Summaries

Håkon Stang

Rise of Ancient Russia

1. The Normanist-Antinormanist controversy is two-dimensional, and in several of its assumptions and expressions should be relegated to history. A new approach and framework is needed; the ones hitherto dominant are marked by the following neglects:

2.1 Neglect of the dominant, formative influence of the Islamic World Market on North Russia (market periphery), in Marxist as well as non-Marxist theory.

2.2 Neglect of a prime piece of archaeological evidence: Islamic coin finds in the North. Conclusions have been drawn and theories advanced or modified on the basis of weapon, etc., finds and town exavations, but not with reference to the troves around Ladoga (partly on the fringe of, party inside ancient Ves', Vepse territory) and (a bit later) in Sweden.

2.3 Neglect of written sources from the dominant world culture, Islam; lack of interpolation between these and other sources (e.g. Primary Chronicle); and skewed reading of the latter resulting from the Normanist—Antinormanist historical phenomenon: a product not of the 9th but of the 18th—20th centuries structuring the firm, partly racist assumptions of Germanic ideologists (historians) and the need for Russian/Soviet responses to these, thus "jamming" signals from a more distant past. Islamic sources, in combination with other materials, explain, among other things, the origins of the Varangian and Rus' names.

2.4 Neglect, in the theoretical approach, of the dominant, formative influence of the Islamic (in addition to the Byzantine) world outlook, in particular the Islamic (and Byzantine) concepts *of* the periphery *on* the periphery. (The Oriental Alexander legend as exported via Bulgar to the North, and traceable in folklore down to the 20th century. Here too lie the origins of names such as Rus', Samojed', Železnye Vorota.)

2.5 Neglect of the "third party": Battle has been joined over the respective merits of the Norse and Slav inputs in ancient Rus'; the Fenno-Ugric, more precisely Čudic component has been ignored — as have the Islamic sources on the Wīsū, i.e. Vepse.

2.6 Neglect of *how* (class) conflict in Novgorodian society (pre-Kiev North Russia) evolved — both along local ethnic lines and in relation to (far-off) centre of market economy (Islam) and (nearby) periphery (Norse barbarians). The Normanists in particular have tended to see the Scandinavians from/via Old Ladoga as simply imposing themselves on the (at least militarily inferior) Slavs, yet Antinormanists too (in their eagerness to do away with Norse dominance, as defined by the Normanists) have failed to define the functional *nîche*/vacuum/opening for the Norse neighbour interventionists *within* the multiethnic, multiclass Ladoga and Novgorod, etc. society.

3.1 The theory presently advanced attempts to explain and integrate a number of hitherto little exploited, or badly integrated, materials (written sources, coin finds, Vepse

archaeological finds of the south-east Ladoga kurgans, of Perm' and of Lappland, Vepse linguistic materials, etc.).

3.2 It attempts to explain the reason and the way in which Scandinavians and Vepse thrust themselves into and were integrated in Novgorodian society.

3.3 It attempts to explain the formation and preservation of the oligarchic class character of Novgorod, and the identities and rôles of the *varjagi* and *kolbjagi*.

3.4 It attempts to explain the development of a multiethnic state characterized by peacefully progressive Russification.

3.5 It attempts to explain the stages and dynamics of Russian (Novgorodian) penetration of the North: *Zavoloč'e = Biarmia*.

4.1 The name, background: Hros of Pseudo-Zacharias ca.555 AD and Rosomones ("Ros-men") of Jordanes 580, given in Alexander-legendary context (Amazons, dog-heads, thumblings of oicumene periphery) — which is manyfoldly reproduced in Arabic sources of 10th century, plus Adam of Bremen.

4.2 The name, actualization: Applied by Byzantine chancellery to Ladoga Swedes 838, verified and discussed with Byzantine emperor by Yaḥ yā al-Ġ azal 839, passed on by Muhammad al-Ǧarmī to eastern Caliphate 841, resulting in the Caliph al Wāthiq's "dream" of Alexander's Wall in far North being breached 842. Attack on Constantinople 860 makes Rhos name famous.

4.3 The name, form: Vepse palatalization cf Čud', Perm', Som', Lib', etc. Name introduced into Russian from Vepse-Norse condominium of Ladoga (= "miry peninsula" and "district of Arthānīyya", "distantmost, third Rūs" beyond the Slovenes, of Arabic sources). Rus' from Biblical Rhos, Rosh, not Ruotsi.

5.1 The Vepse, distribution and interaction with the far-northern peoples: Arabic Wīsū, Īsū (Vepse) located (Bīrūnī et alia) at Vym'/Vyčegda/Ustjug, controlled fur-rich "hinterland" (Perämaa, Perm') of the north and traded with Islamic world via Bulgar, Vepse monopoly defended by fortifications (*Čudskie gorodki*) and perils of the Islamic Alexander legend, cf Gjurjata Rogovič tale of Primary Chronicle 1096, "Samoyeds" of Islamic sources, Iron Gates at Karil south of Vyčegda etc. The Vepse exploited Yugrians and Lapps, Vepse (Ladoga kurgan) artefacts found from Barsov gorodok and the Urals to Hålogaland, legends on Čud:, Ohthere at Kandalakša (walrus tooth traders, cf islamic sources on North Norwegians hunting walrus, teeth delivered — by Wīsū — to Islamic lands, Wīsū mention of North Norwegians as Yā'ǧūǧ and Mā'ǧūǧ to ibn Faḍ lān 922; Onega racial type still dominant in Kandalakša, etc).

5.2 The Vepse, interaction with Novgorod: represented within Novgorod (Slovene), Kriviči and Merjan territory on basis of relationship with Islamic world, in rivalry with several layers of Slovene, Kriviči, Merja populations; allied with minority interests here. Strife recorded in Primary Chronicle (the four tribes, "clan rose against clan"), with reference to Ladoga and upper Volga: slavonic expansion. Vepse position threatened.

5.3 The Vepse, interaction with Norse barbarians, possible explanation: The Vepse had riches in silver, yet to invest in what? Primarily in a dire situation, to invest in defence and consolidation of their position, i.e. "class cops", mercenaries — many of whom took their pay home afterwards. Ladoga Norsemen, squeezed out by Slovenes ca 850, returned in force — with mercenairies.

This may partly explain the Islamic money troves of Gotland and the Mälaren district: What other ware, besides fighting prowess, did the Norsemen have to sell — in great quantity and great demand?

6. Climax, denouement: Coup d'état in Ladoga/Novgorod, minority of local oligarchs allied with the Wīsū-Islamic trading interests "invite" Rjurik in — to turn the tables on slovene expansion. Primary Chronicle hitherto viewied by Antinormanists as effort to legitimise Rjurikovič and Varangian rule. On the contrary, Varangians are branded as *nakhodniki*, invaders, oppressors — whilst the "invitation' (pretext) is nevertheless recorded (and enshrined in subsequent Novgorodian practise, as a token of the success of the oligarchic interests behind the nakhodniki and a token too of the dependence of Rjurik and his successors in Novgorod upon their support).

7.1 The coup is a success: The new state, partly built upon and partly replacing previous tribal proto-state structures, is borne up by Čud' and allied Slav oligarchs and both tribal and Norse armed contingents — in divide-and-rule balancing acts (cf Primary Chronicle on posting of tribal recruits to areas of other tribes). Čud' and Norsemen, speaking Slavonic lingua franca, are rapidly swamped, integrated, Slavicised; their initial position however is still expressed, by and by anachronistically, in the kolbjagi-varjagi references.

7.2 The great southward (Kiev) expansion, Christianization and orientation towards Constantinople quickly changes ,both material basis and spiritual outlook of the state; the Volga-Wīsū way is no longer the spearhead of social economic dynamics; it is rather peripheral. This has consequences for the North:

7.3 The semi-independence of Ladoga being ended in 1105 ("idoša na Ladoga vojnojo" sc. novgorodcy), and Vepse leadership being integrated in Novgorod's, the Novgorodian expansion follows Vepse footsteps — to the White Sea Onega Gulf (where the inhabitants are still called *kaivany*), to Kolo-Perm' (= Kandalakša, Biarmians of Ohthere) and eastward.

7.4 The Zavoločskaja Čud' (= Wīsū) east-northeast of Beloozero, along the Suchona, Vyčegda, Northern Dvina and Mezen' resist desperately, retaining ties with Bulgar, and remaining pagan, but are overwhelmed in 12th century (Vaga and parts of Dvina valley Novgorodian 1137, Vologda 1140, Ustjug 1189 — last Islamic mention of Wīsū control in Biarmia 1137/8, of Novgorod-Biarmian strife 1152, of completed conquest 1199) Mongols retard final push, mouth of Dvina conquered from Čud' 1349.

8. Above analysis hails origin of multinational (though Russian-led) state — of which Lenin took the organizational consequence with the Soviet nationalities policy. Historiography has unduly stressed the Slavonic and Norse beginnings, respectively.

9. Above analysis rejects Normanist theory of state imposed/imported from abroad, as well as Antinormanist theory on autochtonous evolution of state. Theory instead: State arises out of internal societal contradictions, as sharpened by external (in this case economic) factors, and resolved/transformed by external (in this case military) or internal factors (in other cases, viz. revolutions). Parallels to point 6 above are found in more recent events as well.

Magnus Mörner

Komparation: Eine Erweiterung historischer Perspektiven

Einleitend weist der Verf. darauf hin, welche Schwierigkeiten komparative Sichtweisen zu überwinden hatten, um sich bei Historikern gemeinhin durchzusetzen, obgleich explizite Komparation schon seit Marc Bloch energische Vorkämpfer besass. Innerhalb der heutigen, in weitem Umfang durch Projekte gelenkten , schwedischen Geschichtsforschung findet er zwar ein wachsendes interesse an Komparation, vermisst aber ein stärkeres theoretisches Bewusstsein und Kenntnis der aktuellen Debatte. Mörner lehnt den Terminus ,,komparative Methode" ab und geht dann dazu über, die Zielsetzung der expliziten Komparation zu erörtern, die Generalisierung ebenso wie Individualisierung und Beiträge zur Ursachenerklärung umfasst. Er unterstreicht, dass Komparation nicht zum Selbstzweck gemacht werden darf, sondern stets ein Ziel verfolgen sollte. Sodann werden die methodologischen Forderungen nach klaren Begriffsdefinitionen, homogenen Datenbasen und einer adäquaten Auswahl von Vergleichsobjekten diskutiert. Was die letztere Forderung betrifft, greift er u.a. die Fragen der Repräsentativität der Objekte und ihrer Beziehung zu ihrem Zuzammenhang auf. Der Verf. erörert ferner die Verschieden Typen komparativer Klassifizierung und das Verhältnis von Komparation und gesellschaftswissenschaftlicher Theorie auf verschiedenen Komplexitätsebenen. Mörners Darstellung wird durchweg von konkreten Beispielen begleitet, die im allgemeinen komparativen Studien der lateinamerikanischen Geschichte entnommen sind, aber auch anderen historischen Gebieten. Abschliessend demonstriert der Verf. die Anwendung von Komparation auf verschiedene Ebenen im Rahmen des im Gange befindlichen Forschungsprojekts zur agrarischen Strukturentwicklung im Gebiet von Cuzco in Peru seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, für das Mörner seit einigen Jahren die Verantwortung trägt. Schliesslich wäre noch auf eine recht detaillierte längere Darstellung im selben thematischen Bereich, aber unter etwas anderem Aspekt hinzuweisen, die der Verf. zusammen mit zwei jüngeren Mitarbeitern, Julia Fawaz de Viñuela und John French ausgearbeitet hat. Diese Studie, ,,Comparative Approaches to Latin American History", wird in *Latin American Research Review*, XVII:3 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982) erscheinen.

Inga Floto

The Danish Historiographical Debate in the 1970s

During the last ten years a great interest in historiographical problems has been manifest all over the Western world, Denmark being no exception. On the contrary, the debate there has probably been livelier than elsewhere. In this article I am analysing the Danish debate, seeing it as attempting a showdown with tradition — or at least a thoroughgoing critique of it and also as trying to establish historiography as a historical discipline in its own right with its own standards and methods. The debate has thus been generated by existential concerns as well as an interest in the methodological and philosophical problems raised by historical research.

The article reviews the different approaches and results and ends with a discussion of the last contribution to the debate, Jens Cr. Manniche's book on the Radical Danish historians (ca. 1880—1930), *Den radikale historikertradition*, Århus 1981. (Radical in Danish refers to members of the social-liberal party, called *Det radikale Venstre*.) The book is in many ways a summary of the foregoing debate, and a discussion of its results serves to point out the problems for the future.

Jarl Torbacke

The Värmdön Trial of 1819 — the Swedish press' first major victory?

In March, 1819 a double murder occured at Värmdön, southeast of Stockholm. The legal aftermath came to attract great contemporary interest. The perpetrator, jailed shortly after the murder, named his younger brother and his parents as fellow culprits. They also admitted their guilt. Only after a good deal of involved turnings did it come out that both the perpetrator's denunciations and his relatives' admission had been forced out through torture. Torture as a legal method af interrogation had been abholished in Sweden for decades.

The Värmdön Trial's dissolution is traditionally considered to be the high point in the history of the Swedish press. The affair is seen in the literature as the Swedish newspapers' first major victory. It is above all the contribution to the relevation of the true conditions made by the newspaper, *Anmärkaren*, published by the writer, Frederick Cederborgh, and the jurist and Shakespearean interpreter, Georg Scheutz, which gives cause for this high estimation.

The study here is the first to hold the case up to close scholarly scrutiny. The author shows that the *Anmärkaren* was amazingly modern in respect to its journalism — through Scheutz' articles above all — and, by its programmatic statements on the press' tasks, pathbreaking in Sweden. But at the same time it is also clear that the earlier flattering estimations of the newspapers' role in the Värmdön Trial all go back to the assessment made in 1895. The author shows this to be false and deliberately tendentious. The *Anmärkaren's* contribution consisted mostly in the fact that the newspaper drew the principal conclusions of what happened. The honor for the acquittal of those who were falsely accused belongs primarily to the murderer's parents' employer, the nobleman an captain M.F. Leijonmarck. Nor is it likely without importance that the king, Carl XIV Johan, became interested in the affair. When the murder case's true course was revealed, the machinery of justice and the bureaucracy went work, if also slowly and without enthusiasm, to right the wrong that had been done and to punish those guilty for it. Two policemen were condemned to prison, although they probably committed suicide in in jail. The governor and secretary of Stockholm County were condemned to pay heavy fines.

The importance of the Värmdön Trial for the history of the press thus must be reduced. Set in a larger social context the case is still of importance, however. Earlier research has noted that just around the year 1820 the Swedish state leadership altered its position vis-à-vis the freedom of the press. From the time, a decade earlier, when this had been established in the constitution hardly, the newspapers had been given a large degree of freedom in domestic politics. Now a marked change to a more repressive attitude took place. It stands out as obvious that the Swedish establishment just then began to feel its position threatened. And, according to contemporary evidence, this was due to the fact that the liberal opposition was stimulated by the revelations and the successes which the Värmdön Trial's dissolution had occasioned.