Andreas Tullberg

For freedom and human rights: Swedish immigrants participation in the Civil War and the making of a Swedish-American identity

Swedish immigration to North America from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century has been the subject of many studies. Many of these have examined the formation of Swedish ethnicity in the United States. The findings suggest that during the 1850s and 1860s a shared Swedish-American identity existed among Swedish immigrants to North America. It was mainly concentrated in the settlements in Illinois and Minnesota. This feeling of kinship among the Swedes was mainly based on language and religion. However, the Swedish identity was more complex than that. Besides the Swedish heritage stood the new American identity which called for an American patriotism which could connect the Swedish group to other immigrants as well as to the native-born Anglo-Americans. It was the meeting between the two that created the Swedish-American identity. Swedish immigrants' participation in the American Civil War 1861-1865 played an important role in the construction of this new identity. It offered the group an opportunity to show its loyalty to its new country and to the Republican Party. Can the study of the Swedish participation in the Civil War help to complement the overall study of Swedish-American identity in the early days of immigration? What motives were given by the soldiers? With whom or what did they identify themselves? What values were particularly important to them?

By the time of the Civil War, about 20,000 Swedes were living in the United States, and some 3,000 fought to preserve the Union. Almost all were volunteers from the settlements in Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Three of these soldiers, two privates and one non-commissioned officer, constitute the material for this article. Obviously, the limited evidence is too small to support any general conclusion, but might be enough to show how such material may be used.

The six motives studied in the article were: (a) religion, (b) patriotism and nationalism, (c) adventure and money, (d) duty and honour, (e) freedom, equality and justice and (f) peer pressure.

The motives are of course not separated but overlap each other. The three Swedes show, however, a genuine belief that freedom was being threatened and had to be protected at all costs. This meant the complete abolition of slavery and that the aristocratic south had to be brought to its knees by force. The patriotism and duty motives were spurred by the freedom, equality and justice motives. The America that they had come to know and all that it stood for was being threatened and had to be defended.

The evidence shows no conflict between the Swedish ethnicity and American patri-

otism. On the contrary, it was important to show that Swedish-Americans were good Americans and furthermore that Swedish-Americans were *especially* good Americans.

Harald Hals The Michelsen government and Sweden

After the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905, feelings were bitter in Sweden. The newspapers – particularly the most conservative ones – made strong accusations against the Norwegians. In the atmosphere of mutual bad feelings the diplomats whom the Norwegian and the Swedish governments dispatched to each other had no easy task. The Norwegian minister in Stockholm, Benjamin Vogt, was given a warm welcome. Nevertheless, he urged the Norwegian government to pursue a conciliatory line towards the Swedes; relations would then hopefully improve.

Ernst Günther, the Swedish minister in Christiania (the former name of the Norwegian capital), received a far warmer welcome. The king and the government assured him that they wished to have good relations with Sweden. Günther himself was of the opinion that since the break-up of the union was an indisputable fact, it was in Sweden's interest to establish a good relationship with Norway. Among other things, he urged the Swedish press to show moderation in their reporting on Norway. Günther had good reason for his concern because in Norway too there were people with vindictive attitudes, especially among the opponents of the Karlstad Treaty in 1905. In particular, the points about the establishment of a neutral zone to replace the border forts gave rise to bitterness, Nevertheless, in the parliamentary elections of 1905 the opponents of the Karlstad Treaty were defeated. The Michelsen government won due to the voters' fear of war with Sweden. The political situation in parliament was nevertheless unclear because the Venstre party was divided. The opponents of the neutral zone also got some leeway because they were supported by most military officers, who thought that the Swedes would not respect this neutral zone if there were a war.

The conflict between the Michelsen government and the opponents of the neutral zone came to a head over the question of what was to be done with the artillery from the disused border forts. Should it be moved to new military installations along the Glåma River, yet still outside the neutral zone? Christian Michelsen and the majority of the government were against building such installations for fear of aggressive Swedish reactions, but the Minister of Defence, Christian Wilhelm Olssøn, disagreed. This led to his resignation on 25 May 1907. Michelsen himself replaced him, becoming Minister of Defence as well as Prime Minister. The Swedes viewed this as a concilia-tory gesture from the Norwegians.

The Michelsen government also tried to achieve as peaceful relations as possible with Sweden in other ways, for example by expanding the consular corps there. Nevertheless, even men who sought amends with Sweden were not completely without suspicious and prejudice. Michelsen declared in a defence debate in parliament on 12 July 1907 that a military attack could not be anticipated from any other country than Sweden. He also supported the efforts of Foreign Minister Løvland to achieve an agreement with the great powers guaranteeing Norwegian integrity. This was a clear

jab at the Swedes. However, this was little known in Sweden when Michelsen resigned as Prime Minister in October 1907. It was his unaggressive attitude after 1905 the Swedish press knew about, and therefore wrote about him in a conciliatory manner.

Johan Stenfeldt

Totalitarianism, revisionism and historical images of the enemy A study of the place of totalitarian theory in Swedish and Danish historical consciousness 1950–2000

The aim of the study is to investigate the role of the totalitarian theory in the historical consciousness of Sweden and Denmark from 1950 to 2000. Since the totalitarian concept was one the most important pro-West ideological weapons during the Cold War, the author finds it reasonable to assume that the concept has been more popular in Denmark, which was a member of NATO during the whole period, than in the non-aligned Sweden. The material for the study contains of about twenty textbooks for high school students, which seem to have played an important role in the historical culture of each country. A complementary theoretical aim of the study is to establish a definition of a particular pedagogical use of history alongside other uses of history established by the Swedish historian Klas-Göran Karlsson. The qualitative study follows a number of themes which are of great importance for the totalitarian theory, such as the comparison of the camp systems in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the secret police forces, other manifestations of terror and so on, but also the stress upon the aspect of continuity in the relation between Lenin and Stalin.

The study is chronological, and the comparison between the two countries shows that the totalitarian concept seems to have grown in importance during the whole period in Denmark and in Danish historical consciousness. The historical consciousness in the non-aligned Sweden seems to follow the more common historiographical pattern; after great popularity in the fifties the theory was subject to more criticism in the sixties and seventies, and then increased in popularity during the eighties and nineties. This result may not seem logical. The author argues that an important explanation for this finding is the different historical relations to Russia and Germany in Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden, *the* historical relation to Russia is very complicated. Russia is the historical Swedish enemy. In contrast, Danish relations with Russia have always been good. This was confirmed when the Danish island of Bornholm was deliberated by the Red Army in 1945–46. The historical relationship with Germany is also quite opposite in the two countries.

Marie Eriksson & Erik Wångmar The way to female succession to the throne in Sweden 1952–1980

During the 28 years from the first motion in the Swedish Parliament right up to 1980, when the fully cognatic right of inheritance came into force, the question of female succession to the throne principally dealt with the monarchy as an institution. A critical - and benevolent - interpretation of the introduction of female succession is that it became easier to accept at a time when the political role of the monarchy had practically come to an end. For the non-socialist parties the demand for female succession was a way of retaining and consolidating the monarchy, but this was done with overtones of equality between women and men. For the Social Democrats and the Communists the resistance to the introduction of female succession was a way of avoiding a reinforcement of the monarchy which in turn might be an obstacle to the future changeover to a republic. It should be pointed out that succession to the throne was a relatively distinct right-left question in the politics. The true picture of the non-socialist actions can be seen as an interplay of normative and institutional starting points. In terms of purpose and means it was a combination of those. The actions of the Social Democrats was characterized by pragmatism. That the party did not force the matter of republic might above all be explained by the fact that the party assumed that national support for the monarchy was strong.

We want to emphasize that it was mostly male politicians in the non-socialist parties who pursued the policy of introducing female succession to the throne. An exception to this was the participation of Ingrid Gärde-Widemar in first motion in the Swedish Parliament in 1952. This could indicate that this was not a question of equality between women and men, which aimed at influencing the normative level, but was to a greater extent a question of the institutional level. Another explanation might have been that the question of female succession to the throne was a constitutional question and for that reason of greater political importance.