

Summaries

Peter Reinholdsson

A Lost History On a New Attempt to Interpret the Swedish Reformation

The course and effects of the Swedish Reformation have recently been the subject of a reinterpretation in an essay entitled "Förlorarnas historia" (The History of the Losers) by the historian of ideas Magnus Nyman. He attempts there to see the Reformation through the eyes of supporters of the traditional religion. This paper is a critical scrutiny of his attempt.

The author agrees with Nyman that earlier Swedish research into the Reformation has mostly been decidedly pro-Lutheran. Nyman's argumentation circles around two paradoxes which previous research has resulted in. One concerns the question of how the Reformation came about in the first place, since the traditional religion was demonstrably flourishing in the late Middle Ages. The other argument is that historians have considered the Reformation to have been fully completed during the reign of Gustav Vasa, while it has simultaneously been pointed out many times that much of the traditional religion was unchanged. Nyman's treatment of these paradoxes is not unobjectionable. The task of resolving them is of course a gigantic one, but if we are to have a chance we must clarify how the religion functioned in medieval society. In addition, the Reformation must be defined as a historical process. If the reactions of the people are to be illuminated as well, then some methodological reasoning is also required. None of this can be found in Nyman. He is theoretically and methodologically unclear, which is surprising since he claims to be inspired by the so-called revisionist English research into the Reformation, with Eamon Duffy as one of the more famous names.

The weakness of Nyman's approach emerges when he deals with "milestones" in the Swedish Reformation, such as the so-called Reformation Diet in Västerås in 1527, the synod of Örebro in 1529, or the synod of Uppsala in 1536. Like the older research criticized by him, he equates religion, both traditional and Lutheran religion, with its doctrine or its intellectual content. No attention at all is paid to its function as an organizational factor in society and a norm for social behaviour. In other ways, too, Nyman is tied to the outlook of earlier scholars. When women are included in his analysis, it is only the consequences of the Reformation for the nuns and their convents that he considers. But how did it affect other women? How, for example, were women shaped into the new role of priest's wife? Questions like these have been tackled above all in modern gender studies, and one would expect to find them in an essay with ambitions to provide a new interpretation.

Nyman's good intentions are also thwarted to a large extent by his failure to pay enough attention to the fact that the interest in the Reformation has changed character. Gone from modern research is the one-sided state perspective, and gone is the formerly so frequent condescending and off-hand treatment of things that deviated from the official version of the religion. Nyman does tackle the Reformation from a new direction, it is true, but on the whole he does so on the premises of earlier research. Given such conditions, a "History of the Losers" can only become a lost history.

Women and property in the early modern period. State of research and research strategies

It is commonly assumed that property conveys not only wealth but power and influence to the owner. It is also known that historically, the most important source of property and wealth has been inheritance, rather than wages. Thus, if property conveys power, and if property has primarily been transferred by inheritance, historical studies of inheritance practices should be crucial to our understanding of women's social position in times past. So far, however, such studies have been scarce in Swedish historiography. In this article, the authors set out to formulate certain research strategies, which would make it possible to make qualified comparisons about women's position in Sweden and in other countries. Amy Louise Erickson's book *Women and Property in early modern England* (Routledge 1993) is the main point of departure for the discussion, but works of other scholars are also drawn upon.

The authors underline the difference between women's social position *de jure* and *de facto*: the law must not be assumed to be an exhaustive description of social reality. They also emphasise the importance of paying attention to women's social class and civil state. Further, women should not be analysed as individuals, but as members of the economic unit of the household. Moreover, it is vital not to restrict the study to real property but to include moveable property as well, since the latter was comparatively much more valuable in early modern days. Finally, they discuss different female strategies to obviate the negative effects of inheritance rules.

It is fundamental to ascertain whether the inheritance rules laid down by law *were meant* to be compulsory or not. In England, eldest sons were much privileged by common law, but these rules were only put into practice if parents had not made other legal arrangements. Thus, parents could give daughters and younger sons much more than might be assumed from the letter of the law. In Sweden, a similar freedom of action existed. Here, the law said that sons should inherit twice as much land as daughters (except in urban areas, where they received equal shares), but this rule only pertained to land that the parents had inherited themselves. As to land that the parents had bought, no restrictions whatsoever existed. Therefore, Swedish parents who possessed much purchased land were in a position to choose: either to compensate daughters for the fact that they received less of the inherited land, or to give even more to sons, in order to retain the estate undivided. By issuing statute laws, the Swedish state attempted to make people choose the latter alternative.

The authors point out that these state initiatives were sometimes in accord with local practices, sometimes not. Judging from a minor investigation of wills from the county of Närke in central Sweden (first presented here), parents often sought to give the landed estate undivided to a male heir and induced the other children to accept money for their shares. By contrast, previous investigations of a parish in Dalecarlia, further north, have shown that the parents consciously strove to give all children parts of the landed estate. These two examples clearly show how far from the letter of the law – sons and daughters should both inherit land, but sons twice as much – social reality could be. The authors also present a minor investigation of the Swedish Royal Court of Appeal, which shows that 25 % of all plaintiffs were women, often engaged in a law suit about their inheritance. This is also interpreted as a form of female strategy to obviate adverse effects of property arrangements.

Did women achieve power and influence as a consequence of their holding property in early modern days? To this question, no final answer is put forward here, since we do not as yet have a clear and complete empirical picture of the extent to which women actually

held property (of different kinds). There are, however, reasons to believe that Swedish women's access to property was more pronounced in reality than might be assumed from the laws — just as Amy Louise Erickson has shown for English women.

Ingrid Millbourn

The Agricultural Policy of the Swedish Social Democratic Party 1890–1920

In the agricultural policy of the Swedish Social Democratic Party there was a clash of alternative patterns of thought and action which reflected different strategies and different views of mankind and society. They consisted of more or less concealed principles such as centralization, decentralization, rationalization, and cooperation. By Social Democratic policy I mean the standpoints that received a majority in congress resolutions and programmes. Political theory, in my opinion, is characterized by a fixation on individual politicians, and on patterns of thought which belong with Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy", about the power and manipulative behaviour of leaders towards members and voters. I would avoid this way of looking at things by using a theory of processes for success and cooperation, where the concepts of advocate, example, success, and cohesion are applied and politics is seen as a form of interaction. A central question is if and how the Social Democratic considered the needs of small farmers, which I have taken to mean support for ownership of land. The question is steered by the fact that previous scholars are agreed that Social Democratic policy, and above all the 1911 party programme, was changes for tactical reasons to win the votes of the small farmers and hence gain parliamentary power. Many historians have seen the programme as the work of Carl Lindhagen.

The Social Democratic agricultural policy 1890–1920 was dominated by the principles of centralization and rationality; in other words, the land was to be owned and controlled by the state and farmed with benefits of scale. Smallholders were not supported in their ownership of land, but they received a promise that they would enjoy the right to farm the land and to have protection from big companies as long as they retained their smallholdings. At the same time, they were expected to farm the land efficiently, for example, through cooperation. The main concern of the Social Democrats was the industrial workers and their need for cheap food. At the same time, there were people in the party who advocated the principle of decentralization; smallholdings were to dominate, and the land could be owned by the state, privately, or cooperatively. Some had a vision of agriculture without wage labour, while others wished for a cooperative societal system or a federate system consisting of local communes. There was faith in the capacity of the individual for personal responsibility, while the centralists believed in state responsibility. Rationality, however, was a principle shared by all. Small farming was supposed to be as productive as large-scale farming.

The Social Democratic agricultural policy was never friendly to small farmers. Although, for example, the 1911 programme admitted that the smallholders had achieved the goal – holding the labour and the means of production in one hand – the Social Democrats simultaneously tightened their demands for rationality and state control, since the yield on all land had to be increased. The programme gave an illusion of embracing the principle of decentralization, since, for instance, it advocated cooperation, but only as a method for large-scale farming. And that was not Lindhagen's programme, since his was based on decentralization and personal responsibility. Rationality was virtually absent, and cooperation was seen as a system for ownership and mutual assistance. I have interpreted the Social Democratic agricultural policy as a form of interaction, a mutual affirmation which reinforced patterns of thought and action. There were also problematic encounters, which sooner or later led to schism. There could be some accommodation for a time, depending on relations or strength, with the aim of holding the party together. The meaning ascribed to the principles varied depending on who held them. Some principles, such as cooperation and rationality, could be found in all the patterns, whereas there was

no common ground between those who embraced decentralization and those who embraced centralization. Cooperation shows the ambivalence of the patterns. For a theorist such as Karl Kautsky, it meant anarchism and petty bourgeoisie, where it was a means to profitability for most people in the Social Democratic Party, the Youth League, and the farmers' cooperatives. Others, such as Edward David, the consumers in the Swedish Cooperative Union, the young socialists and agrarian socialists, saw it as a strategy leading to a new societal system without state socialism or capitalism.

The concept of success is closely related to that of ideal examples. The models to follow for the politicians were small and large farmers, people in farmers' and consumers' cooperatives, and it was the success of the examples that gave the politicians strength. Those who believed in decentralization had a weak influence on Social Democratic agricultural policy 1905–1917. The reason was that their examples, small farmers and cooperators, appeared to be successful while the party was simultaneously greatly weakened. Some 60 per cent of the members had left the party, mainly because of conflicts over strategies, leaders' powers, and influence over production. The cohesion of the party as the industrial workers' party was more important than the small farmers. And it was the workers that the party wanted to win back; in this they were successful.

In 1917 the party was so strong that the centralists were able to exclude the critics, for example, the Youth League. The Social Democratic Party adopted a new programme in 1920 which unambiguously affirmed centralization and rationality. The concept of cooperation was retained only as a way for consumers to raise their standards. The Left Party, founded in 1917, adopted an agricultural programme that was a compromise between Lindhagen's proposal and that of the Social Democratic Party, both from 1911. In the agricultural policy there was no interaction between the principles of decentralization and centralization. As soon as the centralists were strong enough, there was a schism.

The fact that all the patterns of thought and action included the principle of rationality, while no one advocated zero growth, I see as an opportunity for a deeper understanding of the Social Democratic agricultural policy. This principle took its example from the pattern of action of capital, which included the farmers' cooperatives consisting of large freehold farmers. The encounter with their actions influenced people's consciousness in the true sense, since their commodity production seemed to be so successful. It seemed that the utopia of welfare could only be achieved through its methods, that is, large scale, intensity, and efficiency, while small-scale operations, whether private or cooperative, never became an ideal since they lacked significance on the commodity market. The actions of capital owners dominated the senses by determining what success was and how it could be realized in agricultural policy. Whatever their other principles, everyone believed in productivity and was convinced that utopias could only be reached by producing.

Hans Åke Persson

The Legacy of the Past, Political Culture and Right-Wing Populist Parties in German and Austria: A Comparison

Immigration and refugee policy are sensitive issues, and parties of discontent often employ xenophobia in various forms as a mobilizing factor. The situation varies from country to country depending on political structure, ethnic background and the historical experience of nation building. Germany and Austria are parts of the same Kulturnation and can be labeled part-nation states with a common ethnonationalist background. Historical factors must be considered when analyzing the themes immigration, racism and populist parties.

However, historical structural factors are not sufficient to explain the manner in which states have dealt with these phenomena. For example, it could tentatively be argued that the success of "Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs" (FPÖ) has do to with Austria's problem with Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the Austrian inability to confront the legacy of the past.

Similarly, the emergence of a political centrist-consensus in West Germany based on the importance placed on Germany's integration into the West, was instrumental in ensuring a forty-year period of stability. The German constitutional provisio for asylum-seekers, a reaction to the Nazi persecution, is unique in international law.

In both countries the phenomena of populist parties came to the fore when on highly charged issues a gap developed between the official positions of the established parties and part of the constituencies, a conflict of opinion that could not be resolved within the existing party structures.