Non similitudinem monachi, sed monachum ipsum!

An Investigation into the Monastic Category of the Person – the Case of St Gall

Wojtek Jezierski

for Ivar, born in Örebro on November 29th, 2007

One day, most likely in the early 880s, the noblest monks of the St Gall monastery assembled to deliberate over an outrageous incident that had occurred the previous night. Salomo, the Bishop of Constance, as well as being a former apprentice and a friend of the monastery, secretly crept into its facilities causing a great confusion especially among the younger monks unaccustomed to people in lay clothes within the walls. Even worse, this was just one of his illegitimate nocturnal break-ins, each one aggravating the perplexity in the convent and forcing the abbot and the senatores to regulate the presence of their mighty acquaintance. This time, the bishop asked Abbot Hartmut (872-883) if he should be allowed to enter St Gall’s closure in monk’s habit even though he was only a secular cleric. The abbot, looking for a broader support for his decision, turned to his venerable advisers: "and so they were asked to speak out. Hartmann said: ‘Our rule does not look for a resemblance of a monk, but for the monk himself.’ Notker [Balbulus ~840–912] added: ‘This toga praetexta that he wants to cover himself with would not entirely displease me if it had only been possible to recognize the actual toga.’"

This short fictional dialogue, whose basic elements were taken from the oral tradition but which was considerably improved thanks to its author’s vivid imagination, was noted down nearly two hundred years later, ca. 1050, by a monk of the name Ekkehard (IV). For us today this quoted fragment, despite its brevity, abounds with quite serious and interesting philosophical implications. What was the difference between toga praetexta and the genuine toga, that here stands for a monk’s habit? What did it mean to be a monk, and what were the descriptive limits of this being? Was acting and behaving like a monk sufficient to count as such? In short, what was the relationship between the essence, existence and appearance of persons in the early medieval monastic world?
Part I: Purpose, layout & previous research

What will be investigated is thus, borrowing from Ian Hacking, *the space of possibilities of personhood.* In other words, what were the conditions of being and becoming a person in the monastic milieu as depicted in Ekkehard IV’s *Casus sancti Galli.* In consequence my text must also make an attempt to answer the methodological question of how we should conceptualize these conditions. Both these problems will be elucidated by referring to the concept of role, which, I believe, can fairly accurately cover the category of the person. More precisely this means to explore how, what, and how many roles an individual was allowed or not allowed to play in a medieval monastery, as well as what effects it had on his being and on the institutional life. The contingency of existence is crucial here, because: "Who we are is not only what we did, do, and will do, but also what we might have done and may do." The limits of one’s existence were set by the more or less explicit descriptions of actions these institutions provided for the monks. In the second part of my article, hence, drawing on some more contemporary examples and some recent research, I would like to put forward a more general hypothesis that monks in the early Middle Ages were seen as a special kind of human beings, and that this conviction had serious consequences for their life in cloisters.

The problems that I would like to analyze are interconnected in an obvious way, yet I decided to introduce a twofold division of the text for methodological reasons. The analysis will be conducted on two different levels, first a more historical and sociological one - concerned with the technique of the person production, the second one focusing more on discourse and methodology of research. I will start with the theoretical basis for the analysis of life in closed institutions borrowing from Erving Goffman’s research on social roles. Then I will try to apply these analytical categories to a few examples taken from the *Casus sancti Galli.* In the second part of the article, the conclusions drawn from these examples, as well as from some other sources, will serve to prove a more general point that there was some broader, inherent idea underlying the way of speaking about monks in the early Middle Ages. Finally, these two themes will be brought together in a few methodological postulates for the ways in which the construction of person in the medieval monasteries should be analyzed.

The category of the person is a risky and somehow still undetermined field of study in relation to the Middle Ages, so everyone dealing with it runs the risk of being easily accused of arbitrariness. Then again, an obligation to construct the object and a methodology for its study on the one hand allows for various and occasionally daring conceptualizations, on the other hand, it proves that the problem itself is multi-faceted and many angles are required to illuminate
It. One obvious attempt, always referred to, is Colin Morris’s *The Discovery of the Individual, 1050–1200*, focused on the twelfth-century renaissance of the Latin culture and the social transformations of that time, which led to a new vision of individuality considered independently of the community. Morris notes that people were encouraged to self-knowledge, particularly thanks to the expansion of the practice of confession, also the notions of friendship and love gained new meanings stressing the inner feelings of the person, besides which a host of biographical and historiographical works truly interested in the personal characteristics of people appeared during that period. The conceptual frame of the book is though rather loose, which seems reasonable if one considers that it was to cover many different areas such as art, literature, theology, education etc. in which the individual was discovered. Another attempt is Sarah Coakley’s, this time theologically oriented, short article on the visions of the self indirectly tracing back the Cartesian divide between body and soul to late medieval spiritual handbooks in Western and Eastern Christianity, and obviously many others that follow in a similar vein. One could say that we start every time from the beginning, but that would not be entirely true since in the current article I am greatly indebted to Mayke de Jong’s insightful texts, which have already covered many of the problems enumerated above. She wrote particularly on St Gall and mental boundaries and frames of reference regulating the life of this community, and more broadly on the conceptual divisions organizing the monastic world. It was done, however, almost without any reference to the sociological framework. In no
way do I intend to undermine the value of her research, quite the contrary, despite this lack of theory she came to many very perceptive remarks touching upon the organizational elements of cloistral life. Yet I believe some of her analyses could have been carried further and some issues were left out and need to be taken up again. Her original Dutch text on the *Casus sancti Galli* focuses on the binary opposition of *claustrum* and *saeculum* that organized St Gall’s world not only geographically but also mentally, which resulted in very strong in-group identification.11 She described these borders and the ways they could be crossed by showing persons, who did it in a more or less legitimate way. The *claustrum/saeculum* opposition, as she claimed elsewhere, stems from the *Regula Benedicti* and was elaborated by later commentators such as Hildemar of Corbie, who came with the reform movement initiated by the synods in Aachen 816/817. In the educational process this interpretative frame was to be instilled into the mental horizon of *pueri oblati* trained in the late Carolingian monasteries. It was to form their identity and become a cognitive compass both within cloistral boundaries and outside of them. An ideal monk, so to speak, was to develop an inner cloister in his soul.12 Quite recently de Jong published an expanded and revised version of ‘Kloosterlingen’ in English, which combines more narrowly these two perspectives and better elucidates the normative and typological dimension of the examples she took from the *Casus*.13 Taking a few of the examples studied by de Jong I would like to filter them through the theory and questions chosen for this text. Even if I generally agree with de Jong it should thus be clear that the potential of these instances is greater and allows for more far-going conclusions about the early medieval category of person once they are investigated with better defined and carefully adapted concepts.

**Role & institution**

The conceptual frame that I have chosen for the analysis of the power relations within medieval cloisters is Goffman’s notion of *total institution*, roughly defined as: "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.”14 For present purposes, one central aspect of total institutions is particularly of interest i.e. inmates populating total institutions are expected to have one, and only one role – the one of an inmate. All the mechanisms that are meant to fulfil the official aims of a total institution are designed to tear the attachments, loyalties etc., i.e. roles he brought with him on entering the facility, but also those that could develop within it, away from the individual.15 Separation from the outside world, enforced visibility of everyone’s activities, often violent admission
procedures, and assisted self-mortification etc. serve this one ultimate purpose, that is, to dispose an individual of his roles. 

I shall return to some of these mechanisms in detail, when commenting upon relevant passages from Ekkehard. Of course, every scholar who ever dealt with medieval cloisters will immediately object to this one-sided view, since neither the absolute impermeability of these institutions nor a complete bereavement of external roles were ever achieved in any of them. That is true, but here we speak in terms of Weberian ideal types pointing at common features of similar yet distinct phenomena.

A total institution can actually never be total, because there will always be secondary adjustments that breathe some real life into it by opening the walls for trespassers, separating spheres of activities and, hence, offering an opportunity to enact different roles and allowing inmates to live a sort of real life again. The examples that I will analyze in the current article present individuals, who thanks to their dual belonging i.e. to the external and the internal world of St Gall, challenged the alleged totality and played more than just one role.

A role, according to Goffman, ”consists of the activity the incumbent would engage in were he to act solely in terms of the normative demands upon someone in his position.” Materially, roles exist in enactment, they need to be staged. Moreover, roles lie at the bottom of the socialization process, because thanks to them, on the one hand, people learn not only about their own tasks in society but also anticipate the actions attached to the roles of others. Through roles people discover the dramaturgical social landscape and opportunities opened or closed to them or, to put it differently, to a certain extent they may choose whom to be. On the other hand, every role is constrictive as well, because to choose whom to be is to choose from a catalogue of more or less ready-made roles. At the most basic level then, roles are decisive for being in society as such, because all being (read: enacting) in society is qualified – it has to be of some kind. To follow the script for a given role is thus to count as a human being, a member of society, a person. Obviously people have to play several roles in their lives, and some combinations may cause more friction and result in greater embarrassment than others. In order to evade such situations people tend to separate the audiences for their roles either geographically or temporally. For the same reason the dramaturgical activity is divided into front and backstage regions, where one either stages a desired persona or makes
preparations for a staging process. As I have previously mentioned, one of the organizational methods of a total institution is to tear down this divide and introduce an all-including, homogenous visibility coercively producing equal selves.21 This, however, does not have to be the case.

In the following part I will focus on the so-called *discrepant roles*, those that "bring a person into social establishment in a false guise."22 In other words, individuals playing these roles either acted indifferently to the front/backstage division, created backstage selves where it was prohibited, or did impersonations, that is, they pretended to be someone else. What follows is that the concept of role includes an ethically relevant aspect (the attached obligations and loyalties as well as an ego invested in a given role), which puts serious constraints on an incumbent who would like to engage in such activity. This restriction is the trust that other people may or may not place in him. In all institutions and in total institutions *a fortiori*, social cohesion is a strategic matter for it gives the necessary conditions for these institutions to function. This may be either secured by violence, or a threat to use it, or by trying to build the mutual trust for each other in a common enterprise. Trust is also an indispensable side effect of human interactions, where people present themselves in their usual guises, giving the grounds to predict their future behaviour. But predictability is impaired the moment some people start to present themselves in abnormal, unexpected guises.23 If we accept this rather uncontroversial statement that monks staged a performance for the outside world and acted differently within cloistral bonds, then we can also transpose these terms to the monastic milieu. To put it in a nutshell, other monks found it difficult to trust actors playing discrepant roles even if sometimes their existence in the monastery was necessary or useful. Except that, as we shall see, the monks in St Gall knew some artificial methods for re-establishing the trust. Before we proceed with the examples, we need first to realize what kind of source the *Casus sancti Galli* is from the point of view of the questions posed.

**Casus sancti Galli**

There are numerous modes of reading the *Casus sancti Galli*, some of which were suggested by Ekkehard IV himself in the preface to his work, where he promised to narrate the *fortunia* and *infortunia* of his monastery’s history.24 Yet a modern reader who would like to reconstruct historical events or figures based on this account faces so many problems with factuality, chronology and reliability of the account that Ekkehard’s work must be cross-referenced and treated with extreme caution.25 Newer approaches to the *Casus*, including de Jong’s, accentuate rather its value for studies, regardless of the notion’s
fogginess, on mentality and monastic modes of perception, where this text is without match in comparison to the contemporary sources.\textsuperscript{26} In research of this kind, and I adhere to this tradition with my article, we try to reach the horizon of the author’s understanding, his situated \textit{Weltanschauung} placed beyond self-reflection. Ekkehard’s way of presenting events that had happened at least a hundred years before he noted them down symptomatically mirrors the conditions from his own lifetime but I do not believe that a major change has taken place in regard to the matters discussed here, which evolved at a different pace of the \textit{longue durée}. Furthermore, according to the author’s words, it was the elder monks in the St Gall community that instigated him to write the \textit{Casus} and provided him with information embedded in the oral tradition alive in the monastery.\textsuperscript{27} In an environment where the past was a part of everyday experience and where the present influenced the vision of the past, one could hardly think outside this box of timelessness.\textsuperscript{28} That is why I believe we are entitled to raise the following examples above their historical context and analyze their long-lasting sociological implications as well.

Bishop Salomo’s bad habits

The story of Salomo, Bishop of Constance and Abbot of St Gall that was mentioned at the beginning of my article has drawn the attention of many scholars. In my analysis I would like to limit myself to the ways in which Salomo presented himself to the monks and how he was gradually made to appear in front of them. As was said above, Salomo, stemming from an aristocratic family, was raised as a secular cleric in St Gall, and afterwards joined the royal court of Charles III, where he acquired the position of a chaplain. Finally, in 890 he was appointed Bishop of Constance and Abbot of St Gall. In Ekkehard’s text, Salomo appears when he pleads to become the convent’s \textit{frater conscriptus}, long before he ascended to the chaplain’s office and obtained the abbey.\textsuperscript{29} After he was inscribed into the Book of Life he became too confident of his power and influence and began to enter the closure every day without any guide and dressed in lay clothes, which resulted in great confusion among the brothers and caused his adversaries to mutter.\textsuperscript{30} Salomo, however, unmoved by their mean comments kept on coming to St Gall. One day he gave a fur coat to a brother asking him to pray for his soul, to which the brother answered: "If you like, I will pay you for this fur in the best possible way. I have namely two cowl{s} from the abbot, and I will give one of them to you to wear, so you could, together with us, enter the closure dressed more decently.”\textsuperscript{31} Salomo, defending himself, referred to Abbot Grimald, also a secular cleric, who entered the closure in lay clothes just as often as he did. The monk answered that he, Salomo, was coming in dressed in such a way
only because of his episcopal might. "We do accept laymen as *fratres* sometimes, but we never allow ourselves to enter the closure together with them as long as they are wearing lay clothes." After this, it may have appeared that the bishop was persuaded and accepted not to go into the *claustrum* without an accompanying monk, but soon he was up to his old practices again. One night in Lent, as one of these *identity anecdotes* goes, he came from the court and clandestinely went barefoot into the cloister with a hood over his head, "to be perceived as a brother" ("uti fratum unus putaretur"). This pious fraud ("sanctam fraudam") was exposed almost immediately by the roundsmen because "it was against the custom, [...] as it is still today, that anyone who is not wearing a monk's habit should enter our intimate space, especially during the night." Again, the situation was repeated some time later when this good thief ("bonus fur") sneaked into the monastery's courtyard during nighttime and was spotted there by the noble *fater* Roudker who went out to pray by the graves, and who alarmed the nearby roundsmen. The monks rushed to the courtyard with lanterns and recognized the chronic intruder: "By the merits of St Gall - for that is how the fathers swore in the old days - such dress we do not tolerate in the cloister at this hour!" What followed later was the already mentioned debate between the abbot and his monks, whether Salomo should be granted more access to St Gall or not. Abbot Hartmut answered the doubts of his companions with the following words:

I know, brothers and sons, what you fear of him and something similar crossed my mind as well. But I deem we will be better off, if he is allowed to join us in this manner [by being able to wear a monk's habit in the cloister] and will then become our monk - not that we again, as before, would be subjected to a secular cleric. I mean we should rather come to an agreement with him, so he will use the habit of St Gall in a proper manner. Thus, if a troublesome event occurs again he will still be our brother and monk, despite his adroitness.

And indeed, following the decision of St Gall's senate, Salomo was "allocated a place, which we can still find today marked with rectangular stones, where he would put on monk's clothes when visiting [the cloister], and take them off when leaving." He became a *praemonachus*, an impossible creature of a hitherto unknown species belonging to both worlds.

What were the monks afraid of, then? "They were namely afraid that the man of the court [hominem palatinum], who already possessed several abbeys as a secular cleric, could by chance, see some irregularities and try to take advantage of them with the king to clear his way to our monastery." As it is obvious from this quote and from many others the crucial and a very fragile
resource medieval monasteries had at their disposal was their external reputation. In a way they constantly staged a performance of their regularity for the audience of the outside world, especially when a king was one of the spectators and the ultimate evaluator of this spectacle. For that reason *homo palatinus* Salomo could have been perceived as a spy, someone who pretended in front of the performers that he was one of them, whilst his real intent was to come backstage and to learn *destructive secrets* about the performance and the actors. Needless to say, this information could have been radically incompatible with the image fostered by the performers. Since the monastery clearly profited from Salomo’s proximity (he built churches, made valuable gifts and donations, invited kings to St Gall, organized festivities at his own expense etc.) from its point of view it was important to turn him from an external informer into a loyal and foreseeable member of the team, in other words, to make him a trustable person. A neat definition of trust corresponds very well to this situation and illustrates the goal the institution strived to achieve — “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit another’s vulnerability.”

The methods that the monks of St Gall had at their disposal have already been named: Salomo became *frater conscriptus*, they provided him with a guiding monk, subjected him to rules of entering, and, finally, made him promise to change guises and made him up to a *praemonachus*. Usually these steps were interpreted as his calculated approaching to St Gall that in the end was to win him the abbacy, but this image changes when mirrored. He was instead institutionally stripped of other roles irreconcilable with the cloistral milieu, a sort of symbolical compensation he had to make in order to be allowed to come in. What is characteristic, the symbolism of Salomo’s short-term nudity while he changed clothes is a distant echo of admission procedures such as for the oblation of children and the monks’ profession – to vest a monk’s habit was in the early Middle Ages traditionally recognized as making an implicit vow. Furthermore, it hardly escapes one’s attention that in imposing constraints upon Salomo, the upper echelons of St Gall concentrated primarily on his appearance. It seems as if to conform externally was the first, yet as we shall see insufficient, step on the way to becoming a monk. In addition, there is an interesting dramaturgical asymmetry between the bishop and his hosts in St Gall - he is presented as someone who was to perform ceaselessly, to enact his relevant roles for different audiences, only changing clothes for these occasions. The monks of St Gall, in contrast, played out only for the outside world, while for them the cloister was a backstage, a *natural* milieu for their true selves. He acted, they were.

Speaking of conformity by garment, the *Casus* gives other examples of powerful laymen such as counts, but also servants who on feast days joined the monks in processions walking through St Gall’s *claustrum*. Ekkehard declares...
that he saw with his own eyes how both young and old men, whose beards often reached their belts, marched dressed in habits where only monks of St Gall usually walked. A subsequent example of a certain Bernhard, who regardless of being in the monastery and in spite of the fact that he wore a habit, kept to lay conduct, greedily gulping wine and shouting despite the rule of silence in the refectory. Vestis virum non facit, then? Well, yes and no. No, because with these laymen the clothes they were dressed in had obviously no long-lasting effects on their inner attitude. Yes, because in this yearned-for situation, a monk's habit was to be the instrument that lastingly changed the identity of the person wearing it, a sort of amalgamation of the individual and his dress. To clear up this ambiguity somehow, we should notice the double denotation of the word habitus - a monk's dress, but also the ideal form of life, a permanent inner disposition. In an ideal case this notional ambivalence would dissolve, as clothing would exactly match the conduct and belief, indicative signifiant would be identical with signifié of identity. We shall return to this matter later on when discussing the question of human kinds.

In this regard Salomo as a praemonachus stands for a dissociated individual, someone between habit and habitus. As remarked by Gerold Meyer von Knonau, also in contexts other than strictly related to St Gall, even after his climb to abbacy Salomo is time and again described in terms connoting artificiality and phoniness, that might be linked to his theatrical way of life mentioned above. For now we should only mention that his metamorphosis had never actually neared completion. In his summary of Salomo's character and life following the description of his death, Ekkehard IV, despite the overall elegiac tone in praising his achievements and merits for St Gall, returned to some of his faults e.g. proclivity for cajolement, boisterousness etc. He even revealed, on the face of it - publicly unknown, unbecoming details from the bishop-abbot’s past, namely, that as a young man he had an illicit affair that resulted in an extramarital daughter. To determine how widely this by that time nearly two hundred year old hearsay was known in Salomo’s days, or even whether it was genuine in the first place is impossible. It is though tempting to note that in the sequence of Ekkehard’s narrative the story appears after the account of his death, as if this defamatory information could only do harm to the memory of Salomo, but not to him when still in the office. Thanks to this cunning, if ever intended, literary solution it may seem that Salomo’s vulnerability had not been exploited on the part of St Gall monks.

Salomo’s case, no matter how exceptional or even counterfeit in some details it may seem, works like a perfect prism that both refracts the different means or half-means accessible to a community, which could be used to bind an individual to itself but also splits up the compositional elements of what we today see as a unified individual. This category of person may be simply over-
rated because an individual could have been perceived simultaneously as fake in some aspects and authentic in others, keep opposite allegiances, be a person caught in the no-man’s-land between the institution and its surroundings.

The Janus-faced abbot

We will now move to a different example of discrepant roles, this time the discrepancy was not only fully incorporated into the monastic conceptual frame, but was, to be sure, a desired feature of this specific role constellation attached to a particular function, in this case, the abbot’s. In St Benedict’s eyes it was the abbot who was primarily responsible for the contacts with the outside world and regulated the traffic between these areas. However, these contacts were rather limited, potentes from the outside could only have very restricted influence on a monastery’s internal matters and the monastery itself was imagined as a self-sufficient, rather autonomous entity on the outskirts of the society, which somewhat reflects the world in which St Benedict lived. Monks in the late Carolingian era and in the tenth and eleventh centuries faced nearly the exactly opposite situation - the royal monasteries such as St Gall became important centres of power and their abbots grew to be potentes themselves, often recruited from among the closest advisers of emperors and kings. Their preoccupation with internal affairs, accentuated by St Benedict, had to be counterbalanced by dealing with politics, properties, flocking pilgrims and guests, sometimes even warfare. A conspicuous sign of this new tendency was the growing share of laymen holding abbacies, as Salomo’s example shows, but also an inclination of rulers to hand out these posts as a profitable capital. It goes without saying that the abbot’s duties were constantly debated on various occasions, both when these external conditions altered, but also when a change in internal relations superseded the former order of power. For instance, in Supplex Libellus monachorum Fuldensium, the famous letter of complaint, which the monks of Fulda presented first to Charlemagne (ca. 812) and later to Louis the Pious (816/817), the authors, apart from the litany of calamities that befell them on account of their Abbot Ratgar, included a picture of an ideal abbot that should be adhered to. He was, inter alia, to be benignant for the infirm, merciful for the sinners, supporter of the fatigued, he should also love all the brothers, be modest in his undertakings and not excessive in dispensing the justice. In short, the monks of Fulda implored the successive emperors to appoint them an abbot who would focus on the monastic discipline and the monks of the cloister instead of the disproportionate architectural enterprises that devastated the community’s life, and especially emphasized the harsh methods Abbot Ratgar used to make them comply. As mentioned above, Supplex is just one
instance in a row of discussions about the ideal abbot recurring back as far as the *Regula Benedicti*’s second chapter ”Qualities of the Abbot”, to which we shall return in due course. Now I would like to discuss this problem with the concept of role in mind, and the *Casus* offers a few examples that best elucidate the aforesaid discrepancy.

The abbot that Ekkehard gave most credit to for his time in power was unquestionably Notker (971-975), the great disciplinarian and restorer of St Gall’s prestige injured during the weak abbacy of Purchard I and the hostile incursion of the Saracens. Directly after his election to office, Notker reorganized the incomes of the monastery, acquired many vineyards and filled the monastery’s cellars with barrels of the finest wine. The somewhat shaken discipline was reinforced, Notker chose to punish the monks who lived and worked in St Gall’s cellae outside in the world, whereas the rebellious monks from the monastery were often exiled to desolate outposts. To prevent any rumours of brothers’ misconduct reaching the king’s ears, he decided to bind the monks closer to the claustrum, especially the vociferous ones who because of their noble origin enjoyed greater freedom and spread gossip about the monastery. In his reformative endeavour, with an apparent touch of absolutism, Notker resumed and finished the construction of a high wall around the monastery, provided with protecting towers and gates. The abbot’s actions, then, moved St Gall a little towards the Goffmanian ideal type of total institution. However, what he did outside was, to draw on Ekkehard’s words, the complete opposite (”longe alius”). He used to feast with the laymen and knights both in St Gall and elsewhere and demanded from them to be served in a proper manner i.e. a manner appropriate for potentes. Furthermore, he trained lightly dressed adolescents of noble origin in the game of chess and checkers, and in the taming of birds of prey, taught them algebra, presented them with valuable gifts etc. ”Thanks to such and similar measures, that made him famous as a prudent man, he commended himself to such an extent, that he won eminence everywhere, so even in front of kings he was addressed not less than with the title of the most excellent abbot.” One should, though, observe that, as Ekkehard puts it, Notker allowed himself all this only when no brothers accompanied him (”quando sibi absque fratribus esse vacabat”).

According to de Jong who also commented on this fragment, ”the ideal abbot was a disciplinarian and *nutritor* in both worlds; his success depended on his ability to switch between two codes of behaviour at the drop of a hat, keeping them well apart at the same time.” Correct, but there is more to it. First of all, from the sociological point of view it is hardly surprising that the monastery’s representative, when performing in the outside world, bore more resemblance to the members of the surrounding society than with the members of the institution he stemmed from.
problematic is whether we can speak of representation in this particular case. Literally, on the outside Notker was not re-presenting, in other words, en-acting the standards of his home institution but rather played a different persona - a noble lord. Hence, by Ekkehard’s and, most likely, the wider standards ruling at that time in the feudal society, the question how much of a monk there was in the abbot’s role was much more sophisticated and the above-mentioned discrepancy lay at the core of this relationship. In other words, not looking and behaving like a monk did not necessarily mean that one was not regarded as such. Third, as for the methodology, the materialization of this discrepancy could only be realized by the careful separation of audiences for these incompatible personae.  

The counterexample to Notker that better explains this crucial dual connection, also identified by de Jong in the Casus, is Abbot Hartmann, whose short abbacy (922–925) was marked by on the one hand, the blossoming of scholarship and the strengthening of the internal discipline, on the other hand, the negligence of St Gall’s material condition. The pious abbot was so focused on the inner life of his monastery and so unconcerned about his possessions that “he suffered because his [officials e.g. deans and provosts] owned more than he did.” Especially the external administrators of the monastery’s properties, whose activities remained uncontrolled, grew overconfident about their position and acted like nobles wasting St Gall’s goods away. When some of the aspects of the abbot’s function, it is thus implied, here directed towards the outside world remained unfulfilled, others were likely to take this place, which might have caused damage to the monastery - a worry similar to St Benedict’s concern with priors who might compete with the abbots.  

An analogous example is brought by Jocelin of Brakelond in his twelfth-century Cronica, a source bearing remarkable resemblance in its anecdotal style to Ekkehard’s work. The Cronica starts with the late phase of Abbot Hugh’s term of office (1157–1180), when he became senile and started loosing control over his subjects: “Pious he was and kindly, a strict monk and good, but in the business of this world neither good nor wise.” Again, exactly like Hartmann he was far too concerned with the observation of the Rule and overlooked his agents’ felonies committed outside – “every man did, not what he ought, but what he would, since his lord was simple and growing old.” In this way the properties deteriorated while the abbot, borrowing huge sums of money, exacerbated the already severe situation. After his death a remarkable discussion about the desired qualities of the future abbot broke out in the convent. These dialogues deserve a short study on their own, here I will only focus on the main arguments that were taken up in their course. It appears that this evaluative scheme was triangle-shaped with respectively (i.) wisdom
combined with scholarship, (2.) managerial skills and (3.) care for the internal discipline resting in its angles. Deducing from the opinions voiced in these debates, all three merits went seldom hand in hand and necessary concessions in the election process had to be made.66 Returning finally to the problem of staging, Jocelin, who was the secretary and a close co-worker to Abbot Samson, the main figure in the *Cronica*, noted his master’s views of the office he held. One day Jocelin told him:

“The other is that at home you do not show as kind a face as elsewhere, not even among the brethren who love you still and loved you of old and chose you to be their lord, but you are rarely among them, nor do you rejoice with them, as they say. The abbot saddened with these words and answered: ‘You are a fool and speak like a fool. You should know what Salomon says, ‘Thou hast many daughters. Show not thy face cheerful towards them.’”69

In other words, a seemingly hypocritical practice of adapting different codes of behaviour for external and internal use was in fact sought after.

Concluding from the examples given we can say again, that the function of an abbot was marked with an essential strain, and as long as the balance between the respective poles was maintained, the person holding the office appeared as competent in the eyes of his contemporaries. Fulda’s abbot Ratgar is here the symbol of a fervent administrator, whose enterprises were pursued at the expense of the community; on the other hand, the inward-oriented abbacies of Hartmann in St Gall and Hugh in Bury St Edmunds nearly ruined their economy. Those truly awe-inspiring, like Notker or Samson, proficiently played their roles according to a schizophrenic scenario generated by their institution.70 To put it differently, their role was split into two, independent components subjected to two fundamentally different regimes of expression.

Summing up, using the examples mentioned above, I was trying to show how power acted on the micro-level on its subjects and their ways of expression. The practical instrument for this action was a role handed out to a given subject, while parts of its script were conveyed by the written norms, learned intuitively in the process of socialization, inferred by the incumbent from the social environment, and last but not least, regulated by others through the social control emphasized here. The examples mentioned differ in the degree of these components - while the scenario for an abbot’s role had a solid literary basis (the Rule, customs, *exempla* etc.), to learn how to play a visiting monk or a bishop-abbot craved much rectifying labour on the part of the community and the actor. What they had in common were the collusive loyalties, some more welcome than others, loyalties that had to be institutionally dealt with,
attuned, refined or, when necessary, cut off. Accordingly, I also tried to present the *praxis* of these adjustments – through rituals, the drawing of borders, the wearing of particular clothes, performing, the affixing and removing labels etc. All this may be gathered together, to evoke once again this slightly high-brow term, as putting constraints on the *space of possibilities of personhood*. It is also important to stress again that it was done in interplay between the given individuals and the social group they existed in. What I deliberately excluded from this analysis, and to which I would like to devote the second part of this article, is that these practices and complementing ideas were founded on some broader categories used in thinking about monks as a very specific kind of human being, engendered by monastic institutional discourse.71

**Part II: Human kinds**

The purpose of this section of my article is to unearth some of the wide-ranging discourses about monks as a special kind of human being, which underlie the practices I described in the previous part. Here I would only like to tentatively sketch these discourses so I will constrain myself to a very limited selection of examples to give the readers the general idea. Thus, I will attempt to show that for the correct understanding of power and subjectivity in medieval monasticism we need to oscillate between these two levels. It should be clear that without these general beliefs the practices would not exist, and vice versa - without the practices the beliefs would have no impact on people. The core idea is to demonstrate the tricky symbiosis between people and their classifications. To do this, we need yet more theory, this time the theory of *human kinds*.

*Human kind*, another term coined by Ian Hacking to be used here, is a classificatory device that organizes both our scientific and societal knowledge about diverse groups of people in the society.72 What differentiates these groups may be their behaviour, drives, emotions, situations they find themselves in, experiences they share etc. We need *human kinds* because they help us make generalizations about people and thus make their behaviour more predictable. Hence we can analyze them, and, when necessary, change them to some extent. Since they are descriptions, they affect the space of possible intentional actions. What makes them particularly thorny is that they often have intrinsic moral value (e.g. homosexuals, suicide, war criminals, normalcy), and the greater the moral value the more powerful their effects on the classified people. Finally, the relationship between people and their classifications is reciprocal - they change people, but also people may influence these labels. All in all, *human kinds* are:
(i) kinds that are relevant to some of us, (ii) kinds that primarily sort people, their actions, and behaviour, and (iii) kinds that are studied in the human and social sciences, i.e. kinds about which we hope to have knowledge. I add (iv) that kinds of people are paramount; I want to include kinds of human behaviour, action, tendency, etc. only when they are projected to form the idea of a kind of person.71

For a student of early medieval monasticism only the third point from Hacking’s definition is an obstacle and needs a qualification. For obvious reasons this specification has to be discarded, in the Middle Ages there was nothing comparable to the impact the academia has on the organization of our society nowadays and it is pointless to discuss it any further. In his own research Hacking focused on the human kinds in the post-Enlightenment era and designed this concept from this point of view.74 Nonetheless, he did not deny that human kind is a more universal phenomenon applicable to different contexts e.g. to the problem of witches in early modern Europe.75 Thomas S. Szasz’s research, preceding Hacking’s studies to some extent, suggests that the central feature of witch hunts was indeed a classification and regime for establishing the truth, while burning stakes were only the logical consequence of these classifications.76 When it comes to medieval monks as a human kind, as we shall see in the following examples, the procedures of accountability were not that rigorous as stipulated by Hacking, nevertheless clear enough to support my use of this term.

Making a distinction

In his study on conflicts in monastic communities of the Reich around 1000 Steffen Patzold suggested that the perception of these conflicts, which were predominantly interpreted as effects of the evil and quarrelsome characters of their participants, was not so much dependent on the oral modes of perception of conflicts proposed by Hanna Vollrath as on the type of thinking about human character and essence introduced by St Benedict.77 Indeed, Patzold’s brief examination of the Regula shows that in his prescriptions for the Benedictine communities, its author focused on the desirable personalities of the monks rather than behaviour that could or should be exhibited in cloister e.g.: "Anyone found contentious should be reproved", "Third, there are sarabaites, the most detestable kind of monks, who […] have a character as soft as lead.", "Of what kind should the cellarer be."78 Especially, defining the functionaries-to-be he was aiming at a perfect combination between a given individual’s character and the tasks attached to the office he was supposed to take - an ideal man for an ideal-typical office.79 Furthermore, as mentioned above, St
Benedict had a strictly essentialist view of human beings, where human actions were simply manifestations of the innate dispositions. Finally, he spoke of his monks in terms of a special kind of being distinguished from the outside world and other types of monks by the kind of life they were expected to live.

The further circumscription and specification of the attributes of this life with a simultaneous strengthening of its conditions for qualification as such, was done during the synods at Aachen 816/817 and was an effect of the reform movement started by Benedict of Aniane, strongly supported by Louis the Pious. The significance of this movement and these decisions for drawing distinctions between diverse types of religious life is hard to overestimate, so only two examples of its direct results will suffice; eighth years after Aachen Pope Eugene II, who was himself appointed to this office by Emperor Lothar, summoned another council of bishops in Rome. In the significantly entitled "About monks who only exist in habit, but do not live in it" twenty-eighth chapter of one of the disciplinary decrees issued by the council, the bishops were admonished to ensure that such monks living all too liberally in their dioceses would either return to their proper monasteries or be sent to another one, "so that those who have once vested habits of monks and shaved their heads for God, would hold firm to the regular way of life." The disciplining of those who were already monks was only one of the main thrusts of Benedict of Aniane's reform, another was the cautious upbringing and education of the oblates, who dominated the populace of the monasteries. The commentaries on the Rule written for that purpose by Hildemar of Corbie and Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel, which closely followed the reform, presented a slightly different view of human nature, perhaps because their main objective were children. For their authors, these oblates were a kneadable material, who, as long as sufficient amounts of custodia and disciplina were invested in their bodies and souls, would ultimately develop a nature radically unlike its worldly counterpart - homo interior and homo exterior were to be species so different so they would be unable to live in each other's habitats (which fits well in my use of the notion of the human kind). In fact, this sharp cleavage between the monks and the rest of the society was of deep interest for the secular powers that sought new forms of legitimacy and administrative centres - types of profits that only well-educated, immaculate priest-monks living in celibacy could yield.

Monastic reform and the late Carolingian and early Ottonian eras, in which many royal monasteries rose to power, mark a turning point in the development of the monastic human kind, because, apart from the already existing, so to speak ecclesiastical and inner-monastic categories of definition, a new one begun to play an important role – the public reputation. Since monks became a socially relevant group, it is no wonder that their public image grew to be
a significant element not only deciding about their welfare but also defining their essence, which would explain the serious worries expressed by Ekkehard. Lampert of Hersfeld, almost a contemporary of Ekkehard, also showed in several examples how destructive the consequences of the inner conflicts could be for a monastery’s reputation. Characteristically, which corroborates the thesis of seeing monks as a human kind, Lampert saw this damage as done not only to a particular monastery but also to the monks in general. In one of the episodes he tells of Abbot Robert of Bamberg who bought himself the abbacy in Reichenau and tried to corrupt royal advisers and the king himself to obtain the abbacy in Fulda.

This pseudo-monk - but deeply disgusted, I want to say that even more harshly - this angel of Satan, who transfigured himself into an angel of light, has defamed, corrupted and dishonoured the saintly and angelic profession of monks to such an extent that monks nowadays in our regions are estimated not by their innocence and virtue of their way of life but by the amount of money [...]  

Further on, in a self-reflexive manner, Lampert writes in the margin of the visit he paid to Saalfeld, where he was to investigate the regularity of the monks who replaced the canons that lived there before, how paradoxically the public image of monks could affect their self-esteem. The nearby vulgus held the newly-introduced Benedictines, despite the regularity of the expelled canons, for something better, not for men, but for angels, not for flesh, but for spirit. And this opinion grew roots even deeper and stronger in the minds of the noble men than ordinary folk. From them this belief spread out among the people and caused such anxiety in most of the cloisters in this area, that here thirty, there forty, and somewhere fifty monks scared of the austerities of life left the monasteries and believed it was better to expose the salvation of their souls to worldly danger rather than to take the task beyond one’s powers to violently enter into the kingdom of heaven.  

These two incidents show that the classification of monks both in their own view of themselves and in the external counterpart was an effect of a delicate interaction between the expressions given by them and the response they got from the outside world.
Essential opinion & the discourse of divisible essence

There is no need to continue enumerating these instances especially because abundant examples are well known - my selection of the examples was not meant to be representative nor did I intend to find a main thread leading directly from one to another. More important is to see that monks were defined and defined themselves from different interrelated poles - secular power, public opinion, inner-monastic discourse and within the context of their own monasteries. To a certain extent all these bodies of knowledge upheld the discourse about monks as a kind of human beings radically different from other people in the society. Not only the obvious categories introduced by Hildemar of homo exterior and homo interior, or the claustrum/saeculum divide back this up, but also the terms derived from them like pseudomonachus used by Lampert or the manner in which Ekkehard and his continuator described certain individuals as only looking like monks but not really being them. These latter categories conveyed by the historiographical works are especially interesting here because they seem to translate the former, rather abstract terms into more practical keys for decoding the reality that surrounded these monks. Furthermore, they were indispensable for the, often purely physical, practices of person production, which we have seen in the first part of my article. These ideas required a material expression in clothes, posture, places that people had to occupy if they were to satisfy the established requirements etc. The terms such as pseudomonachus or the angel of Satan could also act as negative labels that would stick and set the machinery of social control in motion, regardless of whether it was the emperor who was to intervene or other brothers. On the other hand, these routines sustained those general categories and classifications, confirmed their purpose but also very subtly shaped their content. Finally, despite the postulated separation from the outside, in reality the secular world functioned not only as an intellectual frame of reference giving feedback to monastic communities, but also as a possible source of practices to maintain this classification - one could, when necessary, turn e.g. to the king, as monks of Fulda or of St Gall did when their abbots’ actions did not adhere to the proper descriptions.

Obviously, here I turned my attention to only two themes among many parallel debates delineating monks as an exceptional kind of human being in the Middle Ages. For instance Giles Constable has presented an absorbing discussion led since St Benedict’s times within the monastic world about the voluntariness of the monk’s profession and which of its elements were necessary for the constitution of a Benedictine monk. His analysis of signs and rituals that accompanied taking the monastic habit brought him to similar conclusions although not headed under the term of human kind. In his
opinion, in the early Middle Ages appearance was taken for reality, hence the simple life led by monks or nuns was often enough to categorize them as such. After 1000 an observable split between the essence and appearance emerged, and a conviction grew that external conformity no longer sufficed to qualify as *monachus ipsus*—thus, on the one hand, greater importance of formality in the entry, on the other hand, growing concern with the monks’ inner feelings.89 These debates rested, in turn, on even more general concepts of the person and the sense of human nature that circulated in Europe around and after 1000. What emerges from the examples of the discrepant roles analyzed in this text shows that an individual was not necessarily perceived as an integrated entity, even if that was the ideal, but also as flexible enough to, in extreme cases, encompass different, seemingly exclusive, *personae* and their accompanying loyalties within himself.90 The important factors, at least in Ekkehard’s eyes, were the particular incumbent’s intentions and whether his role was integrated in the monastery’s institutional frame or not. Depending on these, a given individual could either perform his tasks almost naturally, or be expelled from the cloister stamped as a misfit. However, the essentialist thinking was not entirely gone but persisted, so to speak, on the higher level of the *human kind*, where the alleged essence of the monastic person was debated. Due to the often contradictory interests of contributors to these debates and the expectations of the monastic world that changed over time and, in consequence, due to a lack of a coherent body of knowledge, which would once and for all settle upon its content, during the Middle Ages monks were to remain a fundamentally contested *human kind*. Therefore, the whole *human kind* concept mirrors to some extent the loosely defined idea of *ordo* or “estate”, which characterizes the medieval, and the monastic in particular, way of thinking about society. According to *ordo*, people were divided and belonged to different *ordines*, of which the most outworn example, which actually does no justice to the often abundant and sophisticated hierarchies circulating then, is the tripartite division of *oratores*, *bellatores*, and *laboratores*. In this case, however, the examples taken from Lampert’s *Annales*, and confirmed by numerous others, reveal that during the tenth and eleventh centuries medieval monks as an *ordo* were becoming, in a manner of speaking, a class-for-itself, aware of the range and importance of classifications and self-classification, in consequence developing some sense of common interest.91

Finally, a synopsis of the methodology needs to be given. My suggestion is that for a complete, I dare not say holistic, understanding of monastic person production, the micro-level of everyday life and the macro-level of discourses roughly sketched above are necessary. Here, I proposed to use the Goffman-oriented study of interpersonal communication patterns and processes that
led to establishing the definition of situations expressed in human behaviour; on the other hand, the Foucauldian archaeological overview of social structures and institutions that generated the discourses on personhood. These two paradigms met on the mid-stage of institutions such as monasteries, which, depending on their local context, transformed and implemented the loose discourses and made them into fixable labels - the descriptions of meaningful actions later used in the interpersonal practices. In short, we need Goffman to understand how Foucault’s discourses sneaked into the bodies, and see how people were made up in everyday life as well as in large-scale processes.92 Still, it is essential to bear in mind that on neither of these levels were the outcomes of the operating forces definite. These forces provided a field for the game with loosely defined rules and plenty of possible moves for the players. Also, the connection between the levels was by no means fixed and necessary; the discourses did not stipulate a mechanical response on the level of practices, on the other hand peoples’ actions could manipulate and redesign their classifications - monks, after all, were an interactive human kind.

Before I conclude I need to mention that this article is only a part in a bigger project of a sociologically inspired PhD study: *Total St Gall. The Modes of Power and Social Control in a Medieval Monastery*, which discusses different forms of institutional power that could be found mainly in the *Casus sancti Galli* but also in some parallel monastic sources from about that time. The other studies of this forthcoming project deal with the question of surveillance,93 patterns of persecution and monastic divide between Öffentlichkeit and Nichtöffentlichkeit expressed in the oral and literary practices respectively. In the current article the aspect of power has been deliberately toned down, since this text may have been experienced as already theoretically overloaded but obviously at its core the problem of the category of person is the problem of power and its effects on human subjectivity, both understood in Foucauldian terms.94 I have mainly focused on the interpersonal and discursive dimensions of institutionalized power forming people, but there have clearly been other functions of medieval cloisters, which could be underscored. For instance, the abbot’s authority was a multifarious question - he was a spiritual shepherd of the monks, their economical nutritor, sometimes an erudite person, and in the times of which we speak a powerful, influential person able to punish the disobedient thanks to his mighty friends even when they fled the cloister.95 It seems, though, justified to draw attention to the specific aspects of the power relations within the monasteries and analyze them separately without referring to all their forms. I believe the scheme and the concepts for the analysis of monastic personhood in the Middle Ages presented here will help us to better understand the complex forces that formed this subtle yet very central phenomenon. There is still a chapter on the medieval category of person to
write and we need the analytical equipment, even this stored in the modern toolboxes, to carry out this job, because there are no simple tensions inbuilt in this problem.95 Be it Mayke de Jong’s claustrum as a cognitive category suitable for constant re-negotiation of cleavages in the world, or be it my application of the idea of human kinds and the theory of roles - these concepts allow us to realize how much painstaking intellectual and physical labour on different levels was in fact required to manufacture a medieval monk.

Non similitudinem monachi, sed monachum ipsum! En undersökning om det medeltida klostrets personkategori – exemplet Sankt Gallen


I andra delen av texten, baserad på Ian Hackings begrepp the human kinds, undersöks och presenteras den högmedeltida diskursen om munkar som en speciell art av människor samt skisseras dess utveckling från Sankt Benedikts Regula till högmedeltiden. Metodologiskt påstår att för att få en korrekt uppfattning av det medeltida personbegreppet i klostermiljön måste de två nivåerna kombineras – de abstrakta diskurserna, vilka diskuterade människans och munkens natur, och de intersubjektiva praktiker gällande dräkt, beteende, uttryck osv., som en materiell tillämpning av de allmänna beskrivningsens regler och föreskrifter i vardagslivet.

Keywords: medieval monastery; category of the person; Ekkehard IV; total institution; Casus sancti Galli; Erving Goffman; Salomo, Bishop of Constance
Notes

I would like to thank Jan-Magnus Jansson (Örebro universitet) and Sita Steckel (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster), who commented on the earlier version of this paper as well as two anonymous reviewers for their insightful remarks that helped to improve this article.

2 Ekkehard IV, Casus sancti Galli cap. 6, Darmstadt 1980, (ed. and trans.) Hans F. Haefele, p. 26: "Loquique iussi sunt: "Regula nostra", Hartmannus ait, "non similitudinem monachi, sed monachum ipsum querit." Notker: "Mihi pretexta hec, qua superindui," inquit, "desiderat, si togam praetenderet, non utique displieret."; Further referred to as CSG; all translations of the Casus are mine unless otherwise indicated.
3 Gerold Meyer von Knonau, Ekkehartii (IV.) Casus sancti Galli, St Gallen 1877, p. XLVII.
6 The use of the concept of "role" in the monastic context may be confusing for the readers, since it connotes monastic functions as well, say, of an abbot, cellarer or magister infirmorum. This is, however, not what I will analyze in this text, although some of the examples will deal with the functionaries as well. If I wanted to be consistent, but I do not, sometimes the term "person" and/or "self" would be more appropriate, because I am interested in (1.) Individuals who enacted different personae for their separate audiences and (2.) How power acted upon their selves. For the sake of convenience I will use the umbrella concept of role and make qualifications where necessary.
7 The limited scope of this article unfortunately does not allow for presenting the fundamental text by Marcel Mauss, from which all ‘category of the person’-studies stem more or less directly. For this text and its critical assessment, especially in the essays by N.J. Allen and Steven Collins, see: The Category of the Person. Anthropology, philosophy, history, Cambridge 1985, (ed.) Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, Steven Lukes.
11 de Jong, 1983, p. 340: 'Dat wil zeggen - en dit is de hypothese die ik hier formuleren - dat het claustrum voor de kloosterlingen die binnen de begrenzing hiervan opgroeiden niet alleen een tastbare, fysieke realiteit vormde, maar ook een sociale notie.'


16 Goffman 1968, pp. 24-25, 35-42.


18 Erving Goffman, "Role Distance", in Encounters: two studies in the sociology of interaction, Indianapolis 1961, pp. 84-152, at p. 85. For a brief survey on the use of the concept of role in historical research see: Peter Burke, History and Social Theory, Cambridge 2005, pp. 47-50.

19 The famous idea of Foucault, to whom as a matter of fact the concept of role never mattered, that all human relations are relations of power is perhaps too abstract and intangible to be accepted as an approach to study. In this regard, by combining Foucault with Goffman, we may say that roles are the way power is distributed within the social sphere and that physically it takes form in everyday interaction rituals, where images of people are collaboratively produced: Randall Collins, Theoretical Sociology, San Diego 1988, pp. 188-208; Spencer E. Cahill, "Toward a Sociology of the Person", Sociological Theory 16 (1998), pp. 132-148, at pp. 134-138.


22 Goffman 1959, p. 145.


24 CSG preloquium, p. 16: "quam verissime datum est stilo et atramento veritatem perstringere, fortunia et infortunia loci nostri veritati nihil parcentes edisserere."


27 See for example: CSG preloquium, p. 16; c. 26, p. 67; c. 33, p. 76.

28 Giles Constable, "The Ceremonies and Symbolism of Entering Religious Life and


30 CSG c. 3, p. 20: "Claustrumque ille, quia potens erat, absque duce et, quod magne confusionis tunc erat est".


33 Goffman observed that identity anecdotes i.e. stories about incidents when either inmates or members of the staff or people from the outside mistakenly took the members of the other group for their own affiliates, are one of the characteristic features of the total institutions. He interpreted these as sporadically surfacing awareness of how arbitrary the supposedly vast differences between these worlds were: Goffman 1968, pp. 104-105.

34 CSG c. 5, p. 24: "Nimis tamen, ut iam diximus, insolens semper erat et est praeter monachici nostri habitus quemquam introire intima nostra, maxime noctibus.”


36 CSG c. 6, p. 26: “‘Sciò’, inquit, ‘fratres et filii, quid ab illo vereamini; sed hoc et mihi quoque quiddam subolet. Existimo tamen melius nobiscum actum fore, si sic apud nos initiatus monachum se aliquando nostrum faciat, ne iterum canonicum subdamur ut aneta. Placet igitur, ut agamus cum illo, quo re vera habitum sumat a sancto Gallo, ut, si arte sua acciderit, quod veremur, noster tamen sit frater et monachus.”

37 CSG c. 6, p. 28: “Designaturque ei locus, quem hodie quadris lapidibus notatum videmus, quibus intrans habitum indueret, exiens exu ret”.

38 CSG c. 5, p. 24: “Verebantur enim hominem palatinum, qui iam quasdam abbatias canonicus habebat, ne aliquid irregulare, ut forte fit, viens sibi viam apud regem occasione hac etiam ad nostram aperire temptaret.”

39 St Gall was a royal abbey since 883 and up to the eleventh century was frequently visited by kings and emperors: Johannes Duft, Anton Gössi, Werner Vogler, “St Gallen”, in Helvetia sacra. Früh e Kloster, die Benediktiner und Benedikterinnen in der Schweiz, section III, vol. 1, Bern 1993, (ed.) Elsanne Gilomen-Schenkel, pp. 1180-1181.

40 Goffman 1959, pp. 140-146.


Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge 2003, (trans.) Richard Nice, pp. 94-95: “The whole trick of pedagogic reason [in total institutions *par excellence*] lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant: in obtaining the respect for form and forms of respect which constitute the most visible and at the same time the best-hidden (because most "natural") manifestation of submission to the established order, the incorporation of the arbitrary abolishes what Raymond Ruyer calls "lateral possibilities", that is, all the eccentricities and deviations which are the small change of madness. The concessions of *politeness* always contain *political* concessions.”

Ekkehard affectively called cloistral space for ‘our intimate space’ and ‘our nest’: CSG c. 5, p. 24; c. 75, p. 156. He also had a very strong sense of "we" identification with the monks and the past of St Gall: Wolfgang Egger, Barbara Pätzold, *Wir-Gefühl und Regnum Saxonum bei frühmittelalterlichen Geschichtsschreibern*, Weimar 1984, p. 64.


von Knonau, p. XXIII fn. 64.

CSG c. 28, pp. 68-70.

CSG c. 29, p. 70.


*Supplex Libellus monachorum Fuldensium Carolo Imperatori porrectus* (ed.) Josef Semmler, in *Corpus consuetudinum monasticarum (cura Pontifici Athenaei Sancti Anselmi de Urbe editum)*, (ed.) Kassius Hallinger OSB, Siegburg 1963, vol. 1, pp. 319-327, c. XX, at pp. 326-327: "id est unitatem et concordiam cum abbate nostro habere sicut cum anterioribus nostris abbatibus habuimus et misericordiam et familiaritatem, pietatem et modestiam in illo sentire; et ut esset benignus infirmis, propitius delinquentibus, affabilis fratribus, maestorum consolator, laborantium adiutor, benevolorum auxiliator, bene certantium hortator, lassorum recocillator, cedentium sustentator, cadentium restaurator; omnes fratres amaret, nullum odiret et nullum zeli vel livoris dolo perseveretur fieretque non turbulentus vultu, non anxius animo, non nimius in iudicio, non obstinatus in consilio, sed hilaris facie, laetus mente, discretus in opere, consentiens in utilitate. Et quando aliquis de fratribus praecoccupatus fuerit in aliquo delicto, non statim tyrannica vindicta illum excruciaret, sed misericordi disciplina corrigere festinaret conversumque clementer susciperet nec prava suspicione denuo illum fatigaret neque perpetuo odio exterminaret.”


CSG c. 136, p. 264.
59 CSG c. 135, p. 262: "His similibusque, que se frugi hominem vulgarisset, opibus adeo se ille commendabat, ut ubique de eo fama volaret, sed et coram ipsis quoque regibus non aliter nisi boni abbatis praenomine memoraretur."

60 de Jong 2000, p. 213.

61 Goffman 1968 p. 112: ‘If they are to move with grace and effectiveness in the wider community, then it may be advantageous for them to be recruited from the same small social grouping as leaders of other social units in the wider society.’ This general principle refers better to Salomo than to Notker, but in the latter’s case it may be reversed: by his behavior Notker recruited himself into the social class, for which he was to perform.

62 Goffman 1969, pp. 48-49, 137-140.

63 CSG c. 47, p. 106: "Magisque suos habere passus quam se.”

64 CSG c. 48, pp. 108-110.

65 St Benedict, Regula Benedicti c. 65, pp. 226-228.


67 Jocelin of Brakelond, Crónica Jocelini, p. 1: "dum quiesque, serviens sub domino simplice et iam senescente, fecit quod voluit, non quod decuit.”

68 Jocelin of Brakelond, Crónica Jocelini, pp. 11-15.

69 Jocelin of Brakelond, Crónica Jocelini, p. 36: "Aliud nimirum est quod domi non exibetis vultum propicium sicut alibi, nec inter fratres qui vos diligunt et dilexerunt et in dominum sibi eligerunt, set raro estis inter eos, nec tunc congaudetis eis, sicut dicunt: ‘[…]’ Stultus es et stulte loqueris. Scire deberes quod Salomon ait: ‘Filie tibi sunt multe: vultum propicium ne ostendas eis’.”


71 Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual. Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior, New York 1982, p. 45: “The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters. And if a particular person or group or society seems to have a unique character all its own, it is because its standard set of human-nature elements is pitched and combined in a particular way. […] the human nature of a particular set of persons may be specially designed for a special kind of undertakings in which they participate […]”


75 Hacking 1995, p. 388: “A witch was a kind of person within a framework of knowledge different in type from ours, but no less rigorous. […] If one were to extend my notion of human kind to apply to a classification within a system of knowledge for which there are sharp criteria – procedures of accountability, canons of evidence, and so forth – then in Europe ‘witch’ was a human kind.”


78 St Benedict, Regula Benedicti c. 71, p. 236: ‘Quod si quis contentiosus rependerit, corporiatur’. I have altered the imprecise English translation of this fragment; ‘Tertium vero monachorum tertium genus est sarabitarum, […] in plumbi natura mollitii, c. 1, p. 72; ‘de cellarario monasterii, qualis sit’, c. 31, p. 152; see also cc. 21, 23, 31, 56, 64, 66.


80 St Benedict, Regula Benedicti: ‘Saeculi actibus se facere alienum’ (c. 4, p. 88); ‘ut non suo arbitrio viventes vel desideriis suis et voluptatibus oboedientes, sed ambulantes alieno iudicio et imperio in coenobiis degentes abbatem sibi praesse desiderant’ (c. 5, p. 96); see also c. 73.


82 Angenendt, p. 378.

83 Eugenii II Concilium Romanum, (ed.) Georg Heinrich Pertz, MGH Capit. I, pp. 370-377; at p. 375: ‘De monachis qui in solo habitu existunt et non in ea vita vivunt. Quamquam plura sint genera monachorum, observanda videlicet et alia omnimodis refutanda, tamen de his qui in solo habitu existunt diligenti cura debet unusquisque episcoporum in sua diocese decertare, ut qui religiositate conantur illumere boni pastoris studio coartentur, ut aut ad proprium de quo defuerunt revertantur monasterium aut prospectu congruo in aliu mittantur. Ut, qui semel de Deo voverunt et habitum monachorum ostenderunt vel comas totunderunt regularem teneant vitam, uno scilicet, ut convenit dormitorio ac refectorio dormientes atque existentes et ad similitudinem apostolorum omnia peragentes, quia nequisquam quod habebat aliquid suum esse dicebat, sed erant illis omnia communia.’ Surprisingly, the words of this decree echo in the critique directed against late tenth-century Abbot Gerhard that St Gall monks presented for Otto III, and which is reported by the first continuator of Ekkehard’s Casus sancti Galli: Casuum sancti Galli continuatio anonyma, (ed. and trans.) Heidi Leuppi, Zürich 1987, c. 11, p. 94: ‘Eum, quem nobis, domine rex, abbatem praeposuitis, solo nomine id, quod dicitur, est. Locum enim nostrum sanctum, quem ad regendum suscepit ipse non rector sed destructor omnimodis depravavit. Quod enim maximum est, Dei et sui propositi obliquis, irregulariter vivens regulares disciplinas deseruit, monachi habitum gerens monachi opera nulla fecit.’


86 Lampert of Hersfeld, Lamperti monachi Hersfeldensis Annales, (trans.) Adolf Schmidt, elucidated by Wolfgang Dietrich Fritz, Berlin 1938, pp. 76-86; 324-326. Jocelin of Brakelond seems to suggest that it was better to lie to the pilgrims visiting Bury St Edmunds about the shameful circumstances of the fire that nearly consumed the feretory of the saint in order to protect the monastery’s reputation: Jocelin of Brakelond, Cronica Jocelini, pp. 106-109.

87 Lampert, Lamperti Annales, p. 146: “Is pseudomonachus, dicam expressius vi doloris impulsus, is angelus Satanae transfiguratus in angelum lucis, ita sanctam et angelicam mo-
nachorum professionem infamavit, corruptit, vicavit, ut monachi nostris temporibus atque in his regionibus non innocentia estimentur atque integritate vitae, sed quantitate pecuniae [...]. For another use of pseudomonachus see also: Lampert, Lamperti Annales, p. 154.

88 Lampert, Lamperti Annales, pp. 152-154: "Denique, sicut vulgo assiduitate vilescunt omnia, et popularium animi novarum rerum avidi magis semper stupent ad incognita, nos, quos usu noverant, nihil estimabant, et hos, quia novum insitatumque aliquid preferre videbantur, non homines, sed angelos, non carnem, sed spiritum arbitrabantur. Et hoc opinio principum quam privatorum mentibus altius pressiusque insederat. A quibus ad populum derivatus rumor tantum terroris plerisque in hac regione monasteriis iniecit, ut ad ingressum illorum alias XXX, alias XL, alias L monachi austerioris vitae metu scandalizati de monasteriis abscederent saciusque ducerent de salute animae in seculo periclitari quam supra virium suarum mensuram vim facere regno caelorum."; For an analogous example see: Casuum sancti Galli continuatio: c. 33, p. 100.

89 Constable, pp. 832-834.


93 Jezierski, pp. 167-182.

94 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", in Power. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 3, London 2002, (ed.) James D. Faubion, pp. 326-348, at p. 341: "[Power] operates on the field of possibilities in which behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. [...] it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less [...] it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action."; See also: Lukes, pp. 88-99.

95 See for example the story of monk Victor and his conflict with Abbot Craloh: CSG cc. 69-77, pp. 146-162.
