Exploring the Platonic Heaven of Law: General Principles of EU Law from a Comparative Perspective

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The aim of this article is to explore the general principles of EU law from a comparative law perspective. Instead of offering a descriptive overview of the cases where the CJEU has relied on explicit comparison in its case law concerning the general principles. I shall articulate this article as follows: first, I shall recall the reasons why comparative law is on paper of crucial importance to the CJEU when interpreting the general principles. Second, I shall mention the different methodological options possible for the CJEU in this field. Third, I shall look at comparative law as a source of transparency in the legal reasoning of the Court by recalling some problematic cases, where the lack of explicit comparison caused harsh criticism for the case law of the Luxembourg Court.

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1 GOALS OF THE ARTICLE

The aim of this article is to explore the general principles of EU law from a comparative perspective. In comparative law, the idea of general principles is frequently associated with that of openness, being general principles open norms in at least three senses. First of all, principles are characterised by what Betti defined a ‘surplus of axiological meaning’ [eccedenza di contenuto assiologico],2 because of their *vit expansiva* and their indefinite content when compared to the other norms. Second, principles are also open since they often act as a bridge between two different normative systems (law and morality) by connecting positive law and natural law.3 Finally, they are open because they link the domestic and international legal systems, especially after World War II. Openness is precisely one of the most evident features that characterise many constitutional texts in Europe,4 and it is possible to find the roots of this phenomenon even earlier, looking back

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1 Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-411/05 Félix Palaus de la Villa EU:C:2007:604, para 86.

2 Emilio Betti, *Teoria generale della interpretazione* (Giuffrè, 1955) 850.


at what, in the 1930s, Mirkine- Guetzévitch called the ‘internationalisation of modern constitutions’. In other words, openness belongs within the core of the ‘nouvelles tendances du droit constitutionnel’.

However, if general principles have traditionally been associated with the idea of openness, comparative law shows that this was not always the case. The debate on codifications in Continental Europe clearly shows that there was a period when the general principles were associated with the necessary closure of a legal system, especially in those jurisdictions where the Civil Codes were conceived as an expression of legal nationalism.

The debate on the general principles of law in the Italian Civil Code (dated 1942 and drafted under the fascist regime) is emblematic from this point of view.

The provision of Art. 12 of the preliminary provisions to the Italian Civil Code (listing the interpretative criteria available to the interpreter) was conceived to impede a reference to the principles of natural law. When commenting on this provision, Guastini argued that originally the role reserved to systematic interpretation was very limited for the interpreter. Because of that, systematic interpretation was seen like a sort of *extrema ratio* exploitable only in exceptional cases. When looking at it, scholars also said that according to the original scheme of the Italian Civil Code systematic interpretation was seen as an act of integration rather than as an act of interpretation *stricto sensu* understood. After the entry into force of the Italian Constitution many of the provisions of the same Civil Code (including Art. 12 of its preliminary provisions) were interpreted in light of the new constitutional principles and this has changed the role of the general principles as well. If once they were seen before as the moment of closure for a legal system (nothing out of the Code, no reference to natural law was allowed), today, general principles are perceived as the moment of openness for a legal order that connects domestic and international law. As a consequence, systematic interpretation (often combined with consistent interpretation) is no longer seen as a last resort for the interpreter. In the EU context, there is another level of complexity that should be emphasised: as we will see, there are principles that are frequently seen as shared norms which belong to both the national and the supranational legal systems. This explains why frequently the interpretation of a general principle of EU law inferred from the constitutional traditions common to the member states results in creating conflicts due to the interpretative competition existing between the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the national constitutional courts. Cordero Alonso and Mangold are emblematic of this trend (*infra*).

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6 Ibid.


10 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Paladin (n 9).


http://www.rivistaatic.it/download/1hafjKHFeYv_LgD3rYOwnyoMrsDqwTgP48qlgNfJX464/1-2015-bin.pdf
A couple of preliminary clarifications are necessary at this point to explain what this article is not about. First of all, here I am not going to enter into the very old debate about the nature of comparative law – discussing whether it is a method or an autonomous discipline\(^{15}\) – in this essay comparative law will be understood as a critical exercise characterised by a subversive function and serving as an ‘antidote to uncritical faith in legal doctrine’\(^{16}\).

Second, although, as we will see later, sometimes it is possible to find reference to the idea of ‘evaluative comparative law’ in the Opinions of some Advocates General (infra), here I shall not deal (directly, at least) with the never-ending discussion about the functions of comparative law\(^{17}\).

Generally speaking, comparative law is certainly relevant both for the genesis of the general principles of EU law and for their interpretation.\(^{18}\) Although this is not a piece on the use of comparative law in the case law of the CJEU, the traditional reluctance of the Luxembourg Court to engage in explicit legal comparison\(^{19}\) will inevitably have an impact on the subject of this article. In this sense it has been suggested that the CJEU does a lot of implicit comparison,\(^{20}\) but hardly this will explicitly feature in the final text of its decisions.\(^{21}\) Another caveat is given by the very well-known style of the decisions of the Court:


\(^{16}\) Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 1998) 22.

\(^{17}\) For instance, Michaels identified seven functions ‘(1) the epistemological function of understanding legal rules and institutions, (2) the comparative function of achieving comparability, (3) the presumptive function of emphasizing similarity, (4) the formalizing function of system building, (5) the evaluative function of determining the better law, (6) the universalizing function of preparing legal unification, and (7) the critical function of providing tools for the critique of law’, Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 339, 363.

\(^{18}\) See for instance the examples provided by Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons with regard to concepts such as ‘spouse’ or ‘married official’ (respectively Case C-59/85 Netherlands v Reed/EU:C:1986:157 and Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D and Sweden v Council/EU:C:2001:304) apart from the fact that the comparative law method provides an analytical support for the discovery and development of general principles of EU law, it may also be relied upon with a view to clarifying specific provisions of EU law, Koen Lenaerts, José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘To say what the law of the EU is: methods of interpretation and the European Court of Justice’ (2013) EU Working Paper, Distinguished Lecture delivered on the occasion of the XXIV Law of the European Union course of the Academy of European Law, on 6 July 2013.


\(^{20}\) Giuseppe de Vergottini, Oltre il dialogo tra le Corti. Giudici, diritto straniero, comparazione (Il Mulino, 2010), 144.

although the style of its judgments has changed over the years, even recently, the CJEU condensed the legal reasoning of very revolutionary cases in pretty short decisions. This makes it very difficult to understand the real importance of the comparative argument in the economy of the judicial outcome and introduces another element of non-transparency in the legal reasoning. Finally, another factor to be taken into account is the uncertain content of the general principles, as AG Mazák beautifully suggested:

“The approach adopted by the Court in Mangold has received serious criticism from academia, the media and also from most of the parties to the present proceedings and certainly merits further comment. First of all, it should be emphasised that the concept of general principles of law has been central to the development of the Community legal order. By formulating general principles of Community law – pursuant to its obligation under Article 220 EC to ensure observance of the law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty – the Court has actually added flesh to the bones of Community law, which otherwise – being a legal order based on a framework treaty – would have remained a mere skeleton of rules, not quite constituting a proper legal ‘order’. This source of law enabled the Court – often drawing inspiration from legal traditions common to the Member States, and international treaties – to guarantee and add content to legal principles in such important areas as the protection of fundamental rights and administrative law. However, it lies in the nature of general principles of law, which are to be sought rather in the Platonic heaven of law than in the law books, that both their existence and their substantive content are marked by uncertainty.”

Considerations like these allow me to introduce the structure of this work. Instead of offering a descriptive overview of the cases where the CJEU has relied on explicit comparison in its case law concerning the general principles, I shall articulate this article as follows: first, I shall recall the reasons why comparative law is on paper of crucial importance to the CJEU when interpreting the general principles. Second, I shall mention the different methodological options possible for the CJEU in this field. Third, I shall look at comparative law as a source of transparency in the legal reasoning of the Court by recalling some problematic cases, where the lack of explicit comparison caused harsh criticism for the case law of the Luxembourg Court.

The analysis proposed is case law-based, which means that instead of framing all these issues from a purely theoretical point of view I shall deal with them by looking at some concrete cases decided by the CJEU and at the Opinions delivered by the Advocates General.

23 Although it does not much to do with the use of comparative law Zambrano is an emblematic example of this trend. Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano EU:C:2011:124. Loïc Azoulai, “‘Euro-Bonds’ The Ruiz Zambrano judgment or the Real Invention of EU Citizenship’ (2011) 3 Perspectives on Federalism 31.
24 Opinion of AG AG Mazák in Case C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa EU:C:2007:106, paras 83- 86.
25 For the purpose of this essay I shall not look at the case law of the General Court.
This article focuses on how the CJEU considers domestic legal materials when constructing the general principles of EU Law. 26 Hauer 27 was described by Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons as ‘a paradigmatic example of a case where the CJEU adopted a comparative law method’, 28 since in order to respond to the question raised by the referring court the CJEU offered a comparative analysis of the relevant options present at national level:

‘It is necessary to consider also the indications provided by the constitutional rules and practices of the nine Member States. One of the first points to emerge in this regard is that those rules and practices permit the legislature to control the use of private property in accordance with the general interest. Thus some constitutions refer to the obligations arising out of the ownership of property (German Grundgesetz, Article 14 (2), first sentence), to its social function (Italian constitution, Article 42 (2)), to the subordination of its use to the requirements of the common good (German Grundgesetz, Article 14 (2), second sentence, and the Irish constitution, Article 43.2.29), or of social justice (Irish constitution, Article 43.2.10). In all the Member States, numerous legislative measures have given concrete expression to that social function of the right to property. Thus in all the Member States there is legislation on agriculture and forestry, the water supply, the protection of the environment and town and country planning, which imposes restrictions, sometimes appreciable, on the use of real property’. 29

The topic of this article is still burning since the binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 30 has not made the general principles ‘démode’. On the

27 Case C-44/79 Hauer EU:C:1979:290.
28 Lenaerts, Gutiérrez-Fons (n 18).
29 Hauer (n 27). In light of that the Court stated that: ‘All the wine-producing countries of the Community have restrictive legislation, albeit of differing severity, concerning the planting of vines, the selection of varieties and the methods of cultivation. In none of the countries concerned are those provisions considered to be incompatible in principle with the regard due to the right to property’, para 21.
contrary, there have been cases where the CJEU has relied on a general principle because of the slightly different meaning that is has when compared to the provisions codified in the Charter.\textsuperscript{32} Sometimes this can be explained taking into account the limited scope of application of the Charter.\textsuperscript{33}

2 THE STRUCTURE OF EU LAW: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW (IN THEORY AT LEAST)

The CJEU has been criticised for not making its sources of inspiration transparent when interpreting the Treaties, despite having the occasion to do so. This is a result of the many interpretative opportunities provided by the wording of the Treaties.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, there are “structural” reasons that would suggest a more explicit use of comparative law by the CJEU, especially considering the open nature of the Treaties.

In this respect, as noticed by Arnulf\textsuperscript{35}, among others, the Maastricht Treaty has been a turning point in clarifying the importance of national constitutional traditions in the genesis and interpretation of the general principles of Union law. Since then the EU Treaties have progressively referred to national legal (sometimes even constitutional) materials, norms such as Art. 6 TEU (in all its versions) and even more recently Art. 4 TEU\textsuperscript{36} can be traced back to this trend. The model of Art. 4 TEU is undoubtedly represented by Art. 6 TEU (pre-Lisbon version\textsuperscript{37}), which described the closeness between common constitutional traditions and national fundamental principles. In that provision, in fact, these two kinds of legal sources (common constitutional traditions\textsuperscript{38} and national

\textsuperscript{32} This is the example of the case law on right to good administration or Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial: Herwig Hofmann and Bucura Mihacelu, ‘The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 73; Xavier Groussot, Jörgen Hettne and Gunnar Thor Petursson, ‘General Principles and the Many Faces of Coherence: Between Law and Ideology in the European Union’ in Stefan Vogtenauer, Stephen Weatherill (eds.), \textit{General Principles of Law European and Comparative Perspectives} (Hart 2017) 77.


\textsuperscript{35} Arnulf (26). He also noticed the curious wording of Art. F (2) which maintained the formula “general principles of Community Law” instead of declaring them principles of European Union Law.


fundamental principles – via the reference to the ‘national identities of its Member States’) were mentioned in two subsequent paragraphs, as Ruggeri noticed.39 It is sufficient here to recall the reference made in Art. 6.2 TEU (pre-Lisbon version) to the common constitutional traditions, and the reference to the “national identities” of its Member States in Art. 6.3 TEU (pre-Lisbon version).

Another example of the openness of the EU legal system is given by the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU (EUCFR) and by those clauses of the Charter that refer to ‘national laws and practices’.40 This confirms the open nature of EU law, an element already stressed by Häberle who defined the national and EU legal systems as provided with two partial constitutions.41

There are of course other provisions in the Treaties which expressis verbis refer to national legal materials, this is the case of former Art. 215 ECT which was recalled in Brasserie du Pecher and Factortame.42 This confirms the openness characterising the EU Treaties, since all these norms offer proof of the decision to open up the Treaties to the influence of national legal systems.

Also, current and former members of the Luxembourg Court confirmed the importance of comparative law in the activity of the CJEU.43 Nevertheless, in spite of all these references to national legal materials, the CJEU has been traditionally reluctant to engage in explicit comparison and this has affected the transparency of its legal reasoning as we will see. Indeed, while the idea of ‘the general principles of comparative laws of the Member States’ has frequently been employed by the CJEU in its case law,44 the Luxembourg Court rarely shows its cards, by making these comparative references explicit, with very few exceptions such as the very well-known Algera45 and Hauer46 cases and, more

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40 See, for instance, Art. 9, 10(2), 14(3), 27, 28, 30, and 34–36. Title IV, devoted to ‘Solidarity’, is particularly rich in such references and perhaps that is no coincidence, since in this field the EUCFR is more innovative than in other cases compared with the ECHR.
43 Hans Kutscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation as Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice’ in Reports of a Judicial and Academic Conference held in Luxemburg on 27-28 September 1976, <http://aei.pitt.edu/418> 1. See also Lenaerts, Gutiérrez-Fons (n 18) ‘The ECJ also interprets EU law in light of the legal principles common to the Member States by applying a comparative law method. In so doing, the ECJ does not try to find the “lowest common denominator”, but rather those national solution(s) that would best fulfil the objectives pursued by the EU or that would best give expression to a growing trend in the constitutional laws of the Member States where such a trend can be identified.’ On this see also Patrick Kelly, Law in a law-governed union (Recht in einer Rechtsunion): The Court of Justice of the European Union and the free law doctrine (2015) PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, 44, <http://biblittheses.da.ulec.ac.uk/136/1/cp_Fullversion-2014KellyPhdBBK.pdf>.
44 Especially to justify the protection of fundamental rights. See also the case law of the CJEU on social rights: among Case C-341/05, Landal on Partners Ltd contro Svenska Byggnadsarbetsförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetsförbundets ardehandling 1, Byggtan e Svenska Elektrikerförbundet ECLEU:C:2007:809, para. 91. On this Stefania Ninatti (n 30) 546.
45 Joined Cases C-7/56, 3/57 to 7/57 Algera EU:C:1957:7, para. 55: ‘The possibility of withdrawing such measures is a problem of administrative law, which is familiar in the case-law and learned writing of all the countries of the Community, but for the solution of which the Treaty does not contain any rules. Unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference to the rules acknowledged by
recently, some cases dealing with plurilingualism in European law. A good example of this implicit comparative approach is Berlusconi, where the CJEU – in the words of his current President – has ‘implicitly relied on the comparative study undertaken by AG Kokott who stressed the fact that “[that principle is] established in the (...) legal systems of almost [all Member States]’.

The same can be said with regard to Audiolux in spite of the excellent (from a methodological point of view) Opinion of AG Trstenjak.

As recalled by Arnall, this implicit comparison and the consequent lack of transparency give wide margins of manoeuvre to the CJEU and provokes ‘scepticism about how conscientiously the Court of Justice has actually examined national and international law and expose it to criticism that it is, in reality, pursuing an agenda of its own’.

3 THE METHODOLOGY FOLLOWED BY THE CJEU WHEN DEALING WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES

As pointed out by Rusu, it is possible to notice a certain variety of terminology in this field and in theory the CJEU embarks on comparative law every time it uses formulae like ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’, ‘principles and concepts common to the laws of the States’, and ‘principle[s] common to the laws of the Member States’. However, the lack of transparency in the case law of the CJEU makes it very difficult to understand how the Luxembourg Court proceeds when coming up with a general principle of EU law. Which legal orders should the CJEU consider? Are the national materials sources of EU law? Is it necessary to have a sort of unanimous consensus over a given norm in order to qualify it as common constitutional tradition? If this is not the case, should the CJEU decide?

In theory there are different approaches available, as recalled by AG Maduro in his Opinion in the Fiamm and Fedon case:

the legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the member countries. It emerges from a comparative study of this problem of law that in the six Member States an administrative measure conferring individual rights on the person concerned cannot in principle be withdrawn, if it is a lawful measure; in that case, since the individual right is vested, the need to safeguard confidence in the stability of the situation thus created prevails over the interests of an administration desirous of reversing its decision. This is true in particular of the appointment of an official.

46 Hauer (n 27).
48 Case C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others EU:C:2005:270.
49 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Court of Justice and the Comparative Law Method’ (2016), <https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eh/General_Assembly/2016/K_Lenaerts_ELL_AC_2016.pdf>. Even before, it is interesting to see how in Orkem the Court relied on the comparative analysis carried out by AG Darmon in Case C-374/87 Orkem v Commission of the European Communities EU:C:1989:207, para 29) as noticed by Stefania Ninatti (n 30) 539.
51 Rusu, (n 31).
54 Case C-46/87 Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities EU:C:1989:337, para. 17.
‘Can the discovery of a ‘general principle common to the laws of the Member States’ stem only from the almost mechanistic superimposition of the law of each Member State and the retention of only the elements that match exactly? I do not think so. Such a mathematical logic of the lowest common denominator would lead to the establishment of a regime for Community liability in which the victims of damage attributable to the institutions would have only a very slim chance of obtaining compensation. Although the Court of Justice must certainly be guided by the most characteristic provisions of the systems of domestic law, it must above all ensure that it adopts a solution appropriate to the needs and specific features of the Community legal system. In other words, the Court has the task of drawing on the legal traditions of the Member States in order to find an answer to similar legal questions arising under Community law that both respects those traditions and is appropriate to the context of the Community legal order. From that point of view, even a solution adopted by a minority may be preferred if it best meets the requirements of the Community system.’

This quotation reveals a kind of ‘functional approach’ followed by the AG when selecting the sources of inspiration for a general principle of EU law. On that occasion the CJEU excluded the existence of a convergence ‘as regards the possible existence of a principle of liability in the case of a lawful act or omission of the public authorities, in particular where it is of a legislative nature’. This is an element that somehow finds confirmation in what some former judges of the Luxembourg Court wrote in some academic articles many years ago:

‘There is complete agreement that when the Court interprets or supplements Community law on a comparative-law basis it is not obliged to take the minimum which the national solutions have in common, or their arithmetical mean or the solution produced by a majority of the legal systems as the basis of its decision. The Court has to weigh up and evaluate the particular problem and search for the ‘best’ and ‘most appropriate’ solution. The best possible solution is the one which meets the specific objectives and basic principles of the Community […] the most satisfactory way’.

Another evidence of this functional approach can be found in the words of AG Roemer in the Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamühle case:


56 On the so-called functional method in comparative law see Zweigert and Kötz (n 16) 32. See also Michaels (n 17).


58 Kutscher (n 43) 1.
‘What is important in ascertaining the law under Article 215, second paragraph, is not the unanimity of the legal systems of all Member States, nor a kind of vote ending in a majority finding; no, it is rather a matter of looking at what eminent legal writers (e.g., Zweigert) have called evaluative comparative law (‘Wertende Rechtsvergleichung’). In this connexion — as has already been argued in the Opinion in Case 5/71 — what may be highly relevant is to ascertain which legal system emerges as the most carefully considered (Vide — Zweigert, cited by Heldrich in ‘Europarecht’ 1969, 346)’.59

Even before, also AG Lagrange had noticed something similar by arguing that:

‘In this way the case law of the Court, in so far as it invokes national laws (as it does to a large extent) to define the rules of law relating to the application of the Treaty, is not content to draw on more or less arithmetical 'common denominators' between the different national solutions, but chooses from each of the Member States those solutions which, having regard to the objects of the Treaty, appear to it to be the best or, if one may use the expression, the most progressive. That is the spirit, moreover, which has guided the Court hitherto’.60

What is interesting to us here is to notice how this approach also opens the door for a non-perfect correspondence between the way in which a certain principle is understood in domestic law and the meaning given to it by the Court of Justice. In this respect, as AG Slynn wrote in his Opinion in the AM v. Commission: ‘Such a course is followed not to import national laws as such into Community law, but to use it as a means of discovering an unwritten principle of Community law’.61 This is consistent with the traditional approach of the Court which tends to treat concepts and principles borrowed from national legal systems as autonomous concepts of its own law. This is also what Tridimas meant when he wrote the general principles were ‘children of national law, but as brought in front of the Court, they became enfants terribles’.62 A clear example of that is the development of the EU principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality was ‘extracted’ from the German legal tradition, although the classic three-step partition (Geeignetheit, Erforderlichkeit, Verhältnismäßigkeitprüfung im engeren Sinne) elaborated by the German judges is rarely respected by the CJEU.63 Very recently, in its decision on the European Central Bank’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP)64 the German

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60 Opinion AG Lagrange Case C-14/61 Hoogovens v High Authority EU:C:1962:19, 283-284.
63 Case C-96/03 and C-97/03, A. Tempelman and Coniugi T.H.J.M. van Schaijk v. Directeur van de Rijksdienst voor de kouing van V ve en V les EU:C:2005:145.
64 2 BvR 859/15, <https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr0>
Constitutional Court somehow confirmed that by questioning the way in which the CJEU had carried out the proportionality test in Weiss. In the German Constitutional Court’s words:

‘The specific manner in which the CJEU applies the principle of proportionality in the case at hand renders that principle meaningless for the purposes of distinguishing, in relation to the PSPP, between monetary policy and economic policy, i.e. between the exclusive monetary policy competence conferred upon the EU (Art. 3(1) lit. c TFEU) and the limited conferral upon the EU of the competence to coordinate general economic policies, with the Member States retaining the competence for economic policy at large (Art. 4(1) TEU; Art. 5(1) TFEU).’

This judgment is very telling of the unexpected consequences of the current scenario. Indeed, the risk of collision when handling these ‘shared’ sources (indeed general principles could be defined as ‘multi-sourced equivalent norms’) is evident as judgments like Cordero Alonso show and this perhaps explains one of the most ambivalent judgments in the history of EU law, namely Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. In that decision the CJEU first stated its understanding of absolute primacy (primacy even over national constitutional norms) and later added that some of these constitutional norms might inspire the general principles of EU law. However, it also acknowledged that:

‘[R]ecourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law.’

The risk of conflict between national systems and EU law and the need to reserve the autonomy of EU law are also recalled by AG Maduro in Opinion in Arcelor:

‘In that connection, the Conseil d’État is correct in assuming that the fundamental values of its constitution and those of the Community legal order are identical. It must be pointed out, however, that that structural congruence can be guaranteed

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65 Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others EU:C:2018:1000.
67 For this concept in international law see Tomer Broude, Yuval Shany (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 2011).
68 Case C-81/05 Cordero Alonso EU:C:2006:529. ‘Since the general principle of equality and non-discrimination is a principle of Community law, Member States are bound by the Court's interpretation of that principle. That applies even when the national rules at issue are, according to the constitutional case-law of the Member State concerned, consistent with an equivalent fundamental right recognised by the national legal system’, para. 41.
70 ibid, paras 3-4.
only organically and only at the Community level, through the mechanisms provided for by the Treaty. It is that organic identity which is referred to in Article 6 TEU and which ensures that national constitutions are not undermined, even though they can no longer be used as points of reference for the purpose of reviewing the lawfulness of Community acts. If they could, in so far as the content of the national constitutions and the instruments for protecting them vary considerably, the application of Community acts could be the subject of derogations in one Member State but not in another. Such an outcome would be contrary to the principles set out in Article 6 TEU and, in particular, to the understanding of the Community as a community based on the rule of law. In other words, the effect of being able to rely on national constitutions to require the selective and discriminatory application of Community provisions in the territory of the Union would, paradoxically, be to distort the conformity of the Community legal order with the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.\textsuperscript{71}

In Audiolux the CJEU denied the existence of a general principle of equal treatment of shareholders. While, as usual, the CJEU did not make its comparative analysis explicit, the Opinion of AG Trstenjak\textsuperscript{72} is really important, since there the AG recognised the ambiguity of the case law of the Court in this ambit\textsuperscript{73} and offered some clarifications about the methodology to be followed by the Court when ascertaining the existence of a general principle, the relevant sources to be taken into account (‘primary law’, ‘international guidelines’, ‘acts of EU institutions’), the functions of the general principles\textsuperscript{74} and the status of the general principles within the hierarchy of EU legal sources.

In her Opinion, AG Trstenjak made an interesting distinction between two categories of general principles:

‘In principle, a distinction can be drawn between general principles of Community law in the narrow sense, namely those which are developed exclusively from the spirit and system of the EC Treaty and relate to specific points of Community law, and those general principles which are common to the legal and constitutional orders of the Member States. Whereas the first category of general


\textsuperscript{72} Opinion AG Trstenjak in Case C-101/08 Audiolux S.A e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert S.A (GBL) and Others and Bertelsmann AG and Others EU:C:2009:410.

\textsuperscript{73} ibid, para. 67: ‘However, even today the concept of general principles is a thorny issue. The terminology is inconsistent both in legal literature and in the case-law. To some extent there are differences only in the choice of words, such as where the Court of Justice and the Advocates General refer to a generally-accepted rule of law, a principle generally accepted, a basic principle of law, a fundamental principle, a principle, a rule, or a general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law’

\textsuperscript{74} ibid para. 68: ‘There is agreement in any case that the general principles have considerable importance in the case-law in filling gaps and as an aid to interpretation, not least because the Community legal order is a developing legal order which inevitably has gaps and requires interpretation on account of its openness in respect of integrational development. On the basis of such recognition the Court also appears to have opted not to undertake a precise classification of the general principles in order to retain the flexibility it needs in order to be able to decide on substantive matters which arise regardless of terminological discrepancies.’
principles can be derived directly from primary Community law, the Court essentially uses a critical legal comparison in order to determine the second category, which does not, however, amount to using the lowest common denominator method. Nor is it regarded as necessary for the legal principles developed in this way in their specific expression at Community level always to be present at the same time in all the legal orders under comparison.\textsuperscript{75}

With regard to the second group of general principles, AG Trstenjak rejected the lowest common denominator method. After a detailed analysis AG Trstenjak concluded that “there is no general principle of equal treatment of shareholders which protects a company’s minority shareholders in the event of acquisition of control by another company, in such a way that they are entitled to dispose of their securities on conditions identical to those of all other shareholders”\textsuperscript{76}

These considerations resurfaced in another Opinion of AG Trstenjak given in the Dominguez case:

‘Finally, the law of the Member States themselves has to be considered. Recourse to the comparative law approach often taken by the Court could shed light on whether, according to constitutional traditions or in any event the core provisions of national employment law, such a right is afforded a pre-eminent place in national legal systems […] The comparative law review set out above does indeed show that the idea that an employee is entitled to periodic rest time permeates the legal systems of both the EU and its Member States. The fact that this idea has constitutional status both at EU level and within several Member States is indicative of the prominent position afforded to that right, which suggests its classification as a general principle of EU law. The fact that not all Member States grant it constitutional status within their legal systems is not detrimental, however, as it is in any event considered a core element of national law irrespective of whether an employment relationship is one governed by private or public law; this has also been recognised in the Court’s case-law\textsuperscript{77}.

Finally, it is interesting to recall an Opinion given by AG Kokott in the Akzo Nobel case where the AG argued that:

‘[S]uch recourse to common constitutional traditions or legal principles is

\textsuperscript{75} ibid, para. 69.

\textsuperscript{76} ibid, para. 115. ‘In the light of that conclusion, I do not think it necessary to examine the judgment in Mangold. For that case-law to be applied to the present case it would be necessary to identify beyond doubt a general principle of Community law, which would enable that general principle to be applied even before the entry into force of a specific provision of secondary law with essentially the same normative content. Thus, in Mangold the Court found that Directive 2000/78 does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation. The Court based that conclusion on the finding that the source of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age is found in various international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. However, that condition is not satisfied in the present case’.

\textsuperscript{77} Opinion AG Trstenjak in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre, ECLI:EU:C:2011:559, paras 111-112.
not necessarily subject to the precondition that the practice in question should constitute a tendency which is uniform or has clear majority support. It depends rather on an evaluative comparison of the legal systems which must take due account, in particular, not only of the aims and tasks of the European Union but also of the special nature of European integration and of EU law’. 78

This reveals that comparative law and teleological interpretation have been used in a combined manner, since comparison is sometimes used to detect the existence of a consensus at national level on a certain issue. 79 It should not come as a surprise, since as I mentioned at the beginning of the article comparative law might serve different functions.

4 LACK OF EXPLICIT COMPARISON AS CAUSE OF CRITICISM: THE MANGOLD CASE AND ITS LEGACY

So far, we have seen that the CJEU frequently relies on implicit comparison. In this section I shall deal with the consequences of such a lack of transparency. The Mangold80 case offers an example of the problematic use of comparative law by the Court. On that occasion the CJEU concluded its reasoning by recalling the duty to disapply of the national judge:

‘It is the responsibility of the national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, to provide, in a case within its jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with that law […] It is the responsibility of the national court to guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with Community law, even where the period prescribed for transposition of that directive has not yet expired’. 81

Haztopoulos, one of the first commentators of the judgment, read it together with other cases like Carpenter82 and Karner83: all these cases are characterised by the reference to the legal material of the ECHR and to the general principles. The conclusion reached by

79 As Lenaerts, Gutiérrez-Fons (n 18) pointed out: ‘Accordingly, for the Advocate General, even if a principle is only recognised in a minority of Member States, it may still constitute a general principle of EU law in so far as it reflects a mission with which the authors of the Treaties have entrusted the EU, or mirrors a trend in the constitutional law of the Member States. However, AG Kokott found that those two elements were missing in Akzo’. 80 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] EU:C:2005:709. See Roberta Calvano, ‘Il caso “Mangold”: la Corte di giustizia afferma (senza dirlo) l’efficacia orizzontale di una direttiva comunitaria non scaduta?’ (2006) http://archivio.rivistaitc.it/eroonche/giurisprudenza_comunitaria/mangold/index.html 81 Mangold (n 80) para. 77-78. 82 Case C-60/00 Carpenter EU:C:2002:434. 83 Case C-71/02 Karner EU:C:2004:181.
Hatzopoulos is that the reference to the general principles sometimes risks affecting the quality of the legal reasoning of the CJEU. In Mangold this problem was even increased by the mix between hard and soft law sources:

‘Since EC hard legislation will be rare in fields in which some EU coordination takes place, the Court will be obliged to control national measures by reference to general principles and fundamental rights, in order to effectively protect the latter. This, however, is not a commendable development, at least by currently applicable legal standards, and all the judgments above have been strongly criticised’.84

What it is interesting to us is the way in which the CJEU took inspiration from the national constitutional materials in order to construct a general principle of non-discrimination based on age.

Some German scholars harshly reacted to Mangold by questioning the possibility of inferring such a principle from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States:

‘This “general principle of community law” was a fabrication. In only two of the then 25 member states namely Finland and Portugal is there any reference to a ban on age discrimination, and in not one international treaty is there any mention at all of there being such a ban, contrary to the terse allegation of the ECJ. Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the ECJ dispensed with any degree of specification or any proof of its allegation. To put it bluntly, with this construction which the ECJ more or less pulled out of a hat, they were acting not as part of the judicial power but as the legislature’.85

Mangold is thus emblematic of an ‘octroyée methodology of construing common constitutional traditions’86 according to which the CJEU has been jeopardising the interpretative sovereignty of national constitutional courts. As Arnull pointed out: ‘The Court of Justice itself was initially rather coy about mentioning Mangold or the general principle of equality’.87

However, later on, the CJEU recalled Mangold in Kücükdeveci,88 confirming the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination based on age and conceiving this general principle as its parameter. Although, the implementation period for the directive had already expired at that time and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was recalled only to ‘prove’ the later codification of this general principle, despite the fact that the EU Charter was already in force at that time.

85 Herzog and Gerken (n 34).
88 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci EU:C:2010:21.
More recently the CJEU recalled Mangold also in his Dansk Industri case\textsuperscript{89} where the Court reiterated the duty of disapplication in case of violation of the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age:

‘In order to answer that question, it is appropriate first of all to note that the source of the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, as given concrete expression by Directive 2000/78, is to be found, as is clear from recitals 1 and 4 of the directive, in various international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States (see judgments in Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 74, and Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraphs 20 and 21). It is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that that principle, now enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be regarded as a general principle of EU law (see judgments in Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 75, and Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 21).’\textsuperscript{90}

Mangold still creates mixed feelings. Looking at the national level, it is no coincidence that after Mangold, the German Constitutional Court indirectly responded to the CJEU with the famous Lisbon decision\textsuperscript{91} and then directly with the Honeywell\textsuperscript{92} decision before raising its first preliminary question ex Art. 267 TFEU in the famous Gauweiler case.\textsuperscript{93} The tip of the iceberg was reached in the already mentioned decision on the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP),\textsuperscript{94} where the German Constitutional Court declared that the CJEU had acted \textit{ultra vires} because of the way in which the Luxembourg Court had exercised the proportionality review. Even before this decision, scholars\textsuperscript{95} had already warned about the ‘bad example’\textsuperscript{96} offered by the German judges, especially after that, in 2012, the Czech Constitutional Court\textsuperscript{97} declared the CJEU’s judgment in C-399/09 Landtová ‘ultra vires’. The Czech case represented the first example of the application of the \textit{ultra vires} doctrine. However, now it is different because of the prestige and charisma of the German Constitutional Court and indeed the risk of a \textit{domino} effect is now very high.

One can also trace another decision back to this trend. Indeed, the Danish Supreme

\textsuperscript{89}Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI) EU:C:2016:278. See also the distinguishing made by the CJEU in Bartsch, Case C-427/06, Bartsch EU:C:2008:517, para 24.

\textsuperscript{90}Dansk Industri (n 89), para. 22.


\textsuperscript{92}2 BvR 2661/06, <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106.html>.

\textsuperscript{93}2 BvR 2728/13, para 29. See also : Case C-62/14 Gauweiler EU:C:2015:400.


\textsuperscript{97}Pl. ÚS 5/12, <https://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20120131-pl-us-512-slovak-pensions/>
Court in Ajos\textsuperscript{98} also took the chance to delimit the competences of the EU. On that occasion also the Danish Supreme Court rejected the Mangold case law by using the \textit{ultra vires} doctrine.\textsuperscript{99} Although the lack of transparency in its legal reasoning does not represent the only ground for criticism to this decision, Mangold and its legacy are also an example of the harsh reactions that have been caused by a decision characterised by a questionable use of the comparative method. As we saw the fact that the CJEU has not followed the ‘mathematical logic of the lowest common denominator’ in the reconstruction of a general principle does not represent \textit{per se} an issue, but the lack of transparency in revealing the domestic sources considered for that purpose triggered tensions and conflicts with national courts. Decisions like Mangold\textsuperscript{100} have been perceived as a bad move from national constitutional courts and commentators\textsuperscript{101} and if the CJEU wants to remedy that it must make sure to involve those constitutional courts that are eager to have a proper and loyal dialogue\textsuperscript{102}. Indeed, even traditionally cooperative constitutional courts – such as the Austrian one – have been sending warnings lately, and this tension has later caused important cases like A. v. B.\textsuperscript{103} Indeed, in an important decision the Austrian constitutional court clarified:

‘In light of the fact that Article 47(2) CFR recognises a fundamental right which is derived not only from the ECHR but also from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, it must be heeded also when interpreting the constitutionally guaranteed right to effective legal protection (as an emanation of the duty of interpreting national law in line with Union law and of avoiding situations that discriminate nationals).

Conversely, the interpretation of Article 47(2) CFR must heed the constitutional traditions of the Member States and therefore the distinct characteristics of the rule of law in the Member States. This avoids discrepancies in the interpretation of constitutionally guaranteed rights and of the corresponding Charter rights.’\textsuperscript{104}


\textsuperscript{99} Nicolette Lazzerini, \textit{La Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea: I limiti di applicazione} (Franco Angeli 2018) 131. Zaccarotti argued that on that occasion the Danish Supreme Court basically asked the Court of Justice to withdraw from its Kucukdeveci and Mangold case law and to go back to its Dominguez decision; Giovanni Zaccarotti, ‘Dialogue and conflict between supreme European courts in Dansk Industri’, 2018, https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?Artid=36201.

\textsuperscript{100} Mangold (n 80).

\textsuperscript{101} Herzog and Gerken (n 34).

\textsuperscript{102}According to the examples offered by A. Torres Pérez, \textit{Conflicts of Rights in the European Union A Theory of Supranational Adjudication} (Oxford University Press, 2009) 118.

\textsuperscript{103} Case C-112/13, A v. B and others, EU:C:2014:2195. See also Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 269/2017, on that. Daniel Sarmiento, \textit{Adults in the (Deliberation) Room. A comment on M.A.S., Quaderni costituzionali} 228 (2018).

This Austrian decision was also recalled by the Italian Constitutional Court in an *obiter dictum* included in judgment 269/2017, a case that has opened a new season in its relationship with the CJEU. All these dangerous signals represent the price the CJEU is paying after problematic decisions like Mangold and could jeopardise the inter-judicial cooperation in the long run. Unfortunately, the recent bad news coming from Karlsruhe with the decision on the PSPP seems to confirm this risk.

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105 Corte costituzionale, decision 269/2017, www.cortecostituzionale.it: “Therefore, violations of individual rights posit the need for an erga omnes intervention by this Court, including under the principle that places a centralized system of the constitutional review of laws at the foundation of the constitutional structure (Article 134 of the Constitution). The Court will make a judgment in light of internal parameters and, potentially, European ones as well (per Articles 11 and 117 of the Constitution), in the order that is appropriate to the specific case, including for the purpose of ensuring that the rights guaranteed by the aforementioned Charter of fundamental rights are interpreted in a way consistent with constitutional traditions, which are mentioned in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and by Article 52(4) of the EUCFR as relevant sources in this area. Other national constitutional courts with longstanding traditions have followed an analogous line of reasoning (see, for example, the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court, Judgment U 466/11-18; U 1836/11-13 of 14 March 2012).” On this decision see Giuseppe Martinico, Giorgio Repetto, ‘Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Duels in Europe: An Italian Perspective on Case 269/2017 of the Italian Constitutional Court and Its Aftermath’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 731.

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