Two Faces of Cosmopolitanism: Culture and Politics

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Abstract

This overview article discusses recent developments in the study of cosmopolitanism, with an emphasis on the two major dimensions of culture and politics. It is pointed out that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a surge of interest in the political aspects of cosmopolitanism, but that the relationship between the cultural and political senses of the notion of cosmopolitanism has mostly been given little attention. A comparison is suggested between cosmopolitanism and nationalism – the latter is widely understood to occur in forms of varied cultural density. The article also raises the problem of the social distribution of cosmopolitanism. It is pointed out that while cosmopolitanism has often been understood to be in large part an elite (and male) orientation, more recent studies point to more diverse loci in the social structure.

I first became involved with notions of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitans in the mid-1980s. After that I mostly stayed away from them for some time. Recently, I have returned to them, although not finding them where I left them. As I dwell in what follows on two main tendencies in conceptions of cosmopolitanism, let me begin by briefly sketching some of this personal involvement.

Exploring cosmopolitanism in world culture

It started with a colloquium at Berkeley, where I had sketched some of my interests in the cultural aspects of globalization, and one of my local anthropologist colleagues asked if in this connection I had given any thought to cosmopolitanism. Essentially, my answer at the time had to be "no," but the question remained in my mind as one I ought to do something about. A couple of years later an opportunity presented itself, as I was invited to participate in a rather unusual event, the "First International Conference on the Olympics and East/West and South/North Cultural Exchanges in the World System," in Seoul, Korea, in 1987. (I do not know whether there was ever a "Second.") I presented there a paper titled "Cosmopolitans and Locals in..."
World Culture,” where, in an explorative mode, I drew together some ideas on cosmopolitanism.

It was, as the title indeed suggests, a piece on cosmopolitanism in culture – more specifically, on the cosmopolitan as a type in the management of meaning in an interconnected but culturally diverse world. The most general background of the paper was that I was critical of the widespread tendency to assume that globalization necessarily implied cultural homogenization – my emphasis was on the handling of diversity, as well as on new cultural forms emerging through cultural blending. In this particular case, I argued to begin with that in an increasingly mobile world, mobility in itself was hardly a sufficient condition for the development of what I thought of as the core of cosmopolitanism: an intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, and an ability to make one’s way into other cultures. Drawing for examples rather insouciantly on an essay on travel by Paul Theroux, the novel *The Accidental Tourist* by Anne Tyler, an *International Herald Tribune* feature story on Nigerian market women trading between Lagos and London, and reflections on exile by Edward Said, I argued that going abroad and encountering otherness might involve rejection or narrow, controlled selection, rather than openness. The tourist often seeks out quite particular qualities of a distant place (such as sunshine) rather than embracing it as a whole; in other ways, the place should perhaps be as much like home as possible. The exile, having a foreign sanctuary more or less forced on him, might prefer to encapsulate himself as much as possible with others, possibly also from home, and in similar straits. The business traveler may find it convenient and comforting if all the hotels in major chains stretching across the world look and feel much the same. Not that people of such categories could not turn into cosmopolitans, then, but it was not really to be expected, or assumed.

What I thought was characteristic of the cosmopolitan management of meaning was a certain combination of surrender and mastery. Cosmopolitans, ideally, would seek to immerse themselves in other cultures, participating in them, accepting them as wholes. Yet in not only embracing these cultures but also displaying their skills in handling them, there is at the same time a sense of mastery, not infrequently with a streak of narcissism. Moreover, the surrender of cosmopolitans to otherness is usually situational. There is no real commitment to any particular other culture, I suggested, as one always knows where the exit is.

In my paper I then went on to suggest a certain resemblance between cosmopolitanism, as I understood it, with the conception of intellectuals developed particularly be the Hungarian writer George Konrad and the American sociologist Alvin Gouldner – especially relating to the latter’s notion of "cultures of critical discourse". The latter could be described as an overall orientation to structures of meaning which would be reflexive, problematizing, and generally expansive, pushing on and on in its analysis. People who are habituated to working actively with such explorations of orders of meaning – hoping eventually to master them – it seemed to me, might also be inclined toward cosmopolitanism.

I had done nothing more about publishing the paper when Mike Featherstone, as editor of the journal *Theory, Culture and Society*, asked me if I could contribute something to a special issue on "global culture" that he was planning. Since I had my Seoul...
conference paper at hand, it appeared in the issue, and then that issue was also published as a book, which has thus been the publication reference for my paper (Hannerz 1990). Riding on a wave of growing interest in the sociocultural characteristics of globalization, the book *Global Culture* evidently did extremely well in the market, and thus probably more people may have read that essay of mine than certain other of my writings which I consider more central, and actually more weighty. Occasional later commentators seem even to have come to assume that it summarized my understanding of what globalization in culture is about, which it surely never did.

Anyway, that was where I left my interest in cosmopolitanism for some time. But let me reminisce briefly about the context in which that first paper was presented, for in a way it is significant. At that conference in Seoul in 1987 there were a few participants from Eastern Europe, including even a sport sociologist from the Soviet Union; and that was obviously something remarkable, since contacts between the Soviet Union and South Korea at that time were quite minimal. Consequently our Soviet colleague, and due to his presence our entire group, were closely guarded. As we toured the country by bus after the conference, a police car with a flashing blue roof light preceded us, and when our colleague went for a walk on a side road, he was watched by plainclothes detectives with walkie talkies.

**After the Cold War: cosmopolitics**

My point here is simply that my first paper on cosmopolitanism was still from the Cold War era, and if that probably was not very noticeable in what was in it, it may have had some influence on what was not in it. Varied as the referents for cosmopolitan terms now and in the past may have been, many of them tend to cluster in two areas. Or in other words, cosmopolitanism has two faces. Putting things perhaps a little too simply, one is more cultural, the other more political. The emphasis in my Seoul conference paper had clearly been of the former kind; predictably enough in the context of that conference, and perhaps for a paper by an anthropologist anyway. The more politically oriented notions relating to cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, have to do with global government and governance, with world citizenship and responsibilities toward humanity.

The balance between these two main clusters of ideas about cosmopolitanism has changed greatly in the period after the Cold War. Most of the recent scholarly activity has been on the political side of cosmopolitanism – on the side of cosmopolitics, to adopt a shorthand term. Clearly these developments had much to do with the perception that the era which was now seen to begin might allow new ways of organizing both power and responsibility across borders. The idea of some kind of cosmopolis could a little more credibly be there as a potentiality. But the new and unfolding cosmopolitics was really animated by a more extended series of conditions and experiences, not all equally welcome. Most generally, there was the continuing growth of global interconnectedness, and the increasing consciousness of this fact. Furthermore, if the term “globalization” had to a remarkable extent been appropriated to refer to the deregulation of markets and the triumphant march of capitalism, “cosmopolitanism” suggested that human beings could relate to the world not only as consum-
ers, or members of a labor force, but also as citizens. Cosmopolitanism thus tended to carry with it a critique of at least certain qualities of global capitalism, as well as a search for ways of constraining it.

Soon there was also the fact that the passage of the Cold War order did not go altogether smoothly. New wars and other conflagrations such as those of the Balkans had involved atrocities of which the media now made more people aware, and which contributed to placing "human rights" prominently on a cosmopolitan agenda. Furthermore, environmental changes were seen as matters requiring active handling at a level beyond the nation-state, as they could not be contained within its boundaries. "Risk" became a key word here; it could cover more gradually evolving dangers as well as the threat of disasters of an apparently more sudden nature, such as nuclear power accidents – the explosion at Chernobyl was an event of great symbolic power especially in Europe. And as much as ever, cosmopolitics could also stand opposed to nationalism, nativism, and xenophobia. In large part these latter were adversary responses to global interconnectedness which could be reactions to the influx of migrant labor forces as well as refugees, but sometimes also to other social and cultural traffic across borders.

In all the instances just identified, the cosmopolitan impulse has tended to be one of favoring more inclusive arrangements of compassion, solidarity, and peacefulness – again, then, extending shared moral principles to all humanity, as "a community of citizens of the world", as one dictionary definition of cosmopolis would have it. The organizational forms of cosmopolitan practice have varied: from the various kinds of top-down cosmopolitics involving statesmen and think tanks in working out ideas and institutions of global governance, to more bottom-up variants, in which numerous social movements, networks and other groupings contribute cumulatively to the growing realization of a transnational civil society, or a global public sphere. And all of this has been reflected in new preoccupations among many academic disciplines.

The relationship between culture and politics

Yet all this seems mostly to leave the cultural face of cosmopolitanism out. Consequently, when I have recently returned to thinking about cosmopolitanism, this stands out as one central question: is there a relationship between these two faces of cosmopolitanism, culture and politics? Or are these two clusters of meaning which could seem just accidentally to share one set of labels, a space in the dictionary? Indeed, in Western history the concept as it is may go back a long way. But when I recently spent a research period in Japan, I found it interesting that Japanese colleagues told me that the word "cosmopolitan" has had no immediate indigenous counterpart in the Japanese language, while terms such as sekai shimin, “world citizen”, and chikyu shimin, “global citizen”, would seem, at least to me, to involve ideas rather more over on the cosmopolitical side. Of course, the word “cosmopolitan” itself, and related

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4 This means that cosmopolitanism also belongs in a wider field of debate involving notions of multiculturalism, transnationalism, identity politics, diaspora, or even political correctness. I am grateful to Koichi Iwabuchi for emphasizing the strong connection to this cluster of terms, in a colloquium at Waseda University.
terms, can travel, and so they have been imported and assimilated into Japanese. You
even find *Cosmopolitan*, the glossy women’s magazine, appearing under the same
name but in a Japanese-language edition. Perhaps we should ask, still, whether with
the two sets of meaning sharing a term we are dealing with (originally at least) a char-
acteristically western confusion?

My inclination is to think that there is, after all, a connection between these two
cosmopolitanisms, a sort of elective affinity. To throw more light on this, I find it il-
luminating to turn for comparative purposes to another set of ideas with which cos-
mopolitanism is frequently contrasted: that of nationalism, or patriotism. During the
period of intensive inquiries into nationalism which took off in the 1980s, a decade
earlier than those into cosmopolitics, we learned to distinguish between two main va-
rieties, which could be given various labels, but which have often been described as
on the one hand “ethnic” or “primordial”, and on the other hand “civic” or “consti-
tutional” (see e.g. Kohn 1945; Ignatieff 1994: 3ff; Goldmann, Hannerz, Westin 2000:
12ff).

The “ethnic” variety is indeed based on ethnicity, or something much like it. Be-
longing to the nation here thus tends to be based on a criterion of ascription, and an
assumption of cultural homogeneity and great historical depth. Consequently, this is
a kind of nationalism based on great symbolic density, a major asset in contexts where
solidarity has to be mobilized. The other side of the coin is that it is often rigid and ex-
clusionist when it comes to membership, and for such reasons not seldom conflict-
generating. Civic nationalism is a more strictly political entity. What is needed for
membership is above all a commitment to to an overarching political order. In prin-
ciple, regardless of culture and history, you too can join. But then admirable as such
openness and flexibility may be, some would argue that there is in civic nationalism a
certain cultural deficit. It may be too symbolically narrow, too culturally thin to gain
full commitments.

To that fairly simple contrast – where certainly some number of in-between varia-
tions must also be possible – we can now add another kind of nationalism, identified
somewhat more recently. The political psychologist Michael Billig (1995) has argued
that not all the cultural density accumulated in senses of national identity and nation-
hood need be of a narrowly ethnic, conflict-oriented character. Not least in stable,
affluent contemporary societies there is often a strong but probably largely benign
“banal nationalism,” based on the recurrent routines and experiences of daily life; litt-
le everyday rules and rituals and consumption habits which in their ubiquity and more
or less all-encompassing character come to define much of what it means to belong
to a given nation-state.

In nationalism there are thus two or three major possibilities, clearly recognized in
scholarship. In considerations of cosmopolitanism, the view appears to me to have
been rather different. Among political theorists and philosophers, not least, the ten-
dency has been to point to a certain weakness in cosmopolitanism as a political and
moral notion.5 The philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1996: 15), a major commentator

5 I draw here especially on the debate between Nussbaum and several critical interlocutors in Cohen 1996; a
debate ignited by Nussbaum’s response to a plea for patriotism by Richard Rorty.
on issues of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, is strongly cosmopolitan in her own preferences (yet at the same time seeing no necessary conflict between the two), but notes that cosmopolitanism “offers only reason and the love of humanity, which may seem at times less colorful than other sources of belonging.” “Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business,” she admits. “It is...a kind of exile – from the comfort of local truths, from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one’s own.” A number of other thinkers agree with her.

It seems that the sort of cosmopolitanism identified by Nussbaum and others bears a strong resemblance to civic nationalism. In terms of symbolic load, however, we appear to have both thick and thin nationalisms – but only a thin cosmopolitanism. Why should there be no thick cosmopolitanism?

Again, the argument with regard to nationalism has been that a strong sense of national culture and identity feeds into nationalist political action – in brief, culture can be a resource for politics. The parallel argument would be that what I identified before – and already in that first paper of mine on the topic – as the core of cultural cosmopolitanism, the ability to make one’s way into other cultures, and the appreciative openness toward divergent cultural experiences, could be a resource for cosmopolitical commitments. To come back to the formulation about the two faces of cosmopolitanism again: political cosmopolitanism is often a cosmopolitanism with a worried face, trying to come to grips with very large problems. But cosmopolitanism in its cultural dimension may be a cosmopolitanism with a happy face, enjoying new sights, sounds and tastes, new people. And in combination, and merging with one another, they may be that thick form of cosmopolitanism, where experience and symbolism can motivate identification and a will to action.

Especially in the present era, it is hardly self-evident that nationalisms have a monopoly on central formative experiences, with enduring consequences for personal orientations. For a probably growing number of people, border-crossing involvements with different places, cultures and nations may well also have such qualities. These people may have central work experiences, new links of friendship and kinship, memorable pleasures and challenges, in sites involving encounters with what is initially culturally alien. As such encounters become a part of many people’s life course and of everyday experience, there may grow what (in line with Billig’s terminology) one might describe as "banal cosmopolitanism". To use a somewhat paradoxical but now recurrent formulation, it is a matter of being, or becoming, at home in the world.

Now perhaps it cannot be taken for granted that thick cosmopolitanism comes about quite in the same way as thick nationalism. Perhaps there is something in a lack of steady commitment to particular cultural alterities that makes cosmopolitan identifications somehow less apparently fateful and forceful than national identifications. And people can conceivably be pleased with their experiences and their personal levels of connoisseurship with regard to cultural diversity without proceeding much be-

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6 Notions of "banal cosmopolitanism" or "banal globalism" are apparently such obvious analogies to Billig’s "banal nationalism" that several writers seem to have arrived at them independently – see also Beck (2002) and Szerszynski and Urry (2002).
yond self-indulgent consumption habits, without having any strong sense of civic and humanitarian responsibility transcending national borders. Yet to repeat, if these two senses of cosmopolitanism must not simply be conflated, there could be at least a kind of elective affinity between cosmopolitan culture and cosmopolitics. No doubt, the intertwining of the two can proceed along different lines and take many shapes. But then why should there not be as much scope for variation and complexity here as there has been in the case of nationalism? It may simply be time for the political philosophers of cosmopolitanism to let more ethnographers in.

**Mapping cosmopolitanisms**

Indeed it has been a part of the renewed interest in these matters in recent years to broaden the view of cosmopolitanism, and to draw a new map of its distribution. In part this has been a preoccupation of anthropologists, although other scholars and thinkers have contributed as well.

To begin with one might consider the report by Charles Piot (1999: 23), anthropologist staying with the Kabre, cereal cultivators in the heart of the West African savanna (in Togo), and arguing that they are "as cosmopolitan as the metropole itself, if by cosmopolitanism we mean that people partake in a social life characterized by flux, uncertainty, encounters with difference, and the experience of processes of transculturation." That may be a striking argument simply because it seems so often to be taken for granted that cosmopolitanism belongs in the center, in the affluent urban North of the world. In a field of debate largely populated by scholars and intellectuals from Europe and North America, there is sometimes, not least in generalizing theoretical statements about cosmopolitanism, a rather uncosmopolitan disregard for other parts of the world. An alternative view is set forth even more sharply by Ashis Nandy, the Indian commentator and cultural critic, who suggests that:

> Europe and North America have increasingly lost their cosmopolitanism, paradoxically because of a concept of cosmopolitanism that considers Western culture to be definitionally universal and therefore automatically cosmopolitan. Believe it or not, there is a cost of dominance, and that cost can sometimes be heavy. (Nandy 1998: 146)

That point is in fact not so different from one that I made, rather in passing, in my first cosmopolitanism paper, where I noted that westerners can encapsulate themselves rather easily in their own transnational cultural enclaves even when they move about. It has been the others, the people from the peripheries of the world, who often really have had to learn to handle a culture other than their own. Ashis Nandy makes his comment in the context of an argument for a more direct dialogue between Asian civilizations, a dialogue not so dominated by the West. The argument for a global broadening of the base of cosmopolitan thought has recently also been made forcefully by Mandaville (2003).

Yet mostly the new mapping of cosmopolitanism has concerned not where in the world you find the cosmopolitans, but where in the social structure. It has been a longstanding assumption, whether implicit or explicit, that cosmopolitanism has...
been a privilege that often goes with other privileges; more or less an elite characteristic. Certainly this is not to say that all elites are cosmopolitans. Historically at least, however, a cosmopolitan cultural orientation in this view has gone with more formal education, more travel, more leisure as well as material resources to allow the acquisition of knowledge of the diversity of cultural forms. Moreover, taking a Bourdieuan perspective, we could find cosmopolitan tastes and knowledge serving as symbolic capital in elite competitive games of distinction.

If at one time, this privileged cosmopolitanism may have been in large part aristocratic, it would more recently seem to have gone with professionalism. In my first article, I argued mostly along such lines, linking it with the growing transnationalism of many occupations, and with the “cultures of critical discourse” of intelligentsias. More recently, we can find related points of view toward the social bases of cosmopolitanism for example with the sociologist Craig Calhoun (2002), as he discusses contemporary cosmopolitanism as "the class consciousness of frequent travellers"; or the anthropologist Richard Shweder (2000: 170), who provocatively portrays an emergent, two-tiered world order of two "castes". There will be the cosmopolitan liberals, writes Shweder, who are trained to appreciate value neutrality and cultural diversity and who run the global institutions, and the local non-liberals, who are dedicated to some form of thick ethnicity and are inclined to separate themselves from "others", thereby guaranteeing that there is enough diversity remaining in the world for the cosmopolitan liberals to appreciate.

The point of a fair number of recent ethnographic studies, however, is that cosmopolitanism, of one kind or other, perhaps never was, but in any case is no longer, only an elite phenomenon. For one thing, this has not for a long time, or perhaps ever, really been a world divided between "haves" who move and "havenots" who stay put. One term which we have from a well-known essay on travel by James Clifford (1992), an American intellectual historian with a close connection to anthropology, is “discrepant cosmopolitanisms”; but since the specific conclusion is often that cosmopolitanism also thrives in lower social strata, we could perhaps as well call them subaltern cosmopolitanisms. The British anthropologist Huon Wardle (2000) thus develops the theme by combining personalized ethnography from among his neighbors and associates in working-class urban Jamaica with philosophical notions from Immanuel Kant, and from Georg Simmel. He notes the enduring harshness of Caribbean living conditions and the historical and continued openness of the region to influences from the outside world, and he notes the mobility and the transnational networks, not least of kinship, in which ordinary Jamaicans are engaged. But proceeding beyond material circumstances and practical adaptations, Wardle finds a cosmopolitan philosophy and a shared community esthetic emerging in sociality, out of the uncertainty and flux of life: recognizable for example in playfulness and in narratives of adventure.

Then as James Ferguson (1999), Stanford anthropologist, finds cosmopolitans in the classic anthropological territory of urban Zambian Copperbelt, we are among people who are not likely to have traveled much outside Zambia. But Ferguson finds a distinct cleavage of cultural styles between cosmopolitans and localists. He emphasizes that "style" here is a matter of accomplished, cultivated performance capacity, a
matter of seeking worldliness and at the same time distancing oneself from more parochial ties and traditions. But there are different varieties of cosmopolitanism here—some "high" and some "low". Not so few of the more conspicuous Copperbelt cosmopolitans are in fact hoodlums and prostitutes.

There would seem to be good reason to believe that in the contemporary period, the social bases of cosmopolitanism are expanding. A larger and more varied set of people in the world have important cross-border involvements and experiences of cultural diversity. Even though mobility, again, is perhaps not a sufficient condition for cosmopolitan attitudes, it may matter that labor migration, tourism, backpacking, pilgrimages and student exchanges take people out of their local habitats. Wardle’s Jamaicans are only one example. Ferguson’s Zambian townspeople may have been less transnationally mobile in physical terms, but they would be among those whose horizons and imagined worlds have been affected by new media engagements, and new consumption patterns.

What media, and especially world-wide news reporting, does to cosmopolitan sentiments is probably a complicated issue. How do people respond to views of disaster, war and suffering? I have suggested elsewhere that a kind of "electronic empathy" may grow when you see starving children, or emaciated bodies behind barbed wire in some newly discovered concentration camp, on the television screen (Hannerz 1996: 121). But then we cannot be quite sure that empathy and even activism are what necessarily follows from the experience, by way of the media, of other human beings suffering violence, hunger or disaster somewhere in the world. Perhaps many shared a cosmopolitan moment, a moment of electronic empathy with the victims, on September 11, 2001, when they could see a crew of fanatics wilfully crashing a passenger plane into a crowded skyscraper, but then much of what has followed has been fear and loathing. The journalism scholar Susan Moeller has devoted a book to the phenomenon of Compassion Fatigue (1999). Presumably reactions to news in the media depend a great deal on how the news are framed, and on the wider social and cultural contexts of particular media experiences. (In this issue, Alexa Robertson has more to say about such matters.)

To return to Wardle and Ferguson, however, finding cosmopolitans among proletarians, and even lumpenproletarians, could give us some kind of satisfaction, and lead us toward a broader and in some ways less loaded view of cosmopolitan phenomena. Looking for the points and areas in the social structure where some kind of cosmopolitanism may grow should not, however, be a matter only of looking up or down in the social strata as conventionally understood. We should rather seek out, along more varied dimensions, the loci where experiences and interests may come together, in individuals and groups, to expand horizons and shape wider sets of relationships.

Surely there are age and generational differences here: young people are often most likely to avail themselves of new technologies which cut across distances and make wider cultural inventories accessible, and new opportunities for mobility. (Ioannis Tsoukalas’ study of the Erasmus student exchange scheme in Europe offers an instance of this.) There is also the issue of gender. That classic image of the elite cosmopolitan, to the extent that it was not gender neutral, no doubt had a male bias, if only
because it was assumed that men were more likely to have such advantages as the requisite education, and the freedom of movement, to cultivate a cosmopolitan orientation. But then the point has been made recently for example by the British sociologist Mica Nava (2002) that groups with reason to be dissatisfied with their positions and experiences in the established local order of things may seek alternatives elsewhere, and may therefore be open to other cultures and their expressions; furthermore that women have often been in such situation. Nava’s research has been on early and mid-twentieth century women in Britain, whose cosmopolitanism, and revolt against mainstream Englishness, showed up in the pleasure they would take in American-style department stores, the orientalist Russian Ballet, tango, and immigrant men from the distant reaches of the empire. Quite similarly, the American anthropologist Karen Kelsky (2001) describes the more recent attraction of Japanese women to foreign language study, study abroad, work abroad and in international organizations, and involvements with foreign men as a reaction to the constraints of womanhood in Japanese society.

I suspect that a subcultural approach to the variety of cosmopolitanisms may frequently be useful. For one thing, one may wonder whether a strong involvement in one more or less divergent cultural orientation could possibly lead to greater tolerance, curiosity or appreciation vis-à-vis cultural diversity more generally. But probably equally importantly, contemporary subcultures, far from being only local, small-scale, face-to-face entities, are often transnational phenomena, with their own patterns of mobility and media use, and their own frequently transnational center-periphery relationships. Within the framework of the KOSMOPOLIT project on which this issue of Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift draws, the anthropologist Katja Sarajeva is exploring such a cosmopolitan dimension in the urban communities and networks of Russian gays and lesbians. As a social category with a long history of discrimination extending into the present at home, these evidently find some of their most appealing current centers, and their strongest organized support, in western Europe and North America.

**Rootless and rooted**

In connection with Sarajeva’s project I think it may also be useful to touch on a couple of other points relating to concepts of cosmopolitanism. Our ethnographer in Russia may not use the label cosmopolitanism all that much in her field research, where it carries a fairly heavy load. In history, there have been periods and places where “cosmopolitans” has served as a term of denunciation, of more or less vicious othering. These, it is implied, are people of doubtful loyalty to the “fatherland” – possibly parasites, and potential traitors and renegades. It is typically in such usage, although not only there, that cosmopolitans are taken to be “rootless”. In Russia, under the Czars as well as during the Soviet period, the term was applied, in a somewhat off-and-on way, particularly to Jews, and being thus recognized was not advantageous, and could be dangerous.

The idea of “rootless” cosmopolitans has a long history. “Deterriorialization”, in contrast, is a more recent keyword, summarizing notions that large-scale migration
and the proliferation of media now combine to loosen people’s ties to particular limited spaces. But does it follow that rootlessness and cosmopolitanism more than ever belong together, and spread together?

It seems entirely possible that some people are less rooted, or more complexly rooted, than others. The experiences of migrancy and diaspora may relativize and circumscribe rootedness. If few people are entirely deterritorialized, many may well have the sense of being more or less at home in more than one place. Having “roots” is not necessarily a matter of being forever rooted, but can be one of putting down roots, acting to become rooted. There seems to be no single relationship, however, between cosmopolitanism and degrees of rootedness. Writing about late twentieth century nationalist conflicts, and identifying himself as a cosmopolitan, the well-known scholar-journalist Michael Ignatieff (1994: 7-9) suggests that this is the privilege only of someone who can take a secure nation-state for granted. And the African-born, American-based philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah indeed argues that a “rooted cosmopolitanism” or, alternatively phrased, a “cosmopolitan patriotism,” is entirely possible. His father, a well-known Ghanaian politician, identified firmly with his home region of Ashanti throughout his involvement in the struggle for Ghanaian independence. Yet in an unfinished note found after his death, he reminded his children that they should be citizens of the world. Wherever they chose to live they should make sure they left that place better than they had found it. "The cosmopolitan patriot," his son writes (Appiah 1996: 22), "can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different, people."

If we can overcome the sense that “the rooted cosmopolitan” is somehow a paradox, it allows us to get away from some of the doubts that theorists have nourished with regard to the viability of cosmopolitan politics. When Bhikhu Parekh (2003), for example, argues for a “globally oriented citizenship”, he appears to recognize that levels of commitment which have often been seen as conflicting can also be complementary, allowing for situational selections of relevance.

Native term and analytical concept

What the Russian case, and the instance of the field researcher in Russia, might moreover make clear to us is that we need to distinguish between cosmopolitanism as a native, “emic”, term and as an analytical concept – even as we should keep in mind that it is one characteristic of the contemporary reflexive society that concepts can move quickly between these two spheres. The more or less privileged cosmopolitans, past or present, may have been quite likely to identify themselves self-consciously as cosmopolitans – which would be one reason why the term has come to be associated primarily with them. Piot’s Togolese villagers, Ferguson’s Copperbelt street sophisticates and Wardle’s Jamaican proletarian city dwellers are not likely to be labeled cosmopolitans by anybody in their ordinary environment, nor do they probably think of themselves as such – at least insofar as the term itself, or any immediate counterpart, may well be unknown to them. Members of a stigmatized Russian minority, in con-
contrast, may be conscious of the term and its connotations, and feel that they do not need that additional burden.

Trying to use cosmopolitanism as an analytical category, then, we will apparently need to include some people who are not aware that they are cosmopolitans, or who even deny it, and it may be, too, that we will find reason to exclude some who claim to belong. Meanwhile, we also had better take note of local, historical uses of this and related terms, and understand their contemporary implications.

Yet a more comprehensive ethnographic mapping of the actually existing varieties of cosmopolitanism should also allow us, even prompt us, to be more precise in the use of cosmopolitan concept, and perhaps not least to make some further distinctions. Starting out more or less with the understanding of cosmopolitan culture that I sketched in my first essay, I now wonder if it may be illuminating to draw a couple of contrasts. One may think of the cosmopolitan as possessing an internally diverse, but basically finite, set of cultural skills drawn from some number of sources; a cultural repertoire developed out of particular experiences, equipping this person to deal with a corresponding set of situations. Yet at a somewhat different level, what could be involved might perhaps be a more general orientation toward cultural diversity, a "culture of cultures", a metaculture. Perhaps it entails a kind of optimism about learning, as a general possibility and as a personal capacity; some insight into more overarching modes of organizing experience and knowledge; some inclination to intellectual and emotional risk-taking; a readiness to find pleasure in the new. This looks most like an individual-level cultural psychology, but it may be possible to move beyond that to see if one can find it also as a more collective property of particular groups. In any case, there seems to be room for more conceptual work here, and further investigation.

More concretely again, we should perhaps be aware that not every cultural stance that we may feel deserves to be recognized as cosmopolitan goes, as it were, all the way. Reflecting particularly on some of those ethnographic glimpses of subaltern cosmopolitanisms which we have recently been allowed, it seems we also need to identify a more instrumental cosmopolitanism, involving skills and some self-confidence in dealing with a heterogeneous, more or less alien and sometimes harsh environment. Perhaps such adaptive skills may in time lead to more consummatory cultural values, but in itself this cosmopolitanism is not necessarily of that most conspicuously happy-face variety, of encountering diversity and really enjoying it.

At home in the world

Here I return to the relationship between the culture and the politics of cosmopolitanism. A point I have occasionally made about globalization in cultural terms is that it may mean that you have access to a larger proportion of the total global cultural inventory – but it may also mean that a larger part of that inventory somehow has access to you. The former view seems more positive, even enthusiastic: you have more to choose from, more to work with or play with. The latter view is more sombre: a number of modes of thought or action which you would rather not be bothered with
somehow insist on your attention, as they come in your way in the neighborhood, in your work place, or wherever.

These views show up in different current versions of culturespeak, and they may relate to the social bases of cosmopolitanism I have referred to – and not least to public understandings of such distributions. The view of cosmopolitanism as an elite preoccupation comes in here. We can recognize, to begin with, that the linkage between cosmopolitanism and older or more recent elites is open to at least a couple of unfavorable interpretations, in more political terms. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism may be understood as engaged in creating another burden for ordinary people. “The theory or advocacy of the formation of a world society or cosmopolis”, as one dictionary definition has it, may lead to a mode of domination even less accessible to influence from below than any earlier social order. On the other hand, cosmopolitans, rootless, footloose, carrying their assets with them, may be suspected of escaping from local or national contexts, avoiding responsibility, not sharing in a common burden. Such an understanding of elite cosmopolitanism adds an element of its own to any climate of distrust found between upper and lower strata in many societies: if things go very wrong, is your elite even going to be there to face the music?

Beyond that, however, it appears that elites tend to become identified with that more positive view of cultural diversity, of improved access to the global cultural inventory, which I just identified. There is some of that in Shweder’s formulation as referred to above. At times we may find that this carries the cultural dimension of cosmopolitanism to a certain extreme, seeing cultural diversity in terms of differing performances – to be enjoyed at a certain distance, from a good seat in the audience, as it were.

That may seem like an enlightened, laudable point of view, but it may also entail a certain danger. It is a danger which has been fairly visible not least in Europe in recent years. One may sense that the dramatic, if only relative, success of various anti-immigrant political groupings – in France, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and elsewhere – in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been a reaction not simply against an influx of migrants and refugees. It may also be fueled when complaints about those minor or major everyday nuisances and irritations which too much involuntary cultural access may indeed bring about are met, as a habitual, more or less privileged cosmopolitan response on the part of politicians, officials and others, by a particular kind of celebration of the esthetic and intellectual pleasures of diversity. To those dealing on a daily basis with the big or small nuisances of that diversity, cosmopolitanism with just too happy a face may seem impractical, and a little hypocritical. And so especially across a certain social divide, in a recognizably schizogenetic format, enthusiasms of this kind on one side may just possibly contribute to generating its resentful opposite on the other.

In terms of combining culture and politics, consequently, that may be a somewhat counterproductive kind of thick cosmopolitanism. Coming back to the notion of a

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7 The American scholar-politician Robert Reich’s (1991) well-known conception of “symbolic analysts” points in this direction; see also Hannerz (1996: 81ff).
8 I have developed and further contextualized the point in Hannerz (1999); see Gingrich and Banks, forthcoming, for an anthropological view of European neo-nationalist, anti-immigration politics.
banal cosmopolitanism, however, and the idea of being “at home in the world”, we may in the end be better off thinking about that thick cosmopolitanism somewhat differently. To be “at home in the world” may be as much a question of breadth as of warmth – it may entail having a similar range of experiences out there, of others and of oneself, personally or vicariously, as one has closer at hand, in a local community or in a nation. Its characteristic cosmopolitan openness may be esthetic and intellectual, but it is certainly also pragmatic and instrumental, and some of the satisfaction derived from it is that of a reasonable confidence that one can manage. Encounters with cultural diversity, entanglements with alterity, may not always be a sheer pleasure, but one has come to a habitual readiness to cope with them such as they are.

Some of the work on the kinds of urban sites described as cosmopolitan suggests this kind of practical dispositions and relationships. The veteran American urban sociologist Elijah Anderson (2004: 25) has recently used the notion of “cosmopolitan canopies” to denote the kinds of public spaces which “allow people of different backgrounds the chance to slow down and indulge themselves, observing, pondering, and in effect, doing their own folk ethnography”. They foster a kind of confidence, and a code of civility.

At this point in time, perhaps such a stance, expanding out of the neighborhood to take in more of the world, is not to be underestimated. A kind of modest bottom-up cosmopolitics may at least be a matter of maintaining a certain immunity to extreme antagonisms, of hatred or of fear, and to their more or less organized expressions. If the decade and a half since the Cold War has been a period of renewed interest in cosmopolitanism among the theorists, the headlines and the storylines in these times have often been of another kind: of new wars, human wrongs, things falling apart. Yet that may again be the kinds of things that go most readily precisely into headlines and storylines. It may be worth looking more closely for the small signs of banal, or quotidian, or vernacular, or low-intensity cosmopolitanism.
References