Between Ratio and Charisma – Max Weber’s Views on Plebiscitary Leadership Democracy

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Max Weber and Politics

General

In Germany Weber for a long time – until the recent work on the Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe really got started, with the resulting vitalization of German Weberology – remained largely a controversial political character. Weber has served many purposes, as the cultural hero who might have saved Germany from the disasters of the Weimar-republic, had he only lived longer; as a typical representative of the unawareness among German intellectuals of the dangers of the authoritarian rule, in accordance with the peculiarities of the German societal development (deutscher Sonderweg); and as a founding father of the new federal republic after the last war, inspiring the Heuss brothers.

In the United Kingdom the methodological aspects of Weber have been highly appreciated, sometimes also here in an even hagiographic manner, regarding him as an up-to-date-guide to modern research procedure.

In the USA the main role of Weber seems to have been in pioneering several substantial fields of research, such as the sociology of religion, theory of administration and bureaucracy, industrial sociology, and so forth, although there is a tension between empiricist and theoreticist interpretations of Weber in the New World.

A scholar whose work is so rich that it can be interpreted in so diversified directions is not that easy to grasp. In methodological matters Weber emerges both as a positivist, supporting the theoretical side in the controversy over method, and an antipositivist, launching the method of interpretative understanding (Verstehen). In politics he is both pioneering parliamentary democracy in Germany, as well as forestalling authoritarian Nazi rule, depending on whether the functional or romantic irrational aspects of his crucial concept of plebiscitary leadership democracy is stressed.

Evidently a balanced account of Weber is also a rare thing in the literature; there is still a sheer lack of dependable standard handbooks on Weber. His picture has been only partly painted and his production portioned out in bits and pieces.

Intelectual migrations is an important background factor to this scattered appearance of Weber. Its role has been discussed by H S Hughes (1975), Martin Jay (1973) and others, but exactly how this variable should be treated remains unclear. For example: both Marcuse and Bendix were German emigrees but played very different roles in relation to Weber, as indicated by their respective contributions to the 1964 congress in Heidelberg, dedicated to the centenary of Weber’s birth. In general, those with a serious scientific interest in Weber seem to be unaware of his contributions to the ordered discussions in and on politics, and those who take up these very aspects sometimes seem to regard them as a reason to neglect Weber scientifically or even criticize them as a sort of substitute for scientific criticism.

In this essay I will rather try to stress the rational or at least functional element in Weber’s political analysis, especially his typological approach to charismatic, plebiscitary, leadership.

In Reinhard Bendix’ authoritative book on Weber’s substantial sociology a rather retouched Weber is presented. “At his hands Weber’s nationalism and his emphasis on the role of charismatic leadership in a democracy appear far too blend and reassuring. The sharpness of the tone and the brutality and desperation of the thought...
have been flattened out; what emerges is a Weber cut down after forty years to the mild and well-ordered measure of America in 1960"; HS Hughes writes in a review.

On the other hand, it remained for a long time an obvious risk, as Bendix points out, that Weber's scientific writings in Germany would have been totally put ad acta and left to foreign judgement only. However, that impression certainly no longer stands, since German Weberology indeed catches up rapidly in the wake of the MWG-efforts and the debate on Weber's Gesamtedeutung, initiated by FH Tenbruck's thorough article in Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1975), with contributions by W Mommsen, W Hennis, W Schluchter etc.

The problem of science vs politics in Weber's production is, at least in practice accentuated when the very subject is political. Furthermore, there is no clear line of demarcation between Weber's political and scientific writings in the field of politics. In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (WuG) Weber treats political matters in a purely classificatory manner, outlining his ideal-types of different forms of legitimacy, like Carl von Linnaeus viewed flowers in nature. In his war-time articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung Weber conceives of political affairs in an empirical and scientific way, but here his aim is the normative one, to give policy recommendations to the leaders of the country. Thus these so called tagespolitische Kommentaren (comments on current politics) are value-oriented. We might take them as examples of "normative empirical theory" (i.e. instrumental means-end-analysis), applied on a situational level. There is, moreover, a third level of analysis in Weber's political writings, as when he writes about Germany and Russia in World politics, a sort of conjectural analysis neither ephemeral daily politics, nor scientific classification only, rather analyses with a "middle-range" time-horizon of – let's say – a couple of decades. Maybe the famous East of Elbe-studies on the Polish migrant farm workers in the Eastern border area is the best example of this sort of middle-analysis in the political sphere.

The boundaries between the different types of analysis is not that clear after all. Joh. Winckelmann has argued that some of Weber's articles, for example those collected under the common title "Parlament und Regierung in neugeordneten Deutschland", should be seen as a draft (Rohentwurf), preliminary version, for WuG. In Winckelmann's editions of Weber's WuG they are consequently included as appendix. Accordingly, moreover, Winckelmann tried to compose a Staatssozioologie (sociology of the state) from both Weber's political and scientific writings. This undertaking has been much criticized, by Mommsen and others, as an "Icarian flight". Since WuG is merely a torso and Weber himself never elaborated the political level in WuG systematically, there is some leeway for extrapolation, indeed complicating the modern evaluation of Weber.

Weber – a frustrated politician

Weber's call for value-freedom (Wertfreiheit) has often been misinterpreted. Although he does use the term it is in reality qualified to mean value-relation. (Wertbezogenheit). Weber did not, for example, say that scientists should not take normative stands. On the contrary, the methodological consequence of his value-theory is that the scientist should and must adopt normative stands – not necessarily his own – in order to conduct empirical investigations. But values and facts are not to be mixed. Weber's position is doubtful from a methodological perspective, since it seems to exclude the possibility of pure empirical explanatory theory, as W G Runciman (1972) and others have pointed out. However, we do not recognize the naive positivist Weber who Alvin Gouldner (1964) and others attack.

Right or wrong, Weber's methodology still marks a "break" or at least transition in relation to both earlier forms of inductivist and empiricist historicism, as well as to natural law normativism. Moreover, Weber's procedure is well in line with a long tradition of normative empirical theory, to be distinguished from purely explanatory empirical theory, the former still dominating in modern economically inspired policy analysis, its roots originally stemming from Hobbes and Machiavelli.

In consistence with Weber's reactions against "Systemsucht" we do not find any theory "proper" in Weber's production, although he nevertheless is a most important classic in what is conveniently referred to as "political theory", inspiring both Michels and Schumpeter in their reflections on competitive elites.

Weber simply had the intellectual strength and honesty to unite strong political commitments with unbiased search for truth – and keep these inclinations apart!
Weber's political values

Weber was a dedicated liberal even if he was pessimistic about the future of liberalism. He was concerned with the problems of freedom (freiehléiche Ordnung, is here a typical German term with a certain intrinsic ambiguity) in an age of growing bureaucratization. However, he despised the nostalgic visions of classical liberalism. In the days of Weber there were some tensions revealed between vision and reality which the classics were lucky to be unaware of. Historically speaking, mass democracy – a fairly late phenomenon – and individual rights are two different "projects". Moreover, since this secularized views on democracy left no room for the normative metaphysics of the "democratic spirit" he saw no necessary connection between democracy and freedom and/or equality.

Weber's special kind of liberalism has been characterized in different ways. Sometimes he is labeled a "pessimistic liberal", a "liberal in despair", an "aristocratic liberal" (Mommsen 1974) etc. Weber's national liberalism is adjusted to the particular German circumstances, i.e. the experience of late industrial development "from above" and old fashioned forms of authoritarian government, less adaptable to modern complex society. There is, however, no doubt that Weber is a dedicated liberal – of sort. Given the ensuing development in the field of normative democratic theory, the term "elitistic liberal" might be appropriate. Weber realized earlier than most others the conflict between participation and efficiency, a conflict generating much of later debate, for instance the famous American discussion between Dahl and others on the role of political apathy.

It is just as clear that all his life Weber was a nationalist and that the self-interest of the power-state was a most central concern to him. In his inaugural speech in Freiburg this is endorsed (1895), but also in his early investigations on the farm-workers East of the river Elbe, as well as his contributions during the war to the Frankfurter Zeitung, where his analyses seemingly had the national interest as their point of departure. Moreover, Weber's own political activities reflect the same priorities.

It might be a problem how the preferences were to be divided between Weber's liberalism and his nationalism. This problem, further, could be seen as somewhat hypothetical, since it is only acute to the extent these presumptive values were to collide in a concrete analysis. Nevertheless, since Weber's whole methodological procedure rests on value-relation and his philosophy of value does not provide us with any scientific method for the proper choice between the values serving as points of departure in alternative analyses, adjusted to competing value-hierarchies, it is quite illuminating to scrutinize Weber's own value-hierarchy, in order to understand his policy recommendations and the degree to which they are scientifically well-founded.

David Beetham, in his authoritative study on Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (1974, especially p.14 and p.54), speaks of a certain ambivalence between Weber's nationalism and his liberalism. This might be correct. A more important reason for Weber's desperation, however, is the tensions between liberal values and changing reality; after all it seems pretty clear that the national values are prior to other values in Weber's personal (as well as cultural significant) value-hierarchy. The would-be-value-dualism was at least nothing Weber himself was much plagued by. It is more of a retrospective construction, since liberalism and nationalism are not supposed to mix to well – any longer.

Weber's basic consistency is further indicated by his instrumental way of looking at imperialism, as a means to national unity and harmony between the great powers in Europe. In a certain sense imperialism might be understood as the opposite to (normative) liberalism, although it is of course equally possible to argue that it is an utmost consequence of liberalism as well. In the case of Weber, one might suggest ethnocentrism and unawareness of a coming nation building also among the colonies. Europe's dominance was taken for granted. In this respect Weber was old-fashioned.

We could, in passing, observe certain similarities between Weber and Lenin concerning imperialism, their normative attitudes in fact being the main difference. Empirically they are both modifying the liberal doctrines, as confronted with reality.

Beetham writes: "The character of Weber's nationalism was more subtle than Mommsen allows, while on the other side Weber's defenders fail to make clear what kind of 'liberalism' he was committed to, and ignore the tension between this liberalism and his other values" (p.14). This is a problematic passage, since it could easily cause misunderstandings. At first sight one is inclined
to say that Beetham misinterprets Weber's relationship to liberalism, as well as that of his critics—and that of his defenders. Still he catches an actual dividing-line between Weber's moralistic critics and defenders, both being inhibited to exceed the normative level of interpretation.

I am not sure there is that much of tension between Weber's liberalism and nationalism, although there is a disharmony between classical liberalism and Weber's variation of national liberalism. It is, again, important to note that Weber's critics have no intention to discredit his "liberalism" by some sort of "guilt association" (with ugly "jingoist" nationalism). Rather their criticism could be characterized as varied expressions of "moralistic liberalism", even if J P Mayer, in central respects anticipating this line of criticism against Weber, was more of a Christian than a liberal (Mayer 1944).

Weber's defenders, moreover, display a certain tendency to retouch Weber on the very points where he diverges too obviously from the doctrines of classical (normative) liberalism (for instance Loewenstein 1966). The Auseinandersetzung following Mommsen's famous dissertation (Mommsen 1959) to quite some degree is about to which extent Weber could truthfully be referred to as a founding father of the "liberal", in the original sense, restorazione after "Stunde Null" in the newly born Federal Republic. This is clearly a tacit dimension in recent German debate. The fragile tradition of constitutional liberalism lacked founding fathers in Germany — so it was necessary to create them out of ashes. Weber is a most crucial character in this context, since he evidently tried to introduce more modern, "democratic", forms of government in imperial Germany, in a mode adaptable to the German scenario, i.e. the prevailing peculiar anti-Enlightenment romantic and authoritarian creed. The 48ers, moreover, the old liberals from the national parliament in Frankfurt, were not much to build on, since they represented a failure, while Weber was merely unfilled.

As we will return to later these crucial points of retouché coincide with the points where Wolfgang Mommsen attacks Weber.

How would Weber's views differ, had he been only a nationalist and not a liberal at all? Putting the question that way is both revealing and somewhat distorting, since Weber is certainly never a passionate value-rational nationalist and the impulses from the Anglo-Saxon constitutional liberalism, as we will also return to, are predominantly to be understood on the cognitive level.

The classics are victims and vehicles, often used for purposes transcending their own horizon. This is not necessarily wrong but in the case of Weber it is not easy to integrate him in a fragile tradition of natural-law-inspired liberalism which in Germany got discredited already in the 1848 debacle, therefore to Weber naturally appearing as rather a negative example. Weber's value-philosophy, moreover, points in the same direction. Natural law is a tradition Weber transcends.

David Beetham's general perspective seems accurate: that more attention should be paid to the empirical, cognitive, content of Weber's political thinking.

Even if Weber could be seen as an example, one of many, of romantic reactions against Enlightenment — in that sense moreover representative of a constitutive element in deutscher Sonderweg — he nevertheless also introduces a rational mode of dealing with politics, be it in a political or scientific context.

My general perspective is that Weber is more rational (instrumental, functional) and coherent than is usually recognized in previous interpretations of, to mention a few examples, Karl Löwith (1939/40), J P Mayer (1944), G Lukács (1953), W Mommsen (1959).

True, Weber has a bourgeois activist inclination, which, however, not really violates his basic instrumentalism, rational means-end analysis.

As a dedicated national liberal of the post-1848-generation he might have to control his daemons when analyzing political topics, a self-control required by his scientific creed.

The Roots of Weber's Views on Politics

Weber was an outsider in his milieu, in the sense that he was not a "preservationist". He proposed a functional modernization of the old fashioned German Obrigkeitsstaat. He strived for the introduction of parliamentarianism, although — naturally — in a form adjusted to the peculiar German historical experience: i.e. rapid industrial growth brought about "from above", state idealism and authoritarianism, as interdepending factors. Weber's political writings reflect the German predicament, a result of "die verspätete Nation", to use Plessner's term, i.e. the typical delay in national awareness, ultimately caused by the 30-years war and prolonged fragmentation,
as well as a result of Romantic anti-Enlightenment creed, a resistance to Western rationalism in its purest forms. Cause and effect are not easily separated here, resulting in a voluminous debate on what makes German history different from that of the neighbouring nations. Anyway, Weber of course had to adjust his suggestions, in order to make them adaptable to his own country.

**Power politics**

The very concept of Machtpolitik is in itself something which obviously is not exclusively characterizing the German peculiar experience. However, it is a strong tradition there, partly due to the lack of democratic experiences. Bismarck and von Clausewitz go hand in hand promoting naked Realpolitik, a concept rather well characterizing a basic streak in Weber's thinking, even if he would not endorse the very term himself, since it in his days had special connotations.

Even if the tradition of Machtpolitik was especially vital in Germany almost all responsible actors in the international scene belonged to this tradition, one way or another, until the Second World War.

However, Weber's a-ethic realism, together with his naked "brutal" language, made him of course an easy target, "sitting bird" for a sort of moralizing normatively based denunciation.

In general, the normative controversies in the early Weber renaissance have obscured Weber's empirical qualities, as an analyst of political realities. As his political values have been more in focus he has for long been a neglected pioneer in substantial subject matters like the problematic relationship between the elite and the masses.

The theme of Weber and Machtpolitik was discussed at length at the Heidelberg centennial in 1964, where Raymond Aron delivered a lecture, stimulating the lot of comments from Mommsen and others.

Some general remarks

Weber pleaded for general and equal franchise and wanted to replace the anachronistic Imperial rule with responsible government, preferably with parliamentary forms. Weber belonged to the "Left" in the sense that word was used at the time, as a common label for liberals and socialists, that is those who worked for a further step, from constitutionalism to democratization. However, in the Prussian-dominated Germany not even the constitutional step was firmly established. "Extraordinary" rule was less extraordinary than in other countries, for one thing, and some typical middle age traditions, like private courts as a basis for political murders, to take an example significant as late as in the 20s, seemed to be more common in Germany than for instance in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the meaning of the concept "liberal" appears as somewhat more complex in Germany than in most other countries, because of the illiberal hegemony, following the debacle of 1848.

Although, again, Weber in his milieu was a
"democrat" he was free from the value-rational, ethical and ideological, normative motives, inspiring most other proponents of democratic rule and today, moreover, part of the "overideology" of democracy in most Western states. Weber appears as resistant to such natural natural law-inspired modes of thought.

Weber, however, was in favour of democracy and an abandoning of the hazardous personal rule of the (last) Kaiser, rather for instrumental reasons than because of extra-scientific value inclinations.

Two clarifications should be made at once, in order to avoid popular misunderstandings. First, there is a development in Weber's political orientation, from his early liberal-bourgeois militancy, as manifested in his youthful trumpet-sounds in Freiburger Antrittsrede (see below note 13), to speak with Golo Mann, to his much smoother and more moderate attitudes, for example vis-à-vis the German Social Democrats, in his mature days. In fact, his Burg Lauenstein encounters in 1917 indicates that he was on good speaking terms also with the radical revolutionaries, Mühsam and Toller, whose life he later saved.

Weber's early contacts with the Christian political leader and social reformist Friedrich Naumann contributed to give Weber a better understanding for at least the motives of the Social Democrats, although Weber is still to be characterized more as an adherent of the realpolitische than the sozialpolitische orientation within the Verein für Sozialpolitik, with its "miserabilism", as the more anti-state-interventionist Weber expressed it. Weber had been counselling Naumann for several years and found his idealism naive. Although these contacts also were a possibility for Weber to influence actual politics, he was himself to some extent influenced by the reformatory thoughts within Naumann's nationalsoziale party, a social liberal party formation at the turn of the century, that characteristically wanted to educate the people to make it more mature for political responsibilities and - for the same purpose - to advance its welfare.  

Development, however, does not exclude continuity, which I would suggest after all to be the most striking feature of Weber's thought. From the point of view of the national self-interest it also became more and more adequate to plead for a sort of consensus with the more and more powerful labour-movement, in order to anticipate a dangerous situation, with instability and unforeseeable alternatives, class-struggle turmoil. All his life Weber is a national liberal even if he is more "rightist" in his early years. Naturally Weber's personal political values, for the relevance it might have, were subject to change throughout his life - but the basic continuity of instrumental reason is more noteworthy from a methodological perspective.

Secondly, we must note that in Weber's famous inaugural speech in Freiburg in the mid 90s there is, admittedly, a certain mix-up of the political and scientific aspect. At least there is no distinct demarcation. Now, the very occasion of an inaugural speech is not quite to be equalled with seminar-room activities, having rather the character of academic celebration. Nevertheless, Weber's speech has a most vigilant political creed. It can be read as a programmatic declaration of bourgeois activism.

We should carefully note, however, that Weber's interest in the problems of objectivity of social science peaks a decade later, when his methodological production really gets started, after his recovery from the mental problems following his Father's death. Moreover, even if Weber's inaugural speech has the character of a political program, it does not necessarily follow from this that it contradicts his principal views on science vs politics, later elaborated. Weber's political points of view are most explicitly stated, well in line with the value-philosophical ideal he (and Machiavelli as well as Gunnar Myrdal) stood for; what we might characterize as "normative empirical theory", with its typical lack of natural law and its utilization of means-end rationality.

"Ich bin ein Mitglied der bürgerlichen Klassen, fühle mich als solches und bin erzogen in ihren Anschauungen und Idealen. Allein es ist der Beruf gerade unserer Wissenschaft, zu sagen, was unernst gehört wird, - nach oben, nach unten, und auch der eigenen Klasse, - und wenn ich mich frage, ob das Bürgertum Deutschlands heute reif ist, die politische leitende Klasse der Nation zu sein, so vermag ich heute nicht diese Frage zu bejahen." (GPS 1958, p.20). This central passage in Freiburger Antrittsrede is illustrative.

Weber's aim is to make the unpolitical German bourgeoisie aware of its political responsibilities. From the scientific aspect he might have chosen a more suitable occasion for this. On the other hand, it must be admitted that his significant value-aspects, normative points of departure, are
most explicitly revealed; well in accordance with secular instrumental scientific procedure. His analysis is political – but not really suffused with extrascientific normativism. It is all lucid.

If we restrict our concern to the pure cognitive level I would suggest that even if differences naturally are at hand in several respects, due to a changing reality, the most striking impression after all is the continuity between the “young” and the “mature” Weber. If we compare Freiburger Antrittsrede (officially “Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik”) with “Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland”, his most important Entäußerung during the war, we will in both cases find the national concern as uppermost value and, moreover, the legacy of Bismarck providing the starting point, the problem formulations. The British model appears as a paradigm to learn from.

The Legacy of Bismarck

One might say that Bismarck really overshadows all later German politics, in his making of Continental European history in fact providing the main political elements in deutscher Sonderweg. Of course the roots of the peculiar German Development could be traced much, much, further back in history – for instance the 30-years war causing the typical delay in national development – but during Bismarck’s long rein the realities of policy making those were to be taken into account around the turn of the century were shaped.

It is sometimes jokingly noted that there are two types of Germans, one which always speaks of Goethe, the other always about Bismarck. However, this is no real contradiction: the unpolaritical and state-interventionist attitude in fact supplementing each other well.

Bismarck had not done anything to facilitate his succession, resulting in a vacuum, a crisis of leadership, after his downfall. The Prussian Junkers were still sitting in unaltered estate. On traditional grounds, with traditional legitimacy, in Weber’s terminology, they exercised an unproportional power. Their members provided the dominating recruitment basis for both the military officer corps as well as the state officials, the Beamtenum. Moreover, they did not exactly exercise this power in the interest of the whole nation. Their activities were rather determined by class egoism. Without Bismarck being at the helm nobody really controlled their power.

The Junkers’ lack of responsibility is the main target of Weber’s criticism in his investigations of the farm workers East of the river Elbe. Those enormous investigations were sponsored by the Verein and published during the 90s (recently all republished in the Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe).

The echoes of this early engagement in what we might today call policy science are evident in the Freiburger Antrittsrede. It was, according to Weber, better to employ the Junkers, since the Polish labour force had lower material expectations than had the German, i. e. worked for lower wages. However, the short-sighted interests of the Junkers did not at all coincide with the best interest of the new German Reich. Its boundaries in the east, with czarist Russia, were weakened, as a consequence of Junker class egoism. Increase of the heterogeneity in the population did hardly harmonize with the state-interest, which rather called for further Germanization. Weber simply recommended an end to this Gastarbeiter-inflow. Partly this stand – aside from the interest of the state to achieve ethnic homogeneity, especially in the border areas – also reflects a certain “Russophobia” in Weber’s political thinking, as Beetham rightly has indicated (Beetham 1974, a whole chapter dedicated to Weber’s analyses of Russia).

Weber’s analyses basically in a coherent way express the primary goal to stabilize the new Germany as a nation. The Prussian Junkers, alas, were less receptive to the national task than the more successful British aristocracy.

Weber wished for a responsible and instrumental – modernized if we want – leadership of the nation, more “tuned in” with the common interests of the whole German nation. The general crisis in agriculture made the double loyalties of the Junkers an acute problem, since they were both carrying the structure of the central administration, as Prussian bureaucrats, and being threatened as a class with eroding material basis. The means at their disposal for fighting for survival were thus on a collision-course with vital state-interests, according to Weber.

Weber’s actual general problem was: which force would now be called in to take up the fallen mantle after Bismarck, the greatest Junker, the utmost founding father of the new German nation, who had recently fulfilled the unification of the most of Germany in a way pretty similar to Lincoln’s unification of the USA. Bismarck had no doubt been efficient in most instances, albeit a
victim of his own aparliamentarian system: his forced resignation, soon after Wilhelm II:s ascendance, created an enormous vacuum.

The industrialization of Germany had been a very rapid process. The custom tariff union and other arrangements created the preconditions for a growth in the economy that left the oldfashioned political system far behind, because of the typical lack of bourgeois political break-through, revolution as "modern capitalization in feudal guise". This is one factor contributing to the so called **deutscher Sonderweg**, as already Veblen had observed. Germany was all of a sudden a world-leading industrial power, lagging behind their competitors in political development.

Bismarck had kindly made the unpatriotically minded German Bourgeois classes part of the economic process, including providing them some of its fruits, without delegating any of his power. The German Bourgeoisie was certainly no driving force, as compared with other Western countries. It was rather detached to performing a political role and grateful to the worldly power already institutionalized. The **Bürgers** were **Unter­tanen**, subjects to rule. The state-interventionist transition "from above" was the natural way in Germany, due to its history. The traditions and pre-requisites to be found in France and England, where radical changes had long ago made new groups part of the political game, simply were not at hand. The German Bourgeoisie had never "chopped off a king's head", as Weber regrettingly expressed its apolitical predicament. It was politically inhibited and apt to rely on others' authority. Ever since the total debacle of 1948 in Frankfurt, where the authority of the parliament just faded away – as being more of a speaking than an acting institution – German development had been more and more depending upon the state of Prussia, imposed upon more and more Germans, to their benefit. The legacy from Napoleonic modernization in Westphalia worked the same direction, modernizing from above and destroying the old German system of representation. The French and the British had a state to build their nations on; in Germany it must first be created, a task where the liberal bourgeoisie failed.

After 1871 the lack of political education, to borrow Lawrence Scaff's (1973) term, still created enormous unforeseen problems. No parliamentary institutions were established, in a way matching the democratization in other Western countries (i.e. there were both parliament and franchise – but the **Kanzler** was responsible for his actions to the **Kaiser**). The short and most unhappy history of German liberalism is of course an important part of the political vacuum. It should be added that the cultural aspect of the **Sonderweg** originally also involves a reaction against the Enlightenment, of which liberalism is a part.

The labouring classes were not as yet integrated into the German society. Bismarck neutralized them politically, utilizing a combination of Draconian anti-socialist laws and reformatory social policy. "Zuckerbrot und Peitsche" was Bismarck's characteristic expression for this "package deal". Even if the German workers did not cope with Germany's political development either, they too received some fruits of the industrial growth. The standard of living of the workers was not lagging behind that of the neighbouring countries. However, their political significance was restricted, predominantly to being subject to anticipating reactions, i.e. welfare reforms. Prussian social policy under Bismarck was pioneering in bringing about pension funds and insurance-systems etc. This should be pointed out since it is sometimes forgotten that the modern welfare state – not only in Germany – has a feudal, patrimonial, background as well as a "de Tocquevillian" background of mass democracy, in which the socialist mass movement obtains a substantial stake in exercising the power of taxation, utilizing the right to vote.

The power structure in Germany, however, did not correspond at all to the active forces in society. It was in that sense corrupt, outdated. In the political vacuum after Bismarck the lack of real responsible leadership became increasingly acute, resulting in an uncontrolled power exercised by the state bureaucracy, which was the body coming closest to filling this vacuum. Hence the Junker influence automatically grew even stronger. Against the background of rapidly changing socioeconomic structures this very influence, moreover, became ever more anachronistic. The Junker-recruited **Beamtenstum** embodied Prussia as an **Obrigkeitstaat**.

The ongoing industrialization and the growth of the working class gave more and more significance to the so called **Arbeitfrage**, the problem of how to treat the workers, integrate this new class into the nation. It was still an open question
which way the labour movement would choose: the revolutionary, the trade-unionist, or the reformist, as has been thoroughly scrutinized by Guenther Roth (1963).

One aspect of *die verspätete Nation*, was, further, the typical German lack of regional integration. The new German Reich after Koniggrätz was a fruit of Bismarck's so called *kleindeutsche Lösung*, that is, roughly ten millions ethnic Germans in the Hapsburg empire were simply left aside. Their task was to 'neutralize' some 20 millions Slavonians. There were, moreover, considerable tensions within the Prussia-dominated new Imperial Germany. Bavaria was tricked into Germany through the provoked French declaration of war; Bismarck's purpose with the game around the famous Benedetti-dispatch in Ems. A lot of Bavarians were separatists and some would have preferred a union with Austria instead. Prussians have never been very popular in Bavaria, they are aliens there. There is to be true, a certain ambivalence in the Bavarian attitudes to Bismarckian Reichsgründung. There is only one Bismarck monument in Bavaria — but the first one. Separatism was also a reality in the predominantly Catholic Rheinland. The province of East-Prussia, moreover, had never been a part of the old German Reich, now, however, being naturally included in the newly created nation. German unification in a sense was created from outside. During the Gründerjahre there was not much of common national awareness; the creed of the nation-building efforts was rather Prussian state-idealism than spontaneous nationalism. It was not, after all, a long time since Fichte had to teach the gospel of a nation, stimulated by the Napoleonic turmoil. There was, thus, plenty of space and mission for the sort of nationalism of which Weber himself was a propounder. Many university professors, as being "cosmopolits" within Germany, so to speak, felt a special responsibility for the national creed, to some extent then also incarnating it, since they never rooted enough in one place to become attached to a certain region. Weber himself was a good example of this, borned in Erfurt, with roots in Bielefeld, raised in Berlin, positions in, among other places, Freiburg and Heidelberg, ending up in Munich, after a period in Vienna. This is rather typical than exceptional. There was, moreover, certainly a strong need for a countervailing force, balancing the regionalism, still today a most significant phenomenon in German politics (especially in Bavaria, of course).

In the German political culture at the turn of the century there was a longing for "strong men", which Bismarck in his days had satisfied. The Kaiser was not to be taken seriously in this connection, being more of a *poseur*. The personal rule became an acute problem with a man like Wilhelm II as ruler, especially in the field of foreign policy. The contrast to Bismarck's goal-oriented performance in that field was enormous.

Bismarck is naturally still a most controversial person in German history writing, generating many learned books, from Wehler to Engelberg, and disputes. He certainly got a lot of things done — but also initiated several of the difficulties Germany later had to deal with. Thus, for instance, he was the immediate background to Weber's special combination of liberalism and nationalism, creating the situation that Weber had to analyze. The legacy of Bismarck is the "common denominator" in Weber's analyses during 1895 and 1917–18.

After having sketched the domestic scenario that Bismarck, "a dutiful German servant of Wilhelm I", left behind, it is still necessary to take his foreign policy into account. It is claimed that he had a responsibility for the preconditions of the First World War, not so much because of the French-German war 1870–71 as his unwillingness to endorse German power expansion outside Europe, overseas. "Deutschland ist saturiert" is the phrase from Bismarck which we often hear in this context. Bismarck liked to host international conferences, in which the continents across the oceans were divided among Germany's European competitors. The natural inclination of Germany was rather to become the leading land-based power on the European continent, to the annoyance of the French and the Russians.

A lack of balance thus was bound to emerge in colonial ambitions, between the great powers of Europe. Germany certainly was not alien to the compensatory idea of hegemony on the European continent. Maybe we ought to recall in this context that the world wars — in reality a European civil war with a twenty years long break — in Marxist terminology is labeled an "imperialist redistributive war", for good reasons.

If Germany, in line with Weber's views, had tried to get hold of a "fair deal" of overseas colonies the wars might never had happened; the relations between the great powers of Europe becoming more relaxed. The German ambitions before 1914 were hardly more farreaching than to be-
come another world-power, to take its place aside Great Britain and other nations, no matter the confusing and threatful marine enthusiasm of the Kaiser ("Germany's future is to be found on the oceans"). The famous Fischer-thesis of course points in another direction but this is hardly a well-proven stand. "Weltmachststellung" does not have to mean more than being a "junior-partner to Britain", as Göring said, in conversations with a young Swedish industrialist, Marcus Wallenberg jtr. 16

There is, in fact, a coincidental similarity between Weber's and Hitler's views on German foreign policy, ambiguously vacillating between Bismarck and Wilhelm II, although Weber of course was most critical of the lack of instrumentality in the Kaiser's behaviour. It should further be added that had the Bismarckian foreign policy gone on in line with its original conduct - the good relationship with czarist Russia as the cornerstone - nothing fatal would probably have happened, since the entire alliance-system of Europe would have been different in such a case, the entente never created. The quite unnatural - from the historical point of view - alliance between France and the United Kingdom, as well as the growing estrangement between Germany and Russia, after the pact between the countries not being prolonged in the early 90s and the Russians then in effect forced to turn to others (i.e. France) to borrow money, were both to quite some extent a result of Wilhelm II's well documented talent to tease and upset his neighbouring countries, without any obvious instrumental purpose. This, together with the very rapid German accumulation of strength, economically and military, made especially the French feel an acute danger of being once and for all overshadowed as a significant European power. In fact, most fatal developments in 20th century European history have been generated by French security striving, while hazardous German conduct triggers off the actual calamities (i.e. two world wars). 17

The relation between domestic and foreign policy is a very complex one, in Weber's thinking as well as in reality. (A more early) German imperialism without exceptions would have served both the purposes of harmony between the classes within Germany, as well as the harmony between the great powers, who were otherwise likely to, sooner or later, get into conflicts in Europe. Thus imperialism in a double sense would have been instrumental to promoting stability. This is the Weberian view purified.

Weber's views are enigmatic, but he appears foremost as a friend of peace who realizes the role of war and military potential in the anarchic game of power between the supreme powers. Just as in the case of Hobbes such thinking is most empirically accurate, although ever decreasingly. There is a tendency in the direction of international norm-building, as incarned in the UN, and states do not normally attack each other any longer. In fact, any example of a War between democratic states is hard to find. However, even if war is ever more unmodern and less instrumental - basically a feudal phenomenon - still potentiality of violence, war, seems indispensable to peace. "A power-state" represents an obstacle and danger in the eyes of other power states, and may consequently, simply because of its potential ability to play a role in foreign affairs, be drawn into the manoeuvres of international politics", as HH Bruun puts it (1972, here quoted after Beetham: Op. cit. p. 133). There is no way for a nation to "play its cards" so to speak. From this point of view the calamities the Germans brought over their heads might seem surprising, since their cards were good. A vital and growing nation in the middle of Europe, moreover the largest central people the Germans was in a powerful position no matter its own wishes. The Germans had to pursue their own national self-interest, in an instrumental way, war being a last - and not desired - political method, as Clausewitz would say. It was, however, still a rather normal method. Not until after the A-bomb and UN-
charter has war really become more of an anoma-
lie, an accident. In fact, war is a lingering Feudal
phenomenon. In the Feudal epoch land was es-
tential to wealth, typical of a farming society,
whereas today war is replaced or pursued by
means of international trade.

In many ways Weber differs to the better from
both Bismarck's continental politics and Wilhelm
II's inconsistent, ostentious "Weltpolitik". "A
peace which simply ensured 'that Germany's boot
trod on every foot in Europe' would lack the es-
tential political element necessary to secure Ger-
many's future interest and influence in the
world", is how Beetham illustratively expresses
Weber's view on the state of affairs in Europe
that the First World War had brought about (Op.
cit., p 140).

A stable balance satisfying every nation's secu-
ry interests is hard to create in an anarchic in-
ternational order, since there are no means, ex-
cept for negotiations and patient confidence-
building, tested in the handling of crises. In a
"Hobbesian", in effect lawless, order a balance is
the only we can hope for.

It should be further noted, as observed by
Beetham too, that there is a development in
Weber's political thinking, from the early analy-
ses of German domestic policy, via his analyses
from 1905 (specifically on Russian affairs), where
political phenomena are brought into a wider
context, to the more fullfledged international
analyses, with their reciprocity between Germa-
ny's international affairs and the domestic rela-
tionship between the German social classes. Par-
allels could here, moreover, easily be made with
both Lenin/Hobson as well as later so called
bribe-theory interpretations of imperialism
(Apel).

Weber did obviously not have particularly high
expectations that either the bourgeoisie or the
working class should fill the vacuum after Bis-
marck. "Nicht aus eigener Kraft des Bürgertums
ist der deutsche Staat geschaffen worden, und als
er geschaffen war, stand an der Spitze der Nation
jene Caesarengestalt aus anderem als bürgerli-
chem Holze" (Weber: GPS, pp 20–21). The
workers' political leaders were characterized thus
by Weber: "Kümmerliche politische Kleinmeis-
ter sind sie, – es fehlen ihnen die grossen Macht-
instinkte eine zur politischen Führung berufenen
Klasse" GPS, pp 22).

There was thus a lack of a spontaneous creed
for power, to take command, being part of the
background to Weber's political "theory", to use
a – in connection with Weber – somewhat du-
bious terms. As Lawrence A Scaff puts it: "One
cannot intellectually invent effective and genuine
values or a new political ethos, when not provid-
ed by a tradition, they only emerge gradually
through social practice" (APSR, 1973, p 140).

The British Model

This Weberian predicament has recently been
scrutinized also by Regis Factor & Stephen Turn-
er, from the point of view of the applicability of
the English parliamentary model in the peculiar
German case. "England obsessed the Germans,
and academics of bourgeois origin in particular.
At the time of the revolution in 1848, England
had everything that Germany did not – a unified
nation, an empire and therefore a leading place in
the world politics, modern industry, a bourgeo-
sie that shared in ruling the nation, and a legal
structure in which a minimum of basic rights were
assured. Thus England became a source of in-
spiration and a model. She also became a source
of self-doubt for Germans." (Turner & Factor
1984b, p 39).

Many German scholars were naturally ob-
essed with the success of British imperialism.
"How come that our 'cousins' on the other side of
the channel succeed where we fail", was a natural
question to ask for any German. Even Hitler lat-
er on expressed admiration for the British, stating
that if Germany should have ruled India it would
have needed not a couple of hundred thousands
of civil servants but millions of bureaucrats. One
could, further, note that the British aristocracy
certainly produced more distinguished political
personalities, while its Prussian counterpart was
more exclusively dedicated to the enjoyment of
countryside life, like hunting etc. The British
connection is also of importance for Weber's po-
litical application of the Charisma-concept.

Weber's political writings

The boundaries between Weber's political and
scientific writings on politics are not that clear, as
already indicated, for instance in Freiburger An-
trittsrede (Weber 1895). Certainly Weber's inter-
est in politics takes both scientific as well as polit-
cical manifestations. In WuG chains of definitions,
categories, are built up – often misinterpreted as
theory – to provide devices for the study of poli-
tics. For this purpose the concept of charisma was
developed.

However, Weber's tagespolitische Kommenta-

ren have scientific qualities, too. The contributions to Frankfurter Zeitung during the war have the character of policy recommendations, for the policy makers to adopt or not. The concept of plebiscitary leadership is more frequent in Weber's political writings, and - roughly - corresponds to the concept of charisma in Weber's opus magnum, as WuG is often labeled (although certainly not uncontested).99

We have already mentioned Joh. Winckelmann's effort to comprehend a Weberian Staatssoziologie out of some of the war-time articles, an attempt at symptomatic readings, reconstruction, which has been heavily criticized because of its overexploitation of the systematic character of Weber's work - after all Weber essentially merely responded to events brought over his head, as a responsible German citizen. However, there is still a noteworthy calculating realism in Weber's analyses that certainly makes him differ from most fellow nationalists. Sometimes this is labeled Reappolitik, a somewhat problematic term which Weber himself wouldn't have liked.

Winckelmann has, moreover, naturally been criticized for his "normative extrapolation", that he actually ascribes certain value-objectivist, nay, even natural law elements to Weber's Herrschaftsoziologie; the categories of legitimation supposed to have some limits with regard to its 'legality', that would suffuse their empirical, cognitive, qualities.30

Weber's systematic analysis of power in WuG is divided into two parts. One might say that those parts of WuG where the legitimation parts are to be found actually are of a less formal character, more historical than the earlier parts. In the fifth German edition edited by Winckelmann we find "Die Typen der Herrschaft" in the first part, and "Soziologie der Herrschaft" towards the end of the exposition (pp 122-76 and pp 541-586, respectively). These are the texts where Weber most extensively deals with the concept of charisma.

Rationality and politics

"Aber es gibt nur die Wahl: Führerdemokratie mit 'Maschine' oder Führerlose Demokratie, das heisst: Die Herrschaft der 'Berufspolitiker' ohne Beruf, ohne inneren, charismatischen Qualitäten, die eben zum Führer machen", Weber writes in "Politis als Beruf", one of the famous so called twin-lectures from his late years (GPS, p 532).

These were the alternatives Weber saw, to fill the vacuum after Bismarck: inspired charismatic leadership, or routinized bureaucracy, whether state- or party bureaucracy. There is an obvious immanent tension between the pure political calling and the rational administration, since the great charismatic personality can hardly be calculated, predicted, but rather provides the aims or directions for the rational calculate. A few eminent, outstanding, personalities could lead the others, the mass, if they managed to control the political "machine". The machines arose with the caucuses, the nationwide party organizations that could occure when communications as well as general popular education (with regard to illiteratism) had improved. Weber's elitism is reflected in his views on leadership: these charismatic heroic characters should not interpret the will of the people, rather create, or impose, it. Weber certainly appears as an anti-Rousseauian in this sense.31

Even if Weber sometimes is accused - correctly - of overstressing the role of charisma in modern empirical reality we should note that the routinization of charisma is at least just as important a phenomenon, as charisma itself. In Weber's pessimistic vision the charismatic outburst are now and then occuring attempts to liberate us from the fetters of the otherwise irreversable fatal process of rationalization, which in the long run is hard to avoid, due to its very character likely to gain the upper-hand.

As Weber once put it in an often quoted passage: "Der Puritaner wollte Berufsmensch sein, wir müssen es sein". Once upon a time there was maybe a choice, but ever since the Western process of rationalization had its "take-off" we are stuck in the iron cage. Once enlightened with the impulses of rational calculation one cannot really be expected to plan irrationally, just for the fun of it, in order to preserve traditional values in the human sphere. Moreover, there is quite a risk that we don't recognize those values and their small concrete manifestations until it is too late, when they have already once and for all been rationalized away. Today we go to the shopping malls rather unreflectingly, no matter how much we miss the small "Papa and Mama"-shop around the corner, and small shops still surviving will hardly get any efficient support to keep on, since the nostalgic values they provide are not easily subject to rational calculation. Those in charge of the distribution - "circulation", as Marx would say - would rather prefer to see them disappear totally, on wholly rational ground.
There is a rational basis for Weber’s fatalism concerning what the Puritan ethic brought over our heads.\(^{22}\)

In the German pseudo-constitutional system that Weber had to deal with, if we return to the specific application field of politics and its rationalization, neither chancellor nor emperor provided unambiguous leadership, thus in fact weakening the power of uncontrolled Junker-bureaucracy – which furthermore was exposed to double loyalties: the nation or their own class. Alas they did not coincide. If the political power in reality tended to be in the hand of the state-bureaucracy (Beamtenherrschaft) the political game became merely a chimera. The emperor was unable to fill the leadership function in an ever more complex system of government, with too many complicated functions requiring not easily controlled specialized competence. The chancellors were inhibited because of the outdated unparliamentary system, being principally responsible to the emperor instead of the popularly elected Reichstag, parliament, thus lacking a mandate from increasingly important, large groups, vital factors, in modern political life, like the still rather subservient bourgeoisie or the arising labour movement. The bureaucracy itself is not really to blame in a situation without a strong hand to obey; the bureaucracy had not created the situation and the vacuum after Bismarck had to be filled somehow.\(^{23}\)

Education of responsible leadership as well as an effective control of the bureaucracy (and specialized expertise) were good things that parliamentarism would make real, according to Weber’s view. The political machine should be put to instrumental use; calculating science puts the means to the disposal of the leader. But the charisma, in itself not rational, generates the goals, the uppermost values, needed as guidelines for political striving and achievement. Thus political action is rendered meaning. Politics becomes – after Enlightenment – increasingly a playground for the theodicy-problem.

In the long run – here Weber’s heroic pessimism does not leave us much hope – charisma tends to become institutionalized, in traditional or legal-rational rule, in the Occident predominately the latter. Charisma only gives us some hope to “break-through” the iron cage and to counteract the growing power of bureaucracy, but realistically only as a delaying factor, without the realistic ability to provide us a lasting alternative. Charisma has the nature of an unstable phenomenon.

Bureaucracy as such is universal, although the trend of rationalization is a special feature of the Occident; however, with irreversible effects diffusing to other cultures, thus becoming universal. In the West many-faceted rationalization is a dominating large-scale phenomenon that nobody can realistically escape, in the long run (Thoreau made an attempt at Walden pound).

Worldwide it gets the upper-hand, besieging alternative cultures, as illustrated by the case of Japan – where Weber is also eagerly studied because of the rapid modernization process Japan underwent. It is of course an uttermost remarkable historical phenomenon that small fragmentarized Europe, merely a small peninsula on the Euro-Asian land mass, with the lot of competing older and more advanced cultures, still managed to dominate the whole world, so soon after the birth of Modernity, Renaissance rationalism combined with the Reformation and its puritan working creed triggering off a growth of rationality, soon enough to become an uncontrollable force of its own, taking command over the individual “carriers” of the aquisitive lifestyle. We do not know what would have happened, had for instance modern capitalism been imposed from above in Mandarin China, and thus the capabilities of the most advanced culture had been coordinated to bring about the development which now, as it actually happened, weak Europe came to pioneer.

There are universal elements in modern market calculability, which constitute the secularizing process born in the Renaissance era. For instance, the muslims might for religious reasons cling to non-interest principles in banking, still utilizing modern Western computer techniques. In its early phases the very idea of rational – calculable – book-keeping had a similar effect, i.e. indispensable once inaugurated. The very irreversible character of the process creates this typical predicament, the combination of pride and despair, which the Western destiny imposes upon us, prisoners in the Western iron cage.\(^{24}\)

What also happens in the West is that rationality and bureaucracy merge. Ever growing resources are put at the disposal of the executive power, as a consequence of the rationalization in the sphere of politics. Moreover, to a growing extent, and partly due to the rationalization and routinization, the power is even hard to locate, much less control, then, which is the background to recent investigations in Scandinavia, where the
governments sponsor research on the topic of where to find the power. Realities were less opaque when we saw the castle on the hill and knew that there was the seat of the worldly power, with the capacity to force, kill and purge - and protect. The power of Hobbes's Leviathan might have been more absolute than modern mass democratic governments – but also less significant and farreaching in its scope. The present difficulties to even find the power is of course also to ascribe to a certain hypocrisy in "de Tocquevillian" modern mass democracies – concerning the use of power, force – ultimately violence. Leviathan puts on his Sancta Claus-face, so to speak.55

It might be seen as ironic, certainly stimulating reflections on purpose vs actual outcome, that human activities with rationality as a resulting consequence themselves are historically not rational. The Puritan wanted to please God and thus obtain a mortgage in eternity, which does not sound too rational thinking, from a secular perspective. The activities he pursues, working, saving, accumulating, calculating, as described by Ben Franklin (although in its institutional phase), triggers off a process he cannot control himself, with everlasting consequences. The modification should be made that the Puritan attitude in a way actually reflects a rational mode of thinking, although not always economically rational in itself. The Puritan believed himself to be instrumental in the pursuit of eternal salvation. A timid farmer might avoid getting too deep in debt, thus postponing necessary rationalization, no matter how hard he works and saves. The results of the same attitudes differ, due to circumstances, in one case Breakthrough to modern capitalism, in the other backwardness.

Once the attitudes are secularized and the original superstructure, in this case the interest in eternal life, to be sorted on the right side at Doomsday, is forgotten, there is no return. One might reflect that the irrationality in Weber's philosophy of history, his world-view, in so far seemingly has empirical support that the correlation between purpose and outcome, telos and effect, by no means is instrumental in this very case.

The original Puritan is replaced by unconditionally rational actors. We might recall one of Weber's examples in his essay on the Protestant sects, where religious matters are transformed into a ritual in order to gain credibility; an attitude manifest already in Ben. Franklin's famous "Advice to a young tradesman".26

Similar, or at least parallel, to how the Puritan forgets the original motive, machine politics are also to be combined with any goal. We can bring to our mind the difference between Aristotle and Machiavelli, to the former telos was built into the analysis, while Machiavelli breaks with the natural law-tradition that Aristotle anticipates. The best winner of the power-game might turn out to be the one without any purposes, playing the game for its own sake.

That the politicians tend to forget the original motives for their power dedication, power becoming an end in itself, is the danger with the Weberian decisionism that the critics never get tired of pointing out. However, this is more a philosophical than an empirical matter.

We should note a terminological confusion concerning "bureaucratic rule", sometimes referring to the real power being in the hands of the bureaucrats, like in Prussia occasionally at the turn of the century, but also sometimes used to characterize machine politics as such, i.e., bureaucracy "rules" but is subordinated to a distinct political will with some sort of mandate, legitimating its power, and thus responsible, according to common doctrine; responsibility in this case meaning that power and control should reflect each other, in other words the minimization of the exercise of uncontrolled power.

Weber of course tries to promote political responsibility in the latter sense, his anti-Junker creed being one manifestation of this. What is not on the agenda in the case of Weber is the Utopian alternative notion of an egalitarian anarchic society without any power-relations, like in Habermas's reborn Utopianism of rational communication of a basically Socratic type, replacing the means of violence as the ultimate political resource with the force of rational argument (Habermas 1984).

The entrance of the mass into politics did change the preconditions of political conduct but not necessarily its ends. "As with other so-called 'elite theorists', the involvement of the mass in politics was not regarded by Weber as modifying the fact of oligarchy, but rather the methods by which the few were selected", as Beetham writes (1974, p 103). The politicians so to speak had to play the other instruments, to gain a new "musicality"; in order to balance the vital forces of society.

The relationship between participation and efficiency, mass and elite, is probably the field where Weber contributes the most to a more "eternal" debate; still central topic for disputing
scholars in political philosophy. Both Schumpeter and Michels are working with Weberian themes, those were, again, certainly not originally invented by Weber, who himself was influenced by Ostrogorski, among others.27

Führerauslese

As we already hinted at, the parliament was to Weber a "school", training ground, for the education of responsible leadership, a method of selection, Führerauslese, not the expression of the will of the people, a Romantic "Rousseauian", concept certainly most alien to Weber. "Aber – ach wie viel Resignation werden Sie noch über sich ergehen lassen müssen! Solche Begriffe wie 'Wille des Volkes', wahrer Wille des Volkes, existieren für mich schon lange nicht mehr, sie sind Fiktionen", as Weber writes to his protegé Michels. Although such illusions still might have a cohesive function in the societal belief system, in order to make democracy work, to render it an "overideology", any scholar having transcended the limits of natural law prudishness is actually himself resistant to the validity claim of such notions. We might compare with Machiavelli's so called double moral, one for the ruler and another for the subjects. Some belief-system, ideology, might be most instrumental to the maintenance of legitimate rule, although its actual propositions are not viable to scientific testability.

The role of the Caesaristic or charismatic leader was, however, not restricted to generating new values that the people could believe in and strive for, and to counterwall the ever increasing bureaucratization. He should, moreover, be able to lead, to take the initiative, to appeal to the masses, so to speak coordinating their potential strength into efficient action, bringing about, for instance, national "Dunkirk spirits", to allude on a famous recent example, from the Second World War.

The parliament should, on its part, be a working and not only discussing body, hereby distinguishing itself from the unsuccessful Frankfurt parliament, a traumatic experience to all German liberals. Weber pleaded for parliamentary commissions with investigating – and controlling – functions, like already practiced in other countries, for instance England.

The position of the leader – his power base both within and outside the parliament – creates certain problems. Still, such a position is something the charismatic leader has in common with all constitutional heads, in systems where parliamentary rule is not yet institutionalized in a totalizing way, but still a practice of some sort of division of power, as an expression of constitutionalism.

Given later fatal experiences of history in Germany, the traumatic experience of the NS-rule, it is easy to say that Weber evidently overlooked the crucial conflicts between parliament and charismatic leader that might occur, with the exception for the problem of peaceful dethronization and replacement of a strong but "used" plebiscitary "Caesar", which was a problem of obvious concern in Weber's mind.

Occasionally the charismatic leadership, in its Caesaristic variation especially, stood above constitutional praxis, indeed this even being an important element behind its innovative capacity.

The British connection

In general Weber was more influenced by the actual development of the political system in the homelands of classical liberal parliamentarism, conceived from German spectacles, than of the normative doctrines, which due to their nature are regarded as being of fictitious character, in the "Machiavellian", anti-natural law-tradition of which Weber is an eminent example. Moreover, Weber had of course to adopt the British model in a way adjusted to the special German conditions, the authoritarian structures of the Prussian Obrigkeitsstaat.

In the USA the spoil-system had been an important element in the executive power, since the democratic breakthrough with Andy Jackson's rise to power in 1829. In the United Kingdom Gladstone's demagogic talents had transformed the members of parliament into a bunch of "voting cattle", subordinated to the "whip" of the party. So even if Thomas Carlyle's Romantic great leader should have a more receptive audience in anti-Enlightenment Germany, in accordance with deutscher Sonderweg, he also had quite a playground in the traditional pioneering countries of liberal democracy, enough means of power in his hands to assure efficient leadership. The complicated and highly emotional issue of Home rule for Ireland is a parade example to Weber (referred to in "Politics as a Vocation"). When Gladstone's followers fall in line that is not due to any deeper inner affection or engagement for his policy as such, rather a recognition of his ability as a leader and a trust in his charismatic
personal authority. The party tends to obey because: "1886 war die Maschine bereits derart vollständig charismatisch an der Person orientiert, dass, als die Home-Rule-Frage aufgerollt wurde, der ganze Apparat von oben bis unten nich fragte ... Stehen wir sachlich auf dem Boden Gladstones?, sondern einfach auf das Wort Gladstones mit ihm abschwenkte und sagte: Was er tut, wir folgen ihm ..." (GPS, p524).

Weber's plebiscitary charismatic leadership evidently is no exclusive manifestation of the peculiarities of the German development. It obviously has deep roots in the British parliamentary constitutional praxis, too.

Still, there is a tension between the parliamentary and plebiscitary elements in Weber's thought. Speaking of Gladstone as a "Diktator des Wahlschlachtsfeldes" might be correct as a metaphor but nevertheless has a certain alien touch, lack of "Fingerspitzengefühl", from the parliamentary point of view, which in itself, however, is not incoherent, since charismatic leadership and parliamentary control are balancing factors. However, no promoter of parliamentarism would recognize Weber's rendering as a truly empathic one, catching the core intention - which, again, is nothing enigmatic, since Weber's project was to adopt some functional modernizing elements of parliamentary rule.

Lloyd George might in reality have been a temporary "dictator", to borrow Weber's characterization of another British charismatic, Caesartistic, leader, during the War but "behaved himself" afterwards, in accordance with democratic custom. In Germany at the same time Ludendorff was in reality a sort of "secret" - thus uncontrollable - leader, quite unaffected by any democratic conventions. This makes the main difference and is an important part of the background to Weber's plea for the introduction of parliamentary rule in Germany - not because of the "inner creed" but because of functional need.

In Germany during the pseudo-parliamentary period towards the end of the war (Prinz Max von Baden's chancellorship), the voice of power was seriously split, since the military was not directly subordinated to the parliament or even the government, but the Kaiser, with whom nobody seriously calculated any longer.

Weber's problem was not - again - to fulfill the best form of parliamentarism, but to improve and modernize the German system, to become functionally more "tuned in" with modern times. Many spheres of German social life were more advanced than the outmoded political forms implied. To sum up: deutscher Sonderweg poses the problem - Bismarck being its executor in the political arena - and British parliamentary praxis provides part of the solution.

Charisma vs parliamentarism

There remains, however, still a problem of succession unsolved, as soon as a charismatic - and then in principle also unstable, since the institutionalization of charisma is almost an oxymoron - leader is involved in politics. Even if parliament is assigned controlling functions - at least with a theoretical change of exercising them against the ruler in the cases of Gladstone and Lloyd George, but not in the cases of Bismarck and Ludendorff - it is not so clear how the charismatic leader should be replaced against his own will and thus a conflict arises. Of course the dethronization of leaders might be quite a problem in liberal-democratic constitutional systems too. Sweden is a good example, where the social democrats have had only a handful leaders in its century long history. However, the charismatic leader has more power concentrated in his hands and thus the problem might become more acute if he loses his "touch". Weber had no remedy for this lack of retirement programs for ex-dictators. There is a certain element of bona fide presupposed in the successful descalation of the personal rule, when the Vertrauensdiktatur is no longer required, as Gustav Schmidt has analyzed.28

At a certain level of the exercise of plebiscitary rule there is an evident danger of a manifest conflict between the charismatic and the parliamentary doctrines, relying on ultimately different principles of legitimation.

We cannot say that Weber had anticipated a crystal clear solution, even if he evidently hoped for an increased capacity of parliament to bring about a peaceful change of power. In Germany, however, the acute problem rather was that there existed no balancing power to the selfish - in fact if not in creed (coloured by state-idealism) - and uncontrolled Junker-bureaucracy. In the German setting, then, a plebiscitary charismatic Führer, with all the risks involved, would be a progress.

The functions of parliamentary democracy

Weber's basically functionalist view on constitutional forms allows him to judge the instrumentality of various forms of government unbiased by normative prejudices. "Staatsformen sind fur
mich Techniken wie jede andere Maschinerie. Ich werde ganz ebenso gegen das Parlament und für den Monarchen loschlagen, wenn dieser ein Politiker wäre oder es zu werden verspräche", as Weber wrote in a letter to Ehrenburg in 1917, when the future of German constitutional forms was becoming a more acute concern, since the present one simply did not work (GPS, 1st ed. from 1921, p. 470).

Maybe an extrascientific creed is required to bring about a functioning constitutional praxis, an element of belief, or "overideology". Weber tries to avoid any confusion between politics and ethics, in line with his overtly exposed relativistic value philosophy. This, however, does not exclude an ethical creed in his views on politics, often described as an ethic of responsibility, as contrasted with an ethic of conviction. One could not be satisfied with behaving in line with one's belief; without regard to the consequences. The pure-hearted ideologist would not for instance use capitalist means if he was a fanatic socialist "die-hard". In contrast to this Weber opens the route to modern "cost-benefit"-analysis, not as often misinterpreted to a Loyola-sort of attitude, in which means are justified by the goals. The ethical element, in this sense, in Weber should not be disregarded, overshadowed by his functional view on belief-systems of legitimation, which he has in common with Machiavelli, as the first pioneer. It is good for the people to have some ideological or ethical faith, so the citizens behave themselves. A society consisting only of some ideological or ethical faith, which he in democratic doctrine should serve, or the constitution, which he in an constitutional order should respect – becomes acute in a situation of a vacuum, in the absence – in Weber's case – of a politically minded bourgeoisie. The Bureaucracy was not eager to take command – rather happened to be in a position where the burden was put on its shoulders, automatically. Deutsches Bildungsbürgertum had produced Ranke and Thomas Mann, but not the Junker Bismarck. To the Beamter with the professional ethic, taking on political duties might even be a hard plight, only to be fulfilled with a heavy heart. In politics initiatives now and then have to be taken according to the decisionist principle that belongs within the sphere of politics; in the ideal situation bureaucracy is reduced to its proper role as an instrumental vehicle.

Weber's significance and qualities, as well as some shortcomings, ought to be evaluated on the empirical, cognitive, level. This by no means excludes a supplementary evaluation of Weber's doctrines in their context, of their roots and effects, not only actual content.

Indeed, Weber could only be understood with the specific German background in mind, as a secular influence in a historicist, Romantic, intellectual climate. Since Weber as a classic is more receptive than innovative he has a significant prehistory and influence. He reflects his times, which is, moreover, a traditional motive for any undertaking in the history of ideas focussing upon great men.

If Weber's solution – his combination of parliamentarism and plebiscitary leadership democracy – was an adjusted variation of the British parliamentary system, his problem was German. In Germany, a rapid industrial development had made the system of government outdated and not well suited for the newly created nation.
Notes

1 The early German hagiography was promoted by Karl Jaspers, whose booklet recently has been printed again, with a long introduction by Dieter Henrich (Jaspers 1988), in a volume collecting all Jaspers's essays on Weber. Of course other participants in the circle around Weber’s widow Marianne also contributed to a somewhat uncritical devotion, e.g. the Heuss brothers.

The British methodological hagiography could be exemplified with Runciman (1972) and Sahay (1971).

In the USA the conceptions of Weber exemplified by Parsons and Lazarsfeld & Oberschall respectively are very contrasting, indeed. There are, however, also numerous cases of substantial themes, developed with Weber as a vehicle, or ornament. The list of reference could here be very long.

There is, however, a lack of reliable comprehensive handbook literature on Weber, both in the Anglo-Saxon as well as the German sphere.

Weber’s work is evidently located at the crossroads in both politics as well as methodology, which is part of the background to his otherwise most confusingly varying image, being hard to catch, as a “moving target”.

Hughes: American Historical Review, Vol LXVI (1960), pp 154-5. There is a general problem involved here, about the transformation of ideas when replanted, which also touches upon the commensurability and communication between social science paradigms. Recent works by Srubar (1988), Gutting (1980) and others illuminate this crucial field, as well as the earlier books by Jay (1973) and HS Hughes (1975).

Bendix (1960) has for a long time been regarded as a good monograph over Weber’s substantial sociology but does hardly deal with neither his politics, nor his manifest methodology.

For detailed references see list of literature. The study of Weber has almost become a discipline of its own, as reflected in a couple of recent readers: Lash & Whimster (eds. 1987) and Mommsen & Osterhammer (eds. 1987).

4 Guenther Roth has developed intriguing thoughts about the three levels of analysis of Weber’s works on politics. See esp. p 125 and 195 et passim in Roth (1979). The East of Elbe-studies are now available also in MWG.

5 Weber, Max: Staatssoziologie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1956, with Einführung and Erläuterung by Joh. Winckelmann). For Mommsen’s critique of Winckelmann, see the Excursus at the end of the second ed. of his famous dissertation (Mommsen 1974). A thorough recent discussion is to be found in Zängle (1988), linking the dominating political and methodological themes in Weber to each other.

Recent works by Wagner (1987), Schnädelbach (1983), Köhnke (1986) and Nusser (1986) are all very instrumental, getting under the surface of this frequently misinterpreted concept of value-orientation. In the Anglo-Saxon sphere works by Burger (1976) and Oaks (numerous contributions, for instance 1983 and 1987) have deepened the understanding of the Weberian methodological twist of the fact-value-distinction, beyond the paradigmatic “red herring” it used to be, because of Gouldner, Strauss (1953) and others.

7 For more recent parallels Weber’s basic “theoretical” structure is well in line with Gunnar Myrdal’s well-known dictum of value-significance, as well as the “point of view”-approach pleaded by British historians. It is however, a very long tradition with its roots in the birth of utilitarianism – the calculating individual as expressed in “the rational economic man”-metaphore – in the Renaissance-period.

Here I have certain themes in the democracy-debate in mind, like the goal conflict between participation and efficiency.

Weber’s lack of “inner democratic creed” has sometimes appeared as a bit shocking to scholars raised in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, like in the case of Werner Falk (1935), who also coined the expression about Weber as a “frustrated politician”, plagued by a Faustian tension between the two souls dwelling in his bosom.

The discussion about the more precise nature of Weber’s liberalism has a certain centrality, for a couple of reasons. There is a lack of a successful German “founding fathers” in the young Federal Republic after the war, where democracy after all was introduced only with the help of the occupying powers. It is not by chance that Theodore Heuss wrote a Geleitwort to GPS in 1958. The situation was not favourable for unbiased interpretations as the turmoil following young Mommsen’s revaluation exposed (Mommsen 1959). Moreover, the debate on Weber’s eventual role as a founding father for Nazism, thus revitalized, also is affected, although the possibility of being a forerunner to Nazism as well as liberalism is not to be principally excluded.

In Stammer (ed. 1971, transl. by Kathleen Morris, orig. and more complete in German 1965), pp83–100.

Stern (1972) and Sheehan (1978) are two basic books on the delay of political maturity among the bourgeois classes in Germany. Barkin (1979) deals with the economic aspect of this apolitical stance of German Bildungsbürgertum. For a recent discussion of dieser Sonderweg, see also Blackbourn & Eley (1984). In Germany liberalism is associated with failure, discussions without results, like in the case of the Frankfurt parliament in 1848.

For the relationship between Weber and Naumann, see Andreas Lindt (1973). For a general account of the tendencies in Verein, see Lindenlaub (1967).
For the theme of Weber and "political education", see Scaff (1973) and also Hennis's recent works. I abstain from a more detailed discussion of Weber and the concept of "Realpolitik", in one way a very Weberian notion, quite in line with his basic structure, normative empirical theory and in another way a most un-Weberian concept, insofar as it is suffused with Bismarckian power-subordination.

I have elaborated this basic "theoretical", or rather methodological, continuity in Weber's work in other places. See for instance Eliaeson (1988). Sometimes the erroneous idea is launched that Weber's later philosophy of value (in science) should be some sort of "covering-up" of his political bourgeois activism, as a methodological tool. Still, it immediately becomes evident in Weber that he dedicates his inauguration lecture in Freiburg to political topics. Dr Rita Aldenhoff, at the moment preparing Weber's early political writings for the MWW together with W Mommsen, has, however, put to my attention that Weber's Freiburger Antrittsrede is a handful of pages longer in its original manuscript version, compared with the lecture Weber actually delivered, in a more political tone.

Especially Barkin (1970) deals with this modernization "from above". We should also in this context recall Wolfgang Mommsen's hypotheses about the desastrous effects of old-fashioned forms of government (in context of the Fischer-thesis-debate, on the causes of the First World War).

This is engraved on his tombstone, most likely intended as a verdict on Wilhelm II.

The Germans, in their self-conception, only tried to achieve in (especially Eastern) Europe what the British had already achieved in India and other places, which was the background to the vivid German interest in the British system of government and Imperialist praxis. Not even Hitler was exactly "jumping" on the idea of a war with the United Kingdom, as the actual course of events also indicates; the hesitation after Dunkirk and the somewhat unprompted Operation Barbarossa; his aim was evidently rather to enslave Russia.

Modern European history provides us many good chances to contemplate the interplay between chance, pure incidents, and long term factors, "necessities". But surely the low French growth of population in recent centuries is one of those basic long term factors, easy to overlook, since it is not manifest in spectacular, dramatic, events. It might even, in combination with the effects of the big wars in 17th century on "die Verspätete Nation" of Germany (Plessner 1974), provide the basic key to the understanding of central European security policy, until the formation of the European Economic Community after the Second World War.

The concept introduced by Rudolf Kjellén, the only really internationally famous Swedish political scientist. Geopolitics could be, as was partly the case with Kjellén himself, metaphysically understood, but surely also given a more cognitive application. International politics could still hardly be understood without access to the simple tool of the geographical map, although technological level today is increasingly important – and land control more a lingering feudal concept. However, world politics is often formed by elderly statesmen, focussing on the rear mirror more than the road ahead. Both Hitler and Stalin were subscribers to Haushofer's Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. Geopolitics has played a very central - although diminishing - role in 20th century world politics. This goes especially for Germany, a country unique in the respect that still, as recent events have shown again in 1989, domestic politics immediately become world politics.

Ever since Tenbruck (1975) published his huge article, stressing Weber's sociology, there has been a vivid debate on what is to be seen as Weber's main work and how to catch the key to the comprehensive understanding of it), as well as the character of the posthumous WcG. The most important contributions are published in KZfS, sometimes with abridged translations following in The British Journal of Sociology.

Any natural law-conception of legitimate rule is quite un-Weberian, indeed. Nevertheless, the strange lingering Drang nach Wertung still stimulates such erroneous "creative interpretations", to use a polite term.

However, if for instance the Second World War is interpreted as an excess in nihilism, rather than in Romantic totalizing ideology, the natural law revival is understandable (Schelausehe 1967), although in a longer perspective merely an impediment to a more basic trend of secularization, no matter lingering longing for Aristotelian foundations or moral philosophy, like in the cases of MacIntyre (1984) and Bloom (1987).

Compare Merquior (1980).

Weber is very instrumental for the purpose of this sort of cultural criticism, although we should bear in mind that he would himself not endorse the status of "theory" to this sort of philosophy of history.

There is a general problematic of power vs bureaucracy, will vs tool, involved here. As Mommsen has pointed out the problem was rather acute in Russia and Prussia before World War One. Power vacuums naturally easily occur in transitional periods, like the break-through of modern mass democracy.

See for instance Mommsen (1988), in his contribution to Kocka's reader collecting the contributions to the Nord-Deutsche Rundfunk programs on Weber the other year, where many prominent participants in the Gesamtedeutungs-debate on Weber raised their voices, "on the level of wisdom" trying to popularize their conceptions.

Of course counterfactual hypotheses and the question of the causes of the rise of modern capital-
im is a broad topic, to say the least, but it could not really be left aside when touching upon Weber’s substantial comparative sociology of religion. After all the European hegemony is the dominating sensation in World history since the Renaissance. It must somehow be linked to the special irreversible and universal course of inner-worldly rationality in our otherwise weak and fragmented part of the world.

In the Scandinavian countries they launch special power investigations – government sponsored – in order to locate the power in society. I guess this is typical of idyllic societies where naked power – exercising its monopoly of legal violence – tends to become merely a potential. The internalizing of power mechanisms has been studied by, among others, representatives of the younger Frankfurt school, e.g. Habermas in his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.

In fact Weber’s essay on the North-American sects is most enlightening for the comprehension of his comparative sociology of religion in toto. This is, moreover, not altered by William Swatos’ empirical refutation of some of Weber’s assertions (Swatos 1982) even if they should prove correct.

It is a fact that Weber was influenced by Ostrogradsky. See for instance Beetham, p 104 in first ed. See also Mommsen 1959 (p 109 in English translation from 1984). Again, also here, Weber is more a mediator than an inventor, genuine classic.

Schmidt 1964, esp. p 75 et passim and p 229 et passim.

List of literature


Heuss, Theodor: "Geleitwort" to Max Weber's GPS (see below), 2nd ed.


List of Abbreviations:

Webers work:
GARS = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie
GAW = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre
GPS = Gesammelte politische Schriften
MWG = Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe (most of the political volumes already published, by Mommsen and his assistants; several volumes remain to become published, for instance of letters – one volume published, ten planned – and methodology, etc.).
WuG = Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

Good bibliographies over Weber’s work are made by Käser (first published 1975 in KZSS) and Riesebrodt (in MWG-prospect).

For a good bibliography over the secondary literature, see Seyfarth, Constance & Schmidt, Gert: Max Weber Bibliographie: Eine Dokumentation der Sekun-


Other abbreviations:
APSR = American Political Science Review.
IJPCS = International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society.
KZS = Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.
Archiv = Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.
Verein = Verein für Sozialpolitik.