes by the Haitian governments, especially when elections had been imminent, while after the elections, voodoo had often been outlawed.

Duvalier broke with this pattern. Instead of employing the voodoo clergy only at election time, he made use of his knowledge of the cult to establish a much more solid and enduring relationship. In this process, he projected himself as a *houngan*, a *bocor* (sorcerer) and even a *loa* (voodoo deity). There are plenty of stories of strange, sometimes bizarre, rites taking place in the presidential palace. *Houngans* and *bocors* were consulted and voodoo ceremonies were performed regularly. He frequently made allusion to voodoo in his speeches and sometimes used part of the voodoo ritual in connection with official performances. Voodoo almost assumed the character of official religion in the country. Duvalier even took great care to dress like *Baron Samedi*, the guardian of cemeteries, in a black suit and black hat, and in a mass meeting during the confrontation with the OAS in 1963, he proclaimed: 'I am even now an immaterial being.'<sup>83</sup>

To make consistent use of the voodoo clergy for political purposes was not an easy task. The main difficulty lay in the fact that voodoo lacks a nationwide hierarchy. Each *houngan* in principle commands the loyalty of his own congregation only. However, Duvalier skilfully managed to manipulate all *houngans* to his own advantage. 'Never forget', they were told, 'that I am the supreme authority of the State. Henceforth, I, I alone, I am your only master.'<sup>84</sup> This was in 1959. Already before that, *houngans* who refused to cooperate were eliminated, and from time to time voodoo was taxed to drive home the point of who was in command. *Houngans* and *mambos* (priestesses) ended up putting pictures of Duvalier in their *houmforts*.

Papa Doc had at least three good reasons for coopting the voodoo clergy. In the first place, the Haitian masses, and in particular the peasants, believe firmly in supernatural explanations of fortune and misfortune. Secondly, *houngans* and *mambos*, because of the religious functions they fulfill, are natural community leaders in Haiti. Finally, the voodoo clergy is inherently conservative, because modernization could easily threaten their own existence. According to Rémy Bastien,

... no *houngan* has ever sponsored the building of a school, promoted a program of community development, sought to introduce new crops, or innovated an agricultural technique. His overspecialization not only guarantees him relative power and wealth, but it also makes him unfit for the kind of *true* leadership which places the material and spiritual welfare of the community above personal advantages. The type of change needed today is beyond the comprehension of Vodoun and contrary to its interests.<sup>85</sup>

Duvalier knew this perfectly well and it suited *his* interests perfectly. By resorting at the same time to the stick and the carrot, he turned voodoo into a political weapon. Across the entire country the *houngans* were forced to join the ranks of the *tonton macoutes* if they wanted to survive. Michel Laguerre reports that in the slum areas of Port-au-Prince which furnished the material for his study of an urban ghetto, *all the houngans* were simultaneously *tonton macoutes* and fulfilled the same type of political functions.<sup>86</sup> This move, however, also conferred positive advantages of a very tangible kind on the *macoute houngans*. They were given *carte blanche* to hold their ceremonies without notifying the authorities. Sometimes they were given a salary. They could at times gain power over other *houngans* and in this way get economic benefits both from a wider congregation and from their political connections. They could provide jobs for their relatives, an education for their children, money to make family members emigrate etc.

The final pillar of support for the Duvalier regime was found in the rural administration. Traditionally rural Haiti has been governed in a military fashion. In theory, two parallel systems have been used, one military and another civil. In both, the basic unit has been the *section*, the smallest rural administrative cell, headed by a *chef de section* who is a military and who is the head of the local police.<sup>87</sup>

His influence was often decisive: 'For all practical purposes, he may well be described as the state within the section ...', wrote Jean Comhaire in 1955.<sup>88</sup> He was usually recruited among the local *notables*. This was important, since this gave him status and local influence, both of which were crucial for maintaining social control over his *section*. Formally, his appointment was recommended by the commander of the *arrondissement* (an army general) and was confirmed by the president. In practice this conferred a great deal of autonomy on the commander.

Duvalier chose to change the system, in a way which suited his own purposes, giving him a third means of control over the population. He took over the appointment personally and this made all *chefs de section* directly dependent on his own person in the same way as was the case with the *tonton macoutes* and the voodoo clergy. (Frequently the role of *chef de section* coincided with that of local *macoute* boss.) Thus, '... power politics in the capital was ... instrumental'<sup>89</sup> in deciding whether the *chef* would remain in office or not. The 'boss' role was substantially diminished as Duvalier took over and the *chef de section* was converted into an arm for the president instead.

Papa Doc was extremely efficient in his destruction of the traditional Haitian political structures. One of the standard theorems of neoclassical economics states that in order to maximize the value of output in society, marginal value product equalization must obtain between the sectors of the economy, i.e. the value (to society) of the contribution to production of the last unit of a given factor must be equal in all the sectors. If not, it pays to reallocate the factor in question to those uses that yield higher marginal contributions to the value of output. It appears that Papa Doc understood this principle, and in his own perverse way applied it in his purge of each and every part of the opposition.

Thus, there seems to be little doubt regarding the fact that the money spent on enhancing the security of the president was used efficiently. Nor were these funds small. Adding the budgetary expenditure on Interior and Defense to the unbudgeted expenditures of the *Régie du Tabac* (supposedly financing the operations of e.g. the *tonton macoutes*) gives a figure which amounts to a little more than 30 percent of total government expenditures during the first half of the sixties to fall to some 26 percent during the last two years of Papa Doc's rule.<sup>90</sup>

By substituting a reign of terror for the traditional Haitian political structure building on the personal dependency of the terror agents on the president, Papa Doc obtained a vastly higher security than any Haitian president since the days of Boyer. It may hence be contended that in the choice between security and personal income — the perennial dilemma of the Haitian kleptocrats — he opted for the former. Quite probably Papa Doc could have retained much more money for himself during the early years of his presidency, but then only at the expense of his security. After, say 1965, the tradeoff is no longer so visible although it still existed. At that time the opposition was already completely crushed, and this in turn left plenty of scope for milking the treasury and the economy in general. Hence, by investing as heavily as he did in security, Duvalier quite probably also increased his personal incomes during his *entire* period in office. To this aspect we will now turn.

In his book on race and color in Haiti, David Nicholls argues that Duvalier's 'general aim' as president 'was to translate into practical policy that ideology which he had helped to develop since the time of the American occupation'. According to Nicholls, 'Duvalier came to power with certain ideals; he was genuinely concerned to forward and complete the work which Estimé had begun.' By the same token, Nicholls argues that it is 'mistaken' to portray Papa Doc as 'a cynical operator whose sole ambition was to gather maximal wealth and power to himself and his family; according to this view ideology was merely a camouflage which was employed to hoodwink the masses and to present an acceptable image to the world scene.'<sup>91</sup>

It cannot be denied that Duvalier in various ways did more to promote lower class blacks than any of his predecessors, including Estimé. What can be subject to strong doubts is, however, that Duvalier's actions in the main should derive



from any conscious effort on his part to achieve a genuine social revolution. Rather, it appears as if the promotion of middle-class blacks into top positions in the government and the administration, the recruitment of the Port-au-Prince *ton-ton macoutes* from the urban proletariat and the promotion of young black officers in the army was a necessary by-product of the personal goals of the president.

If instead of dealing with Duvalier's professed ideology, which we have to some extent already sketched, we concentrate on his actions, his 'revealed' preferences, it is hardly possible to find any traces of social egalitarianism, as it was professed, for example during the election campaign in 1957. Most eloquent on this point is the complete lack of willingness to improve the situation in rural areas, which is where the overwhelming majority of Haitians live and work. Nicholls writes:

Perhaps the most significant result of Duvalier's 'revolution' will turn out to be the sense which was given to the mass of peasants that they were really citizens and that what they did was important. The actual power which they possessed to influence the course of events was negligible, but the rhetoric of populism, the mass rallies and the countryside organization of the VSN [*ton-ton macoutes*] have led to a new consciousness on the part of the masses. If people are told often enough that they are important, they may begin to believe it.<sup>92</sup>

This statement hardly squares with the starving of the agricultural sector of funds which took place during Duvalier's entire regime, with the fact that coffee taxation, given its heavy incidence on the peasants, continued to be one of the most important sources of government revenue and with the favoring of luxury goods above the mass consumption items needed by the peasants in matters of taxation. The fact is that hardly any attention at all was paid to the agricultural sector under Papa Doc's time in office and that whatever attention that was paid was in the main of a negative kind.<sup>93</sup> The yearly report of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress in 1968 summarized the Haitian government's agricultural policy by referring to it as an attitude of parasitism.<sup>94</sup>

It is simply not possible to understand Duvalier's term in office without invoking the economic element. I am not advocating the reduction of his goals or his personality to a *simpliste* interpretation *only* in terms of security and personal gains, but I am on the other hand completely convinced that Nicholls is violating reality when he chooses to forget that, innovative as he was, Papa Doc can also be seen as a link in the chain of kleptocrat rulers which has plagued Haiti ever since the beginning of the 1840s. This is obvious when his financial record is examined.

During his election campaign Duvalier vehemently denounced the 'Machievellism of the usurping bourgeois whose favorite weapons are lies, robbery, exploitation',<sup>95</sup> and in his first press conference after having been elected he emphasized the need for honesty in government and public administration.<sup>96</sup>

The reality turned out to be entirely different. The old patterns of graft and corruption that had become an institution in Haitian society continued to erode the capacity of the economy to transform, and in addition a new element was added to the Haitian soft state, one with which the Haitians lacked previous experience: pure gangsterism and extortionism.

There is little doubt that Duvalier did a better job of milking the Haitian economy for his own benefit than his predecessor, Magloire.<sup>97</sup> The estimates of the amounts involved vary. In 1963, the International Commission of Jurists estimated that the Haitian treasury lost some US \$ 10 million per year due to the operations of the Duvalier clique and Wolf Donner quotes evidence that Papa Doc transferred more than 7 million per year out of the country for personal purposes.<sup>98</sup>

His loyal collaborators shared the spoils. Leslie Manigat, himself a Duvalier supporter during the early years, paints an eloquent picture of the general pattern:

... the impoverished people looked on at the spiraling fortunes of officials, who, with a monthly salary of less than \$ 400—500 and savings of less than \$ 50 in 1957, were able to build, in less than four years, villas worth at least \$ 40,000 to \$ 50,000. The demand for furniture from Italy, France, and the US, the vogue for hi-fi-stereo, and the craze for private swimming pools had spread throughout the *milieu* of men in power. Savings accounts in Swiss banks were known to have increased with every trip to Switzerland by big-wigs of the regime. Corruption was the favorite way of keeping a faithful and loyal clientele.<sup>99</sup>

This money was raised in a number of ways which often in themselves were innovative. One such way was connected with foreign investment in the country. Duvalier declared himself to be a supporter of private capital injections, which, however, in the main turned out to be mere rackets. Projects like the following were typical, especially for the first years:

A Chicago firm, through a 'Haitian Resources Development Corporation', offered to build a 550-room hotel and an airport at Cap-Haitien (the total of hotel rooms in Port-au-Prince was then 712, while the number in Cap-Haitien was only a small fraction of that figure). In addition, it undertook to restore various national monuments (including the Citadelle and the palace of Sans Souci) and, if it was found necessary, to build a radio broadcasting station, a hippodrome, a yacht basin, and a golf course. Financing was to be by means of an \$ 18-million bond issue. Although a contract covering this proposition was signed and apparently received legislative approval, it never became effective. A contract was signed with the Starlite Construction Company in Miami to tear down the capital's waterfront slum, build on the site a shopping and residential center, and relocate the slum dwellers elsewhere; the cost, of which the government was to bear one-half, was estimated at \$ 1 million. A 15-year concession was granted to the West India Fruit and Steamship Company, an American enterprise, for the production and purchase for export of bananas in the départements of the north, northwest, and Artibonite.<sup>100</sup>

The objective was hardly to carry out the projects, but to share the money paid out by the government between the contracting firm and government officials on various levels, including the very highest one. In 1961 the World Bank offered to undertake a study of a highway project between Port-au-Prince and Cayes at a cost of \$ 35,000. Instead, the government signed a contract with a private American company for \$ 80,000, which produced a study which did not meet World Bank standards.<sup>101</sup> Three expensive preliminary studies of the jet airport, which was completed in 1964, were carried out and at least four different contracts were signed with foreign construction companies, but all the deals fell through because of the unabashed pushing by government officials for 'their own' companies. Taxes for amounts several times the final cost of the airport were collected for five years.<sup>102</sup> The international casino of Port-au-Prince changed hands several times during the Duvalier period. In 1958 the government canceled a thirty-year contract held by an Italian and turned the casino over to the duvalierists, and Clément Barbot, before he was ousted, had it change hands three times — each time against appropriate fees.<sup>103</sup>

On at least one occasion the manipulations involved US politicians as well. In 1961 the abattoirs of the Haitian-American Meat and Provision Company were inspected by an employee of the American embassy to see whether they met US sanitary standards or not, since the company which had obtained a monopoly from the Haitian government had requested an export licence. The certificate was denied on the grounds of 'certain deficiencies'. After a while HAMPCO managed to get its licence, however, paying a one-cent-a-pound commission to former Lyndon B. Johnson aide Robert B. Baker, who obviously saw to it that quotas on beef and pork imports were changed and that veterinary standards were dispensed with. Baker gained at least \$ 20,000 before he was convicted by US courts for these and other similar manipulations using his political position.<sup>104</sup>

Duvalier also used the fact that Haitians crossed the border every year to the Dominican Republic to work during the sugar harvest. In 1952 Haiti and the Dominican Republic had signed a contract to organize the flow of labor. This contract was renewed by the Duvalier and Trujillo governments in 1958. From 1957 to 1963, some 30,000 sugarcane workers left for the Dominican Republic every year. The latter year, the American AFL-CIO labor federation and the federation of Dominican sugar workers had an inquiry conducted which revealed that the deal involved a direct 15 dollar per head payment to the Haitian contractors and that half of the wages earned by the Haitians were sent directly back home in dollars, but that the Haitians received nothing upon their return. The commission of inquiry calculated that this enabled the Duvalier government to put away something like 6 to 8 million dollars every year.<sup>105</sup> This traffic was temporarily suspended in 1963, when relations between the two countries hit a rock-bottom level, but in 1966 a new contract was signed which stipulated a payment of 60 dollars to the Haitian government per worker supplied.<sup>106</sup>

Corresponding to the large-scale bribes and kickbacks in connection with the

concession-mongering and the labor contracts were the smaller-scale bribes received at lower levels. Most favors required a bribe. To get a government job, however unimportant, the applicant frequently had to leave two or three months' salary to the official who got the job for him.<sup>107</sup> *Tonton macoutes* connected with the presidential palace or with the emigration services established regular businesses consisting in letting politically 'hot' people out of the country against \$ 25 to \$ 5,000 fees depending on the risk involved in each particular case,<sup>108</sup> or sold 'protective' services e.g. to foreign citizens.<sup>109</sup> Local import-export merchants avoided paying customs duties, paying the customs officials instead.<sup>110</sup>

A third innovation when it came to raising money was to ask for 'voluntary' donations. After the abortive guerrilla landing in 1959, well-off businessmen had to contribute to the defense of Haiti, deputies had to sacrifice a month's salary each and a total of \$ 17,000 was taken from army officers.<sup>111</sup> The following year, Osvald Brandt, reputedly the richest Haitian citizen, bought one million dollars' worth of government bonds — the complete issue.<sup>112</sup> These ventures proved so successful that in 1961 they were put on a systematically organized basis, in the *Mouvement de Rénovation Nationale*, originated by a deputy from the little town of Cabaret, Luckner Cambronne. The official idea presented by Cambronne was that of converting his home town into a model town with the name of Duvalierville. The legislature immediately voted to contribute 10 dollars per member and month, and other groups in society were asked for contributions as well:

In Gonaïves in early 1961 the militia made a house-to house search to rout out all merchants and tell them what their NRM donations would be. One businessman, told to send fifty dollars, returned a check for ten dollars. The check was sent back, this time with a request for \$ 1,000. A reluctant merchant sometimes found himself tapped on the shoulder as he walked down the street and taken to Cambronne's NRM office. If he started to protest he was met with a reproach: 'Ah, ah', the official would say, 'just pay'.<sup>113</sup>

Contributions could run very high, indeed. One large company had to present a check of no less than half a million dollars. Neither were small contributions looked down upon. School children had to pay 10 cents a piece.<sup>114</sup> None of these funds were ever put into the budgeted accounts of the government, and the International Commission of Jurists in 1963 concluded that MRN 'programs of work are pure fiction, it is not hard to guess where the funds of the [MRN] go...'<sup>115</sup>

The last year of the Duvalierville 'project', the 'results' of which are neatly described in *The Comedians*, was 1961. The following year new ventures were tried. The MNR announced that the Pétionville residents no longer needed to pay in full what had been requested from them for road repairs and for a new *lycée*. Instead, the amount was to be decided by their generosity.<sup>116</sup> In 1964 businessmen were once again subject to a payment of 25 dollar contributions for a

May Day gift to Duvalier — a giant sized gold medal, and a diploma hailing him as ‘chief of the revolution and grand protector of commerce and industry.’<sup>117</sup>

Blackmail took place at lower levels in the system as well. Only the higher-ranking *tonton macoutes* received a regular salary, as a rule 30—50 dollars per month. The rest were simply given a gun and the loosely defined authority connected with that, meaning that it was easy to ask for goods and services without payment, to steal and plunder, and at times getting away with murder as well.<sup>118</sup> Sometimes organized and unorganized ventures were mixed. Thus, the MRN itself had to face corruption within its ranks. Some *macoutes* used Cambronne’s name to cover up their own, private fund collecting.<sup>119</sup>

Parallel to the ‘voluntary’ contribution business the duvalierist government operated a series of compulsory payments of various kinds. During Papa Doc’s first years in office all literates were required to teach a minimum of one illiterate how to read and write in Creole with the option of instead paying \$ 2 to a fund for literacy teachers.<sup>120</sup> In 1961, a compulsory state lottery made its appearance yielding a gross income of \$ 2.25 million, a large amount of which was raised by withholding part of the salaries of government employees. The names of the winners were never published and in most cases not even known, especially as far as the top prizes were concerned, but most of the prize money is believed never to have been paid out or to have been paid to those in the inner political circles only.<sup>121</sup> In 1962, Duvalier also launched an ‘economic liberation’ campaign which was to be financed, among other things, by an emission of economic liberation bonds (*certificats de libération économique*) redeemable in five years. Purchase was mandatory for all salary earners. Duvalier set the example by contributing 15 percent of his salary, and others had to do the same. Nominally, the issue was made for the financing of the new airport.<sup>122</sup> Another lottery on behalf of the economic liberation was ‘compulsory for employees of the public administration . . . pensioners, autonomous services, commercial and industrial societies, shopkeepers and their staff.’<sup>123</sup>

Lotteries and bond emissions were complemented by compulsory inspection of private and public vehicles against a fee, by collection of tolls on roads and bridges, and by collection of faked telephone bills — sometimes going several years back in time.<sup>124</sup>

In 1966 an unbudgeted old-age pension system was introduced, for which 3 percent of the salaries of Haitian employees were to be deducted. Upon having paid contributions for twenty years, reaching the age of 65 and presenting a medical certificate stating that the employee in question no longer could work, a pension would be paid out.<sup>125</sup> Two years later, it was decided that every government employee needed a copy of volume II of the *Oeuvres essentielles* of the president, containing the speeches made by him during the campaign for the presidency and which cost \$ 15.<sup>126</sup> The system of compulsory payments was also made more or less private use of by the *tonton macoutes*. The toll booth system proved to be excellently suited for private business undertakings. Very few

dared to ask any questions concerning the legality when being told to pay at gunpoint.<sup>127</sup>

A fifth method for raising money was a very 'direct' one: the taking over of property, businesses or jobs which belonged to political adversaries, when the latter were killed or exiled.<sup>128</sup> Often the very reason for exiling somebody was not primarily of a political nature but rather a means of seizing a profitable trade or business establishment. Boycotts, threats, nightly raids and other forms of intimidation made the owners comply.<sup>129</sup> Desirable educations and foreign scholarships were monopolized by duvalierists.<sup>130</sup>

The duvalierists also made use of other traditional devices for raising money. When Duvalier came into office he obtained a \$ 4 million loan from a Cuban bank, allegedly based on 7 million dollars' worth of deposits of Haitian sugar workers in Cuba. This loan never figured in the books of the Haitian government, but one million reputedly went to Batista's clique, while the remaining three went to Duvalier, with no repayment.<sup>131</sup> In 1959, US Senator J. David was expelled from Haiti for asking questions to the Haitian Minister of Finance regarding the employment of certain funds since the beginning of Duvalier's presidency, especially \$ 1.2 million supposedly turned over from the *Régie du Tabac* to a military housing project, a \$ 400,000 advancement on a French-American trade deal, later rejected by the Haitian legislature and an initial \$ 1 million payment to a Miami company on a shopping center which was never built.<sup>132</sup>

Funds were also diverted quite openly. Duvalier ruled by decrees during most of his term in office and could therefore easily switch budget items from one heading to another and did so quite frequently. As an example, Lester Velie mentions how once *Le Moniteur*, the official gazette, listed no less than seventeen switches in favor of the *tonton macoutes*.<sup>133</sup> Municipal funds were re-budgeted as well. Already in 1958, certain of these funds were put under the command of the national government, to be put into an unfiscalized account. The same law authorized their use by the *macoutes*.<sup>134</sup>

Finally, mention must once more be made of the funds of the *Régie du Tabac*. This autonomous government agency which collected taxes on e.g. tobacco, matches, sugar, cement, flour, textiles, edible oils, alcoholic beverages, dairy products, candies and chocolates, was never included in the government budget, and no information was ever published regarding the use of its funds, in spite of repeated demands from e.g. international donor organizations. Quite probably, what was not used for paying the *tonton macoutes* went to the leading members of the Duvalier polity.

### Conclusions

The actions of Papa Doc have often been depicted as ideologically determined, both by the apologists of the Duvalier regime and by neutral analysts of his presidency. He came into power equipped with a heavily ideologically colored

vocabulary which he made extensive use of during his time in office. In the name of the social 'revolution' of 1946, he promised to put an end to traditional clique rule in the country and to substitute national concord and social and economic egalitarianism for the traditional predatory state.

It can, however, by no means be seriously contended that Papa Doc reached his officially professed goals. It is not so hard to understand why. These goals were part of the official façade only and had nothing to do with his real intentions. To determine the latter, it is not enough to look at the contents of his writings and speeches. His actions also have to be examined, i.e. his revealed preferences, and these tell a completely different story.

Papa Doc *did* change traditional Haitian politics, but not in the fashion he had envisaged during his election campaign. Instead he proceeded to crush the existing political structures using brutal violence as his main force. This put him in a unique position in Haitian history, at least since the early 1840s. Beginning around that time, a predatory state had developed in the country, where the two main goals of the contending politicians had been the retention of power and the creation of personal fortunes. Since the retention of power was not without costs, a tradeoff existed between these two goals. Spending more on security meant lower personal incomes for the ruler. Faced with this tradeoff, the majority of nineteenth-century rulers had opted for income and had consequently been very short-lived in office. After the American occupation of Haiti, the tradeoff had been removed or had at least assumed a different character. The predatory state had become praetorian, with the army deciding how long the presidents could stay in power and hence also establishing the limits for personal license in office. This was the situation when Duvalier assumed the presidency.

Through a series of 'innovations' which did not change the two traditional political goals of the predatory state, Papa Doc converted the praetorian state into a reign of terror, where the traditional tradeoff between incomes and security was reestablished — *but at a much higher level of security than ever before*. He chose not to rely on any other politicians and destroyed praetorianism when he crushed the army. Instead he built his power base on three groups whose members were all tied to the president in a way where they became personally dependent on him and consequently on his staying in office: the *tonton macoutes*, the voodoo clergy and the *chefs de section*. None of these groups were in a position where they could make an independent bid for power.

By basing his regime on a non-traditional power base Papa Doc managed to stay in office for no less than fourteen years — more than any Haitian ruler since Boyer — and to die a natural death while still president. The retention of power was, however, not his only concern. Leaving other aspects aside, we have also demonstrated how his actions in the economic sphere clearly indicate that income considerations were as important for Duvalier as for any other Haitian ruler, and how these considerations led to the development of a repertoire of unorthodox tricks for raising funds that could easily be channeled into personal

accounts. By spending heavily on his political apparatus he also managed to increase his personal income to a level well above what would have been possible either in the traditional predatory setting or in the praetorian state. It is hard to consider Papa Doc's success in relation to the two traditional goals of Haitian politics as anything other than total. By letting the Haitian nation pay a high price in both political and economic terms he carved out a unique position for himself in the history of Haitian kleptocracy.



## NOTES

1. This theme is developed at length in Lundahl (1979).
2. See Laswell & Kaplan (1950), p. 211, for a discussion of the term 'predatory state'.
3. *Cacos* were peasant troops from northern Haiti, regularly recruited by would-be presidents when a revolution was brewing, as it was at least 102 times between 1843 and 1915 (Heinl & Heinl (1978), p. 404).
4. Notably Robert Rotberg and the Heinls. See Rotberg & Clague (1971), especially Chapters 6 and 10, and Heinl & Heinl (1978), Chapter 14. Cf. also e.g. Manigat (1964), especially pp. 5–6.
5. See e.g. Pierre-Charles (1969).
6. Most importantly Nicholls (1979).
7. Cf. Laswell & Kaplan (1950), p. 211.
8. This is dealt with in detail in Lundahl (1983:1) and (forthcoming).
9. For an analysis of the causes of the land reform, see Lundahl (1979), Chapter 6 and Lundahl (1983:2).
10. See Lundahl (1979), Chapters 6–8 and (1983:2).
11. For a discussion of the concept of unlimited supply of land, see Hansen (1979).
12. A model of this dilemma is derived in Lundahl (1983:2).
13. Cf. Laswell & Kaplan (1950), p. 211. For a discussion of praetorianism in a wider context, see Huntington (1968), Chapter 4.
14. Cf. Millspaugh (1931), p. 185.
15. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 142.
16. Nicholls (1979), p. 11.
17. Leyburn (1966), p. 311.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
19. Price-Mars (1973).
20. Price-Mars was, however, not the first Haitian to do so. Cf. Nicholls (1979), pp. 152–55, for a brief summary of the writings of J.C. Dorsainvil and Arthur Holly.
21. For details, the reader should consult e.g. Fleischmann (1969), Dash (1981), MacLeod (1962) and Hoffman (1982).
22. Roumain (1944).
23. Nicholls (1979), pp. 167–72 gives some details. Duvalier's ideologically oriented writings are collected in Duvalier (1968:1).
24. See in particular the analysis of Denis & Duvalier (1948).
25. Diederich & Burt (1972), Chapters 8 and 1, give a detailed account of the election campaign. Cf. also Rotberg & Clague (1971), pp. 185–96.

26. The speeches and messages delivered by Duvalier during the campaign are collected in Duvalier (1968:2).
27. Frequently, the speeches were ghostwritten, notably by Roger Dorsainville and even more Lucien Daumec (Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 81). It has been claimed that Duvalier's own efforts were not unduly successful: 'One campaign manager laughed and said: "Hell, Doc Duvalier can't even come up with a good speech. He just showed me one he was going to make in Cap-Haïtien." Expressing disgust, he added: "I tore it up and wrote him a new one."' (Ibid.)
28. Duvalier (1968:2), pp. 35—36.
29. Ibid., p. 151.
30. Ibid., p. 23.
31. Ibid., p. 177—78.
32. Ibid., p. 158.
33. Ibid., p. 195.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 133.
37. Ibid., p. 182.
38. Ibid., p. 185.
39. Ibid., pp. 194—95.
40. Ibid., p. 100.
41. Nicholls (1979), p. 209.
42. Quoted by Gingras (1967), p. 99.
43. Duvalier (1967:1), pp. 3—6.
44. Ibid., p. 13.
45. The literature on this aspect of Duvalier's presidency is rich. The material in this section comes from Rotberg & Clague (1971), pp. 196—257, 342—78, Manigat (1964) passim, (1972) passim, Wingfield (1966), pp. 221—66, Diederich & Burt (1972) passim, Pierre-Charles (1969) passim, Moore (1972), pp. 87—107, Gingras (1967), pp. 97—129, Mintz (1966), Heintl & Heintl (1978), Chapter 14, Nicholls (1979), Chapters 8 and 9. Cf. also Crassweller (1971) and (1972), Hardouin (1963), Latortue (1966:1), (1966:2), (1967), (n.d.), and OAS (1963).
46. Nicholls (1979), p. 211.
47. Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818—43) ruled longer, but this was before the predatory state had been created.
48. Duvalier (1968:2), p. 142.
49. Lundahl (1982) gives an account of the Haitian migration to Cuba.
50. Jumelle's funeral was interrupted by the *tonton macoutes* who took possession of the coffin and disappeared with it. This was the incident behind the interrupted funeral in Graham Greene's *The Comedians*.
51. Heintl & Heintl (1978), p. 606.
52. Ibid., p. 582.
53. In 1958, the *Garde* had been renamed *Forces Armées d'Haïti*.

54. Heinel & Heinel (1978), p. 607.
55. Pierre-Charles (1969), p. 78.
56. Duvalier (1967:2), p. 221.
57. For an example of these attitudes, see e.g. Riou (1976), pp. 178—94.
58. Voodoo priests.
59. Quoted by Nicholls (1979), p. 222.
60. Ibid., pp. 224—25.
61. Heinel & Heinel (1978), p. 611.
62. For Duvalier's own (official) view of the controversy with the Catholic church and the resumption of relations, see Duvalier (1969).
63. Rotberg & Clague (1971), pp. 357—58.
64. Wingfield (1966), p. 225.
65. Ibid. Around 100,000 are known to have voted, but there was a total of 1,320,748 ballots (Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 232).
66. Quoted by *ibid.*, p. 234.
67. Ibid.
68. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 397.
69. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 360 give a list of ministers and their histories in the government.
70. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 173.
71. Heinel & Heinel (1978), p. 619.
72. Ibid., pp. 620—21.
73. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 151.
74. Duvalier (1967:1), p. 238—46.
75. Ibid., pp. 244—45.
76. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 151.
77. Literally, the expression means 'uncle basket', the bogeyman of Haitian folklore. In 1962, the official denomination became *Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale* (VSN).
78. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 215. Heinel & Heinel (1978), p. 608 give a slightly higher figure: 12,000.
79. Heinel & Heinel (1978), p. 596.
80. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 205.
81. Laguerre (1976), Chapter 6, gives an excellent account of how both these mechanisms worked in the context of local-level, urban slum politics.
82. In addition to the sources in note 41, the reader should consult Bastien (1966) and Laguerre (1976), Chapter 6.
83. Quoted by Heinel & Heinel (1978), p. 633.
84. Quoted by *ibid.*, p. 601.
85. Bastien (1966), p. 48.
86. Laguerre (1976), p. 219.

87. The literature on the *chef de section* is scanty and consists in the main only of Comhaire (1955) and Lahav (1975).
88. Comhaire (1955), p. 621.
89. Lahav (1975), p. 69.
90. The figure for 1960/61—1966/67 are available in Lundahl (1979), p. 382. The corresponding percentages for 1969/70 and 1970/71 have been computed from the figures in IBRD (1974), Tables 5.5 och 5.9. In both cases it has been assumed that *Régie* expenditures equal *Régie* revenues.
91. Nicholls (1979), p. 212.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
93. This is dealt with in detail in Lundahl (1979), *passim*.
94. CIAP (1968), pp. 93—94.
95. Quoted by Gingras (1967), p. 108.
96. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 102.
97. Wingfield (1966), p. 250, Moore (1972), p. 93, 104, Latortue (n.d.), p. 6.
98. Wingfield (1966), p. 252, Donner (1980), note, p. 338.
99. Manigat (1964), p. 75.
100. Moore (1972), pp. 90—91.
101. Velie (1962), pp. 125—26.
102. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 311.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
104. *Ibid.*, pp. 374—75, Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 211.
105. Gingras (1967), pp. 115—16.
106. Lundahl & Vargas (1983), p. 126.
107. Pierre-Charles (1969), p. 101.
108. Latortue (n.d.), p. 6.
109. For an example see Diederich & Burt (1972), pp. 178—80.
110. Latortue (n.d.), p. 6.
111. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 207.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
113. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 173.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
115. Quoted by *ibid.*, p. 253. One ‘contributor’ is reported to have received his canceled check with the endorsement of the mistress of Luckner Cambronne (Wingfield (1966), p. 252).
116. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 240.
117. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 272.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 173. Cf. Rotberg & Clague (1971), pp. 227—28.
119. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 173.
120. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 211.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
122. *Ibid.*, Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 183.
123. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 184.
124. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 240, Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 174.
125. Diederich & Burt (1972), p. 372.
126. Rotberg & Clague (1971), p. 255.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
128. Gingras (1967), p. 109.
129. Manigat (1964), p. 75.
130. Wingfield (1966), pp. 250—51.
131. Moore (1972), p. 91.
132. Gingras (1967), p. 104—05.
133. Velie (1962), p. 125.
134. García-Zamor (1966), pp. 82—83.

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