

Summaries

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History and Language History

Language is a biological and social phenomenon. The structure of the human brain defines the limits of what can be a grammatical or a lexical rule of a language. But how a specific language emerges and changes within the biologically given boundaries is a sociohistorical process, and it should be understood and explained as such.

The link between history on one hand and the grammar or the lexicon of a language on the other is the use of the language in spoken and written communication, the production of texts. Through texts history is influenced by language: the language available makes it easier to say some things than others. Through texts the rules of a language are influenced by history: the verbal interaction between people confirms or challenges the linguistic rules in force. This article is about the latter kind of influence or determination.

The way we talk is only partly dependent upon current conventions: superordinate maxims of communication makes it possible, practical or necessary to deviate from the norms. What we say — or write — is therefore full of ellipses, expansions (metaphors, expanded meanings of words), borrowings and even errors etc.

Some of these deviations or expansions are taken over by other language users and conventionalized as parts of the common system of grammatical and lexical rules.

A couple of quite general motive forces lie behind the conventionalization of individual communicative solutions, e.g.

functionality: an expression is (experienced as) practical

prestige: an expression is (experienced as) a sign of power status, education, group membership etc.)

modernity: an expression is (experienced as) fresh, contemporary, not worn out.

Functionality may be interpreted broadly as what is good or necessary for any human communication to work effectively. But very often functionality is related to the kind of communication which is important or dominant in a specific social organization at specific times or places. What is functional, prestigious or modern is then determined by the kind of society where a language is used.

Whether an expression should be taken over or not by the community is sometimes made an ideological issue, and the innovation may even be fought against or promoted with political power (“language planning”). But mostly the actors of the community are not aware of what is going on: they create the history of their language without knowing it.

The article gives various examples from the history of the Swedish standard language to demonstrate the interplay between language and society.

Göran Blomqvist

Academic Visions during the Last Three Decades of the 19th Century

During the last 30 years of the 19th Century, Swedish universities changed fundamentally. The sciences expanded, the share of non-permanent teachers grew, and the research became more important than the teaching. The central subject of the discussion was how the universities should be designed in the best way in order to fulfil their functions, i. e. to produce and transmit knowledge. The participants had ideals, academic visions, which consisted of different parts:

- the order of priority among the different functions of the university,
- the design of the local academic government,
- the methods of recruitment,
- the valuation of different qualifications in the promotions.

This article deals with the three topics, that aroused most public attention.

1. The power over academic positions and the local government. From the 1870s, three alternatives competed: the guild-model, the professional-model, and the monarchy-model. The first one, the traditional model, implied that the full professors made all decisions together as colleagues, and that they appointed all positions by co-optation. The professional-model opposed successfully against it. This model wanted to specialize the local government,. Appointments should be made after an open competition between the applicants and under the guidance by expert reports. The monarchy-model finally, failed to gain much support. It gave priority to individual leadership before collective, and that the influence of the separate university over the recruitment should be reduced.

2. The struggle for the academic career. At the turn of the century, the non-permanent teachers in numbers dominated the academic staff. Since the 1860s, they had tried hard to improve their financial conditions, to raise their social status and their influence in the local government. Their associations (unions) got access to the political decision-making process. They offended against unwritten rules and showed why it was not self-evident, that the full professors should rule the university.

3. During the 1890s, the academic career got into several difficulties. The number of unsalaried "docents" (readers) increased more rapidly than the scholarships and the posts. The university-career was founded on the possibility for the "docents" of being appointed senior master of the state secondary grammar schools. But the other teachers of these schools disliked to be a parallel professional career to the university. On the other hand: some academic disciplines had no qualified candidates to hold the chairs. Both cases were a breeding ground to the demands for a more favourable, self-contained academic career. University teachers began to break with the old ideal among officials to be moderate. The loyalty to the discipline and the department increased, at the expense of the established corporative organizations. The mentality changed, when the common goals and the collegiate values of the university-teachers was less emphasized. The integrated university became atomistic.

Sverker Oredsson

**Dreams of empire and thirst for battle
A theme in Swedish opinion-moulding and politics 1910–1942**

This article is about the way the Swedish Age of Greatness (1630–1718) was invoked in opinion-moulding and acted as a source of inspiration for civilian and particularly military decision-makers from the time before the First World War until a few years into the Second World War. Most of the essay focuses on the years 1938–1941.

When the Caroline Association (Karolinska förbundet) was formed in 1910, one aim was to revive the spirit of King Karl XII and his warriors. Many military and right-wing persons saw it as a serious case of national treachery that Norway had been allowed to leave the union with Sweden in 1905 without a war. The defence agitation, which was also in large measure a campaign against Russia, was led by the explorer Sven Hedin. Two young officers, Carl Bennedich and Axel Rappe, urged King Gustaf V to assume personal power over the Swedish army, in other words, to stage a *coup d'état* against the hated liberal government of Karl Staaff. Their ideal here was the relationship between the king and the army that had prevailed during the Age of Greatness.

When the First World War broke out, many leading officers thought that Sweden should seize the opportunity to recreate a great empire by allying with Germany. The obvious enemy was Russia. Leading Swedish historians believed that Germany was now fighting the same struggle that Sweden had once fought under Karl XII, that is, for the Germanic peoples and against the Slavs, who were viewed as representing a lower form of culture.

The possibility that Finland could be liberated was greeted with rejoicing. Finland was regarded as the eastern half of the kingdom of Sweden. It was seen as yet another act of treachery that Sweden did not actively support the White side in the civil war. However, a thousand Swedish volunteers did take part on the White side, including many men who would later attain leading positions in the Swedish defence. The good personal relations that were built up included contacts with the Finnish commander in chief, C G Mannerheim.

In 1923 the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Hederstierna, had to resign because he had advocated a defensive alliance between Sweden and Finland. Secret military cooperation was nevertheless built up between Sweden and Finland. An ideological foundation for this was provided by the general staff captain Axel Rappe, who, invoking Swedish historians, claimed that Sweden had faced eastwards since time immemorial.

In 1925 Sweden decided on extensive disarmament. In the defence committee set up in 1930, with Per Albin Hansson as chairman, a new generation of army officers acquired great influence, including Axel Rappe, Helge Jung, and C A Ehrensverd. Their line was that Sweden should be defended at the Finnish-Russian border, the old border of the Swedish empire near Ladoga.

At the end of the 1930s, this group of officers had reached even higher positions of power. Ehrensverd was chief negotiator in the talks with Finland. Fortifying Åland was for him, as for Rappe, only a means to arrive at a Finno-Swedish defensive alliance. The foreign minister, Sandler, also appears to have shared this view. In the government it was above all the finance minister, Wigforss, who was the core of resistance to the plans of the general staff officers and the foreign minister.

Sandler had to leave the foreign office at the outbreak of the Finnish Winter War, but the leading Swedish officers, headed by the commander in chief, Thörnell, and the chief of the general staff, Rappe, eagerly supported Swedish intervention on Finland's side. An important goal would be to stop the spread of Bolshevism. On 21 February 1940, the Swedish defence leadership was still pleading with the government for Swedish divisions to be sent far into Soviet territory to settle the war along with Finland. In the light of military history, this was seen as the probable outcome.

Rappe also made contact with the Finnish foreign minister, Tanner, to persuade him to refuse the peace terms which the Swedish government was trying to mediate between Finland and the Soviet Union. Rappe tried to get Mannerheim, the Finnish commander in chief, to ask the western powers for assistance, so that Sweden would be forced to join the war.

In 1940–41, a group of Swedes were working on a proposal for a union between Sweden and Finland. The joint head of state would be the King of Sweden, and Mannerheim would be commander in chief. Axel Rappe was one of the men behind this plan.

In January 1941, Rappe told the Swedish generals that Sweden's defence should be concentrated in eastern Finland. This speech appears to have been one of the reasons for his departure from the post of chief of the general staff.

Rappe was conspiring against the Swedish government. Thörnell, the commander in chief, was not conspiratorial but he basically had the same views. He thought that Sweden neither could nor should stand idly by if Finland and Germany found themselves at war with the Soviet Union. After Operation Barbarossa had begun, Thörnell pleaded for Swedish participation. He believed in a German victory, thinking, that "the defeat of communism" would be beneficial for discipline in the Swedish defence forces. Sweden's prestige in Germany's eyes would also increase if the country assisted in the conquest of the Soviet Union.

The German campaign in Russia was not the victory that many had expected. In 1942, opinion also began to swing in military circles. New guidelines were drawn up in the defence staff, and the message went out to every Swede that the country would be defended on *every* side, and that any statement to the effect that resistance should cease was false.