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Zeichen und Körper

Seit mehreren Jahren ist eine wesentliche Seite des europäischen Hochmittelalters mehr oder weniger unbeachtet geblieben.

Besonders innerhalb des *Rechtssektors*, wo die Forschung ihr Augenmerk hauptsächlich auf die schriftlich überlieferten Urkunden aus einer nahezu analphabetischen Welt richtet, geht man in aller Regel von der stillen Voraussetzung aus, das im Hochmittelalter *das Geschriebene die entscheidende Kommunikationssprache war*. Es erhebt sich die Frage, ob das Hochmittelalter selbst die Sache so betrachtet hat?

Namentlich, falls man die bestimmende Funktion der Zeremonie in Verbindung mit der Eigentumsübertragung berücksichtigt, nämlich der Verleihungszeremonie.

Als Folge hiervon nehmen wir in der vorliegenden Forschungsskizze das rechtlich gesehen wichtigste Ritual, *corporalis investitura*, näher in Augenschein. Denn genau in dessen Rahmen übertrug der dominus das Lehen dem Vasallen persönlich, indem er ihm symbolisch ein Zeichen überreichte (z.B. eine Fahne oder ein Schwert). Auf dem Hintergrund einerseits des „Sachsenspiegels“, andererseits des einzigartigen Investiturberichts des Placidus von Nonantula stellen wir die Hypothese auf, dass alle diese verschiedenen Zeichen für verschiedene Rechte standen. Diese These unterziehen wir mittels einer vorläufigen Untersuchung zweier Lehenszeichen, nämlich der Fahne und des Schwertes, einer näheren Prüfung, welche sich nur auf das hochmittelalterliche Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation erstreckt und die wichtigsten näher beschriebenen Fahnen und Schwertlehensübertragungen umfasst, unterstützt die aufgestellte Hypothese; Inhalt des Schwertzeichens scheint die Formel „*plenam iurisdictionem*“ zu sein, während als Inhalt des Fahnenzeichens „*cum omni iure – concedere*“ oder „*conferre*“ angenommen wird.

Weiterhin deuten wir an, dass diese Zeicheninhalte, welche in eine Bedeutungshierarchie einzugehen scheinen, eng mit dem Begriff der Regalien verknüpft waren, so wie dieser Begriff beim Roncalischen Treffen von 1158 definiert worden war. Vermutlich stellten die Lehenszeichen einen sichtbaren Rechtskodex dar, welchen der königliche Machtapparat in einer Welt benötigte, die nicht des Schreibens und Lesens kundig war.

Setzt man diesen rituell definierten Lehnsrechtskodex in Zusammenhang mit dem im Hochmittelalter beginnenden Gebrauch von Diplomen als Rechtsdokumenten, so werden vor allen Dingen die weltlichen, Personen darstellenden Diplomsiegel in ein neues Licht gebracht. Denn eben diese sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass die auf ihnen abgebildeten Personen entweder stehen oder sitzen und dabei eine Fahne oder ein Schwert o. dgl. in der Hand halten. Auf der Grundlage u.a. der Siegel Heinrichs des Löwen aus der Zeit vor und nach seines Absetzung (1180) wird der Schluss gezogen, dass die weltlichen, Personen darstellenden Siegelzeichen Lehnsrechtszeichen abbilden. Und damit übernehmen die Siegelzeichen die Rolle des entscheidenden Verbindungsgliedes zwischen der existierenden rechtlichen Belehungszeremonie und dem neuen Medium: der geschriebenen Urkunde; und damit auch die Rolle als wichtigste Quelle für die Organisation des Lehenswesens.

Das Ritual, d.h. der menschliche Körper und die mit ihm verbundenen Zeichen, waren vermutlich in einem wesentlichen Teil des Hochmittelalters *die einzige sichere Kommunikationssprache rechtlicher Art*.

Nur eine grundlegende künftige Untersuchung hauptsächlich der Diplomsiegel,

Belehnungsdiplome, Lehensrechtsbücher und Berichte über Belehnungen wird entscheiden können, wie fest und differenziert diese visuelle Kommunikationsprache gewesen ist.

Tom Ericsson

Between Capital and Labor. Shopkeepers in Sweden, 1870–1915

The introduction of freedom of trade in Sweden during the middle of the 19th century brought extensive changes to small business. Until then traditional retailing had been encased in strict rules and regulations. From the mid-1860s on almost anybody was free to carry on trade as long as he was economically able to do so. The number of shopkeepers rose considerably from 1870 to the First World War. Alongside traditional retailing grew up a great variety of forms of trade that gave rise to new competitive conditions. Among the advocates of traditional retailing these latter, chiefly house-to-house peddling and consumer cooperatives, were seen as an economic threat. During the last decade of the 19th century, in connection with the building of Sweden's General Trade Association, the advocates of retail trade already began to conduct an active policy to limit the extent and spread of house-to-house peddling and consumer cooperatives.

The shopkeepers' fear of these two forms of trade was often considerably exaggerated. In many cases the economic arguments were subordinated to ideological positions. What was essential, however, was that the shopkeepers felt themselves threatened by the growing consumer cooperatives and house-to-house peddling, and their ideas and attitudes were influenced by their sense of a threat, regardless of whether the economic threat was real or not.

In the shopkeepers' world view house-to-house peddling and consumer cooperatives were alien forms of trade. They were thus unacceptable in the retailers' eyes. The latter identified house-to-house peddling with foreign business interests, and Jews above all came to be a target for the shopkeepers' discontentment. Consumer cooperatives were seen as an instrument in the service of socialism, where the final goal was to take over both traditional retail trade and power in society.

In their views on house-to-house peddling and consumer cooperatives Swedish shopkeepers stood for an ideology which had its counterpart on the European continent. An ideology which was characterized by nationalism and anti-Semitism.

Thorsten Nybom

On the Question of Science as Ideology

In the past few years a discussion has taken place both within and without social and human sciences in which the participants seem to have wanted above all to articulate the confusion in their own scientific ideology and theory. At times this "crisis debate" has been characterized by such intensity and confusion that it resembled a kind of social group therapy of science.

Some of the debate's effects have certainly been positive. The debate has forced social scientists and humanists to reflect about and at times also articulate their theoretical and ideological scientific assumptions, and for that reason the future scholarly debate hopefully can be conducted with greater stringency and rationality.

But if the "crisis" and the crisis debate has had such positive effects, it has also meant that other "crisis immanent" reactions have come to the surface. First, one group clearly uses the crisis in order to return to the "true faith", that is, to turn scholarship back to already obsolete theoretical and practical scientific positions. For this group the question of "scientificness" is limited to meeting satisfactorily certain clearly defined technical and methodological minimum demands. Human and social sciences are to be seen primarily as retrospective public investigations that presumably will be transformed eventually into science – which can provide general knowledge of social developments – merely by the force of their steadily growing mass.

Secondly, theoretical and ideological scientific crises are often accompanied by a conscious attempt to change and/or redefine the concept of science itself. So even this time. Such an ambition at first can appear honourable and praiseworthy, a quite permissible attempt to advance scholarly positions. But such an effort can directly or at least indirectly produce diametrically opposite consequences, that is one contributes to such a disintegration of the concept of science so that the effort as such can justly be questioned.

With reference to historical sociology, anthropology and ideology criticism ("*Ideologiekritik*") and their putative "demands", one has partly pleaded for an anti-scholarly "amateurization", partly attempted to erase the present boundaries between science and the production of ideology, which are recognized, at least formally, within human and social sciences.

As an example of the latter development I have chosen to present and analyze the third part of Lennart Svensson's dissertation, *Från bildning till utbildning. Universitetens omvandling från 1870-talet till 1970-talet* (From education to training. The transformation of the university from the 1870s to the 1970s), Gothenburg, 1980. For his primary explanatory model Svensson has based himself on Max Weber's concept of rationalization and Jürgen Habermas' typology of knowledge (Svensson's term). The analysis is further set in a not more closely specified "historical materialist" perspective which allows Svensson to make statements on higher education's immediate social determinants interests.

The principal criticisms against Svensson's presentation can be summarized very simply in a few central points.

1. Historical development is primarily subordinated to Svensson's (ideological) "need". Its task thus is primarily to fill Svensson's general assertions with suitable content. Thus the connection between theoretical and empirical levels tends to become

arbitrary to such an extent that in principle it can be removed without putting Svensson's results in danger.

2. His theoretical and analytical concepts lack precision, not only in respect to their relevance, range, application, etc in the reality investigated but also in terms of their purely *theoretical* power and range.

The actual consequences of such a situation are illustrated by an analysis of Svensson's investigation, partly in principle, partly in actual research practice – through an evaluation of the 1955 university investigation – and partly through a problematized evaluation of Svensson's conceptual apparatus, above all the concepts bureaucracy and bureaucratization.

Further contrasted, in a shorter excursus, are the actual meaning and complexity in Habermas' sociology of knowledge and criticism of science and Svensson's unreflective and uni-dimensional operationalization of the latter that is found in much of Habermas' formidable mass of thought.

By way of conclusion it is maintained that those social and humanistic sciences which use the research results' political tendency, social utility and/or commercial use rather than the results' validity, consistency and verifiable relevance to measure the degree of "emancipatory power", "conscience raising", "deepened understanding", and "social relevance" have no reason to continue describing themselves as "sciences".

In addition to the long-term danger which an "ideologized" science brings arises a more immediate one, namely that its explicit connection to theory and holistic ambitions risks pretty well compromising all theoretically conscious and structurally oriented social and human science, that is, every effort for socially relevant scholarship in the proper sense.

As a consequence, "ideologized" science – as also source fetishist "understanding" – that considers itself to be an alternative to and a qualitative difference from currently existing and impotent "positivism", would ironically enough become that positivism's most effective comrade-in-arms.

Jan Thelander

History, Theory and Knowledge-Development. The Art of Questioning in the Research Process.

There is a peculiar trait in dominating Western scientific traditions during modern times. It is a fear of recognizing what the questioning activity really means in the research process. For two hundred years, from Newton onwards, no one advocated the use of hypotheses without taking an uneasy glance backwards. The positivistic penetration of the humanities during the middle of the 19th. century, established a similar view in historical research. The Western view of the research process may be characterized as a hunting for subjective elements.

In debates on the relationships of science to society this view will become problematic as soon as interest is directed to the potentialities of science and to its limits. If it is at all possible to define which answers science can not or ought not to handle, then one immediately encounters other difficulties in attempting to define the upper limits of what science may ask about. How do researchers argue about the limits of their discipline? What are their views on the costs involved in crossing a scientific border?

This article deals with the development of historical research and the strategies emerging there for changing the goals of the discipline in the direction of interdisciplinary research and a greater openness to the demands of society. For at least two hundred years, historians have been striving for a wholeness in writing about their subjects. "Wholeness" has been on their program. The latest development in the discipline, that of an outspoken interest in reviving the narrative and a disillusionment with the social science approach, has exposed the fundamental problems of the historian's activities, that is, the compatibility or lack of compatibility between positivistic and hermeneutic views of questioning in the research process and between intuitive and analytic conceptions of wholeness. We are brought back to a problem situation similar to that of the 1850s and the turn of the century, which has been illuminated recently by an interest in new methods and theories of the social sciences. The real challenge to the goals of the discipline appeared with the historian's adoption of neo-classical economic theories. Is the historian's conception of wholeness compatible with the use of such theories? The debates of recent decades show a remarkable ambivalence in the attitudes of historians. Is the historian's activity unique and if so, in what ways? The basic difficulty is, in writing about historical subjects to retain a conception of wholeness, and lay the main emphasis on the question in the research process. History as a discipline has become part of a "problem-culture", where the main emphasis of the research process, paradoxically, lies in its answers. In order to become a discipline of its own kind, history must abandon this view and recognize the art of questioning. In the "problem-culture", the research process has an asymmetry which favors the answer: in a "questioning-culture", the asymmetry is reversed and favors the question.

This shift will, among other things, have important consequences for research education in the future. The art of questioning ought to have a place in the centre of that activity. "Questioning" is an art and can only be learned in an indirect way. What students may learn more about and learn more directly, are the limits of the activity and how these are to be dealt with.

In a general sense, this shift means that more than one type of questioning will be

furthered in society. When we are no longer certain of how complex societal problems develop, it becomes necessary that there is, beside scientific questioning, also a well-developed questioning tradition in politics, in organisations and among the general public.