

Communicology and Culturology: Semiotic Phenomenological Method in Applied Small Group Research

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Abstract

Communicology is the science of human communication where consciousness is constituted as a medium of communication at four interconnected levels of interaction experience: intrapersonal (embodied), interpersonal (dyadic), group (social), and inter-group (cultural). The focus of the paper is the group level of communication across generations, thus constituting inter-group communication that stabilizes norms (forms a culture). I propose to explicate the way in which the method of semiotic phenomenology informs the pioneering work at the University of Toronto by Tom McFeat, a Harvard trained cultural anthropologist, on small group cultures as an experimental research methodology. Rather than the cognitive-analytic (Husserl's transcendental eidetic) techniques suggest by Don Ihde as a pseudo "experimental phenomenology", McFeat provides an applied method for the empirical experimental constitution of culture in conscious experience. Group cultures are constructed in the communicological practices of group formation and transformation by means of a self-generating group narrative (myth) design. McFeat's method consists of three steps of culture formation by communication that are: (1) Content-Ordering, (2) Task-Ordering, and (3) Group-Ordering, i.e., what Ernst Cassirer and Karl Jaspers call the logic of culture or Culturology. These steps are compared to the descriptive phenomenology research procedures suggested by Amedeo Giorgi following Husserl's approach: (1) Find a sense of the whole, (2) Determine meaning units, (3) Transform the natural attitude expressions into phenomenologically, psychologically sensitive expressions. A second correlation will be made to Richard Lanigan's semiotic phenomenology method following the work of Cassirer,

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Jaspers, and Merleau-Ponty: (1) Description of Signs, (2) Reduction of Signifiers, and (3) Interpretation of Signifieds.

1. Introduction

The human science of Communicology culminates from several disciplinary developments, largely viewed as singular constitutions and foundational to differential attitudes about (1) the nature and function of philosophy and (2) the theory and method of science in *opposition* to *human embodiment* (Merleau-Ponty's reflective, reversible, reflexive consciousness of experience as experience of consciousness). In more familiar terms, the idea of Culture stands in contrast to the idea of Science, because there is a measured distinction between what human beings express and what they perceive. In Modernity, we know this situation as the emergence of (1) the distinct cultural disciplines of Linguistics (constraining Anthropology and Philology), History (constraining Sociology and Political Economy), Philosophy (constraining Logic and Psychology) over against the (2) the distinct scientific disciplines of Biology, Mathematics, and Physics. Ernst Cassirer explores this problematic of the disciplines in *The Logic of the Cultural Sciences* (1942/2000) where he distinguishes Culture as the perception-of-expression and Science as the perception-of-objects. Cassirer's four volume thematic of a qualitative human science is to be found in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923-1996) where his *semiotic phenomenology* of human communication is articulated in detail wherein Science is in the service of Culture. In this context, human *understanding* emerges from the semiotic matrix of communication and culture and comes to constitute the essence of the person. As a research problematic, this proposition requires explanation. "Explanations of human communication are by definition projects in metatheory construction. Just as natural languages may be used to explain themselves, the construction rules for communication systems may be used to articulate new paradigms constituting a higher logical type of communication" (Lanigan 1988: 184; Cassirer 1946/1953). The main focus of my research analysis is an explication of the *method and process* by which persons constitute their culture through the communication of understanding and memory.

My explication necessarily is an analysis of human science qualitative methodology (Phenomenology). Historically there have been two contemporary schools of thought on phenomenological methodology that emerged in the United States respectively in the disciplines of Psychology and Communicology. Amadeo Giorgi (2009) in the Department of

Psychology at Duquesne University is the founding figure for the approach known as *descriptive phenomenology*. My own work (Lanigan 1984, 1988, 1992) in the Department of Speech Communication at Southern Illinois University established the approach of *semiotic phenomenology* in the discipline of Communicology. In addition, the issue of *empirical* and *eidetic* methodology within Phenomenology was introduced by Don Ihde (1970) in the discipline of Philosophy. Thus, my overall analysis takes up these various methodological issues by raising certain theory construction concerns which are, in turn, exemplified with published research drawn from the disciplines of anthropology, communicology, psychology, and philosophy.

First, it is helpful to recall the foundational review of research methodologies offered by Karl Jaspers (1913/1963: 23-37) in which he distinguishes *techniques* [case-studies, statistics, experiments] from *logic*: (1) *the practical logic of research* [1. Collection of individual phenomena, 2. Enquiry into connections, 3. Grasp of complex unities], and, (2) “inevitable *mistakes in formal logic* that have to be constantly overcome” [unlimited *counting*, unlimited ‘*ad hoc*’ *hypothesis*, acceptance of *endless possibility*, unlimited *use of references*, the impasse created by *absolutes*, pseudo-insight through *terminology*]. The failure of “practical logic” is particularly notable in standard *quantitative* “social science” models, while the “mistakes in formal logic” are especially apparent in *qualitative* “social science” models and in standard *analytic* “philosophy” approaches.

Given the use of *logic* to ground methodology, Jaspers offers a succinct statement of the approach I am taking with my analysis:

Discussion of method makes sense only when there is a concrete case to consider and when the particular effects can be shown. Discussion of method in the abstract is painful. Only a concrete logic is valid in the empirical sciences. Without factual investigations and concrete material, arguments become suspended in mid-air. There is little point in thinking up methods which are not put into practice and perhaps never can be. (Jaspers 1913/1963: 37-38).

Phenomenology sets out on a number of tasks: it *gives a concrete description* of the psychic states which patients actually experience and *presents them for observation*. It reviews the inter-relations of these, *delineates* them as sharply as possible, differentiates them and creates a suitable terminology. Since we


never can perceive the psychic experiences of others in any direct fashion, as with physical phenomena, we can only make some kind of representation of them. There has to be an act of empathy, of understanding, to which may be added as the case demands an enumeration of the external characteristics of the psychic state or of the conditions under which the phenomena occur, or we may make sharp comparisons or resort to the use of symbols or fall back on a kind of suggestive handling of the data. Our chief help in all this comes from the patient's *self-descriptions*, which can be evoked and tested out in the course of personal conversation (Jaspers 1913/1963: 55).

For a detailed explication of the *logic of conversation*, see Jaspers profound analysis of human communication (Jaspers 1932/1970: 47-103).

It is a commonplace among human scientists that in many cultures the very concepts of “culture” and “communication” are embodied in the same word, e.g., Chinese 交. Why this is so sets the boundary conditions for examining the mutual influence of culture as a process of *value transmission* and communication as a process of *value constitution*. Recall that “values” are *decisions* displayed in verbal and nonverbal behavior. With respect to cultural transmission, Margaret Mead's (1970) work on the nature of family generations is an appropriate context for later examining Tom McFeat's experimental phenomenology project to specify the generational production, interpretation, and innovation of meaning. To appreciate the theoretical and applied advance that McFeat's research makes, it is necessary to briefly review Don Ihde's (1977) introduction to Edmund Husserl's method, the *only* publication to attempt an explanation of *experimental phenomenology* in either philosophy or the human sciences! Ihde (1977: 14) proposes that, following the direction of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method, “the thought-experiment—or better, experience-experiments—that are worked out here attempts to show the way in which phenomenological inquiry proceeds.”

There many theoretical principles involved in Ihde’s description of his human science research. Before reviewing them briefly, it is helpful to examine an illustration of the theory construction involved as presented in **Fig. 1** (compare Table 2). Basically, we need a to be aware of the methodological counterpoint to Husserl as a context for understanding. Charles S. Peirce (2.227-229; 2.619-644) offers a *logic of typology* by which Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s *existential phenomenological method* of (1) *Description* (1945/2012: lxxi) is the use of *Types*, (2) *Reduction* (1945/2012: lxxiv) is the use of *Tokens*, and (3) *Interpretation* (1945/2012: lxxxviii) is the use of *Tones*.

The Logic of Types (Charles S. Peirce)



The Logic of Abduction*/Adduction** (Charles S. Peirce)
 (*Particular, a posteriori; **Universal, a priori)



The Logic of Validity and Reliability



Example: Interviewing the Last Living Speaker of English




Figure 1. An Example of Research Using an “*n* of 1”

Ihde makes several important points based on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. First, he begins a “thought experiment” which is to examine the perceptual process involved in viewing a Necker Cube. This cube is really a drawing in two dimensions of a three dimensional image of a cube. We are not dealing with any actual object, but rather the visual representation of a mathematical idea. The unusual properties of the Necker Cube are the

“optical illusion” images that it presents vis-à-vis the fact that multiple images are capable of perception because human brain physiology requires a shifting focus on one image at a time depending on which parts are abstracted mentally. Second, the thought experiment turns into “experience-experiments” where one Type of images can be taken as multiple Tokens, each with its own unique visual characteristics or Tone. Third, this shifting process is possible because the human consciousness understands by means of the logic of abduction (one particular experience). That is to say, an image (*type* of experience) of the Necker Cube is perceived in one modality (a *token* of experience) with one meaning (a *tone* of the experience). Third, only now is it appropriate to call the Necker Cube a thought experiment because we can now abstract from our experience a *rule* of thinking (*necessary condition*) that validates our *consciousness of* experience (called “intentionality” in phenomenological method). Without this rule, we would never be able to recognize our experience when it repeats itself (*result*), so we conclude that that one original experience was sufficient to understand our experience (*reliability*). In short, to experience is to understand (a *case* or “state-of-affairs”). Is this example of the Necker Cube unusual? Yes, it is because the cube image is a fiction and does not occur in the natural world. But, it is the representation of an idea!

Recall now that *language* is a representation of the natural world and the *cultural world of ideas*. Ihde’s presentation is merely a variation on the method used in all human sciences to investigate our human consciousness of human experience. In Fig. 1, we have a simple presentation of this complex logic as method. I use the example of a cultural linguist recording the last known speaker of the English language (imagine it is you!). By following the phenomenological method, the anthropologist is able to interview and record for posterity the semiotic-system known as the English language. This is a synoptic view of how human culture is a production, interpretation, and innovation of meaning across the generations of humankind. Culturally speaking, each generation interviews the previous generation for the meanings it wants to preserve, discard, or innovative to a new context as understanding and memory.

2. Understanding and Communicology

Communicology is the science of human communication where consciousness is constituted as a *medium* (not a channel) at four interconnected levels of interaction experience:

intrapersonal (embodied), interpersonal (dyadic), group (social), and inter-group (cultural) as illustrated in **Table 1**.

Table 1. Communicology Media Levels: Each Level is a Medium.

SPECIFICATION OF NETWORKS AT THE FOUR LEVELS OF COMMUNICOLOGY						
ELEMENTS	ADDRESSER	CONTEXT	MESSAGE	CONTACT	CODE	ADDRESSEE
FUNCTIONS	EMOTIVE	REFERENTIAL	POETIC	PHATIC	METALINGUISTIC	CONATIVE
MEDIA NETWORK LEVELS:						
1. INTRAPERSONAL	Embodiment; Self as Mind	Content Ordering	Store Signification "Within One"	Pre-Consciousness; Pre-Reflectivity	Synesthetic Meaning	Memory
2. INTERPERSONAL	Dyad Relationship; Self as Other	Task Ordering	Transmit Meaning "One to One"	Consciousness; Reflectivity	Cognitive Meaning	History
3. GROUP	Socialization; Other as Self	Group Ordering	Retrieve Signification	Present; Reflexivity	Affective Meaning	Consociates
I. EGOCENTRIC	Task Group; Identity by Rule	Aggregate Parts	Centrifugal: "One to Many"	Competition creates Agony	Names Create Static Categories	Primary Roles; Leadership Dominates
II. SOCIOCENTRIC	Affiliation Group; Identity by Role	Organic Whole	Centripetal: "Many to One"	Cooperation creates Harmony	Names Create Dynamic Relations	Secondary Roles; Membership Dominates
4. CULTURE	Co-Figurative "Peers learn from Peers"	Inter-Group Ordering	Evaluate Meaning	Present; Reversibility	Conative Meaning	Contemporaries
I. SPACE	Post-Figurative "Children learn from Forebears"	Place Community	Space Binding "Many to Many"	Past	Digital Logic: In-Group vs. Out-Group	Predecessors
II. TIME	Pre-Figurative "Adults learn from Children"	Non-Place Community	Time Binding "Many to Many"	Future	Analogue Logic: Diffusion of Innovations	Successors

All concepts discussed in the analysis to follow, especially those presented in the various figures and tables, are explicated in detail in specific studies that are easily referenced (Lanigan 1988, 1992, 1995a, 2010). My analysis proceeds from the point of view that human communication is a verbal and gestural form of conscious experience that is culturally contextualized as *discourse*. **Fig.2** illustrates the standard linguistic frame of reference for discourse analysis in which each level codes the next level and constrains these correlations: (1) *Parole* = Intrapersonal medium, (2) *Langue* = Interpersonal medium, (3) *Discours* = Group medium, and (4) *Langage* = Intergroup medium.




Figure 2. Discourse Hierarchy Model (Wilden 1980, 1987)

Utilizing the key discourse theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault contextualized by the semiotic phenomenological work of Roman Jakobson, the discourse model can be elaborated as **Fig. 3.**




Figure 3. Communicology Model of Discourse Functions

The discourse elements specified in Fig. 3 are grounded philosophically in the phenomenological and semiotic tradition of philosophy and the human sciences, both American (Charles S. Peirce) and European (Roman Jakobson). Given the complexity of this metatheoretical approach, it will be useful to see the interdisciplinary convergence of logic, linguistics, semiotics, phenomenology, and communicology presented in **Table 2**. Basic categories are represented in the boxed concepts with the dialectic process relationships indicated by the given arrows linking boxes. Our particular concern is the ground for methodological comparisons that will be made later. For example, Syntactics and Pragmatics are Type 1 explanations where mechanical linkages are made in a language system, whereas Semantics and *Sinegebung* represents a Type 2 explanation where there is an isomorphism between language systems. Last, Chiasm and “le Meme et L’Autre”, are Type 3 explanations wherein there are transformations of the involved systems (Holenstein 1974: 7; see Table 4).

In particular, Merleau-Ponty (1968: 263) uses the speech trope of *chiasm* and Bühler (1990: 438ff) gives a Type 3 explanation at the center of the discourse problematic and thematic with his discussion of *anaphora deixis*. Merleau-Ponty's example of *chiasm* is "I - Other — Other - I" and is the culmination of his *semiotic phenomenology of discourse* (1964: 86) which of course, informs Foucault formulation of his *quadratic model* of discourse usually formulated as "Self : Same :: Other : Different"(Lanigan 1992: 110).

Let me make special note of the discourse reference to *Greek Cosmology* that appears in **Table 2**. This to say in particular that Merleau-Ponty (as well as Martin Heidegger) makes subtle, but critical, reference to the Greek *register of discourse*. This fact is badly misunderstood by most readers of Merleau-Ponty when he makes such statements as "The world [*nous*] and reason [*logos*] are not problems; and though we might call them mysterious [*mystos*], this mystery [*mythos*] is essential to them: there can be no question of dissolving it [*magikos*] through some 'solution', it is beneath the level of solutions" (2012: lxxxv; my insert). Or again, "In movement [*mythos*], the relationships [*nous*] between my decision [*logos*] and my body [*mystos*] are magic [*magikos*] ones" (2012: 97; my insert). Let me give the standard translations: *logos* (consciousness, rationality, speech that is), *nous* (mind) *mystos* (silence), *mythos* (speech that can be), *magikos* (art, *technē*). When the discourse sequence moves from *logos* (*symbol* = present absence) to *magikos* (*symbol* = absent presence), we have the trope of speech called *Asyndeton* [voiceless name]; the reverse order is the trope of *Prosopopeia* [nameless voice]. Hence, the ambiguity of interpreting the prophecies of the Oracle at Delphi, especially when they are articulated as a *chiasm*! Last, let me emphasize that the very representational *essence* of a *symbol* is that it is *per se* a *chiasm* in communication. To explain, a *symbol* in discourse is simultaneously both *encoded* (nameless voice; *prosopopeia*) and *decoded* (voiceless name; *asyndeton*) in the process of intersubjective communication—an empirical adductive proof of Husserl's proposition that "Subjectivity is Intersubjectivity"!(1969: 155; see Lanigan 2012). As Merleau-Ponty (2012: 474) confirms: "My life must have a sense that I do not constitute, there must be, literally an intersubjectivity; each of us must be at once anonymous in the sense of an absolute individuality and anonymous in the sense of an absolute generality. Our being in the world is the concrete bearer of this double anonymity." Hence, the synonymy of "communication" and "culture" in one word or symbol.

Table 2. Comparative Table of the Human Sciences


Logic	Linguistics	Semiotics	Phenomenology	Communicology
Type [Real]	Lexicon [Stylistics]	Sign [System]	Noema [Description] {Reflexivity}	Discuor [Savior]
Abduction (Particular; a posteriori)	Syntactics (Poetics)		Operative Intentionality	Tacit Cogito ("I am given") {Body}
Token [Imaginary]	Register [Figures of Language]	Signifier [Redundancy] Feature]	Noesis [Reduction] {Reversibility}	Parole Parlée [Énonciation]
Adduction (Universal; a priori)	Pragmatics (Rhetorics)		Thetic Intentionality	Spoken Cogito ("I am given to myself") {Embodiment}
Tone [Symbolic]	Morphology [Tropes of Speech]	Signified [Distinctive Feature]	Essence [Interpretation] {Reflectivity}	Parole Parlante [Énoncé]
Semantics (Symbology) NAMELESS VOICE ⇔ VOICELESS NAME (PROSOPOPOEIA) (ASYNDETON) [Greek Cosmology] [LOGOS ⇔ NOUS ⇔ MYSTOS ⇔ MYTHOS ⇔ MAGIKOS]			Sinngebung (Ek-stase) (existential expression-perception as reflexivity, reversibility, and reflectivity) ("I can")	
CHAISM (Merleau-Ponty) (X = chi) (semantic juxtaposition of words that reverse meaning) "The nameless voice speaks a voiceless name." Nameless ↔ Voice Voice ↔ Nameless			Le Même et L'Autre (Foucault) (SELF : OTHER :: SAME : DIFFERENT) SELF ↔ OTHER SAME ↔ DIFFERENT SELF ↔ DIFFERENT OTHER ↔ SAME BÜHLER'S ANAPHORIC DEIXIS (METACHIASM = Eco's HYPERCODE)	
<p>Source: Richard L. Lanigan, The Human Science of Communicology: A Phenomenology of Discourse in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1992).</p>				

3. Logic and Qualitative Research

While it is generally known that quantitative research is based mainly on statistical formulations of occurrence frequency grounded in mathematics, it is also generally *unknown* that qualitative research is based on *class typologies grounded in logic*. While this fact may be intuitively obvious to philosophers generally and phenomenological philosophers in particular, it is scarcely acknowledged by phenomenological human scientists and generally unknown at all in the humanities disciplines. Note, however, that semiotics has stimulated research in Literary Science from the point of view that literature is discourse descriptive of human comportment in specific cultural contexts describing the *Lebenswelt* and *Umwelt*. Hence in Table 1, the connection among Stylistics, Poetics, and Rhetorics is a matter of phenomenological human science research. For example studies, see Lanigan (1984, 1995b, 2005). Hence, a brief review of the applicable logics in human science qualitative research is given in **Table 3**. The logics so discussed are part of the interface between theory and method, which is to say the dialectic of theory construction and methodological application as a test of theory.

The basic purpose of the Table 3 presentation is to provide a concise description of the basic logics available to human science research: Abduction, Adduction, Induction, and Deduction. In addition, we come to understand how the logics of abduction and adduction are applied as a logic of typology (type, token, tone) formulated by Peirce (Lanigan 1995a). For European phenomenologists it is also necessary to make the correlation between these logics as used by Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Husserl and the Peircian logic. The corresponding correlation to evidence (*data* = what is given; *acta* = what is done; *capta* = what is taken) as modalities of *symbolism in discourse* is an integral part of understanding the Lanigan approach to *phenomenological method*: (1) *Thematizing* the description of the *Signs* (system of understanding and memory), (2) *Abstracting* the description of the *Signifier* (expression), and (3) *Explicating* the *Signified* (perception). The possible semiotic codes of phenomenological expression and perception are discussed at length in Lanigan (2010).

Table 3. Theory and Methodology Logics



4. Phenomenological Research

In order to contextualize the Lanigan phenomenological methodology, **Table 4** gives a brief comparison to the latest statement of method by Amedeo Giorgi, (2009), the leading phenomenological psychology researcher. The basic reason for the comparison is to emphasize the necessity of *metatheory construction* in phenomenology. In brief, Giorgi fails to adequately account for logic and linguistics as semiotic constituents of the phenomenological research situation. The result is a latent methodological positivism that is embedded in the “natural attitude” about language as the data given in interview based research. For example, Giorgi argues:

In fact, sentences are psychologically neutral in the sense that they could be psychologically loaded or empty. Sentences are not the primary way that psychological reality reveals itself in expressions. Of course, grammar of some type is necessary, but it is another dimension of expressiveness not well suited to reveal psychological meanings. Thus, the constitution of parts in the method are based upon the dimension that is most sensitive to the ultimate goal of the task.

Unfortunately, this is the same argument that analytic philosophers of language, like John Searle, use to say that eidetic “propositions”(noetic) are contained in empirical “sentences” (noema) and therefore grammar is not the operative logic in the analysis. There are two fundamental problems here:

(1) What language is the research using as an empirical actuality? If, for example, it is English, then English *grammar* dictates a very specific subject-predicate *logic* in analysis wherein typologies of meaning are pre-given [data] and it is impossible to distinguish between code signification (syntactics) and message meaning (semantics) as between speaker *encoding* (interviewee; research respondent) and listener *decoding* (interviewer; researcher) as referents in actuality (pragmatics). This is the confusion of *parole parlée* and *parole parlante* or *énonciation* and *énoncé*, to cite only one the dimensional issues. Recall that *coded symbols are representations* on a minimum of two logical levels: the *object language* and the *metalanguage*. The minimum logic conditions for theory construction are *three levels*, i.e., Type 1, 2, and 3 semiotic explanations (Holenstein 1974: 7).

Table 4. Methodology Comparison of Giorgi Descriptive Phenomenology and Lanigan Semiotic Phenomenology

Human Science Phenomenological Method (Qualitative Research)		
Metatheory	Giorgi Method	Lanigan Method
Discipline	<i>Psychology</i>	<i>Communicology</i>
Evidence	Language <i>Behavior</i> , Social Situation	Speech, Body <i>Comportment</i> , Lebenswelt, Umwelt
Methodology	Experiential	Experiential, Experimental
Evidence Collection	Transcribed Interviews	Human Discourse (all media)
Evidence Item [Bordieu]	“Meaning Unit” [<i>Habitus</i>]	“Revelatory Phrase / Image” [<i>Hexis</i>]
Data Theory	Linguistic (uncritically assumed, Grammar Neutrality dictates Covert Epistemes) Symbolization of Mental States	Semiotic, Logic Symbolization of Embodiment and Intersubjective Practice
Acta Theory	Uncritical Identity of Speech, Writing, and Thinking; <i>Social Context</i> (No Control for Bi-Cultural Bi-Lingual, etc. Respondents)	Differentiation of Symbolic Comportment (all media); <i>Cultural Context</i> (culture, language controls)
Capta Theory	<i>Information Theory:</i> Disjunctive Choice in Context (Either/Or)	<i>Communication Theory:</i> Conjunctive Choice of Context (Both/And)
Validity Criteria = <i>Logic</i>	<i>Inductive Logic,</i> <i>Sufficient Condition</i>	<i>Abductive and Adductive Logic,</i> <i>Necessary Condition</i>
Qualitative Validity	Intensional Semantic Specification by Analytic Selection of <i>Paradigmatic</i> Categories	Extensional and Intensional Specification by Analytic and Synthetic Comparison of <i>Paradigmatic</i> and <i>Syntagmatic</i> Categories (Jakobson’s “Prague Prism”)*
Reliability (Logical) [Linguistic Systems]	<i>Replication</i> [Type 1 Explanation: Mechanical linkage of single elements in a system] [<i>Assumption</i> of Type 2 Explanation: Isomorphism of the systems]	<i>Sufficient Condition</i> * [Type 3 Explanation: Transformation of the systems] [Bühler’s <i>Anaphoric Deixis</i>]
Quantitative Reliability	n 1+ (usually < 10) (until there is category redundancy) { n 1 + ? = Sufficient Condition}	n 1 (Typology = Logical Class) { n1 + 1 = Necessary Condition}
Metaphysics (<i>Husserl</i>)	Morphological Essence of <i>Behavior</i>	Morphological and Existential Essence of <i>Comportment</i>
Epistemology	Analysis, then Synthesis; <i>Typology of Data</i> (NOT generalization) [Theory Unknown]	Comparative Analysis and Synthesis; Type, Token, Tone Specification as <i>Typology of Capta</i> [Theory: <i>Charles S. Peirce</i>]

(2) Any dimension of “expressiveness” must be paired with a dimension of “perceptiveness” and this is impossible without an explicit statement of the semiotic system which constrains the conjunction of logic and linguistics as an analytic tool of application. This is, the limitation of expressiveness to “language” fails to account for the logical hierarchy of discourse (see Fig. 2). Which level of discourse is “psychological”, “propositional”, etc.?

Giorgi and Lanigan are in agreement about the metaphysical position from Edmund Husserl that grounds their phenomenological theory. In his early work, Husserl refers to what he labels “*morphological essences*”. These are not the usual “transcendental essences” which seem to be, at best, difficult to specify. Even Husserl (1960; see Lanigan 2012) shifts toward the morphological category in his later work which is favored by most human scientists. Interestingly enough, neither Husserl nor Giorgi give a *theoretical or applied* account of what this metaphysical category of “morphology” means in the phenomenological method, except to say that such “essences” are not exact concept like those in mathematics, but are marked by “vagueness”.

Let’s try to sort this out the vagary by looking briefly at the *linguistic concept of morphology* (our research is based in discourse!), then we can move to the semiotic and logical equivalents. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* provides a standard account of *morphology*:

This branch of linguistics studies the structure of words. In the following list, all the words except the last can be divided into parts, each of which has some kind of independent meaning.

<i>unhappiness</i>	<i>un- -happi- -ness</i>
<i>horses</i>	<i>horse- -s</i>
<i>talking</i>	<i>talk- -ing</i>
<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>

Yes has no internal grammatical structure. We could analyze its constituent sounds, /j/, /e/, /s/, but none of these has any meaning in isolation. By contrast, *horse*, *talk*, and *happy* plainly have a meaning, as do the elements attached to them (the ‘affixes’): *un-* carries a negative meaning; *-ness* expresses a state or quality; *-s* expresses a plural; and *-ing* helps to convey a sense of duration. The

smallest meaningful elements into which words can be analyzed are known as morphemes; and the way morphemes operate in language provides the subject matter of *morphology* (Crystal 1997: 90).

Considering the category of “Evidence Item” in Table 4, the importance of morphological essence becomes a critical point. For Giorgi, the “meaning unit” has no logical status in a typology until the researcher creates it, but on what theoretical basis? Here is where standard grammar provides a ready-made, natural attitude guideline. The result is a confirmation of grammar, not a phenomenological description of a mental state (psychology).

By contrast, Lanigan’s “revelatory phrase” is guided by semiotic theory. Logic, especially abduction, requires a semiotics, namely, a sign-system that has two constitutive construction rules: (1) Things in the system, and, (2) Things outside the system. In the definition of morphology above, it is immediately obvious that Ihde has no guideline for explaining the “meaning unit” that counts as a morpheme. But using the “revelatory phrase” approach, semiotic theory immediately explains how morphemes are generated and how one *type* of morpheme (e.g., *yes*) can be distinguished from all others (Lanigan 2010a). Hence in our example, we have something like simple morphemes (e.g., *yes*) and complex morphemes (the other examples), i.e. two types and *now* the ability to differentiate *typologies*. This is precisely how linguists differentiate *inflectional morphology* (use of *tone* of voice to change meaning) from *derived morphology* (using compounds to form new *token* words, e.g. making *drink* into *drinkable*). For a theoretical account of the discourse semiotics applicable to our analysis, see my (1988: 223) “Semiotic Phenomenology in Plato’s *Sophist*” which distinguishes the logic of *grammar* (*genus—species*) as “meaning unit” and the logic of *semiotic* (*genus—differentia*) in the “revelatory phrases” of discourse. An empirical example of the same issue is demonstrated using *experimental phenomenology* in “Guess at the Word, or, How to Phenomenologically research the hermeneutic Experience of Language and Logic” (Lanigan 1988: 118). An explicit comparison to Giorgi’s method is my text based study of one “revelatory phrase” (n=1) in “Metajournalism: Merleau-Ponty on Signs, Emblems, and Appeals in the Poetry of Truth” (Lanigan 1988: 103; for an analysis of a single word and coding at the phonological level, see 2010a).

5. Understanding Culture and Communication

Where does the analysis stand at this point? We began with Don Ihde's phenomenological attempt to extend philosophical analysis from the eidetic level to the empirical level by means of a "thought experiment" transformed to an "experience experiment". Of course *experiential research* (in contrast to the statistical projection of eidetic categories represented as "behavior") is fundamentally *empirical* because it is *concrete, actual experience*, not the *idea* of experience which is hypostatized as *real* (Ihde) or as *ideal* (Searle's "conceptual realism"). Then, we moved to Amedeo Giorgi's latest theoretical discussion of empirical phenomenological method to account for experiential research. I found theoretical problems with this method and illustrated my alternative method and its metatheoretical (interdisciplinary) ground in Table 4.

I now want to turn to the experimental communication research of Tom McFeat because he uses an *experiential phenomenological method* of communication analysis to accomplish these ground breaking results: (1) an account of how *communication constitutes culture* by means of intergenerational communication, and hence, (2) how *group culture as a communication medium* constitutes the *formation of understanding and memory* for individual persons. To understand communication among generations of people, we will briefly review the work of Margaret Mead based on her anthropological research in various cultural settings.

5.1. Mead on Generational Communicology

Understanding human values in families, how they are remembered and then passed from one generation to another is an enduring question for those who study human culture. In modern times with modern technology, the study of long-term transmission of messages has become critical. For example, the necessity of marking nuclear waste sites with "danger" warning messages that will endure *and be understood* after 10,000 years or 100 generations is a current practical problem being researched in the USA (Lanigan 1995c; Sebeok 1982). As a brief introduction to the semiotic system codes involved with intergenerational communication, **Table 5** give a summary of Mead's model of generational communication as a cultural paradigm.

Table 5. Margaret Mead’s Model of Intergenerational Communicology

MARGARET MEAD’S MODEL OF CULTURAL COMMUNICOLOGY (SEMIOTIC INNOVATION, TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, RETRIEVAL) The continuity and survival of all cultures require the living presence of at least three generations who engage in group communication.			
CULTURE TYPOLOGY	POSTFIGURATIVE TOKEN CULTURE	COFIGURATIVE TOKEN CULTURE	PREFIGURATIVE TOKEN CULTURE
Developmental Process (TONE)	1 st GENERATION → <GRANDPARENTS>	2 nd GENERATION → <PARENTS>	3 rd GENERATION <CHILDREN>
LOGIC CODE	Children learn primary from FOREBEARS (Old Forms ASSIMILATE New Forms)	Children and Adults learn from their PEERS (Old Forms ACCOMMODATE New Forms)	Adults learn from their CHILDREN (New Forms ASSIMILATE Old Forms)
CHRONEMIC CODE	Reality is the PAST. Elders cannot conceive of change.	Reality is the PRESENT. Difference and Change is a normal expectation.	Reality is the FUTURE. The new and unexpected is a normal expectation.
PROXEMIC CODE	Each Person is an Embodiment of the Whole Culture.	Postfigurative Culture begins to breakdown; Embodiment is not predictable (Entropy).	Cofigurative Culture begins to breakdown; Children embody the new culture (Negentropy).
KINESIC CODE	Migration is Internal; geographical within regional boundaries.	Migration is External; geographical across national boundaries.	Migration is Internal; Economic across class boundaries.
HAPTIC CODE	Gender Roles are Stereotypical; Embodiment is Iconic	Gender Roles are Prototypical; Embodiment is Indexical	Gender Roles are Atypical; Embodiment is Symbolic
LINGUISTIC CODE	All three generations are Monolingual and Mono-gestural	One generation is monolingual; one or two generations are partially Bilingual – Bi-gestural.	Children can be fully Bilingual and Bi-gestural, hence Bi-Cultural.
COMMUNICATION CODE	All verbal and nonverbal forms are SYNTHETIC (<i>Oral Tradition dominates the Written Tradition; Fashion and Dress are Stereotypical</i>)	All verbal and nonverbal forms are INFERENCEAL (<i>Nonverbal Fashion and Dress choice dominates; verbal critique is ignored</i>)	All verbal and nonverbal forms are ANALYTIC (<i>Technology Innovation dominates verbal practices; nonverbal norms are ambiguous and experimental</i>)
Table is based on: Margaret Mead, <i>Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap</i> (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1970) Richard L. Lanigan, <i>The Human Science of Communicology</i> (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1992).			

5.2. McFeat’s Small Group Experimental Phenomenology

Tom McFeat (1974, 1979, 2002) was a doctoral student of Robert Bales in the Department of Human Relations at Harvard University and spent his career teaching anthropology at the University of Toronto, Canada. He did extensive field research on the

Navajo and Zuni cultures in Arizona and New Mexico (USA) in addition to the Northwest Indians of Canada. I was privileged to have attended his seminar in Toronto (Lanigan 1980; see Lanigan 2012b). Robert Bales' classic research on small group communication is the base from which McFeat created his experimental model for culture generation. For a discussion of the classic model of task group and affiliation group formation and communication structure, see Lanigan (2011a,b).

Recalling Figs. 2 and 3, we must first examine the discourse context assumed by McFeat in developing his research experiment. This is to say, human scientists surmise that successful intergenerational communication beyond ten generations (1000 years) requires the use of a *myth discourse* model (see Lanigan 1995c, Sebeok 1982). Recalling the Greek Cosmology of Discourse in Table 1, the consensus means that the successful discourse system must reach the *mythos* and *magikos* level for successful understanding and preservation in memory(coding) of a critical message in culture. **Table 6** is a summary of these ideas including McFeats information content categories.

This use of *myth discourse* is easier to comprehend, if I put it this way: a message must be internalized in the mind as a meaning critical for survival and the memory will be aided by embodiment practices (rituals) that stimulate this memory. In most cultures this discourse myth-ritual phenomenon is easily recognized as “praying to god for understanding in moments that threaten survival”. I have previously used the myth model, derived from the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958: 202-228), to analyze schizophrenic discourse in a therapy situation (Lanigan 2010a) and in a novel (Lanigan 2005). All such research must take account of the eidetic and empirical complexity of reference when embodied as discourse, either verbal (Lanigan2010b) or nonverbal (Lanigan 2012). Recall from Table 1 that a *normal discourse paradigm* describes *Actuality* by (1) matching diachronic time with syntagmatic space and (2) matching synchronic time with paradigmatic space; culture calls this *Reality*. This is the Greek metaphysical model wherein *discourse contextualizes ritual* in the sequence [logos → nous → mystos → mythos → magikos]. In short, “saying” leads to “doing”.


Table 6. Discourse Model Correlation to Myth Hermeneutics

1. Information	Example**	2. Communication	3. Communicology
1. Content-Ordered Culture	Narrative {Hermeneutic}	2. Task-Ordered Culture	3. Group-Ordered Culture
1. Postfigurative Culture*	Figuration = matrix pattern	2. Cofigurative Culture*	3. Prefigurative Culture*
a. Children learn primarily from their forebearers. b. Elders cannot conceive of change; reality is the Past . c. Continuity reflects itself in synthetic forms of speech and gesture.	*Margaret Mead (1970): The continuity and survival of all cultures requires the <i>living presence of at least three generations who engage in group communication.</i>	a. Children and Adults learn from their peers. b. Difference and change is a normal expectation; reality is the Present . c. Continuity is linked to fashion and dress; sexual roles are stereotypic and symbolic.	a. Adults learn from their Children. b. The new, unexpected are normal; reality is the Future . c. Continuity is linked to immediacy of experience, mediated by technology.
Referent Content Culture is an organization in Space .	Myth Level 0 {Literal} **Tom McFeat (1974): Experimental Group Phenomenology	Langage {Logic, Syntactics} Culture is an organization in Space .	Actuality = Concrete Experience Culture is an organization in Space .
Basic Content Culture is a static pattern of action in Time .	Myth Level 1 {Allegorical} The First Half Novel (Given Facts = Data) "depicting the characters and events as given" (p. 129)	Langue {Rhetoric, Pragmatics} Culture is a dynamic pattern of interaction in Time .	Reality = Abstract Experience Culture is a dynamic matrix of transaction in Time .
Interpreted Content Information (<i>messages</i>) remains stable .	Myth Level 2 {Tropological} "This intermediate form was sought after in all groups before they were willing to or even able to innovate. This became a commentary on the novel but also a means of referring to conditions arising outside this novel or novels in general" (p. 129)	Discours {Figure of Language; Grammar} Information (<i>context</i>) is unstable ; environmental pressure to change .	Ideality = Consciousness of Experience Information is shared meanings (codes) in the group as a concrete medium .
Innovated Content The group is unaffected by the inflow of information .	Myth Level 3 {Anagogical} The [missing] Second Half Novel (Taken Facts = Capta) "the conclusion sought after or arrived at" (p. 129)	Parole {Trope of Speech; Semantics} The group is fundamentally affected by the inflow of information (<i>context</i>); there is a potential for restructuring the group .	Surreality = Experience of Consciousness The group is fundamentally affected by the inflow and outflow of information (contact) ; there is an actual and ongoing structuring of the group .

The analysis of an *abnormal discourse paradigm* (e.g., schizophrenia, religious conversion, etc.) takes Actuality and constructs a Myth or *Ideality* by (1) matching diachronic time with paradigmatic space and (2) matching synchronic time with syntagmatic space; culture calls this ideal construction *Myth*. This construction *reverses* the Greek metaphysical model such that *ritual contextualizes discourse* in the sequence [magikos → mythos → mystos → nous → logos]. Thus, “doing” precedes “saying”. Thus, the western aphorism of “Do as I say, not as I do” is meant to promote the *myth* of culturally appropriate decisions. **Table 7** allows for a comparison of the paradigmatic function in both “real” and “myth” discourse. Lévi-Strauss (1958: 202-228) worked closely with Roman Jakobson(1962-2000) at

the New School for Social Research in New York City, thus the shared fundamental elements of structural linguistics in both scholars approach to cultural discourse.

Table 7. Lanigan Reality/Myth Model based on Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss.



The basic research problematic that McFeat proposes to investigate is the fact that each generation of a group (e.g., a family) selects a *referent content of information* (formation) as it’s understanding of their *Lebenswelt* situated in an *Umwelt*. When a second generation emerges (birth of children), the information (message/code) is passed along to the new generation. The resulting dialogue between the two generations involves dialogue about the *morphological essence* of the content resulting in the transformation of the content so that it becomes *interpreted content information*. From a phenomenological perspective the

formation of referent content is a *phenomenological description*. Using Lanigan's method (see Table 3), this is a first generation "thematizing the signs" followed by a second generation "abstracting of the signifiers" (confirmed by the first generation), i.e., performing a *phenomenological reduction*. With the introduction of a third generation (grandchildren), the communication process continues with the interpreted content transforming to become *innovated content information*. Innovated information is now the accepted actuality referent information now known as Reality (the information has been phenomenologically *verified* as *reliable*).

In all of McFeats 1967 experimental groups, at least six (6) generations occurs successfully. The importance of achieving the six generation mark is that it verifies the full implementation of the all the recursive steps (both theoretical and methodological) of the Lanigan method (again see Table 3). Keep in mind that Step 9 in method is a dialectic shift of transformation back into Step 1 from the perspective of the succeeding generation. The failure of McFeat's 1966 and 1970 group experiments confirms the necessity of Mead's abduction that three generations are minimally required for the formation and survival of cultural information.

McFeat's three experiential group experiments are summarized in **Table 8** for easy comparison of success and failure features. He experiments with three different conditions of textual message: (1) a *magazine article* [complete narrative text], (2) an incomplete fiction *book* { a novel with the final chapter missing = no conclusion}, and (3) *memory*, i.e., an ideal text [a narrative story assumed in experiential memory]. It may not be apparent at first, but text (1) was "real" in that it was content ordered as "what was read" and then existed in memory as reality, but was actually not available for reading by the second and subsequent generations who had only a "lost text". In the case of text (3), no actual text ever existed, but narrative memory of experience was transformed into a "real text" as if some actual texts could be referenced in some vague sense of "everyone knows it". Text (2) is an "actual text" completed by the first generation as an "actual text made into real text" {narrative end invented according to cultural values in the group] that the second generation has to interpret as a complete "real text", and then the "real text" was innovated by the third generation as the "ideal text" or myth.

Now we may draw some conclusions about experiential phenomenological method as used by *groups as a medium* to communicate their understandings as culture. The 1966 group is an example of text (1) and is precisely the type of process that Giorgi's method represents. The 1970 group is an example of text (3) and matches the propositional assumption of speech

act theorists like John Searle. Neither of the methodological approaches produce an understanding of either communication or culture as the basis for human understanding and memory. The message representations as “real” and “ideal” cannot be specified as “actual” in communicative or cultural experience, much less the “consciousness of” them. Text (2) is an “actual” message that can be communicated as “real” and culturally preserved (in memory) as “ideal” thereby constituting *understanding*.

A final word needs to be said about McFeat’s surprise and mild confusion by the communicative comportment of *Lin’s Group* in the 1967 experiments. The short explanation, contained in **Table 9**, is that McFeat was unaware of the communicological differentiation of cultures on the basis of preferred communication semiotic structures (codes) at the intergroup level. As a researcher with an Egocentric culture model of *perception*, he was literally unable to perceive the Sociocentric modality of *expression* produced by his Hong Kong students within their Chinese cultural framework. For an example studies illustrating these egocentric and sociocentric differences, see Lanigan (2011b, 2012b) or Roberts (1951).

Western cultures in general, and the USA and Canada in particular, are Egocentric cultures favoring individual *direct* communication where *individual* leadership is favored over membership participation. By comparison, Eastern Cultures and the Chinese in particular are sociocentric cultures that prefer *indirect* communication in a group. There is a preferred deference to group opinion where membership participation is prized above leadership; unique individual behavior is avoided (Lanigan 2009, 2012c). Sociocentric cultures actually have an advantage when it comes to *intergenerational* communication inasmuch as they promote a narrative structure that favors consistency of memory over time for most messages meant to endure for many generations. Hence, references to *ancestors* in China is ubiquitous, while similar references to *forebearers* in the USA are rare indeed!

Table 8. McFeats Experimental Phenomenology for 1966, 1967 (3 Groups), 1970

Small Group Culture Structure		
GROUP	TEXT	INSTRUCTION
<p style="text-align: center;">1966 Group</p> <p>Generation Turn-Over Principle: “If information content proved to be teachable and learnable then (a) the group would continue; when the teaching and learning were complete, then (b) new members would be introduced who © would learn what had been taught in such a way that (a) all members would also teach what was to be learned. This design was learned several thousand years ago with the introduction into the human community of narrative style which in turn evolved into myths” (p. 116).</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">MAGAZINE ARTICLE</p> <p>“What Has Happened to Our Old-Fashioned Morals” <i>Ladies Home Journal</i> December 1961</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Read by First Generation. 2. Only Oral Transmission to Second Generation. 3. Transmit information to next generation. <p>“We looked for a single and continuous problem which resolved itself into action that was not terminal. The solution to such a problem should (a) perpetuate a group, (b) introduce new members, © train all members in such a way as to (a) perpetuate the group. And so on.” (p. 115)</p>	<p>“Without benefit of further reading, please agree among yourselves about the content of this article and then be prepared to pass this on as new members enter the group to replace established members, when you feel you are ready to receive them. Please bear in mind that only you will have read the article.”</p>
<p>1966 Group Culture Failure Characteristics: Members assumed the identity of the five personalities mentioned in the article; one also became the moderator. Real and fictive roles merged creating constant humor. The grouped became closed. Content was structured in the sequence of the article presentation; a moderator assigned topics; new members were given sub-topics, but not coordinated. Transition to generations did not occur. “Although our cases are few, the evidence is suggestive that the failure of the 1966 and the success of the 1967 groups are in part understandable in terms of the stringencies and utilities of conditions set up by the different content structures (or codes) confronting initial groups” (p. 127).</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;">1967 Groups {3 Successful Groups}</p> <p>“We seek to discover how established myths perpetuate in a small-group medium. Myth not only lends itself to transmission in groups but maintains its integrity across generations. But how?” (p. 127)</p> <p>“New members entered all groups within two to four weeks of formation; and again within a week after joining, they showed evidence of being familiar with the contents of information” (p. 129).</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NOVEL</p> <p>“We decided to introduce a novel (actually a half-novel) into the 1967 groups where this had not been done the previous year. ... The novel we introduced was written by Frances Shelley Wees, a Canadian writer of great experience and skill; written in 1956, it was entitled <i>The Keys of My Prison</i>” (p. 127).</p>	<p>Suggest a conclusion (the missing second half of the novel) to the narrative. “The [narrative] themes center on these questions: ‘Can a woman ever <i>really</i> know the man she married? Can family solidarity hold out against intrusion through seduction? What brings on, what cures, and what is revealed in <i>amnesia</i>? When troubled, does one turn to the establishment?’ “ (p. 128).</p>



Table 8. (continued vertically, part 2)

Small Group Culture Structure		
GROUP	TEXT	INSTRUCTION
<p>BUSTER'S GROUP</p> <p>[Western Heritage Canadians; Egocentric Group]*</p>	<p>Each group member became a character in the novel: Robin Sloan (lawyer), Dr. Prescott, Dr. Merrill, P. C. Lake (police), Aunt Edie, her niece, Julie (central figure), and Rafe (Julie's husband).</p> <p>"There was a tendency for new members to direct inquires and requests for clarification to first- or second-generation members since, from their point of view, there was no difference between them" (p. 133).</p>	<p>Moved through Six Generations. "First and Second generations argued from a symmetrical (same level) rather than a complementary (generation one vs. Generation two) basis" (p. 131).</p> <p>"Literal information retrieval occurred in narrative: one person was chosen to narrate and others corrected details when necessary" (p. 133).</p> <p>"Buster's group operated with three generations and then moved to a no-generation pattern when innovating" (p. 139).</p>
<p>CRANSHAW'S GROUP</p> <p>[Western Heritage Canadians; Egocentric Group]*</p>	<p>"Specifics of content passed through many generations, indeed were never lost, that had originated with Cranshaw" (p. 138). "Transmission of the literal content of the basic information was the primary task" (p. 138).</p>	<p>"There was no long term interest in innovating information" (p. 137). "A preoccupation with basic content of information continued throughout the life of this group from generation one to Generation Seven" (p. 139). "Cranshaw's group worked well with three generations but did depart from this for a long time, while Joan and Frank were senior members" (p. 139).</p>
<p>LIN'S GROUP {Hong Kong Chinese}</p> <p>[Eastern Heritage Canadians; Sociocentric Group]*</p> <p>*{The Egocentric (= independent generations) versus Sociocentric (= dependent generations) distinction is not know to McFeat and, thus, is not part of his analysis. Hence, he cannot understand the Lin Group interaction formation of generations nor the indirect communication patterns}</p>	<p>"The Lin group very early established a dyadic pattern, a pattern of thesis and antithesis with a synthesis always in sight, but rarely achieved" (pp. 139-140). "The Chinese expressed interest in the family as a corporation ... emphasized the the resource base of the family company" [part of novel's plot] (p. 140).</p> <p>"Frequent references on the part of all members of the first generation to '<i>what we have decided</i>' once interpreted content entered the transmission" (p. 141).</p> <p>"We found it interesting how willingly the second generation deferred to members of the first despite the heated arguments they had indulged in, but their deference was accorded only in the transmission of basic information" (p. 142).</p>	<p>"Unlike Buster's group and somewhat like Cranshaw's, Lin's group tended at times to collapse all of its interactions into two-generation directions" (p. 139).</p> <p>"Lin's group persisted for Six Generations" (p. 147). "When the time came to deal with innovated content of information (i.e., to arrive at a conclusion) Lin asked Lorna to supply her own version. In some confusion, but with firmness, Lorna declined. So systematically were the innovated results tied into the interpreted content of information, and firmly agreed upon by the original group, that Lorna apparently felt she was in this way being asked for a <i>show of loyalty to the group</i>" (p. 140). "The second group entered passively and showed great interest in the details of the narrative; ... it began to create generations" (p. 141).</p>

Table 8. (continued vertically, part 3)

Small Group Culture Structure		
GROUP	TEXT	INSTRUCTION
1970 Group	<p style="text-align: center;">NO TEXT</p> <p>A study by members of a student seminar (23 students) to improve all department seminars. No text was referenced, yet the goal was a Department publication describing a typical seminar. Personal experience was abstracted into discussion.</p>	<p>Innovate new information.</p> <p>“The task was devised without the need to establish concrete written information regarding seminars. This body of information was felt already to be known, and the group therefore proceeded to retrieve information <i>already</i> assumed to be stored!” (p. 123). “There were no generational differences based on control over information, therefore no asymmetry based upon the transmission of information (sending and receiving) and in the long run therefore, no generational differences at all” (p. 124).</p>
<p>1970 Group Culture Failure Characteristics: <i>A group without a task quickly becomes an Affiliation Group.</i> Members proceeded to retrieve already assumed information. “There were no generational differences based on control over information, therefore no asymmetry based upon the transmission of information (sending and receiving) and in the long run therefore, no generational differences at all. ... Information circulated through members which provided no objective context for group formation” (pp. 123-124). “The content of culture not only must be learned—as everyone has recognized—but also <i>it must be so phrased as to be learnable</i>” (p. 114).</p>		

Table 9. A Communicological Comparison of Egocentric and Sociocentric Cultures

COMMUNICOLOGY CULTURE MODELS	
EGOCENTRIC CULTURE	SOCIOCENTRIC CULTURE
U. S. A.	P. R. CHINA
Individual "Ego"	Group "Face"
Aggregate Form	Organic Form
PARTS make a Whole "Marbles in a Bag"	WHOLE makes the Parts "Pile of Salt"
	
MEMBER of Groups	GROUP of Members
MESSAGE gives the Contact and Code	CODE Gives the Context and Message
Independence of Form Is the paramount Social Goal	Convergence of Form Is the paramount Social Goal
Communication Entropy creates GROUP INSTABILITY	Communication Negentropy creates GROUP STABILITY
SPACE: Proxemic Code defines Culture as a World of Static THINGS	TIME: Chronemic Code defines Culture as a World of Dynamic BEHAVIORS
Embodied Verbal SPEECH Is High Context "Space Binding" Consciousness	Embodied Nonverbal PRACTICE Is Low Context "Time Binding" Comportment
Expression: Understanding of one SELF ("Me") DIRECT COMMUNICATION: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NAME specifies Individual PERSON • GIVEN NAMES control the formality level of Interpersonal Interactions • First Name Reference Preference • DAY → Month → Year ► Successors 	Perception: Understanding of the OTHERS ("Them") INDIRECT COMMUNICATION: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NAME specifies Family GROUP • "RELATIONSHIP" NAMES control the level of Interpersonal Interactions • Family Name Reference Preference • YEAR → Month → Day ► Ancestors

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