Challenging Epistemic Violence
Parrhesia, Counter-Hegemony and Transformation

DINESH WADIWEL

A prominent tactic of pro animal advocacy is the use of imagery or knowledge of animal suffering to unveil to audiences "the truth" of human violence against animals, with the aim of prompting individual or systemic change. However, the efficacy of this tactic is undermined by what could be described as "epistemic violence" (Wadiwel 2015, 29-36): namely in the operation of systems of knowledge which render violence against animals as natural, acceptable, "necessary" or beneficent. This epistemic violence poses a tactical problem for pro animal advocacy, since the display of images of, or relay of information on, animal suffering may not necessarily lead to the hoped for individual or systemic change for the audiences that experience them. In this paper I explore the problem of how to challenge epistemic violence as part of a politics of institutional transformation. I examine Michel Foucault's final lectures at the Collège de France, which feature a close analysis of "speaking freely" or *parrhesia*. Here, Foucault's analysis of the truth telling subject who seeks to interrupt an order of knowledge has resonance with many of the tactics of animal advocacy. However, Foucault also reveals the limits of these tactics: this form of truth telling can only occur in a circumstance where the listener is ready to hear the truth, and thus a relationship exists between a truth teller and their audience. Focusing on this relationship – between the truth teller and their audience – I will speculate on the correspondence between Foucault's understanding of *parrhesiastic* truth-telling, and the role of intellectuals in counter-hegemonic political movements as described by Antonio Gramsci. As I argue, Gramsci provides an alternative pathway for understanding the process of the cultivation of a relationship between frank truth telling and an audience who has the courage to hear: namely, in the form of the transformational political party which serves both as a method of cultivating alternative worldviews and facilitating truth telling, and also as a means to realise large scale institutional change.

INTRODUCTION

There is long-standing tactic utilized by pro animal advocacy[1] which involves the display of graphic footage or imagery, such as video from a slaughterhouse, factory farm or research facility, which is communicated to an audience, whether at a protest or through electronic or print communication, as a means of achieving transformational change. This repertoire of communication has a distinct logic: it offers the viewer an "unfiltered" image of a reality that had otherwise been hidden in order to impel – sometimes through shock – critical reflection and behaviour change. One can find this repertoire of political action repeated across the terrain of animal advocacy (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Mika 2006; Fernández 2019; Aaltola 2014) and this highlights the important role of visual imagery, or otherwise hidden information, for animal advocates in persuading others of the "truth" of their cause.[2]

Arguably this repertoire of political action has proved appealing because it is, at some level, successful.

In some cases, the use of imagery and footage of animal suffering by animal advocates can lead to tangible individual change, political reaction and institutional transformation. For example, for some individuals, exposure to these images has proved an important politicizing moment, enabling them to interrogate "speciesist attitudes towards other animals … strengthening their commitment to stop consuming them and to work towards their liberation" (Fernández 2021: 151). In some cases, as Kathryn Gillespie argues, this process of "bearing witness" to animal suffering can ,when it moves past mere voyeurism, disrupt "grave power imbalances" and cultivate "a new understanding of subjectivity that extends beyond the human experience to multispecies lifeworlds" (Gillespie 2016, 576). Transformation need not only be individual or personal; exposure to such images and footage depicting violence against animals can also mobilise political actors towards large scale collective action and institutional transformation. For example, in Australia, the dissemination of footage which re-

vealed a "truth" about the inner workings of the live animal export industry prompted unprecedented street protests and triggered government oversight, regulation, and in some cases – admittedly provisional – industry bans (Jones and Davis 2016; Chen 2016, 91-91; and Dalziell and Wadiwel 2017).

It worth noting that this repertoire of political strategy – which gives prioritization to the visibility of animal suffering as a political tactic for transformation – emerges within a particular terrain that is perhaps peculiar to pro animal advocacy, and as such is a by-product of the unique political obstacles faced by advocates. While it is true that many other social movements combat secrecy and denial, it is notable that the bulk of animal advocacy works against monumental institutional sequestration and misinformation that, by design it would appear, accompanies large scale industrial animal agriculture and animal-based research. Despite the massive scale of these industries, animals remain largely invisible within facilities, and there is comparatively little public discussion which focuses on the conditions these animals endure (O'Sullivan, 2011; and Pachirat, 2011; see also English & Zacka 2022). These circumstances have been intensified globally by recent directions in legal regulation which have merged industry obfuscation with legal attempts to criminalize the work of those who wish to expose violence against animals (Potter, 2017).

While animal advocates must deal with the political obstacles of industries and laws hiding from view violence towards animals, they also face another important problem: the unwillingness of publics to be informed. It does not seem controversial to state that many people – perhaps most people – do not want to know what animals experience within food systems or in research labs, and are unwilling to discuss the ways in which mainstream institutions and consumer choices remain bound to, and help, reproduce this violence. In other words, while industry and government obfuscation is certainly a problem, a central, and perhaps more important, barrier facing animal advocates is the desire of the public to "look away" rather than take responsibility (English & Zacka 2022, 1030-1031). There is thus a low public appetite for revelation in relation to cruel treatment of animals, and a level of hostility directed against those who frankly – honestly – speak out against this cruelty. Perhaps, as scholars such as Elisa Aaltola suggest, this represents a form of *akrasia*, where a person "knows 'the good' and acts against it" (Aaltola, 2019).

I highlight these conditions which circulate knowledge systems and shape the visibility of human vi-olence towards animals to illustrate the particular context in which pro animal advocacy occurs today, where a combination of sequestration, institutional and legal concealment, willful misinformation and widespread denial and unwillingness to know confront pro animal advocates. As a response to this unique set of circumstances, advocates have had to choose their strategies carefully, often opting to depend upon tactics that are selected because of their powerful capacity to rupture the certainties that have only appeared uncontestable as a result of the secrecy, misinformation and denial that has been the public face of industries that utilise animal lives. To this extent, the attachment of pro animal movements to the use of shocking imagery and footage is likely *symptomatic* of the political terrain which animal advocates find themselves within.[3] These tactics emerge as a political strategy under concrete conditions where institutional sequestration, collusion and the use of State violence prevail; and where many individuals within societies are uninterested in, or willfully hold at a distance, the reality of human treatment of animals.

However, while I would say this politics of visibility is symptomatic of a particular political terrain, there is no reason to assume that this repertoire of action is always effective, or a preferred approach. Indeed, the utility of these political tactics remains uncertain; and this is reflected in the somewhat contradictory evidence available on whether activism which shocks viewers in this fashion is either effective or ethical (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Mika 2006; Fernández 2019; Aaltola 2014; Scudder and Mills 2009; Bianchi et al 2018; English & Zacka 2022; and Haile et al 2021).

One strategic concern is related to the fragility of the assumed relation between the visibility of animal suffering and political interest in improved welfare and rights for animals. While making violence visible clearly does work as a strategy in different contexts, it is not clear that there exists an intelligible or predictable line between the visibility of animal suffering and a public appetite for improved protections for animals (Pachirat 2011, 233-256). Here we strike an *epistemic* problem on the relation between knowledge and power, something I have previously discussed using the phrase "epistemic violence" (Wadiwel, 2015, 29-36; see also Spivak 1998; and Meijer 2019, 118-123).[4] This epistemic violence is a direct product of the hierarchically anthropocentric[5] culture we find ourselves amidst, which produces a prevailing knowledge system that treats mass scale violence against animals as natural, normal, necessary and beneficent. Here, human violence towards animals in agricul-

ture, experimental labs, or in recreational settings is "seen" as either benign or in conformity with the interests or desires of animals themselves. The problem of this epistemic violence is how deeply it structures knowledge systems, so much so that even when evidence of violence towards animals is directly available, and evidence of animal resistance to this violence everywhere, many humans interpret observed phenomena in ways that are almost diametrically opposed. Thus, violence is rendered as "non-violence"; imagined as natural, inevitable and even beneficial for the animals that experience it.

Epistemic violence has direct bearing on the potential for images of animal suffering to prompt transformational political change. We can certainly find circumstances where the visibility of egregious and cruel violence against animals appears to have no political impact upon its viewer. We know for example that in some forms of sport and recreational fishing the supposed "pleasure" of the endeavour involves directly witnessing suffering and animal resistance to violence (Wadiwel 2016). However, it is not apparent that people who engage in recreational fishing are impacted or reformed by the animal suffering they inflict and intimately witness. We could make the same observation of any number of spheres of interaction where human violence towards animals is openly displayed: such as bull fighting, rodeos, horse racing and zoos. This is because we are not in the space of vision *per se* but epistemology. It is not enough to simply witness an animal being exposed to violence to impel action to stop this violence; rather, knowledge systems have to be available to render the object of violence as being capable of being seen as suffering, or being diminished by this coercive act – as being a bona fide victim of violence – in a way that matters to and impacts the viewer, and thus convinces them to take action in response. Animals that fail to garner this epistemic attention will fail to generate any will to protect them from this violence. However, it is not just animals used publicly in "sport and recreation" that are subject to epistemic violence; on the contrary, within the context of a prevailing hierarchical anthropocentrism that is inherent to mainstay knowledge systems, all non-humans are subject to a systematic failure to recognise rights, interests, flourishing and lifeworlds. It is for this reason that the task of challenging our knowledge systems is one of the primary steps required by pro animal movements if they are going to create the conditions for the large-scale structural change. That is, pro animal movements need to intervene at the level of knowledge systems to destab-

lise a prevailing hierarchical anthropocentrism, and replace this with forms of knowledge that both recognize animals as beings with interests, including protection from violence, and imagines future political institutions which are premised on the flourishing of both human and non-human. It is only when epistemic change occurs that it is possible to "see" violence against animals and imagine a different arrangement of society and its institutions.

It is this challenge for pro animal movements in addressing epistemic violence that is the focus of this paper. The focus here is on how pro animal advocacy might engage the complex task of transforming knowledge systems, of reorienting in a political sense what is commonly held as "true." In order to think through this admittedly difficult challenge, in this paper I will explore two different – albeit, as I will argue, complimentary – theoretical perspectives on the relationship between knowledge and political change. As I shall discuss, both perspectives deal with the question of how "truth" claims are verified and gain traction, and the role of political actors in transforming the knowledge systems that underpin what is known. As such, both perspectives are of relevance to pro animal movements today. Firstly, I will interrogate Michel Foucault's understanding of the relation between truth, power and knowledge transformation. My focus here will be Foucault's final lectures at the Collége de France, which feature a close analysis of *parrhesia*, which might be understood as speaking freely, or perhaps more accurately, speaking frankly about the truth (Foucault 2010 and 2011). *Parrhesia* is interesting for Foucault because it is potentially a modality of truth speech that is not clearly aligned to power; indeed, it disrupts power relations by offering a truth that destablises prominent or accepted truths. As I shall discuss, I think this form of truth telling has a strong resonance with the tactics of animal advocacy which I have described above, which seek to transform the listener through a frank discourse on the "true." However, as I outline, there are limits on how useful Foucault's understanding of *parrhesia* is for understanding the role of political movements in the transformation of large-scale knowledge systems. In order to address this gap, I seek to place this discussion by Foucault next to a different interlocutor: namely Antonio Gramsci. There are, I believe, a curious set of resonances between Foucault's discussion of *parrhesia* and Gramsci's conceptualisation of the strategic role of intellectuals within counter-hegemonic movements. As I argue, Gramsci opens a different tactical horizon for animal

advocacy in the form of the political party as a carriage for interventions into hegemonic truths. I will thus make a case for the place of the "revolutionary", or transformational, political party as a site for analysis and knowledge transformation towards large scale structural change.

In thinking through Foucault and Gramsci's perspectives, I openly seek to create a wider space for pro animal movements to consider both the challenges we have before us, and the appropriate tactics that might be deployed in challenging hierarchical anthropocentricism and its epistemic violence. Both Foucault and Gramsci wrestle with a set of overlapping problems that are relevant to pro animal movements, and offer different ways to interrogate strategy and tactics. Importantly, both thinkers provide a useful way to consider how it is that systems of knowledge might be transformed, and the role of political actors within this transformation. Together both thinkers provide a theoretical foundation for thinking though the tactics of pro animal movements in challenging epistemic violence.

PARRHESIA AND THE COURAGE TO KNOW

Foucault explored the ancient concept of *parrhesia* in the 1982-83 and 1983-84 lectures at the Collége de France, published in English under the titles *The Government of Self and Others* and *The Courage of Truth*. In both the introductions to the 1982-83 and 1983-84 series of lectures, Foucault notes a departure in method, which moves this work beyond the old concerns he had for knowledge and power, disciplines and the body, towards subjectivity and governance:

> replacing the history of knowledge with the historical analysis of forms of veridiction, replacing the history of domination with the historical analysis of procedures of governmentality, and replacing the theory of the subject…with the historical analysis of the pragmatics of self (Foucault 2010, 5) .

It is worth stressing that here Foucault does not appear, at least to me, to be offering an improved or refined method, but simply a different way of looking at his central problematics; so for example, rather than describe how relations of power produce and make legible the subject (that is how the subject is shaped by power), instead Foucault is interested in how the subject engages in practices that shape and govern themselves (that is how the subject grapples with power relations through speech and subjectivity). The appeal of this shift in

method is that Foucault offers a way to think about the subject and their relation to power that goes beyond the older reading of power Foucault had offered, in for example *Discipline and Punish* or the *History of Sexuality 1*, which appeared to empty the possibility of political agency out of relations.[6] Instead here, at least in these final lectures, Foucault provides a method to explore the subject within the constraints of the model of power and truth he had put forward. This framing is important for consideration of *parrhesia*: as we shall see below, the concept aims to make sense of the way in which truth might transform the listener, and thus has direct relationship to the formation of subjectivities, and the possibility of political change.

Across the 1982-83 and 1983-84 lectures Foucault explores the different and contradictory meanings of the concept of *parrhesia* (2010:45). At least one interesting feature of *parrhesia* is the way in which it differs from other forms of veridiction. One aspect of this difference is that while the speaker who engages in *parrhesia* seeks to persuade, they do not rely on persuasive communication to change minds. It is thus not a form of rhetoric:

> *parrhesia* is fundamentally, essentially, and primarily defined as truth-telling, whereas rhetoric is a way, an art, or a technique of arranging elements of discourse in such a way as to persuade. It is not essential to rhetoric that this discourse speak the truth (Foucault 2010, 53; see also Foucault 2011, 13).

Parrhesiastic communication relies on the truth itself, no matter how poorly expressed, or brutal it appears, to persuade the audience. In this context, *parrhesia* does not aim at flattering the listener. Indeed, in line with the political history of frank truth telling, this form of discourse is sought out precisely because flattery prevails and prevents truths from being heard (Foucault 2010, 46). Thus, the repeated references Foucault makes to political *parrhesia* taking the form of the advisor to the prince or the emperor, who occasionally takes on great personal risk to offer an undistilled truth to the ruler. Others in the court only seek to flatter the sovereign. Only the trusted advisor offers a frank and uncomfortable truth, sometimes taking their own life into their hands in offering this advice, such as Senaca's words in Nero's ears (Foucault 2011, 7), or Machiavelli's famous treatise to the Prince. In other words, *parrhesia* is a form of political speech; but it differs from rhetoric, or that speech that occurs within the echo chambers that accompany political power. It is centered upon persuasion

through unadorned truth alone. It is for this reason, as I shall discuss below, the concept is highly relevant to the prominent tactics of animal advocacy.

A key aspect of this uniqueness of *parrhesia* is the sense in which the purveyor of frank speech risks themselves through the use of their own name: they place themselves and their reputation in danger through staking a claim to speak the truth:

> The parrhesiast gives his opinion, he says what he thinks, he personally signs, as it were, the truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he is consequently bound to it and by it. But this is not enough. For after all, a teacher, a grammarian or a geometer, may say something true about the grammar or geometry they teach, a truth which they believe, which they think. And yet we will not call this parrhesia. We will not say that the geometer and grammarian are parrhesiasts when they teach truths which they believe. For there to be parrhesia…the subject must be taking some kind of risk [in speaking] this truth which he signs as his opinion, his thought, his belief, a risk which concerns his relationship with the person to whom he is speaking. For there to be parrhesia, in speaking the truth one must open up, establish, and confront the risk of offending the other person, of irritating him, of making him angry and provoking him to conduct which may even be extremely violent. So it is the truth subject to risk of violence (Foucault 2011, 11).

Here we can note, that the one who speaks frankly in this way – the *parrhesiastes* – can be contrasted with other practitioners of persuasive speech. For example, *parrhesia* differs from the truth offered by the prophet, whose task is to provide a prediction of future events (Foucault 2011, 15). The prophet is only a medium for the message, and thus does not have an attachment to what they profess as true; instead, the sign of what is to come has arrived through processes external to them. Similarly, the sage, the spiritual leader and the mystic all offer truths; but their wisdoms are age old, and they claim no authorship; rather they simply channel wisdom that has always been known (Foucault 2011, 16-17). Finally, the teacher or the technician also makes truth claims, but their role is also as an intermediary of past and produced knowledge which they pass down through a pedagogical process (Foucault 2011, 24). In under-

standing *parrhesia* as detached from these different forms of veridiction, Foucault is also pointing to the lack of necessary status or authority of the person who offers frank advice; the *parrhesiastes* does not need to have the status of a prophet, a sage or a teacher. Indeed, often a precondition of this sort of speech is that the authority or status of the speaker is minimized; their status arises instead because of their reputation for telling the truth.

The *parrhesiastes* may indeed go so far to claim that they lack status – or even that they lack knowledge – but still know the truth: "I don't have a degree, I don't have authority, I have never been trained, but I know this to be true." This performative helps highlight that the speaker is driven by the imperative of the truth they hold itself: what is drawn into focus is the weight of what is said and its claimed status as a truth that disrupts other truths. Here, Foucault draws particular attention to the figure of Socrates, as embodying a kind of practice of *parrhesia*. This is in part connected with Foucault's contention that philosophy inherits *parrhesia* (and not prophesy nor wisdom) as its primary mode of operation. That is, philosophy inherits a particular promise to interrogate truth, to uncover, frankly and fearlessly. But we also see in Socrates a useful analogy for the peculiar power relations and status that accompanies this form of truth telling. Socrates, the annoying man who spends his days prodding and interrogating others, claims no particular status or authority. Instead, he literally claims to know nothing: "I neither know nor think that I know" (Plato 1999). Indeed, as Foucault notes, the cycle (or drama) of the Socratic exchange is precisely of the famous philosopher who begins their interrogation with a statement of their own ignorance – the fact they do not know or profess to know – which is directed at others who claim to know. The exchange that follows within the dialogues ends up revealing that in truth Socrates, who initially claimed to know nothing, actually had more knowledge than others. Here, truth telling does not have recourse to status or authority; rather, the reputation for being able to offer truth accrues to the individual who frankly, bluntly, challenges the truths of others, and almost doggedly seeks through this process to arrive at knowledge that might be described as true.

There is here a curious relation of power, since the speaker of these frank truths places themselves at risk by the process of telling their truth. Thus, while *parrhesia* might be associated with "freedom to speak" (Foucault 2010, 46) – indeed assumes and requires space to speak and a right to speak – it simultaneously emerges within a context of danger and risk. It is because the truth teller

has a truth that is not widely available, cannot be heard, and will expose the orator to risk if the truth is uttered, that courage is required to speak freely. Thus, *parrhesia* reveals the limits of democracy, since even though within a democracy it would appear all are free to speak, *parrhesia* can only emerge in contexts where some truths are not accessible or are only able to be spoken with great risk; the fact of *parrhesia*, the fact it happens, demonstrates that truth, even within a democracy, freedom of speech is held hostage by flatterers and technicians of power. Naturally, in such a context *parrhesia* is dangerous; it disrupts the established order of truth and threatens the relations of power that underpin them. This is why for Foucault "the *parrhesiast* always risks undermining that relationship which is the condition of possibility of his discourse" (Foucault 2011, 11). It is thus for this reason that Socrates' life is in danger when he conducts his interrogations.

I have provided some detail above of Foucault's interrogation of *parrhesia* because of their striking resonances with the politics of animal advocacy today. This is because, I would argue, the repertoire of pro-animal politics reflects the dynamics of *parrhesiastic* speech, where the advocate reveals a frank and uncomfortable truth that the listener may not want to hear. At least one area of resonance is the blunt nature of the message, which does not seek to flatter or persuade with rhetoric. Indeed, if we think about this sort of animal advocacy, where for example, masked activists confront unwilling audiences with graphic images of animal suffering to persuade them to make dietary changes, then we know that the opposite of flattery is occurring. Instead, the activists seek to implicate the viewer in suffering, and through the shock and shame of self-reflection, impel action. Note there are further important resonances with *parrhesia* as Foucault articulates it. The animal advocate typically lacks any authority, status or identification. Frequently, radical animal advocates do not make any claim to technical expertise or authority; rather the truth of animal suffering, the fact that it exists, is positioned as enough to convince the audience, and the speaker of the truth does not highlight their own status in proclaiming this truth. Finally, this speech is risky. It emerges in a context where "free speech" is lacking. The conditions of visibility are deeply constrained; public discussion tends to support utilization of animals for human benefit; and widespread anthropocentrism normalises mass violence towards animals. Opposition to mainstream truths is dangerous because of the hostility, alienation and (on occasion) criminal sanction that this speech may generate. Moreover, the animal advocate in challenging hierarchical anthropocentrism openly seeks to undermine a mainstay pillar of dominant knowledge systems, and thus appears as a challenge to prevailing values: "the *parrhesiast* always risks undermining that relationship which is the condition of possibility of his discourse" (Foucault 2011, 11).

By highlighting this connection between the tactics of pro animal advocacy and Foucault's discussion of *parrhesia*, I wish to take note of the distinctive relationship between animal advocacy tactics and the problem of knowledge and truth. As I have highlighted above, the challenge that faces pro animal advocates involves disrupting epistemic violence that is a product of a wide-scale hierarchical anthropocentrism that is deeply embedded in prevailing knowledge systems, which systematically hides mass scale violence towards animals, renders it trivial or treats it as beneficial. As I have indicated above, given the general conditions of censorship, sequestration and deceit that encircle violence against animals, it is not surprising that advocates will symptomatically resort to a repertoire of tactics which "reveal the truth" of human utilization of animals, extending to displaying images and videos of animal suffering in public spaces. In other words, it is not surprising that the tactics of animal advocacy should take the form of *parrhesiastic* communication.

However, even if we acknowledge that these political tactics are symptomatic of existing power relations, this does not mean that *parrhesiastic* communication is effective within this political terrain. As I have highlighted above, the evidence for the effectiveness of these tactics is uncertain, at least in part because knowledge systems either or both, prevent individuals from seeing the truth of animal suffering and death, or create conditions where many people would "rather not know." Here, Foucault's discussion of *parrhesia* assists in highlighting *both* what is useful, but also simultaneously, what is problematic in this form of activist truth telling.

At least one problem with *parrhesiastic* communication which Foucault points to relates to the willingness and consent of the audience to receive and engage with this communication. Foucault reminds us that truth telling can only occur in a particular context, including one where the listener is ready to hear to truth:

> *parrhesia* is the courage of truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor's courage

in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears (Foucault 2011, 13).

Here, it is not enough for the truth teller to have a message that they urgently need to broadcast. There must also be a listener with the courage to hear. This is of course one of the significant constraints on the effectiveness of animal advocates who utilise actions which confront unsuspecting members of the public with the "truth" of our treatment of animals: many will walk by or actively avoid this confrontation, or will prove immune to a short, albeit provocative, intervention.[7] Further, as I have stated, there are attendant problems with this sort of campaigning, including for example, the potentially traumatising effect of these images, and the lack of consent of the audience in experiencing this trauma (Aaltola 2014; and Fernández 2021).

In this context, I want to suggest that *parrhesiastic* communication requires a cultivation of a relationship between the teller of truths – the *parrhesiastes* – and those who want to hear these truths. It is not merely enough to assume that an audience is available as a receptacle for frank speech; rather, *parrhesiastic* communication necessarily implies an interconnection, or relationality, with an audience who trusts the speaker and is willing to be open to being transformed by the truth they hear. Taking this dynamic into account compels us to consider less the dramatics of truth telling itself, the courage of the speaker, and instead concentrate on the long-term process of building relations between those who want to enter into dialogue. That is, pay attention to the process of developing a collective relationship between the courage of the speaker and the courage of the potential listener. This approach to understanding *parrhesiastic* communication would highlight that this speech can only have utility within those particular contexts where a listener is available who wishes to hear the dangerous truth, or where a program exists to cultivate an audience who will be susceptible to this frank truth telling.

So where are we likely to encounter a cultivated relationship between the purveyor of frank truths and an audience who has the courage to hear? Certainly, pedagogic contexts might be one space where this interaction between truth teller and courageous listener might occur. While Foucault points out that *parrhesiastic* communication cannot be associated directly with the role of the teacher – who performs a technical function in relaying accumulated knowledge (Foucault 2011, 24) – we might nevertheless point out that a pedagogical relationship might potentially create a space where truth telling might occur alongside the cultivation of the courage to

hear. Here, the potential safety of the education relationship – frequently found in schools and universities – might present one space where transformation may occur (Pedersen 2019). However, we don't need to think about formal educational institutions in imagining what this *parrhesia* might look like; there are other spaces relevant to animal advocacy movements where this sort of careful cultivation of the educative relation between the courage to speak and the courage to hear might occur, such as farmed animal sanctuaries (Abrell 2021, 127-131).[8]

A different, but perhaps interconnected, space where we might encounter a cultivated relation between frank truth teller and courageous listener – and a space relevant to my focus on pro animal advocacy in this paper – is the production and transfer of knowledge which occurs within social and political movements. This is particularly the case for radical or "revolutionary" political movements which seek transformational change to social, economic and political institutions. In such transformational movements, there is the need for the active construction of new worldviews which "perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform" (Freire 2005, 49). Radical social and political movements must aim to create relations that allow for a susceptibility or openness to frank truths that disrupt affiliation with mainstream norms and shape the ground by which transformative action might occur. In other words, these movements seek to cultivate a knowledge or "ideology," that counters pervading or "hegemonic" ways of thinking or understanding the world.

However, here we are immediately departing from the confines of Foucault's discussion of *parrhesia*, which is framed in relation to ethics and the individual process of challenging truths, to the broader project of deploying truths which might "radically transform collective ways of life" (Demirović 2016, 21). We are instead moving towards something more akin to a Gramscian problem of knowledge: namely, how do political movements alter what is believed, known and appears as "common sense" (Gramsci 1971a, 407-410)? And in a connected way, how do individuals within political movements cultivate an environment to create new worldviews? I would argue that to answer these problems, we may need to bring Foucault and Gramsci together.

GRAMSCI AND THE "INTELLECTUAL"

As I shall discuss, it is my view that Gramsci's discussion of hegemony, intellectuals and the political party

corresponds with, and in some ways complements, Foucault's discussion of *parrhesia*. Both Gramsci and Foucault are dealing with a similar set of problems which circulate around how it is that a truth, which has no means of verification within a prevailing order of truth, might be spoken and heard; and, in this context, how we identify the conditions under which this speaker of the truth might emerge. In other words, in what context is it possible for intellectuals to emerge who are able to produce and communicate new or inadmissible truths, working in a cultivated fashion with an audience who has the courage to hear? In this context, in my view, both thinkers – Foucault and Gramsci – have something useful to offer contemporary pro animal advocacy movements.

However, I acknowledge I am drawing Foucault together with Gramsci here in a way that is potentially disorienting due to the important theoretical differences between the two thinkers. Perhaps the most prominent cause for suspicion relates to the way in which ideology and its relation to power was understood within at least some Marxist thought[9], and Foucault's critique of this (Foucault 1980, 118; see also Barrett 1991, 124). However, in theorizing "hegemony," Gramsci substantially "deviates from the traditional Marxist view that the superstructure is simply a means of reproducing and transmitting the ideology of the dominant economic class" (Schulzke 2016, 63). Here, in his distance from "the traditional Marxist view," Gramsci has something important in common with Foucault. Indeed, a range of scholars have already explored these fascinating resonances between Gramsci and Foucault noting their correlation (Barrett 1991; Schulzke 2016; Mouffe 2014; Smart 1983; Demirović 2016 and Daldal 2014).[10] There is no need to revisit this scholarship here; of particular interest in this paper however, are the intersections between the late writing of Foucault on *parrhesia* and Gramsci's understanding of the intellectual within the context of political movements, and its implication for thinking about the task of animal advocacy in challenging hierarchical anthropocentrism. Thus, I want to steer now, in the final part of this paper, to consider Gramsci, the interesting resonances with Foucault on *parrhesia*, and then their implications for thinking about pro animal social movements.

Gramsci's understanding of knowledge might be comprehended through his characterisation of power as involving direct and tactical applications of force and coercion, often by the State; and simultaneously, modalities of consent, expressed through a variety of institutions of social life, often in conformity with the interests of a dominant class. The latter assemblage Gramsci associates with "hegemony" defined as:

> …the "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production (Gramsci 1971b, 100).

It would be a mistake to assume that hegemony implies a simple system of propaganda where a ruling class controls knowledge. Instead, Gramsci is describing a complex system of knowledge relations where ideas continually compete within a range of institutions, shaping what is known and what appears to be common sense; or as Chantal Mouffe describes it, "a complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which will be brought about by one fundamental group and groups allied to it *through the intermediary of ideology*" (Mouffe 1979, 181).[11] This complexity means that hegemony is a useful way to describe the process by which ideas which are logically contradictory come together to form an apparently coherent whole (Hall 2021, 161-173). As Schulzke describes:

> Hegemony is not a unified system, nor are hegemonic values always coherent. Rather, hegemony is a diverse assemblage of institutions and values that can be both complementary and contradictory. Because of its diverse form and its various instantiations, it is difficult to challenge hegemony, especially through force. Hegemony can incorporate attempts at resistance, depriving them of their force and even transforming them into affirmations of the status quo (Schulzke 2016, 64).

This understanding of hegemony is of course very useful for making sense of the way in which hierarchical anthropocentricism might operate within diverse contexts. We can note, in line with the above, that while hierarchical anthropocentricism is certainly endorsed by and supported by the State, the force of this set of knowledge relations does not originate in the State; instead, it is widely dispersed and establishes the generalized conditions of acceptance and consent for violence and domination towards animals. It is also expressly contradictory; many individuals express that they "care"

about animals and abhor cruelty; yet industrial scale cruelty is standard practice in animal agriculture globally and most individuals are complicit with this. In this respect, the Gramscian conception of hegemony is a useful way to understand the knowledge component of violence and domination towards animals, and certainly Gramsci has informed some animal studies scholarship: for example, John Sanbonmatsu has used this Gramscian understanding of hegemony to describe "speciesism" as a dominant ideology (Sanbonmatsu 2011).

Within this conception of hegemony advanced by Gramsci, knowledge and ideas are continually being crafted by diverse actors, movements and institutions. In this context "intellectuals" play an important role as identifiable agents who craft, authorize, reproduce and facilitate the emergence of knowledge. However, what constitutes an intellectual for Gramsci is not self-evident. One thing to note in this context is that Gramsci emphasises that all individuals have the capacity for engagement in the work of intellectual labour: "although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist" (Gramsci 1971b, 97). Thus, Gramsci democratises the definition of the intellectual in a significant way. However, this does not mean that all individuals are understood by prevailing society as performing intellectual labour. There are certainly "intellectuals" who conform to institutional roles within knowledge production – the "vulgarised type" as Gramsci describes them – such as priests, academics and bureaucrats: these "traditional" intellectuals serve functions in reproducing ideas that enable the conditions for the reproduction of consent (Gramsci 1971b, 97).[12] In addition, there are so called "organic" intellectuals that arise within the context of social groups and classes which articulate the interests of that group or class (Gramsci 1971b, 97; see also Gramsci 1971c). This schema establishes the process for the development of counter hegemony within social movements, and the role of intellectuals within this process. For Gramsci, the challenge for the left was in countering the hegemony of ruling interests which dominated civil society – including those interests articulated by "traditional" intellectuals – and created generalised conditions of consent to rule:

> One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer "ideologically" the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the

group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals (Gramsci 1971b, 96).

But this meant that the left must not only organise itself, but also organise the environment for the generation of ideas; that is, create the conditions for the emergence of different world views which contest the hegemonic perspective of the ruling class, and with this, the left must take seriously the task of creating "a new stratum of intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971b, 97). As is apparent in Gramsci's analysis, knowledge cannot be separated from the terrain of power. In Gramsci, the "organic" intellectual arises within the context of a particular circular relation between power and truth which allows for the ideas of this intellectual to be heard and be credible.

Here, Gramsci also questions the role of the "traditional intellectual" – that is, the academic, the priest, the bureaucrat – since they all serve particular routine or technocratic functions in reproducing mainstream discourse, and thus do not automatically produce counter truths that rupture prevailing ideas: "the … [traditional] … intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" (Gramsci 1971b, 100). In this respect, there are certainly strong resonances between Gramsci's conception of the intellectual within a transformational movement and with Foucault views on the *parrhesiastes* who is able to speak frankly. For both Gramsci and Foucault, there is a distance placed between the individual who speaks the truth and the technician of learning who is imagined as reproducing an institutional order. As we saw above for Foucault, *parrhesiastic* communication relies on the truth itself, rather than the status of the orator as an academic or priest. Similarly, for Gramsci, the "organic" intellectual (as opposed to the "traditional" intellectual) is not an intellectual because they have a pre-existing or traditional social or political status which allows them to speak authoritatively to ideas. Instead, this intellectual emerges within the context of a group, class or movement, and is intelligible within that context. This has implications for left social and political movements. The intellectual in the social movement – as envisaged by Gramsci – emerges without necessary connection to their technical expertise or recognized education. Gramsci states:

> The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical

life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent per-suader" and not just a simple orator (Gramsci 1971b, 98).

Here, veridiction does arrive through an art of ora-tion; rather through the voice of a speaker whose truth does not arise from a status as a technician. Again, we can see above a resonance with Foucault, in the insist-ence that *parrhesiastic* communication should occur with-out rhetoric, and in a way that devalorises the subject of speech in favour of the "truth" of what is conveyed.

In pointing to the intersections between Gramsci and Foucault, I certainly don't mean to deny the very re-al differences between these thinkers in relation to truth and the role of intellectuals. Indeed, Foucault, clarifies the difference between his perspective and that of Gramsci in the following remark:

> …the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or "or-ganic" intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his con-dition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, the political and eco-nomic demands to which he submits or against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truth in our societies. And it's with this last fac-tor that his position can take on a general sig-nificance and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectoral (Foucault 1980, 132).

Here, Foucault would distinguish the "organic intel-lectual of the proletariat" from a different intellectual as-sociated with the "politics of truth in our societies."[13] The former intellectual is positioned as functional to class position; the latter intellectual as engaged in the dif-ficult process of interrogating the regime of truth itself, focused upon "detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, with-in which it operates at the present time" (Foucault 1980, 133). Whether Foucault intended to draw a hard and categorical distinction between these two types of intel-lectual labour is perhaps open to question; and it is tell-ing that in the same interview Foucault adds the dis-claimer that "all this must seem very confused and un-certain…what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis" (Foucault 1980, 132). Nor is this ques-tion vital for our purpose here; which is simply to high-

light, as I have suggested above, that both Gramsci and Foucault are dealing with a similar problem of what pro-cesses are required such that new truths, even those that were previously inadmissible within a system of knowledge, might come into being.

Gramsci certainly gives us a very concrete answer to this question. And this answer moves beyond the ro-manticised scenario of the relation between the philoso-pher and student, towards the strategic problem of how new truths are generated, cultivated and nurtured as a tactic within the context of the oppositional political movements. Here, the political movement must create the conditions for the development of its own culture, and with this there must arise particular intellectuals who are able to distil the truth of the political situation; that is, to be read credibly as being able to speak the truth they see around them. Gramsci identifies this process with the development of the political party, which he suggests can be defined precisely as a collectivity of in-tellectuals:

> The political party for some social groups is nothing other than their specific way of elabo-rating their own category of organic intellectu-als directly in the political and philosophical field and not just in the field of productive technique. These intellectuals are formed in this way and cannot indeed be formed in any other way, given the general character and the conditions of formation, life and development of the social group (Gramsci 1971c, 103; see also Gramsci 1971d).[14]

Here Gramsci suggests that the point of the political party is to generate an internal culture not available elsewhere, that facilitates the emergence of intellectuals who work in both the "political and philosophical field." Further, the party democratises the process of the for-mation of intellectuals. As discussed above, Gramsci has a particular understanding of intellectuals, such that this categorization of labour is not limited to a particular class or technical ability, but is an aspect of life for all: "non-intellectuals do not exist." While rationalized forms of labour organisation separate between "manual" and "intellectual" labour, and thus partition opportuni-ties to be identified with intellectual activity (Gramsci, 1971b, 100-101), the party for Gramsci creates the space for relief, since all people join parties to participate as in-tellectuals within a movement:

> That all members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals is an affirmation that

can easily lend itself to mockery and caricature. But if one thinks about it nothing could be more exact …What matters is the function, which is directive and organisational, i.e. educative, i.e. intellectual. A tradesman does not join a political party in order to do business, nor an industrialist in order to produce more at lower cost, nor a peasant to learn new methods of cultivation, even if some aspects of these demands of the tradesman, the industrialist or the peasant can find satisfaction in the party (1971c, 105).

Here we find ourselves at a moment of potential intersection between Gramsci and Foucault. As I have discussed, the problem of *parrhesia* is interconnected with the challenge of establishing an audience who has the courage to hear, and this potentially involves a cultivated relation between the speaker of frank truths and the listener who is prepared to be challenged. As I have suggested above, we might conceivably imagine this interaction as commonplace within radical political movements. Certainly it is instructive that Foucault does briefly discuss the role of parrhesia within revolutionary politics, pointing out that this form of frank truth telling operates in a modern context with the figure of the "revolutionary": "What is this person who arises within society and says: I am telling the truth, and I am telling the truth in the name of a revolution that I am going to make and that we will make together" (Foucault 2010, 70; and Foucault 2011, 30). The interaction with the multiplicity – "we will make together" – reminds us that this revolutionary moment of parrhesia occurs within the context of a movement of people who are aiming to change society together as a collective project. Yet Foucault does not appear to develop further this particular collective revolutionary or transformational condition for *parrhesia*.[15] This is precisely where Gramsci's observations on the intellectual within the party – indeed the party as a movement of intellectuals towards radical change – usefully complements Foucault's analysis. Gramsci's rendering of the political party is an invitation to think about the kind of intellectual environment required for social change. The recruits to the transformational party join a collective grouping of individuals who find themselves exposed to truth; the recruits experience of a frank truth telling – the courage to hear – becomes essential for the members of the group, who must hear this truth so they in turn cultivate the ability to speak the truth themselves without fear. This process of intellectual acculturation is essential to what a political party – at

least in the ideal form described by Gramsci – does; it creates the space for the development of intellectuals required to articulate the societal transformation required and the tactics needed to achieve this change.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE TRANSFORMATIONAL PARTY?

I began this paper with the problem of epistemic violence and the challenge this poses for pro animal advocacy. As I have argued, while many pro animal movements prioritise the politicising effect of "unveiling" the horrors of the ways animals are treated in our societies, the challenge of altering knowledge systems, the systems of thought that make violence against animals "visible," is more complicated to address. In simple terms, as I have argued, displaying images or conveying information on animal suffering is not enough in itself to guarantee political response; instead, work must be done at an epistemic level to enable animals to be seen as bona fide victims of violence, and for this violence to be seen as morally and politically problematic. That is, to counter epistemic violence, we need to undermine the prevailing heirarchichal anthropocentrism that sees and constructs animals as subjects who cannot be violated because they are imagined as having no interests of their own. In the above analysis I have looked at two theoretical perspectives – Foucault and Gramsci – on the relationship between knowledge and power, drawing attention to not only the courage and initiative of the person who "speaks the truth" in an attempt to disrupt a knowledge system, but also the courage of an audience, who may need to be supported – cultivated – to hear the truth. For Foucault, consideration *parrhesia* provides one pathway to understand how speech may register as "true", even if this truth is challenging or threatening to its audience. For Gramsci, we have a complementary analysis of the relationship between knowledge and power which highlights the collective processes for the cultivation of intellectuals, and the process of generating a counter-hegemony.

I conclude with three summary points. Firstly, in my view at least some animal advocacy utilises strategy that takes the form of *parrhesia* as Foucault has outlined it: that is, as a political form of courageous frank truth telling designed to challenge and dislodge a prevailing order of knowledge. Like other forms of *parrhesia* the teller of this truth will not profit from espousing their distinct knowledge; indeed, they may face alienation, persecution and even, in some jurisdictions, risk of criminal prosecution for sharing this message. Indeed, as I

have indicated, it is perhaps because of the broad epistemic inadmissibility of critical and alternative perspectives that *parrhesia* has emerged as one of the preferred modalities by which political communication occurs as a tactic of animal advocacy.

Secondly, an element of the practice of *parrhesia* is the willingness or courage of the audience to hear. To an extent the dramatics of the *parrhesiastic* communication of pro animal advocacy is precisely that the audience is unwilling to listen. However the efficacy of *parrhesia* as a political strategy – at least in part – relies upon convincing an audience through this style of truth telling that there is something worth listening to; it is because the listener is aware that the speaker is acting courageously to speak the truth that it becomes persuasive, but this dynamic of persuasion still depends on an audience being willing to be persuaded, to have the courage to listen, which grants the *parrhesiastes* epistemic authority. To this extent *parrhesia* works in an ideal sense when a relation has been cultivated between the truth teller and the audience, such that the audience expects frank truth speech, and prepares themselves for a revelation that they know will be shocking and alter an established worldview. From my standpoint, while animal advocacy has been successful through this repertoire of frank truth telling in making some people aware of the conditions animals face, the failure of this *parrhesiastic* communication in shifting the mainstream knowledge systems which underpin human violence towards animals (and with that, most public opinion which endorses this) is in part due to the difficulties of cultivating an audience who is receptive to this knowledge, who trusts the speaker as offering frank truths; that is, an audience with the courage to hear.

Finally, as I have argued, this problem moves us closer to a Gramscian conception of knowledge, and the question of how political movements can build a counter-hegemony: that is, how political movements can establish the conditions under which alternative worldviews might come into being. Gramsci, in this context, highlights the relation of intellectuals to movements, emphasising that "organic" intellectuals emerge within the context of groups and that these intellectuals differ from "traditional" intellectuals in bureaucracies or universities. As I have argued, this leads us in Gramsci's thought to the political party, which evolves as a movement of intellectuals with a concrete task to analyze the terrain of power and develop strategy in relation to it. As I have suggested, Gramsci provides us a way to complete Foucault's interrogation of *parrhesia* by exploring

one additional space where this communication occurs: that is, in the context of the "revolutionary" or transformational party, which not only creates the conditions for the emergence of *parrhesiastic* communication, but also cultivates an audience of intellectuals who have the courage to hear, and the willingness to work towards large scale structural change.

If the goal of animal advocates is a transformation of the institutional features of societies and to challenge to anthropocentric knowledge systems which dominate what is known to be true, then this suggests that these movements must not simply seek to speak the truth frankly (that is to festishise the experience of *parrhesiastic* communication as a primary tactic) but also develop the collective forms of organisation that allow for the truth to be heard, and for those involved to be part of this intellectual culture of truth telling. It is notable that many forms of radical pro animal advocacy have little in common with the party which Gramsci had in mind when he wrote his notebooks; that is, in this case, the Communist Party. However, given the radical aspirations of animal advocates towards system transformation, perhaps the comparison does not seem remote. And further, perhaps in making this comparison, we can highlight the the unexplored potential for animal advocacy in achieving goals through the use of the transformational party as a tactic for radical structural change.

What forms this political party takes is an open question. However, Gramsci provides us a useful template, in so far as the party is imagined as not only a space for the cultivation of a countervailing knowledge system, but a democratic space that enables all its participants to become intellectuals. For Gramsci this endeavor is vital in providing an analysis of the present terrain of power, and for deliberating on questions of strategy and tactics. Internationally, there has been some success in the development of electoral parties which focus on intervening into parliamentary and governmental systems to improve animal welfare and rights (Morini 2018; Otjes 2016; Abbey 2022; Meijer 2019, 112-113; and Chen 2016, 286-287). Many of these animal parties have had broad agendas which moved beyond a narrow focus on animals; as Morini points out, we need not think of these parties as "single issue focused" and these parties can include environmental agendas and "left-wing ideological proposals" (Morini 2018, 433).[16] However it is not clear that these parties have functioned in the way Gramsci imagined; that is, based upon the function of a socialist or communist party. Parliamentary parties are not necessarily agents of radical political transformation,

nor do they necessarily utilise the same democratic processes or foster active internal intellectual cultures in the way that Gramsci described.[17] However, Gramsci provides us a template for thinking about the function of the political party in the context of transformational change, and there is certainly scope to imagine the place of animal advocacy within a broader left project of radical social transformation. Radical socialist and communist political parties – of the kind that Gramsci addresses – are in short supply today, and do not posses the widespread participation and membership that they once had. However, perhaps as different scholars have pointed out (Dean 2012; Huber 2022; and Taylor 2016), it is precisely this sort of political organisation – a transformational political party – that is required at this moment to respond to the structural challenges before us, including the climate emergency, entrenched and deepening economic inequality; systemic and enduring racial injustice, and the rise of far right and fascist movements. In part, the work of such movements is to build solidarity and facilitate collective action. But much of the work of radical political parties is about developing a shared vision for alternative societies. Of relevance, Jodi Dean has argued that "the problem of the Left" is that "we have lost sight of the communist horizon" (Dean 2012, 6); in other words, progressive movements have lost sight of the guiding vision for a radical transformation of social and economic systems. For Dean the reinvigorating the transformational party is one tactical solution.[18] It is here that I would suggest that perhaps the question of the appropriate tactics that animal advocates should pursue potentially converge with the questions being asked by other radical social movements. Although it has been noted that pro animal advocacy movements operate at some distance from other left social and political movements (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014), animal advocates are not the only movements that are calling for radical transformation of our societies (Wadiwel 2018). It is notable that as economic inequality heightens globally, the old demands to radically reform or even abolish capitalism are re-emerging as justice projects. Anthropogenic climate change has produced radical green movement demands which similarly call for far reaching social and economic transformation, often highlighting the non-compatibility between our economic system and the environmental crisis facing planetary systems. Decolonial movements and the now global Black Lives Matter movement have highlighted the structuring role of colonialism and race in the formation of our world and knowledge systems, and demanded

land, reparations, and racial justice. In this context, animal advocates are not alone in demanding a new world. The challenge of course is trying to determine the basis for solidarity: what is the problem we are facing in common? where we are heading? and how is change possible (how do we get there)? These are problems at the level of knowledge, but the answers are not self-evident; ideally these problems should be subject to thought, debate, refinement and critique in a collective context. The challenge is creating a space for this conversation to be heard, that enables both the boldness to speak, and the courage to hear. It is here perhaps that the reflection on the importance of the radical political party to come is valuable to contemplate. If the challenges before us demand the return of transformational political parties, then perhaps the challenge for pro animal advocates is to position themselves as an integral constituent of these movements.

NOTES

1 I have used the phrase 'pro animal advocacy' to describe radical animal advocacy movements who seek dramatic transformation of human animal relations, that extend to campaign goals such as ending animal agriculture and use of animals in research, and / or seek behaviour change through encouraging humans to withdraw from product consumption and lifestyle choices which support violence towards animals.

2 Even where images depicting violence against animals are not used, protest action by animal advocates might nevertheless be informed by similar dynamics of "bearing witness" to violence that is otherwise hidden. For example, the global Save movement, which uses activist vigils to bear witness to animal transport and slaughter processes, builds on this logic of visibility and truth (Lockwood, 2018; see also Giraud, 2021, 74-77).

3 I use "symptomatic" here in a psychoanalytic fashion as highlighting the way in which resistance is fashioned in relation to the character of relations of power it emerges amidst. In a world where open and frank discussion of the horror of our treatment of animals is banished from parliaments, the media, classrooms and dining rooms, it is no surprise that animal advocacy has taken on unique forms, often "uncomfortable," forms of social and political intervention.

4 As cited, I consider the problem of epistemic violence in The War against Animals (Wadiwel 2015); however, this discussion may also be understood through the work on epistemic justice, and particularly testimonial injustice as discussed by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007).

5 I use the term "hierarchical anthropocentricism" to refer to a consolidated set of knowledge relations associated with the European Enlightenment, which categorised and ranked humans and animals into a "great chain of being" and provided a rationale for downwards violence and exploitation. As a

range of scholars have indicated, this anthropocentricism is interconnected with forms of human oppression, such as racism and anti-black violence (Kim 2017), and ableism (Taylor 2017).

6 It is because Foucault makes this shift in his later work, that I think it is erroneous to suggest that there is no room for agency in Foucault's theories. On this long debate, and the effect of the publication of the lectures at the College de France on interpretation, see Christopher Mayes' excellent discussion (Mayes 2015).

7 On the potential ineffectiveness of a brief interventions, such as a pamphlet, in prompting attitude change, see Haile et al 2021.

8 I note in this context, we don't need to imagine pedagogy as only involving frank speech and courageous listening between human teachers and learners. An important element of this education may be the capacity to listen to animals. Indeed, central to Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's exploration of the radical potential of farmed animal sanctuaries to function as intentional communities is the opportunity for an educative role in providing processes by which to understand animal "preferences about how they want to relate to us and to other species" (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 68). Such experiments, if they are to be authentic, require the courage to hear animal communication, even if the message is uncomfortable because it threatens to dislodge presumed hierarchical anthropocentricism and asks us to "begin again" (Meijer 2019, 237-241). This points to the function of animal communication in such contexts as perhaps, by definition, *parrhesiastic*, in so far as animal expressions of preferences – if they are heard, rather than ignored or misunderstood – may indeed threaten to disrupt many sedimented truths about human animal relations.

9 Karl Marx's conception of knowledge assumed a disjunction between material relations of production and the realm of ideas. In some respects, this represents an inversion of the Hegelian epistemology which gave primacy to knowledge as the driving force of history: "in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too" (Hegel 1977, 54, §85). Against this, Marx would orient Hegel the "right side up" to instead focus on material relations which are "reflected by the human mind" through ideology (Marx 1867). This unique inversion of Hegelian idealism produces the distinct approach of Marx to ideology, expressed with clarity in an often-cited passage from the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: "It is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic, in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such an epoch of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life,

from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which it is broadly sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the womb of the old society" (Marx 1976, 4).

10 Certainly, as Chantal Mouffe observes, there is perhaps a convergence occurring between Foucault and Gramsci in many respects (Mouffe 2014, 201). I would note that Gramsci's theory of knowledge and the emergence of "rationality" in this context demonstrates a remarkable cross over with Foucault. Consider the following description of the emergence of a hegemonic worldview: "It is evident that this kind of mass creation cannot just happen 'arbitrarily,' around any ideology, simply because of the formally constructive will of a personality or a group which puts it forward solely on the basis of its own fanatical philosophical or religious convictions. Mass adhesion or non-adhesion to an ideology is the real critical test of the rationality and historicity of modes of thinking. Any arbitrary constructions are pretty rapidly eliminated by historical competition, even if sometimes, through a combination of immediately favourable circumstances, they manage to enjoy popularity of a kind; whereas constructions which respond to the demands of a complex organic period of history always impose themselves and prevail in the end, even though they may pass through several intermediary phases during which they manage to affirm themselves only in more or less bizarre and heterogeneous combinations" (Gramsci 1971c, 423). Here, we certainly find a view of ideology which is complex, and notes that the prevailing "rationality" of the time is contextual to the system of knowledge which prevails.

11 How Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' has been interpreted within contemporary scholarship is open to some critical analysis (Shalbak 2018). Referring to contemporary understandings of hegemony, Shalbak points out, relevant to this paper, that an understanding of hegemony alone is not enough for transformation: "The focus on the how of gaining hegemony downplayed the other two important and integral tasks to any emancipatory politics: the what, which involves an analysis of the power structure and social forces that underpin the structure of authority in any giving time, and the why, an updated meditation on and vision of the alternative society to come" (59).

12 Indeed, while Edward Said passionately argued for a different sort of role for an engaged intellectual, without "specialist" technical knowledge, he acknowledged that today "so many new professions – broadcasters, academic professionals, computer analysts, sports and media lawyers, management consultants, policy experts, government advisers, authors of specialized market reports, and indeed the whole field of modern mass journalism itself – have vindicated Gramsci's vision" (Said 1996, 8-9).

13 Here there is a strong resonance with Said's view that the true intellectual operates at a distance from society, who is

willing to be unpopular in order to express the truth: "Every intellectual has an audience and a constituency. The issue is whether that audience is there to be satisfied, and hence a client to be kept happy, or whether it is there to be challenged, and hence stirred into outright opposition or mobilized into greater democratic participation in the society" (Said 1996, 83).

14 Gramsci goes on: "The political party, for all groups, is precisely the mechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the State carries out, more synthetically and over a larger scale, in political society. In other words, it is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given group -- the dominant one -- and the traditional intellectuals."

15 In the later lectures Foucault explores the way that Christian ethics takes up *parrhesia* as a kind of individual and collective way of living, and identifies the emergence of this ascetics with the "militant lifestyle" of secret revolutionary groups in the 19th Century, something Foucault quickly suggests disappears in the institutionalization of the French Communist Party within mainstream politics in the 1970s (Foucault 2011, 186).

16 For example, the Australian Animal Justice Party uses the slogan "Animals, People, Planet" to highlight this wider political program (AJP 2022).

17 It is of course difficult to generalise, as different animal parties operate in heterogenous ways, some of which include forms of internal democracy and commitments to large scale transformation. The French political party Révolution écologique pour le vivant has a strong flavour of transformational politics in its policies, and commitments to internal democracy (REV ND). The Australian Animal Justice Party supports local area groups, delegates, and policy working groups comprised of volunteers, though is avowedly structured around electoral success.

18 However, it important to note that for Dean the question of what the radical political party should look like remains open: "We don't yet know how we will structure our communist party – in part because we stopped thinking about it, giving way to the transience of issues, ease of one-click networked politics, and the illusion that our individual activities would immanently converge in a plurality of post-capitalist practices of creating and sharing" (Dean 2012, 20). I add that the question of what "communism," or any society after capitalism, looks like also remains open. The word "communism" is contentious in part because of the nightmares of the totalitarian experiment of State socialism, which has made contemporary discussion on "communism" fraught as a result of this legacy.

REFERENCES

Aaltola, E. (2019). The Meat Paradox: Omnivore's Akrasia, and Animal Ethics. *Animals*, 9(12), 1125. doi: 10.3390/ani9121125

Aaltola, E. (2014). Animal Suffering: Representations and the Act of Looking. *Anthrozoös*, *27*(1), 19–31. doi: 10.2752/175303714X13837396326297

Abbey, R. (2022). Veganism and Australia's Animal Justice Party. *New Political Science*, *44*(2), 309–323. doi: 10.1080/07393148.2022.2053475

Abrell, E. (2021) *Saving Animals: Multispecies Ecologies of Rescue and Care*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Animal Justice Party (AJP) (2022). A Better World for Animals People and Planet. Animal Justice Party. Retrieved at:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NkkmI3eyM1IPZjox8uML9PBYLjINlxFO/view

Barrett, M. (1991). *The Politics of Truth : From Marx to Foucault*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bianchi, F.; Dorsel, C.; Garnett, E.; Aveyard, P.; & Jebb, S.A. (2018) Interventions targeting conscious determinants of human behaviour to reduce the demand for meat: a systematic review with qualitative comparative analysis. *International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Phyical Acti*vity, 15 (102). doi: 10.1186/s12966-018-0729-6

Chen, P.J. (2016). *Animal Welfare in Australia: Policy and Politics*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Daldal, A. (2014). Power and Ideology in Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci: A Comparative Analysis. *Review of History and Political Science*, 2(2), 149-167.

Dalziell, J & Wadiwel, D. (2017). Live Exports, Animal Advocacy, Race and 'Animal Nationalism'. In A. Potts (Eds.), *Meat Culture*. Leiden: Brill. 73-89.

Demirović, A. (2016). The Politics of Truth: For a Different Way of Life. In D. Kreps (Ed.), *Gramsci and Foucault: A Reassessment*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2016. 11-29

Donaldson, S. & Kymlicka, S. (2015). Farmed Animal Sanctuaries: The Heart of the Movement? A Socio-Political Perspective. *Politics and Animals*, 1(1): 50–74.

English, J., & Zacka, B. (2022). The Politics of Sight: Revisiting Timothy Pachirat's Every Twelve Seconds. American Political Science Review, 116(3), 1025-1037. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001192

Fernández, L. (2019). Using Images of Farmed Animals in Environmental Advocacy: An Antispeciesist, Strategic Visual Communication Proposal. *The American Behavioral Scientist (Beverly Hills)*, *63*(8), 138–158. doi: 10.1177/0002764219830454.

Fernández, L. (2021). Images That Liberate: Moral Shock and Strategic Visual Communication in Animal Liberation Activism. *The Journal of Communication Inquiry*, *45*(2), 138–158.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0196859920932881.

Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language.* New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. (1980). Truth and Power. C. Gordon (Ed.), *Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977.* New York: Pantheon Books. 109-130.

Foucault, M. (1994). *The Order of Things.* New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, M. (2010). *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the College de France, 1982-1983.* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. (2011). *The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the College de France, 1983-1984.* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freire, P. (2005). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* New York: Continuum.

Fricker, M. (2007). *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.* Oxford University Press.

Gillespie, K. (2016). Witnessing Animal Others: Bearing Witness, Grief, and the Political Function of Emotion. *Hypatia,* 31: 572-588. https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12261

Giraud, E. (2021). *Veganism: Politics, Practice and Theory.* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Gramsci, A. (1971a). The Intellectuals: The Formation of Intellectuals. In Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith (Eds.), *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci.* New York: International Publishers. 406-425.

Gramsci, A. (1971b). The Intellectuals: The Formation of Intellectuals. In Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith (Eds.), *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci.* New York: International Publishers. 94-102.

Gramsci, A. (1971c). The Different Position of Urban and Rural-Type Intellectuals. In Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith (Eds.), *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci.* New York: International Publishers. 103-111.

Gramsci, A. (1971d). The Political Party. In Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith (Eds.), *Selections From The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci.* New York: International Publishers. 231-240.

Haile, M.; Jalil, A.; Tasoff, J.; & Bustamante, A.V. (2021). Changing Hearts and Plates: The Effect of Animal-Advocacy Pamphlets on Meat Consumption. *Frontiers in Psychology.* 12:668674. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.668674

Hegel, G.W.F. (1977). *The Phenomenology of Spirit.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jasper, J.M. & Poulsen, J.D. (1995). Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests. *Social Problems.* 42(4), 493-512. doi: 10.1525/sp.1995.42.4.03x0129y.

Jones, B. and J. Davis (2016). *Backlash: Australia's Conflict of Values Over Live Exports.* Braidwood: Finlay Lloyd.

Lockwood, A. (2018). Bodily Encounter, Bearing Witness and the Engaged Activism of the Global Save Movement. *Animal Studies Journal.* 7(1), 104-126.

Kim, C.J. (2017). 'Murder and Mattering in Harambe's House', *Politics and Animals* 3 (2017). Retrieved from: https://journals.lub.lu.se/pa/article/view/16274/14916

Kymlicka, W. and Donaldson, S. (2014). Animal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left. *Journal of Social Philosophy.* 45 (2014): 116-135. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12047

Marx, K. (1999). Afterword to the Second German Edition. *Capital Vol. 1.* Retrieved from: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm

Marx, K. (1976). *Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.* Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mayes, C. R. (2015). Revisiting Foucault's 'Normative Confusions': Surveying the Debate Since the *Collège de France* Lectures. *Philosophy Compass,* 10: 841–855. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12274.

Meijer, E. (2019). *When Animals Speak: Towards and Interspecies Democracy.* New York: New York University Press.

Mika, M. (2006). Framing the Issue: Religion, Secular Ethics and the Case of Animal Rights Mobilization. *Social Forces,* 85(2), 915–941.

Morini, M. (2018). "Animals first!" The rise of animal advocacy parties in the EU: a new party family. *Contemporary Politics,* 24(4), 418–435.

Mouffe, C. (2014). Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci. In C. Mouffe (Ed.) Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge. 168-204.

Plato. (1999). Apology. Project Gutenburg. Retrieved at: https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1656/pg1656-images.html

O'Sullivan, S. (2011). *Animals Equality and Democracy.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Otjes, S. (2016). The Hobbyhorse of the Party for the Animals. *Society & Animals,* 24(4), 383–402.

Pachirat, T. (2011). *Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pedersen, H. (2019). *Schizoanalysis and Animal Science Edu-*

cation. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Potter, W. (2017). Ag-Gag Laws: Corporate Attempts to Keep Consumers in the Dark. Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity. 5(1), 1-31.

Révolution écologique pour le vivant (REV) (No Date). Démocratie Interne. Website. Retrieved from: https://revolutionecologiquepourlevivant.fr/parti/democratie-interne

Sanbonmatsu, J. (2011). "Introduction." J. Sanbonmatsu (Ed.) *Critical Theory and Animal Liberation.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 1-32.

Scudder, J. N., & Mills, C. B. (2009). The credibility of shock advocacy: Animal rights attack messages. *Public Relations Review*, *35*(2), 162–164. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2008.09.007

Shalbak, I. (2018). Hegemony Thinking: A Detour Through Gramsci. Thesis Eleven. 147(1), 45–61. doi: 10.1177/07255136187876

Schulzke, M. (2016. Power and Resistance: Linking Gramsci and Foucault. D. Kreps (Ed.) *Gramsci and Foucault: A Reassessment.* Farnham: Ashgate, 2016. 57-73

Smart, B. (1983). *Foucault, Marxism and Critique.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Spivak, G.C. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture.* Basingstoke: Macmillan Education. 271–313.

Taylor, S. (2017). *Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation.* New York: New Press.

Wadiwel, D.J. (2015). *The War against Animals.* Leiden: Brill.

Wadiwel, D.J. (2016). Do Fish Resist? *Cultural Studies Review*, 22(1), 196-242. doi: 10.5130/csr.v22i1.4363

Wadiwel, D. (2018). Animal Utopia: Liberal, Communitarian, Libertarian Or…? [Review Essay] Wayne Gabardi. The Next Social Contract: Animals, The Anthropocene, and Biopolitics, *Animal Studies Journal*, 7(1), 2018, 304-318. Available at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/asj/vol7/iss1/14

Wadiwel, D. (2018). 'Fishing for Fun': The Politics of Recreational Fishing. *Animal Studies Journal*, 8(2), 2019, 202-228. doi: 10.14453/asj.v8i2.13.