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Tattoos as Narratives: Skin and Self

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Abstract

This article explores the polysemic nature of contemporary tattoos by comparing interviewees' perceptions of the meanings of their tattoos with the meanings which can be imputed to them by a researcher studying cultural history and semiotics. After systematically comparing the referencing and mapping of tattoos by interviewees in St. John's, Newfoundland, the author argues that tattoos should be viewed in a light that reflects the endless potential of human self-expression. Part of this statement is meant to address the structure-agency dichotomy which has long been reflected in the literature on sociological theories and the tattooing/body literature. Another part is meant to give substantive evidence to the claim that regardless of motivations or meanings, the truth behind meaning and identity can only be found in complex and ephemeral moments which populate the life of the cultural and individual actor.

Introduction

Against the backdrop of our late-modern world tattoos are becoming more complex symbols of our self and social identities. Because of the growing complexity of the modern tattoo, this research proposes that these ink marks need to be viewed with the same symbolic complexity that reflects their contemporary artistic designs. In the following discussion I focus on the tattoos which people don so that we may explore their deep meaning; and so we may appreciate tattoos as semiotic representations of the individual and culture it effects and is affected by. I will argue these points through the visual aid of my interviewees' art works, their own understanding of the meanings of their tattoos, and ideas about the meanings of symbols from history and semiotics. I organize this information around concepts Stephen Harold Riggins (1990, 1994) introduced in material culture studies, referencing and mapping. We demonstrate cultural sophistication when we "reference" objects by talking about their

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aesthetics, history or customary use. When we use objects as a way of talking about people and personal experiences, we "map" objects. Conversations about domestic artifacts (for example, objects displayed in living rooms) consist primarily of mapping. I try to see if the same is true for tattoos. The fact that tattoos are more personal than domestic artifacts may result in even more talk classified as mapping. Referencing and mapping delineate multiple meanings as they fall in line with cultural/historical connections, on one hand; and personal/familial relations on the other. Perhaps the most original aspect of this discussion is the detailed biographical and aesthetic information I have gathered from my interviewees about their tattoos. Although this might seem an obvious topic to explore, it has rarely been done by sociologists studying tattoos.

This article is organized so that readers first learn to appreciate the tattoo literature. This is followed by a section which depicts the methodology used in this study. Then I provide an in-depth and original analysis of six of my research participants' tattoos. In this analysis section, readers will be introduced to three categories of tattoo enthusiasts which allow for new understandings of the complexities tattoos can hold. These three categories of individuals who I have called the Social Peacocks, Familial Hearts, and Beauty and Art enthusiasts are not meant to represent all of the tattooed population. Instead they allow for an understanding of some of the motivations, meanings, and connections to identity that tattoos have. They also allow for an exploration of the concepts of referencing and mapping as they help to apply Anthony Giddens' structuration theory in recognizing the social action of becoming tattooed as one that is complicated by both individual and cultural factors.

Giddens' Structuration Theory

Anthony Giddens (1991: 75-77) writes in *Modernity and Self-identity* that "the self is seen as a reflexive project, for which the individual is responsible. We are, not what we are, but what we made ourselves…. The reflexivity of the self extends to the body, where the body is part of an action system rather than merely a passive object." I believe the principles that Giddens describes as characterizing "high" or "late" modernity explain what it means to be human today, and importantly, how our bodies are connected to the ongoing process of actualizing a self-identity. The principles of constant reproduction of self in social interaction, the influence of conscious individual intent (or agency) as well as enabling and constraining structures, and the search for ontological security are all reflected in this article.

Giddens' structuration theory is of paramount importance to this discussion and to the understanding of the process of becoming tattooed and the meanings and motivations behind the marks. Whether studying the tattoo as artistic expression, body project, commodity, or vehicle for the self, some strikingly similar debates enter into the literature. I refer to those debates which attempt to pinpoint body alterations as a result of structures of influence or expressions of individual control (e.g., Shilling 1993; Foucault 1977, 1982; Sanders 1989, etc.). Giddens' structuration theory is unique because it offers divergent nodes of thought from these dichotomous loops. Allowing for an understanding of the potential for structure and agency to be in a symbiotic rather than dichotomous relationship, Giddens argues, is most productive to the pursuit of knowledge about cultural acts. This is primarily because cultural acts which involve the conscious action of an agent, as well as the systems of knowledge and practice which come to be socially created and signified, have all been processed in tandem rather than separately from each other. In Giddens' (1985: 25) words: "analyzing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction." This quotation allows for a useful summation of the ingredients in understanding structuration theory and further, to understanding all social/cultural acts. Acknowledging the role of knowledgeable actors as well as the importance of social systems/structures in making up the components of the social construction of reality is of key importance to understanding how it is that an act like indelibly marking the skin with ink must always be understood as both an individual and cultural affair. If we understand this to be the case, we must also realize how meaning and identity attributed to a social act like becoming tattooed will also have deep and varied interpretations and systems of significance.

How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Going: A Brief History of Western Tattoo Practices and the Sociological Literature on Tattooing

The historically rich origins of tattooing in North America – which is no more creative than the designs indelibly marked on the surface of bodies everywhere – is said to have begun with the English exploration vessel *The Endeavor* and its Captain, James Cook (Sanders 1989; Pitts 2003; Atkinson 2003). Ten years after Cook and his crew finished plotting out the new British territory known as Newfoundland in 1759, they were sent to the South Pacific for

further exploration. It is in the South Pacific that the *tatau* (a Tahitian word, meaning "to strike") was observed, recorded, and eventually exported back to Europe. Now known as a "tattoo," the practice travelled back on the arms of many sailors, as well as in the form of a living Tahitian prince named Omai. The practice has since been regarded in many different lights, and according to Michael Atkinson, has seen a "sociogenesis" (2003) ranging from associations with different social classes, as well as varying in the degree of consideration as deviant status. According to Atkinson (2003: 24, 30-50), "tattoos are best understood within generational moments" and can be divided into six distinct eras which reflect the differing fields of cultural production. These eras are the colonist/pioneer, circus/carnival, working-class, rebel, new age, and finally supermarket era(s).

As Clinton Sanders points out in his text *Customizing the Body: The Art and Culture of Tattooing*, the journey from craft to art, or outlawed deviant activity to partially-respected social outlet, was long and quite difficult. Sanders (1989: 3, 21) appropriately notes in his introduction that: "those who define tattooing as an artistic practice are deeply involved with a process of collective legitimation" and later, that "body alteration is culture; it is meaningful to the members of the society in which it occurs, and it is produced within complex webs of collective action." Sanders backs the claim of the meaningfulness of tattooing by stating that "tattooing is being moved away from its roots as a widely devalued craft-like practice pursued by producers and consumers who are marginal to mainstream social groups. In turn, impelled by the purposive activities of a variety of committed individuals, it is coming to be defined as an art form..." (Sanders 1989: 21). Throughout Sanders' text on the world of tattooing, he remains adamant about the fact that tattooing is important for social communication, for holding meaning, and as a cultural signifier.

While differentiating between "types" of tattooists and their reasons for interest in the occupation Sanders quotes a "fine art" tattooist who is (as is typical for this type of tattooed individual) in search of an "art form that offered a creative outlet." The respondent remarks "the first female I ever saw with a tattoo was a friend of mine ... the whole image of it looked like a piece of art work instead of the idea we usually project onto a tattoo" (Sanders 1989: 67). While exploring what it means to "become a tattooed person," Sanders, through use of Goffmanian concepts, aptly notes that "the tattoo becomes an item in the tattooee's personal "identity-kit." However varying and quite personal the reasons for getting tattoos or becoming a tattooist may be, Sanders' final message that despite these deep lines of meaning which may permeate the inked skin, the tattoo remains (and will remain) – explicitly – a deviant activity, still existing on the fringes of culture but segregated to a subcultural status.

Heavily influenced by the theory of figuration introduced by Norbert Elias, Michael Atkinson carefully and empirically explores tattooing within historical contexts as it shifts through space and time. Notably, while making reference to past theories and avenues of thought concerning tattooing, Atkinson (2003: 23) claims that "the limited sociological analyses of tattooing have viewed the practice from a narrow viewpoint." He also makes reference to what he calls a "cultural stereotype (that) has long held tattoos as marks of shame worn by outlaws, misfits, or those fallen from social grace." What sets Atkinson apart from other academics or social scientists studying the art of tattooing (despite the fact that he is heavily tattooed) is his concept of the practice "as a powerful form of human expression" that need not be outcast as deviant, especially by contemporary standards. For Atkinson (2003: 24), "tattoos are now considerably more open to interpretation and subject to situated definition." Indeed, despite the potential for historical reductionism, one can still make the argument that some of the most valuable sociological contributions to the understanding of cultural and social phenomena are the result of a deep historical and contextual analysis of cultural practices or trends (Foucault 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986; Durkheim 1897, 1912) because it places action within specific social contexts and avoids generality.

 As Atkinson argues, noting feminist scholars studying gender and identity politics is a very useful tool of inquiry. One can certainly appreciate the vested interest such intellectuals have in exploring implications of the practice of body modification in terms of gender and oppressive roles. Atkinson (2003: 15-16) notes how theories in this sense have viewed body modification practices from two polar and equally influential stances: "either the ongoing maintenance of hegemonic ideology about femininity or the conscious attempt to subvert patriarchal ideology through bodily resistance." Many have argued that bodies are an integral center point where the powers of society display their influence (Foucault 1977, 1978), but ultimately Atkinson seems to favor defining bodies as a tool for forming "an empowered self" or as a potential "vehicle of liberation."

Importantly, Atkinson (2003: 56- 60) provides a useful summary of three popular categories of sociological analysis of tattooing in the past. These modes of study focus on "tattooing as social deviance; (as an) analysis of tattoo artists and their everyday experience in the business; and investigations of the tattoo as a form of political resistance." Within each of these categories, we find cultural ethnographers digging deep into the practice of tattooing to look at the practice in a myriad of ways, sometimes richly employing forms of looking into the "polysemic nature of cultural understandings" (60; see Mifflin 1997). Other times they look at biopolitical resistance such as how enthusiasts attack outside control over their body,

for example from the church, through the "urban primitive use of tattooing in Canada (which) is directly opposed to Christian-based codes of bodily display that are part of the hegemony of Western cultures" (Atkinson 2003: 46).

It must be noted that this article builds on the work of Atkinson and others but it also benefits from the current cultural climate of the practice of marking the flesh which is more popular than ever before. Whereas the focus in past theories and avenues of thought was inspired by the current state of the practice and the cultures or fields of cultural production at the time. This discussion falls in this same category but benefits from being part of a culture of tattooing that has never existed quite like it does now. However, this does not discount the stock of knowledge that is still relevant and useful from these inquires. For example, Sanders (1989) concludes that tattoos are in fact deviant or marks of (partial) marginality because of the era in which he completed his influential study. As Atkinson (57) notes, " he was one of the first sociologists to hold firm to the idea that tattooing is a practice subject to social constructions and definitions (deviant or otherwise), and influenced by the personal biographies of, collective world views held by, and contextual interpretations of individuals."

In his text *Body and Social Theory* Chris Shilling introduces an influential concept and theoretical question called "the body-project." This concept may best be understood by looking at Shilling's definition which states that the "body is most profitably conceptualized as an unfinished biological and social phenomenon which is transformed, within certain limits, as a result of its entry into, and participation in, society. It is this biological and social quality that makes the body at once such an obvious, and yet elusive phenomenon" (Shilling 1993: 11). The body as a project is also meant to be reflective of the idea that in Western societies there is an obsession with changing and altering the body in the search for idealized beauty or perfection. Who is ultimately in control of crafting and evaluating the project is a major question that arises in texts related to the body project.

As the discussion progresses in Shilling's text, advocates on both sides of the debate are represented. For an example of those who attribute the body project to individual agency, Shilling himself argues that through a micro-relationship lens these projects can work in forming one's own self-identity or purposefully displaying this to others through the *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Shilling 1993: 72; Goffman 1959). From a feminist perspective, author Victoria Pitts notes how "some women have described their body art as a way to rebel against male dominance and to 'reclaim' power over their own bodies. In creating scarred, branded, pierced, and heavily tattooed bodies, they aim to reject the pressures of beauty norms and roles of 'proper' femininity" (Pitts 2003: 3).

Expanding upon Shilling's body project, Atkinson notes (2003: 25), "body projects intended to camouflage the body (like plastic surgery or make-up) are seen or read by others as an everyday method of presenting favorable images of the self, and typically conform to cultural codes about bodies and norms governing personal representation as a means of communicating a person's commitment to cultural body habits." Atkinson's transformation of the concept in relation to the practice of tattooing presents the idea that although Shilling often favors viewing the body project in a light which helps researchers understand how individual agency can contribute to self-identity, it is also of equal importance to be aware of the other brand of thinkers who will staunchly argue that these kinds of body modifications are actually doomed by the plight of aging, the inevitable breakdown of the body through life's natural course, and the *insatiable thirst* for obtaining more physical capital by meeting beauty standards of class (see the discussion of Bourdieu in Shilling 1993: 113; Turner 1984). The idea of the never-ending chance of salvation from competitive and oppressive cultural norms is made perfectly evident with a quotation from Durkheim representing Giddens' orthodox consensus of classical sociological theories. While discussing the plight of anomic suicide, Durkheim poetically notes:

> Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss. But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture (Durkheim 1897: 247).

Reflections on the Literature

The literature examined above is some of the most influential texts in the sociological analysis of tattooing. It is my intent now to demonstrate how my research, although inspired and indebted by these studies, differs from these texts. First, while each author ambitiously sets his or her sights on analyzing the practice and field of tattooing, I focus instead more specifically on the meanings of the tattoos themselves. Second, in the literature presented it should be noted that readers will be taken on a trip back and forth, between what is considered as the primary ontological understanding for committing an action. Each time the author is attempting to commit the readers' sociological imagination to the idea that it is more a result

of structures of control, or the power of individual agency, which is responsible for the crafting of ourselves and our bodies in the late-modern world.[2] On the contrary, what I argue is that our personal and social identity can never be fully a result of our own personal subjectivities, and for that matter can never be fully dictated by structures of influence or control. While choosing to become tattooed, and while also drawing lines of reference to our identities from these tattoos, we must understand the dynamic role social actors take with regards to the practical consciousness of everyday life. As we will see, Giddens (1985), Goffman (1959), and Garfinkel (1967) offer a remedy to the dichotomy of subject/object by allowing us to understand that we are always, at once, both. Despite convincing arguments toward either side, such as that from the ultra-articulate Durkheim who illuminates the strong will to power structures of influence have over the body and the social actor, we must be constantly reminded that actors are always conscious and knowledgeable about themselves in society. In line with Giddens' "duality of structure" (1985: 25) structure is always serving as both enabler and constrainer.

Methodology

This research is qualitative and has been conducted through semi-structured interviews. My sample size is 15, with 11 female and 4 male respondents. I have focused primarily on persons who wear what I call "contemporary-style tattoo art." These intricately designed tattoos are representative of recent trends toward the professionalization and growth of complex designs in the field of tattoo art (Atkinson 2003: 46; See also "neo-traditional"). My participants form a non-probability, convenience sample which has been chosen because they represent a small group of enthusiasts who are highly educated (all are university students) and who encompass a variety of modern tattoo designs. These tattooees allow me to make claims about the polysemic nature of tattoo designs because they live these multiple meanings every day. This includes the ability to hide or show their tattoos if need be.

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[2] Although I believe Atkinson understands the dynamic complexity behind social action as a contribution of individual, intersubjective, and objective influence, I also believe that my approach of using Giddens' structuration theory offers a more thorough exploration of these themes than is the case through Atkinson's exploration of Elias' figurational sociology.

Contemporary-Style Tattooee

Narrowing my approach to studying contemporary-style tattooees has enabled me to discuss a sample population which is relatively articulate and culturally sophisticated. But what must be said about approaching a specific group of tattoo enthusiasts is that, although a primary interest in proving the shifting nature of cultural/social meanings of art has been tied to the goal of proving the usefulness of the term I have created, I do not wish to express this term as an authentically specific category used by tattoo enthusiasts. Rather, for the purposes of this research, the contemporary-style tattooee is someone who idealizes a broad variety of different time-sensitive designs that not only demonstrate a professional lineage in the art world of tattooing, but also necessarily demonstrate changing technologies and artistic professionalism in the field of tattoo design. According to Steve Gilbert who writes in *Tattoo History: A Source Book* (2000: 125):

> The most popular designs in traditional American tattooing evolved from
> the efforts of many artists who traded, copied, swiped, and improved on
> each other's work. In this way they developed a set of stereotyped
> symbols which were inspired by the spirit of the times, and especially by
> the experiences of soldiers and sailors during the World Wars. Many of
> these designs represented courage, patriotism, defiance of death, and
> longing for family and loved ones left behind.

This remark parallels other studies which have noted so-called "stars" or "mavericks" in the tattoo art world who have contributed to the mass production and circulation of popular designs. Some popular examples include Lew "the Jew" Alberts (Atkinson 2003: 37; DeMello 2000: 54) and more recently Don Ed Hardy (Sanders 1989: 34; Don Ed Hardy 1999). While these stars of the tattoo art world have contributed to what Frankfurt School social theorists (among others) might typically devalue as inauthentic art, I wish to argue that authenticity is a useless category by itself as a single determinate of social action, distinction, or acceptance. I believe this is a valuable assertion primarily because of the shifting nature of meaning in tattoos, and also because from a structuration perspective we understand how authenticity should only be considered a reified system which influences tattoo enthusiasts' decisions by way of presenting itself as an often constraining structure (much like the "rules of the game" in Bourdieu's field), but is never the total reason for aesthetic choice or design. For an example of the types of discussion which devalue the contemporary-style tattoo

design, we may turn to Adorno et al. who define art in a text titled *Aesthetic Theory* by stating that: "art keeps itself alive through its social force of resistance; unless it reifies itself, it becomes a commodity. Its contribution to society is not communication with it but rather something extremely mediated: It is resistance in which, by virtue of inner-aesthetic development, social development is reproduced without being imitated" (Adorno et al. 2004: 296). This discussion specifically argues that the productive use of defining art in such constraining ways serves only to contribute to Giddens' concept of the orthodox consensus of classical social theory which fails to understand the importance of the knowledgeable agent in contributing to social action (See Giddens 1979: 235-254; 1985: xv-xxxv).

Analysis: The Skin and The Self

By systematically discussing respondents' remarks and narratives and focusing on a few of their tattoos I wish to demonstrate the polysemic and complex forms meaning and identity take on with regards to tattoos. It is in the details of these indelible marks that "proof" will be offered supporting the idea that tattoos are complex mementos of the *wild passions* which have consumed our souls as individuals and as cultural actors. In these *wild passions* we see the influence of both structure and agency and therefore the need for a broad theoretical tool-kit from the social researcher in order to address tattoos in the context of the late-modern world. In discussing "wild passions," I am referring to Emile Durkheim's description of the reasons why actors use their body to display marks of their totem in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1996: 232). But I transform the word to signify not just the heated impulses fed through group influence, but also the possibilities of human expression when tied with "true" emotions.

Part of my method will be borrowed from a study of material culture by Stephen Harold Riggins. Specifically I will be using concepts defined in the text "Fieldwork in the Living Room" *as referencing* and *mapping*. According to Riggins (1994: 109), the term referencing applies to an interviewee's remarks "about the history, aesthetics or customary uses of an object." Mapping refers to how actors use objects to plot "their social network, representing their cosmology and ideology, and projecting their history onto the world's map, its spatial spread so to speak." I believe these terms will prove a rich source for this study as they represent the cultural/historical and personal meanings connected to self-identity. When asking respondents to discuss the meanings of their tattoos, I often heard remarks mostly about the social ties and personal occasions tattoos represented (mapping). While this is ideal for qualitative research into the body, art, and tattooing, it is also of equal importance for

myself, as the researcher, to provide intellectual authority on the referencing attributes of the same symbol. "...It is essential for the ethnographer to exceed the informant's often rather minimal level of referencing" (Riggins 1994: 109).

This analysis will be divided into sections based on the emerging themes from each collection of tattooees. The first people to be discussed are those who I will call the "social peacocks." These are the individuals who use tattoos in such broad social ways that they typify the contemporary style tattooee – able to adapt to any situation and to look cool while doing so. Their tattoos are sophisticated designs, reflective of the complicated meanings which are attached to them. These tattoos easily demonstrate multiple meanings from both a mapping and referencing perspective once interviewees are given the chance to do so. The second group of tattooees is the people who display "true" emotions, especially related to family. I argue, as does Atkinson (2003: 212-213), that a large part of becoming tattooed, and choosing the location and designs of the tattoo, is fueled by deep familial relations and ties. This will be evident in just how much mapping will be present in each tattoo analyzed in this section. Lastly, I will be discussing a collection of tattooees who represent issues around the body, sexuality, and gender. In this section, the topics of structure and agency are viewed once more as they aid in drawing out meaning behind tattoos and tattooees who are interested in things like beauty, femininity, and social acceptance while at the same time wishing to set themselves apart artistically through their body from constraints of their surrounding society. I believe these three themes of (1) social performance and knowledgeability of agents in crafting meaning; (2) deep and true emotions and the influence of family structures; and (3) the role of social and cultural aspects of gender, beauty, sexuality, and the body, are all ways of allowing my respondents to provide new discourses on what it means to be tattooed in the modern world. These themes will take readers into many different cultures, histories, and genres of thought. Tattoos are never about only one form of expression or social connection, but in fact are deeply human forms of social expression which have changed, and continue to record lives in multiple and complex ways.

Figure 1.

Roger

Photo: Left arm from four angles.

Description

Gender: male.
Location on body: left arm.

Colours: blue, green, pink, yellow.

Design: maneki neko with a lantern, 1960's inspired toy robot, flying saucers.

Text: N/A.
visibility: can be hidden under long sleeve shirt.
Style: new school, contemporary-style, Japanese.

Symbolic Meanings: images represent favorite bands album covers (Flaming Lips and Pixies), deceased cat, kitschy art, 1960's toy.

Social/cultural aspects: boy peacock, Kitsch.

Roger

Roger has a large number of tattoos, although because of their connectedness, and engrossing nature, he refers to them as "two major pieces." As seen in *Figure 1*, Roger's two major pieces include the contemporary popular "tattoo sleeve" in which enthusiasts devote the entire landscape of flesh on their appendage(s) to being implanted with inks of various shadings. This inked devotion is most often linked with the goal of having a mural of artwork on an arm or leg which encompasses a primary style with a large number of different designs – all flowing together as a particular genre (Japanese, New School, Sailor Jerry, etc.). These tattoo sleeves represent an example of Lévi-Strauss's metaphor of the bricolage paired with what Tania Zittoun (2006: 128) describes as a collection of "cultural elements without a clear intention" where the tattooee is left to fill in the voids or complete the sometimes scattered image with meanings and personal elements of culture. For this study, it is important to note that I propose multiple meanings can only be exemplified – and never truly exhausted – through a cultural, social, historical, and personal exploration by an external observer.

The Social Peacocks

Roger's Maneki Neko
Referencing

According to William E. Deal in *Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan*, the maneki neko or "'welcoming cat' (was traditionally) used to greet customers at Edo-period shops and (was) believed to bring prosperity to the merchant (Deal 2007: 113). This reputation for greeting customers has made the *maneki neko* a symbol of a beckoning cat whose paws can mean either more customers or more money, depending on which one is elevated. As Roger notes, "It is a *maneki neko,* a lucky cat or whatever, I believe if he has a right arm up he is trying to lure in money, and the left is about bringing luck. I have the right arm up, but it is not about money." Further analysis of the *maneki neko* in the context of the Edo period would identify the piece as a product of a "blossoming urban culture of extraordinary richness, diversity, and originality" (Guth 1996: 11). Because the *maneki neko* is often present in Chinese businesses, many people incorrectly assume it is Chinese in origin. This is most likely a result of the idea that China is often noted as "Japan's cultural mentor" and because of the fact that "the intimate relationship between painting, poetry, and calligraphy that prevailed in China also characterized artistic expression in Japan" (Guth 1996: 11).

In the context of the art world of tattooing DeMello (2000: 72) places Japanese-style tattooing like the *maneki neko* in the hands of a few pioneering characters in American tattooing. "It was Sailor Jerry (Collins) who first introduced Japanese tattoo imagery and style to U.S. tattooists like Ed Hardy, thereby directly influencing American tattooing." According to DeMello (2000: 73), Sailor Jerry had an ongoing "trade relationship with Japanese tattooist Horihide (Kazuo Oguri)." For Roger, it is interesting to note that he has developed a great deal of pride in asserting that his tattoos are often made to strike a balance between the elements of being conventional and being unique. It is apparently important to Roger to control the meanings behind his tattoos and the ways in which others interpret them.

> All of mine have coded meaning, but the thing is people grab my arms all
> the time and say "tell me what this means?" Since these meanings are
> codified, it is not always about telling everyone about them. The *maneki
> neko*, for example, has multiple meanings in that it represents a cat I had

that died, but it also represents a Frank Black album called "Show Me

Your Tears" which also features a *maneki neko* on the cover.

This type of contrast between traditional and personal influences is said to reflect the history of the Americanized Japanese tattooing style. According to DeMello, Sailor Jerry may have maintained a working relationship with Japanese artists, but he secretly held a grudge after the Second World War toward the Japanese. Because of this, he set out on a mission to use American imagery as a substitution for the focus images in traditional Japanese-style tattoos. DeMello (2000: 73) notes that Sailor Jerry believed "...what was exceptional about Japanese tattooing was not the center image but the background." This personal and cultural "give and take" is reflective of the power in the relationship between structure and agency as it serves as an intertwined precursor to social action. It is also a confirmation of the human complexities and contexts that exist on ink-marked skin.

The significance of the cat as the symbol in the *maneki neko* and in Roger's tattoo is in itself an interesting topic for discussion. As we will see in the mapping aspects of this tattoo, there are unique personal reasons why Roger chose the cat. But from a cultural aspect, it is worth noting Alger et al.'s *Cat Culture: The Social World of a Cat Shelter*. In this ethnography of a cat shelter, the social aspects of cats as members of cultures and groups of their own are discussed: "If cats can engage in such symbolic interaction, they will, given time, produce elements of culture or social organization such as norms, roles, and sanctions. That is, a group of cats over time in the same setting will produce a web of socially transmitted behaviors that constitute that group's solutions to its problems" (Alger et al. 2003: 48). If we assume that the connection humans have with pets will form another layer of symbolic interaction in itself, then we should imagine how humans can often become deeply connected with the same routines the pet has created for itself. This is significant in understanding both the human-pet relation and the deep connection humans can share with their pets as they become integrated into their daily lives as a living member of a culture of their own.

Mapping

The love of a pet can be a strong precursor to getting a tattoo. In fact, one of my latest tattoos is the boldly written name "Maxx" representing my cat that died last year. For Roger, the *maneki neko* has been given a distinct look from its usual all-white furry appearance. "It also reminds me of high school and hanging out with my friends and shit like that. I also had

a cat that died that was black and white, so I go the tattoo to match her. Of course, I am white, so the white looks more pink." What seems to influence Roger most about his tattoos is their relation to his musical ambitions and obsessions. Music has played the role in his life that Riggins (1994: 113) calls a "social facilitator." It means that music is the avenue by which Roger has been able to interact with others and create friendships. In this same spirit, the tattoos also work as "time indicators" in that they act as indelible hubs of memory which can represent specific people, attitudes, and feelings. When asked "why music?" Roger responded: "the only thing besides, like knowledge or thinking about what to do next that can keep me up at night, is the idea of just thinking about music. Like it holds in memory, emotion and it is part of your life."

While we have seen the *maneki neko* serving the role of luring business customers, its cultural history does not give it the role Roger has intended for it. According to Roger, "I also got it so the cat was part of the destruction scene, where the robot is destroying the city and the cat is the light. Like the *maneki neko* saves the day." Another reading is that the cat holds a lantern like a human and might thus suggest Diogenes the Cynic (or Diogenes of Sinope, died 323 BCE), who supposedly carried a lantern in daylight looking for an "honest" man in Athens. Roger does not seem to be aware of this reference. The tattoo which forms a necessary part of Roger's sleeve is a deeply seeded sign of love and loss for a pet while it also represents the musical side of his life. For this reason I believe the mapping aspects of this tattoo, although not as overt as the potential referencing aspects, are held in high esteem.

The Toy Robot
Referencing

So, with the robot tattoo, I don't know why it is my favorite one. I think it's because I really like kitschy 1950's cultural things. The robot I have is based on a toy I had that was a reproduction of a 1950's design.

I am not sure of the history. It is just a very iconic robot and I date it to the 50's based on other original toys like this I have seen on eBay.

After a search on eBay, I discovered that Roger had been relatively accurate about his dating of the toy robot. I also discovered that original toys of this design sell for up to $800. Peer-reviewed information on vintage toys is hard to find. Independent research conducted by

collectors tends to be the basis of information for such topics. As such, both webpages "Doc Atomic's Attic of Astounding Artifacts" and "Attacking Martian" claim the original tin robot toy is a product of the "Yonezawa Toy Company" based in Japan. Its name is "Smoking Robot" and it is popularly considered to be a toy of the early 1960s. The following pictures are from a 1963 catalogue of toys produced by the "Yonezawa Toy Company" collected from the "Attacking Martian" webpage. The close-up image is the toy purchased by the author of the blog "Doc Atomic's Attic of Astounding Artifacts."

Figure 1.A.

Figure 1.B.

According to James Allen Dator in *Social Foundations of Human Space Exploration*, at the time when these robots were designed and manufactured space exploration was on the horizon. "Space was then for visionaries and dreamers, an alluring fantasy from the ever-expanding future" and it was "an arena for adventure and romance" (Dator 2012: 32). Over time, however, space travel would evolve into an arena for Cold War rivalry. "…Since the days of the Cold War, the stern cultures of the military, government, and military-aligned businesses have taken over, and wrung all the fun and fantasy out of the enterprise. Space

now is about rockets, wars, and jobs, and not about visions and transcendence" (Dator 2012: 32). Roger shares an affinity for the romance and wonder of space. This can be noted in his tattoos of flying saucers. But instead of identifying with space travel, Roger explains his attraction to these types of images as a deep interest in "kitsch." Whereas the mysteries of space may once have been a source for romance and science fiction, Roger (like many others) has now relegated fantastic stories and speculative images such as the space robot to the world of kitsch. "So, with the robot tattoo, I don't know why it is my favorite one. I think it's because I really like kitschy 1950's cultural things. A lot of this again is about the 1950's kitschy art thing."

Esther Leslie defines kitsch in her analysis of the philosopher Walter Benjamin by noting Benjamin's understanding of this new form of "art" as a practice in the resiliency and commodification of capitalism. "Developed are new techniques of using this industrialized material – entertainment devices, cheap prints, ornaments and the rest. Novel objects, mass-produced kitsch commodities, force themselves on 'the new person,' jostling for attention in cluttered environments. Kitsch and clutter, abortions of industrial technological developments, demand the right to existence and love" (Leslie 2000: 11). A similar critique of kitschy art is found in Clement Greenberg's essay for the *Partisan Review* titled "Avant-Garde and Kitsch." In Greenberg's critical cultural analysis we see his distaste for the kitschy as it takes its place at the cultural table as the antitheses of the avant-garde.

> Where there is an avant-garde, generally we also find a rear-guard. True enough – simultaneously with the entrance of the avant-garde, a second new cultural phenomenon appeared in the industrial West: that thing to which the Germans give the wonderful name of *Kitsch*: popular, commercial art and literature with their chromeotypes, magazine covers, illustrations, ads, slick and pulp fiction, comics, Tin Pan Alley music, tap dancing, Hollywood movies, etc., etc. (Greenberg 1939: II Para 1).

Readers should recognize the struggle for true authenticity in Greenberg and Benjamin's writings. Critical theory and cultural criticism which have Marxism as their foundation maintain that true emotion cannot exist in kitsch. The only exchange is that of cold, hard cash. These perspectives look at the impact of structural determinism on choices of social action

and on the practice of art/tattooing. The personal meanings which counter these arguments can be found in the mapping aspects of the tattoo art.

Mapping:

> The toy had been a gift from a girlfriend at the time and when I was getting the tattoo I gave the toy to my artist who had other toys in his shop anyway.... It is also my (current) girlfriend's favorite tattoo.... You know also she was doing a presentation one time recently and she was really nervous. So I ended up buying her a pen with the robot on it as a way of cheering her up.

The mapping aspects of this piece, as is the case with many other tattoos which will be discussed, is the level of meaning which illustrates human agency as part of the act of getting a tattoo. The preceding quotation, which draws out the influence of multiple partners on Roger's choice of tattoo, conveys an impression of intrigue. An interest in kitsch is a choice to adore art which is not a fine art. In such a perspective we may include Roger's use of otherwise kitschy or disregarded art as a tool for personal expression as an example of the concept of "alien use" (Riggins 1994: 112). This is because the manufacturers of the toy robot, the countless reproductions of it, and the cultural fad of space travel have all contributed to the current social and personal meanings Roger attributes to the design, even if this was never meant to be the original purpose of the toy robot. This shows the polysemy that is inherent in material artifacts and in inked artifacts. An even better example of alien use in this design can be found in the comparison between the enjoyment of this tattoo by Roger's partner and his description of the interaction of everyday life as a tattooed man. "Without a doubt ... there is no girl who I've been with who hasn't liked my tattoos. It's like you're a boy peacock and they like your feathers.... You can call it a sort of sexual insurance." The ability to use one's body as a form of expression is not limited by the authenticity of designs. For Roger, what may constitute inauthentic art to some people has now shifted to an interesting and exotic category of kitsch transformed into highly decorative tattoo art.

Figure 2.

Morris

Description

Gender: male.
Location on body: left and right forearm, left hand, chest, knuckles.
Colours: red, black, blue.
Design: postmodern Icarus, knuckle lettering, phoenix, 7 roses.
Text: non serviam, stay good.

Visibility: tattoos span arms, chest, hands, and neck.
Style: old school, gang, Japanese.

Symbolic Meanings: pushing the limits, anti-binary opposites, family, death and rebirth.
Social/cultural aspects: deviance, peacock, sexual attraction, interaction-specific meanings.

Photos: Top Left: Icarus with "Non Serviam" on chest, Top Right: Knuckles "Stay Good", Bottom Left: rose on left hand, Bottom Right: Phoenix (sleeve) left arm.

Morris

My interview with Morris was one of the most interesting and challenging. This is partly because he is a graduate student studying English literature and philosophy, which means that he supplied an uneven mix of referencing and mapping perspectives on his tattoos. Although this may seem like a good thing, it is important to complete an interview with a large stock of examples of mapping. Unlike referencing which can be obtained from books and the Internet, mapping comes from only one source, the interviewee. It was also difficult for me to see the significance of some of the comments I was given until I conducted further research. Morris is one of several examples of a person giving coded meanings for his art which reside in very specific and culturally sophisticated sources. Because of the variety of meanings and mapping/referencing aspects I was given by Morris, I am forced in this case to refer to Morris' tattoos more broadly rather than to specific tattoos at a time. In exploring the referencing aspects of his tattoos I will discuss Morris' Icarus and his four-leaf clover. In regards to the mapping aspects, I will focus on his mother-inspired tattoo and with his relations with others.

Morris' Postmodern Icarus, Four-Leaf Clover, and his Mom's Roses

Referencing

> Well, the story of Icarus and Daedalus is about a father who builds wings
> for his son to escape the labyrinth but tells him not to fly too high because
> the sun will melt the wax. But we did Icarus in a postmodern pose because
> he looks like he is doing more of a Led Zeppelin pose rather than a
> traditional man with wings. It is also a reference to (James) Joyce, and his
> character Stephen Dedalus in his *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. It
> goes back to the idea of pushing it too far. Don't go too close to the sun, but
> he does it anyway. This is a symbol I associate with coming of age, with art.
> Take it too far, always take it too far. Fuck whatever instructions. This is the
> symbol for the artist. Don't follow instructions and at the end of the day
> you'll end up doing what you want to do.
>
> There is a line in the book *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* which is
> Latin that says: "non serviam." It means "I will not serve." There is a
> famous idea of Joyce leaving the Church of Ireland and saying this. It is in
> the book and it is known to be the words Satan spoke when he left Heaven.
> And Joyce was never the one to shy away from pride.

I begin this section of referencing Morris' Icarus tattoo with the above quotation because the idea of "pushing limits" placed on yourself and by others in society is without a doubt a theme that transcends all of Morris' tattoos. It is a message that is represented in the Latin words that Morris has tattooed in script on his chest which says "Non Serviam" (I will not serve). It is characterized in Morris' admiration for the idea of the artist as someone who slips into a life of questioning that which has been laid out before him or her and that which is virtuous and necessary in creating art.

In James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as Young Man*, a book that has influenced Morris' opinions and tattoos, the protagonist Stephen Dedalus writes of a life contemplated by the influences of structures of control and the possibilities of structures influenced through epiphanies. For Dedalus, the journey to consider himself an artist leads to the claim "I will not serve that in which I no longer believe, whether it calls itself my home, my fatherland or

my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or as art as freely as I can
and as wholly as I can, using for my defense the only arms I allow myself to use, silence,
exile and cunning" (Joyce 1928: 291). These words are powerful because as Morris noted "I
will not serve" has a strong connotation for a person willing to abandon a religious
upbringing in the pursuit of art. It is also popularly associated with the devil and deviance. As
Joyce noted earlier in the text before his epiphany of watching a beautiful girl "paddling in a
stream with her skirt hiked up" (Joyce 1928: 108):

> Lucifer, we are told, was a son of the morning, a radiant and mighty
> angel; yet he fell: he fell and there fell with him a third part of the host of
> heaven: he fell and was hurled with his rebellious angels to hell. What
> his sin was we cannot say. Theologians consider that it was the sin of
> pride, the sinful thought conceived in an instant: *non serviam*: I will not
> serve.

Throughout this article, I have been stressing the importance of structure and agency
as dual antecedents to any social action, including becoming tattooed. This is because, in line
with Giddens' duality of structure, there is always a consequence to action which affects and
is affected by structure. Structure is the means and end to an action. I refer to these theoretical
ideas here because there is always a reaction to any action and thus pushing limits in the
pursuit of art or otherwise will surely have an effect and this may not be the ideal outcome of
the conscious intent. While listening to Morris' description of his tattoos, I felt I had to ask
how his neck and hand tattoos might affect his ability of getting by and performing different
roles in everyday life. Like Joyce, Morris displayed a certain and intentional, although
bittersweet, satisfaction in having pushed the limits he set on himself, including where to get
tattooed.

> This four-leaf clover on my hand I got after coming home from Las Vegas
> when I won some money and I was on a rush. I went down to my artist and told
> him and he was like cool, but are you sure? People say get them, but avoid your
> hands, neck, that kind of stuff. But I got this anyway and 2 years later I have
> my neck and both my hands tattooed. It was a big one to get for breaking the
> barrier.

This idea of the consequences of action is also important in the cultural and historical significance of the classical Greek myth of Icarus. This is because Icarus is not always seen as a symbol for the virtue of pushing the limits. It is important because there is a contradictory nature in Morris' caviler attitude toward rules and structure "I see the value in structure, but I don't think it has any transcending or guiding principle."

In Wallace and Hirsch's *Contemporary Art and Classical Myth*, Sharon Sliwinski (2011: 199) draws a powerful comparison between the image of *The Falling Man* on 9/11 and Icarus. The photograph of the man jumping from the World Trade Centre in New York City on September 11, 2001, has become an image which is implanted in the minds of those who have experienced it. I say "experienced it" because as Sliwinski notes "Drew's picture is certainly mesmerizing – the calm, arrow-straight position of the figure's body, the uniformity of the background, the overwhelming sense of negative space. But the perturbation one feels when gazing upon the photograph comes from elsewhere. And it is considerably harder to speak of this perturbation that it is to speak of the picture's formal properties" (Sliwinski 2011: 201). Although the image and the myth of Daedalus and Icarus have been reproduced countless times, Sliwinski notes the 1606 woodcut by Antonio Tempesta titled *The Fall of Icarus* as the most notable and striking comparison with *The Falling Man*. According to Sliwinski (2011: 208), who recites the classical myth: "Icarus disobeyed his father's instructions and began to soar to greater and greater heights, rejoicing on the lift of his great wings ... spectators of this image once again find themselves witness to a horrifying plunge. Icarus' face is turned away from us, his robes flap helplessly in the wind, his arms and fingers stretch outwards in that unmistakable gesture of one who is falling a long, long way." Our mortality, our ambitions, and our connectedness are all evident in these images. This comparison may be a stretch in some regards, but the images which define human history are those which often lead to the same themes and messages. For Morris, it is curious to wonder about both the virtues and the potential negative consequences he may experience in "pushing the limits."

Richard Drew (2001), "The Falling Man" http://www.esquire.com/features/ESQ0903-SEP_FALLINGMAN

Antonio Tempesta (1699), "Daedalus Icaro alto nimis ambienti orbatur (The Fall of Icarus)." http://popartmachine.com/art/FASF-FASF.58478/function.pg-connect

Mapping

I began my interview with Morris who is heavily tattooed with a novel approach which occurred to me by trial and error through interviews with other tattooees. I asked him to tell me his favorite, and from there I circled around his skin canvas to explore others. To my surprise, Morris had an answer right away to my question of his favorite. His response was: "Ah my mom, I got a tattoo a couple of years ago for my mom. Just the story around it makes me think of it as having the most meaning. I enjoy my tattoos, but this one sticks out most." He gives this tattoo the most significance of any his tattoos. The meaning is an example of mapping. It is a tattoo which we can understand through what Riggins' (1994: 112) terms an "esteem object" as it represents a perceived gratified feeling and respect for both his parents and what they represent.

It's her name and seven roses. It comes from a story my dad explained to me when I was younger. He told me that when he first met my mom he was trying to court or woo her, or some crap. Anyway, he was trying to buy a dozen roses but he couldn't afford them. So he thought of buying six but

> decided that it would be too clichéd, so he waited and saved enough money
> to buy the seventh one. Now every year, on their anniversary, he still gives
> her seven roses. It's like going more than what you think you should do and
> making something your own. It's like, "fuck the status quo."

The importance of meaning was very evident in Morris' description of both family and of social interaction. In regard to interaction with others in everyday life, Morris maps out the relation he has with others who have not necessarily been reflective of the original meaning he intended for his tattoos but those who have been involved in the renegotiation of what his tattoos mean to him over time.

> I go with traditional styles of the rose but it is not as much about the
> image as it is about the symbolism and the way you arrange them. And
> maybe it is because I am a nerd or an English student but I feel that the
> meaning kind of improves as you grow. Maybe the meaning I had when I
> first got the tattoo is different now. On the other side of the coin, how
> easy it is to make up a story when you are in a bar and you don't want to
> talk to someone about your tattoos. I've come up with some pretty fun
> stories.

The chance to hear a story of meaning, one which was made up to suit a social interaction and one which has had Morris reflect upon it as a necessary part of further social interaction as a heavily tattooed individual was an opportunity I could not pass up. This story is an example of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology of interaction and of Riggins' (1994: 113) concept of social facilitators.

> Well, I don't know exactly what I said, but the situation was a lady in a
> bar that was far too drunk and I am not sure if she was hitting on me or
> whatever but she was fascinated by my tattoos. I was uncomfortable and
> she was touching me, so basically I told her I got these in prison. "This
> one is for time served," you know, whatever.

Morris' tattoos have pushed the limits on my knowledge of contemporary art and classical myths. For this reason, I count his tattoos to be some of the most complex designs, irrelevant of their actual detail which, as can be noted in *Figure 2,* is also quite extensive.

Morris and Social Theory

Morris, who considers himself to be an anti-Structuralist and even used this perspective to plan out his ink art, discusses his opposite tattoos like the grim reaper on his left forearm and the phoenix on his right forearm by saying: "And I kind of like how they are opposites but not exactly. In my academic life I am always hearing about binaries. I don't know if that's an influence of Derrida in there. But it is nice to not have exact opposites." The same sentiment is shared about his knuckle tattoos, which are another example of crossing a line of limits. "A lot of people get opposites on their fingers, but I didn't want to. I was like fuck that." These statements, coupled with the stories of interaction and the role his tattoos have in everyday life are important points in understanding Morris' tattoos and their meaning, especially if we substantiate the point through similar perspectives emphasized by Anthony Giddens and structuration theory. This is because like Morris' ideas about the meaning behind his "anti-binary opposites," Giddens' idea of meaning production is also an anti-Structuralist perspective. Kenneth Tucker (1998: 79) notes that "according to Giddens, social meaning does not simply derive from differences in enclosed linguistic systems, as many in the Saussurean tradition argue. Like Goffman, Giddens contends that meaning is bound up with practical activity in the real world. Giddens states that an adequate understanding of meaning must be tied to the ethnomethodological 'use of methods' embedded in practical consciousness."

Familial Hearts and Ink Marks:

If their Stories are True, their Truth is a Story

It is important to note that while I will discuss "true" emotion in this collection of tattooees, the word truth is not meant in a traditional sense – if such a sense can really exist – denoting a true value as opposed to false or incorrect lesser values. In fact, I use the word to illustrate the polysemic nature words, symbols, and phrases possess. In my interviews I aimed to see, listen, and record what I know to be honest emotion. These feelings like love, hope, loss, and redemption come attached to the ink marks on my respondents. These feelings form

stories which encompass a part of my interviewees' lives and embody memories which have been, and continue to be, influenced by the shifting nature of identity, meaning, and time.

Family is one of the powerful reasons given by tattoo respondents as a motivation for becoming tattooed and in choosing where to get tattooed. One hundred percent (15) of my participants listed family as part of the mapping aspects of at least one of their tattoos. The following respondents literally embody a love and kinship for family that was so strong it needed to be made permanent and part of their cultural repertoire. Tattoos are so often about being in dialogue with one's self and with others. Thus these family-inspired tattoos influence social interactions and the looking-glass self (Cooley 1998) aspects of these tattooed peoples' lives in an infinite number of ways.

Élise

An example of this blend of raw emotion and ink-marked skin comes from the next research participant who I call Élise. Élise has the entire left portion of her torso stretching right down to her thigh and up towards her shoulders marked by what she sometimes calls a "fallen angel" and at other times a "seraphim" *(Figure 3)*.

Figure 3.

Élise

Description

Gender: female.
Location on body: left torso, back, left thigh (not pictured).
Colours: black and white, blue.
Design: seraphim (fallen angel).
Text: this too shall pass.
Visibility: can be hidden with a t-shirt.
Style: gothic, portrait, detailed shading.

Symbolic Meanings: burning away the darkness, eternal sorrow, family and death.
Social/cultural aspects: deep family devotion, artistic, religious.

Referencing

According to the classic theological text *Celestial Hierarchy* by Dionysian, a seraphim "destroys and dispels every kind of obscure darkness." In Élise's case, the seraphim whose task is to dispel darkness through light, and the profane through the sacred, has been made permanent on her skin with an array of mostly black and white shading with an artistic, and emotional splash of richly coloured blue ink. The piece, which was drawn partly free-hand and partly stenciled, is a very intricate example of a contemporary-style tattoo because it beautifully blends traditional and new designs while also demonstrating an increased professionalism in artistry, depth, shading, and close attention to details. For Élise, the primary meaning of this tattoo is not its aesthetics but its symbolism.

Mapping

In line with the mapping aspects of her conversation, Élise tells me how the angel is meant to be a memorial to two siblings who passed away at young ages and are evidently deeply missed.

> The wings are tattered and broken. Her face is in anguish and the flowers
> are blue because it was my brother's favorite color. It is the only color in
> the tattoo. I have script running down my thigh that says "this too shall
> pass".... I took my brother's goalie mask and asked the artist to have the
> mask rest on the angel's lap. She is weeping over it.

For Élise, this piece is a container of memory, a painful display of emotion, a sign of love, and a representative of her artistic side. The tattoo takes on multiple meanings and gives other people a different image of her, which will indefinitely influence the way they view her body, and in turn, the way she views herself. Thus I tend to view Élise's seraphim as completing the ingredients of a structuration perspective on understanding the role a social actor plays in being both enabled and constrained by social structures while, at the same time, knowingly conveying a specific personal meaning that is not fully evident by looking at her tattoo. She has to explain the autobiographical dimensions. Élise is creating new meanings for herself and her family while still being influenced and shaped by others, namely through social definitions of art, beauty, love, and the capabilities of the institution of tattooing.

Jerry

Figure 4 shows about half of the tattoos on "Jerry's" body. The rest runs down his thigh and ends on his calf. The blend of styles, colours, motivations, meanings, and their relation to his identity has led me to count Jerry as one of the Newfoundland enthusiasts proving the complexities tattoos can carry, especially related to the way he connects them to his home and family.

Referencing

What is visible in this picture are famous images from the vicinity of St. John's, Newfoundland, which reflect the referencing aspects of Jerry's talk. The tattoos depict the Cabot Tower, "jellybean" coloured row houses, a humpback whale, and the fickle twilight sky. These tattoos represent ideas that have long been considered a source of intrigue to cultural scholars interested in Newfoundland (Overton 1988, 1996; Sider 1980; Pocius 1988). This is Newfoundland's eclectic cultural and social history and its role in providing a source of pride and a burden of responsibility to Newfoundlanders as they function as gatekeepers of the province's tradition and heritage. James Overton (1988: 6) writes that "a number of

intellectual patriots have been involved in cultural regeneration, claiming to be articulators of the collective unconscious of Newfoundland. They have attempted to come home to Newfoundland's distinct culture, searching for it, discovering it, surrendering to it, recording it, defending it, preserving it, promoting it, reviving it, and drawing inspiration from its artistic work." Overton writes so detailed and succinctly about the ongoing process of culture building and maintaining that Newfoundlanders' employ as a way of stressing the importance place can have for those involved with collective negotiations of self, culture, and belonging. In fact, Overton (1988: 6) also notes how "culture is on the march in Newfoundland.... References to tradition, culture, way of life, identity, lifestyle, and heritage liberally sprinkle the newspaper columns, the pages of various small magazines, the speeches and slogans of politicians of all stripes, and the lyrics of popular songs." Readers may note the large number and subject matter of Jerry's tattoos relating specifically to Newfoundland as a useful illustration of this type of patriotism and task in maintaining Newfoundland culture and spirit in a permanent way.

Figure 4.

Jerry

Description

Gender: male.
Location on body: left torso, back, left thigh (not pictured).
Colours: blue, orange, grey, red, yellow.
Design: underwater whale scene, St. John's, NL imagery, Cabot Tower, "jelly-bean" row houses.
Text: N/A
Visibility: can be hidden with 3/4 length sleeve.
Style: new school, Japanese style (finger) waves.

Symbolic Meanings: home, family, parental relationships, pride.
Social/cultural aspects: the importance of place, home, divorce.

Mapping

What is not visible in the image is the way Jerry maps his family, his childhood, and his views on the socialness of tattoos. Here is what Jerry says, while referring to the underwater scene on his stomach which can partly be seen in this image: "I love whales, so I got some whales.... I got some lobsters, you know, cause it reminds me of home. You know my dad [who divorced my mother] was a fisherman. So I'd get lobsters as a form of child support. The whales and lobsters were also ways to make my underwater scene unique, and the whales make it like even more of a fucking St. John's scene."

Repeatedly and voluntarily, Jerry talked about his family in relation to his tattoos. When asked if others like his tattoos, his comments gravitate toward family rather than art history. When asked if he thinks tattoos are becoming more popular, he discusses his mom's unexpected desire to get a tattoo. Despite all of this talk of family, his father was only mentioned once and then only with a sarcastic remark about his inability to provide for his child. All of these remarks contribute to Jerry's identity, his pride in Newfoundland (specifically his small home community), his pride in family, and his wish to be unique. All provide an in-depth look at his self-identity as it has been recursively affected by others. Importantly it also describes how Jerry views his body as a vehicle to display such complex sentiments: "I was like, fuck it. I'll just use my entire body. I can't just get one tattoo."

Beauty and Art: Gender, the Body, and Self-expression

To recap, the *social peacocks* have allowed us to see the creative and expressive nature of human agency in conversation with others. The *familial hearts in ink marks* demonstrate the enabling aspect of group or structural influence. Now it is time to view another category of tattooees who fully demonstrate both the enabling and the constraining aspects of structure which influence their ability to commit themselves and their bodies to becoming tattooed. To be clear, this means that although tattoos are representations of both our *wild passions* which define us and mementos of ephermal moments which populate our lives – they are also influenced by the cultures which we live in / live through and by *Fine Lines* (Zerubavel 1991) which are drawn as objective realities in culture and come to form real consequences in our lives.

These *Fine Lines*, as Eviatar Zerubavel points out in cognitive sociology, are the lines social actors draw in their minds in order to interpret the world from different objective realities. Where we – as a social collective or culture – place the line, influences and begins a

cycle of acceptance, repetition, and finally the construction of a new reality which forms "real" consequences of its own. "Separating one island of meaning from another entails the introduction of some mental void between them. As we carve discrete mental chunks out of continuous streams of experience, we normally visualize substantial gaps separating them from one another" (Zerubavel 1991: 21). In other words, "the lines drawn in the sand" by the cultures we live in come to form boundaries and levels of acceptance for social phenomena. This is the experience of the tattooed individual. While the line is constantly withdrawn and constructed again, tattooed individuals can often be subject to real consequences from *social laws* (Tarde, as referenced in Ruitenbeek 1963) that do not really exist. *Social Laws* by Gabriel Tarde, a contemporary of Durkheim, is mentioned here because the epistemological description of science and the resulting creation of social laws that Tarde explores in this pivotal work, I suggest, are mirroring processes to the development of Zerubavel's fine lines. As Tarde notes: "thus science consists in viewing any fact whatsoever under three aspects, corresponding, respectively, to the repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations which it contains and which are obscured by a mass of variations, dissymmetries, and disharmonies" (Tarde, as quoted in Ruitenbeek 1963: 101). These concepts will become more clear when we focus on the tattooed individuals who will be discussed in the final category of analysis for this article. These tattooees are the people who openly shared their feelings with me about what has influenced and continues to shape their roles as social actors in deciding to become tattooed, where to get tattooed, and the appearance of their tattoos.

Not everyone can get tattooed. It is costly. It is painful. It is increasingly regulated by age and by shop practice. And it is also a permanent corporeal commitment which can impact the life not only of tattooees but also the people they will interact with in the future. As 73% of my sample (11) is female, gender is a good starting point in discussing the constraining aspects of structure. Sociologists from the symbolic interactionist tradition (Blumer 1969, Goffman 1959) make it perfectly clear that the desire to look favourable while interacting with others is an inherent part of what it means to be social. Anthony Giddens (1991: 100) provides an interactionist-influenced perspective on the reflexive self which focuses on society's constraints on bodies: "Not only must an individual be prepared to interact with others in public places, where demeanour is expected to meet certain generalized criteria (fine lines) of everyday competence, but he or she must be able to maintain appropriate behaviour in a variety of settings or locales. Naturally, individuals adjust both appearance and demeanour somewhat according to the perceived demands of the particular setting." Similarly, the ideas of Michel Foucault are of key importance in understanding biopolitical

influences on our bodies. While discussing discourses on medicine and proper *care of the self,* Foucault (1986: 100-101) notes "*...* whether we are walking or sitting, whether we are oiling our body or taking a bath, whether we are eating, drinking – in a word, whatever we may do, during the whole course of life and in the midst of life's diverse occupations, we have need of advice for an employment of this life that is worthwhile and free of inconvenience." These remarks, put the following narratives under a lens which clarifies not only the expressive human agency in getting a tattoo, but also the world of structural influences which constrain and enable our decisions and how we live with the consequences of these fine lines or social laws. Although I believe it is always important to see the subject in the constitution of social action like getting tattooed, it would also be irresponsible to ignore all the men, and particularly woman, I talked with and who provided stories about outside influences on their body and their concept of gender.

Rachael

While discussing her family's reactions to her tattoos, Rachael adds a gendered perspective on her tattoos. And although it is clear from her words and non-verbal expressions that her family's opinions about her tattoos are important to her in many ways, it is also clear that Rachael has a certain desire to break the gender barrier and in the words of Betty Friedan in the pivotal *Feminine Mystique* (1963: 73) provide "an act of rebellion, a violent denial of the identity of women as it (has) been defined ... to shatter, violently if necessary, the decorative Dresden figurine that represented the ideal woman of the last century." The language used in feminist scholarship is powerful and emotion-provoking because that is necessary to provoke change and new modes of thought. Rachael counters the feminine images of the past, alluded to in Friedan's work, by noting:

Figure 5.

Rachael

Description

Gender: female.
Location on Body: right-upper bicep, right forearm.
Colours: blue, white, red, green.
Design: Salvador Dali- Meditative Rose.
Text: just like autumn leaves, we're in for change.
Visibility: can be hidden with 3/4 length sleeve.
Style: surrealism, reproduction art.

Symbolic Meanings: love and personal connection with art, change.
Social/Cultural Aspects: femininity, beauty, art, ownership of the body, divorce, family.

I get some good and some bad (reactions to my tattoos). And the bad mostly come from my family. Like a lot of people are interested in the tattoos, but others not so much. My grandmother called me "damaged goods" when I was 18. She looked at me and said "who is going to marry you with your body like that?" My father also sighs every time I tell him I have another one. But I didn't need him. Around the time I started to get them my parents were getting divorced. I think he doesn't like them because he wasn't part of the discussions my mom and I had about getting them.

With my grandmother I could never really get a chance to tell her what they meant. It doesn't really even make any sense because I have male cousins who have tattoos and she doesn't really say anything to them. I am the damaged one. And I don't want to have to justify myself to anyone. These are for me.

With these remarks in mind, we may begin to reference and map two of Rachael's tattoos so we can come to appreciate how the social and personal are reflected in her tattoos. In their aesthetic, their placement, and their meanings, Rachael's tattoos say something about her desire to express her own interests and also the enabling and constraining structures limiting her options.

Rachael's tattoo of Salvador Dali's Meditative Rose

Referencing

Surrealism is a unique genre of painting, literature, and poetry that emphasizes the logic of the illogical, the "logic" of dreams, for example. According to *Modern Art 1900-1945: The Age of the Avant-Gardes*: "Given its anti-logical and irrational character, contrary to all codification and hostile to rules and hierarchies, the surrealist movement had no homogenous or unitary structure; it can be said that there were as many surrealisms as there were artists who, to a greater or lesser degree, made surrealist art" (Crepaldi 2007: 207). But a more precise definition of the art form can be taken from André Breton's 1924 *Manifeste du Surréalisme* which defines surrealism as "psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express – verbally, by means of written word, or in any other manner – the actual functioning of thought. It is dictated by thought in the absence of any control being exercised by reason and is exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern" (Breton, as quoted in Crepaldi 2007: 206). Salvador Dali (1904-1989) was an eclectic and controversial artist who is commonly associated with surrealism. An example of how Dali's work has been discussed as surrealist art can be taken from the book *Dali and Surrealism*:

Within a highly sophisticated and carefully structured pictorial mental landscape (Dali) used devices to create formal visual analogies for the experience of dreams and hallucinations…. Odd or apparently illogical

connections are made between disparate objects or groups of objects, and

people or things can metamorphose unexpectedly into something else,

for no apparent reason (Ades 1982: 75).

Influenced by the work of Sigmund Freud, Dali used surrealism to explore one of the most potentially illogical forms of cognition: dreams. Moreover, a reason why Dali's work is considered surrealist can be drawn from the general cultural dissent and marginality he was said to have felt. According to Dali in the book *Dali by Dali* "I have always been an anarchist and a monarchist at the same time. Let us not forget the two founders of anarchism were Prince Kropotkin and princely Bakunin. I am, and have always been, against the bourgeoisie" (Dali 1970: 64-65). The spirit of surrealism is one which has far-reaching influences.

Surrealism has been quite influential in mid-twentieth-century French culture. Paul Bouissac, French intellectual and Structuralist – known for studying the unconscious logic which governs the culture of the circus (See Bouissac 1985, 2010) – candidly discusses the impact the surrealist movement had on his intellectual outlook: "… but at the same time, surrealism had already permeated the (French intellectual) culture. Through exhibitions, it was present in my cultural environment. And it was marked by a coefficient of value." This coefficient of value describes "things which I would look at positively, if only because they were marked by a sign of marginality, subversion, cultural rebellion, and so on. I never felt mainstream. This was the general attractiveness or rebellious cultural movement in surrealism" (Bouissac, as quoted in Riggins 2003: 100).

Given the spontaneity surrealists idealized, it is an interesting juxtaposition to put Dali in the context of structures of control on the body and gender. But the motives behind surrealism no doubt parallel some of the practices of tattooing. Tattoos are very often a form of surrealist art in that they are marks of expression that can, and have been, tied to rebellion, cultural subversiveness, and social marginality. One aspect of getting tattooed is the topic of control, in Rachael's case the decision to hide her tattoos, if necessary:[3]

Well I actually started placing them in spots that made the tattoos nice

but so they could also be hidden. You know, if I have to get a job or

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[3] All (100%) respondents indicated some form of concern for their tattoos when it came to employment. Although this is most likely a result of the fact that all respondents are students working toward a career, it is nonetheless very telling of the cultural misconceptions about tattoo enthusiasts that still exists and thus have real consequences.

anything, it was a big concern for my mom on signing off on the first

couple. At the end of the day, she wanted to make sure I could still get a

job.

Nevertheless, a message that Rachael's tattoo embodies is that a tattoo can equally be a sign of personality and self-expression while doubling as a sign of cultural difference or rebellion. For example, Rachael's comment quoted earlier, which expresses the way she believes other people view her body as "damaged goods" shows how her tattoos are living examples of the constraining and enabling aspects of structure. The only way a tattooee can claim to be different is by first being the same. But this does not mean that the notions of surrealist art die when one chooses to adhere to certain "civilizing processes" (Atkinson 2004; Elias 2000).

Tattoos are, first and foremost, about self and social expression; and this means they can be a sign of adherence to culture while, at the same time, a mark of difference, personality, and uniqueness. As both are present, it is not intellectually sound to claim that tattoos are only an adherence to cultural repertoires of body projects suited strictly to prove the enthusiast is part of a collective. On the other hand, it is also not sound to claim that tattoos are only about being different, unique, and disconnected from the status quo. The expressive nature of tattoos becomes complicated when they bridge the relationship between individual and culture. This is why tattoos can be about being part of a figuration, but they can also be part of a deeply personal story. "Like when I look at my arms," Rachael says, "I felt they were always meant to be there – like a birthmark or something. I can't even imagine myself without them at this point.... And for me, these are for me. I'm okay with not everyone being able to always see them all the time. They are also about being fun and representing growing up a little bit."

In sum, Rachael's Salvador Dali tattoo of a rose floating in air – illogical surrealist image and a symbol of traditional femininity – is yet another example of a tattoo's "coefficient of value." Even if surrealists aim to find the unconscious logic in the illogical, and soon end up with some standardized images, there is always the possibility of creativity in art and in interpretation. And even while feminist movements have fundamentally altered the way we view gender inequalities, influences still remain from structures of control which contend with structures of change and creative individuality. The structures of control are forces like *hegemonic masculinity* and *ideal body types* that continue to fuel the fight for equality among scholars in gender studies (Atkinson 2011; Kimbrell 1995) and feminism (MacKinnon 1989; Smith 1987).

Mapping: Rachael's "T.V. on the Radio" Lyrics

As was the case with Roger, music plays a big part in Rachael's life and functions as a *social facilitator* (Riggins 1994:113) for friendships and relationships. During our interview Rachael spoke repeatedly about her boyfriend, an English Major, musician, and a tattooed person. When speaking about the popularity of text tattoos, Rachael mentions how she "had (her) boyfriend look over (her) tattoo a dozen times to assure the grammar would be correct, just in case." The lyrics Rachael has tattooed on her left forearm are: "Just like autumn leaves we're in for change." The message comes from the song "Province" by the band T.V. on the Radio. The idea of change is something that this article broaches time and time again, in reference to meanings, identity, emotions, expressions, etc. This is why I believe Rachael's tattoo about change is an insightful commonsense addition to my dataset.

Rachael describes the tattoo by saying "I think about that (changing). I think if I could always like a tattoo as specific as these lyrics. But even if I change, these are the things that are important to me in different times of my life. So I will never hate them." Tattoos form part of our social and cultural repertoires as enthusiasts. But they also form part of our body, our skin, our story. Tattoos represent how even the most permanent of things like body and mind change over time even while they remain the same. Rachael describes the liberating feeling when we understand change as both inevitable and enabling: "I spent the whole summer before coming to university planning out my next four years and I have figured out you can't plan everything. Things will change and this is not a bad thing." The chorus of "Province" by T.V. on the Radio says "all our memories are precious as gold." One lesson I have learned from my discussions with these enthusiasts and from myself is that tattoos are a powerful way humans have invented for preserving what is most precious in our lives. Memories fade more quickly than the ink of tattoos.

Figure 6.

Elle

Description

Gender: female.
Location on Body: right thigh, left torso.
Colours: green, blue, burnt orange.
Design: peacock feather, three lilly on a vine.
Text: N/A.
Visibility: can be hidden with pants and t-shirt.
Style: realism, new school

Symbolic Meanings: katimavik, women's shelter volunteer, sisters and family.
Social/Cultural Aspects: feminism, masculinity crisis, feeling pretty.

Elle

The Peacock Revisited

Referencing – Elle's Peacock Feather

Elle's peacock feather tattoo was influenced by the idea that "the really pretty (peacock feathers) actually belong to the male … and although the feather belongs to the masculine, it can also be pretty." According to Elle, "I know women have always been marginalized by gendered assumptions, but I am also interested in the masculinity crisis." Elle's feelings about her tattoo are reflective of her opinions about the issues of gender, the body, and feminism in Western culture. For Elle, her tattoos represent an act of rebellion from gender stereotypes or assumptions; but they also represent her connection with her human desire to look and feel pretty and to be part of a collective.

Although the idea of feeling pretty is often equated with femininity, this article has shown – through the use of the peacock feather – that tattoos are about demonstrating a

favorable aspect of self and social identity to others for both men and women. Thus, what Elle's tattoo says about the gender lines of society and the current state of feminist scholarship is entangled with notions of her human desires to be attractive, to fit in, and by the masculinity crisis. Just like the motivations for her tattoo, Elle's opinions on feminism demonstrate a popular new spin on gender studies (see Atkinson 2011; Faludi 1999; Farrell 2001). This is the connection between resisting or rebelling against the hegemony and patriarchy of Western culture (or perhaps world culture), while also understanding complicated identities and human emotions which obfuscate meta-narratives of an egalitarian society. Here is what Elle says about the discipline of feminism:

> Well, you get into this whole grey area. Sometimes I hate what feminism
> has been equated with. I recognize that my female sisters have been
> wholly oppressed, but I have been given so many opportunities being
> female. Basically, I feel I would just be a lot happier if gender didn't
> exist.

Since Elle mentions the masculinity crisis and the notion of the pretty peacock, scholars writing in the field of gender and masculinity studies need to be discussed here. As I understand the topic, they allow for a new spin on scholarship which describes no gender as "safe" from the perils of mistaken and misattributed identities and confused states of belonging. The most valuable lesson of any study trying to explain gender is that a focus on the micro before attacking the macro is necessary for understanding the nuanced mistreatment of others based on gender for both men and women. In other words, although shattering glass ceilings may be on the agenda, those who live above and below should first be forewarned before their realities become shards of broken glass.

According to Atkinson (2011: 42), the principles of Bauman's *Liquid Modernity* (2001) and Giddens' high or late modernity (1991) can help us understand the ever-changing – interaction specific – gender performances of skilled social actors in everyday life: "The late modern man is powerful when he finally accepts and wields his ability to change the nature and performance of his masculinity when need be, when emergent situations demand him to enact gender in a variety of ways." Susan Faludi makes a similar observation of the complicated roles a man faces in contemporary culture in her influential book *Stiffed: The*

Betrayal of the American Man (1999). While participating in ethnographic research at weekly-meetings of domestic violence groups, Faludi makes note of the men who had "lost their compass in the world. They had lost or were losing, jobs, homes, cars, and families. They had been labeled outlaws, but felt like castoffs. Their strongest desire was to be dutiful and to belong, to adhere with precision to the roles society has set for them as men… (and they had) nothing but the gender rule book to fall back on" (Faludi 1999: 9).

The peacock feather is a symbol for a new understanding of gender as an issue underscoring the life of men and women in the late-modern world. The tattoo is thus an act of rebellion in making note of this fact and purposefully mocking the gendered barriers of masculine/feminine, pretty/strong, male/female. But it is also representative of the confusion of roles felt by men and women in their desire to act out gender-appropriate roles in specific situations. In a sense the peacock is a confusing symbol of gender because most people will associate feathers with traditional femininity. Show girls used to wear feathers. A generation or so ago women often had feathers in their hats. Most people will overlook the fact that it is the male which has the brightest feathers in many species of birds. Elle's contribution to our understanding of the importance of structure as an enabler and constrainer is contextualized through her unwavering desire to maintain attributes of pretty and nice, while also allowing her to play on these biopolitical principles as a motivation for artwork which mocks these very principles.

Elle says, "oh yeah, I wanted to look pretty. Everyone wants to look pretty. Boys want to look pretty too." The idea of wanting to look pretty was mentioned as important to 67% of my sample and of this percentage, 2 or 20% were males. I believe this is part of the performance and communicative aspect of tattoos. As art, tattoos are designed with shapes and lines that flow, look elegant, evoke feeling, and show emotion. In this way, the artistic principles of tattoos (of which gender rules often apply) are often the ways in which tattoos can be most constrained and enabled by the structures which influence them.

Mapping

The peacock feather says a lot about very complicated socio-cultural issues. But Elle did not spend much time speaking about them. Instead, her experiences as a volunteer with Katimavik (Inuktitut for "meeting place") are what define this tattoo's meanings for Elle.

Katimavik is a program that began in 1977 as a mission for Canadian youth volunteers to be exposed to other cultures, people, and to a much broader appreciation of Canada as civically engaged citizens (http://www.katimavik.org/our-mission). Elle describes her participation with the program as "life-changing" and says "I was a Katimavik participant during 2008-09 and I was a volunteer at a woman's shelter in Slave Lake in the nearby First Nations reserve in Blind River. Our main responsibility as volunteers was to decorate and run the charity gala. The centerpiece for the tables was peacock feathers and as a parting gift they gave me an Inuksuk and two peacock feathers from the gala."

The influence this program had on Elle's life is very evident not only in her choice to make this symbol permanent on her body, but also in the way she describes the feelings of empowerment in helping women and coming to an understanding of what it means to be a woman and part of a team. Elle says her family does not generally support her tattoos, but "the tattoo on my leg has a lot of significance to me. So my family members seem to try and to understand a little when I tell them."

Conclusions

Through the case studies of these six tattooees and the supporting knowledge and perspective given by the rest of my sample, this article has identified three categories of tattoo enthusiasts who embody and describe what it means to be tattooed in the modern world, and importantly what tattoos can mean to those who don them and to the culture and history of symbols which contextualize them. Every mark of self and culture that we make on the world is always influenced by a plethora of circumstances and principles. I have identified three categories of interviewees: (1). *Social Peacocks*, (2). *Familial Hearts*, (3). *Beauty and Art Enthusiasts*. This allows for an interpretation of Giddens' structuration theory and thus corresponds to the following ingredients in the constitution of social action:

1. Those which allow us to see an example of the creative human agency.

2. Those which are inspired by the enabling aspects of structure (family).

3. Those which demonstrate both the enabling and constraining aspects of social structure.

In each category I have drawn out the multiple meanings existing in the ink through tools introduced by Riggins (1990, 1994), referencing and mapping. The overall message is that tattoos are more than marks of culture or marks of individuality. They are something we make in order to be in contact with other people, but also to be in contact with ourselves.

Tattoos are about self and social expression and this means for some people that they may have a rebellious feel to them. They may be about setting yourself apart. But they are never about only one thing. Because they mean something different to us than to the people around us, some may consider our ink rebellious while we consider it artistic, beautiful, signs of love, or memento of where we've been. The cliché "don't judge a book by its cover" is a relevant conclusion to this research because as we have seen through an exploration of the genres of art (surrealism, Greek myths, contemporary photography, Japanese tattooing); and through references to feminism, elite literature, and ancient theological texts, that tattoos are much more complicated than they are normally depicted.

Tattoos are symbolic of the places we have been, the people we have known and have been in conversation with, and even the intrigue we have as social beings with far-off places we have not, or may never, experience. Popular tattoo designs like Chinese characters, Latin phrases, or Japanese mythical images can be seen tattooed on bodies of individuals who are not fluent in either the language or the cultural nuances reflected in these "far-off" designs. From this research, I wish to theorize the following reason for such discrepancies: First, people get tattoos that may be in different languages or have obfuscated meanings in some way because this is part of the ability agents have in making meaning coded and controlled. We note this with Morris who wishes to have his tattoos sometimes be a secret to himself or from the occasional onlooker. Second, tattoos are about art and this means enthusiasts and their tattoo artists often work together to create designs that are both personally and visually/socially appealing. This means people choose designs often because of aesthetics, capabilities of the art of tattooing, and its relevancies to their wishes and tastes. For example, Rachael expressed these ideas while talking about the placement of her tattoos and transformative elements of surrealist art to tattoo art. Third and finally, one of the most exciting aspects of any form of art whether it be on a canvas, vinyl, string, or skin, is its mystery and its ability to foster a multiplicity of interpretations and personal and social relevancies. When I started to research this topic I found a book at a local bookstore that had connected some popular tattoo designs with a finite definition of the symbol across the page. This book gave me the motivation to do research that did the exact opposite. Readers should

not leave this discussion with an understanding of what some tattoos mean, but instead what tattoos can mean and how this meaning will change over time and space and from person to person.

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The Mimesis Hierarchy of semiotic development: Five stages of intersubjectivity in children

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Abstract

The paper proposes that intersubjectivity develops in children along a progression of five, more or less distinct, stages of semiotic development. The theoretical model within which this is couched is the Mimesis Hierarchy (MH) model (Zlatev & Andrén 2009). As in previous treatments, the MH-model focuses on bodily mimesis, its "precursors" (empathetic perception) and "post-developments" (conventionality, language and narrative). Mimesis is pivotal since it provides the basis for the development of (i) conventions (through imitation), (ii) intentional communication, and (iii) for bringing the two together in communicative, shared representations (signs). The main difference from previous applications is in the treatment of the concepts of representation and communicative intent. Due to recent empirical findings, and a more bodily-enactive and social-oriented perspective, I propose that Stage 2 gives rise to imitation and mimetic schemas (Zlatev 2007, in press), but that the first gestures (or vocalizations) of children are neither externalizations of these "internal representations", nor fully-fledged representations/signs on their own, but action schemas bi-directionally associated with particular contexts. That would explain why the onset of intentional communication occurs in Stage 3 with pointing and other deictic gestures (such as showing), which are not representations or fully-fledged (explicit) signs, but rather performative communicative acts, accompanied with makers of communicative intent. It is first in Stage 4 that the proto-representations of Stage 2 and the communicative intent of Stage 3 are combined to give rise to communicative iconic gestures, and more generally to the "insight" of using communicative, shared representations, or what is commonly referred to as symbols or signs.

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1. Introduction

Children develop from birth, and possibly even earlier, not just *cognitively*, i.e. what they *know* about their surrounding physical and social environment, but in terms of *meaning,* i.e. their value-based relationship to the world as subjects of experience (Zlatev 2009). With time, this relationship changes, acquires new dimensions and undergoes transitions. In other words: children undergo *semiotic development*.[2]

Different theorists have focused on different aspects and periods of such development. Trevarthen (1979) and Trevarthen & Hubley (1978) charted basic social capacities: from neonatal imitation, to "proto-conversations" and eventually triadic interactions around objects, and described the changes during the first year of life as a gradual shift from primary to secondary intersubjectivity. From a similar theoretical approach, Reddy (2003, 2005) reported evidence for surprisingly early awareness of self and other. Moro (2011) has rather focused on the role of interactions with cultural artifacts, and how children thereby expand their semiotic horizons through the help of others. Tomasello's (1999, 2003) interest has rather been on the second year of life, with the development of joint attention, pointing, the understanding of communicative intent, and the first indisputable steps in the acquisition of language: from the production of the first words around 14 months, through the "vocabulary spurt" around 18-20 months, to the first multi-word constructions. Nelson (1996, 2003) has convincingly shown how the development of language implies cognitive-semiotic development, in particular through the ability to construct narratives, and with their help autobiographical memories, from the fourth year of life. But while language is a key semiotic resource, from a cognitive-semiotic perspective, other resources should not be underestimated. Thus, the studies of DeLoache (2004) on children's progressive understanding of pictorial representation constitute an important complement.

Such research has given us important insights on children's semiotic development. One drawback, however, which becomes evident if we compare any of the mentioned studies with Piaget's classical developmental theory (Piaget 1954, 1962), is that they appear quite specific, with focus on particular ages and cognitive-semiotic skills such as interpersonal interactions, artifacts, intentions, words, narratives, pictures... While some would claim that the quest for

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[2] Of course, cognition and mieaning are closely intertwined, and the term "semiotic developpemtent" should be viewed as a short-hand for cognitive-semiotic development.

such general developmental theories as Piaget's is outmoded, there is something quite unsatisfactory with the current "particularist" zeitgeist in much of developmental psychology. Lenninger (2012), for example, urges to consider children's semiotic development more holistically.

The particularist flavor of most studies of semiotic development stems, in part, from the fact that the mastery of specific semiotic resources such as language and picture-understanding takes place at different periods of development, and it has not been clear whether, and if so *how* these are related. In this respect a crucial social-semiotic skill, which was intentionally omitted above, differs: *children's gestures* which are generally agreed to co-develop with speech (Bates et al. 1979; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow 1998; McNeill 2005; Andrén 2010). Gesture, however, has been argued by Donald (1991, 2001) to be part of a more general cognitive-semiotic suite, for which Donald reserves the Aristotelian concept *mimesis*, understood as "the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are intentional but not [narrowly] linguistic" (Donald 1991: 168). According to Donald, bodily mimesis evolved in our ancestors during the past two million years, as "the result of evolving better conscious control over action. In its purest form, it is epitomized by four uniquely human abilities: mime, imitation, skill [rehearsal], and gesture." (Donald 2001: 263)

In previous work, I have argued that bodily mimesis is intimately linked with the human capacity for *intersubjectivity*, understood as "the sharing of affective, perceptual and reflective experiences between two or more subjects, [which] can take different forms, some more immediate, while others more mediated by higher cognitive [-semiotic] processes" (Zlatev 2008a: 215). Furthermore, since it is possible to identify close "precursors" to mimesis on the one hand, and language can be seen as essentially post-mimetic on the other, I have proposed a *Mimesis Hierarchy*, consisting of five more or less distinct levels, each building cumulatively on top of the previous. The application of this model to human cognitive-semiotic evolution, and in particular to the evolution of language, has been productive (Zlatev 2008b). Since the levels of the Mimesis Hierarchy are sufficiently generally defined (see Section 2), it is also possible to apply the model to children's semiotic development, without evoking any simplistic notion of "recapitulation". This was essentially the argument presented in previous work (Zlatev & Andrén 2009), where we focused on the development of children's gestures, and to some extent speech.

The goal of the present article is to elaborate on this, proposing that the five levels of the model correspond to *five more or less distinct stages in the development of intersubjectivity*: from basic empathy to folk psychology. Since intersubjectivity is arguably one of the essential characteristics of the human mind (Zlatev et al. 2008), these stages should also be expected to involve other cognitive-semiotic skills. Thus, I submit that the Mimesis Hierarchy may serve as the basis for *a general model of semiotic development*, unifying many of the approaches mentioned earlier. A likely objection to a multi-stage developmental model was anticipated by Zlatev & Andrén (2009: 380-381):

> The concept of *developmental stage* played a central role in nearly all the classic theories of cognitive, emotional, and moral development of the past century, such as those of Montessori, Piaget, Kohlberg, Freud, Erikson and Vygotsky. In language acquisition, "it is possibly the most often used term" (Ingram 1989: 32). During the last two decades, however, the stage concept has come under a good deal of critique for being inconsistently defined (or not defined at all), failing to predict the varying performance of children in different cognitive domains (Gardner 1992), being too discrete and static (Siegler 1996) and often implying a complete replacement and "dismantling" of the previous stage, while "no emerging domain disappears; each remains active and interacts dynamically with all the others" (Stern 1998: xii). However, such critiques can be taken as implying the need to *improve* on the notion of developmental stage, rather than reject it.

The concept assumed in the present article is similar to that proposed earlier: *a stage in the development of X, is a (relatively stable) period in life, characterized by the consolidation of a novel cognitive-semiotic capacity, which may dominate the expression of X at this stage, but does not replace capacities from previous stages.* Since "modularity" is no longer as generally accepted as it was in the last decades of the past century, such a concept may be (once again) found fruitful. Section 2 presents the concept of bodily mimesis, and the Mimesis Hierarchy in its application to *the development of intersubjectivity in children*. In Section 3, I will briefly review research that mostly supports the original model (Zlatev & Andrén 2009), but also calls for some important modifications. These will be summarized in the final section, which also provides brief comparisons with similar models, and general conclusions.

2. Bodily mimesis and the Mimesis Hierarchy model of semiotic development

Bodily mimesis is either realized through action, or else this action could be imagined, virtual, or as currently popularly phrased: "simulated". To delineate it from other similar phenomena such as mimicry ("from below"), or signed language ("from above"), the following definition will suffice:

(DEF) An act of cognition or communication is **an act of bodily mimesis** if and only if:

1) It involves a *cross-modal mapping* between exteroception (e.g. vision) and proprioception (e.g. kinesthesia).

2) It is *under conscious control* and *is perceived by the subject to be similar to* some other action, object or event.

3) The subject *intends* the act to stand for some action, object or event *for an addressee,* and for the addressee to recognize this intention.

4) It is *not fully conventional* (and normative).

5) It does *not divide (semi)compositionally* into meaningful sub-acts that *systematically relate* to other similar acts (as in grammar).

This is nearly the same definition as that provided earlier (Zlatev 2008a, 2008b), with the difference that clause (2) has been simplified, and now explicitly involves *similarity*: as in acts of imitation, or in bodily-iconic signs (gestures, pantomimes). Unlike in previous treatments, acts of pointing qualify as mimetic acts to the extent that they are imitated, but not in general. However, since the specifics of pointing acts are largely culture-typical, and there is good evidence that they are learned by children at least in part through imitation (Tomasello 1999), pointing should nevertheless be regarded as an instance of bodily mimesis, and when accompanied with communicative intent, as triadic mimesis (see below).

The Mimesis Hierarchy (hence, MH) follows straightforwardly from this definition, once it is stated that if only (1) is fulfilled, the act is one of *Proto-mimesis*; that (1) and (2) together qualify for *Dyadic (non-intentionally communicative) mimesis*, and only when (3) is added is there full *Triadic (intentionally communicative) mimesis*. When also (4) and (5), the negative criteria in the definition, are fulfilled we have rather two post-mimetic stages: *Protolanguage*

(with little systematicity, i.e. "grammar") and *Language*, with sufficient systematicity to allow the construction of discourse and narratives. Table 1 displays the MH applied to the development of intersubjectivity, listing (i) crucial novel cognitive-semiotic capacities that define the stage compared to its predecessor, (ii) example skills that may be regarded as "behavioral indexes" and (iii) approximate age-periods. All of these will be further motivated and illustrated in the following section.

Prior to that, I wish to highlight three points. First, the "novel features" for each successive stage are formulated in a way that expresses their fundamentally interpersonal character, with some changes compared to earlier formulations, especially concerning Stages 3 and 4 and the transition between them. Second, many of the aspects of semiotic development mentioned in Section 1, from neonatal imitation to narrative, figure as specific "skills" in the model: a testimony to its integrating character. Third, the MH is a "layered model" in the sense of Stern (1998) or the "Russian doll" model of empathy of de Waal (2007), where higher levels engulf lower ones rather than replace them, as in the classical Piagetian framework (at least as commonly interpreted).

Table 1. The Mimesis Hierarchy of children's semiotic development, with focus on the development of intersubjectivity

1	Proto-mimesis	Empathetic perception	- neonatal imitation - emotional contagion - "proto-conversations" - synchronous (joint) attention	0-9 m
2	Dyadic mimesis	Volitional control and Imitation	- generalized/deferred imitation - coordinated (joint) attention	9-14 m
3	Triadic mimesis	Communicative intent	- declarative pointing - reciprocal (joint) attention - associative schemas	14-20 m
4	Protolanguage	Communicative, conventional representations ("signs")	- vocabulary spurt - reorganization of gestures - gradual increase in utterance complexity	20-30 m
5	Language	Language-mediated folk psychology	- complex sentences - discourse - onset of narrative	30 m -

3. Five stages in the development of intersubjectivity

The challenges for any stage model of development is to provide (i) an account of the factors that organize the *coherence* of a particular stage, (ii) link these which particular *manifestations*, as testified by evidence and (iii) account for the factors (other than maturation) bringing about a *transition* of a consecutive stage. The aim of this section is to provide (i)-(iii), albeit in summary fashion, for the each of the five stages.

Stage 1: Empathetic perception *(0-9 months)*

The phenomenological tradition, and prominently Merleau-Ponty (1962), has contributed to a notion of perception as active and empathetic, in which the feeling body (*Leib*) "resonates" with the world, and especially with con-specifics. Despite some exaggerated initial enthusiasm, the "mirror neuron" literature of the past decade (cf. Iacoboni 2008 for a summary) has provided a series of hard-science confirmations of this conception, according to which in perception, the actions of others are "mapped" onto one's own bodily actions and sensations.

The now classical studies of *neonatal imitation* of Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1983), showing that newborn babies are capable of imitating simple movements involving mouth-opening, tongue-protrusion, lip-protrusion, and simple hand movements, have provided evidence that at least some of this capacity is innate, i.e. present at birth (Gallagher 2005). At the same time, it undoubtedly undergoes gradual post-natal development, e.g. as caregivers engage in "imitating games", e.g. matching the baby's first spontaneous smiles with their own. Infants thus spontaneously learn to share in the somatosensory states of others, and thus realize a basic form of empathy, which may generally be defined as "any process where the attended perception of the object's [i.e. other's] state generates a state in the subject that is more applicable to the object's [i.e. other's] state or situation than to the subject's own prior state or situation" (Preston & de Waal 2002: 4). In its simplest form, this can be observed in *emotional contagion*, familiar from situations in which crying "catches on" in a post-natal ward. Towards the 6th month, infants also learn to orient themselves in the direction where the other is looking: a form of *attention contagion*, or the simplest kind of joint attention, "synchronous", (Zlatev, Brinck & Andrén 2008, see below)

While the proto-mimetic behaviors mentioned in the previous paragraph have also been demonstrated (albeit in weaker forms) in other non-human primates (Preston & de Waal 2002; Zlatev 2008a), other more finely tuned "orchestrations" of what Trevarthen (1979) refers to as *primary intersubjectivity* have not. For example, starting from 2 months, the "proto-conversations" of caregivers and infants take on the quality of a rhythmic "dance", and frustration follows if this attunement is disrupted. Working in the same tradition, Reddy has argued that starting from several months infants "show an awareness of others as attending beings, as well as an awareness of self as an object of others' attention" (Reddy 2003: 357), displayed in phenomena such as mutual gaze, intense smiling, coyness, "calling" vocalizations, showing-off etc. The range of such primary intersubjective engagements shows that "mirroring" or "exteroception-proprioception matching" is not sufficient to characterize what is here called empathetic perception: it should also involve (i) spontaneous anticipations (called *protentions* in the phenomenological literature), (ii) responses across different modalities (cross-modality), and (iii) at least some degree of self-other differentiation. Still, even such enriched empathetic perception does not require full voluntary control of one's movements, nor an explicit distinction between self and other; as noted by Reddy (2003: 401): "older infants reveal a greater focus on the self and the younger ones reveal a *more immersed, less detached* focus on the other".

Mutual gaze has been regarded by Reddy and others as a powerful index of primary intersubjectivity, and has been suggested to be human-specific. On the other hand, Bard et al. (2005) have provided evidence for similar rates and durations of mutual gazing in parent-infants dyads among human beings and chimpanzees. To through light on this, we conducted a comparative study in which 5 ape dyads (three chimpanzee, one bonobo, one gorilla) and 5 human dyads (living in Lund, Sweden) were recorded for 3 hours per dyad during typical interactions (mean age for apes = 8;26, children = 6;11). Indeed, we found that the rates of mutual gaze for the human dyads were much higher (34.9 vs. 1.8 per hour) and of much longer duration (3.33 vs. 0.94 sec.). Obviously, these differences cannot be attributed only to biological factors since the infants were being raised in radically different environments and cultures. However, it underscores the importance of the "gaze of the other", and the meeting of minds in acts of perception, prior to the development of full motor control, and in consort with that, a full sense of agency and "ownership" of the body (Gallagher 2005).

Stage 2: Volitional control and imitation *(9-14 months)*

There is considerable agreement that a transition in cognitive-semiotic development occurs around 9 months, though views on how to explain it vary considerably. As mentioned in Section 1, for Trevarthen & Hubley (1978) this marks the onset of secondary intersubjectivity, involving triangulations between infant, adult and an external object. However, joint activities with objects are observed, at least in some cultures, much earlier (Rodriquez & Moro 2008). Tomasello (1995, 1999) famously proposed that a major "social-cognitive revolution" occurs at this particular age:

> At about 9 months of age, infants begin to behave in a number of ways that demonstrate their growing awareness of how other persons work as psychological beings. They look where adults are looking (joint attention), they look to see how adults are feeling toward a novel person or object (social referencing), and they do what adults are doing with a novel object (imitation learning). ... Infants also at this time first direct intentional communicative gestures to adults, indicating an expectation that adults are causal agents who can make things happen. (Tomasello 1995: 175)

However, this synchrony of developmental landmarks has been questioned. Reddy (2005) points out that infants display the marks of "understanding attention", in particular with respect to themselves, much earlier (see Stage 1) and that "social referencing" is generally accepted to begin from 7 months. As for "intentional communicative gestures", in the quotation, Tomasello seems to blur the distinction between (a) gestures performed intentionally (i.e. volitionally), and serving a communicative purpose though not intended as such (such as an arm stretched out in the direction of a desired object) and (b) gestures accompanied with marks of communicative intent, especially those performed for the sake of informing an addressee. While the first do indeed commence around this period, both production and comprehension of the latter will require a further stage in the development of intersubjectivity.

Still, what remains intact from the Tomasello quotation ("growing awareness", "imitation learning", volition) is consistent with the explanation offered by the MH-model for the transition to Stage 2 of child intersubjectivity (cf. Zlatev & Andrén 2009): namely, that what

gradually develops, in interaction with others, during the first stage is a "sense of a core self" (Stern 1998) in which the body is felt to be "one's own" and under *volitional control.* This allows a much more precise and flexible form of imitation than that of neonates, and this imitation on its part allows a fuller understanding of the other "as a psychological being" – and vice-versa. Or as stated famously by Baldwin (1894): "My sense of myself grows by imitation of you and my sense of yourself grows in terms of myself". But unlike the direct empathy of Stage 1, this loop of volition and imitation does not decrease, but on the contrary, *increases the awareness of a distinction between self and other*: it highlights the lack of direct control of others' actions, and along with that motivates attempts to influence them to perform actions that are desired. This can possibly explain the surge in this stage of communicative signals, including gestures such as "imperative pointing", which however, are not yet fully developed acts of intentional communication.

Concerning evidence for this interpretation of Stage 2, the studies performed by Mandler (2004) with infants during this age period show that they are not only capable of direct, "sensorimotor imitation" (Piaget 1962), but also of *generalized imitation,* in which infants first observe pretend-actions such as giving a sip of water to toy-objects such as airplanes, birds, jeeps and dogs, and then are given the chance to imitate with either the same object or novel ones. Mandler showed that starting from 9 months, and progressing up to 14 months, infants do not imitate "inappropriate" actions (e.g. water is given to animals, but not vehicles) and when given a novel object, do not generalize on the basis of shape (e.g. from bird to airplane), but stay within the global category (animate vs. inanimate). Further studies show that infants, again from 9 months "begin to be able to reproduce event sequences after a delay" (ibid: 232), i.e. *deferred imitation*, or the second step in the development of imitation according to Piaget, though quite a bit earlier that he anticipated. If infants are also capable of the third step: *representational imitation,* in which "the interior image precedes the exterior gesture, which is thus a copy of an "internal model" that guarantees the connection between the real, but absent model, and the imitative reproduction of it" (Piaget 1962: 279) – during this stage is not clear, and if so, the (largely) preverbal children of 9-14 months would be fulfilling two of the mimetic skills singled out by Donald (2001, see Section 1): imitation and skill-rehearsal.

What about the remaining two: "gesture" and "mime"? As noted earlier, "imperative gestures" clearly appear from 9 months, but even with gaze alternation between desired object and other person, they are relatively poor indicators of communicative intentions, since they can be learned as behavioural sequences (Brinck 2003). Declarative gestures, on the other hand, clearly indicate that the infant interacts with the other as a subject, rather than as a means-to-an-end (Tomasello's "causal agent"). Summarizing a number of (sometimes contradictory) research findings, Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello (1998: 20) state that "whereas declarative showing and pointing (with gaze alternation) first appear at around 9-10 months of age, they do not occur with great frequency until 12-15 months of age", whereas imperatives do not display such a pattern of later increase.

In a study comparing types of joint attention (or "perceptual intersubjectivity") of 12-month and 18- month-old Swedish and Thai children in naturally occurring interactions, we distinguished between three kinds of joint attention: *synchronous* (with no referential behavior or gaze alternation on the part of the child), *coordinated* (when one or both of these behaviors were present), and *reciprocal* (when in addition there was a bout of mutual gaze, confirming that the target had been mutually attended) (cf. Zlatev, Brinck & Andrén 2008). The results showed that while all three types were present in both age groups, there was a clear shift in the direction of the two latter types (coordinated and reciprocal) in the older age-group. Together with findings that the synchronous type of joint attention was also the only type present in chimpanzee dyads, this supports its interpretation as an essentially proto-mimetic phenomenon (see Stage 1), and that while the understanding of the other as a subject of experience whose attention may be influenced by deictic gestures begins at Stage 2, this understanding is not yet stabilized.

The other major type of gesture that children begin to use during this stage are conventional, from the standpoint of the community, gestures such as BYE and HEAD-NOD. However, these are highly restricted in number. Hence, it was quite surprising when Acredolo & Goodwyn (1988) showed that starting from 9 months, infants are capable of learning many so-called "baby signs". All of these involve some action associated with a particular object or sensation: "With encouragement from parents, babies can learn to associate dozens and dozens of gestures with specific things-like flapping arms for *bird*, smacking lips for *fish*, blowing for *hot*, or even patting the chest for *afraid*." (Acredolo and Goodwyn 2000: 84). What this finding indicates, once more, is *mimesis as imitation*. However, since there is no indication that children at this age are aware of either the conventional (mutually known)

status of gestures, or their representational, iconic character (Namy, Campbell & Tomasello 2004, see below), these gestures cannot be yet regarded as either *iconic* or *symbolic signs*. In the best case, they may be seen as spatio-temporally associated *indexes*, though their referential (directed), as opposed to purely associative character would need to be established. Therefore it may be concluded that mimesis in the sense of "mime" (as in symbolic play), as well as the communicative intent necessary for "triadic mimesis", are still absent in children around the age of one.

Stage 3: Communicative intent *(14 – 20 months)*

What heralds the onset of Stage 3 is precisely the understanding of *communicative intent*, as a participant in acts of intentional communication, in both production and comprehension. The notion stems from Grice (1957), according to whom to mean something by uttering/performing X is approximately equivalent to intending X to (a) produce some effect on another individual and (b) for this individual to recognize that one is intending (a). Theorists who have employed the notion (Sperber & Wilson 1995; Zlatev 2008a; Moore under review) differ in the interpretation of how complex, or how "mentalist" it should be, but there is general agreement that communicative intent implies *at least a second-order intention (b) to recognize the primary intention (a)*.

It has been recently suggested independently by Andrén (2010) and Moore (under review), that communicative intent and *semiotic vehicles* (such as gestures, words, or pictures) can be considered independent dimensions, though intermixing in a single communicative act. Any act performed with deliberate expressiveness for the sake of an addressee will be likely understood as intentionally communicative, irrespective of whether it "stands for" something or not (Sperber & Wilson 1995). In this respect, ostensive *mutual gaze* with an addressee can "enact" communicative intent, and specifically the second-order intention in a Gricean analysis (cf. Moore under review). On the other hand, a particular performance can function as a sign without there being a communicative intention, as when a child engages in symbolic play without anyone else present.[3]

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[3] Semiotic theories tend to privilege the role of vehicles (often regarded as "signs", in a general sense of the term), while Gricean (and psychological) approaches tend to focus on intentions. The cognitive-semiotic approach here adopted suggests that both are non-reducible to one another though closely interacting, aspects of meaning.

We can adduce a number of recent studies in support for the proposal that (higher-order) communicative intent (and thus: triadic mimesis, see clause (3) in the definition, Section 2) begins to characterize the cognitive-semiotic performances of children in the middle of the second year of life. First, it could be remembered that the more advanced forms of joint attention (coordinated and reciprocal), which predominated in the bouts of attention sharing of 18 month-old-children as opposed to 12-month-old children, where characterized precisely by "enacting communicative intent" in the form of gaze-alternation and mutual gaze (Zlatev, Brinck & Andrén 2008).

Experimentally, the most common paradigm for assessing communicative intent is "the object-choice task", in which an experimenter hides a reward under one of two (or three) different boxes and then he (or another experimenter, a "helper") communicates the location of the reward by various semiotic vehicles and means of indicating communicative intent. Behne et al. (2005) showed that 14-month old children could solve the object-choice task when the experimenter pointed to the correct box, gaze-shifting between the box and the addressee, but not when pointing to the box while looking elsewhere. Ostensive gazing alone often led to finding the reward, though 24-month-old children performed better than 14- and 18-month-olds. Tomasello et al. (1997) showed similar results for the three vehicle types Point, Marker and Replica for 30 and 36-month old children, but it has not been reported how children who are two years and younger perform with other semiotic vehicles than Ostensive gaze and Point. In a recent study (Zlatev et al., under review), we included a forth vehicle (Picture), and conducted the object-choice task with three groups of children: of 18, 24 and 30 months of age. The results were that while the 18-month olds were clearly above chance with Pointing and Marker, and the 24-month-olds were even better, only the 30-month-olds performed reliably with Picture and Replica, though about 50% of the children still failed the criterion of 5 out of 6 correct choices.

Table 2 shows the semiotic properties of the various vehicles used in our and others' studies. Since, as can be seen, the vehicles differed in terms of a number of properties, we cannot provide a definite explanation of this difference. Still, given all available research, the most likely interpretation is that while children at 18 months do not yet understand (iconic) representations like pictures and replicas (of the correct box) as communicative signs, they understand communicative intent, and do so not only for familiar vehicles such as pointing, but also novel ones as markers.

Table 2. Classifying semiotic vehicles used in object-choice studies according to the factors bodily means, semiotic ground, directionality and representational relationship (from Zlatev et al., under review)

Vehicle	Bodily	Ground	Directionality	Representation
Ostensive gaze	Yes	-	Yes	No
Proximal point	Yes	Indexical (+ Symbolic)	Yes	No
Marker	No/Yes	Indexical	No/Yes	No/Yes
Picture	No	Iconic (+ Symbolic)	No	Yes
Replica	No	Iconic	No	Yes

The fact that children at this stage do not (yet) understand iconic representations, even when executed in the "bodily" modality (i.e. gestures), was shown by Namy, Campbell & Tomasello (2004), in an experiment where 18-month old children associated equally well iconic as well as arbitrary gestures with specific objects (small toys of a car, rabbit, hammer and spoon), while 26-month-old children performed much better with the iconic gestures than the arbitrary ones. This can be explained by assuming that at 18-months children do not understand gestures qualitatively differently from the previous stages (e.g. the "baby signs"), i.e. as *imitated schemas associated with a particular object or event*. It is rather the element of communicative intent ("give me the object that we associated with THIS action") that is the novel element.

How can this "failure" in iconicity to make a difference in comprehension be reconciled with the testified use of iconic gestures in production of children of the same age? Zlatev (in press), for example, found a total of 72 gestures that were classified as iconic in 60 minutes of spontaneous interaction between caregivers and 6 children at approximately 18 months, or 1.2 iconic gestures per minute. The answer is above all in *the definition of gesture*, adopted from Andrén (2010), which requires either "explicitly other-oriented action, with visible communicative intentionality" *or* for the act to be used as an "explicit sign" (with expression standing for a referent), *but not necessarily both*. In the case of iconic gestures in the study,

thus, if the act was used with a marker of communicative intent, even (stylized) performances of practical actions (such as KISS and HIT) were included. In addition, enactive "symbolic play" representations, such as FEED (mother with an empty spoon) occurred at that early age. An additional factor contributing to the presence of iconic gestures in this stage is imitation: in the study they were found to be more often (on average 30%) directly imitated from the actions/gestures of caregivers than either deictic or emblematic (conventional) gestures.

Thus, *pace* Piaget (1962), as well as Zlatev & Andrén (2009), it is *not the understanding of representations* ("the symbolic/semiotic/sign function") that constitutes the major difference compared to the previous stage, but rather the understanding of communicative intent. This understanding is achieved not so much intellectually as a higher-order intention, but as bodily markers accompanying acts of communication, signaling *that* one is communicating intentionally, very often for the benefit of the addressee. Understanding *what* is being communicated is signaled by semiotic vehicles that are (usually) performed with the body, allowing them to be readily imitated and "typified" (Andrén 2010). This is a major step in semiotic development, as well as in intersubjectivity, since it allows the further synergistic interaction between communicative intent and semiotic vehicles, paving the way to the insight that objects, actions and events have "names" (not necessarily verbal) that are commonly known, i.e. conventional, and thus eventually to language.

Stage 4: Communicative, conventional representations *(20-30 months)*

To give a rough estimate of the linguistic competence of the three groups of children in the object-choice study reviewed above (Zlatev et al., under review), we asked parents to fill in the forms of the *Swedish Early Communicative Development Inventory* (SECDI) (Berglund & Eriksson 2000), providing measures of the children's receptive and productive vocabulary. It is characteristic that the median score in the most comprehensive measure (asking if the children produced any of 710 common lexical items) was 35 for the 18-month old children and 305 for those at 24 months, an increase of 900%. This was a clear reflection of the well-known phenomenon known as the *vocabulary spurt*, occurring for most children in the second half of the second year: "At first their rate of vocabulary growth is very slow, but one typically sees a "burst" or acceleration in the rate of vocabulary growth somewhere between 16-20 months" (Bates 2002: 15). What can explain this highly accelerated growth? While the idea of a "symbolic insight" was popular in earlier analyses of first-language learning (cf.

Ingram 1989), more recent interpretations, including that of Bates (2002), have tended to downplay the phenomenon, and to attribute it to non-linear dynamics in rates of learning.

However, there are other indications that a cognitive-semiotic "reorganization" takes place between 18 and 26 months. Concerning the rather surprising results of Namy et al. (2004), summarized above, the authors suggest the following explanation: "At 26 months, children have developed more rigid expectations than their younger counterparts about the forms that object labels may take" (ibid: 54). In other words, they propose that infants expect vocal labels not to sound like what they refer to, but that gestures, when used as labels, should resemble their referents. It can be noted that this explanation presupposes that during this stage, infants have some degree of explicit awareness (if they are going to have different expectations) *that words and gesture are used "as labels", i.e. as signs*. The reason that iconic and arbitrary gestures were both associated with objects in the previous stage can actually be explained by assuming, as suggested earlier, that they were learned as associations, rather than as "explicit signs", a possibility that Namy et al. do not consider. Still it would be consistent with their proposal of a re-organization in "symbol-learning" towards the end of the second year.

Furthermore, in our previous study of the development of children's gestures from 18 to 27 months in three Swedish and three Thai children, which we analyzed in terms of the Mimesis Hierarchy (Zlatev & Andrén 2009), we also found evidence for a transition around 20 months: on average, this was the age when (i) deictic gestures, produced together with deictic expressions and nominals peaked, while (ii) what seemed like iconic gestures decreased, and (iii) emblematic (conventional) gestures suddenly increased. From then on, until 27 months, all these tendencies were reversed: the rates of deictic and emblematic gestures decreased, while iconic gestures (mostly cases of symbolic play), increased, along with measures of the children's linguistic proficiency (vocabulary, MLU).

The explanation of this apparent reorganization that we offered was "a more or less *explicit understanding* (insight) that the meaning of the sign (gesture or word) is common to oneself and the addressee, i.e. the sign's *conventionality"* (ibid: 384) which was qualified as "a kind of "symbolic insight", not in the sense that the children did not use any signs prior to that, but that they grasped, at least partially, the nature of semiotic norms (conventions) around this time" (ibid: 396). Given the empirical findings mentioned earlier, and the theoretical

advantages of distinguishing communicative intent and semiotic vehicles, as well as different levels of conventionality (Andrén 2010), this interpretation should be modified.

The present proposal is rather that the common denominator to the vocabulary spurt, the U-curve in interpreting arbitrary gestures, and the observed gestural reorganization, is most precisely captured by the original term *symbolic insight*, comprising the realization both that (i) "things have names", and (ii) that these names are common, i.e. conventional, and thus at least to some degree normative. Otherwise, it is difficult to account why children at 26 months should have different expectations with respect to words and gestures: the first being typically "arbitrary", while the latter typically "iconic". This proposal has the further advantage of not requiring a "normative insight" at 20 months, which is indeed rather implausible, and a higher level of conventionality can build on the verbal and gestural schemas acquired gradually through imitation/mimesis, since the onset of Stage 2. What makes the conventionality of "labels" more normative than that of actions, or mimetic schemas, is that misuse will tend to lead to misunderstandings, and frustrations of communication ("I want the DOG, not the BIRD"). Thus, semiotic normativity comes for free, so to speak, with the symbolic insight, though of course this is only its developmental onset. Throughout this stage, grammatical norms begin to be acquired, with piece-by-piece imitations, and "creative" generalizations (Tomasello 2003), the child proceeds to re-construct the linguistic system of the community throughout the duration of this stage, which should be viewed as a highly transitional stage, with upward boarders that are somewhat diffuse.

Stage 5: Language-mediated folk-psychology (*2.5 years -*)

It is difficult to pinpoint the onset of truly "creative" language use, since even among adults utterances are often imitations and permutations of what they have already experienced. Still, it is clear that around the middle of the third year, children indeed say things that surprise caregivers. For example, at 3 years my son, after coming home from the first night-time car-trip in his life, commented: *Cars make the moon go*. It was not until sometime later that we realized that he was referring to the "apparent motion" of the moon behind the trees, when looking out of the window of a moving car.

Once children have developed a sufficiently expressive "conventional-normative semiotic system for communication and thought" (i.e. the definition of *language* adopted by Zlatev 2008b), this inevitably has repercussions for their understanding of "social cognition", yielding an additional stage in the development of intersubjectivity. The following properties of language have been suggested to be instrumental for performance on so-called "theory-of-mind" tasks. First, structural features like mental predicates (verbs like *think, believe, know*) and sentential complement constructions (Astington & Jenkins 1999). Second, discursive features like disagreements, repairs and meta-linguistic discourse (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003). Third, Hutto (2008) has argued that linguistic proficiency brings first apprenticeship and then mastery in understanding and producing narratives,[4] and it is through these that children, at least from their fourth year, begin to understand the folk-psychology of beliefs and desires, allowing them e.g. to pass "false-belief" tests. As Nelson (2003) has further argued, knowledge of "cultural myths and social narratives" has a constitutive role for forming autobiographical memories. This observation highlights an important theoretical point: that subjectivity and intersubjectivity are co-dependent categories, and that development in one is intertwined with development in the other. Thus, the stage-model here presented can also be regarded as a model of the development of self-hood, which explains why it tallies to some extent with the one offered by Stern (1998).

4. Conclusions

In this article, I have elaborated on, and corrected some interpretations from previous work on the relationship between bodily mimesis and intersubjectivity (Zlatev 2008a) and the application of the Mimesis Hierarchy model to semiotic development in children (Zlatev & Andrén 2009). The model of (at least) five more or less distinct stages stands in contrast to those who treat the development of intersubjectivity as gradual, with most capacities essentially present "from the start" and only in need of unfolding (Trevarthen 1979). Or alternatively, as a two-stage process, the first stage a matter of enactive perception and interaction, and the second - introducing narrative (Gallagher 2005; Hutto 2008). It is, of course, also quite distinct from those operating with the concept of "theory of mind", either of the theory-theory or simulation-theory variety (cf. Zlatev et al. 2008). By being a multi-level model, it is most similar to that of Stern (1998) on the development of "the sense of self", and

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[4] This focus on language-mediated narratives is most in line with Donald's original proposal to call language-dominated culture and cognition "mythic".

to Tomasello's (1999) model of the "cultural origins of human cognition", including both pre-linguistic and linguistic factors, as well as to Nelson's (1996) application of Donald's evolutionary model to development. Though, naturally, it differs in most of the specifics.

As in previous treatments, the MH-model focuses on bodily mimesis, its "precursors" (empathetic perception) and "post-developments" (conventionality, language and narrative). Mimesis is pivotal, as in Donald's evolutionary model, since it provides the basis for the development of (i) conventions (through imitation), (ii) intentional communication, and (iii) for bringing the two together in communicative, shared representations (signs). What Donald states for evolution, applies equally well for development: "Language is different from mimesis, but is has mimetic roots. It is a collective product and must have evolved as a group adaptation, in the context of mimetic expressive culture. Given the conventional, collective nature of language, it could not have emerged in any other way." (Donald 2001: 274)

The main difference from the previous applications of these ideas has been in the treatment of the concepts of *representation* and *communicative intent*. Under the influence of Piaget (1962), I previously regarded representations as emerging from the imitation of practical acts, i.e. as properties of dyadic mimesis (Stage 2), and treated children's first gestures as "externalizations" of these, with communicative intentions "added on" to yield triadic mimesis (Stage 3). With the onset of semiotic normativity (Stage 4), communicative focus turns to language, and gestural signs undergo a consequent reorganization. Due to the empirical findings reviewed in Section 3, and a less "mentalist" and more bodily-enactive and social-oriented perspective, I have here proposed a more or less reversed sequence: Stage 2 gives rise to imitation and *mimetic schemas* (Zlatev 2007, in press), but the first gestures (and vocalizations) of children are neither externalizations of these "internal representations", nor fully-fledged representations/signs on their own, but action schemas bi-directionally *associated* with particular contexts. That is why the onset of intentional communication occurs in Stage 3 with *pointing and other deictic gestures (such as showing), which are not representations or fully-fledged (explicit) signs*, but rather performative communicative acts, accompanied with makers of communicative intent. It is first in Stage 4 that the proto-representations of Stage 2 (Piaget's internalized imitation-based "symbols", my mimetic schemas) and the communicative intent of Stage 3 are combined to give rise to communicative iconic gestures, and more generally to the "insight" of using communicative, shared representations, or what is variously referred to as "symbols" (Tomasello 1999; Namy

et al. 2004) or "signs" (Zlatev 2009). While this account would undoubtedly undergo further modifications, it resolves a number of difficulties inherent in the previous one.

Finally, I hope to have demonstrated that models of semiotic development need not be focused on specific skills and time periods, but can follow in the tradition of Piaget and propose more general, integrational accounts, which can lead to scientific progress, despite the risk of being wrong in many of the particulars.

Acknowledgements

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Communicology and Culturology:
Semiotic Phenomenological Method in Applied Small Group Research

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Abstract

Communicology is the science of human communication where consciousness is constituted as a medium *of communication at four interconnected levels of interaction experience: intrapersonal (embodied), interpersonal (dyadic), group (social), and inter-group (cultural). The focus of the paper is the group level of communication across generations, thus constituting inter-group communication that stabilizes norms (forms a culture). I propose to explicate the way in which the method of semiotic phenomenology informs the pioneering work at the University of Toronto by Tom McFeat, a Harvard trained cultural anthropologist, on small group cultures as an experimental research methodology. Rather than the cognitive-analytic (Husserl's transcendental eidetic)* techniques *suggest by Don Ihde as a pseudo "experimental phenomenology", McFeat provides an applied method for the* empirical experimental constitution *of culture in conscious experience. Group cultures are constructed in the communicological practices of group formation and transformation by means of a self-generating group narrative (myth) design. McFeat's method consists of three steps of culture formation by communication that are: (1) Content-Ordering, (2) Task-Ordering, and (3) Group-Ordering, i.e., what Ernst Cassirer and Karl Jaspers call the* logic *of culture or* Culturology. *These steps are compared to the* descriptive phenomenology *research procedures suggested by Amedeo Giorgi following Husserl's approach: (1) Find a sense of the whole, (2) Determine meaning units, (3) Transform the natural attitude expressions into phenomenologically, psychologically sensitive expressions. A second correlation will be made to Richard Lanigan's* semiotic phenomenology *method following the work of Cassirer,*

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Jaspers, and Merleau-Ponty: (1) Description of Signs, (2) Reduction of Signifiers, and (3) Interpretation of Signifieds.

1. Introduction

The human science of Communicology culminates from several disciplinary developments, largely viewed as singular constitutions and foundational to differential attitudes about (1) the nature and function of philosophy and (2) the theory and method of science in *apposition* to *human embodiment* (Merleau-Ponty's reflective, reversible, reflexive consciousness of experience as experience of consciousness). In more familiar terms, the idea of Culture stands in contrast to the idea of Science, because there is a measured distinction between what human beings express and what they perceive. In Modernity, we know this situation as the emergence of (1) the distinct cultural disciplines of Linguistics (constraining Anthropology and Philology), History (constraining Sociology and Political Economy), Philosophy (constraining Logic and Psychology) over against the (2) the distinct scientific disciplines of Biology, Mathematics, and Physics. Ernst Cassirer explores this problematic of the disciplines in *The Logic of the Cultural Sciences* (1942/2000) where he distinguishes Culture as the perception-of-expression and Science as the perception-of-objects. Cassirer's four volume thematic of a qualitative human science is to be found in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923-1996) where his *semiotic phenomenology* of human communication is articulated in detail wherein Science is in the service of Culture. In this context, human *understanding* emerges from the semiotic matrix of communication and culture and comes to constitute the essence of the person. As a research problematic, this proposition requires explanation. "Explanations of human communication are by definition projects in metatheory construction. Just as natural languages may be used to explain themselves, the construction rules for communication systems may be used to articulate new paradigms constituting a higher logical type of communication" (Lanigan 1988: 184; Cassirer 1946/1953). The main focus of my research analysis is an explication of the *method and process* by which persons constitute their culture through the communication of understanding and memory.

My explication necessarily is an analysis of human science qualitative methodology (Phenomenology). Historically there have been two contemporary schools of thought on phenomenological methodology that emerged in the United States respectively in the disciplines of Psychology and Communicology. Amadeo Giorgi (2009) in the Department of

Psychology at Duquesne University is the founding figure for the approach known as *descriptive phenomenology*. My own work (Lanigan 1984, 1988, 1992) in the Department of Speech Communication at Southern Illinois University established the approach of *semiotic phenomenology* in the discipline of Communicology. In addition, the issue of *empirical* and *eidetic* methodology within Phenomenology was introduced by Don Ihde (1970) in the discipline of Philosophy. Thus, my overall analysis takes up these various methodological issues by raising certain theory construction concerns which are, in turn, exemplified with published research drawn from the disciplines of anthropology, communicology, psychology, and philosophy.

First, it is helpful to recall the foundational review of research methodologies offered by Karl Jaspers (1913/1963: 23-37) in which he distinguishes **techniques** [case-studies, statistics, experiments] from **logic**: (1) *the practical logic of research* [1. Collection of individual phenomena, 2. Enquiry into connections, 3. Grasp of complex unities], and, (2) "inevitable *mistakes in formal logic* that have to be constantly overcome" [unlimited *counting*, unlimited *'ad hoc' hypothesis*, acceptance of *endless possibility*, unlimited *use of references*, the impasse created by *absolutes*, pseudo-insight through *terminology*]. The failure of "practical logic" is particularly notable in standard *quantitative* "social science" models, while the "mistakes in formal logic" are especially apparent in *qualitative* "social science" models and in standard *analytic* "philosophy" approaches.

Given the use of *logic* to ground methodology, Jaspers offers a succinct statement of the approach I am taking with my analysis:

Discussion of method makes sense only when there is a concrete case to consider and when the particular effects can be shown. Discussion of method in the abstract is painful. Only a concrete logic is valid in the empirical sciences. Without factual investigations and concrete material, arguments become suspended in mid-air. There is little point in thinking up methods which are not put into practice and perhaps never can be.(Jaspers 1913/1963: 37-38).

Phenomenology sets out on a number of tasks: it *gives a concrete description* of the psychic states which patients actually experience and *presents* them *for observation.* It reviews the inter-relations of these, *delineates* them as sharply as possible, differentiates them and creates a suitable terminology. Since we

never can perceive the psychic experiences of others in any direct fashion, as with physical phenomena, we can only make some kind of representation of them. There has to be an act of empathy, of understanding, to which may be added as the case demands an enumeration of the external characteristics of the psychic state or of the conditions under which the phenomena occur, or we may make sharp comparisons or resort to the use of symbols or fall back on a kind of suggestive handling of the data. Our chief help in all this comes from the patient's *self-descriptions,* which can be evoked and tested out in the course of personal conversation (Jaspers 1913/1963: 55).

For a detailed explication of the *logic of conversation,* see Jaspers profound analysis of human communication (Jaspers 1932/1970: 47-103).

It is a commonplace among human scientists that in many cultures the very concepts of "culture" and "communication" are embodied in the same word, e.g., Chinese 交. Why this is so sets the boundary conditions for examining the mutual influence of culture as a process of *value transmission* and communication as a process of *value constitution*. Recall that "values" are *decisions* displayed in verbal and nonverbal behavior. With respect to cultural transmission, Margaret Mead's (1970) work on the nature of family generations is an appropriate context for later examining Tom McFeat's experimental phenomenology project to specify the generational production, interpretation, and innovation of meaning. To appreciate the theoretical and applied advance that McFeat's research makes, it is necessary to briefly review Don Ihde's (1977) introduction to Edmund Husserl's method, the *only* publication to attempt an explanation of *experimental phenomenology* in either philosophy or the human sciences! Ihde (1977: 14) proposes that, following the direction of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method, "the thought-experiment—or better, experience-experiments—that are worked out here attempts to show the way in which phenomenological inquiry proceeds."

There many theoretical principles involved in Ihde's description of his human science research. Before reviewing them briefly, it is helpful to examine an illustration of the theory construction involved as presented in **Fig. 1** (compare Table 2). Basically, we need a to be aware of the methodological counterpoint to Husserl as a context for understanding. Charles S. Peirce (2.227-229; 2.619-644) offers a *logic of typology* by which Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *existential phenomenological method* of (1) *Description* (1945/2012: lxxi) is the use of *Types*, (2) *Reduction* (1945/2012: lxxiv) is the use of *Tokens*, and (3) *Interpretation* (1945/2012: lxxxviii) is the use of *Tones*.

The Logic of Types (Charles S. Peirce)

Types → Tokens → Tones
<Genre?>

The Logic of Abduction*/Adduction** (Charles S. Peirce)
{*Particular, a posteriori; **Universal, a priori}

Rule → Result → Case

The Logic of Validity and Reliability

NECESSARY CONDITION **Validity** → SUFFICIENT CONDITION **Reliability** → ACTUAL **Objective**

Example: Interviewing the Last Living Speaker of English

RECORD the GRAMMAR and LEXICON → DIALOGUE IN SITU → Language is Alive!
<n = 1>

Figure 1. An Example of Research Using an "***n*** of 1"

Ihde makes several important points based on Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. First, he begins a "thought experiment" which is to examine the perceptual process involved in viewing a Necker Cube. This cube is really a drawing in two dimensions of a three dimensional image of a cube. We are not dealing with any actual object, but rather the visual representation of a mathematical idea. The unusual properties of the Necker Cube are the

"optical illusion" images that it presents vis-á-vis the fact that multiple images are capable of perception because human brain physiology requires a shifting focus on one image at a time depending on which parts are abstracted mentally. Second, the thought experiment turns into "experience-experiments" where one Type of images can be taken as multiple Tokens, each with its own unique visual characteristics or Tone. Third, this shifting process is possible because the human consciousness understands by means of the logic of abduction (one particular experience). That is to say, an image (*type* of experience) of the Necker Cube is perceived in one modality (a *token* of experience) with one meaning (a *tone* of the experience). Third, only now is it appropriate to call the necker Cube a thought experiment because we can now abstract from our experience a *rule* of thinking (*necessary condition*) that validates our *consciousness of* experience (called "intentionality" in phenomenological method). Without this rule, we would never be able to recognize our experience when it repeats itself (*result*), so we conclude that that one original experience was sufficient to understand our experience (r*eliability*). In short, to experience is to understand (a *case* or "state-of-affairs"). Is this example of the Necker Cube unusual? Yes, it is because the cube image is a fiction and does not occur in the natural world. But, it is the representation of an idea!

Recall now that *language* is a representation of the natural world and the *cultural world of ideas.* Ihde's presentation is merely a variation on the method used in all human sciences to investigate our human consciousness of human experience. In Fig. 1, we have a simple presentation of this complex logic as method. I use the example of a cultural linguist recording the last know speaker of the English language (imagine it is you!). By following the phenomenological method, the anthropologist is able to interview and record for posterity the semiotic-system known as the English language. This is a synoptic view of how human culture is a production, interpretation, and innovation of meaning across the generations of humankind. Culturally speaking, each generation interviews the previous generation for the meanings it wants to preserve, discard, or innovative to a new context as understanding and memory.

2. Understanding and Communicology

Communicology is the science of human communication where consciousness is constituted as a *medium* (not a channel) at four interconnected levels of interaction experience:

intrapersonal (embodied), interpersonal (dyadic), group (social), and inter-group (cultural) as illustrated in **Table 1**.

Table 1. Communicology Media Levels: Each Level is a Medium.

SPECIFICATION OF NETWORKS AT THE FOUR LEVELS OF COMMUNICOLOGY						
ELEMENTS	**ADDRESSER**	**CONTEXT**	**MESSAGE**	**CONTACT**	**CODE**	**ADDRESSEE**
FUNCTIONS	EMOTIVE	REFERENTIAL	POETIC	PHATIC	METALINGUISTIC	CONATIVE
MEDIA NETWORK LEVELS:						
1. INTRAPERSONAL	Embodiment; Self as Mind	Content Ordering	Store Signification "Within One"	Pre-Consciousnes; Pre-Reflectivity	Synesthetic Meaning	Memory
2. INTERPERSONAL	Dyad Relationship; Self as Other	Task Ordering	Transmit Meaning "One to One"	Consciousness; Reflectivity	Cognitive Meaning	History
3. GROUP	Socialization; Other as Self	Group Ordering	Retrieve Signification	Present; Reflexivity	Affective Meaning	Consociates
I. EGOCENTRIC	Task Group: Identity by Rule	Aggregate Parts	Centrifugal: "One to Many"	Competition creates Agony	Names Create Static Categories	Primary Roles; Leadership Dominates
II. SOCIOCENTRIC	Affiliation Group: Identity by Role	Organic Whole	Centripetal: "Many to One"	Cooperation creates Harmony	Names Create Dynamic Relations	Secondary Roles: Membership Dominates
4. CULTURE	Co-Figurative "Peers learn from Peers"	Inter-Group Ordering	Evaluate Meaning	Present; Reversibility	Conative Meaning	Contemporaries
I. SPACE	Post-Figurative "Children learn from Forebears"	Place Community	Space Binding "Many to Many"	Past	Digital Logic: In-Group vs. Out-Group	Predecessors
II. TIME	Pre-Figurative "Adults learn from Children"	Non-Place Community	Time Binding "Many to Many"	Future	Analogue Logic: Diffusion of Innovations	Successors

All concepts discussed in the analysis to follow, especially those presented in the various figures and tables, are explicated in detail is specific studies that are easily referenced (Lanigan 1988, 1992, 1995a, 2010). My analysis proceeds from the point of view that human communication is a verbal and gestural form of conscious experience that is culturally contextualized as *discourse*. **Fig.2** illustrates the standard linguistic frame of reference for discourse analysis in which each level codes the next level and constrains these correlations: (1) *Parole* = Intrapersonal medium, (2) *Langue* = Interpersonal medium, (3) *Discours* = Group medium, and (4) *Langage* = Intergroup medium.

Figure 2. Discourse Hierarchy Model (Wilden 1980, 1987)

Utilizing the key discourse theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault contextualized by the semiotic phenomenological work of Roman Jakobson, the discourse model can be elaborated as **Fig. 3.**

Figure 3. Communicology Model of Discourse Functions

The discourse elements specified in Fig. 3 are grounded philosophically in the phenomenological and semiotic tradition of philosophy and the human sciences, both American (Charles S. Peirce) and European (Roman Jakobson). Given the complexity of this metatheoretical approach, it will be useful to see the interdisciplinary convergence of logic, linguistics, semiotics, phenomenology, and communicology presented in **Table 2**. Basic categories are represented in the boxed concepts with the dialectic process relationships indicated by the given arrows linking boxes. Our particular concern is the ground for methodological comparisons that will be made later. For example, Syntactics and Pragmatics are Type 1 explanations where mechanical linkages are made in a language system, whereas Semantics and *Sinegebung* represents a Type 2 explanation where there is an isomorphism between language systems. Last, Chaism and "le Meme et L'Autre", are Type 3 explanations wherein there are transformations of the involved systems (Holenstein 1974: 7; see Table 4).

In particular, Merleau-Ponty (1968: 263) uses the speech trope of *chiasm* and Bühler (1990: 438ff) gives a Type 3 explanation at the center of the discourse problematic and thematic with his discussion of *anaphora deixis*. Merleau-Ponty's example of *chiasm* is "I - Other — Other - I" and is the culmination of his *semiotic phenomenology of discourse* (1964: 86) which of course, informs Foucault formulation of his *quadratic model* of discourse usually formulated as "Self : Same :: Other : Different"(Lanigan 1992: 110).

Let me make special note of the discourse reference to *Greek Cosmology* that appears in **Table 2**. This to say in particular that Merleau-Ponty (as well as Martin Heidegger) makes subtle, but critical, reference to the Greek *register of discourse*. This fact is badly misunderstood by most readers of Merleau-Ponty when he makes such statements as "The world [*nous*] and reason [*logos*] are not problems; and though we might call them mysterious [*mystos*], this mystery [*mythos*] is essential to them: there can be no question of dissolving it [*magikos*] through some 'solution', it is beneath the level of solutions" (2012: lxxxv; my insert). Or again, "In movement [*mythos*], the relationships [*nous*] between my decision [*logos*] and my body[*mystos*] are magic [*magikos*] ones" (2012: 97; my insert). Let me give the standard translations: *logos* (consciousness, rationality, speech that is), *nous* (mind) *mystos* (silence), *mythos* (speech that can be), *magikos* (art, *technē*). When the discourse sequence moves from logos (*symbol* = present absence) to magikos (*symbol* = absent presence), we have the trope of speech called *Asyndeton* [voiceless name]; the reverse order is the trope of *Prosopopeia* [nameless voice]. Hence, the ambiguity of interpreting the prophesies of the Oracle at Delphi, especially when they are articulated as a *chiasm*! Last, let me emphasize that the very representational *essence* of a symbol is that it is *per se* a *chiasm* in communication. To explain, a **symbol** in discourse is simultaneously both *encoded* (nameless voice; *prosopopoeia*) and *decoded* (voiceless name; *asyndeton*) in the process of intersubjective communication—an empirical adductive proof of Husserl's proposition that "Subjectivity is Intersubjectivity"!(1969: 155; see Lanigan 2012). As Merleau-Ponty (2012: 474) confirms: "My life must have a sense that I do not constitute, there must be, literally an intersubjectivity; each of us must be at once anonymous in the sense of an absolute individuality and anonymous in the sense of an absolute generality. Our being in the world is the concrete bearer of this double anonymity." Hence, the synonymy of "communication" and "culture" in one word or symbol.

Table 2. Comparative Table of the Human Sciences

Logic	Linguistics	Semiotics	Phenomenology	Communicology
Type [*Real*]	**Lexicon** [*Stylistics*]	**Sign** [*System*]	**Noema** [*Description*] {Reflexivity}	**Discuor** [*Savior*]
Abduction (*Particular; a posteriori*)	**Syntactics** (*Poetics*)		**Operative Intentionality**	**Tacit Cogito** ("I am given") {Body}
Token [*Imaginary*]	**Register** [*Figures of Language*]	**Signifier** [*Redundancy] Feature*	**Noesis** [*Reduction*] {Reversibility}	**Parole Parlée** [*Énonciation*]
Adduction (*Universal; a priori*)	**Pragmatics** (*Rhetorics*)		**Thetic Intentionality**	**Spoken Cogito** ("I am given to myself") {Embodiment}
Tone [*Symbolic*]	**Morphology** [*Tropes of Speech*]	**Signified** [*Distinctive Feature*]	**Essence** [*Interpretation*] {Reflectivity}	**Parole Parlante** [*Énoncé*]

Semantics (Symbology)			**Sinngebung** (Ek-stase)	
NAMELESS VOICE ⇄ VOICELESS NAME (PROSOPOPOEIA)　(ASYNDETON) **[Greek Cosmology]** [LOGOS ⇄ NOUS ⇄ MYSTOS ⇄ MYTHOS ⇄ MAGIKOS]			(existential expression-perception as reflexivity, reversibility, and reflectivity) ("I can")	

| **CHAISM** (Merleau-Ponty) (X = *chi*) (semantic juxtaposition of words that reverse meaning) "The nameless voice speaks a voiceless name." Nameless ⟶ Voice Voice ⟶ Nameless | | BÜHLER'S ANAPHORIC DEIXIS | **Le Même et L'Autre** (Foucault) (SELF : OTHER :: SAME : DIFFERENT) SELF ⟷ OTHER SAME ⟷ DIFFERENT (METACHIASM = ECO'S HYPERCODE) | |

Source: Richard L. Lanigan, **The Human Science of Communicology: A Phenomenology of Discourse in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty** (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1992).

3. Logic and Qualitative Research

While is it generally known that quantitative research is based mainly on statistical formulations of occurrence frequency grounded in mathematics, it is also generally *unknown* that qualitative research is based on *class typologies grounded in logic*. While this fact may be intuitively obvious to philosophers generally and phenomenological philosophers in particular, it is scarcely acknowledged by phenomenological human scientists and generally unknown at all in the humanities disciplines. Note, however, that semiotics has stimulated research in Literary Science from the point of view that literature is discourse descriptive of human comportment in specific cultural contexts describing the *Lebenswelt* and *Umwelt*. Hence in Table 1, the connection among Stylistics, Poetics, and Rhetorics is a matter of phenomenological human science research. For example studies, see Lanigan (1984, 1995b, 2005). Hence, a brief review of the applicable logics in human science qualitative research is given in **Table 3**. The logics so discussed are part of the interface between theory and method, which is to say the dialectic of theory construction and methodological application as a test of theory.

The basic purpose of the Table 3 presentation is to provide a concise description of the basic logics available to human science research: Abduction, Adduction, Induction, and Deduction. In addition, we come to understand how the logics of abduction and adduction are applied as a logic of typology (type, token, tone) formulated by Peirce (Lanigan 1995a). For European phenomenologists it is also necessary make the correlation between these logics as used by Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Husserl and the Peircian logic. The corresponding correlation to evidence (*data* = what is given; *acta* = what is done; *capta* = what is taken) as modalities of *symbolism in discourse* is an integral part of understanding the Lanigan approach to *phenomenological method:* (1) *Thematizing* the description of the *Signs* (system of understanding and memory), (2) *Abstracting* the description of the *Signifier* (expression), and (3) *Explicating* the the *Signified* (perception). The possible semiotic codes of phenomenological expression and perception are discussed at length in Lanigan (2010).

Table 3. Theory and Methodology Logics

Communicology:
The Theory and Method of Semiotic Phenomenology
HandChart © 2010, R. L. Lanigan, Ph.D.

Phenomenological Theory
{Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault}

❶ **DESCRIPTION** entails:
↳ a. Description;
↳ b. Reduction;
↳ c. Interpretation.

❷ **REDUCTION** entails:
↳ a. Description;
↳ b. Reduction;
↳ c. Interpretation.

❸ **INTERPRETATION** entails:
↳ a. Description;
↳ b. Reduction;
↳ c. Interpretation.

Phenomenological Method
{Peirce, Lanigan, Alexander}

❶ DESCRIPTION ◉ ***Thematizing*** the
◉ Interpretation of the
◉ Reduction of the   *Type*
◉ Description of the **SIGN**(S).

❷ REDUCTION ◉ ***Abstracting*** the
◉ Interpretation of the
◉ Reduction of the   *Token*
◉ Description of the **SIGNIFIER.**

❸ INTERPRETATION ◉ ***Explicating*** the
◉ Interpretation of the   *Tone*
◉ Reduction of the
◉ Description of the **SIGNIFIED.**

Qualitative Logics: "Normative Semiotic Models" of Peirce (2.619-644)
[Peirce corrects the English translation of Aristotle's Greek]

① **AB**DUCTION: Rule   +   Result   =   Case (*Particular; a posteriori*)*
                                                              (Token ➔ Tone) [Peirce 4.537]

② **AD**DUCTION: Rule   +   Result   =   Case (*Universal; a priori*)*
                                                              (Type ➔ Token)

③ **IN**DUCTION: Case   +   Result   =   Rule

④ **DE**DUCTION: Rule   +   Case =   Result

* Logics also cited by Merleau-Ponty in *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945).

Equivalent Relations of Terminology and Procedure

MERLEAU-PONTY	**FOUCAULT**	**HUSSERL**	**PEIRCE** (2.227-229)	
❶ Description ➔	Archaeology ➔	Horizon ➔	Rule ➔	Object *(Type)* [Data]
❷ Reduction ➔	Genealogy ➔	Field ➔	Result ➔	Ground *(Token)* [Acta]
❸ Interpretation ➔	Critical Methodology ➔	Core/ Focus ➔	Case ➔	Interpretant *(Tone)* [Capta]

4. Phenomenological Research

In order to contextualize the Lanigan phenomenological methodology, **Table 4** gives a brief comparison to the latest statement of method by Amedeo Giorgi, (2009), the leading phenomenological psychology researcher. The basic reason for the comparison is to emphasize the necessity of *metatheory construction* in phenomenology. In brief, Giorgi fails to adequately account for logic and linguistics as semiotic constituents of the phenomenological research situation. The result is a latent methodological positivism that is embedded in the "natural attitude" about language as the data given in interview based research. For example, Giorgi argues:

> In fact, sentences are psychologically neutral in the sense that they could be psychologically loaded or empty. Sentences are not the primary way that psychological reality reveals itself in expressions. Of course, grammar of some type is necessary, but it is another dimension of expressiveness not well suited to reveal psychological meanings. Thus, the constitution of parts in the method are based upon the dimension that is most sensitive to the ultimate goal of the task.

Unfortunately, this is the same argument that analytic philosophers of language, like John Searle, use to say that eidetic "propositions"(*noetic*) are contained in empirical "sentences" (*noema*) and therefore grammar is not the operative logic in the analysis. There are two fundamental problems here:

(1) What language is the research using as an empirical actuality? If, for example, it is English, then English *grammar* dictates a very specific subject-predicate *logic* in analysis wherein typologies of meaning are pre-given [data] and it is impossible to distinguish between code signification (syntactics) and message meaning (semantics) as between speaker *encoding* (interviewee; research respondent) and listener *decoding* (interviewer; researcher) as referents in actuality (pragmatics). This is the confusion of *parole parlée* and *parole parlante* or *énonciation* and *énocé*, to cite only one the dimensional issues. Recall that *coded symbols are representations* on a minimum of two logical levels: the *object language* and the *metalanguage*. The minimum logic conditions for theory construction are *three levels*, i.e., Type 1, 2, and 3 semiotic explanations (Holenstein 1974: 7}.

Table 4. Methodology Comparison of Giorgi Descriptive Phenomenology and Lanigan Semiotic Phenomenology

Human Science Phenomenological Method (Qualitative Research)		
Metatheory	**Giorgi Method**	**Lanigan Method**
Discipline	*Psychology*	*Communicology*
Evidence	Language *Behavior,* Social Situation	Speech, Body *Comportment,* Lebenswelt, Umwelt
Methodology	Experiential	Experiential, Experimental
Evidence Collection	Transcribed Interviews	Human Discourse (all media)
Evidence Item [Bordieu]	"Meaning Unit" [*Habitus*]	"Revelatory Phrase / Image" [*Hexis*]
Data Theory	Linguistic (uncritically assumed, Grammar Neutrality dictates Covert Epistemes) Symbolization of Mental States	Semiotic, Logic Symbolization of Embodiment and Intersubjective Practice
Acta Theory	Uncritical Identity of Speech, Writing, and Thinking; *Social Context* (No Control for Bi-Cultural Bi-Lingual, etc. Respondents)	Differentiation of Symbolic Comportment (all media); *Cultural Context* (culture, language controls)
Capta Theory	*Information Theory:* Disjunctive Choice in Context (Either/Or)	*Communication Theory:* Conjunctive Choice of Context (Both/And)
Validity Criteria = Logic	*Inductive Logic, Sufficient Condition*	*Abductive and Adductive Logic, Necessary Condition*
Qualitative Validity	Intensional Semantic Specification by Analytic Selection of *Paradigmatic* Categories	Extensional and Intensional Specification by Analytic and Synthetic Comparison of *Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic* Categories (Jakobson's "Prague Prism")*
Reliability (Logical) [Linguistic Systems]	*Replication* [Type 1 Explanation: Mechanical linkage of single elements in a system] [*Assumption* of Type 2 Explanation: Isomorphism of the systems]	*Sufficient Condition* * [Type 3 Explanation: Transformation of the systems] [Bühler's *Anaphoric Deixis*]
Quantitative Reliability	n 1+ (usually < 10) (until there is category redundancy) { n 1 + ? = Sufficient Condition}	n 1 (Typology = Logical Class) { n1 + 1 = Necessary Condition}
Metaphysics (*Husserl*)	Morphological Essence of *Behavior*	Morphological and Existential Essence of *Comportment*
Epistemology	Analysis, then Synthesis; *Typology of Data* (NOT generalization) [Theory Unknown]	Comparative Analysis and Synthesis; Type, Token, Tone Specification as *Typology of Capta* [Theory: *Charles S. Peirce*)

(2) Any dimension of "expressiveness" must be paired with a dimension of "perceptiveness" and this is impossible without an explicit statement of the semiotic system which constrains the conjunction of logic and linguistics as an analytic tool of application. This is, the limitation of expressiveness to "language" fails to account for the logical hierarchy of discourse (see Fig. 2). Which level of discourse is "psychological", "propositional", etc.?

Giorgi and Lanigan are in agreement about the metaphysical position from Edmund Husserl that grounds their phenomenological theory. In his early work, Husserl refers to what he labels "***morphological essences***". These are not the usual "transcendental essences" which seem to be, at best, difficult to specify. Even Husserl (1960; see Lanigan 2012) shifts toward the morphological category in his later work which is favored by most human scientists. Interestingly enough, neither Husserl nor Giorgi give a *theoretical or applied* account of what this metaphysical category of "morphology" means in the phenomenological method, except to say that such "essences" are not exact concept like those in mathematics, but are marked by "vagueness".

Let's try to sort this out the vagary by looking briefly at the *linguistic concept of morphology* (our research is based in discourse!), then we can move to the semiotic and logical equivalents. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* provides a standard account of ***morphology:***

> This branch of linguistics studies the structure of words. In the following list, all the words except the last can be divided into parts, each of which has some kind of independent meaning.

unhappiness	*un- -happi- -ness*
horses	*horse- -s*
talking	*talk- -ing*
yes	*yes*

> *Yes* has no internal grammatical structure. We could analyze its constituent sounds, /j/, /e/, /s/, but none of these has any meaning in isolation. By contrast, *horse*, talk, and happy plainly have a meaning, as do the elements attached to them (the 'affixs'): *un-* carries a negative meaning; *-ness* expresses a state or quality; *-s* expresses a plural; and *-ing* helps to convey a sense of duration. The

smallest meaningful elements into which words can be analyzed are known as morphemes; and the way morphemes operate in language provides the subject matter of *morphology* (Crystal 1997: 90).

Considering the category of "Evidence Item" in Table 4, the importance of morphological essence becomes a critical point. For Giorgi, the "meaning unit" has no logical status in a typology until the researcher creates it, but on what theoretical basis? Here is where standard grammar provides a ready-made, natural attitude guideline. The result is a confirmation of grammar, not a phenomenological description of a mental state (psychology).

By contrast, Lanigan's "revelatory phrase" is guided by semiotic theory. Logic, especially abduction, requires a semiotics, namely, a sign-system that has two constitutive construction rules: (1) Things in the system, and, (2) Things outside the system. In the definition of morphology above, it is immediately obvious that Ihde has no guideline for explaining the "meaning unit" that counts as a morpheme. But using the "revelatory phrase" approach, semiotic theory immediately explains how morphemes are generated and how one **type** of morpheme (e.g., *yes*) can be distinguished from all others (Lanigan 2010a). Hence in our example, we have something like simple morphemes (e.g., *yes*) and complex morphemes (the other examples), i.e. two types and *now* the ability to differentiate **typologies**. This is precisely how linguists differentiate *inflectional morphology* (use of t*one* of voice to change meaning) from *derived morphology* (using compounds to form new *token* words, e.g. making *drink* into *drinkable*). For a theoretical account of the discourse semiotics applicable to our analysis, see my (1988: 223) "Semiotic Phenomenology in Plato's *Sophist*" which distinguishes the logic of *grammar* (*genus—species*) as "meaning unit" and the logic of *semiotic* (*genus—differentia*) in the "revelatory phrases" of discourse. An empirical example of the same issue is demonstrated using *experimental phenomenology* in "Guess at the Word, or, How to Phenomenologically research the hermeneutic Experience of Language and Logic" (Lanigan 1988: 118). An explicit comparison to Giorgi's method is my text based study of one "revelatory phrase" (n=1) in "Metajournalism: Merleau-Ponty on Signs, Emblems, and Appeals in the Poetry of Truth" (Lanigan 1988: 103; for an analysis of a single word and coding at the phonological level, see2010a).

5. Understanding Culture and Communication

Where does the analysis stand at this point? We began with Don Ihde's phenomenological attempt to extend philosophical analysis from the eidetic level to the empirical level by means of a "thought experiment" transformed to an "experience experiment". Of course *experiential research* (in contrast to the statistical projection of eidetic categories represented as "behavior") is fundamentally *empirical* because it is *concrete, actual experience*, not the *idea* of experience which is hypostatized as *real* (Ihde) or as *ideal* (Searle's "conceptual realism"). Then, we moved to Amedeo Giorgi's latest theoretical discussion of empirical phenomenological method to account for experiential research. I found theoretical problems with this method and illustrated my alternative method and its metatheoretical (interdisciplinary) ground in Table 4.

I now want to turn to the experimental communication research of Tom McFeat because he uses an *experiential phenomenological method* of communication analysis to accomplish these ground breaking results: (1) an account of how *communication constitutes culture* by means of intergenerational communication, and hence, (2) how *group culture as a communication medium* constitutes the *formation of understanding and memory* for individual persons. To understand communication among generations of people, we will briefly review the work of Margaret Mead based on her anthropological research in various cultural settings.

5.1. Mead on Generational Communicology

Understanding human values in families, how they are remembered and then passed from one generation to another is an enduring question for those who study human culture. In modern times with modern technology, the study of long-term transmission of messages has become critical. For example, the necessity of marking nuclear waste sites with "danger" warning messages that will endure *and be understood* after 10,000 years or 100 generations is a current practical problem being researched in the USA (Lanigan 1995c; Sebeok 1982).As a brief introduction to the semiotic system codes involved with intergenerational communication, **Table 5** give a summary of Mead's model of generational communication as a cultural paradigm.

Table 5. Margaret Mead's Model of Intergenerational Communicology

MARGARET MEAD'S MODEL OF CULTURAL COMMUNICOLOGY (SEMIOTIC INNOVATION, TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, RETRIEVAL) The continuity and survival of all cultures require the living presence of at least three generations who engage in group communication.			
CULTURE TYPOLOGY	**POSTFIGURATIVE** TOKEN CULTURE	**COFIGURATIVE** TOKEN CULTURE	**PREFIGURATIVE** TOKEN CULTURE
Developmental Process (TONE)	1st GENERATION → ⟨GRANDPARENTS⟩	2nd GENERATION → ⟨PARENTS⟩	3rd GENERATION ⟨CHILDREN⟩
LOGIC CODE	Children **learn** primary from **FOREBEARS** (Old Forms ASSIMILATE New Forms)	Children and Adults **learn** from their **PEERS** (Old Forms ACCOMMODATE New Forms)	Adults **learn** from their **CHILDREN** (New Forms ASSIMILATE Old Forms)
CHRONEMIC CODE	**Reality is the PAST.** Elders cannot conceive of change.	**Reality is the PRESENT.** Difference and Change is a normal expectation.	**Reality is the FUTURE.** The new and unexpected is a normal expectation.
PROXEMIC CODE	Each Person is an Embodiment of the Whole Culture.	Postfigurative Culture begins to breakdown; Embodiment is not predictable (Entropy).	Cofigurative Culture begins to breakdown; Children embody the new culture (Negentropy).
KINESIC CODE	**Migration is Internal;** geographical within regional boundaries.	**Migration is External;** geographical across national boundaries.	**Migration is Internal;** Economic across class boundaries.
HAPTIC CODE	**Gender Roles are Stereotypical; Embodiment is Iconic**	**Gender Roles are Prototypical; Embodiment is Indexical**	**Gender Roles are Atypical; Embodiment is Symbolic**
LINGUISTIC CODE	All three generations are **Monolingual** and **Mono-gestural**	One generation is monolingual; one or two generations are partially **Bilingual — Bi-gestural.**	Children can be fully **Bilingual and Bi-gestural,** hence **Bi-Cultural.**
COMMUNICATION CODE	All verbal and nonverbal forms are **SYNTHETIC** *(Oral Tradition dominates the Written Tradition; Fashion and Dress are Stereotypical)*	All verbal and nonverbal forms are **INFERENTIAL** *(Nonverbal Fashion and Dress choice dominates; verbal critique is ignored)*	All verbal and nonverbal forms are **ANALYTIC** *(Technology Innovation dominates verbal practices; nonverbal norms are ambiguous and experimental)*
Table is based on: Margaret Mead, *Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1970) Richard L. Lanigan, *The Human Science of Communicology* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1992).			

5.2. McFeat's Small Group Experimental Phenomenology

Tom McFeat (1974, 1979, 2002) was a doctoral student of Robert Bales in the Department of Human Relations at Harvard University and spent his career teaching anthropology at the University of Toronto, Canada. He did extensive field research on the

Navajo and Zuni cultures in Arizona and New Mexico (USA) in addition to the Northwest Indians of Canada. I was privileged to have attended his seminar in Toronto (Lanigan 1980; see Lanigan 2012b). Robert Bales' classic research on small group communication is the base from which McFeat created his experimental model for culture generation. For a discussion of the classic model of task group and affiliation group formation and communication structure, see Lanigan (2011a,b).

Recalling Figs. 2 and 3, we must first examine the discourse context assumed by McFeat in developing his research experiment. This is to say, human scientists surmise that successful intergenerational communication beyond ten generations (1000 years) requires the use of a *myth discourse* model (see Lanigan 1995c, Sebeok 1982). Recalling the Greek Cosmology of Discourse in Table 1, the consensus means that the successful discourse system must reach the *mythos* and *magikos* level for successful understanding and preservation in memory(coding) of a critical message in culture. **Table 6** is a summary of these ideas including McFeats information content categories.

This use of *myth discourse* is easier to comprehend, if I put it this way: a message must be internalized in the mind as a meaning critical for survival and the memory will be aided by embodiment practices (rituals) that stimulate this memory. In most cultures this discourse myth-ritual phenomenon is easily recognized as "praying to god for understanding in moments that threaten survival". I have previously used the myth model, derived from the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958: 202-228), to analyze schizophrenic discourse in a therapy situation (Lanigan 2010a) and in a novel (Lanigan 2005). All such research must take account of the eidetic and empirical complexity of reference when embodied as discourse, either verbal (Lanigan2010b) or nonverbal (Lanigan 2012). Recall from Table 1 that a *normal discourse paradigm* describes *Actuality* by (1) matching diachronic time with syntagmatic space and (2) matching synchronic time with paradigmatic space; culture calls this *Reality*. This is the Greek metaphysical model wherein *discourse contextualizes ritual* in the sequence [logos → nous → mystos → mythos → magikos]. In short, "saying" leads to "doing".

Table 6. Discourse Model Correlation to Myth Hermeneutics

1. Information	Example**	2. Comunication	3. Communicology
1. Content-Ordered Culture	Narrative {Hermeneutic}	2. Task-Ordered Culture	3. Group-Ordered Culture
1. Postfigurative Culture*	Figuration = matrix pattern	2. Cofigurative Culture*	3. Prefigurative Culture*
a. Children learn primarily from their forebearers. **b.** Elders cannot conceive of change; reality is the *Past*. **c.** Continuity reflects itself in synthetic forms of speech and gesture.	*Margaret Mead (1970):* The continuity and survival of all cultures requires the *living presence of at least three generations* who engage in group communication.	**a.** Children and Adults learn from their peers. **b.** Difference and change is a normal expectation; reality is the *Present*. **c.** Continuity is linked to fashion and dress; sexual roles are stereotypic and symbolic.	**a.** Adults learn from their Children. **b.** The new, unexpected are normal; reality is the *Future*. **c.** Continuity is linked to immediacy of experience, mediated by technology.
Referent Content Culture is an organization in **Space**.	Myth Level 0 {Literal} **Tom McFeat (1974):** Experimental Group Phenomenology	*Langage* {Logic, Syntactics} Culture is an **organization** in **Space**.	Actuality = Concrete Experience **Culture** is an organization in **Space**.
Basic Content Culture is a **static** pattern of **action** in **Time**.	Myth Level 1 {Allegorical} The First Half Novel (Given Facts = *Data*) "depicting the characters and events as given" (p. 129)	*Langue* {Rhetoric, Pragmatics} Culture is a **dynamic** pattern of **interaction** in **Time**.	Reality = Abstract Experience Culture is a dynamic **matrix** of **transaction** in **Time**.
Interpreted Content Information (*messages*) remains **stable**.	Myth Level 2 {Tropological} "This intermediate form was sought after in all groups before they were willing to or even able to innovate. This became a commentary on the novel but also a means of referring to conditions arising outside this novel or novels in general" (p. 129)	*Discours* {Figure of Language; Grammar} Information (*context*) is **unstable**; environmental pressure to **change**.	Ideality = Consciousness of Experience Information is **shared meanings** (*codes*) in the **group as a concrete medium**.
Innovated Content The group is **unaffected by** the inflow of **information**.	Myth Level 3 {Anagogical} The [missing] Second Half Novel (Taken Facts = *Capta*) "the conclusion sought after or arrived at" (p. 129)	*Parole* {Trope of Speech; Semantics} The group is fundamentally **affected** by the inflow of information (*context*); there is a potential for **restructuring** the group.	Surreality = Experience of Consciousness The group is fundamentally **affected by the inflow** and outflow of information (*contact*); there is an **actual** and ongoing **structuring of the group**.

The analysis of an *abnormal discourse paradigm* (e.g., schizophrenia, religious conversion, etc.) takes Actuality and constructs a Myth or *Ideality* by (1) matching diachronic time with paradigmatic space and (2) matching synchronic time with syntagmatic space; culture calls this ideal construction *Myth*. This construction *reverses* the Greek metaphysical model such that *ritual contextualizes discourse* in the sequence [magikos → mythos → mystos → nous → logos]. Thus, "doing" precedes "saying". Thus, the western aphorism of "Do as I say, not as I do" is meant to promote the *myth* of culturally appropriate decisions. **Table 7** allows for a comparison of the paradigmatic function in both "real" and "myth" discourse. Lévi-Strauss (1958: 202-228) worked closely with Roman Jakobson(1962-2000) at

the New School for Social Research in New York City, thus the shared fundamental elements of structural linguistics in both scholars approach to cultural discourse.

Table 7. Lanigan Reality/Myth Model based on Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss.

DIACHRONIC

SYNCHRONIC

REAL ← SYNTAGMATIC

PARADIGMATIC

REALITY:
"HERE" AND "NOW" **CONTACT**
IS THE POINT OF EXPRESSION-
PERCEPTION FOR A CONTEXT
THAT IS "THEN" AND "THERE"

DEFINITIONS:

Synchronic = "Now" (Present; *in praesentia*; Self)

Diachronic = "Then" (Past, Future; *in absentia*; Other)

Paradigmatic = "Here" (Vertical Category, Place *Selection*)

Syntagmatic = "There" (Horizontal Category, Place *Combination*)

REAL = Synchronic/Paradigmatic *punctuation*
with Diachronic/Syntagmatic coherence
[Hjelmslev's semiotic "Substance"]

MYTH = Diachronic/Paradigmatic *coherence*
with Synchronic/Syntagmatic punctuation
[Hjelmslev's semiotic "Form"]

DIACHRONIC

SYNCHRONIC

MYTH ← PARADIGMATIC

SYNTAGMATIC

MYTH:
"THERE" AND "NOW" CONTACT
IS THE POINT OF EXPRESSION-
PERCEPTION FOR A **CONTEXT**
THAT IS "HERE" AND "THEN"

Mythic discourse [Text/Utterance Level; Paradigmatic Message] shows a structural similarity with "schizophrenic" emblematic language [Phonemic Level; Syntagmatic Code]. It is extremely difficult to decode the Syntagmatic chain (a continuos sound sequence) without discovering the "revelatory phrase" [phonemic key] that is the Paradigmatic key to (parsing of) the message uttered or written by the patient.

The basic research problematic that McFeat proposes to investigate is the fact that each generation of a group (e.g., a family) selects a ***referent*** *content of information* (formation) as it's understanding of their *Lebenswelt* situated in an *Umwelt*. When a second generation emerges (birth of children), the information (message/code) is passed along to the new generation. The resulting dialogue between the two generations involves dialogue about the *morphological essence* of the content resulting in the transformation of the content so that it becomes ***interpreted*** *content information*. From a phenomenological perspective the

formation of referent content is a ***phenomenological description***. Using Lanigan's method (see Table 3), this is a first generation "thematizing the signs" followed by a second generation "abstracting of the signifiers" (confirmed by the first generation), i.e., performing a ***phenomenological reduction***. With the introduction of a third generation (grandchildren), the communication process continues with the interpreted content transforming to become ***innovated*** *content information*. Innovated information is now the accepted actuality referent information now known as Reality (the information has been phenomenologically *verified* as *reliable*).

In all of McFeats 1967 experimental groups, at least six (6) generations occurs successfully. The importance of achieving the six generation mark is that it verifies the full implementation of the all the recursive steps (both theoretical and methodological) of the Lanigan method (again see Table 3). Keep in mind that Step 9 in method is a dialectic shift of transformation back into Step 1 from the perspective of the succeeding generation. The failure of McFeat's 1966 and 1970 group experiments confirms the necessity of Mead's abduction that three generations are minimally required for the formation and survival of cultural information.

McFeat's three experiential group experiments are summarized in **Table 8** for easy comparison of success and failure features. He experiments with three different conditions of textual message: (1) a *magazine article* [complete narrative text], (2) an incomplete fiction *book* { a novel with the final chapter missing = no conclusion], and (3) *memory*, i.e., an ideal text [a narrative story assumed in experiential memory]. It may not be apparent at first, but text (1) was "real" in that it was content ordered as "what was read" and then existed in memory as reality, but was actually not available for reading by the second and subsequent generations who had only a "lost text". In the case of text (3), no actual text ever existed, but narrative memory of experience was transformed into a "real text" as if some actual texts could be referenced in some vague sense of "everyone knows it". Text (2) is an "actual text" completed by the first generation as an "actual text made into real text" {narrative end invented according to cultural values in the group] that the second generation has to interpret as a complete "real text", and then the "real text" was innovated by the third generation as the "ideal text" or myth.

Now we may draw some conclusions about experiential phenomenological method as used by *groups as a medium* to communicate their understandings as culture. The 1966 group is an example of text (1) and is precisely the type of process that Giorgi's method represents. The 1970 group is an example of text (3) and matches the propositional assumption of speech

act theorists like John Searle. Neither of the methodological approaches produce an understanding of either communication or culture as the basis for human understanding and memory. The message representations as "real" and "ideal" cannot be specified as "actual" in communicative or cultural experience, much less the "consciousness of" them. Text (2) is an "actual" message that can be communicated as "real" and culturally preserved (in memory) as "ideal" thereby constituting *understanding*.

A final word needs to be said about McFeat's surprise and mild confusion by the communicative comportment of *Lin's Group* in the 1967 experiments. The short explanation, contained in **Table 9**, is that McFeat was unaware of the communicological differentiation of cultures on the basis of preferred communication semiotic structures (codes) at the intergroup level. As a researcher with an Egocentric culture model of *perception*, he was literally unable to perceive the Sociocentric modality of *expression* produced by his Hong Kong students within their Chinese cultural framework. For an example studies illustrating these egocentric and sociocentric differences, see Lanigan (2011b, 2012b) or Roberts (1951).

Western cultures in general, and the USA and Canada in particular, are Egocentric cultures favoring individual *direct* communication where *individual* leadership is favored over membership participation. By comparison, Eastern Cultures and the Chinese in particular are sociocentric cultures that prefer *indirect* communication in a group. There is a preferred deference to group opinion where membership participation is prized above leadership; unique individual behavior is avoided (Lanigan 2009, 2012c). Sociocentric cultures actually have an advantage when it comes to *intergenerational* communication inasmuch as they promote a narrative structure that favors consistency of memory over time for most messages meant to endure for many generations. Hence, references to *ancestors* in China is ubiquitous, while similar references to *forebearers* in the USA are rare indeed!

Table 8. McFeats Experimental Phenomenology for 1966, 1967 (3 Groups), 1970

| Small Group Culture Structure		
GROUP	*TEXT*	*INSTRUCTION*
1966 Group **Generation Turn-Over Principle:** "If information content proved to be teachable and learnable then (a) the group would continue; when the teaching and learning were complete, then (b) new members would be introduced who © would learn what had been taught in such a way that (a) all members would also teach what was to be learned. This design was learned several thousand years ago with the introduction into the human community of narrative style which in turn evolved into myths" (p. 116).	*MAGAZINE ARTICLE* "What Has Happened to Our Old-Fashioned Morals" *Ladies Home Journal* December 1961 1. Read by First Generation. 2. Only Oral Transmission to Second Generation. 3. Transmit information to next generation. "We looked for a single and continuous problem which resolved itself into action that was not terminal. The solution to such a problem should (a) perpetuate a group, (b) introduce new members, © train all members in such a way as to (a) perpetuate the group. And so on." (p. 115)	"Without benefit of further reading, please agree among yourselves about the content of this article and then be prepared to pass this on as new members enter the group to replace established members, when you feel you are ready to receive them. Please bear in mind that only you will have red the article."
1966 Group Culture Failure Characteristics: Members assumed the identity of the five personalities mentioned in the article; one also became the moderator. Real and fictive roles merged creating constant humor. The grouped became closed. Content was structured in the sequence of the article presentation; a moderator assigned topics; new members were given sub-topics, but not coordinated. Transition to generations did not occur. "Although our cases are few, the evidence is suggestive that the failure of the 1966 and the success of the 1967 groups are in part understandable in terms of the stringencies and utilities of conditions set up by the different content structures (or codes) confronting initial groups" (p. 127).		
1967 Groups **{3 Successful Groups}** "We seek to discover how established myths perpetuate in a small-group medium. Myth not only lends itself to transmission in groups but maintains its integrity across generations. But how?" (p. 127) "New members entered all groups within two to four weeks of formation; and again within a week after joining, they showed evidence of being familiar with the contents of information" (p. 129).	*NOVEL* "We decided to introduce a novel (actually a half-novel) into the 1967 groups where this had not been done the previous year. ... The novel we introduced was written by Frances Shelley Wees, a Canadian writer of great experience and skill; written in 1956, it was entitled *The Keys of My Prison*" (p. 127).	Suggest a conclusion (the missing second half of the novel) to the narrative. "The [narrative] themes center on these questions: 'Can a woman ever *really* know the man she married? Can family solidarity hold out against intrusion through seduction? What brings on, what cures, and what is revealed in *amnesia*? When troubled, does one turn to the establishment?' " (p. 128).

Table 8. (continued vertically, part 2)

Small Group Culture Structure		
GROUP	*TEXT*	*INSTRUCTION*
BUSTER'S GROUP [Western Heritage Canadians; **Egocentric Group]***	Each group member became a character in the novel: Robin Sloan (lawyer), Dr. Prescott, Dr. Merrill, P. C. Lake (police), Aunt Edie, her niece, Julie (central figure), and Rafe (Julie's husband). "There was a tendency for new members to direct inquires and requests for clarification to first- *or* second-generation members since, from their point of view, there was no difference between them" (p. 133).	Moved through *Six Generations*. "First and Second generations argued from a symmetrical (same level) rather than a complementary (generation one vs. Generation two) basis" (p. 131). "Literal information retrieval occurred in narrative: one person was chosen to narrate and others corrected details when necessary" (p. 133). "Buster's group operated with three generations and then moved to a no-generation pattern when innovating" (p. 139).
CRANSHAW'S GROUP [Western Heritage Canadians; **Egocentric Group]***	"Specifics of content passed through many generations, indeed were never lost, that had originated with Cranshaw" (p. 138). "Transmission of the literal content of the basic information was the primary task" (p. 138).	"There was no long term interest in innovating information" (p. 137). "A preoccupation with basic content of information continued throughout the life of this group from generation *one to Generation Seven*" (p. 139). "Cranshaw's group worked well with three generations but did depart from this for a long time, while Joan and Frank were senior members" (p. 139).
LIN'S GROUP {Hong Kong Chinese} [Eastern Heritage Canadians; **Sociocentric Group]*** *{The Egocentric (= independent generations) versus Sociocentric (= dependent generations) distinction is *not* know to McFeat and, thus, is not part of his analysis. Hence, he cannot understand the Lin Group interaction formation of generations nor the indirect communication patterns}	"The Lin group very early established a dyadic pattern, a pattern of thesis and antithesis with a synthesis always in sight, but rarely achieved" (pp. 139-140). "The Chinese expressed interest in the family as a corporation ... emphasized the the resource base of the family company" [part of novel's plot] (p. 140). "Frequent references on the part of all members of the first generation to '*what we have decided*' once interpreted content entered the transmission" (p. 141). "We found it interesting how willingly the second generation deferred to members of the first despite the heated arguments they had indulged in, but their deference was accorded only in the transmission of basic information" (p. 142).	"Unlike Buster's group and somewhat like Cranshaw's, Lin's group tended at times to collapse all of its interactions into two-generation directions" (p. 139). "Lin's group persisted for *Six Generations*" (p. 147). "When the time came to deal with innovated content of information (i.e., to arrive at a conclusion) Lin asked Lorna to supply her own version. In some confusion, but with firmness, Lorna declined. So systematically were the innovated results tied into the interpreted content of information, and firmly agreed upon by the original group, that Lorna apparently felt she was in this way being asked for a *show of loyalty to the group*" (p. 140). "The second group entered passively and showed great interest in the details of the narrative; ... it began to create generations" (p. 141).

Table 8. (continued vertically, part 3)

Small Group Culture Structure		
GROUP	**TEXT**	**INSTRUCTION**
1970 Group	**NO TEXT** A study by members of a student seminar (23 students) to improve all department seminars. No text was referenced, yet the goal was a Department publication describing a typical seminar. Personal experience was abstracted into discuss-ion.	Innovate new information. "The task was devised without the need to establish concrete written information regarding seminars. This body of information was felt already to be known, and the group therefore proceeded to retrieve information *already* assumed to be stored!" (p. 123). "There were no generational differences based on control over information, therefore no asymmetry based upon the transmission of information (sending and receiving) and in the long run therefore, **no generational differences** at all" (p. 124).
1970 Group Culture Failure Characteristics: *A group without a task quickly becomes an Affiliation Group.* Members proceeded to retrieve already assumed information. "There were no generational differences based on control over information, therefore no asymmetry based upon the transmission of information (sending and receiving) and in the long run therefore, no generational differences at all. ... Information circulated through members which provided no objective context for group formation" (pp. 123-124). "The content of culture not only must be learned—as everyone has recognized—but also *it must be so phrased as to be learnable*" (p. 114).		

Table 9. A Communicological Comparison of Egocentric and Sociocentric Cultures

COMMUNICOLOGY CULTURE MODELS	
EGOCENTRIC CULTURE	**SOCIOCENTRIC CULTURE**
U. S. A.	P. R. CHINA
Individual "Ego"	Group "Face"
Aggregate Form	*Organic* Form
PARTS make a Whole "Marbles in a Bag"	*WHOLE* makes the Parts "Pile of Salt"
MEMBER of Groups	*GROUP of Members*
MESSAGE gives the *Contact* and *Code*	*CODE* Gives the *Context* and *Message*
Independence of Form Is the paramount *Social Goal*	*Convergence of Form* Is the paramount *Social Goal*
Communication Entropy creates *GROUP INSTABILITY*	*Communication Negentropy* creates *GROUP STABILITY*
SPACE: Proxemic Code defines Culture as a World of Static *THINGS*	*TIME: Chronemic Code* defines Culture as a World of Dynamic *BEHAVIORS*
Embodied Verbal SPEECH Is High Context "Space Binding" *Consciousness*	*Embodied Nonverbal PRACTICE* Is Low Context "Time Binding" *Comportment*
Expression: Understanding of one SELF ("Me") **DIRECT COMMUNICATION:** · NAME specifies Individual PERSON · GIVEN NAMES control the formality level of Interpersonal Interactions · *First Name* Reference Preference · *DAY* → Month → Year ▶ **Succesors**	*Perception: Understanding of the OTHERS ("Them")* **INDIRECT COMMUNICATION:** · NAME specifies Family GROUP · "RELATIONSHIP" NAMES control the level of Interpersonal Interactions · *Family Name* Reference Preference · *YEAR* → Month → Day ▶ **Ancestors**

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On the Inscrutability of Logic in Certain Natural Language Contexts

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Abstract

The paper opens by defining 'logical universality' as the retention of the propositional content of expressions under any enunciative circumstances. Universality in this sense, the paper claims, cannot be demonstrated in the same manner across different discursive domains and sign systems. Unlike in geometry, arithmetic, algebraic and mathematical logic, where logical universality can be shown to be non-controversial, the concept of universality becomes problematic as soon as natural language terms and syntax are employed. The paper shows the main reasons for this difficulty to lie in the extensional *features of natural language, which cannot be adequately captured by* intentional *means.* Intentional *descriptions are claimed to apply only to* semiotically homogeneous *sign systems of a formal kind. Natural language expressions, in contrast, are* semiotically heterogeneous, *or* heterosemiotic, *characterised as they are by quasi-perceptual ingredients. Nevertheless, the paper argues, there are three cases in which logical universality can be demonstrated to hold in spite of natural language being employed, one of which is strictly technical language. In contrast, culturally fully saturated natural language use is shown to escape the constraints of logical universality as defined, on the grounds that some of its essential features, such as* referential background, reference, *and* deixis, *especially in its* implicit *form, effectively undermine the retention of identical propositional contents across cultures and time.*

Introduction

If logical relations were able to appear outside specific semiotic systems, in pure form as it were, for example as Platonic universals or Kantian noumenal entities, only foolhardy philosophers would be tempted to dispute their universality. Alas, whenever we are dealing

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with logic we are engaging at the same time with a specific significatory practice, a sign system, by which logical relations are expressed. The very invention of mathematical logic as an enterprise aiming at univocity and clarity is an acknowledgment of this inevitable semiotic linkage. Under these circumstances, we require a working definition of 'logical universality' suitable to address the two fundamental features of all sign systems: what a sign sequence is about (propositions, reference) and its enunciation (deixis). Let us therefore call a sentence 'logically universal' if its propositional content cannot be altered in its use, that is, by any of its possible deictic applications. The universality of logic then would be characterized and guaranteed by meaning stability under any sort of enunciative circumstances. To be called logically universal, the propositional content of such a sentence would have to remain identical whether we sing it, speak it ironically, utter it in markedly different cultures, under different political circumstances, or recover it from a distant past. In this sense, *x=y ->y=x for all x,y* cannot be regarded as other than logically universal. In Foucauldian terms, we could say that a sentence could be called universal if the statement we make by means of it remains identical no matter under what 'enunciative modalities' it occurs historically or culturally. Foucault, of course, would be horrified at such a prospect. After all, it was precisely his aim to free language from the grip of *semantic intentionality* and instead locate it squarely in a pragmatics that led him down the winding path at the end of which his readers are finally offered his radically historicised notion of the 'statement'. On the other hand, if Foucault is right, then logic cannot function as universal in any natural language context. Should we be in a position to show that we can generate sentences in natural language whose propositional contents remain unchanged under diverse enunciative circumstances, his pragmatic position will have to be amended. (Foucault 1978) This is why in this paper I want to address the question whether or not and, if so, to what extent, expressions ranging from formal logic to natural language are able to satisfy our opening constraint. Do all these sign systems yield to what Wittgenstein called the 'hardness of the logical must'? (Wittgenstein 2009: §437) As we shall see, answering these questions will require the distinction between at least five distinct cases for which logical universality must be argued in markedly different ways.

Non-controversial logical universality

When we look at various forms of geometry, algebra, mathematics, formal logic and even strictly technical language, we find that in such artificial sign systems logical universality is something we find difficult to deny. Perhaps surprisingly, this has nothing to do with truth or falsity, or even validity of argument. Whether false or ungrammatical, the claim to logical

universality appears to hold for the expressions of all formal systems. Why is this so? Let us look at the way formal expressions are construed. The structure of a calculus, for example, typically looks like this. We begin with an arbitrary number of basic signs, a kind of 'alphabet'. Then we design a partial set of terms, made up of signs of the alphabet. This we can call the 'expression' set or the set of 'formulae' of the calculus. Out of these we can construct a partial set which term the 'sentences' of the expression set. And finally there are rules of derivation for every partial set of the formulae of the calculus. Since all of the signs and their combinations in expressions and sentences are uniquely and fully defined, lexical or syntactic murkiness does not occur, the elimination of which was part of the reason for designing the calculus in the first place. In performance, that is, the pragmatics of the calculus, anyone who follows the prescribed procedures will come up with identical results. Enunciation has no effect on the propositional content of any of its formulations which are endlessly transferable without change across time and amongst the most radically different cultures.

This applies to all kinds formal logic, in its algebraic versions from Boole to Frege, its mathematical forms in the contributions by Hilbert, Russell and Whitehead, as well as its further developments to this day, to all algorithms, recursive functions, including such critiques from within the field of logic as by Kurt Gödel and Alonzo Church. Leaving undecidability in certain cases aside, what these varieties of logic have in common is their *definitional tightness,* which eliminates lexical and syntactic ambiguity, and *neutralisation of deixis*, which guarantees identity of propositions across pragmatic events. Another reason for their uniformity is that we are dealing here with *semiotically homogeneous* systems. I will argue later that natural languages, by contrast, are *semiotically heterogeneous* in virtue of their perceptual and quasi-perceptual traces, which they have inherited from early stages in the evolution of language and which continue to be active ingredients in both lexicon and syntax, a situation that radically separates natural language from the domain of the formal. The remainder of this section addresses two cases in which formal and natural language features are combined.

What happens when a natural language expression is translated into Boolean binary-digital code and sent into the bit stream of our laptop? Are the original sequence of signifiers and its propositional content altered in any way? Just such a case of semantic/pragmatic effects has been argued by Katherine Hayles as a result of what she calls 'flickering signifiers'. (Hayles

1993) As a matter of fact, try as you may, no such shifts can be demonstrated either at the level of signifiers or at the level of signifieds, except for font changes. (Ruthrof 2000:160-161) This should not be surprising. After all, the machinic transformation process which natural language expressions undergo in the computer no more than replicate and economise the input, only to return it in identical shape to the reader. Consequently, we cannot speak of either a change in propositional content or enunciative modification, and so logical universality could be maintained if, that is, it can be successfully argued for all natural language use. A less clear case is the combination of formal signs and natural language expressions as it occurs in the vast arena of specialized industrial communication: technical language. Take for example the note for a welding job, 'Continuous 316 stainless steel welding on both sides of the flange' or the instructions for the use of a tec gun, 'Revs no higher than1300 for mild steel up to 10mm thickness'. What is taking place here when contingency enters the formal, or the formal is imposed on the phenomenal in the guise of natural language terms? If logical universality could not be guaranteed in expressions of technical language technological chaos would be inevitable. Yet whenever chaos does occur in this domain it usually has causes quite different from that of the failure of logical universality. The short answer to the question seems to be that the lexicon ('continuous', 'welding', 'stainless steel') is carefully defined by industrial standards guaranteeing numerical identity and so can be neatly combined with formal features ('316', '1300', '10mm'). No inscrutability here. At the same time, deictic features, or enunciative modalities, are neutralized in the sense that it makes no difference whether we speak such instructions ironically or contemptuously, an aspect of communication that would otherwise seriously affect the propositional content of natural language expressions. Compare the remark 'A heroic act' uttered by someone who is observing a strong young man bashing an old pensioner. Or consider sentences such as 'I beg your pardon', 'There is only one Jeep', and 'Pardon my French', each of which permits radical changes of propositional contents in diverse pragmatic contexts. 'You bloody bastard' can be an endearing exclamation during an Australian fishing venture or a serious insult, shifts in meaning that have a profound effect on the kind of logical relations we will distil. In contrast, in technical speech, ironic and other reversals of propositional content are denied by its definitional alignment with the formal. As in formal systems, the enunciative function has been neutralised.

Culture, history and pedagogy

A quite different situation presents itself in culturally saturated natural language. Here enunciative modalities, as well as referential background, play a vital role. To illustrate some of the complexities we face in such expressions, let me take a recent Chinese example, the new 'guiding principles' or 'mission statement' of the Chinese Education Television in Beijing, as presented to the Chinese government. (Kang 2004) Written in the traditional four characters and four line poetic style, the statement reads in *pinyin* as follows. *Neng li wei xian, Shi shang xui xi, Yi ren wei ben, Fu wu wei he*. Literally, this could be rendered in English as 'Ability as priority, Make a fashion of study, People as fundamental, Service as Core.' When asked to elaborate, native Mandarin speakers will respond to these lines with somewhat different readings, such as 'Everybody has to demonstrate their ability, We must catch up with contemporary knowledge, Whatever we do, our focus of attention must always be on people, Serving the people must be our emphasis' or 'Competence is our priority, We must make study fashionable, People are to be regarded as fundamental, Service is our core value.' While what we could call the *rough directionality* of the message is maintained in these as in a number of similar renderings, we cannot claim to be dealing here with *synonymy* in any strict sense, let alone a single propositional content that could be transferred across cultures and time. Even in this globally affected and market oriented phrasing of the CETV mission statement, the traditional force of literary language still plays a powerful role. As a result, we are dealing with an indicative grid of terms inviting a range of readings in roughly the same interpretive direction. What is important here is that the Chinese emphasis on interpretive elaboration still contrasts sharply with the techniques of *generalisation* and *formalisation* and their goal of tightly controllable propositional contents. This is why when we speak of *logical universality* in a natural language context differences in cultural history cannot be ignored.

We may wonder why China, in the heyday of its rich tradition, did not grant logic a prominent place in its cultural life. Anyone glancing at summaries of Chinese philosophy is struck by the prominence of Lao-tze, Confucius, Mo-tze, Mencius, the Legalists, and Buddhism, with barely a mention of China's logicians. Though never part of the mainstream of Chinese philosophy, we find documented in the third and second centuries BC a school of logic, the *Ming jia,* the School of Dialecticians or School of Names. Given the less than encouraging reception of its writers at the time and the outright contempt and hostility to matters of logic since then, it is not surprising that only a tiny portion of their output has survived. Since the dominant strands of Chinese philosophy were concerned mainly with developing rules for

social conduct in support of the existing hierarchy of political power, obedience and respect for the social ranking order, as well as a meritorious system of education and administrative service, logical argument by itself was regarded throughout the Chinese tradition as impractical, if not frivolous. It apparently never occurred to Chinese thinkers that logic, in conjunction with the advancement of mathematics, could ever prove useful and provide the culture with a special advantage over competing societies. In such a broadly shared frame of mind, the claim that logic was universal would have not have been accepted, except perhaps as universal nonsense.

The two leading figures of the *Ming jia* movement are Hui Shi (c.380-305 BC) and Gongsun Longzi (320-250 BC). What has remained of Hui Shi's output is a small collection of paradoxes, as well as a record of the high esteem he enjoyed among a select group of contemporaries. His dicta, 'Today I go to Yueh State and arrive there in the past', or 'The myriad things in Nature are both completely similar and completely dissimilar, a state of affairs to be described as a great similarity-in-dissimilarity' well illustrate his emphasis on the relativity of reality as we experience it. Gongsun Longzi wrote mainly about the relation between reality, perception, and language. His observations that 'Fire is not hot' (rather, it is our sensation of heat that makes us think in terms of heat) or 'Eyes do not see' (it is our mind that does so with the assistance of the eye) or his insistence that there is no such thing as a white horse on the grounds that 'whiteness' does not contribute to 'horseness' testify to the kind of original distinctions Gongsun Longzi introduced into Chinese philosophy. His accomplishments in metaphysics apparently included a theory of names and concepts that has been compared to Platonist theorisations of universals. (Wade Baskin 1972:147-148;219-224;) But even his practical political engagement and his attempts to show the usefulness of the study of the relation of things and names failed to prevent his achievements from suffering the fate of near oblivion. As Chuangzi, a rival philosopher, is recorded to have remarked about the logicians, 'they were able to subdue other people's mouths, but cannot win their hearts. This is where their narrowness lies'. (Wing-Tsit Chan 1963:233) Does this suggest that logic is simply not applicable to certain cultures? Or can we say that different cultures develop different kinds of logic? And if logic is culture dependent, is logical universality a misguided dream?

Not all natural language use shows up 'propositional inscrutability' as persuasively as does our Chinese 'mission statement'. And in some cases, logical universality can indeed be argued

in spite of cultural difference. No matter how strange they may at first blush appear, the paradoxes of the 'founder of dialectic', Zeno of Elea, have made it into the first year philosophy classes of most cultures and much with the same results. Why is this so? After all, they emerged from a temporary and culturally distant world and were formulated in a foreign tongue. Can their logic be called universal? And if so, how is that possible? It would seem that if the identity of the propositional content of Zeno's arguments can be retained in all utterance contexts this is so because the double inscrutability of reference and deixis, to broaden Quine's parameters, has been *neutralized*. (Quine 1964) Indeed, reading Zeno we note that we are able to reduce 'Achilles' and the 'tortoise' to non-living moving entities which we can codify by place holders without loss of meaning. As a result, we can represent the paradox by way of an algorithm. After all, Zeno's *extensional* entities, such as his chosen names, are no more than a front for *intentional*, formal principles and so their normal semantic/pragmatic scope is rendered immaterial. Neither the mythological context within which the name Achilles was typically understood by Zeno's Greek audience, nor the real world relations in which tortoises were seen to be embedded, play any role in the logic stakes. Viewed from the perspective of reader as victim, one may feel somewhat manipulated by Zeno's clever use of language. (Habermas 1979) Questions of morality and power aside, we could speak here of a reversal of the procedure of naming as a 'baptism of an object', noted by Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 2009: §38) and elaborated by Kripke. (Kripke 1980) Certainly, the move via anonymization of natural language terms for logical purposes is the first step in Zeno's reduction of the represented phenomenal world to a non-actual, merely formal spatial matrix, a process that allows him to generate the paradox. From this perspective, Zeno's paradoxes can be viewed as stepping stones in the history of the movement from natural language to formal logic. What is striking in this example, as it is in Kant's Categorical Imperative, is that in spite of its use of what looks like culturally saturated natural language, the generalised content of his language appears to be logically universal.

Taking Zeno as a stand-in for many similar examples, as well as from the perspective of the emergence of geometry and arithmetic, we can say that the path from natural language to the formal is paved with *two fundamental reductions*: the neutralization of reference and the neutralization of deixis. This process follows two lines of abstraction, two axes that cut across one another; one, the axis ranging from specification to generalisation, the other, the axis with the polarities of materialisation and formalisation. The former permits us to view objects of the world, as well as formal entities, at increasingly or decreasingly levels of specificity or

generality; the latter permits a process of reduction from 'full' mental-material content to formal emptiness. Generalisation and formalisation (or dematerialisation) are the two basic ways by which we form abstractions. In this reductive trajectory, specific reference in natural language expressions, and the manner in which they are uttered, their enunciative modalities, appear to matter less and less. At a very high level of generalisation and at the point of complete de-materialisation (or formalisation), reference and deixis appear to cease to affect the propositional contents of natural language expressions. The difficult question to answer is where we peg the point at which we can say that a natural language expression has been *sufficiently de-referentialised* and *de-modalised* to meet our initial definition in the way it is satisfied by a formal expression such as (p->(q->r)) ->((p->q) -> (p->r).

Are we then committed to something like 'contingent universality'?

'Contingent' universality

Both Leibniz and Kant were aware of the gap in reasoning between the *intentional* neatness of mathematic logic and the complexities introduced by contingency, even if not precisely in those terms. In order to close the gap, Leibniz built his bridge of *zureichender Grund* or 'sufficient reason', while Kant went a few steps further by splitting the reasoning process into at least six clearly demarcated procedures, each with its different logical mechanism. (Kant 1956; 1967; 1968) (1) Formal or 'pure' reason is stipulated and definitionally controlled, yielding to verification. (2) Reasoning with empirical concepts introduces fuzziness both at the boundaries of the concepts themselves and the potential infinity of its analysis, a reformulation of 'sufficient reason', yielding to 'falsification'. (Popper 1975). (3) Reasoning in matters of practical ethics borrows stipulated concepts from a quasi-formal system of rules and applies them to the phenomenal world of social action, monitored by community mores. (4) Reflective reason permits judgments of isolated phenomena within complex systems the totality of which escapes us, such that we cannot but stipulate a law not yet given that would govern the instance in question, a bottom-up procedure guided by community expectations. (5) In the absence of such an overall law, Kant proposes a non-Aristotelian telos, or teleological reason, the top-down procedure of an interpretive frame, which we must stipulate if we wish to judge complex phenomena with the help of reflective reason, sanctioned by interpretive communities. (6) Transcendental reasoning, finally, is his second-order logical process of emptying a specific reasoning process of material content, leaving as distilled result the mere bones of the reasoning process itself. (Hintikka 1972) As noted, Kant also added a social component to this immanent scheme, the notion of *sensus communis*, which

plays a minimal role in (1), restricted as it is here to a community of logicians and the right to veto, increasing to (4) and (5), where, in the absence of any stability of either subject or predicate, the role of *sensus communis* as interpretive community becomes all important.

Can logic be called universal in Kant's six forms of reasoning? According to our opening definition of propositional identity only 'pure' reason would qualify. After all, as soon as we involve empirical concepts reflecting phenomenal underdetermination, propositional contents display features of indeterminacy. So, perhaps, logical universality can be rescued only at the level of the formal mechanism underlying his remaining five forms of reasoning. This could go through since those mechanisms do not depend on natural language expressions and can, without loss, be replaced by fully formal sign sequences. However, we are then left with a dilemma: how are we to describe the degree of logical validity of a result of transcendental reasoning such as the Categorical Imperative, reformulated as 'Act in such a way that you would be happy with the rules that informed your action to become general law'? And why is it so difficult for readers of any culture to show that Kant's Enlightenment statement does not apply to non-European societies today or some centuries earlier? Is it because there is a universal logic embedded in it? And if so, what is it that makes it so? Unlike the logical mechanisms of (1) to (5) the Categorical Imperative cannot be translated, without loss, into a merely formal sign sequence. If we replace its natural language terms by mere place holders, removing any reference to their original meaning, we could not reconstruct the thrust of Kant's message. On the other hand, would the retention of its natural language expressions not mean to retain also the contingencies which contradict our initial constraint on logical universality? And yet, short of fully-fledged formalisation, there appears to be a degree of generality operating here that permits Kant to cover all varieties of societies by which we may wish to test the Imperative. What Kant has indeed achieved in the radical generalisation of his transcendental reduction appears to be less a summary of formal ethics than a *definition of the social.* For the violation of Kant's ethical meta-rule would mean the destruction of any existing society itself. This, I suspect, is why so far none of my students has ever come up with a refutation of the inner logic and practical applicability of that notorious principle, apart from complaining that it does not cater for Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean forms of will and does nothing for their emotions. Any serious denial of the universal validity of the logic of the Imperative would have to invent a 'society' in a possible world in which the bare bones of Kant's Imperative do not apply.

While Kant succeeded in demonstrating the scope of logical universality via specific reasoning procedures for specific judgments, Frege took a more radical turn. (Frege 1970) By collapsing formal and natural language sense and so stripping 'sense' of the senses, shrinking the ostensive force of *Bedeutung* as a pointing to scientific reference and eliminating *Vorstellung* from the lexicon, he was able to reduce sentence meaning to 'pure thought' and the test of two-valued logic. In the ideal of an unambiguously signifying *Begriffsschrift* (purely conceptual notation) the logical propositional content of natural language expressions is aimed to function just as it does in mathematical logic. The crucial assumption in Frege's scheme is that it is possible in natural language expressions to achieve semantic identity conditions. When we pay close attention to Frege's moves in this enterprise we note that he takes as his starting point the ideality of arithmetic and geometric expressions and then without hesitation, let alone justification, transfers this observations to the domain of natural language expressions, such that the noun phrase 'the evening star' is supposed to function just as do his Euclidian '*a*', '*b*' and '*c*'. In other words, Frege makes the massive assumption that the sense of natural language expressions can be equated with formal sense *salve veritate*. This is what I have referred to elsewhere as 'Frege's error'. (Ruthrof 1993) The question is whether something like the Fregean manoeuvre is required to make the logic of natural languages fit the bill of universality as defined.

It requires a certain kind of conception of language to argue synonymy and truth convention as we find them from Carnap (1967) to Bierwisch (1970) and from Tarski (1956) to Wiggins (1992), respectively. When it comes to synonymy, the assumption for example that active and voice in 'John threw the ball at Jane' and 'The ball was thrown at Jane by John' deliver semantic/pragmatic coextensive identity rests on the assumption that there is no more to natural language than the reflection of a state of affairs. And as long as this *extensional* side of language can be systematically aligned with its *intentional* features, as well as equally well controlled by way of definition, synonymy is supposed to pose no problem. What we are denying here, however, is the role of the deictic side of language, its enunciative modalities, an omission that may look insignificant in this example but can play havoc in more complex contexts. The devil here is in the choice of examples. Accounts such as these well suit the description of formal sign systems, but prove less and less satisfactory as the complexity of our examples increases.

As to truth oriented approaches, one can show that Tarski's 'Convention T' requires framing conditions absent in its original formulation. The attempt by Wiggins to revive the Fregean truth criterion rests on the stipulation of a 'literal' meaning which very much looks like an intentional entity. (Wiggins 1992: 66) Donald Davidson's application of a reformulated 'Convention T' for truth-conditional semantics shares this problem and in addition hides the fact that propositional checking mechanisms are second-order operations and as such parasitic on resemblance relations and so on meaning. (Ruthrof 2013) If we follow Quine here, a path I recommend, such stipulations cannot get off the ground. (Quine 1964) As far as natural language is concerned, we should instead settle for what Quince calls 'domestic meanings'. (Quine 1993: 53ff.) This has serious consequences for the claim to logical universality in natural language. Assumptions as to the *intentional* nature of meaning in natural languages surface in the description of a number of specific features. *Recursivity* is foregrounded by Chomsky, much as if it operated more or less the same as in formal signification. (Chomsky 1957) *Predicability* in natural language has likewise been constructed as a formal system. (Keil 1981). Much the same can be said about *grammaticality* and *syntax*. The fundamental problem in all such descriptions is that they are a little bit like formal tools employed to measure the coastline of Australia, never to yield quite the same result. The more complex our examples, the less satisfying the outcome. Unless we play rough shot with our initial constraint of logical universality, 'is logic universal?' does not look likely to be answerable in the affirmative, at least not in general.

Natural language and intentional entities

When Quine rejected the view that natural language could in any way be adequately described in terms of *intension*, he revived a theme that we find towards the end of Kant's first *Critique* where empirical concepts are sharply distinguished from their mathematical cousins. Kant here makes two important observations. One concerns conceptual boundaries, that is, the problem of the firmness of the definitional delimitations that stabilize the scope of the concepts of natural language. As far as empirical concepts are concerned, Kant says, their boundaries are 'never secure'. (KrV 725ff.) The second seminal observation in this section can be regarded as a consequence of the first in that it curtails the degree to which our conceptual analysis is able in principle to successfully pursue the task of stabilization. Here Kant emphasizes the sobering point that any such analysis 'will never be complete'. If Kant is right on these two points, since natural language relies heavily on empirical concepts, the *intentional* description of natural language is misguided in whatever form. For if the

boundaries of empirical concepts are wobbly and our analysis of the nature of such concepts cannot be halted logically but only by the practical decision of a Leibnizian *sufficient reason*, then natural language expressions fundamentally violate the definitional neatness of any notion of *intension*. Since the sense of a term viewed in its intentional context would depend only on its definition, without taking into consideration its *extensional* scope, its semantic/pragmatic range of application, natural language terms violate the very principle on which the distinction of *intension* and *extension* is based. We cannot define a natural language expression while disregarding the classes of all objects covered by it, and so its '*intension*' is always already contaminated, as it were, by its *'extensions'*. In using a phrase such as 'social responsibility' we are never quite in the position of a logician who first defines *'x'* as *'2y'* and then provides his *intentional* entities with an *extension* such as '*y=the width of my thumb'*. Furthermore, while the formal expressions have logical universality, the semantic/pragmatic scope of 'social responsibility' varies from culture to culture, as do its explicit and implicit enunciative modalities. In the case of culturally saturated language expressions we find ourselves from the outset in a holistic frame of meaning negotiation within social limits, involving reference, referential background, as well as explicit and implicit deixis.

Quine famously elaborates the implications of the failure of *intentional* description in theories of meaning, among other things, in terms of inadequate notions of meaning, a critique of synonymy, and the 'inscrutability of reference'. (Quine 1964) Yet referential inscrutability is by no means an all or nothing affair. Rather we should speak of degrees of inscrutability depending on two factors, one, what kind of sign system we are talking about and, two, to what kind of use a sign system is put. I briefly comment on each of these. (1) Reference functions somewhat differently according to different semiotic systems. In formal signification with formal reference, Quine's inscrutability is absent since we are dealing with the *intentional* entities of two systematically aligned axiomatically and definitionally governed structures. Nor can reference in a technical blueprint justifiably called inscrutable where intentional contexts constrain reference such that interpretation beyond acts of numerical identification is strictly curtailed. By contrast, in culturally fully saturated signification, such as natural language, Quine's critique bites, with devastating consequences for a range of positions in the philosophy of language. (2) The specific use to which a sign system is put in pragmatic contexts is another factor that plays a role in deciding on the degree to which referential opacity makes reference fixing problematic. (Ruthrof 1992:4-5) This applies most forcefully to natural language. And since there is no such thing as a non-

pragmatic context, including attempts at aligning natural language with formal semantics, we cannot without falsification investigate language outside such contexts. Given this caution, whenever natural language is employed in its full range of cultural involvements, rather than as a technical, reduced version, inscrutability of reference poses a serious problem for the philosophy of language well beyond Quine's intervention. For Quine's analysis is vulnerable to the charge that had he embraced a broader frame of analysis, including that of nonverbal semiosis in which all natural languages are crucially embedded, he would have been able to offer solutions to his 'gavagai' problematic and related observations in a more satisfactory manner. (Ruthrof 2003) Nevertheless, we should embrace his rejection of *intensions* as appropriate tools for the description of natural language and his emphasis on our difficulties in securing reference.

Referential inscrutability in Quine's critique, however, remains limited in a few crucial respects. I suggest that the view of natural language held by Quine, as by the majority of analytical language theorists is too limited. For the broadly shared assumption that the semantic and pragmatic sides of natural language are well described by linguistic expression, sense, and reference, with some slack given to deictic notions in speech act theory and presuppositions in Gricean analysis, is simply too narrow. What is missing is first the fact that natural language is not only used in acts of referring in Strawson's sense and so has reference as a result of use, (Strawson 1950; Evans 1982) but that its lexicon also has what I have called *referential background,* that is the typical way linguistic expressions indicate portions of a cultural world prior to pinpointing specific references. Frege's 'morning star' is a prime example. Without the shared referential background of typical mornings indicated in the phrase we would not be able to argue the link to the reference 'Venus'. Likewise, the 'evening star'. Second, the traditional analysis of marked deixis needs to be supplemented by an investigation of *implicit deixis*, the typical way in which a culture utters its terms. When '*xin bu'* in traditional Chinese culture was typically translated as 'Ministry of Justice', it is useful to be reminded that the more literal translations of 'pain inflicting ministry' or 'department of physical punishment' much better reflect the manner in which the vocabulary of law, legal processes, and legislation were spoken and thought about. Given this history and in spite of a massive recent campaign of introducing law oriented thinking and processes into contemporary Chinese consciousness, matters of law are still being viewed suspiciously and with an eye to the traditional conception of the law as punitive. Without such larger notions of *referential background* and *implicit deixis* our analysis misses two vital components.

If referential and deictic complications of this sort are absent in formal languages yet forcefully present in natural languages, what accounts for the difference? I drew attention earlier to the difference between *semiotic homogeneity* and *semiotic heterogeneity*, the former characteristic of artificial languages, the latter being typical of their natural language counterparts. Formal sign systems are semiotically homogeneous in the sense that they strictly employ terms from within one and the same domain, formal sense, 'pure thought', or *intentionality*. In contrast, natural languages are fundamentally tied to their *extensional contexts* via referential background, specific reference, as well as marked and *implicit* deixis. At the same time, and this is a crucial point to note, this *extensionality* is *semiotically heterogeneous*, characterized as it is by the necessary activation of *nonverbal* sign systems, such as olfactory, gustatory, haptic, tactile, visual and other sign clusters in the performance of language. This necessary linkage in the meaning making process in natural language between expressions and their *extensional* nonverbal components is as important as it is undertheorized. An approach which attempts to account for the *extensional* side of natural language in terms of nonverbal semiosis and quasi-perceptual traces can be found in Ruthrof (1997; 2000; 2007; 2009).

Because of the different forms of signification that are active in meaning events in natural language, the *semiotic homogeneity* of formal signs does not apply; without it, natural language expressions escape strictly definitional constraints. This is why one misses the point if one treats natural language *extensionality* by *intentional* means. In order to realize full cultural reference and deixis, or even their *sufficient* equivalents, the user of a natural language typically activates its verbal signifiers by means of nonverbal *Vorstellung*, the collective of mental states appropriate for each speech situation. It is well to remember at this point that *Vorstellung*, as mental modification of perception, is by definition *multisemiotic* and therefore *heterosemiotic* and cannot, without falsification, be translated into something formal, as for instance 'propositional attitudes'. So, if natural language cannot be described satisfactorily in terms of *intentional* entities and contexts and if their reference and deixis are complicated in the manner indicated, the claim to logical universality would seem to have suffered a severe setback.

Conclusion

In light of what has been said, we face five distinct kinds of semiotic contexts for which the claim of logical universality must be argued differently. Two of them strike me as uncontroversial because it can be shown that their propositional contents do not change under diverse enunciative conditions and so satisfy our opening definition. (1) One is formal logic, such as mathematical and symbolic logic; the other (2) technical language proper, that is, language in which deixis is fully neutralised and reference strictly delimited. The other three cases share the medium of natural language but are problematic in that they must be carefully distinguished not only from (1) and (2), but also amongst themselves. All three share some logical relations as part of their structure and meaning while those relations are veiled to different degrees by the characteristics of natural language. (3) In the third case we need to read 'through' their natural language components to distil the logical relations hidden behind the cultural ingredients of reference, referential background and deictic features. This is done by generalising and formalising those natural language features to the degree to which they were neutralised in the original design of the logical relations to be expressed. Logical universality is disguised as natural language narrative. What we have to do as readers to see through the manipulation is to transform the *extensional* character of the natural language text into its *intentional* skeleton. Here, then we have a situation of natural language use where an intentional approach is indeed not just relevant but the appropriate path to argue logical universality. Such is the case with Zeno's paradoxes, as we have seen. (4) There are cases in which sentences in natural language present a logical sequence while retaining a degree of referential and deictic mental material, yet nevertheless qualify in terms of our opening definition. They do so as a consequence of the high level of semantic generality at which they are formulated. However, it must remain a moot point whether it is possible to design a rule by which we could determine precisely at what level of abstraction such a qualification is justified. Suffice it to suggest that this level must be *meta-cultural*, an abstraction from the specifics of any kind of culture, to be able to produce a rule of subsumption. Referential and deictic reduction in this type of language use then is achieved not by pretence but rather by a process of abstraction laid bare for the reader, as in the transcendental reduction of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Natural language use according to (3) and (4) however is by no means self-evident, but requires decisions based on interpretation. Yet the involvement of interpretive acts complicates the matter. For the interpreter would have to know in advance and in principle what precisely satisfies the criteria of referential and deictic neutralisation, as well as what degree of generalisation of natural language phrases suffices to meet the

universality requirement. An alternative route is the one taken in this paper, that is, to ask whether a natural language statement (in the non-Foucauldian sense) retains its propositional content under any thinkable enunciative circumstances. If it does, it can claim logical universality; if it does not, it cannot. If it can, then its referential and deictic reductions are deemed *sufficient*; if it doesn't they are not. The Leibnizian move here may rescue the procedure from vicious circularity, but still leaves our interpretive problematic unsolved, a task to be taken on elsewhere. (5) No such manoeuvres, however, are likely to shore up the claim to universality of logical relations embedded in fully fledged natural language use. For it follows from what has been said that logical universality cannot be secured in any instance of natural language use where reference, referential background, marked deixis and implicit or cultural deixis remain specific, that is, are neither *sufficiently* neutralised nor lifted to a level of *sufficient generality* that would eliminate cultural, historical and other specifications. Such is the case of a vast bulk of natural language expressions. No matter how charitably we apply our opening constraint of continued identity of propositional contents under diverse utterance conditions, in natural languages employed in their full cultural settings, no such condition can be consistently argued. Neither does such natural language use yield to *intentional* description, nor can their *extensional* relations to the nonverbal complexities of cultures rescue them from inscrutability, an arch enemy of logical universality. So we are forced to conclude that while mathematical and other formal kinds of logic, (1,2) including such interventions as those made by Gödel and Church (Gödel 1962; Church 1958), satisfy our initial definition and while logical relations can be regarded charitably as universal in the kind of natural language use described in (3) and (4), any such compliance must remain a logician's dream for all cases of (5). As we have seen, this is not the result of a failure of the ideality of logical relations, the universality of which has not be doubted, but rather of the *inscrutability of logic* in *heterosemiotic*, culturally fully saturated natural language contexts.

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