

# Summaries Zusammenfassungen

Ove Moberg

### **The Opponents of King Canute the Great at the Battle of Helgeå**

The battle of Helgeå played an important part in the strivings of King Canute the Great to create a North Sea Empire. Sources pertaining to this encounter contain conflicting information, not only about who the opponents of Canute actually were. Research has still not succeeded in clarifying the facts about the struggle at the mouth of the River Helgeå.

This essay deals with one particular problem concerning the battle, that is: who were Eilif and Ulf, who, according to Anglo-Saxon chronicles, were the commanders of the Swedes against Canute's Anglo-Danish army? It has been assumed until now that Eilif was the Viking Chieftain who, along with Torkel the Tall and his brother Heming, attacked England in 1009, and that Ulf was Ulf the brother-in-law of Canute the Great, father of the Danish King Sven Estridsson. The author maintains that this could not have been the case. After Canute's takeover of power in England, Eilif became one of the closest advisers of the King and was present in England at the time of Canute's death in 1035. Canute's brother-in-law Ulf was the son of the Anglo-Saxon Spracling, and his sister was married to the Earl of Godwin. Immediately after the Battle of Helgeå, Ulf was in Roskilde together with his brother-in-law Canute. It appears out of the question that Canute's brother-in-law Ulf and his earl Eilif should have fought against him at Helgeå as the commander of the Swedes.

The author demonstrates that Ulf and Eilif were Swedes, sons of the Swedish Chieftain Ragnvald. They have previously led an anonymous existence, but they played an important part in Sweden in the 1020s. Ragnvald was the brother-in-law of the Norwegian King Olav Trygvesson and was also related to the Norwegian Hlade jarls. When Olav Haraldsson the saintly King had taken power in Norway, a conflict arose between Norway and Sweden. King Olav sent the poet Sigvat Thordsson to Sweden to seek peace between the Scandinavian neighbours. Sigvat the poet reported on his mission in the poem *Austfararvísur*. According to the poet it was only the intervention of Ragnvald's sons Ulf and Eilif which enabled the maintenance of peace.

The Swedish Chieftains Ulf and Eilif Ragnvaldsson, who achieved peace between Sweden and Norway in the beginning of the 1020s must have been Ulf and Eilif of the Anglo-Saxon chronicles, who fought against Canute the Great at Helgeå as Commanders of the Swedish fleet.

Tue Hejlskov Larsen

### **Ist das Siegel Knuds des Heiligen von 1085 eine Fälschung?**

Vor dem Hintergrund von vornehmlich einigen tausend fotokopierten und veröffentlichten Siegeln der Zeit von ungefähr 1000–1250 aus dem ganzen westeuropäischen Raum unternimmt der Verfasser die ersten Schritte zu einer genaueren quellenkritischen Analyse der ältesten Abzeichnung des Siegels von 1085 (das Original ist verschollen). Der Stoff wird unter zwei methodischen Gesichtswinkeln betrachtet: einmal einem typologischen und zum anderen einem angedeuteten funktionalen. Die Resultate der Analyse lassen sich auf der vorhandenen Grundlage folgendermassen zusammenfassen: das Versmass der Legenden und die Befestigung des Siegels könnten auf das Siegel Wilhelms des Eroberers verweisen und das Fehlen einer Gebietsangabe auf das des gleichzeitigen deutschen Königs (Heinrichs IV.), während die Anbringung des Thronbildes auf der Vorderseite gegen einen Einfluss vom Siegel Wilhelms des Eroberers spricht. Der Klappstuhl deutet auf die Siegel der französischen Könige hin oder auf des schottischen Königs Edgar oder auf einige mitteleuropäische geistliche Siegel vom Anfang des 12. Jahrhunderts, wogegen die Verwandtschaftsangabe und der Reiter mit dem Falken (wenn man von dem gekrönten Helm absieht) auf der Rückseite auf Siegeltypen hinzudeuten scheint, die erst gegen Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts auftauchen. Die charakteristische Haltung der rechten Hand auf dem Avers gehört vermutlich erst dem 13. Jahrhundert an, und die Spuren auf dem Revers lassen sich lediglich dem 14. Jahrhundert zuschreiben. Zudem hat die Untersuchung auch eine Reihe von ganz einzigartigen Zügen an dem Siegel aufgedeckt, die zusammengenommen seine Echtheit stark in Frage stellen: die ziemlich unbekanntes Kronenhelme, der flatternde Gewandzipfel an der rechten Schulter auf der Vorderseite, die Gestaltung des Pferdes, der gekrönte Falkenreiter; und schliesslich findet sich kein Gegenstück dazu, dass die thronende Person nur einen Reichsapfel hält, und dass das Siegel eines regierenden Königs das Bild eines Falkenreiters trägt.

Bei der Analyse dieser letzteren Züge trug der funktionale Gesichtswinkel auf entscheidende Weise dazu bei, eine kirchliche Tendenz mit dem Fehlen des Zepfers zu verbinden und hinter dem gekrönten Reiter mit dem Falken kirchlichen Einfluss zu vermuten. Besonders auffällig ist die absurde Kombination der Majestäts- und der Falkenreiterdarstellung auf dem Doppelsiegel, wenn man die Zeichen auf dem Siegel in einem weltlich rechtlichen Zusammenhang sieht.

Eben diese tendenziösen Züge zusammen mit dem jüngsten datierbaren Charakteristikum des Siegels von 1085 könnten eine Erklärung in den Nachrichten darüber finden, dass die Privilegiensammlung der Lunder Kirche um 1300 von Christoph II. bei seinem Einbruch in die Sakristei in Lund vernichtet wurde: das Siegel von 1085 dürfte irgendwann im 14. Jahrhundert im Lunder Domkapitel gefertigt worden sein und kann nicht von einem dänischen König, der seine eigenen Würde und seine kirchlichen Interessen wahrte, anerkannt worden sein.

## Birgit Sawyer

**Saxo – Valdemar – Absalon**

*Gesta Danorum* (*GD*) by Saxo Grammaticus is the main source for the reigns of Valdemar I and his son Knud (1157–82; 1182–1202). According to received opinion he glorified these Danish rulers and gave expression to the ‘official values’ of their time. It has, moreover, been assumed that Saxo fulfilled the intentions of his patron, Archbishop Absalon, whose policies have, consequently, been assumed to be identical with those of Valdemar and Knud. This interpretation of *GD* underlies the prevailing view that the Valdemarean period was a time of ‘harmonious cooperation between church and state’. This is questionable. If *GD* is read as a whole it is clear that Saxo denies any such ‘harmonious cooperation’. He does this by writing on two levels, indirectly questioning what he directly asserts. The writer, as Birgit Strand, drew attention to this sophisticated technique of Saxo and to some of its implications in *Kvinnor och män i Gesta Danorum* (1980).

Some of the contrasts in *GD* may have been unintentional, but many must have been deliberately contrived to express covert criticism or disapproval of people or policies that Saxo could not openly oppose. These included several of the very matters he was expected to support: the legitimacy of Valdemarean rule, hereditary royal succession, ‘national’ unity, and the legal rights of women. The main purpose of this article is to consider Saxo’s attitude to these and related matters, and the discussion has been directed to four questions about central aspects of the received opinion about *GD* and the Age of the Valdemars: 1) Did Saxo glorify Valdemar and Knud? 2) Can Saxo be said to have expressed the ‘official values’ of his time? 3) Were Absalon’s policies the same as Valdemar’s? 4) Did Saxo faithfully fulfil his patron’s intentions?

1) In Saxo’s contemporary history it is Absalon who is represented as the real leader of all diplomatic missions and military expeditions. Valdemar is consistently compared unfavourably with Absalon, and Knud is hardly more than a shadow. Thus, far from glorifying the Valdemars, Saxo offers very unflattering portraits of them, and suspicion is even cast on Valdemar’s father, Knud Lavard. It was no mere *topos*, when, in addressing Valdemar II, Saxo wrote, in the preface to *GD*, that he feared that he had failed to depict his lineage properly.

2) One of the aims of Valdemar and Knud was to concentrate power in their own hands and so to unify Denmark effectively. This policy provoked strong resistance and propaganda was needed to help overcome the opposition. Even if Saxo made some effort to legitimize Valdemar I’s claim to power, at the same time and in subtle ways, he cast doubt on the worthiness of this branch of the royal family. Both Saxo and his contemporary, Sven Aggesen, took pains to conceal the novelty of ‘national’ unity, but Saxo *also* shows that the Danes were deeply divided.

It has been claimed that the main theme of *GD* is the glorification of strong royal power. It is, however, the cooperation between church and king that Saxo glorifies. There are also good reasons for rejecting the view that Saxo supported hereditary kingship: this – relatively new – principle is depicted as alien and is given anything but a glorious past in Denmark’s history.

Other issues of current debate, reflected in *GD*, include changes in the law of inheritance and marriage. By writing on two levels Saxo provided a historical basis for

the church demands for female consent to marriage and for the inheritance rights of women, but, at the same time, he opposes both.

3) We cannot assume that Absalon's intentions corresponded to those of the Valdemars in all respects. That was certainly the impression Absalon wished to give. Saxo describes many disputes between Archbishop and King, not least over Denmark's relations with Germany. Whatever reality lies behind this, it is clear that *GD* largely gives Absalon's view of events as a counter to the royal version reflected by Sven Aggesen.

4) Since Saxo questions or criticizes several policies that we would expect Absalon to have supported, it appears that he double-crossed his patron. It can also be shown that Saxo is distancing himself from Absalon (who died before the work was finished) and indirectly criticizes him, e.g. by praising his successor Andreas Sunesen for exactly those qualities that Absalon himself lacked.

– It is difficult to regard Saxo as representing a single group or party: we ought to see him as a man of independent ideas who was nevertheless dependent on patrons for support. His work had to be acceptable to both the secular and the ecclesiastical powers and in a rapidly changing world he had to ride several horses at the same time.

Lars-Olof Larsson

## The Distribution of Land Ownership in Sweden during the Reign of Gustav Vasa

Comprehensive fiscal records concerning the reconstruction of the Swedish state administration by Gustav Vasa have been preserved for posterity. The bailiff's accounts alone form an important component concerning no less the King's own reign from around 1530 onwards.

One very central matter which can be illuminated by these records is that of the distribution of land ownership in the Swedish realm. This, in turn, provides a very solid foundation for significant conclusions about social structures and about the basis of income of the Crown, the Church and the privileged classes, who were exempted from land dues to the Crown at the beginning of the Vasa age. Hans Forssell's pioneering work *A Domestic History of Sweden from Gustav the First* (1869) was the first to treat and quantify these records in a way which made possible at least a broader view of the situation in 1560. It also provided the basis for conclusions on the extent and significance of the reduction of the Church.

The records presented were however scarcely employed to the extent which might have been expected. Not until Eli Heckscher released the first part of his great work *An Economic History of Sweden from Gustav Vasa* for publishing in 1935 were Forssell's statistical records employed to calculate lucid figures on the distribution of land in Sweden at the end of the Middle Ages (1520) and at the time of Gustav Vasa's death in 1560. Those figures which were presented by Heckscher have never been put in question since. They have been included in practically all works which give an oversight of the history of the 1500s.

This study has been devoted above all to a critical examination of Heckscher's statistics on the distribution of land ownership on the Swedish mainland during the reign of Gustav Vasa, and to an analysis of regional patterns of land ownership. To conclude, some critical views have been formulated about the way comparisons are often made between the situation during the 1500s and that of later periods of Swedish history.

Heckscher's figures on the distribution of land ownership on the Swedish mainland are expressed in percentages as follows (taxable land = the land owned by freeholders):

	Taxable Land	The Crown	The Church	The Privileged Classes
1520	52.4	5.6	21.2	20.7
1560	50.1	28.5	–	21.4

For the realm as a whole, i.e. including the Finnish part of the realm, Heckscher's figures are as follows:

	Taxable Land	The Crown	The Church	The Privileged Classes
1520	66.9	3.9	15.1	14.1
1560	65.4	20.0	–	14.6

In the American edition of Heckscher's *Swedish Work and Life* (1954) the author has adjusted these figures to some extent, although without justifying the alterations. An examination of Heckscher's methods shows that his figures for both 1520 and 1560 are based upon a summary of the number of farms in 1560, calculated in the Royal Counting House. This signifies that Heckscher presumed all farms to be included in the summary. That this was not the case is apparent from primary fiscal sources consisting of land records for the individual bailiwicks.

Several categories of farms have been repeatedly overlooked here: residential estates of the nobility, the principal estates of the Church and the Crown as well as the vicarages of the parish priests. As a consequence, the properties of both the church and the nobility and to some extent of the Crown are reproduced in Heckscher's statistics in insufficient numbers.

In Heckscher's calculation of the distribution of land ownership in 1520 is also based on the 1560 summary. The assumption here is that the number of estates has not changed at all between the two dates. Changes in land ownership, meanwhile, are explained as having principally been caused by the transfer of the Church lands of the Crown and to some extent to the privileged classes. In actual fact the whole reign of Gustav Vasa was marked by a broad colonisation, whereby several thousand new estates were opened and taxed.

In this investigation the figures for 1520 have been derived from the oldest parts of the state land records instead. It is possible to demonstrate the extent of colonisation by comparing these to the situation in 1560. It can further be demonstrated that this colonisation resulted in new Crown and taxable estates.

The combined results of this re-examination of Heckscher's statistics gives quite different figures for the distribution of land ownership, especially for 1520. On the actual Swedish mainland this can be determined as follows, expressed in percentages:

	Taxable Land	The Crown	The Church	The Privileged Classes
1520	45	6.1	24.6	24.3
1560	47.2	30.5	–	22.3

For the realm in its entirety the following distribution is determined:

	Taxable Land	The Crown	The Church	The Privileged Classes
1520	61.8	3.5	17.4	17.3
1560	62.5	21.2	–	16.2

Very great regional differences were shown in the ownership of land meanwhile. Taxable lands were completely predominant in Finland (apart from the most south-westerly part), in the Northern Regions (Norrland) and the Swedish Dales (Dalar-na). This was also the case in the extremities of Uppland, Västmanland, Värmland and Dalsland. In other East-Central (Svea) and West-Central (Gothic) Regions the proportion of taxable lands mostly made up less than 30 %, in Östergötland and Södermanland even less than 20 %.

The nobility as a land-owning class (owning land exempt from dues to the Crown) broadly presents a contrasting picture to taxable land. In the whole of Norrland there were only two exempted estates and the number was exceptionally low, even

in large parts of Finland and of the Dales (Dalarna). In the West-Central (Gothic) Regions and Södermanland on the other hand, they made up a strikingly large proportion, usually up to 35–40%.

The proportion of Church land was generally high in approximately the same regions as exempted land, but was distributed more evenly. Where diocesan capitals and monasteries were concerned, the proportion was nonetheless high. This was particularly the case in Östergötland, where a good 40% of the land was owned by the Church.

The proportion of land owned by the Crown at the end of the Middle Ages was remarkably low and furthermore had a very uneven distribution. The Crown owned no land in large areas of the realm, while there were strikingly local concentrations with a very clear pattern in other parts. These were usually located near mediaeval castles owned by the Crown, in Stockholm, Kalmar, Nyköping, etc.

By way of conclusion, the comparisons which are all too often and all too carelessly made between the distribution of land ownership during the era of Gustav Vasa, and those figures which Heckscher has produced for 1654 and 1700, are criticised here. In several respects the figures are not comparable. The figures for 1654 do not concern land ownership: they concern that proportion of the homesteads of the realm which paid permanent taxes, amongst other things, to the Crown and the nobility respectively. The figures for 1700 furthermore concern a considerably larger geographical area (including Scania, Blekinge, Halland, Bohus County, etc.), where the newly arisen regional ownership structure had been quite special.



Harald Gustafsson

**Family Formation and Means of Subsistence –  
Legislation and Reality in Eighteenth-Century Iceland**

It is considered typical of old European agrarian societies that there was a very strong bond between family formation and production. The formation of a new family was only permitted if it was considered to possess the economic means to sustain itself. Iceland has been held up as an unusually clean example of this. From 1824 it was prohibited for persons who were all too poor to marry. Much suggests, however, that legal hindrances to certain marriages of this nature had already been applied at an earlier date. Two occasions between 1766 and 1776, when the introduction of such legislation were discussed, are examined here.

The initiative to legislate against the marriage of paupers came from Icelandic officials. These officials were often great landowners and held the traditional views of Icelandic landowners. The labour force should be bound to agriculture on the basis of annual employment. The emergence of households with insufficient land which sustained themselves through fishery were a threat to the prevailing social and economic order, which was based upon land ownership and stock-raising.

Ranged against the older perspective was the prevailing economic doctrine which emphasises the value of increases in population. Leading officials in Copenhagen's central administration as well as a small group of officials in Iceland wished to facilitate the establishment of households in order to stimulate economic growth in this way. Those with more traditionally Icelandic views of family formation could not press through the legislation they desired as long as this 'populationism' was dominant amongst leading officials in Copenhagen. The latter and their few Icelandic supporters could not either, however, make measures function in practice for increasing the frequency of marriages – measures such as tax relief for newly-weds. It was the prerogative of the conservative Icelandic officials to carry out decisions at the local level. In a way which was typical of the period, a conflict had appeared between reformist powers of state and a local elite which sought to preserve society in its existing form.

Even if a ban on paupers' marriages did not materialise during the seventeen hundreds, sources which have been examined here indicate that a ban was sometimes applied by local authorities. It appears, for example, that a number of priests considered that the refusal of wedlock to the poor contradicted "the word of God and religion". Other priests appear to have applied such a ban meanwhile. The strong bond between family, household and farm could obviously be maintained irrespective of what the law said, and it is doubtful whether the legislated ban of 1824 actually changed much of local reality.

Seved Johnson

### Swedish Foreign Policy in 1811–1814

The Tilsit agreement of 1807 between Alexander and Napoleon had involved for Sweden's part the exceptionally painful loss of Finland. A centuries-old Swedish conception of Russia as the arch-enemy was reinforced. The defeat fed feelings of hate and revenge. In this situation the Swedish *riksdag* (Diet) took the provocative step of electing the French Marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte as the successor to the Swedish throne, in the clearly expressed hope that Bernadotte would claim vengeance and retake the lost half of the realm with French aid. It proved to be the case, however, that the new successor to the throne did not share the emotions of his contemporaries, nor their coloured views, restricted as these were to political and military circumstances in the North of Europe. Carl Johan evaluated the problem of Finland from a strikingly detached military and political perspective. To him Finland represented a "legacy of war and misfortune". By way of contrast, Norway caught his interest. The thought of unifying the Scandinavian peninsula in one realm was not a new one. The Crown Prince was able to align with ambitions of Swedish foreign policy, which had deep roots in tradition. He soon adopted them. The realisation of these ambitions was to be the outstanding feature of his statecraft. What was new and original in this was that the acquisition of Norway would be negotiated with Russia and not with France. Napoleon had met Carl Johan's enquiries in Paris on the matter of Norway with cold indifference, although the enquiries were undoubtedly not seriously meant. Sweden ought to look to the East. Perhaps the greatest difficulty for the Crown Prince consisted of winning over a hostile domestic opinion to a radical transformation of traditional Swedish foreign policy.

In these matters Napoleon unexpectedly played into his hands when French troops occupied Swedish Pomerania without a declaration of war in January 1812. This occupation had the immediate consequence that negotiations for an alliance were taken up by Sweden with both Russia and Great Britain. These gave quick results in St. Petersburg. Russia found herself in a very pressed situation. The deployment of the French army was complete. Alexander was now particularly concerned to come to some form of agreement with Sweden and with the heir to the Swedish throne – who was highly regarded militarily. Alexander sought to protect himself against revanchist actions by Sweden. On the 5 April 1812 a treaty was signed in St. Petersburg. The main content of the treaty was that Sweden would acquire Norway with Russian help, whereafter an allied Russo-Swedish army would act against the French in the North of Germany. In March 1813 the British Government was also to accede in principle to this agreement on Swedish participation in the war. The provision was to become a stumbling block, however, which Alexander and Carl Johan were to trip over again and again. It led the Tsar to regret his pledge from time to time, and strained relations between the two Princes to breaking point in the spring of 1813.

When the French attack on Russia materialised in the summer of 1812 revealing its awesome force, it soon proved impossible for Alexander to earmark troops for a Swedish conquest of Norway, the basic precondition for a Swedish participation in the war. It became necessary to revise the terms of the alliance between the two

nations. At the end of August the Tsar and the Swedish Crown Prince met at Åbo in Finland. The meeting resulted in both written and verbal agreements which could no more be realised than the previous ones. Continued French military successes and the fall of Moscow ruled out operations on peripheral fronts. In the autumn of 1812 the military and political situation changed with the retreat of the French forces. As the Russian armies approached Central Europe Sweden became a strategic back-water. The primary aim of the Tsar's diplomacy was now to gather the European powers for the final encounter with Napoleon. Not only Prussia and Austria came under Alexander's consideration, but also Denmark. Where Denmark was concerned Swedish and Russian interests were heading for a collision. Right up until the Trachenberg meeting of July 1813 these interests disturbed and discomforted Russo-Swedish relations. The military successes of Napoleon in the spring of 1813 and the armistice of Pläswitz compelled Carl Johan to back down in what was for him the principal issue, that of Norway. The defeat of Napoleon had been given priority. Carl Johan is believed to have been the author of the operational plans which were drawn up at Trachenberg, and which were to bring about the fall of the Napoleonic Empire in less than one year.

As the influence of Austria, Britain and Prussia increased in Allied Councils, the prospects for Carl Johan of achieving his primary objective in foreign policy diminished. After Leipzig therefore, Carl Johan resolutely seized the initiative, and reserved a contingent of the Northern army for an encounter with Denmark on Swedish conditions. After various military and diplomatic developments Denmark was compelled in the new year of 1814 to cede Norway to Sweden. This could presumably not have taken place without Alexander's firmness in favour of Sweden as his oldest partner in the alliance. On the other hand, relations worsened with two of the major powers of the coalition, Austria and Britain. Certainly Alexander supported Carl Johan as long as he could, but the Tsar scarcely served Carl Johan's cause when he proposed him as a suitable candidate for the position of Head of State of France. In both Åbo and Leipzig Alexander and Carl Johan had discussed issues concerning the organisation and arrangement of post-Napoleonic France, and these issues had probably occupied the political imagination of the former French Marshal for some time. The extent to which they may have influenced his military and political actions evades serious analysis, however. The Swedish Crown Prince was successful in his policy to the extent that he won Norway for Sweden. He placed Sweden on the right side in the gigantic struggle between the Russia of Alexander and the France of Napoleon in the spring of 1812. He could have surrendered to an insistent Swedish domestic opinion, joined his forces with Napoleon's, ordered a revanchist Swedish campaign against Russia across Finland and perhaps changed the course of world history. What Carl Johan declined to do at that time was never to leave Alexander's mind despite political and military reverses which were often arduous. Carl Johan's contribution was certainly quite passive but probably no less decisive for Russia. The friendly relations which were established between the two Nordic Princes at Åbo and which were confirmed in Trachenberg, Leipzig and Paris could not be disrupted seriously by any power or circumstance. They constituted a unique aspect of the history of Swedish-Russian relations, which were otherwise ridden with centuries of conflict.

Erland Kleen

### **The Quartet which failed. Scandinavia in the Face of Hitler's Offer of a Non-Aggression Pact in the Spring of 1939**

It is usual to regard Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact to the Nordic States of the 28 April 1939 as a coherent part of German propaganda against President Roosevelt, after his call for peace of a few weeks before – a kind of “diplomatic double-dealing for the souls of the neutrals”, to borrow Max Jakobson's expression. The matter was interpreted in this way in Scandinavia and other parts of the world.

Berlin must have counted on the German offer producing different reactions in the Nordic countries and on divergent answers resulting from these. The Germans were primarily concerned with procuring a quick answer, however, irrespective of how it turned out. When the Nordic countries showed their desire to thoroughly examine possibilities of a common response, leading in turn to drawn-out negotiations both internally and between the four governments, this caused great irritation amongst the Germans concerned. Primary sources give the impression that Berlin attached less and less attention to the direction the answers might take in the end; the major point was that the answers should be given with the least delay, so that they might be exploited in German propaganda. Even a negative answer from all four could of course easily have been re-interpreted by the German Propaganda Ministry as demonstrating that the Nordic States had nothing to fear from Hitler and consequently regarded a non-aggression pact as unnecessary. The matter was complicated when one answered yes and three no, but Berlin was even able to portray this as correcting Roosevelt.

The reactions of the Nordic States to the German offer are not easy to interpret. In spite of the propaganda aspects of the German initiative in a matter of some substance to the foreign policies of the Nordic countries, the inherent weaknesses of Nordic concord were revealed at a stroke. Denmark was allowed to go her own way, despite consistent efforts to win Nordic understanding for her exposed position. Finland was at first inclined to follow the line taken by Denmark.

After thinking more closely, however, she decided to mark her loyalty to her Swedish partner and join up with her. This was particularly important in respect of the issue of Åland which was current just then. Norway was indifferent from the beginning, since she did not feel threatened by Germany. Meanwhile Sweden considered that neutrality combined with military readiness was a better protection against eventual Great Power conflicts than separate non-aggression pacts. In short: it was geographical position rather than feeling for Nordic identity which finally determined the response of each country.

When it was decided in the final stages to mark a certain Nordic solidarity through the Swedish-Norwegian-Finnish declaration of loyalty to Denmark it soon transpired, ironically enough, that this created surprise and irritation in Berlin, far from supporting Denmark in her negotiations with Germany. The confusion was not reduced in Germany when the laboured arguments of the Nordic governments were presented to Germany bearing witness to a race between the Nordic Ministers to present their answers.

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The four Foreign Ministers, Erkko, Koht, Munch and Sandler soon had other things to think about. The Second World War loomed on the horizon; the Nazi-Soviet Pact one week before the outbreak of war changed the whole basis of the political and military situation in the Baltic. The Soviet attack on Finland at the beginning of December compelled the resignation of Sandler and Erkko. Before a year had passed since the announcement of Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact to the Nordic States, German troops marched in and occupied the only country, Denmark, which had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Simultaneously the Germans attacked another of the four countries, Norway, whose Foreign Minister had declared but one year before that "I do not believe that Germany has any kind of plans for aggression against Norway".

Klaus Misgeld

## **Das Friedensmanifest der nordischen Arbeiterbewegung 1951. Ein Dokument aus der Zeit des Koreakrieges**

Entstehung, Inhalt und Intention des Friedensmanifestes der nordischen Arbeiterbewegung (26.1.1951), in dem Nordkorea, die Volksrepublik China und der „internationale Kommunismus“ scharf kritisiert und eine Stärkung der Vereinten Nationen gefordert werden, werden in dem vorliegenden Aufsatz vor allem aus schwedischer Perspektive und unter der Rücksicht der sozialdemokratischen Regierungspartei Schwedens betrachtet. Drei Aspekte sollen besonders festgehalten werden:

1. Das Manifest bot der schwedischen Arbeiterbewegung die Gelegenheit, Gemeinsamkeit mit den übrigen skandinavischen Ländern zu betonen, auch was die „Verteidigung der Demokratie“ betraf und obwohl die beiden anderen skandinavischen Staaten Mitglieder des westlichen Militärbündnisses waren (und sind). Es bot weiterhin Gelegenheit, die Zusammengehörigkeit mit „den freien Nationen . . . des Westens“ zu unterstreichen. So konnte man auch einer befürchteten Isolierung – innerhalb der UNO und auch im Verhältnis zu Westeuropa – entgegenwirken, bei Beibehaltung der schwedischen Aussenpolitik der Bündnislosigkeit. Man nutzte diese Möglichkeit aus, sowohl in der Debatte im eigenen Land wie auch international, u. a. im Zusammenhang mit der Neuorganisation der Sozialistischen Internationale (1951). Im letztgenannten Zusammenhang profilierte sich die schwedische Sozialdemokratie in besonderem Masse.

2. Schweden war durch das Weltfriedenskomitee und den sog. Stockholmer Appell (1950) auf eine Weise ins internationale ‚Gerade‘ geraten, wie es der Regierungspartei wenig behagte, da man die Aktivitäten des Komitees, dessen Appell Anfang 1951 erneuert werden sollte, als kommunistisches Propagandastück beurteilte. In Dänemark und Norwegen verspürte man zwar ein noch stärkeres Bedürfnis für Gegenaktionen gegen die Kommunisten, aber auch in Sweden wollte man seitens der Sozialdemokratie den kommunistischen Initiativen begegnen und für die öffentliche Meinung des Landes unterstreichen, dass man sich nicht scheute, Stellung zu nehmen in der Frage, wer Angreifer, wer Friedensstörer (in Korea) sei, und dass man auch bereit dazu war, Wege anzugeben, wie der Friede gewonnen werden könnte.

Ausserdem erhielt man so gleichzeitig Gelegenheit, Vorschläge zu machen, wie die grossen internationalen Probleme gelöst werden sollten, um einen dauernden Frieden zu sichern und den Vormarsch der kommunistischen „Diktaturen“ zu beenden. Hier kamen die Entwicklungsländer, Deutschland, Österreich und wechselseitige Garantien der verschiedenen Militärpakte ins Blickfeld, neben der notwendigen Stärkung der UNO und ihrer Schiedsgerichtbarkeit, der Abrüstung und der Abschaffung von Atomwaffen – alles Punkte, die in dem Manifest aufgerechnet werden.

3. Das Manifest, seine Entstehungsgeschichte und sein Inhalt demonstrieren ebenfalls, vor welche grundlegenden Schwierigkeiten sozialistische bzw. sozialdemokratische Parteien gestellt werden können, vor allem wenn sie die Regierung tragen. Anders formuliert: Je stärker eine Arbeiterpartei im eigenen Lande wird, desto weniger wird sie geneigt sein, sich durch internationale Beschlüsse und Resolutionen binden zu lassen, auch nicht durch die der eigenen Internationale, und

dies, obwohl die Partei von Charakter und Programm her ‚internationalistisch‘ sein sollte, Teil einer internationalen Bewegung. Man könnte hier von einem internationalen Wachstumsparadox der Arbeiterbewegung sprechen und dies mit zahlreichen Beispielen und Dokumenten der nordischen Arbeiterbewegung illustrieren.

Zweifellos konnten die Forderung einerseits, Rücksicht auf die ‚internationale Meinung‘ zu nehmen, sich als ‚Internationalisten‘ zu gebärden, und die Aufgabe andererseits, als Regierungspartei in Verantwortung vor der eigenen Nation zu handeln und die Politik des eigenen Staates zu führen, zu Komplikationen führen.

In diesem Fall führte der von den Norwegern, aber auch Dänen ausgeübte Druck auf die schwedische Partei, offensichtlich in Übereinstimmung mit der ‚öffentlichen Meinung‘ auch in Schweden, zu einer recht weitgehenden Stellungnahme. Allerdings lässt sich das Manifest auch so deuten, dass man auf diese Weise noch weiter gehende Forderungen der Norweger entschärfen konnte. Formulierungen des Manifests wie „Aggressionshandlungen“ der „Pekinger Regierung“ müssen wohl in diesem Zusammenhang gesehen werden. In der UNO hatte man sich ja zur gleichen Zeit geweigert, solche Formulierungen zu akzeptieren, da die Regierung befürchtete, dass Schweden in Sanktionsaktionen der Vereinten Nationen gegen China einbezogen werden könnte. Diese Zurückhaltung in der UNO wurde nicht einmal von allen Mitgliedern der sozialdemokratischen Fraktion, noch weniger aber vom grösseren Teil der bürgerlichen Opposition (lib. u. kons.) gebilligt. Die Kritiker forderten u. a. mehr Solidarität mit der UNO und konnten hier schliesslich auch auf den Text des Manifests verweisen.

Parteiführung und Regierung hatten von der Sache her gesehen wohl kaum Einwände gegen Formulierungen, in denen der „aggressive Kommunismus“ als der eigentliche Friedensstörer bezeichnet wird, auch wenn man in der UNO aus anderen Gründen unterliess, entsprechende Resolutionen zu unterzeichnen. „Die Kommunisten sind eine Gefahr für den Frieden“, formulierte auch der Parteivorsitzende und Regierungschef Tage Erlander im Reichstag anlässlich einer Korea-debatte (7.2.1951).

Es gibt so einerseits Gründe für die Vermutung, dass man in der Führung der SAP zwar nicht sehr zufrieden war mit einigen Formulierungen des Manifests, dass man diese andererseits aber doch als Ausdruck einer balancierenden Auffassung betrachtete, unter Berücksichtigung von Umständen und Situation. Auf weitere Sicht hin war ja die Unterstützung der UNO, ihrer Friedensbemühungen und ihrer Schiedsrichterrolle von grösserer Bedeutung. Der Wille, Demokratie, Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit zu verteidigen, sollte kombiniert werden mit einer gesteigerten Bereitschaft zur internationalen Zusammenarbeit. Hier spricht auch ein relativ starker Optimismus aus den Formulierungen des Manifests, trotz aller kompromissbetonten Formulierungen, die dem Bedürfnis entsprangen, die Forderungen eines ‚sozialistischen Internationalismus‘ mit den Erfordernissen der schwedischen Aussenpolitik zu vereinen, vor dem Hintergrund von Kaltem Krieg und Koreakonflikt. Darauf lief die Botschaft des Manifestes hinaus: Die Konflikte in der Welt lassen sich lösen, auf friedlichem Weg, in einer „freien und offenen Welt“, mit „guten Verbindungen zwischen den Völkern“.

Wilhelm Agrell

**Changes in Military Strategy and Swedish-Soviet conflicts  
in the Baltic Area after 1945**

The purpose of this article is to discuss the nature of military incidents between Sweden and the Soviet Union in the early 1950s and early 1980s against the background of changes in the strategic importance of the Baltic area.

The term strategic importance can be used either in an objective or in a subjective meaning. For the analysis of a historical process the main interest is to note how different actors have perceived the importance of a specific area and how these perceptions have changed. The problem is often lack of sources, and this is also the case with Soviet perceptions of the Baltic. One possible method to investigate these is to analyze the changes in the composition of the Soviet armed forces and first of all of the naval forces. These changes indicate that during the early post-war period, the Baltic area was regarded as first of all a defensive barrier, but that the Baltic in the 1960s and 70s becomes first of all a rear area in a global maritime strategy.

A number of military incidents occurred between Sweden and the Soviet Union in the late 40s and early 50s culminating in the downing of two Swedish aircrafts in 1952. Considerable efforts were made in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Defence Staff to analyze the Soviet motives behind the incidents. The same questions reappeared after a number of Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish waters in the early 80s. The main difference between the incidents in the 50s and the submarine incursions is the dislocation and duration of the activity. While the downing of the Swedish planes obviously was a consequence of the Soviet perception of security zones in the eastern Baltic, the submarine operations into Swedish territorial waters indicate far more ambitious security interests that might be explained by changes in the Soviet naval strategy and the Soviet perception of the strategic importance of the Baltic area.



Lars Niléhn

### **The Owl of Minerva – Flying in the Dusk? Thoughts about history in the 1960's**

It is a well-known fact that the theoretical and methodical discussion within history as an academic discipline in Sweden grew immensely more lively in the 1960's than it had been before. After earlier long conflicts, a consensus may finally be said to have been established in 1960 or thereabouts. The dominating principle of this consensus was positivism: research was undertaken in a vein of empiricism and source criticism. If we take the concept of family likeness (from Wittgenstein), historical research was similar to research in other fields, such as in natural science. Previously, different schools of history had been competitive, but it had nevertheless proven possible to maintain some form of discussion in the shape of a dialogue.

In the 1960's debate two traits dominated history in Sweden: firstly, how to interpret explanation. Were historical explanations patterned on the hypothetical-deductive model, as in Popper or Hempel? No conclusion resulted from this. Secondly, how could the methods of the social sciences be used or assimilated?

Interest in the social sciences may be traced primarily to the general intellectual climate in Sweden of the day. It may not, as is usually suggested, be traced to the internal problems of the academic field of history. During the 1960's the social sciences attracted a great deal of interest from the Swedish state under Social Democratic government. The social sciences had furthermore established an identity of their own. In general cultural debate in the leading newspapers a very distinct swing was noticeable between 1960 and 1970 towards social questions and the current problems of the day. The government had however already placed priority on the social sciences long before that.

A change in historical research can be discerned during these turbulent years. Firstly there was a clear shift of interest towards fields and subjects dealing with the problems of the twentieth century. In addition to this, there was a noticeable emphasis on quantitative and social approaches. Finally, interest in the methods and theories of social science became almost overwhelming.

A basic question remains, however, whether this process was part of a fundamental change in the way Swedish historians think and work – a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense. In spite of tendencies to the contrary, it seems as if historians were (and are) very anxious to maintain their identity as representatives of an idiographic field of research. This should not be allowed to disguise numerous instances of Swedish historians seeking new directions in their intellectual view of the world nonetheless. Examples of their interests are marxism, heremeneutics and critical theory, as well as a more recent interest in the West German "Bielefeld school" as it is known.

By and large positivism is still the dominating trait in Swedish historiography. If anything it has been heavily re-inforced by influences from the social sciences. The reaction to the Bielefeld school (which was influenced by critical theory) was significant in this respect. Attention was only drawn to it in Sweden at a late stage, comparatively later than what happened to the basically positivist "Fischer school" of West Germany in the 1960's. Both schools may be said to be revisionist but revisionism belonged to the positivist breakthrough in Sweden as early as in the 1920's.

When, to paraphrase Hegel, the question is put whether the owl of Minerva has flown in the dusk; i.e., if the self-consciousness of the epoch has matured to an imminent end, it may be answered that, although many important theoretical as well as historiographical works were published in the mid-1960's – which could be interpreted as a means of strengthening a stagnating paradigm – this was really no sign of a waning of the theory. Instead, in spite of tendencies to the contrary, it has been re-inforced, maybe even rejuvenated, and still dominates the field of history in Sweden.

Hans Gillingstam

**The identification of the skeletons in Magnus "ladulås" Grave  
in the Riddarholm Church**

In this article the author criticizes the presentation by Ola Kyhlberg in Scandia No 2, 1984 of his efforts to identify some skeletons. According to annotations from the 16th century king Valdemar was buried in the nunnery of Vreta and his niece Rikissa in the nunnery of St. Clara in Stockholm, not in the Riddarholm church, and according to king Valdemar's brother the bishop Bengt's will this bishop was buried in the cathedral of Linköping, not in the Riddarholm church.

Ola Kyhlberg

**Archeological Analysis and Historic Interpretation.  
A reply to Hans Gillingstam**

The article discusses different theoretical oppositions that are found in scholarship: quality versus quantity, analysis versus interpretation, etc. It criticizes in Hans Gillingstam the absence of a discussion of the archeological-methodological argument. In this connection it also criticizes the credence historians give to written sources above other, non-written source material. The argumentation for an identification of Valdemar Birgersson (died 1302) as well as Queen Helvig (died ca. 1325) and Rikissa Magnusdotter (died ca. 1350) is insisted upon.

In order to be effective and authoritative, the suggestions that are put forward for historical hypotheses and interpretations must be judged according to the method and analysis of the archeological source material, on which it will stand or fall.