Ju mer vi är tillsammans. Del 3: Underlag för refor­
samer samt förslag. Folkrörelseutredningens betänkan­
de, SOU 1987:35.

Micheletti i Sociologia Ruralis.

Mancur Olson, 1975.

Exempel på fringisar är: en spalt i Staatstjänstemän­nen där medlemmarna utan kostnad kan annonsera

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theoretical languages. A number of proposals for theoretical systems modelling the policy sequence from initiative to outcome has been made (Lundquist, 1985). How do we choose between them?

**Typology of Policy Models**

One may approach policy-making and policy implementation from the basis of either actor oriented theory or structural theory. Taking the first approach the emphasis is on consciousness interpreted in terms of ends and means as well as capacity for action (Lundquist, 1987:42) whereas the second research strategy looks at "societal structures (as) the intended or unintended outcome of human action, creating, maintaining, changing and destroying structures" (Lundquist, 1987:41) focussing on institutions, procedures, role patterns, rules, myths and resources. Whereas the first research strategy has been the dominant mode in decision analysis, the second approach has been prevalent in organizational theory. The methodological distinction between actor and structure has up until recently been considered as sharp as to be unbridgeable. An original attempt to close this gulf in administrative theory has been suggested by L. Lundquist in his Implementation Steering: An Actor-Structure Approach (1987). Looking at policy-making and implementation as the making and execution of choice in a collective context we follow the Lundquist plea for a linkage approach between actor and structure by focussing on the type of conditions determining the policy process – actor oriented or structural conditions.

By "policy models" we refer to theories or sets of hypotheses about the nature of the making of policy as well as of the implementation of policy. We do not cover the various models used in policy analysis to come up with recommendations for policy or employed in policy evaluation. Models – quantitative or qualitative – for interpreting policy data have been dealt with elsewhere (Nagel & Neef, 1979; Dolbeare, 1974) – models of policy versus models for policy (Gordon, Lewis & Young, 1977). Several policy models may be listed in the nowadays large literature on public administration and organizational analysis. We need some sort of classificatory system to reduce the number of models to manageable proportions. Four fundamental distinctions may be employed to sort things out in a neat way. The first distinction between decision-making models and models of implementation follows from the theory that the policy cycle may be analytically separated into the formation of policies on the one hand and the execution of policies on the other (May & Wildavsky, 1977; Hodgson & Peters, 1983). The second distinction divides the models into those that approach decision-making and implementation as a function of the environment or external factors – structure – and theories that model the policy cycle as involving internal processes – actor: means and ends. Thus we have the format:

\[
P = f (EV, IV),
\]

or policy as a function of external or internal variables. Which are the external and the internal variables, respectively? Thirdly, the internal models may be classified according to the rationality of the model assumptions. And fourthly the implementation models may be classified according to the extent of hierarchy in the implementation perspective. It may be objected that the policy process may be approached in terms of other kinds of models – power, corporatism, intra- versus interorganizational complexity, and integration and differentiation e.g. (Benson, 1982). True, the focussing on various kinds of perspectives has its limitations – let us see where a concentration on decision-making might take us.

**Model choice and model evaluation**

Confronted with a bewildering array of various models the methodologist must search for criteria for the arrival at a proper model choice on the basis of model evaluation in terms of explicitly stated criteria. How about truth or the extent of empirical confirmation (Glymour, 1982)? Are we to make model choices on the basis of criteria like simplicity (Quine & Ullian, 1970; Goodman, 1972; Scheffler, 1967) or pragmatism and aesthetics (Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend, 1975); maybe we should use criteria like deductive power or theoretical coherence (Hempel, 1965; Nagel, 1961) or model understanding is more of a pattern type experience (Kaplan, 1964). Some argue that the test of a model is falsification, the potential (falsifiability) or actual confrontation (corroboration) with facts (Popper, 1959; 1963). Maybe we are to evaluate public decision theories in terms of the realism of their assumptions (Simon, 1957); perhaps we do better following those who advocate the potential fruitfulness of working with model assumptions that are abstract distortions of the complex observational world in order to derive powerful predictions (Friedman, 1953). Selecting the evaluation criteria is by no means a simple thing (Rescher, 1970; Hesse, 1974; Putnam, 1980). Are not moral or ethical considerations relevant to the evaluation of models of public choice and implementation (Goodin, 1982)?

Various models of the policy cycle may perform differently on the evaluation criteria employed. Model evaluation then becomes the task of listing the pros and cons of different approaches. Equally true, various
kinds of models may perform differently in relation to various types of situations. Some models may satisfy certain types of situations whereas other models satisfy other types of situations. In stead of generally rejecting or accepting a public policy model we may point out the type of situations where a model performs well and the situations where it is inadequate. Model evaluation is a complex judgement of how models score on criteria such as: deductive power, falsifiability, scope of applicability, degree of confirmation, coherence, simplicity, and practical usefulness.

A model may score differently on these meta-theoretical criteria. Deductive power is measured by the number of implications that may be derived from the model. Coherence refers to the degree of unity of the theoretical principles. Falsifiability stands for the number of prohibited states or what the theory rejects as false a priori. Scope of applicability stands for the number of social entities or different areas covered by the theory. Simplicity refers to the number of theoretical assumptions. Degree of confirmation or corroboration stands for the available evidence for the theory a posteriori. And practical usefulness means practical policy relevance.

The functions of public policy models are to explain, understand, interpret and organize data concerning the making and implementation of decisions by public bodies - government and bureaux. Just as data without models means that we are blind so models without data are empty. Thus, model evaluation has to pay attention to how the models satisfy data - correspondence with fact - as well as to the model capacity to organize data - internal consistency, deductive power and simplicity. Public policy models may also have normative implications to be considered.

The demographic approach

The idea that policy-making is a reflexion of the environment has a long standing in comparative policy analysis. Actually, the demographic approach had many supporters up until the mid-seventies, because the early environmental studies scored high on one of the model evaluation criteria - the degree of empirical confirmation (Dye, 1976; Sharkansky, 1969; Hofferbert, 1973; Wilensky, 1975). However, it has lately met with more and more criticism. Renewed analyses of the impact of environmental variables on policy indicators have not been able to come up with acceptable goodness of fit (Danziger, 1978; Sharpe & Newton, 1984). Whereas the demographic model used to be considered valid in local and regional government research its status in national government policy research has been far more contested. It is still an undecided problem how much of national policy-making is a function of environmental variables like wealth, economic variables, the position of the trade unions and political parties (Castles, 1982; Schmidt, 1983; Alt & Chrystal, 1982). A demographic model is simple:

[1] \( P_c = f(E) \), where \( P_c \) = cost per capita of policy and \( E \) = environment.

Although the demographic model approach may not be without relevance as far as one of the evaluation criteria is concerned - correspondence with facts - it seems as if it is far more problematic in relation to the other criteria. The attempt to find determinants of a policy variation in space variables describing the environment of policy-making suffers from all the weaknesses of crude empiricism: little deductive power, weak coherence between propositions and naive model specification. The research strategy is based on the atheoretical idea to maximize the number of independent and dependent variables and to resort to the mechanical calculation of simple correlations as a tool for the specification of regression models. A number of theoretical problems has been left undecided with regard to the interpretation of both the dependent and independent variables (Anckar & Ståhleberg, 1980). Little effort has been devoted to the understanding of the findings integrating the estimation of a large number of demographic models. Since there is little of coherence in the interpretation of various relationships between variables one cannot expect much of deductive power. The whole procedure is based on an empirical strategy of maximizing the variation in variables; a theoretical structure is virtually non-existent (Ashford, 1976).

However, it cannot be denied that the demographic approach acknowledging its weaknesses from a theoretical point of view located an aspect of some types of policy-making. The demographic model appears to satisfy data on local government cross-sectional variation in policy-making concerning divisible goods and services. Its explanatory relevance is little in relation to public goods, i.e. indivisible entities. It would no doubt be astonishing if public policy-making was not related to its environment, but the basic problem is the nature of the links between environmental factors and decision-making in collective choice. It would be just as unlikely that public policy would have no relationship whatsoever to its environment as that policy-making could be conceived as strictly determined by the environment. Maybe what matters is how decision-makers take environmental factors into account and how they in their preferences wish to give differential recognition to various factors in their preferences? It may be worthwhile to

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move in the direction of reinterpreting the demographic approach in terms of an internal perspective on policy-making (Hansen, 1982).

**Incrementalism**

The incrementalist approach to public decision-making starts from a model with a special external variable, viz. time:

\[ P_t = f(P_{t-1}) \]

Incremental models concerning the policy process approach the relation between environment and decision-making in a more complex way than the demographic model approach. Incrementalism is thus more adequate from a theoretical point of view as it scores high on criteria like coherence and simplicity. In terms of the external perspective incrementalism claims that decision-making in general and in the public sector in particular is determined by time. Previously made decisions are crucial determinants of present policies. This simple idea that policy is a function of itself in a time perspective is integrated as the conclusion of an elaborate decision theory: marginalism or disjointed incrementalism, successive limited comparisons and partisan mutual adjustment – consisting of a number of coherent propositions about values, cognitions and coordination (Lindblom, 1958; Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1965; Wildavsky, 1964). The theory has been employed in qualitative descriptions (Heclo & Wildavsky, 1973) as well as tested in quantitative budgetary models (Wildavsky, 1964). Such models may be more or less complete:

\[ A_t = f(A_{t-1}) \]
\[ R_t = f(R_{t-1}) \]
\[ A_t = f(R_t) \]
\[ R_t = f(A_t + R_t) \]

Incrementalism appears to possess theoretical content and meet with empirical confirmation, explaining its attractiveness in policy analysis. However, the incrementalist approach does not score high on all evaluation criteria. The basic problem is the interpretation of the concept of an increment, a difficulty which has far-reaching implications for the deductive power of the incremental models.

The predictive power of incremental models would be impressive if the models could specify how large a program change is allowed to be if it is to be designated as an "increment" and at what level of government positive or negative increments are to be measured. However, it appears to be theoretically very difficult to specify how large the addition positively or negatively is allowed to be (Dempster & Wildavsky, 1978). It seems as if the specification of the permissible size of the increment depends upon the level of decision-making, as if the incremental model could safely predict future policies simple because of aggregation effects cancelling out large positive and negative effect at higher levels of decision-making. Non-incremental changes would thus tend to be concealed by the mere summing up of expansion and cut-backs (Vanat, 1974).

What matters even more is the pattern of decision-making whatever the size of the changes. Incremental models satisfy decision processes which are stable over time meaning that the future is a linear function of the past. At first it seems as if the incremental models adapted for the budgetary process received considerable support when estimated empirically. Then it was realized that there were considerable econometric problems involved in estimating the simple incremental equations. The resort to more complex incremental models has not been as successful as the early attempts at incremental modelling. Recent literature talks about shift-points in relation of policy, which defy incremental modelling and reduce the deductive power of incrementalist models.

The incrementalist approach to policy-making is in a dilemma: its deductive power is constrained by the difficulty in specifying what an increment is whilst its degree of confirmation is reduced by the occurrence of shift-points in policy-making which defy the interpretation of the incrementalist equations as stable linear growth models. If the policy-process is modelled as structurally unstable (Westlund & Lane, 1983; Lane & Westlund, 1987) allowing for the occurrence of shift-points, then the deductive power of incrementalism is reduced as there is as yet little knowledge when and how shift-points take place.

For all its simplicity maybe incrementalism is too crude in relation to the complexity of the policy process; the idea that policies are heavily constrained by past commitments, that policy-making is the application of mechanical rules that reduce complexity, calculation and uncertainty, and that policy-making never touches the base of its programs may satisfy data for certain periods of decision-making in some countries. Its general validity is doubtful and its theoretical appeal is decreased by the obvious voluntaristic aspect of action, including collective action. It may be the case that public policy-making could not consider all the alternatives and rank all the outcomes as marginalism predicts, but it does not follow that decision-making is bound to be of limited scope at the margin. Decision-making in the face of uncertainty, focussing only upon a few alternatives and values, does not ipso facto have to be
marginal. Decision-making may be comprehensive in terms of the changes aimed at. If structural shift-points are at odds with incremental modelling, then how do we explain the occurrence of these types of policy changes?

If the external variables and its space and time dimensions do not suffice to account for policies, then maybe we should turn to approaches that only employ internal variables – the internal perspective. There is a number of models of the decision-making process that emphasize the relevance of internal factors of various types. Let us begin with the rational choice model.

**Rational decision-making**

The strength of the rational decision model derives from its attractive theoretical properties (Harsanyi, 1986). The set of assumptions is characterized by coherence and simplicity: (1) the value function is consistent and integrated; (2) complete knowledge about the alternatives and the environment; (3) simple decision rules like the maximization of expected average utility or in a Bayesian approach expected value, or the max-max or mini-regret rules (Lindgren, 1971; Simon, 1957). The weakness of the rational decision model stems from its lack of behavioural realism. Since its assumptions are seldom satisfied the model has a low degree of confirmation. This is not only true of individual choice behaviour but applies equally to organized collective choice in a political setting. Government like any organization acts under the rationality assumption in the Thompson meaning as spelled out in his *Organizations in Action* (1967), but it is an empirical question how closely actual behaviour meets with the expectations of the rational decision model.

Choice in an organizational setting is a function of the goals set up and the technology that is available. By making very special assumptions about the goal function and the level of knowledge about behaviour technologies the rational decision model maximizes deductive power predicting unique solutions up to a certain limit where action reciprocities as displayed in two-person and n-person game theory make unique solutions impossible. At the same time the realism of the model is minimized as organizations seldom have connected and transitive goal functions covering each and every possible outcome and as organizations typically face objective or subjective uncertainty concerning the alternatives of action as well as the environment of behaviour. Thus, goals may not be precise nor clear and the technology employed may be risky, imperfect or unreliable (Wildavsky, 1979). If this is the state of the goal function and the technology, then it is far from evident that the behaviour rules devised by the rational decision model are the most appropriate one. Such decision situations may call for decision rules like marginalism or satisfying criteria (Simon, 1957; March & Simon, 1958; Vickers, 1965).

Public policy is a means-end phenomenon. Government typically defines a number of goals or targets for its programs, some of which are to be achieved independently and simultaneously whilst others are to be accomplished reciprocally and sequentially. When various goals are interrelated so that the accomplishment of one goal has implications for the achievement of another we have a means-end chain or a means-end hierarchy. The rational decision model requires that the acting organization is able to assign values – utilities – to various ends and means so that organizations can tell which are preferred when faced with goal conflicts. Bypassing the methodological strife between cardinalists and ordinalists the rational decision model is still unrealistic when it demands that organizations be able to specify a connected and transitive value function for all conceivable means and ends let alone assign these values on a ratio or ordinal scale (Simon, 1964).

Value is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for public decision-making. Besides means-end hierarchies public policy comprises means-end technologies, based on knowledge about the causal relationship between the alternatives of action and outcomes – probabilities. Although organizations typically act on the assumption that its means are conducive to the achievement of its ends, it must be emphasized that such beliefs may be all but characterized by the knowledge requirements of the rational decision model. If public policy would possess knowledge about perfect and reliable programs that result in the desired outcomes, then the technology problem would be solved. With a clear and precise goal function certain technologies would make the calculation of both technical and economic rationality possible.

However, there are several sources of uncertainty in public technologies. Either knowledge at the present stage may be inadequate for various reasons meaning that causal relationships may not be known (uncertainty) or reality may be such that the possible programs cannot be trusted with a high degree of probability (risk). The difficulty is not whether uncertainty is to be placed with the decision-maker as a result of deficient knowledge or is typical of the actual situation of decision-making; the problem in public policy-making is that it may be very difficult to handle uncertainty – objective or subjective – whatever its source by a uniform assignment of probabilities. Often technologies fail to recognize all the interdependencies between ends and means or the beliefs in causal relationships between the means and the ends may be unrealistic. Although gov-
Governments may have clear intentions knowing what they wish to accomplish with recognized means it is often the case that the relationship between program and outcome is far more problematic. If the idea of a rational means-end hierarchy is unrealistic in relation to organizational action in a governmental setting, then the same judgement must be made with regard to the notion of rational technologies. Ambiguity in the goal function and uncertainty of the technology severely limits the applicability of the rational decision model as its immediate relevance is confined to choice situations of the type I in Diagram 1, and its scope of applicability to choice situations of the types II and IV.

Consequently, by making strong theoretical assumptions the rational decision model limits its scope of applicability. There is a striking contrast between the simplicity of the model and its rejectability. Its falsifiability is too limited, as it actually prohibits very little. Confronted with some falsified prediction it is always possible it seems to maintain that one or more of the assumptions were not fulfilled. The rational decision model may be more attractive as a regulative notion than as a tool for the understanding of how actually policy-making takes place. In certain choice situations it may be normatively relevant to policy-makers; however, it fails to offer guidance to the understanding of policy-making characterized by choice situations of the types II and IV.

Moreover, the assumptions of the rational decision model are not unproblematic when applied to collective choice. Actually, the application of a rational decision model to organizational behaviour raises a number of new problems about the value function and the technologies in policy-making. We may wish to know not simply that the assumptions apply or not, but how they come to apply. If organizations act under the rationality assumptions, then how do organizations establish means-end hierarchies? And how is information about technologies collected and used? Organizations may take action to improve upon their technologies, but the rational decision model says very little about how this is done. Even if the rational decision model had performed differently in terms of empirical applicability and degree of confirmation there would still be a need for models that account for how the value function in collective choice is established (Wildavsky, 1987) and how the relationship between program and outcome in technologies works in the implementation of the means. Before we proceed to models of group choice and implementation that complement the rational decision model whatever its validity may be it should be contrasted with the garbage can model, which is a substitute for the rational decision model.

The garbage can model

Evidently, the so-called garbage can model was intended as a way to model organizational choice more realistically than the rational decision model, which was originally developed for individual choice behaviour. Unlike the rational decision model its behaviour assumptions are highly realistic: (1) the value function is ambiguous; (2) knowledge about the choice situation is subjectively uncertain; (3) decision rules are complex and symbolic (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1976). The garbage can model has been employed to model decision-making in various types of organizations, and it is no exaggeration to suggest that its appeal has been most obvious in governmental type organizations (March & Olsen, 1976; Olsen, 1983; March, 1981; Clark, 1982). Maybe it is not without justification to point out that the literature on so-called policy styles could be seen as an extension of the garbage can model (Richardson, 1982). In relation to the evaluation criteria empirical confirmation is not the major problem. No doubt, there are sets of data about policy-making that satisfy the garbage can model as public decision-making often generate into garbage can processes: ambiguity, uncertainty and political symbolism. The degree of empirical support is an issue of contention as it has been argued that the garbage can model overemphasizes the irrational components of organizational behaviour, even in relation to its most typical empirical case — university decision making (Trow, 1984). The argument about the empirical validity of the garbage can model must not overshadow its most serious weakness, its lack of deductive power and its moral obtrusiveness.

An empirical test of models is not enough; besides the requirement of corroboration or verification as it were models fulfill the function of integrating knowledge. Models systematize knowledge by creating a network between propositions. The implications of models are as important as their explicit content. The rational
decision model is no doubt very strong if judged by the
criterion of deductive power. The problem with its sug-
gested replacor – the garbage can model – is that it is far
from obvious what its implications are. What can we de-
duce about organizational behaviour from these as-
sumptions about value ambiguity, subjective technol-
gy uncertainty and political ritualism?

If the rational decision model suffers from too much
theoretical content, then certainly the garbage can
model places too high a value upon descriptive realism.
To state that organizational choice is irrational, that so-
lutions look for problems, to claim that budget-making
is ritualism, that technology is foolishness and that lead-
ership is luck seems to operate effectively as a critique
of the rational choice model pointing out its strictly lim-
ited applicability. However, as a behaviour theory on its
own terms the garbage can model appears to raise as
many questions as it answers. We may wish to know if
rational organizational behaviour is ever feasible or
even desirable, if it is generally impossible as the gar-
bage can model seems to imply. Moreover, it is far from
obvious that reality only contains two alternatives: ra-
tional behaviour or irrational behaviour.

It may well be the case that organizations acting un-
der the rationality assumption satisfy some other deci-
sion-model which does not contain such strong assump-
tions as the rational decision model whilst also by-
passing the amorphous nature of policy-making implied
by the garbage can model – the Simon model of satisfy-
ing behaviour or the mixed-scanning model of Et-
zioni or the optimal model of Dror. The new institu-
tionalism seems to steer inbetween rationality and foolish-
ness (March & Olsen, 1984) just as the new inter-
pretation of muddling through (Lindblom, 1979).
Public policy-making could have clear goals tied to their
programs; the emphasis on evaluation and implementa-
tion implies that some programs may have a reliable
technology finding some of their outcomes though pol-
cy-making may fall far short of the requirements of the
rational decision model. Let us quote from Etzioni:

A mixed-scanning strategy would include elements of
both approaches by employing two cameras: a broad-
angle camera that would cover all parts of the sky but
not in great detail, and a second one which would zero
in those areas revealed by the first camera to require a
more in-depth examination. While mixed-scanning
might miss areas in which only a detailed camera could
reveal trouble, it is less likely than incrementalism to
miss obvious trouble spots in unfamiliar areas. (Et-
zioni, 1967:389)

The elaboration of policy models that fall inbetween
the rational decision model and the the irrational garbage
can model has an obvious prescriptive purpose trying to
save some collective choice capacity for social reform by
means of policy (Dror, 1980). Limited rational choice is
feasible by mixing major and minor policy decisions ar-
gues Etzioni:

... each of the two elements in mixed scanning helps to
reduce the effects of the particular shortcomings of the
other; incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of
rationalism by limiting the details required in funda-
mental decisions, and contextualizing rationalism helps
to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism
by exploring longer-run alternatives. (Etzioni, 1967:390)

It is easy to point out the imprecise and vague nature of
many goals in public policy-maing; the lack of tech-
ologies in the public sector has often been called atten-
tion to (Rose, 1982); and it is not difficult to find proc-
cesses of policy-making that are more oriented towards
the avoidance of a decision than the making of one, or
that simply confirms by ritual action what has been de-
cided elsewhere or not decided at all. However, how do
we decide when the goal function is more or less vague
and imprecise, when the technology is more or less un-
certain, and when political symbolism occurs together
with real decision-making? Again, if systematic criteria
are worked out that allow us to classify choice situations
as more or less rational, then it may well turn out that
the garbage can model only covers an extreme case of
decision-making as the polar type of rational decision-
making (Axelson, 1981). If any deviation from the
stringent requirement of the rational decision model
means that the data satisfy the garbage can model, then
it would indeed have a large coverage. If, on the other,
its field of application is much more limited, then we
will certainly be interested in knowing more about the
choice situations inbetween rationality and irration-
ality. It seems important to allow for the possibility that
choice in Diagram 1 may be more or less rational, have
more or less clear goals and face more or less of knowl-
edge uncertainty.

The garbage can model raises some puzzling prob-
lems about the practical usefulness and moral attrac-
tiveness of theories modelling public sector decision-
making. The rational decision model has a long stand-
ing as a useful tool for solving problems in the public
sector. Actually, the adherents of program budgeting
modelled public sector funding and planning on the im-
age of a comprehensive rational decision model (Nov-
wick, 1965; 1975), thus seriously overstating the case for
rationality in organizations (Wildavsky, 1986). Yet, it
seems as if the practical conclusions of the garbage can
model are none at best and objectionable at worst. If
organizational choice is ambiguity and foolishness, then how do we change decision-making in the public sector? If the garbage can model were valid of all policies, then why would there be policy analysis recommending strategies for better policy-making like Public Policy Development (1975) and The Policy Organization (1983). If these approaches to the improvement of policy-making have any relevance, then we wish to know how it comes that there occur garbage-can processes and why such processes sometimes do not occur. Just as we ask Why Policies Succeed or Fail (Ingram & Mann, 1980) we must ask why some policies run into a garbage-can process whereas others do not.

Is the garbage can model generally true or true of some special segment of the public sector? We need additional criteria that allow us to understand when organizational behaviour is pathological. The garbage can model scores high on model realism and applicability but is weak in terms of deductive power. Its degree of empirical confirmation is contested whereas its practical usefulness is practically nil. If it is true that the process are characterized by policy pathologies, there may be policy cures against these (Hogwood & Peters, 1985).

The social welfare function model

The central place of goals in public policy can hardly be denied. At stake in public decision-making is the choice of objectives or ends — values — that are to govern the program structure. Objectives or the objective function is basic in the collective choice processes that are the essence of public policy making. None of the models thus far considered have explained how the collective values or the social objectives are established. The incremental approach states that the objectives function will change only marginally, the demographic model implies that objectives will vary as a function of the environment, and the rational model simply assumes the existence of an objective function. Of particular interest is the approach that models the derivation of the objectives of public policy — the so called social welfare functions (SWF).

It could be argued that the social welfare function models is a mathematical branch of decision-making theory with mainly a normative focus that is irrelevant to the understanding of on-going policy-making. These models would constitute abstract collective choice theory as an elaboration of welfare economics without relevance for empirical research on public decision-making (Moulin, 1983; Quirk & Saposnick, 1968). Actually, it has been argued that the famous Arrow Impossibility Theorem is irrelevant (Tullock, 1988) and that the whole idea of rational collective decisions is abortive (Buchanan, 1960). However, it is not difficult to point out the potential fertility of the social welfare function approach to the understanding of policy-making. (Sen, 1970; Fishburn, 1973)

Since in the social welfare function the objectives in choice are social states (Arrow, 1963:17) and the problem is to derive some acceptable ordering of the possible social states the SWF is at the heart of public policy. To quote Mishan:

The SWF ...(is) any kind of criterion that might be used to rank alternative situations open to society subject to given economic constraints. (Mishan, 1981:114)

The theory of the SWF is about various mechanisms for the specification of the objective function in policymaking — something left unexplained in the rational choice model. Basically, there are three interpretations of the SWF: the axiomatic, the normative and the real valued social welfare function.

In a welfare state public policy cannot be dictatorial in the sense that is must somehow be a function of the way in which the various participating individuals order the relevant social states. Collective choice mechanisms enter at various levels in the public sector decision-making system and the participating individuals may vary from choice situation to choice situation; whether it is a matter of referendum or committee decision, local government or Parliament public policy-making in democratic nations proceeds from some type of mechanism for the aggregation of individual orderings of social states into a social decision. Such choice mechanisms may have different properties besides the condition of non-dictatorship — properties that may help us understand public policy-making, its processes as well as its outcomes.

Typically, the axiomatic approach to the SWF is to display theoretically how various properties of social mechanisms may be combined; there is no reason why the analysis of the possible or impossible combinations of decision-making properties could not be employed in empirical policy analysis. Actually, the collective choice properties that are relevant in the SWF models are very interesting in a policy perspective: rationality, Pareto optimality, Condorcet winner, unrestricted domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship, acyclicity, anonymity, neutrality, positive responsiveness.

It would be most interesting to investigate empirically the extent to which policy-making in various fields fail to satisfy each of these separate criteria on the social choice mechanism employed. That any social mechanism must fail to satisfy all these criteria we know from...
the Arrow finding, but the question of which criteria apply and which criteria must go is still unresolved. Recent institutional analysis has highlighted the extent to which various choice paradoxes actually occur and how various choice mechanisms in use in ongoing policy-making handle the problem of satisfying these normative criteria.

In the normative approach to the specification of the SWF the focus is not upon the derivation of the goal function of policy-making from the utility functions or preferences of the participating individuals, but to identify choice criteria that allow society to make the "correct" normative judgements about the possible social states. In effect, these models of policy-making state what goals of public decision-making are proper goals. Again, though these models presumably offer guidance more than understanding of policy-making thus satisfying the evaluation criterion of practical usefulness they are not without relevance for the analysis of ongoing public decision-making.

It is not necessary to construct fictional theoretical assumptions about a natural state as the veil of ignorance (Rawls), of contractarian man (Buchanan) and the existence of ethical preferences besides subjective preferences (Harsanyi) in order to pledge for the relevance of specifying criteria that may guide the choice between goals. True, this is very different from outcome analysis or impact studies, which shed light upon the distributional consequences of public policies; however, a decision focus should include considerations about how policy-makers enter judgements about justice into the making of decisions.

A real valued SWF is sought in the modelling of social choice in welfare economics (Samuelson, 1967) assuming that society disposes of a technique for adding individual utility scores into a social welfare judgement for the solution of distribution matters (Graaff, 1970). However, admitting the profound problems with a cardinal approach to welfare utility, even such models are relevant to the explanation of actual policy-making as they clarify the relationship between efficiency and desirability (Mishan, 1981). Public policies benefit various citizens differently and it is vital to unravel how the provision of goods and services affect the utility of various citizens and whether it is possible to improve the utility of some citizens while holding the utility of others constant. Maybe too much interest has focussed upon external determinants of policy variations at various levels of government to the neglect of efficiency and productivity considerations. It would no doubt increase our understanding of policy-making if alternative distributions could be compared on the basis of some principle of justice.

It is difficult to evaluate the social welfare function approach to public decision-making, as it has been employed in the understanding of policy-making to a little extent. Thus, we know little of its falsifiability and degree of empirical confirmation. Yet, its simplicity and deductive power is such that it should be employed in empirical policy research to a much larger extent. Since we know fairly well how decision mechanism properties may or may not be combined it is an interesting and challenging task to study how existing institutions for policy-making compare judged by the collective choice properties. Typical of the social welfare function models is that they cover all kinds of social choice mechanisms.

In an empirical application these models would have to be pinned down to the special institutions that dominate ongoing social decision-making. Crucial distinctions between various types of collective choice mechanisms may be introduced. One such important distinction is that between public resource allocation and private resource allocation - a distinction which has several names: voting versus market, authority versus exchange, bureaucracy versus competition, planning versus laissez-faire. According to one approach to the modelling of public policy-making there are rational limits to the specification of an objective function for public decision-making - the public finance approach.

**The public finance model**

What is public policy all about? Are there some things that public policy should concentrate on to the exclusion of other things? According to the so-called public finance model there are rational restrictions on the scope of public policy derived from efficiency considerations. The public finance model claims that there exists a set of goods and services which defines the allocation objectives of public policy - the public goods set (Musgrave, 1959; Buchanan, 1967; Tullock, 1970). Such goods are characterized by two properties: nonexcludability and jointness (Head, 1973). And these very characteristics imply that public policy is the only available choice mechanism as various forms of voluntary exchange like market institutions cannot handle the free rider problem or the phenomena of decreasing marginal costs in an efficient way (Layards & Walter, 1970). The classical public finance model restricted the allocation branch of public policy to goods and services that were clearly public like external and internal defense. Recent public finance models have enlarged the scope of the theory by pointing out that the public goods properties may be transformed into criteria for public policy actions as various goods and services may be characterized by more or less of excludability and more or less of jointness (Baumol, 1965; Prest & Barr,
The basic criterion of public policy would then be whether externalities and scale economies are more efficiently handled by means of public policy or in terms of market arrangements (Bohm, 1976).

The public finance model following the Wiksell approach is typically supplemented by some theory about the distribution branch of government. Efficiency considerations have to be supplemented by deliberations about justice both ex ante and ex post the working out of the efficiency implications of public policy. The public finance model though recognizing the necessity of distributional criteria has very little to say about the criteria of social justice to be employed in public policy; the trick is to assume that such criteria are determined exogenously in some relevant SWF (Loehr & Sandler, 1978).

The public finance model scores high on the simplicity dimension and its normative attractiveness with regard to the allocation function of public policy is no doubt considerable. However, its applicability is narrow as there seems to be much more to public policy than non-excludability and jointness. Is actually on-going policy-making really an attempt to find an efficient solution to the problem of satisfying wants – social ones? Do we understand a public program structure or a public policy budget when we call attention to the free rider problem or the rational ambition to ripe scale economies? What about human motivation in public policy?

**The public choice models**

The increasing popularity of the public choice approach to politics reflects its theoretical structure derived from rational choice theory. There is a set of theories that exemplify the public choice method – “the economic study of nonmarket decision-making” according to Mueller (1979:1). They refer to different aspects of politics – in a positive or normative perspective. Looking at the policy cycle there are two public choice models that are clearly relevant for the analysis of on-going policy-making, viz. the model of the politician’s motivation and the logic of bureaucratic behaviour.

Why are there public policies in the amount and with the form and content that on-going policy programs display? Perhaps these policies reflect the public interest calculated in accordance with some technique by politicians due to altruism? The intent of the public choice theory of policy determination is to reject any such traditional notion of policy as public interest. Politicians are no different from private entrepreneurs and their supply of public policy is motivated by private concerns to the same extent as the private profit maximiser (Frohlich, 1970; Breton, 1974; Frohlich & Oppenheim, 1978). What is the objective function that a politician maximizes and what are the implications for the understanding of policy-making?

According to the public choice model of the politician a function consisting of the probability of reelection ($w$) and private variables such as power, income, prestige and political ideals ($a$) is maximized. Thus, we have

$$[9] \ U_p = U_p (w, a),$$

The same hypothesis applies to the politician as individual actor as well as to an organized group – a political party. To move from one politician to a group of politicians one assumes that the group has found same mechanism for motivating the individual actors. A maximization of (9) results in the effort on the part of politicians to choose those policies during the election period that minimizes the policy distance between the expectations of the citizens or voters ($r_c(t)$ and those supplied by government ($r_g(t)$) given a memory function on the part of the citizens, $m$. Thus, we have:

$$[10] h = \sum_{t=0}^{T1} m (r_c(t) - r_g(t))dt, \ (0<m<1)$$

The public choice model will thus predict that each politician or political party chooses a bundle of policies such that the policy distance $h$ is minimized. The model (10) can be accommodated to recognize competition between government and opposition by assuming that the opposition reminds the electorate about the size of the policy distance, i.e. by affecting the $m$ variable. Thus, we have:

$$[11] h = \sum_{t=0}^{T1} m (c(t)) (r_c(t) - r_g(t))dt, \ (0<m<1)$$

where $(c(t))$ is the amount of opposition in the system. The variation in the efforts of the opposition will thus affect the government and its choice of public policies.

This basic model could be developed by relating the supply of policies by political parties to the demand for policies by the electorate ascending to the Hotelling-Downs model (Mueller, 1979).

The choice of public policy is also affected by the behaviour of the bureaucracy which is the actual producer of policy programs. The supply of policies is a function of both the politician’s aims and the objectives of the bureaucrat. What is the logic of bureaucracy behaviour according to public choice theory?

Public choice theory modelling the behaviour of the one set of policy-makers – politicians – may be complemented by a model revealing the motivation of another set of policy-makers: bureaucrats. Let us look at the Niskanen model of the budget maximizing bureaucrats.
Niskanen models the behaviour fundamentals of bureaucrats as a private utility function consisting of salary, prestige and power. These entities are positively related to the size of the budget of the bureau.

The output of the bureau or – what is the same thing – the public policies in the programs of the bureau thus basically stem from not a rational consideration of all alternatives and a public interest utility function but from the private motivation of the bureaucrats. The originality of the Niskanen public policy model is, however, not the assumption that the public interest is a fiction, but the peculiar economics of budget-making in relation to public policy. Public policies are the outcome of the interaction of a supply function based on bureau behaviour and a demand function reflecting the interests of the politicians. Thus we have:

\[ B = aQ - b/2 Q^2 \]  

(politician's demand curve)

\[ C = cQ + dQ^2 \]  

(bureaucrat's cost curve)

The restriction on the interaction between politicians providing the bureaus with their budgets and the bureaucrats reciprocating with goods and services is that:

\[ B \geq TC. \]

This implies that the size of the budget or the amount of goods and services provided will be determined where total costs are covered, not where marginal benefit equals marginal cost – the standard efficiency criterion. The peculiar economics of public policy results in equilibrium points at which marginal costs are larger than marginal benefits – and the loosers are the politicians. The budget maximizing bureaucrat will receive too large a budget due to the asymmetrical relation between the bureaucrat and the politician with regard to knowledge about the efficiency conditions for the allocation of public policy goods and services. The budget maximizing bureaucrat will receive too large a budget and take the standard efficiency criterion for granted. The politician deals with budget-making by matching the total costs for the provision of some goods or services in stead of looking at the size where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Thus, public resource allocation is always socially inefficient. A similar model though focusing on a different aspect of bureau behaviour has been suggested by Downs talking about the size maximizing behaviour of bureaus (Downs, 1967).

The original Kristensen model of public budget-making as asymmetry enters the public choice school (Kristensen, 1987).

The Niskanen model has nice model properties: simplicity, deductive power and surprise. Its chief weakness lies in the empirical base of the model as evidence is lacking and it is difficult to derive a proper test. (Downsire, 1987; Hood, 1987). What are the implications of the Niskanen model for empirical hypotheses? That bureaus generally tend to be inefficient meaning X-efficiency (Lieberstein, 1967)? Could it be tested by looking at the growth in the number of employees at the bureau or the growth in their salaries? Perhaps, but the crux of the model is the comparison with private resource allocation. It claims that whatever shape bureau provision has there will always be an efficiency problem because of the nature of the interaction: duopoly. Thus, privatization is the crucial experiment.

Public choice models score high on simplicity and deductive power; yet their assumptions are very different from those of public finance and welfare economics. Typical is the self-interest axiom. Thus, Brennan and Buchanan model natural government as a revenue maximizing Leviathan. Of all government revenues, \( R \), a portion, \( a \), is spent on public goods, \( G \), leaving a surplus for government, \( S \). Thus, we have

\[ S = (1-a)R. \]

Governments will try to choose a tax rate, \( r \), and a tax base, \( b \), such that revenues are maximized, \( R^* \) in order to maximize \( S \). A citizen will try to choose a public goods provision that minimizes \( S \), i.e. an efficient \( G^* \). Thus, taxation is a struggle between Leviathan and the citizen over the parameters in the model:

\[ R^* (b,r) = \frac{G^*}{a}. \]

The brutality of the assumptions means that public choice models score low on moral attractiveness (Brennan & Buchanan, 1977).

The implementation models

The status of so-called implementation models is precarious with regard to the standard public policy models (Dunsire, 1978). They are considered a necessary complement to the policy models because – it is argued – these model only the decision-making process assuming that the enactment of policy implies the execution of policy programs as well as the implementation of policy objectives (van Meter & van Horn, 1975). Or even worse, the policy models discussed above adhere to a naive assumption about public administration, viz. that policies once decided upon automatically achieve their objectives by means of the policy outputs as if implementation was something utterly simply and auto-
The argument about implementation deficit implied a radical rejection of this hypothesis. Neglecting the implementation stages could not be considered worse than adhering to a naive theory about public administration and the behaviour of implementors.

Thus, implementation models consistute the missing link between policy decision-making on the one hand and policy execution and policy implementation on the other (Hargrove, 1975). The argument about the missing link may appear as a revelation to those who had realized that policy may have one appearance when enacted and a quite different one when put into practice. The basic problem was, however, to explain why this misfit tended to occur more than often - how are we to understand what happens after the formulation and formation of policy? To the extent that this hypothesis about a lack of congruence between policy objectives and policy outcomes is true it amounted to a rather drastic criticism, if not straightforward rejection, of the standard policy models.

The basic policy models were accused of either neglecting the problematic phase in the policy process or adhering to a naive model of implementation: state the goals, derive the means, execute the programs and find the outcomes. Beginning with the Pressman & Wildavsky analysis in Implementation (1973) a large literature poured out warnings against any public policy model that regarded implementation as simple or straightforward. Each and every policy model was regarded as incomplete at best or deficient at worst because they lacked a theory about the mechanism in implementation: how programs should be handled in order that stated objectives could be achieved in terms of positive outcomes. To identify this mechanism of implementation - the key to successful implementation - became the target of a number of new policy models focussing on what happens after the decision stage. At the same time these new models were open to the same kind of criticism: they bypassed the initial phases of the policy process, i.e. they were one-sided. The attempts to extend the implementation models to cover the entire policy cycle have hardly been successful. We are still stuck with a gulf between decision-making models and implementation models in the study of public policy.

The implementation models differ as to the nature of the mechanism to be employed in the monitoring of programs: top-down models versus bottom-up models. Let us make a short survey of the various implementation models.

Implementation as perfect administration
Hood suggests a model of implementation that would "produce perfect policy implementation" (Hood, 1976:6). Such a model would include a unitary administrative system with a single line of authority, enforcement of uniform rules or objectives, a set of clear and authoritative objectives implementable on the basis of perfect obedience or perfect administrative control, perfect coordination and perfect information within and between administrative units, absence of time pressure, unlimited material resources for tackling the problem and unambiguous overall objectives and perfect political acceptability of the policies pursued (Hood, 1976:6-8).

The model of perfect administration is an ideal-type construct to be instrumental in finding what went wrong in processes of implementation failure (Hood, 1976:190-207). The model approaches implementation from the narrow focus of the characteristics of pure authority relations - hierarchy, obedience, control and perfect coordination - viewed as the mechanism for the accomplishment of successful implementation.

However, empirical work on implementation outcomes has resulted in a different finding, viz. that mechanisms more symmetrical in nature such as exchange, and negotiation are more germane to the implementation process than authority and its characteristics (Lipsky, 1980; Barrett & Fudge, 1981). These bargaining mechanisms for the implementation of policy are as important as structures of authority (Bardach, 1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973:87-124). It is questionable whether the model conditions listed really are conducive to perfect implementation; e.g. it is true that the model conditions of this top-down version of implementation seldom apply due to intra- or inter-organizational complexity (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978).

Implementation as policy management
A model of implementation may involve the search for guidelines for successful implementation. In a 1979 article, "Conditions of Effective Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy Objectives" Sabatier and Manhattan state:

The program is based on a sound theory relating changes in target group behaviour to the achievement of the desired end-state (objectives). The statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambiguous policy directives and structures the implementation process so as to maximize the likelihood that target groups will perform as desired. The leaders of the implementing agencies possess substantial managerial and political skill and are committed to statutory goals. The program is actively supported by organized constituency groups and by a few key legislators (or the chief executive) throughout the implementation process, with the courts being neutral or supportive. The relative priority of statutory ob-
jjectives is not significantly undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions that undermine the statute’s “technical” theory or political support. (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979:484-485)

These presumed sufficient conditions for successful implementation do identify crucial factors that affect policy accomplishment: technology, unambiguity of objectives, skill, support and consensus. However, the counter-argument is that this theory begs the question of what a “sound” policy technology is. Moreover, what is “substantial” policy skill and “enough” policy support? And when is a policy “significantly” undermined by conflict?

Implementation as evolution

Wildavsky has introduced the theory of a process of implementation as necessarily resulting not in implementation but in redefinition of objectives and reinterpretation of outcomes, i.e. evolution. If implementation processes result in the redefinition of objectives and the reinterpretation of outcomes, then how could there be implementation? The evolutionary conception of implementation implies that implementation processes may not be neatly separated from stages of policy formulation mingling objectives and outcomes. It also implies that implementation is endless: “Implementation will always be evolutionary; it will inevitably reformulate as well as carry out policy” (Majone & Wildavsky, 1978:116). This is an empirical argument that is open to refutation pending a major survey of program accomplishments – see e.g. George & Wilding (1984).

Implementation as learning

Wildavsky has outlined yet another interesting interpretation of the nature of the implementation process (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983 a, 1983 b). Implementation is modeled as an endless learning process where the implementors through continuous search processes come up with improved goal functions and more reliable program technologies. There is no natural end to the process of policy implementation because each stage means an improvement in relation to earlier stages where over time the original objectives are bound to become transformed and the initial means replaced.

The theory that implementation is learning may be regarded as an optimistic explanation of the hypothesis that implementation is evolution. The kind of implementation process conceived of in the various versions of a top-down approach – naive implementation, perfect administration (Hood), a hierarchical model (Ve-
dung), conditions for successful implementation (Sabatier) – is suboptimal.

Implementation as implementation structures

The events constituting a process of implementation are typically approached as pieces forming a whole. How to separate what is part of an implementation process and what is not (demarcation)? What are the basic pieces of a process of implementation (identification)? In “Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis”, Hjern and Porter state:

An implementation structure is comprised of subsets of members within organizations which view a programme as their primary (or an instrumentally important) interest. (Hjern & Porter, 1981:216).

Obviously, an implementation structure consists of sets of actors, but which sets of actors constitute one and only one implementation structure? Is it enough that these actors are members of organizations and have a “primary interest” in a program? Is it not necessary for people who have a “primary” interest in a policy also to wish or attempt to put it into effect? The approach of an implementation structure follows from an emphasis on properties of processes of implementation other than those of the top-down perspective: organization complexity, self-selection of participants, multiplicity of goals and motives, local discretion.

Hjern and Porter state:

Implementation structures are not organizations. They are comprised of parts of many organizations; organizations are comprised of parts of many programmes. As analytic constructs, implementation structures are conceptualized to identify the units of purposive action which implement programmes. They are ‘phenomenological administrative units’, partly defined by their participating members. (Hjern & Porter, 1981:222).

The description of implementation structures as comprising units that implement programs is of little help as it is circular. Either an implementation structure is a construct, simply a “unit for administrative analysis”, or “implementation structures are administrative entities” (Hjern & Porter, 1981:219), but not both. The concept of an implementation structure is relevant for the analysis of implementation processes, but one has to be aware of the fallacy of reification or misplaced concreteness. No wonder that implementation is described as difficult, as it is hard to find out how an implementation structure is to be demarcated or identified (Hjern & Hull, 1982).
Implementation as outcomes

Fudge and Barrett state that a theory of the implementation process follows from a particular concept of implementation. If implementation is not “putting policy into effect”, Fudge & Barrett state, then:

The emphasis . . . shifts away from a master/subordinate relationship to one where policy-makers and implementers are more equal and the interaction between them becomes the focus for study. (Barrett & Fudge, 1981:258)

The concept of implementation and the concept of an implementation process should be kept separate analytically. Why could not organization complexity or autonomy, just as like exchange and negotiation, be conducive to or compatible with implementation as “putting a policy into effect”? Similarly it could be the case that the perfect administration model may only achieve a state describable as “getting something done”. To analyze what must obtain in order to apply the concept of implementation is different from stating a model as to how implementation – in particular successful implementation – comes about.

Implementation as perspective

In his “The Implementation Perspective”, Williams argues strongly in favour of taking such a perspective. Is the implementation perspective some kind of practical science of administration, a body of knowledge that policy-makers and implementors could draw upon as they approach the implementation of policies? For Williams the implementation perspective is the perspective of the implementation practitioners (Williams, 1982).

From the fact that actors are participating in something they label an “implementation process” does not follow that implementation is really going on. As several implementation studies have testified, actors may execute policies believing that their actions will eventually bring about implementation, but they may be wrong. In order to state the extent to which an implementation perspective meets with successful implementation there must be a different implementation perspective, that of the theoretician.

Implementation as backward mapping

The implementation process involves a number of participants; are some more important than others? Elmore argues convincingly that much of implementation analysis has focussed upon those placed high up in the public authority structure, whereas implementation analysis actually demands that attention be focussed upon those responsible for the production of outcomes on a day-to-day basis. The crucial nexus in the implementation process is the behavior of those who are placed most closely to the production of outputs, i.e. those placed far down in the hierarchy. (Lipsky, 1980)

Implementation as political symbolism

Fudge and Barrett state that an implementation perspective cannot be taken for granted. It is an insight gained from studies of implementation processes not only that the implementors may resist change or approach both objectives and programs in terms of their own interpretation, but also that the policy-makers may find it necessary or advantageous to neglect policy execution (Edelman, 1971). The fact that a process of implementation exhibits political symbolism – bypassing a sincere effort at implementing a real policy – does not preclude the applicability of the concept of implementation.
tion; goals may be accomplished because they were intertwined with other goals, combined with pseudo political behaviour as well as executed on the basis of extensive uncertainty among the participants. The extent to which each and every implementation process has more or fewer symbolic elements, and what the consequences are for the possibility of goal accomplishment is an entirely empirical question.

Implementation as ambiguity

Policy ambiguity may be less a strategic instrument manipulable by politicians at will than a necessary byproduct of the political process (Baier, March & Saetren, 1986). It is believed that implementation fails because the bureaucracy is either not able enough or too autonomous. However, the difficulty inherent in achieving successful implementation, viz. the so-called implementation deficit, may reflect a far more serious threat to the idea of policy implementation. The policy process may be such as to make ambiguity systemic in all policies. Thus, policy implementation would fail not because of a gap between rational policy-making and imperfect policy implementation but due to the necessary looseness of policy. More radically, it is argued that policy cannot be separated from implementation, that on the contrary policy can only be identified in the process of implementation (Ham & Hill, 1985). If this were true, then the whole idea of a policy approach would be reducible to organizational analysis or traditional public administration. But is it really true that social reforms can never be conceived and outlined in a policy document? Again, if policy ambiguity were as prevalent as claimed, if policy were the resultant of implementation, then how could policy analysis improve policy-making (Meltsner, 1976). Some policies are ambiguous no doubt, but do all policies have to be so?

Implementation as coalition

Sabatier, once an adherent of some version of the top-down model of implementation, argues that implementation processes consist of so-called advocacy coalitions: "actors from various public and private organizations who share a set of beliefs and who seek to realize their common goals over time" (Sabatier, 1986:39). This new hybrid model is derived from two sources, the policy network framework (Richardson & Jordan, 1979; Sharpe, 1985; Dunleavy, 1985) and the hypothesis that implementation is basically learning (Browne & Wildavsky, 1984).

The new Sabatier theory seems to focus on earlier stages of the implementation process. It may even be questioned if it is not more of a model of the general policy cycle, especially the policy enactment phase. Sabatier states:

How can we be sure of this? Are we to interpret this as if any coalition of implementors – private and public – are bound to produce outputs that result in successful implementations? Maybe the effects on targets are dysfunctional?

The other component of the new theory of implementation is the emphasis on long-term learning in these advocacy coalitions. A distinction is made between the core and the secondary aspects of policy, where learning refers to the secondary aspects (Sabatier, 1986:40-42):

While changes in the policy core are usually the result of external perturbations, changes in the secondary aspects of a governmental action program are often the result of policy-oriented learning by various coalitions or policy brokers. (Sabatier, 1986:43).

If implementation is to be understood as a long-term process where policy coalitions interact and learn about program technologies and program outcomes, then perhaps implementation is everything? Why is there this need for more of learning? Obviously, because implementation does not work. But is this always a function of a lack of learning which benevolent coalitions may undo? Simply having policy coalitions does not produce implementation, let alone successful implementation; too many actors or too many coalitions may block the implementation process. And how can we ever make beneficial assumptions about the probability that so-called policy-brokers will make peace between and within so-called policy coalitions.

The two implementation problems

The implementation models discussed above fall into two sets. On the one hand we have the top-down models which score high on simplicity and coherence but lack substantial evidence. On the other hand there is the set of bottom-up models which score high on realism and applicability. The difference between the two set of models appears in a striking manner when it comes to practical or normative considerations. Whereas the top-down models emphasize responsibility, the bottom-up models underline trust. What is more impor-
The concept of implementation deals with the identification of a policy, a set of outcomes and the relationships between these two entities. The concept of an implementation process refers to how policies are carried out in an environment conducive to policy accomplishment or policy failure—what is usually referred to as stages of implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier 1983).

An implementor gives practical effect to a policy by taking action in relation to the objectives of the policy. Hopefully, the implementor is sooner or later confronted with a set of outcomes that are positively relevant to the realization of the objectives. If these outcomes are congruent with the objectives then there will be successful implementation. If the set of outcomes is related to the set of objectives in such a way that to each objective there is a corresponding outcome and vice versa—what the logicians call a one-to-one relationship—then we have policy accomplishment par excellence. But this is only theory. In actual practice all objectives do not find their outcomes and there are outcomes that lack objectives. Outcomes have to be interpreted in terms of the objectives and one objective may be partly satisfied by several different outcomes, or it may be satisfied by one outcome but be in opposition to another. A policy contains a number of goals—ends and means concerning various policy aspects—and some of these goals may find their outcomes whereas others may confront outcomes that are contrary to these objectives. No objective procedure for summing up the partial accomplishments of objectives or adding and subtracting pros and cons is known.

There is no single model of policy execution that will guarantee policy accomplishment. Implementation theory has thus far been the search for some interaction pattern or way of structuring the process of implementation in such a manner that there will be a high probability of policy accomplishment. This has resulted in a controversy between those who believe in control, planning and hierarchy on the one hand and those who believe in spontaneity, learning and adaptation as implementation techniques. A reorientation of implementation theory would be to inquire into how accountability is to be upheld in the implementation of policies and how much trust is in agreement with the requirement of accountability.

Whereas implementation as an outcome is rather unambiguous—to carry a policy into effect—the implementation process is much more complex a phenomenon. Implementation processes involve coalitions, learning, political symbolism, implementation perspectives, as well as control. But this is not enough for the general claims that implementation is advocacy coalitions, is evolutionary learning or hierarchical control. Any kind of mechanism may be used in the implementation process, because of the loose connection between implementation as an outcome and implementation as a process.

**Normative models**

To speak about ethics in relation to public policy may raise serious disagreement about the nature of policy analysis and policy studies. We are accustomed—in particular in Scandinavia—to the distinction between is and ought and the traditional focus of the conduct of scientific inquiry on matters of fact whether in a theoretical mode or an empirical one. However, one may agree with Goodin in *Political Theory and Public Goods* (1982):

> Mostly this should be seen as a "sampler" illustrating the sort of analysis that can and should be undertaken by those of us truly committed to the joint practice of both the social and the moral sciences. Even if facts and values could be separated—and there is much in policy debates to put pay to the myth that they can—this book strongly argues that they should not be. Empirical and ethical theory ought both to be used, and used in tandem, to guide public policymaking. (Goodin, 1982:4)

Since policy analysis is heavily oriented towards questions of ends and means as well as values it seems important to stick to the distinction between the scientific study of policies and the moral inquiry into the proper solutions of policy problems.

However, public policies are justified by the resort to moral concepts such as social justice. And the ethical interpretation of the notion of justice may be employed in the understanding of ongoing policy-making. These norms may be regarded as offering the standard against which existing policy programs may be evaluated. It is relevant to ask how far public policies are from various theories of justice. Following the public choice models we would predict a vast gulf between ideal conceptions and the actual reality. The following conceptions of justice may be relevant.

**The utilitarian approach**

The policy relevance of the utilitarian definition of social justice seems straightforward. What could be more obvious than that policies should promote the utility of citizens? Policies are no doubt enacted because it is believed that they promote the common interest according to some utility interpretation (Sen & Williams, 1982).
Why, then, not declare that the basic objective of public policy is to satisfy the utilitarian criterion on justice? And why not employ some utility yardstick as the technique for evaluating various policies? The utilitarian model, thus, appears to be highly salient to policy-making, but the model suffers from severe theoretical problems due to the difficulties inherent in the concept of utility. There is actually a set of utilitarian models and no agreement has as yet been forthcoming about which one to use in public policy. Firstly, there is the classical utilitarian model according to which total utility is to be maximized. Secondly, there is the average utility model maximizing the average utility of citizens over all conceivable programs. Thirdly, we have the Harsanyi impersonality model which maximizes the utility which a detached person would recommend as a behaviour if it were a rule (Harsanyi, 1977). Fourthly, there is the neo-classical utility model of von Neumann and Morgenstern which replaces the measurement of utilities with a probability experiment. The difficulty with the utilitarian approach is that utility is a notoriously difficult concept to handle both operationally - what is actually measured - and theoretically; are all kinds of utility worthy of justice? Suppose some public policy that scores high on some utility measurement is still considered unjust, then what to do? And it is not difficult to find examples of policies that may give the majority a higher utility score than other policies while at the same time doing injustice to the minority? How would policy-making be conducted employing the utilitarian criteria (Sen, 1982)?

The Rawlsian model

The difficulties in the concept of utility and in the notion of utility aggregation prompted Rawls to suggest a principle of justice that is independent of any measure of utility, well-being or pleasure - justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971). The fairness principle is a Kantian rule which everybody would choose as the guiding principle of public policy were they to pick normative principles in a state of a veil of ignorance. The difference principle states that the advantages of the least favoured are to be maximized given the priority of the liberty principle that each should have as large a liberty as is possible given the same liberty for everyone. The difference principle is a combination of an efficiency principle - Pareto optimality - and a weak principle of equality as a redistribution criterion. Given the natural differences in capacities between individuals the lot of the poor is to be maximized given free opportunity for everyone. Thus, schemes of redistribution are allowed only in so far as they do not hurt the incentives of those able to carry on activities beneficial to all in terms of their consequences. Thus, there is no real trade off between liberty and equality, but simple the rule that given the liberty of all, the position of the least favoured is to be maximized. To what extent is this a clear principle for public policy-making?

The Buchanan and Nozick models

Whereas the utilitarian models as well as the Rawlsian model could be employed to justify various policy programs, the models suggested by Buchanan and Nozick although very different in basic assumptions derive a state with a minimal commitment to public policy. Buchanan would favour policies that are conducive to efficiency as defined by the Pareto principle. There is to be two different policy programs: the protective state and the productive state. The first kind of public policy is oriented towards internal and external security guaranteeing the sanctity of contract. The second kind of policy would be oriented towards the provision of pure public goods due to the free rider problem. This is the only foundation for public policy with the exception that citizens may decide by majority rule to redesign the property rights according to some principle of legitimacy. How such redistributions are to be justified is not clarified by Buchanan who only claims that justice singly rests in the policy process in a constitutional setting (Buchanan, 1975). No end state is just in itself as utilitarians or Rawls would argue; if unanimity is accepted as the decision principle we would be guaranteed Pareto optimality in the public goods provision, but Buchanan is prepared to relax the unanimity rule in favour of majoritarian principles due to the existence of staggering decision costs (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Buchanan, 1977). But why would majorities always promote just or efficient policies?

More radical in the rejection of policy-making is the Nozick entitlement principle stating that social justice follows naturally from the just endowment of entitlement and the proper transfer of rights according to a just process of interaction (Nozick, 1975). No policy is ever needed except those that clarify and ascertain justice in property rights and justice in property rights transaction. In the Nozick minimal state the best public policy is no policy.

Conclusion

Since policy analysis was recognized as a field of its own (Lerner & Lasswell, 1951) there has been a theoretical search for a general theory of the policy process besides the proliferation of special models to be employed in policy analysis proper (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). If there was ever some minimum agreement about the in-
interpretation of the policy cycle – a Weberian conception of politics and administration as it were – we now face severe disagreement as how to model policy-making as well as policy implementation. These decision and implementation models score differently on a number of criteria for model evaluation. There is a sharp gulf between the rationalist interpretation of the policy process – a rational decision model combined with a top-down implementation model – and the realist understanding of the actual conduct of policy-making and policy implementation – a limited or irrational decision model in conjunction with a bottom-up implementation model. Thus we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION</th>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounded Rationality or Irrational</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Choice in the policy process may be approached in four fundamentally different ways. Firstly, there is the rational and top-down approach which maximizes model simplicity, deductive power and the moral appeal of responsibility. Secondly, we have a rational bottom-up perspective which has no real counterpart. Thirdly, there is the bottom-up approach based on a bounded rationality or garbage can model which is prevalent in institutional analysis underlining model realism and trust. Finally, there is the top-down perspective in conjunction with a limited rationality model.

Public policy-making may be approached by structure as in the demographic and incremental models or it may be approached as an actor oriented phenomenon involving ends and means (Lundquist, 1984). Pure structure models appear to be too crude in the light of empirical evidence as well as in terms of the level of theoretical understanding aimed at. Introducing internal choice variables increases empirical confirmation as well as theoretical coherence, but what kind of choice theory to choose? There seems to be a fundamental gulf between model simplicity and model realism. The realist models of policy-making and policy implementation suggest no limit to the amount of complexity and number of variables to be taken into account. On the other hand, the simple models of rational policy-making and top-down policy implementation appear to be only tools of analysis giving the policy analyst some direction as to where to look as policy-making and policy implementation deviates from model predictions. Judged by the practical criteria of usefulness and moral appeal there is a paradox in relation to the rational decision models. A Bayesian decision approach seems to offer most guidance about how to approach public policy problems, but at the same time the public choice models imply that a search for the public interest is not likely to come about. The realist models seem to deny that problems can be found for solutions.

It is hardly possible to argue that one of these four approaches to the policy process is superior to the others. They score differently on the various meta-theoretical criteria. The search for one true approach to the public policy process is a venture bound to fail. Model choice may be done in two fundamentally different ways. Either one may try to build a general model true, of each and every policy cycle interpreted in terms of the making and implementation of decisions rejecting various restrained models that have been falsified by the data. Or one may proceed in a relativistic fashion operating with a number of restrictive models but stating the limits of their applicability clearly.

Jan-Erik Lane

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**Literature**


