

Summaries

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War and the National registration system in Seventeenth-century Sweden

The article discusses the development and functions of the national registration system in the Swedish military state of the 1600s. I regard the national registration system as church registries in the form of ministry records, i.e., birth, death and marriage records, as well as parish catechismal records of each household and its individual members. However, I also include the national population registry, i.e., records which are used for special taxation purposes and for the conscription of soldiers, and which account for all males or households rather than farms, which are the basic unit used by the ordinary tax records.

During the big war period from 1600 on, special taxes and even the conscription of soldiers were added almost every year. The most severe extractions were made during the reign of Gustav Adolf II (1611–1632), and especially after 1620 when one soldier was selected from every ten men eligible for military service, as against the earlier selection of one man from every ten farms. It was the priests' responsibility to draw up the records for these extra tax and military duties.

At this time, these same priests also began to keep church records by individual. The Swedish church registration system was naturally influenced by similar registration systems in Europe. However, the Swedish system has some noteworthy characteristics, as e.g., its parish catechismal records (*husförhörslängder*). At the beginning, registration ordinances were enacted by diocese: in 1622 and 1628 in Västerås' and in 1633 in Linköping's diocese, while the remaining did not establish ordinances until the second half of the seventeenth century. During this later period, the church law of 1686 was also enacted, which established regulations concerning church registration which would have nationwide validity. The inventory of church records completed the picture. In many places, registration by individual began already before the ordinances were enacted, so that their purpose appears to be to note those who had, or who would pay their priest for a particular service. These records were then transferred into the ordinary ministry records, often in connection with an order by the bishops for such registration. It was thus the priests' private interests which underlay these records, and probably also an interest which was perhaps foremost among the bishops: to keep track of those who had participated in the aëts and sacraments of the church.

While this registration became an official obligation of the State with the church law of 1686, the period of special taxation and conscription for military service by individual was largely over. Nevertheless, the State's interest in the church registration system is apparent from its beginnings. When taxation and military conscriptions began to intensify, it was often remarked that the priests knew their parishioners' age and demands best, and that they should therefore be responsible for keeping the records. In his military ordinance, Gustav Adolf justifies the participation of the priests in military conscriptions in that they were already recording incomes they received from their parishioners. For control purposes, they should now keep additional records of deaths, moves and "those who are growing up, such that when they have reached fifteen years of age, that one should then add them to the records and thereby strengthen the groups of men eligible for military conscriptions ("rotar")." The requirement by the military state could not be expressed more clearly.

According to a later instruction, Bishop Johannes Botvidi was to ensure that birth and death records were maintained, and that all those who wandered around the country were kept track of. Botvidi then gave instructions about these registrations as well as about marriage records, and even broached the subject, albeit loosely, of recording individuals' moves. This issue was again addressed in the State council, during discussions about the effectiveness of the military conscriptions: it was maintained that priests should record not only births and deaths but also moves, so that persons would not be able to avoid conscription to military service. The issue of recording individuals' moves was a central one: demands for such records appear in all statements and propositions made by the State, as do demands for birth and death records as well. The church, however, found it satisfactory to recommend ministry records, and sometimes only a few of them, as well as the parish catechismal records. Thus, a proposal made in 1682 by the priests' estate concerning the organisation of the Church, mentions only baptismal and parish catechismal records and was disapproved of by the king. However, the church law of 1686 contains regulations about all records, including registration of individuals' moves.

My thesis is thus that the State had a strong interest, even in the church registration system. It was needed as an aid to the State registration system, which formed the basis for the new taxes and military conscriptions. These were constructed so as to affect many more people than previously, and this was entirely in accordance with the demands of wartime politics. These politics involved severe strains, all the more because year after year, newly recruited soldiers were sent to the other side of the Baltic Sea, where almost all of them died.

In this context, the priests played a central part. On their shoulders rested a large part of wartime propaganda, and it was they who supplied all the personal records which formed the basis for the assessment of taxes and recruitment of soldiers. They were not, however, entirely in agreement with their task. Their antipathy was held back during Gustav Adolf's reign, but their aversion existed and is apparent in, among other things, the manuscript of an old, rural priest, Ericus Othonis. He objects to all the wordly tasks which have been assigned to priests and asks how an audience can hear a sermon with joy in their hearts, when it is spoken by those whom they know are amongst those who demand their taxes and who also recruit them for the military. After the king's death, the priests' dissatisfaction broke out in a great number of petitions which demanded release from all this recordkeeping. Release was granted in the middle of the 1600s, an act however, which depended primarily upon a return to the use of the farm as the basic unit for taxation and military conscription purposes, which was in turn a reaction toward earlier politics. Remaining, however, was the priests' obligation to assist in the establishment of records for population taxes (*mantalspengar*) which were still assessed and which were an important check on the population. They were also required to have their church books available and prepared for inspection. It was through these obligations and the State's successively widening control over the church registration system, that it gained firm control over all population registration.

Researchers of the formation of national states wish to stress the importance of war and the Armed Forces in that process whereby the standing army and its requirements become significant forces, and thereby result in the growth of a tax state and organs for the control of the population. I believe that the Swedish military state of the 1600s is perhaps the best example of these processes. It is within this context that I now wish to incorporate the entire, well-developed control-apparatus which the state and church

registration systems constitute, an apparatus which could and also did make it possible to capture the entire population, to force its way to individuals and into households, and to exploit all the information it gathered.

Eva Österberg

"The Good Old Days": Contrasting Models of the Traditional Peasant Society in Modern Historical Research

During recent years, there has been a lively discussion in historical as well as ethnological research, as to the organization and functions of the "traditional European peasant society." For some time, there has been a tendency in Swedish research to visualize two contrasting historical patterns:

On the one hand, the agrarian society of the past, which was characterized by a subsistence economy, great stability and both social and economic homogeneity;

on the other hand, the commercialized, stratified and mobile society of today.

Given this approach, eighteenth-century Sweden is considered to be the transitional period, both due to the beginning of agrarian capitalism during this period, and because of the substantial population increase between circa 1750–1870.

However, this picture is, to some degree, challenged here. In her search for a Swedish, "traditional peasant society," the author chooses to focus on periods earlier than the eighteenth century. The article is structured as follows:

1. Recent research from England (i.e., Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism*) is introduced, described and discussed. Using the sociological and anthropological interpretations of traditional peasantry, British research has questioned the existence of such a peasantry in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century, medieval England.
2. A critical evaluation is made of some modern investigations of geographical mobility and economic differentiation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Sweden.
3. Finally, an analysis is made: first, of the frequency of land transactions in two local agrarian communities in central Sweden during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; second, of the norm system, values and mentalities implicit in the punishments of sexual crimes which occurred in these same communities.

The combination of critical research survey and empirical studies provokes conclusions about historical realities as well as about research strategics:

A. Swedish historians who wish to look for patterns of behaviour and living conditions in support of the existence of either a traditional or a non-traditional peasant society, will have to consider periods earlier than the eighteenth- or nineteenth-centuries. It is also necessary to initiate more investigations into potential economic polarizations over time and to be open to chronological shifts between equalization and differentiation.

Furthermore, there is a need to deepen the discussion of those mechanisms which are responsible for the increasing socio-economic differences in agrarian society.

B. Knowledge of old, Swedish, peasant society cannot be integrated into an international debate unless it is augmented and re-evaluated using the multi-dimensional theories and concepts of international peasantry studies. It is not enough to focus solely on demographic variables, or solely on the spread of property in order to verify or falsify the existence of a traditional, peasant society. What is needed is a combination of variables in which data on migration, family structures and economic stratification are

linked with knowledge of heritage practices, land sales and the prevalent patterns of legal, cultural and social integration in society. Much remains to be done in this area of Swedish historical research.

C. In this article, court records are not used for the primary purpose of increasing our data on laws and legal practice. Rather, they are used to support preliminary interpretations of social realities as well as the mentalities of seventeenth-century, local, Swedish communities. These interpretations suggest that the beginning of the seventeenth century witnessed a conflict between integrating and disintegrating forces in society. Thus, men left the community to become soldiers abroad, there was an increase in the migration of young servants, the State demanded extra taxes and the peasant population was homogeneous to a lesser extent than was probably true of earlier times. During this period of internal pressure and potential unrest, the local establishment of peasant society included a sharpening in reactions to certain moral questions of fundamental importance to ordinary life and the norm system. Thus, the author does not consider these moral-legal reactions to be mainly the results of initiatives from the State or the Church authorities. In their local implementation, they are instead seen as the consequences of values that were internalized by the ordinary people of the peasant society of that period.

Arne Jarrick

Freud and History

This article on Freud and historical study is divided into three parts. In the *first part* I treat the Freudian theory of development with a view to ferret out distinct speculative currents in psychoanalytical thought. This may be done in several different ways. Through an examination of the topographical representations of the psycho I have tried to show that the Freudian language of observation does not correspond to the observations which are made. No organic observations underlie Freud's way of outlining the psychic hierarchy of categories. This applies as much to Freud's earlier conceptions of the psyche as to his later (which are often called structural, while the earlier have received the name of topographical). Some of the reasons for the distinctive psychoanalytic language may be lie, in part, in Freud's attachment to a "scientific" position that is, to a sort of determinism which excludes some action or thinking being accidental – and, in part, in the idea that superficially seen accidental behavior can be traced back to unconscious intentions and desires. Even if the psychoanalytical psychology of development is speculative, it nevertheless builds on extensive and empathetic observations, while the Freudian idea of history is largely only unempirical analogies to development psychology.

Freud himself was conscious (at least sometimes) of the discrepancy between observations and observation language. He warned against a substantial interpretation of his topography and structural views. Yet, he never doubted the scientific character of psychoanalysis and occasionally hoped that in time it would be possible to give it an organic basis.

The *second part* of the article is an attempt to draw a meaningful distinction between speculation and science, without, as a consequence, desparaging the speculative mode of thinking as inferior to the scientific. Science devotes itself to investigating what is or has been. It expresses itself in such a way that the language of observation corresponds to the observations, and the statements are falsifiable (in the Popperian sense). Speculation devotes itself not primarily to confirming what has been, etc., but above all to giving meaning to a course (as an historical one). It makes use of language which, like Freud's, is analogical, whose terms do not correspond, or not without the use of different types of indicators can be made to correspond, to the observed.

In addition, speculation seldom satisfies the demand for falsification. This is due to the fact that speculative language has a low intersubjective status because of the fact that it has not yet managed to become conventionalized. To be scientific one must meet positivistic demands. But in doing so one may be forced with the help of indicators to deviate from one's own questions. Speculation is often "transcendental"; it answers abruptly to questions posed, but in a scientifically uncontrollable way. Both areas of thought are necessary for the development of knowledge. Freud's thinking is thus not uninteresting for being classified as speculative. Speculation must be protected from positivism's demands. Traditional distinctions do not correspond to the division introduced here. This applies equally well to the distinction positivism-hermeneutics as to the little fruitful division explanation-understanding.

In the *Third part* of the article an examination of Freud's ideas of history is made. These are narrowly based on Freudian developmental psychology. History is seen to be analogical to an individual's life cycle. Freud's ideas of history are markedly

speculative, but, in contrast to psychoanalytical theory as such, empirical observations are almost completely missing here as a basis. Nor did Freud try to achieve some form of social-psychological synthesis. Social and other nonpsychological factors figure only in the periphery and in passing. For Freud, in history as in men's lives, it is the earliest experiences which play the largest role for continued development. In both cases the oedipal conflict is central. Historical development begins with sons in primitive tribes murdering their father so as to possess sexually their mother. The guilt, or the feeling of guilt for the accomplished or conceived original patricide, is inherited phylogenetically so that each future generation unconsciously carries it onward. The patricide which has the greatest symbolic value is the killing of Moses on his way from Egypt. Freud sees history developing in stages which correspond to distinct steps of development, ontogenetically seen.

Apart from the purely speculative in Freud's historical outline, the analogy in itself is unsuccessful. Freud has not succeeded in getting the different levels in his stage theory to agree with each other. So long as one is clear about their limitations, however, I would consider them still able to be used to understand certain historical courses. Stockholm's 17th century *Tänkeböcker* (Thought Books) is taken as an example. Much criticism remains however. For example, historical *change* can hardly be explained with the help of the coarse Oedipus conflict concept Freud uses.

Dan-Erik Jönsson – Immanuel Steen

The Dilemma of Marxist Historical Research

Marxist theory is generally considered as a rival to traditional or "bourgeois" history. This paper discusses the role Marxist theory plays in historical science. Our analysis concentrates on two aspects: a) the consequences of the various ways of applying Marxist theory, and b) the demands made by the traditional historical method to operationalize this theory. This study is primarily on a methodological level, since both aspects mainly concern the relation between theory and verification.

The Marxist view on these aspects is given by two articles: Gareth Stedman Jones' "From historical sociology to theoretical history" and Pierre Vilar's "Histoire marxiste, histoire en construction. Essai de dialogue avec Althusser". Both authors argue that (Marxist) historical science still remains to be constructed. They emphasize that the task is a theoretical one, the development of "the unfinished achievement of Marx". But this theoretical task involves the political commitment of the theory. The purpose of Marxist theory is to serve Marxist politics. This political ambition aims at a total change of society and the theory has to account for the fundamental character of society as a whole. Stedman Jones and Vilar hope for a theoretical history which creates a holistic theory covering historical societies. But to achieve this, a method able to operationalize this theory must be found. Evidently the Marxist view is that this can be achieved by combining old techniques with new theoretical principles. We think they underestimate the integrity of method. The function and results of a method are dependent upon its theoretical premises, and this fundamental character of a method cannot be changed. The prevalent method used in historical science is source criticism, which most Marxist historians accept. Our question is whether source criticism can serve the theoretical aims of Marxism. We shall firstly discuss the premises of source criticism and their consequences.

Rolf Torstendahl's account of source criticism in his book, *History as Science*, is thorough and bears a striking resemblance to the famous Durkheimian rule "consider social facts as things". Torstendahl's parallel to this rule is "science shall only work with what can be observed and proven". Torstendahl and Durkheim, despite their different backgrounds, reach the same conclusion; phenomena cannot be studied directly but only through their material traces. In the case of history, since the past is not extant, knowledge about it can be obtained only by the extant representations of the past: the sources. The discussion of the consequences of this premise is focused on the categories of sources and the operationalization of theories. The categories of the sources decide what types of data the historian has at his disposal and thus what types of factual assertions he can prove. Another consequence of this tie to the sources is that subjective evaluations, by definition, are excluded as not objectively given in the sources. Thus the rules of rendering a theory operative are strictly regulated. Theories not proven by the sources or not logically related to other theories fulfilling this demand are excluded as unscientific evaluations. Evidently, this limitation causes problems mainly for broad, very general theories, such as Marxist theory. A Marxist historian must either accept source criticism and its limitations or reject it as a whole. There is no third alternative.

Analyzing the second aspect, the application of Marxist theory, we concentrate on the dialectical-logical relation between theory and praxis. This is a dominant structural relation which cannot be changed without changing the structure of the theory itself.

From these concepts, theory and praxis, we have constructed a property space. (See Table A, page 163.) In this four-field property space the values of the attitude towards theory are strict and vague interpretation, and of the attitude towards praxis strict and vague demand, respectively. The four fields represent four fundamental attitudes, all of which, given certain conditions, are covered by the theory. The property space also contains two dimensions typical for this theory, namely politics and science, whose synthesis contributes to the development of theory (See Table B, page 163.) The political dimension forms the "natural" axis, while the scientific approach is a "derivate" one, due to the fact that the aim of the theory is social change, a plausible, active political praxis, while scientific praxis can only serve indirectly. The property space yields four concepts: *Fundamentalism* is orthodox in its attitude towards the relation theory – praxis. Ultimately, the theory is tested by revolutionary praxis, while the scientific work is a theoretical praxis solely concerned with developing logical and conceptual relations. Simultaneously the theory points out the political consequences of material development. The value of history is, exclusively, to demonstrate the logical potency of the theory through studying the consequences of earlier modes of production. *Empiricism* is the position of those theoreticians who replace the concept of praxis with scientific verification. They put greater importance on the scientific dimension than on the political, aiming to demonstrate that the theory is not only superior politically, but the best theory generally, as it also leads to the best scientific results. *Theoreticism* concentrates on the theory and its scientific results. Its attitude towards the concept of praxis is ambivalent. As the empirical results of the theory are scanty, the problem is regarded as a consequence of the ideological character of traditional scientific criteria. In contrast, for Marxism, incorporating political praxis, it is not enough to demonstrate the present state. Its theory goes beyond the existing social structure, this being an indispensable condition for showing that a change, as prescribed by the theory, is necessary. An effort is made to create theoretical criteria separating "ideological science" from "real productive science". *Revisionism* is a position which can only be accepted with strong reservations within the theory. For most Marxists, it should be quite disgusting to hear a revisionist reject historical necessity, for example. We exclude revisionism from our discussion because this flexible and pragmatic attitude attracts far more politicians than scholars.

Each of the first three positions is illustrated by an example: Marxist empiricism by Christer Winberg's dissertation *Population Growth and Proletarianization. The Transformation of Social Structures in Rural Sweden during the Agrarian Revolution*; theoreticism by Sven-Eric Liedman's articles "Marxism and History of Ideas. I and II" and "Marxism and Dialectics, Some Notes"; fundamentalism by Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst's book *Pre-capitalist Modes of Production*.

To sum the results of our discussion: The characteristic trait of Marxist theory is its political aim, the revolutionary change of society. The task of the scholar is to demonstrate theoretically through the material development the necessity of political change, and thus render to the Party an exact (and true) knowledge of society as a basis for political action. Dialectics is regarded as the true Marxist method, combining political ambition with scientific analysis. But the dilemma of the Marxist is that his qualitative dialectical contradictions cannot be made operative since the predictions of his theory concern a total change of a total system. His political ambition thus leads to a methodological dilemma. Source criticism, on the other hand, gives methodic instructions, but its construction eliminates political ambition, among other values. Here, any

political ambition is subordinate to the scientific aims contradictory to Marxism. The Marxists' approach in handling this tension between the political and scientific aims differs in accordance with the attitudes given in the property space. The Marxist *empiricist* has chosen science as praxis, but faces the problem of dialectical changes, not having methodic instructions to operationalize his theory. Therefore he has to choose source criticism, which certainly gives him methodic instructions but forces him to adapt his theory to fit the specific demands of these instructions. Consequently, the empiricist must base his research on the categories of sources instead of the categories of his theory. The theory becomes a postulate which in the best of cases can be related to results given by the sources. Adherence to *theoreticism* means a rejection of the empiricist solution. The theoreticist maintains his theory and the inner logical necessity of its relations. He thus faces the empirical problem that there must be something wrong with reality. However, since the latter is undeniable, he must concede to it some validity. Thus empirical support is accepted to a certain degree by saying that scientific verification is ideological and by subordinating praxis as empirical verification to praxis as political action. It is Marxist theory that creates clarity out of this gliding disorder by arranging everything in the true political context. The *fundamentalist* simply rejects the scientific dimension and verification. For him theory and praxis is one coherent whole. The value of science lies entirely in its capacity to give a theoretical preparation for political action. This doctrine of the unity of theory and praxis is correlated to the belief in historical necessity. The realization of the unity of theory and praxis in the future will verify the theory and the correctness of the political actions. Any doubt of historical necessity slackens party discipline and its belief in the righteousness of its political action.

Our conclusion is that Marxists are wrestling with a methodological dilemma. They must either choose scientific verification and have to accept a gap between the theory and their scientific practice, or opt for strict adherence to theory and lack methodic instructions to operationalize this theory, conducting "research in the sky". Therefore we agree with Pierre Vilar when he says that "on every level Marxist history remains to be constructed". Vilar still believes that this is possible. We are less optimistic.