etiska överväganden i studiet av svensk utrikespolitik. Ännu bättre hade det varit om han också explicit kopplat sin studie till existerande forskning om ämnesfältet moral och utrikespolitik. Inom de ramar han själv ställt upp, med en i huvudsak deskriptiv analys av förändringar i moralys- nen över nästan 30 år, gör DB ett fullgott och ibland imponerande jobb: han introducerar huvudbegrepp och analysredskap och använder dessa systematiskt och tydligt i sin analys av ett omfattande empiriskt material. Uppmärksammanhet av inklusions- och exklusionskritiker hos olika svenska regeringar över tid utgör ett värdefullt bidrag till litteraturen. Själv hade jag gärna sett att DB gått ett steg längre i sin analys och också systematiskt diskuterat orsaker till de förändringar han spårar. Jag hade också gärna sett att han mer utförligt utmanat sin egen tolkning av materialet innebär de förändringar han redovisar verkliga förändringar i grundläggande moraliska ståndpunkter eller kan det finnas alternativa tolkningsmöjligheter? Jag har fört fram en sådan möjlighet.

Referenser


ANIRUDH KRISHNA

The stage for Katrin Uba’s Ph.D. thesis opens in 1991. In the background you can hear the drumbeat of structural adjustment. The Washington Consensus and the ascendancy of the World Bank and IMF loom large. Most non-oil exporting developing countries are facing grave financial situations. Many have accumulated large international debts, which they are finding difficult to service. Most are running large budget deficits and face very serious balance-of-payments problems. In this scenario, the World Bank and especially the IMF step in to offer loans. But conditionality is an inseparable part of the loans they advance. And structural adjustment is synonymous with the conditions laid down.

Privatization of state enterprises is a key component of structural adjustment, along with currency devaluation, trade liberalization, reducing government expenditures, and curtailing subsidies. And governments are under pressure to privatize SOEs as rapidly as possible. Doing so will help generate additional revenues, while reducing the burden of present and future expenditures. So any delay or postponement of privatization is not in the government’s economic interest.

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Once the technocratic problems of valuation and putting in place efficient and transparent processes are resolved, it seems relatively easy to privatize SOEs. Politically, it should not pose much of a problem, for unlike the removal of subsidies, which affects a substantial proportion of the population, and unlike currency devaluation and trade liberalization, which still affect considerable numbers, privatization of SOEs directly affects a very much smaller constituency. In the two countries considered by Uba, employees of SOEs constitute no more than — what? — about 4-5% of the labor force? Labor and labor unions in SOEs are thus the bit players on this stage. It does not seem likely that their animosity should amount to very much.

The assumption, therefore, should be that privatization of SOEs should be among the least difficult parts of structural adjustment to carry out, but in fact it turns out to be quite a difficult part. Theories about concentrated losses and diffuse benefits have some relevance for this result. Still, actions by less than half of 10 million unionized SOE employees all over India, a country with a population that is one hundred times bigger, should not count for very much overall. But they do.

Protest actions by employees’ unions turn out to have considerable impact; they significantly postpone the completion of privatization. In both India and Peru, quite far apart geographically and in terms of economic history, Uba’s analyses show similar results.

Politics trumps techno-economic considerations. The bit actors begin to have quite a considerable influence, resulting in postponing privatization, even though governments (and their advisors in the World Bank and IMF) want to implement it with urgency.

Protest by trade unions has a consistently significant prolonging effect upon privatization. And this effect is magnified when the protestors cause economic disturbances, widening the ambit of protest activity to affect the lives of ordinary citizens, and thereby bringing additional actors onto the stage where this drama is being played out.

Other factors that make a significant difference to the length of the privatization process include — whether or not the enterprise is loss making, the availability of political allies, especially within political parties; the nature of the regime (democratic or not); the broad sector of activity; and the nature of disinvestment (e.g., whether or not the workers are offered equity) — but the effects of each of these factors is more contingent.

It is notable and important that Uba examines the impact of protest activity, i.e., she examines what happens after protests have taken place. Previous work in both political science and also, I believe, in sociology has mostly analyzed the period before protests occur. Analysts have looked at different aspects related to how and why protests occur, for example, they have investigated who participates in protests, and they have examined the nature of collective action and organization that enables protests to come about. Refreshingly — and somewhat daringly (because it opens her up to many challenges) — Uba has selected to examine what happens after protests occur: How much impact do they have? Do protests make an impact more by threatening government officials or by persuading them? Are these effects direct — or are they mostly indirect, mediated by political allies and by the public at large?
What have protesters been able to achieve in practice? Are protesters able to reverse the government’s decision to privatize their particular SOE? Are they able, at least, to win more favorable terms for themselves? Are they able to prolong or earn some moratorium on the process of privatization, in the bargain prolonging their own employment at these firms?

In order to grapple with these questions, three bodies of theory are consulted by Uba. She looks, first, at theories of political participation, including participation in protest activity. But these theories are more useful for telling us how protest arises, and they have little to say about what protest can achieve in terms of tangible outcomes. So not much light is shed by participation theories on the issue of what protests can actually achieve.

She looks, second; at the social movement literature, and while this body of work considers more fully the policy impacts that can result from protest activity, it still does not have much to say about the mechanisms that make these impacts possible. For example, little evidence is available about the relative size of direct and indirect effects. This body of theorizing is also mostly focused upon Europe and the US, with relatively little work being based within the different contexts of developing countries.

Finally, Uba looks at the literatures on structural adjustment, especially at work on SOE privatization. However, this literature, too, examines mostly why governments take the decision to privatize — i.e., once again it examines the process before privatization is announced as policy — and it does not examine the process whereby these decisions get implemented (or not). This literature is also strangely silent about the role of non-state actors, in particular, ignoring the roles played by organized labor, perhaps because of its relative size; it is after all a rather small player in the larger scheme of things. But this literature also ignores the role played by public opinion in democracies — and it is here that Uba’s analysis has some important things to contribute.

Uba uses an interesting and relatively novel methodology to probe these issues. She has used a Web-based search service – Factiva – to probe news reports produced over the entire period of her analysis, 1991-2004, by multiple sources, including both national news media in India and Peru as well as international news sources. She also uses an interesting technique – Event History Analysis – to analyze the results provided by her search of news reports. In addition to this use of secondary sources of data, Uba has also assembled some primary data by going out to India and Peru and interviewing trade union leaders and others. I will ask her later to tell us more about these methods of data assembly and analysis. I will also ask her to tell us about how she coded the values of the key variables in her analysis: e.g., What constitutes a protest? What type of news reports lead her to conclude that a protest affecting a particular SOE actually occurred?

Her unit of analysis is an individual SOE. Her question? To what extent and under what circumstances did protest activity by trade unions affect the implementation of the government’s decision to privatize this particular unit? To what extent was implementation delayed or put off as a result of protest activity?

Her results? In both countries, protest activity has a consistently negative effect upon the implementation of the privatization decision, postponing the date when the unit is finally handed over to a private buyer. Protests significantly elongate the
onto the stage of this drama by creating economic disturbances that adversely affect citizens' daily lives – tend to amplify this negative effect.

Regime type also matters. The government of Peru under Fujimori was less amenable to (and perhaps less vulnerable to) protest activity than the democratic regimes that preceded and succeeded it. In fact, faced with economic disturbances it came down even harder, speeding up privatization and concluding it more quickly, whereas in India, this period was lengthened when protests occurred. In India, as well, rule by a right-wing party, the BJP tended to go together with faster implementation of privatization.

The fresh analysis that Uba has presented concerning the impact of protest actions against encroaching global capitalism, considered here in the sphere of state enterprise privatizations, is useful and timely for many reasons. State leaders wishing to assess the likely consequences of a decision to privatize can more fully game the likely situation starting with the variables that Uba has isolated. Union managers can similarly calculate the likely benefits and costs of future protests. Better-informed deal-making is a possible result. Better understanding of the processes involved certainly follows.


Ian Clark 1

This doctoral thesis had its public disputation on 21 September and was approved. I was the Opponent for this occasion.

The work employs a specific case in order to explore a more general theoretical argument. The specific case is that of India in the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, and it asks why India's stand changed from that of initial support to final repudiation. From this basis, the author asks the general question why states defect from the possibility of cooperation, and most of the work is a sustained contribution to this theoretical position.

It has some elements of major originality. The book starts from a sense of dissatisfaction with the present state of the IR theoretical literature on state defection. It insists that, despite the claims of neoliberalism and constructivism, there is no serious alternative to structural realism as an explanation of state defection. Whenever defection from cooperation occurs, all theories seem to vindicate structural realism, and so the author seeks to develop a theoretical position which represents a genuine alternative. It starts with some elements taken from the realist perspective, and injects into this a novel constructivist

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