A Prelude to the British Bombardment of Copenhagen:
Viscount Howick and Denmark, 1806–1807

In mid-August 1807, a British army landed on the Danish island of Zealand and laid siege to Copenhagen. The object of this military operation was to secure the surrender of the Danish fleet into British hands – a goal which was achieved after Copenhagen had been subjected to three nights of bombardment during the first days of September 1807. Earlier that year, in late March, the coalition government made up chiefly of the Grenvillite and Foxite parliamentary factions had been succeeded amidst great acrimony by the Portland administration, a ministry which brought together the former followers of William Pitt. The attack on Denmark was the most striking initiative undertaken by the new government in 1807, and the Danish policy of the Portland administration was strongly criticized by the opposition during the parliamentary session which stretched from January to July 1808.

One of the arguments used by ministers and their supporters in defence of the government was to imply that the decision to attack Denmark built on the policy pursued by their predecessors. In particular, a number of despatches written by Earl Grey, foreign secretary between September 1806 and March 1807 and now co-leader of the opposition, were produced to demonstrate the hard line he had supposedly adopted while in office. Grey and other members of the opposition vehemently rejected the insinuation that, whatever their fine words now, the Grenville administration would in practice have pursued the same policy towards Denmark in the late summer of 1807 as the Portland ministry if it had remained in power. As one prominent member of the opposition put it, Grey felt that he had been accused “of holding one language while in office, and another when out of it”. Needless to say, no resolution of the question was achieved in 1808: this was a matter of party advantage and one side was never going to yield to the other. In a less partisan way, the question has remained implicit in all discussion among historians of the factors which led to the British assault on Copenhagen in 1807. Should the British decision to attack Denmark be seen as a response to an immediate and unexpected crisis in July 1807, as the child of Friedland and Tilsit? Or is
it to be regarded as the product of growing suspicion and irritation over a longer period of time?

This article will re-examine Grey's policy towards Denmark while he was foreign secretary, drawing on sources which have not previously been utilized for this purpose or, in some cases, at all. It will not discuss what were the central motives which in July 1807 impelled the Portland government to attack Denmark or attempt to analyse the true nature of Danish neutrality policy. These are matters that will be left for another day. Nor is my primary concern to determine whether the charge of hypocrisy against Grey during the parliamentary debates of 1808 can be substantiated, though a few words will be said about that in the conclusion. It is above all to explore the level of continuity which characterized British policy towards Denmark between 1803 and July 1807; and in this connection, the period of Grey's foreign secretariaship is of particular interest.

As a historical figure, Grey is primarily remembered for the last phase of his political career when he served as prime minister from 1830 to 1834 and secured the enactment of the “Great Reform Bill” of 1832. When he came to the foreign office in September 1806, he was a much younger man with little experience of government and none at all of diplomacy. While he was at the foreign office, and indeed until the death of his father in November 1807, he was Viscount Howick, not the second Earl Grey, and that is what he will be called for the remainder of this article.

Britain and Denmark, May 1803 to September 1806
When Howick became foreign secretary in September 1806, he inherited a comparatively untroubled relationship with Denmark. Since the resumption of hostilities between France and Britain in May 1803, Denmark had followed a policy of timid but dogged neutrality. Denmark was an absolute monarchy in which the king exercised virtually untrammeled authority, but real if not nominal power lay in the hands not of King Christian VII, who was incapacitated from governing by mental illness, but of his son, Crown Prince Frederik, the future Frederik VI. The two men who played the largest role in the execution of foreign policy were Count Christian Bernstorff, the foreign minister, and his younger brother, Count Joachim Bernstorff, the “director” of the foreign ministry. In the early nineteenth century the territories of the Danish state in mainland Europe included not only the kingdom of Denmark proper but also Norway to the north and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in the south. Although Denmark was not a strong power on land, her navy was quite significant and consisted of about 20 ships of the line. The fundamental long-term problem of Danish security policy was the Swedish threat to Norway. One of the main goals of Swedish foreign policy for much of the time since the early 1770s had been the acquisition of Norway, and the Danish response had taken two forms. The first was to maintain a fleet which possessed an
adequate measure of naval superiority over Sweden. This was essential, partly because Denmark had to be able to keep open her communications with Norway and partly because, in view of the difficulties of the Norwegian terrain, a Swedish attack over the sea against the heart of the Danish state, Copenhagen on the island of Zealand, was as much to be feared as a direct assault on Norway.

The second Danish response was the link to the great power which also had reason to regard Sweden as a potential threat, Russia. Denmark’s association with Russia was the ultimate guarantee of her continued hold on Norway, and this dependence to a great extent had made Denmark a client of Russia. The central importance of the Russian alignment – combined with growing Anglo-Danish tensions in the late 1790s over the maritime trading rights of neutral states – had led Denmark into the Armed Neutrality of 1800, which Russia created as an instrument to promote her own position in European politics. The results were catastrophic for Denmark. The Danish navy was defeated by Nelson at the battle of Copenhagen on 2 April 1801; and Russia subsequently yielded to the British interpretation of neutral maritime rights on most points in the Anglo-Russian convention of 17 June 1801, an agreement to which Denmark had no choice but to adhere in October 1801. The events of 1801 were a bitter lesson to Denmark.

After the outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1803, Denmark was more cautious in her dealings with Britain about neutral trade and less inclined to follow Russia down hazardous paths.

The outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1803 led to a new and immediate security problem for Denmark, because it was followed in June 1803 by a French occupation of Hanover, which created a threat not only to north German states like Mecklenburg, Lübeck and Hamburg but also to Holstein. The French move into Hanover made Denmark vulnerable to French invasion. Given the weakness of Denmark’s land forces, it was inconceivable that the Danes could hold Holstein, Schleswig and the rest of the Jutlandic peninsula against a sustained French attack. The Danish islands or at least Zealand and the capital, Copenhagen, were another matter. In this case, naval strength, not troops, would be decisive. The tenuous nature of the Danish hold on the Jutlandic peninsula was a fundamental factor in Danish foreign policy from June 1803 until Denmark’s entry into the war in 1807.

France was a constant source of anxiety for the Danish government. For example, in the summer of 1803 it feared that France might complement the occupation of Hanover by the seizure of Holstein so as to exclude British trade more effectively from north-western Germany, and French officers in Hanover spoke of forcing Denmark to close the Sound to the British flag. However, despite such anxieties, which foreshadowed the recurrent fears of the winter of 1806–1807 that France would demand the closure of Danish ports and the Sound to British shipping, France’s official policy towards Denmark was generally restrained be-
tween June 1803 and the autumn of 1806, and serious diplomatic contact between the two countries was slight.

Denmark's most frequent exchanges during these years were with the two great powers of the Baltic region, Russia and Prussia. Russia made several attempts to secure Danish co-operation in opposing French expansion, and Berlin was often interested in involving Denmark in a Prussian-led grouping of north German states, but neither applied strong pressure, and Denmark was able to evade all their attempts between 1803 and 1806 to enter into arrangements which would, in one way or another, have compromised her isolated neutrality. The only concrete result of these tortuous discussions was the Danish decision in September 1805, taken to please both Russia and Prussia, to assemble a force of about 20,000 regular troops in Holstein to protect the neutrality of that province. The level of preparedness at the sea batteries protecting Elsinore and Copenhagen was also raised, but the Danish navy continued to lie unrigged in the harbour of Copenhagen, as it had done since the outbreak of war in 1803.

The crown prince chose to command the force in Holstein in person from headquarters at Kiel, and Christian Bernstorff went with him. As a result, from October 1805 until after Denmark was drawn into the war in August 1807 Frederik and Christian Bernstorff resided at Kiel, while foreign envoys were obliged to remain at Copenhagen and transact official business with Joachim Bernstorff.

Anglo-Danish relations between the outbreak of war in May 1803 and Howick's appointment to the foreign office in September 1806 were marked by a great measure of continuity, despite several changes of administration in London. There was no repetition of the disputes over neutral trade between Britain and Denmark which had characterized the previous Anglo-French war, and Denmark abided by the limitations placed on neutral maritime rights by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 17 June 1811. Even with these restrictions, Danish trade, as Christian Bernstorff observed early in December 1805, was "more prosperous than ever." Britain had responded to the French occupation of Hanover by blockading the Elbe, and the Danish government protested formally both at the principle behind the blockade and at the effects on the two Danish ports located on the Elbe, Altona and Glückstadt. In practice, however, the French occupation of Hanover and the British blockade of the Elbe rapidly created a mutually advantageous relationship between Britain and Denmark, as British goods which would previously have been shipped directly to Hamburg were diverted to the tiny Danish port of Tonningen on the Ejder river before they were transported in a semi-clandestine fashion to Hamburg and on into the heart of Germany. The inhabitants of Schleswig and Holstein benefited from this trade, and so too did the finances of the Danish state, which received a significant revenue from tolls levied at Tonningen.

Despite the armed clash between Britain and Denmark in 1801, Britain's dip-
diplomatic representatives in Copenhagen regarded Denmark after May 1803 as a friendly power, whose leading statesmen were genuinely well disposed towards Britain and wished to see a curtailment of French expansion in Europe. It was accepted that Denmark was likely to remain neutral. As Lord Hawkesbury, the foreign secretary in the Addington administration, put it in June 1803, it was “certainly desirable” that Denmark should observe “a strict neutrality ... except in the event of a general confederation of the powers of the continent”, and that even if such an alliance came into being, “it would not be prudent that the King of Denmark should become a party to it until he could do so without danger to his own dominions”. This was a very satisfactory attitude from a Danish point of view, but it is noteworthy that at the same time, even at this early stage in the conflict, Hawkesbury expressed anxiety that France might not respect Danish neutrality and might occupy Holstein or demand the closure of Danish ports to British shipping.

With this one exception, continuing Danish neutrality satisfied British interests, because it ensured that the Sound remained open to British shipping. The Baltic was not a major market for British exports, but it was an essential source of certain vital imports – above all naval stores and grain – and in 1805 almost 6,000 merchant vessels passed the Sound on their way to or from British ports. It is therefore symptomatic that the only significant flurry of anxiety in London over Denmark before Howick became foreign secretary was occasioned by a perceived threat the free passage of the Sound. The catalyst was Prussia’s annexation of Hanover accompanied by the announcement that the North Sea ports of Prussia and Hanover would be closed to British shipping. Prussia seemed to be working with France against Britain, and a number of despatches from Benjamin Garlike, the British minister to Denmark, received around 1 April 1806 in London suggested that these developments might have serious consequences for Denmark. Garlike reported on 18 March that the Danish government feared “the request of France to shut the ports of Denmark, and if possible the Sound itself against English and Russian ships” and expressed his own apprehension that Holstein might be occupied by French or Prussian troops.

The foreign secretary, Charles James Fox, reacted by instructing Garlike to warn the Danish government, with all suitable expressions of British friendship and goodwill, that if Denmark closed her ports to the British flag in response to French or Prussian pressure, Britain would be obliged to regard this step as “an unequivocal measure of hostility” and to act “to secure the passages into the Baltic” (he did not specify how) and to blockade Danish ports. If, on the other hand, Denmark was attacked because she stood up to Prussian and French demands, Britain would provide “every support within [her] power”. In London, Fox made the same points to the Danish minister to Britain, Count Wedel Jarlsberg, on 16 April.
By the time he received Fox’s instructions, Garlike was already involved in a series of consultations, which included an exchange of letters, with Joachim Bernstorff in which the latter assured the British envoy that no French or Prussian demands had been presented to Denmark and that, if they were, Denmark would defend her neutrality and independence\textsuperscript{23}. This crisis – if the word is not too strong – in Anglo-Danish relations rapidly blew over. No Prussian or French demands were made to Denmark. On 6 May, before he had even received all of Garlike’s reports on his exchanges with Bernstorff, Fox expressed “the highest satisfaction” with Garlike’s description “of the excellent dispositions of the Danish government”\textsuperscript{24}, and he said the same to Jarlsberg on 8 May\textsuperscript{25}. Fox’s anxieties were allayed, and he paid little attention to Denmark over the following months. In the summer of 1806 the war in northern Europe was quiescent and both Britain and Russia were engaged in negotiations, which ultimately proved fruitless, for peace with France. Anglo-Danish relations were untroubled: Garlike received no instructions on matters of any significance between late May and October, while Christian Bernstorff sent no instructions at all to the Danish mission in London between 28 June and 3 November\textsuperscript{26}. Nonetheless, the mini-crisis of April 1806 was a portent of many of the issues in Anglo-Danish relations with which Howick would have to grapple the following winter.

Viscount Howick, the collapse of Prussia and the prospect of Dano-Swedish co-operation, 24 September – 3 December 1806

Fox died on 13 September. Howick became foreign secretary on 24 September as the earlier menace of Franco-Prussian co-operation was giving way to an escalating crisis in the relations between these two states, and his first instructions to Garlike were prompted by the imminent outbreak of war between France and Prussia. As early as 12 September, the prime minister, Lord Grenville, had written warmly of the potential virtues of “a northern league” embracing Britain, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and certain smaller German states\textsuperscript{27}, and on 9 October Howick instructed Garlike to ascertain Danish views about “a concert, founded upon just principles, of the chief powers of the North”. He was aware of “the cautious policy” hitherto pursued by Denmark and “the circumstances by which it has been dictated”, but the time now seemed to have arrived “when a different system may be required”. Garlike was therefore to recommend the maintenance of a strong corps in Holstein which could act in support of the right wing of the Prussian army if hostilities commenced, and he was authorized to offer British assistance if it was required to enable Denmark “to act according to this suggestion”. Howick did not specify the form that this assistance might take\textsuperscript{28}.

When Howick wrote these words, hostilities had in fact already begun between Prussia and France, and they rapidly led to an astonishing and virtually complete collapse of the Prussian state. The Prussian army was decisively defeated at the
battles of Jena and Auerstädt on 14 October, and the French entered Berlin on 25 October. In early November, they moved into Poland, which became the main theatre of operations where Napoleon’s Grande Armée contended against the Russians and the remnants of the Prussian army. In north-western Germany, the collapse of Prussia was followed during the course of November not only by the return of the French to Hanover but also by their occupation of Mecklenburg and the previously neutral Hanseatic towns of Lübeck, Hamburg and Bremen. Prussia was exposed alone to the full force of French arms and it would clearly be some time before she could receive Russian assistance. The Danish government firmly rejected Prussian and Russian approaches designed to secure Danish participation in the war, and there was no prospect that it would react differently to appeals from Britain. On the contrary, as Garlike observed on 14 November, Danish ministers saw in the growing danger from France “the confirmation of their present system of neutrality, and the still stricter observance of all its obligations”. What was more, “several leading persons” had mentioned to Garlike the possibility of abandoning the whole of the Jutlandic peninsula and probably also the island of Fyn in the event of a French attack in order to concentrate on the defence of Zealand and the other islands to the east of the Great Belt (Møn, Falster and Lolland).

As we shall see, neither Garlike nor Howick regarded the notion of directing all of Denmark’s resources to the defence of Zealand and its adjacent islands as necessarily being a misguided one, but it was not compatible with a Danish incursion into northern Germany. However, by mid-November, Howick had tacitly dropped the idea of active Danish involvement in the war. The despatch which he wrote to Garlike on 11 November was couched in terms of despondent resignation.

In the uncertainty of the present moment ... it is impossible to send you any precise instructions for the regulation of your conduct – it can only be stated generally that if Denmark should be brought into a situation to contend for its independence His Majesty will be willing to afford the most effectual assistance. This was more a vague promise of help if Danish neutrality were violated than an exhortation to join the war. As such, it represented a more realistic appraisal of likely Danish policy than Howick’s earlier despatches had done. Indeed, it must be doubtful if his efforts to secure Danish participation in the Jena campaign were ever more than a pro forma gesture towards the cause of the continental war; the imprecision of the British offer of assistance to Denmark does not suggest that they were. It was at this stage that the prospect of a renewed British acceptance of continuing Danish neutrality was complicated by proposals emanating from one of Britain’s allies, Sweden.

Sweden was a member of the coalition against France and received British subsidies to maintain a field army of 10,000 men operating offensively from Swedish
Pomerania. For reasons that lie outside the framework of this article, Prussian-Swedish relations were strained\(^{32}\), and Sweden played no real part in the short-lived Jena campaign. A few of the Swedish troops in Pomerania were even withdrawn to Sweden\(^{33}\). The inactivity of the king of Sweden, Gustav IV Adolf, did not save him from the consequences of Prussia's collapse, and it became increasingly evident in the course of November that Swedish Pomerania would soon face the prospect of French attack, though it was only on 12 December that a French corps of about 15,000 men took up a position along the borders of that province\(^{34}\). Howick was angered by Gustav Adolf's unenterprising approach\(^{35}\), but a number of factors combined in November to improve Anglo-Swedish relations. One was the clear French threat to Swedish Pomerania, and above all to the fortress and port of Stralsund, a valuable bridgehead in northern Germany for the anti-French alliance\(^{36}\). Gustav Adolf assured Henry Pierrepoint, the British minister to Sweden, in mid-November that he had given orders for two battalions to be sent to Stralsund, and indeed about 1,100 additional Swedish troops did ultimately land in Pomerania on 26 January 1807\(^{37}\). This was a point in Sweden's favour, as was what Pierrepoint called Gustav Adolf's "manly and independent conduct" in rejecting out of hand a peace feeler from Napoleon\(^{38}\).

It was at this point, in mid-November 1806, that Danish and Swedish affairs became entangled in British policy-making. The catalyst was a despatch Gustav Adolf received on 11 November from Baron Gotthard Mauritz von Rehausen, the Swedish minister to Britain, dated 31 October in which the latter reported that Howick had in late October emphasized the need for diversions to assist Prussia. In this connection, Howick had mentioned that much could be achieved by uniting the Danish and Swedish field armies, that both Garlike and Pierrepoint had been instructed to promote such a combination of forces and that Britain was prepared to pay subsidies for as many troops as Gustav Adolf could raise for this purpose\(^{39}\).

Howick's version of this conversation, as given in a private letter to Pierrepoint over a month later, is rather different. According to Howick, he happened to meet Rehausen at dinner at Holland House, and it was Rehausen who mentioned the advantages which might be gained by a junction of the Danish and Swedish armies to assist Prussia and asked whether Britain would augment her subsidies to Sweden if the latter could provide an army of 30,000 for active operations in association with Denmark. Howick had replied that Britain would certainly be willing to contribute to the support of such "combined exertions" and that "if a junction of the forces of Sweden & Denmark should be desired by those powers, such co-operation might be of the greatest use". However, he had observed that he "feared there would be found great difficulties in the way of this proposal". He concluded the account of the conversation which he sent to Pierrepoint by observing that "In truth the cause of my omitting to say any thing to you about
Denmark ... was that I thought ... that the Danish & Swedish armies could not probably be brought to act harmoniously together"40 – a reference presumably to the notoriously poor relations between the two Scandinavian kingdoms. Howick’s despatches to Garlike and Pierrepont in October and November tend to bear out Howick’s rather than Rehausen’s version of their conversation. They contain no mention of possible co-operation between the two powers, still less instructions to attempt to promote it.

Rehausen’s despatch did, however, make a considerable impression on Gustav Adolf, and when he saw Pierrepont on 16 November at Malmö in Skåne, where Gustav Adolf spent the winter, he alluded to the possibility of combined military operations by Denmark and Sweden and said that he understood from Rehausen that Garlike and Pierrepont had received identical instructions on the subject. In the absence of such instructions, Pierrepont was only able to reply by referring in general terms to the desirability of co-operation between neighbouring states41. Undeterred, Gustav Adolf instructed Rehausen on 18 November to tell Howick that Napoleon undoubtedly intended, now that he had defeated Prussia, to gain control of Holstein so as to realise his old plan of forcing Denmark to co-operate in shutting the Sound to British trade. Gustav Adolf therefore proposed that Britain should pay subsidies for an additional 25,000 Swedish troops which he was prepared to furnish without delay to act jointly with the Danes in Holstein. This Swedish army would enhance both the desire and the ability of the Danes to defend their independence, and if Britain could also send some troops, the combined force would be strong enough not only to defend Holstein but also to undertake a diversion to liberate northern Germany42.

When Howick saw Rehausen on the morning of 2 December, he was faced with a concrete Swedish proposal which potentially possessed far-reaching implications for Britain’s relations with both Denmark and Sweden. It led him to see Rehausen and to write at length to Garlike in early December, and in his communication to Garlike he set out for the first time since becoming foreign secretary his views in any considered way on what British policy towards Denmark ought to be.

Rehausen’s account of his conversation with Howick on the morning of 2 December can only have made discouraging reading for Gustav Adolf. According to Rehausen, when the question of military co-operation for the defence of Holstein was discussed, he encountered “only uncertainty and little desire to act, at least for the moment” (qu’incertitude et peu de volonté d’agir, du moins pour le moment). Though Howick accepted the argument that such co-operation was desirable, he did not believe that it would be possible to persuade Denmark to agree43. In his despatch to Garlike on 3 December, Howick was philosophical about Danish wariness towards France.

The language of Count Bernstorff and the Danish ministers is such as was naturally to be expected from their former policy, and from the effect of the recent events in
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the north of Germany. Any endeavour to induce them to adopt other sentiments, if indeed such an attempt were advisable, would, at the present moment, probably be without a hope of success ... the question no longer is whether Denmark should give her aid to a powerful ally [i.e. Prussia], but whether she should, without any continental support, expose herself alone to the resentment of France ... a prudent system of neutrality, which shall not impair the means of future defence, is probably best. What was required from Denmark was vigilance and an ability “to defend those parts of the Danish dominions which possess effectual means of resistance”. This sounds very much like an endorsement of the proposal to abandon the Jutlandic peninsula if the French attacked, and this is confirmed later in the despatch, when Howick told Garlike that he should “particularly direct the attention of the Danish ministers” to the fact that a French attack on the Danish islands “would present many great difficulties, such as might ... prove insurmountable”.

As for the Swedish offer to send troops to Holstein, immediately after instructing Garlike to draw the attention of Danish ministers to the difficulties in the way of a French invasion of the Danish islands, Howick told him to “recommend to the most serious attention of the Danish ministers” Gustav Adolf’s offer to provide a corps of 25,000 men to join the Danish troops in Holstein. If, however, the Danish government was unwilling to agree to this measure or regarded the defence of Holstein as “impracticable”, no effort was to spared to put the Danish islands “in a proper state of defence” and Britain would be glad to “co-operate in naval measures for that purpose, if Denmark should really stand in need of such aid”.

This was tantamount to an endorsement of Danish neutrality, and a tacit dismissal of the Swedish proposal about Holstein, but there was a sting in the tail. Howick added the statement that

there is one point which cannot be too soon understood between this government and that of Denmark ... it would be impossible for the King to acquiesce in any arrangement whereby the whole, or any part of the Danish navy might be placed at the disposal of France ... in order to secure the German dominions [i.e. Holstein] of the Crown of Denmark.

Howick expressed his confidence that Denmark was unlikely to submit to “so humiliating a condition”, and Garlike was not instructed to take up this matter himself, but he was told to make British views known “distinctly and unequivocally” if “any question of this sort [should] arise”.

This was the first time since the resumption of war in 1803 that a British foreign secretary had referred to a risk that France might gain possession of all or part of the Danish navy. Garlike had never mentioned the possibility that Denmark might enter into a transaction with France involving Holstein and the Danish navy, and there are two ways in which Howick might have got this idea into his head. One is that he had learnt of some rumour along these lines which has not
been preserved in the surviving sources. The other is that the possibility occurred to him spontaneously because of the obvious vulnerability of the Jutlandic peninsula when combined with something Garlike had written six weeks earlier about a suggestion that a part of the Danish fleet be sold. On 25 October Garlike had reported that a plan was under consideration to reduce the Danish fleet to perhaps as little as seven or eight ships of the line on the grounds that Sweden only had six or seven and that the money saved could be used to strengthen Denmark’s land forces. Garlike believed that if the plan went ahead, France would try to buy the surplus vessels, but that Denmark would prefer to sell to Russia and that in any case the whole scheme was unlikely to be pursued. Howick received this despatch on 5 November and had not reacted at the time beyond having it copied to the Admiralty, but it is possible that it stuck in his mind and was the source of his anxieties about a transaction involving the Danish fleet in early December. Garlike’s report shows, incidentally, that he had gained some knowledge from a Danish source of Denmark’s new naval plan, adopted in the autumn of 1806, which did envisage a reduction in the number of ships of the line to twelve by 1814, though it said nothing of selling the remainder to a foreign power.

The record of what Howick said to Rehausen and wrote to Garlike on 2 and 3 December broadly tells the same story, except that there is a glaring inconsistency at the heart of his despatch to Garlike. With regard to the Swedish proposal about Holstein, what he gave with one hand, he took away with the other. Indeed, in this respect, his despatch to Garlike can only be described as bizarre. On the one hand, he was aware from Garlike’s reports of Denmark’s determination to remain neutral, saw it as a reasonable policy in the existing circumstances and accepted that the Jutlandic peninsula might have to be abandoned if the French attacked. On the other hand, he wanted to recommend the admission of a Swedish corps into Holstein, which would have involved Denmark in immediate war with France, since Sweden was an ally of Britain and Russia – though admittedly the recommendation was very tentative and was coupled with a cheerful acceptance that the Danish government would probably reject the proposal and might prefer to concentrate on the defence of the Danish islands.

There is thus much internal evidence to suggest that his instructions to Garlike on this point were a half-hearted gesture towards his Swedish ally. This was certainly the opinion of Garlike himself, who wrote privately to Pierrepoint on 13 December that “The entire embarrassment is felt by Lord Howick who cannot refuse [the Swedish] offer, & see no chance of bringing [Denmark] to act upon it”\(^47\). Whatever “embarrassment” Gustav Adolf’s proposal had caused Howick, it had only superficially led to a contradictory outlook towards Denmark. By early December, Howick had essentially reverted to the Danish policy which Britain had pursued since the outbreak of war in 1803: support for continuing Danish neutrality. However, the credibility of Danish neutrality in British eyes was about
to sustain a number of savage blows. The first was the withdrawal of the bulk of the Danish field army from Holstein.

The Danish withdrawal from Holstein, 19 November – 26 December 1806

The catalyst for the crisis in Anglo-Danish relations of December 1806 and January 1807 was Prince Frederik's decision on 19 November to withdraw the bulk of his troops in Holstein from that duchy, leaving only a light cordon of troops to police the frontier. The remainder of his forces took up a position behind the Ejder, the river separating Holstein from Schleswig, but in the course of December some of these troops were pulled back to Fyn and the northern part of the Jutlandic peninsula beyond the duchy of Schleswig. Two factors influenced this decision. The southern frontier of Holstein did not offer a good defensive position, and this applied even more strongly after Lübeck fell to the French on 6 November. The second consideration was a political one. On 6 November, the same day as they took Lübeck, French troops in pursuit of a retreating Prussian force had crossed the border and clashed with the Danish advanced guard. The incident was smoothed over, but Frederik took it as an injunction to caution. There were now only French troops south of the Holstein border, and they were in secure possession of the area. The continued presence of a substantial Danish force on the southern frontier of Holstein would imply a distrust of France which Napoleon might well find provocative, particularly since it would present some potential threat to his extended lines of communication into Poland.

On 21 November Napoleon instructed his foreign minister to urge the Danish government to pull back the Holstein corps to the frontier, but in fact the decision to withdraw had already been taken and Frederik's pre-emptive ingratiating had rendered the French approach superfluous. The Danish retreat to the Ejder was accompanied by many rumours in the second half of November that Napoleon would complement the occupation of Hanover and the Hanseatic towns by moving against Denmark or demanding the closure of Danish ports and the Sound to British navigation. However, they gradually abated as the focus of the war shifted towards Pomerania and above all Poland. The danger of complications with France had receded, even if the Danish government was well aware that the respite might only be temporary.

When Howick wrote to Pierrepoint and Garlike on 2 and 3 December, he framed his words as if he did not yet know that the whole question of Denmark's position in international relations had been placed in a different light by the Danish withdrawal from Holstein. In reality, news of this development had reached the foreign office on 29 November from Edward Thornton, the British envoy to the Hanse Towns since 1805. He normally resided at Hamburg, but on 19 November he withdrew into Holstein. On 21 and 23 November he reported from
Holstein that Danish troops had been ordered to evacuate that province and that he expected the French to occupy not only Holstein but also the rest of the Jutlandic peninsula and Fyn. Thornton gave no source for any of this information, and that perhaps is why Howick ignored it. However, he did pay attention when he received virtually the same information again from Pierrepoint in a far more alarming form on 6 December.

On 24 November Pierrepoint received a visit from Baron Gustaf af Wetterstedt, the official with chief responsibility for the execution of Gustav Adolf’s foreign policy. Wetterstedt brought disturbing news from Hamburg, namely that Denmark and France had concluded an agreement that the Danes would evacuate Holstein and that the ports of that province would be occupied by the French. Gustav Adolf professed to see this development as a threat to Sweden proper, and believed that it was appropriate to consider

the strongest acts of precaution if not, even ... those of hostility to prevent the advantages that the Danish Government might derive from the want of an early opposition to it’s measures ... There can exist no doubt that if Denmark declares her intention of allowing the ports of Holstein to be closed against His Majesty’s flag, no time should be lost in acting against that power for she would naturally conceal, for some time, the extent of her submission to the will of Bonaparte with the view of gaining time, to draw her troops home for the protection of Zealand (now in a state of little or no military defence), and it would not be till their arrival in that island, that she would dare to manifest the full extent of her subserviency to the views and intentions of France.

In the light of these circumstances, Gustav Adolf therefore intended to give instant orders for the assembly of a strong body of troops in Skåne, and he also wanted a British naval force to be sent immediately to the Sound either to cover the retreat of the Danish army across the Belts, “if it is still possible to kindle a spark of independence in the Court of Denmark” or to undertake “just measures of retaliation” if Danish intentions were indeed hostile. Pierrepoint’s subsequent discussion with Gustav Adolf on 25 November revealed that the latter intended “to demand an immediate and explicit avowal of the views and intentions of the Danish Government”. Later the same day, Wetterstedt called on Pierrepoint to say that Gustav Adolf had now hit on the more conciliatory idea of proposing a personal meeting between himself and Frederik to discuss the crisis instead of presenting a note demanding an explanation of Danish policy.

Pierrepoint’s despatches describing these conversations reached London on 6 December, and — in contrast to Thornton’s earlier reports — they certainly made an impression on Howick. When Rehausen saw Howick on 8 December, he largely reiterated the points Wetterstedt and Gustav Adolf had already made to Pierrepoint, but he was less oblique on the subject of Zealand. If Denmark could not be persuaded to defend her own territory and to accept Swedish help, then she
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"ought to be forced to do so" (borde ... tvingas dertill), and Gustav Adolf had a duty to occupy Zealand to ensure that Swedish territory did not become a theatre of war. Howick clearly saw his first task as being to restrain the Swedes from precipitate action. He conceded that an explanation of its policy was required from the Danish government, but insisted that no action should be taken until that explanation had been received and that British warships could not be sent to the Baltic in wintertime. The conversation was renewed the following day at Howick's suggestion. Howick explained that he had not yet conferred with his ministerial colleagues as to the measures to be taken if Swedish suspicions about Danish conduct were confirmed, but he expressed the hope that there would be no question of a Swedish descent on Zealand until all the possibilities of negotiation had been exhausted.

Howick had told Rehausen that he had not yet consulted his ministerial colleagues, but, if that was true, he must have done so almost immediately, because later the same day, 9 December, a Cabinet Minute was sent to George III which pointed out that, in view of "accounts which have been received rendering it probable that Holstein may have been occupied by the French, & of the doubts necessarily resulting from this measure with respect to the future conduct of the Court of Denmark", it might "eventually" be necessary to seize the Danish island of Heligoland in the North Sea "in order to secure a safe position for your Majesty's ships". The cabinet therefore proposed that the naval squadron stationed off the Elbe estuary should be ordered to prevent any reinforcements of troops from being sent to Heligoland.

This represented a fairly modest measure of precaution, and the reference to Denmark's "future conduct" suggests that the cabinet as a whole did not regard Danish acquiescence in a French occupation of Holstein by itself as sufficient to warrant a British seizure of Heligoland. This impression is confirmed by the new instructions Howick sent to Garlike the same day. His tone towards Denmark was only somewhat sharper than it had been a week earlier. In his despatch of 9 December, Howick instructed Garlike to demand a full explanation from the Danish government of what had happened and "also of the system of policy which that government means in future to pursue in its relations with this country and with France". However, on a more conciliatory note, Howick added that, "notwithstanding present appearances", he expected the Danish answer "will be such as the friendship which has so long subsisted between the two governments requires".

On the same day, 9 December, Howick also wrote to Pierrepoint that Rehausen has pressed for immediate measures with respect to Denmark ... and he has hinted in pretty plain terms at the expediency in case satisfactory explanations should not be given, of taking possession of Zealand by a Swedish Army ... His Majesty however still hopes that the interest of Denmark itself, and the known character of [Fred-
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erik], will prevent the acquiescence of that government, in any demands which shall ultimately render the preservation of the relations of amity with this country impossible... till the necessary explanations have been refused, and measures shall have been taken, which indicate more certainly the departure of Denmark from that policy which is alone consistent either with her own interest, or with that of the powers at war with France, all possible forbearance should be observed, and nothing done which may tend to precipitate her into any engagements with the enemy.

Gustav Adolf's plan to join forces with the Danes had turned pretty rapidly into the idea of a possible descent on Zealand, and some of the points he made (sending a fleet to Danish waters and striking before the Danes could assemble any troops in Zealand) bear an uncanny resemblance to the thinking of the Portland government in July 1807. However, Howick's despatch to Pierrepont on 9 December bears eloquent testimony to the moderation of his attitude to Denmark, even at a time when he believed that the French had occupied the ports of Holstein in the wake of a Danish withdrawal and that the Danes might be contemplating selling some or all of their navy to France.

Howick's restrained stance on 9 December in response to the Swedish proposals about Denmark effectively put an end to Gustav Adolf's ideas for military involvement in Denmark, and the point was reinforced by Frederik's refusal to meet him in person. On 9 December Garlike reported that Bernstorff had told him that Frederik had declined Gustav Adolf's suggestion of a meeting so as not to increase Denmark's "embarrassment with France by an appearance of concerted military measures in the actual crisis." Both Frederik's refusal to meet him and Rehausen's account of Howick's cautious line during their interview on 2 December had a strong effect on Gustav Adolf; and on 12 December he told Pierrepont, with regard to his ideas about Denmark, that "he could only consider all that had passed upon the subject, as completely at an end." This was not entirely true: Gustav Adolf now reverted to the notion of demanding a written explanation of Danish policy, and the exchanges between the Danish and Swedish governments on this subject dragged on until early February 1807. However, it is the case that from now on Anglo-Swedish negotiations essentially concentrated on the linked questions of additional British subsidies for an increased force in Swedish Pomerania and the possibility of mounting a diversion in northern Germany from that province. Denmark no longer featured as a central subject of discussion between Britain and Sweden, but - as we shall see - Howick had begun to hope that a more harmonious relationship could be developed between Denmark and Sweden so as to facilitate military co-operation if Denmark were ultimately exposed to French aggression.

In the days following 9 December information reached the foreign office in London which dispelled the notion that the French were about to occupy (or had already occupied) the ports of Holstein in collusion with the Danish government.
On 11 December Howick received despatches from Thornton, who was now at Kiel, dated 26 November, which reported that the French troops in Hamburg had begun to march eastwards into Mecklenburg and that consequently no immediate invasion of Holstein was likely, and on 6 December Thornton wrote that “The apprehension of the invasion of Holstein seems to have entirely subsided for the present”. It was also on 11 December that Howick finally received official notification from Garlike of the Danish withdrawal from Holstein. When Joachim Bernstorff informed him on 24 November that the bulk of the Danish field army was being withdrawn from Holstein, this was accompanied by an assurance that if the Jutlandic peninsula should fall to the French, Denmark would respond by “the immediate arming of the fleet for the defence of [Zealand] and the adjacent islands”. Garlike had learnt from Pierrepoint of Gustav Adolf’s suspicions about the retreat from Holstein long before he received Howick’s despatches of 3 and 9 December, and on 29 November he wrote to Howick that he had raised the subject with Joachim Bernstorff on his own initiative. The latter had assured him “in terms and manner to which I give my perfect confidence ... that no transaction whatever had taken place relative to the respective positions of the French and Danish troops.

It is clear that by Christmas 1806 Howick’s anxieties about the nature of Danish policy had been largely assuaged. That was certainly the impression gained by Johan Georg Rist, the Danish chargé d’affaires in London, and it is confirmed by the despatches which Howick wrote to Garlike and Pierrepoint on 26 December. He told Pierrepoint that “The assurances hitherto given by [Frederik] are of the most satisfactory nature”, and he was anxious that Swedish policy towards Denmark should be conciliatory and restrained. The idea of sending Swedish troops to Holstein was obviously dead, but the prospect of Swedish co-operation in the defence of Zealand and its adjacent islands in the event of a French invasion of Denmark had caught his imagination. The advantages of such co-operation were self-evident. A strong combined force of Danish and Swedish troops on Zealand, supported perhaps by a British naval squadron, would not only shield Skåne from French attack but also protect Britain’s continued access to the Baltic. His acceptance of Danish neutrality was therefore bracketed with a belief that Denmark should lose no time in “concerting measures of common defence” with Sweden. Denmark’s own “precautionary measures” should be “so conducted as neither to provoke nor to afford a pretext of hostilities on the part of France”, but he did not think Denmark could “reasonably object to such communications as may lead to an ultimate union of measures with [Britain] and Sweden whenever it shall be necessary”. In short, Howick had come to terms with the Danish withdrawal from Holstein. The immediate crisis had passed, but worse was to come.
Denmark’s maritime defences, 5 December 1806 – 26 January 1807

In September 1805, at the same time as Frederik decided to assemble an army corps in Holstein, the sea batteries at Copenhagen and at Kronborg Castle in Elsinore had also been placed in a higher state of preparedness. By late 1806, these precautionary measures on the Sound had been relaxed for reasons of economy, but the growing number of Swedish troops in Skåne led to a revival of interest in securing Kronborg and Copenhagen against surprise attack. As we have seen, in mid-November, Gustav Adolf ordered two battalions to be sent through Skåne to Germany, and 1,100 troops eventually landed in Pomerania on 26 January 1807, while on 24 November Wetterstedt told Pierrepoint that a considerable force would be assembled in Skåne because of the Danish withdrawal from Holstein. In the end, once the crisis in Dano-Swedish relations had blown over, a further 4,000 men were transported from Skåne to Pomerania and landed on Rügen between 11 and 24 March 1807.

The Swedish troop movements were noted by the Danish authorities, and on 5 December Frederik ordered that the defences of the sea batteries protecting Copenhagen and Elsinore should be restored to the level established in September 1805. A week later, on 12 December, he added that the garrisons of some of the batteries should be augmented. As a result, there was a certain amount of visible activity as cannon were mounted, additional gunpowder was supplied and the number of guards on patrol increased. These enhanced measures of precaution were fairly modest, but they did not pass unnoticed.

On 18 December, Thornton reported from Holstein that “two sources of intelligence at Hamburg of a very authentic kind and ... letters from Copenhagen arrived there [i.e. at Hamburg]” contained news of interesting developments in Denmark.

The writer of the letter after expressing his apprehension that the Danes must have to dread either the invasion of the French, or the appearance of an English fleet in the road of Copenhagen adds that the walls of the Citadel have been lately mounted with cannon, that the guards there and in the harbour have been re-inforced (ostensibly, says he, because many Swedish troops are assembling in Malmoe) and that there is a talk of equipping some ships of war.

Thornton’s despatch reached the foreign office on Christmas Day, but Howick clearly had not read it when he wrote to Garlike and Pierrepoint on 26 December. Its influence, however, is unmistakable only four days later, on 30 December, when he told Garlike that “the most vigilant attention was required ... Above all you will not neglect to transmit the earliest intelligence of any preparation which may seem to be made with a view to resist the power of England rather than that of France.” He wrote in similar terms to Thornton: “The preparations said to be making at Copenhagen, and above all at Cronenburg [Kronborg] cannot ... be regarded without some uneasiness. You will continue therefore to transmit the
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most accurate information it may be in your power to obtain upon this subject”73.
The reference to Kronborg, which lay at the narrowest point on the Sound, highlights the nature of Howick’s anxieties. He interpreted the strengthening of Denmark’s coastal defences and the rumour that part of the Danish navy would be equipped for sea as a worrying indication of Denmark’s future intentions. They suggested that the Danish government was expecting to yield to French demands that Denmark should attempt to close the Sound to Britain’s vital Baltic trade.

On 7 January Howick received two communications from Garlike which did nothing to reassure him. The first concerned Howick’s instructions to recommend the Swedish offer of 25,000 troops for the defence of Holstein. Garlike had two meetings with Bernstorff on the subject and had found the Danish reaction to be one of “the most undisguised aversion”. Bernstorff did not reject it on the grounds that the decision to withdraw from Holstein had already been taken. He simply argued that the proposal was “incongruous ... from a power at war to a power at peace, inapplicable with respect to time ... when the attack of Holstein is no longer a problem; and dangerous above all, as inviting, or rather immediately committing, the country to unavoidable war”. Garlike knew that the Swedish overture had virtually no prospect of a favourable reception and wrote to Howick that he used the occasion to familiarize the Danes with “the prospect of sincere cooperation on the part of Sweden” so as to lay the groundwork for “a real good understanding between the two countries”, which sadly had “prejudices on all that can occur”74.

This was perhaps no more than what was to be expected, but Howick found Garlike’s second communication more alarming. Like Howick, Garlike was not at all worried by the idea that the Danes would probably abandon the Jutlandic peninsula and Fyn in the event of French aggression and concentrate on the defence of Zealand and the adjacent islands of Møn, Falster and Lolland. What did alarm Garlike was Danish reluctance to take any precautionary action to resist a French attack on the Danish islands. The possibility of a surprise descent on Copenhagen by the French from the newly conquered ports of northern Germany was a particular bugbear of Garlike’s. As he wrote to Howick much later on 26 January 1807, what he feared was “the emerging of boats and armed men from the Baltic ports, who might suddenly attack the town of Copenhagen itself ... the previous collection of boats, the sudden marching of men, the favour of wind”75.

Against this background, Garlike was encouraged in late December by a letter he received from Captain Dunbar, the master of the frigate Astrea, which suffered such severe damage when it went aground on Anholt Reef that it had to be repaired at Copenhagen76. Garlike asked Dunbar to report on the state of the Danish navy while his ship was in the dockyard, and on 20 December Garlike wrote to Howick quoting Dunbar’s observations on the subject. Dunbar found that there were 20 ships of the line “in the best and highest order with all their lower masts in
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and ballast”, that the smaller vessels were also in good repair and that there were four new floating batteries. He observed that “not a single article down to the most insignificant thing is wanting” – the rigging, sails and ropes were all ready. In his opinion, “in one month in the proper season the whole fleet could be in the roads”, though “men no doubt for a time would be wanting. The ships are many of them new, their guns heavy; fine men of war”. He added that “the attention paid to the floating batteries” seemed to indicate a particular vigilance against attack from the sea.

Garlike clearly suspected that Dunbar was exaggerating, but found his report encouraging in so far as he believed it. The floating batteries would be helpful against a sudden descent on Copenhagen from the ports of northern Germany and the state of readiness described by Dunbar meant that a strong naval force could rapidly be placed in the Great Belt in the spring. That was not how Howick reacted when he read Garlike’s despatch incorporating Dunbar’s report. Instead, Dunbar’s observations reinforced his anxieties about a possible threat to Britain’s Baltic trade through the Sound. As a result, when Howick wrote again to Garlike on 9 January, his anxieties about Danish maritime preparations had grown. His official despatch was quite mild. He welcomed the assurances that Denmark would resist French demands inconsistent with her “honour and independence”; accepted their sincerity; and conceded that “An immediate junction of a Swedish force to the army of Denmark might, as has been stated by Count Bernstorff, put an end at once to the neutrality which the latter government still wishes to preserve”. However, he still wanted “a previous and confidential explanation and concert with Sweden on the measures necessary for the common defence of the two powers”, which would not provoke immediate war with France.

Upon the best means of defence it is impossible for this government to pretend to form a satisfactory opinion. It may be true that the [Jutlandic] peninsula affords no position in which the force of Denmark could hope to withstand the power of France; and it may be advisable, therefore, to withdraw the troops for the defence of the islands.

All this was conciliatory enough, or at least not new, but Howick’s accompanying private letter struck a different tone.

The most obvious remark that must occur upon the measures lately taken is, that ... [the Danes] withdraw the defence which had been prepared for the security of their continental possessions, and strengthen fortifications and provide means which could only be used against an English fleet. The extraordinary activity in their arsenals, the extension of their naval defences, and above all the extraordinary state of preparation in which according to the report of Captain Dunbar their fleet is now found must necessarily excite some jealousy ... Their objection to receiving a Swedish force upon the Danish territory, as necessarily putting an end to their neutrality, has, I admit, considerable weight ... But you will observe in my former despatches
that aware of this objection, I recommended a concert with Sweden, which without committing them in any dispute with France at present, might enable them to make arrangements for the timely co-operation of the force offered by that country whenever the period in which hostilities could no longer be avoided should arise ... I must regret therefore the want of confidence, or rather the jealousy and suspicion which continues to separate two courts, whose common interests at the present moment require the most perfect good understanding upon all points connected with their mutual defence.  

Howick's reaction to the reports about the Danish navy and the coastal defences at Elsinore and Copenhagen combined concern with continuing moderation, but the British government's response to them went beyond diplomacy. On 10 January 1807, the admiralty instructed Admiral Lord Collingwood, the commander of the British fleet in the Mediterranean to send one of his subordinate officers, Vice Admiral Sir John Duckworth, back to Britain "without a moment's loss of time", since the admiralty intended "that he should command a squadron to be employed in the Baltic". The previous day, Rist (who had not seen Howick for several weeks) had written to Christian Bernstorff that Denmark's reported maritime preparations had, according to a reliable source, produced "a most deplorable impression" (la plus facheuse impression). There were also rumours that a fleet would be sent to the Baltic "to keep us [i.e. the Danes] under observation" (à nous surveiller). However, the decision to send a squadron to the Baltic was not exclusively prompted by Denmark's maritime preparations. On 7 January Howick received from Thornton a report that 4,000 French seamen would be sent to man the vessels captured by the French at Rostock and Wismar, and on 12 January he referred, when speaking to Rist, to news that the French were arming privateers at the Baltic ports which had fallen into their hands and to the need to protect British trade in that sea. The mixture of motives behind the decision is illustrated by a private letter written by Thomas Grenville, the first lord of the admiralty, to Duckworth on 18 January.

The success of the French army seeming to threaten our interests & those of our allies in the Baltic, and there being reason to apprehend that the arms or the influence of France may prevail in Denmark, I have judged it necessary to make all possible exertions for augmenting our present naval force, by providing a fleet of ten or twelve sail of the line to be ready for the Baltic by the end of February or the beginning of March.

For the time being, of course, nothing more had been done than to summon home a naval commander for a squadron, not yet assembled, that would sail for the Baltic in the spring. On 12 January, a few days after the despatch of these instructions to Collingwood, Howick was to some extent reassured about Danish intentions by a long conversation with Rist. Howick insisted on seeing a link between the withdrawal from Holstein and the maritime preparations in the
Sound: they suggested a fear of Britain and a sense of security towards France and, as such, could only “throw a very unfavourable light on Danish intentions” (jeter un jour très défavorable sur les intentions du Dannemarc). Rist replied that he had no knowledge of these maritime preparations, but that if it were true that they were taking place, the only explanation could be the Swedish military buildup in Skåne. Denmark had no reason to fear “discord” (mésintelligence) with Britain, but it had always been Danish policy to take precautionary measures when the Swedes assembled a force of any size in Skåne. He reinforced his point by quoting a statement in a despatch he had received from Christian Bernstorff to the effect that Denmark would never enter into an agreement with a third party which would destroy her friendly relations with Britain. Howick refused to consider the possibility that Gustav Adolf entertained anything other than “the most pure and friendly” (les plus pures et les plus amicales) intentions towards Denmark, but Rist thought that his own explanations and assurances had produced a good effect on the foreign secretary. Howick told him that he was personally persuaded of Danish good faith and Rist left the interview feeling more at ease than he had expected to do.

Rist’s impression is confirmed by Rehausen’s account on an interview he had with Howick on the same day. Rehausen seized on the Danish maritime preparations as suggesting, when combined with the withdrawal from Holstein, the existence of a secret arrangement with France, but Howick reverted to his customary role of restraining the Swedes in relation to Denmark. He conceded that the Denmark’s maritime preparations had created suspicion and ill-feeling in Britain, but he said that the British government had confidence in the very explicit assurances given by Frederik. Howick was convinced that Denmark could not be so blind to her own commercial interests as not to see that a rupture with Britain “would destroy” (ferait évanouir) the advantages which she derived from her neutrality.

When Howick wrote to Garlike on 22 January, his tone was not particularly worried. In his official despatch, Howick affirmed that Britain did not wish to cause “any embarrassment to the court of Denmark with respect to the neutrality which that government is desirous of preserving”, but a “most friendly understanding, in order to prepare the means of defence” against a common danger was clearly in the interests of both Sweden and Denmark. The Danish government had not given “due weight” to this consideration. Garlike should therefore use his good offices to remove “mutual suspicions and distrust”. Gustav Adolf’s military “preparations” in Skåne were sufficiently explained by the need to provide for the security of Sweden. Howick’s private letter to Garlike of the same date was more forthright. He described it as “incredible” that Sweden and Denmark should be divided by “particular jealousies” when they were threatened by “a common danger”.

This fatality has had its full share in producing the successes of the French, and it seems to be only too reasonable to fear that, in spite of all experience, it will operate
to the serious injury, if not to the ultimate destruction of Sweden & Denmark ...
Placed so unfortunately between powers, each in its turn affording cause of com-
plaint to the other, it must be your endeavour to conciliate matters as much as
possible ... I will not abandon the hope that the good sense of the Danish govern-
ment will induce it to overlook any circumstances which a momentary irritation
may have produced, for the sake of so important an object as that of preserving
union & friendship where division and enmity must inevitably produce the most
fatal effects.

The whole tenor of what Howick wrote to Garlike on 22 January suggests that he
now regarded Danish maritime preparations as directed at Sweden rather than
Britain and saw the main task of British diplomacy when dealing with Denmark
and Sweden as being to promote a better relationship between the two Scandina-
vian kingdoms. At all events, his two communications to Garlike were primarily
concerned with the desirability of promoting Dano-Swedish co-operation. This
was clearly his long-term goal and in the interests of pursuing it he allowed himself
to be less than frank, given what he knew about earlier Swedish ideas concerning
a pre-emptive strike against Zealand, when discussing the Swedish military build-
up in Skåne with Rist.

After 22 January, Howick never wrote another private letter to Garlike and he
only sent him one further official despatch on a matter of any importance before
he left office in late March. This passivity reflected the passing of the immediate
crisis. After the alarms of December and January, Anglo-Danish relations moved
for the time being into calmer waters.

The Berlin Decree and the British Orders in Council, 21 November 1806 – 25 March 1807
The consistent interest Howick had displayed in Denmark during December
1806 and January 1807 was followed by a lull in February and early March: no
new reports of disturbing developments involving Denmark were received during
this period. Rist continued to report that a British squadron would be sent to the
Baltic in the spring, and Garlike (who had been given no guidance on the sub-
ject by the British government) noted in late March that it was widely believed in
Copenhagen that a British fleet would arrive in the Baltic at an early date. How-
ever, it was by no means clear that the purpose of such a measure would primarily
be to overawe the Danes. Both Russia and Sweden were anxious to take measures
to blockade the Baltic ports which had fallen into French hands and to protect
Baltic trade from French privateers. Nonetheless, the question of a squadron for
the Baltic clearly possessed a Danish dimension in the eyes of British ministers.
On 13 February Rehausen reported that Howick had told him that the British
government favoured naval co-operation with Sweden in the Baltic to protect
trade and “especially to be prepared to resist the designs of Denmark, if they
should prove detrimental to the interests of the allied powers" (för att i synnerhet vara beredd att emotstå Danmarks projekter, om de skulle befinnas vara stridande emot de Allierade Magternes Intresse)92. Ten days later, on 23 February, Thomas Grenville wrote to his brother, the Marquis of Buckingham, (who was not a member of the government) that “Denmark is still amicable in language and my colleagues are not anxious yet for the Baltic squadron”93.

A squadron could not be sent to the Baltic until the coming of spring, and in February and March was still a matter for the future. However, Howick’s last weeks at the foreign office witnessed one final burst of activity in relation to Denmark. It was prompted by the Danish reaction to the British Orders in Council of 7 January 1807. On 21 November 1806 Napoleon had issued the Berlin Decree, which declared the British Isles to be under blockade and prohibited all commerce with them. The decree obviously applied to France and to the territories under French control and its tenth article stated that it would be communicated to France’s allies. However, the wording of the decree could be interpreted as meaning that it covered every nation of the world. There was, in fact, no attempt at this stage to impose the decree on neutral powers, but its contents were communicated to the Danish government accompanied by a suggestion that Denmark ought to support this attempt to curb the overbearing maritime power of Britain. In practice, so long as France did not demand Danish adherence to the Berlin Decree, the effect on Danish trade was slight. The Danish government did not make a formal protest, but the French chargé d’affaires in Denmark was told orally that Denmark had always disputed the British interpretation of the law of blockade and could not therefore officially recognise the validity of the Berlin Decree94.

Garlike clung for some time to the suspicion that merely by the act of communicating the Berlin Decree to the Danish government, France had implied that she expected the closure of the Holstein ports to the British flag95. By late January Garlike was persuaded, as a result of two long conversations with Joachim Bernstorff, that Denmark would refuse a French demand to close any of her ports to the British flag; and he pointed out that, although “I have never looked without anxiety to the ultimate resolutions of this country as a minor state borne upon by the arts and ferocity of France”, Denmark had not accompanied the French notification of the Berlin Decree “with the usual formalities of publication which a measure thought justifiable would have called for”96. For the time being, Denmark’s response to the Berlin Decree was hardly a major issue in Anglo-Danish relations, but it assumed greater significance later when Denmark’s perceived passivity in relation to French economic warfare was contrasted with her attitude towards the British Orders in Council of 7 January 1807.

The Orders in Council were the British response to the Berlin Decree: they declared all ships trading between any two ports from which the British flag was excluded as liable to seizure as lawful prize. The Orders in Council did not, how-
ever, forbid direct trade on neutral vessels between ports under French control and neutral states (which in effect meant Denmark and the United States of America). In the event, the Orders in Council had little effect on Danish commerce, but the Danish government, and especially Joachim Bernstorff, were keen to object in principle to the violation of neutral trading rights involved. Rist was not aware of his government’s attitude and his initial note to Howick on 12 January acknowledging notification of the Orders in Council was restrained in tone and conceded that they had been provoked by the Berlin Decree. On 4 February the Orders in Council were debated in the Commons and they were strongly attacked by the Pittite opposition for their leniency, and defended with equal vigour by Howick and the King’s Advocate, Sir John Nicholl. Rist found himself pleased by what he regarded as the moderate and fair-minded attitude of ministers during the debate and more or less said so to Howick in the course of an informal conversation on 7 February. In his despatch to Christian Bernstorff, Rist observed that Denmark had reason to be grateful to the opposition, since it had, “by preaching too loudly the principles of maritime despotism and oppression” (d’avoir prêché trop hautement les principes du despotisme et de l’oppression maritime), obliged the government to espouse the cause of moderation.

Matters were seen rather differently in Copenhagen. When Garlike reported on 30 January about his first meeting with Joachim Bernstorff concerning the Orders in Council, he found that they had produced a “very unfavourable effect ... on this government”. Indeed, Bernstorff’s “anger so exceeded, that it almost deprived him of utterance”. In a private letter, Garlike warned Howick that if Rist was instructed to respond to the notification of the Orders in Council, it was to be expected that his communication would “be conceived as much in the same tone, as the language of diplomatick papers will allow”. However, he went on to say that the Danish ministers were “certainly influenced more by their fears of France in the present instance, than by the dislike of the measure of which they complain” and that “Count J. Bernstorff is not ill disposed towards England; and the violence of his manner is accompanied with proofs that he is not”. Garlike added that he understood the French chargé d’affaires had been told that Denmark “deprecated” the Berlin Decree.

Garlike was quite justified in fearing that Rist would be instructed to protest in the strongest terms, and it is doubtful if Howick found much consolation in Garlike’s suggestion that the Danes did not really mean what they were saying. The lengthy note, dated 9 March, which Rist addressed to Howick argued that Denmark would suffer grave commercial consequences from the Orders in Council, which would deprive her of the profits not only from the “coasting trade” between enemy ports but also from her direct commerce with French-controlled territory. It had been the practice of Danish merchantmen to sell the produce of their own country in the northern ports of Holland, France and Spain and then to
sail south in order to fetch goods for the home market from the Mediterranean. This would now be impossible: Danish vessels trading with French-controlled ports would be obliged to sail in ballast for one half of their journey, and this trade would consequently become unprofitable. The existing treaties between Britain and Denmark guaranteed Denmark “the entire liberty of its commerce”, except for the restrictions expressly detailed in those treaties. The Danish government could not accept that the right of retaliation against Napoleon’s Berlin Decree, “whose example Great Britain seems but too ready to follow”, entitled Britain unilaterally to set aside her treaties with Denmark. Even though the Berlin Decree did not apply to all vessels trading with Britain and had “not as yet caused any sensible interruption to the commerce of Denmark with Great Britain”, the Danish government had nonetheless “protested solemnly” against it. As for the British Orders in Council, the Danish government wished to declare that it could never acquiesce in them and consequently hoped that they would be rescinded. The claim that Denmark had protested strongly and formally at the Berlin Decree was intended as an olive branch (even though it was rather less than the unalloyed truth). So too were Rist’s concluding remarks that his hopes of a favourable response were enhanced by “a knowledge of the liberal way of thinking and acting of the enlightened minister” to whom the note was addressed and who had already been the “advocate” of neutral rights.

All this cut no ice with Howick. He suspected (correctly) that Denmark had made no serious protest against the Berlin Decree, and – even if Garlike’s reports had alerted him to Joachim Bernstorff’s reaction to the Orders in Council – the note was very different in tone from the attitude Rist had displayed over the previous two months. The parallels drawn between British and French conduct were offensive and, worst of all perhaps, the Danish note was a poor return for the public defence of a moderate line towards neutral trade which he had mounted in the Commons on 4 February, despite the pat on the head with which Rist rounded off his communication. On 10 March, Rehausen found Howick in a bitter mood towards the Danish government. According to Rehausen, Howick “was well aware that it would ultimately be necessary to take vigorous measures in relation to this power” (voyait bien qu’il faudrait finir par prendre de mesures vigoureuses avec cette puissance). A week later, Howick described the Danish note to Rehausen as “rather hostile” (ganska hostile). Rehausen thought the British reply would be sharply worded.

Rehausen was right. Howick’s reply to Rist contained two concrete points. The first was an emphatic rejection of any notion that the Orders in Council should be withdrawn until the Berlin Decree had been “publicly and formally repealed”. The second was that the Danish government had misunderstood the Orders in Council: Danish vessels remained free to unload their outward cargoes at one enemy port and then to proceed to another in order to pick up a cargo for their
homeward voyage, provided they did not carry enemy goods on the way. This was an important concession to Denmark in that it swept away at a stroke the aspect of the Orders in Council which the Danish government had considered the most damaging to Danish commerce. Even Joachim Bernstorff was pleased. On 2 April Garlike was able to report that Bernstorff had admitted to him that the note had given an explanation of the Orders in Council “more favourable to the commerce of Denmark, than his first interpretation”\textsuperscript{106}.

However, the good news was enveloped in many sharp observations about the nature of Danish neutrality. Howick disputed Rist’s assertion that the Berlin Decree did not apply to neutral trade with the British Isles and was sceptical about his claim that Denmark had protested against it. Howick argued that the Berlin Decree did prohibit all commerce with the British Isles and that any neutral which had not “resisted” this assault on neutral rights was automatically deprived of “the privileges of fair neutrality” and the protection afforded by any treaties designed to protect neutral trade. The British government was “altogether ignorant” about the response of Denmark when the Berlin Decree had been communicated to her by France, “but no intention of resistance has appeared in any public document, or in any steps taken by the Danish government”. In addition, the note contained several passing remarks which implied that the Danish government was not as impartial as it ought to be. A Danish corps had been maintained in Holstein while the forces of France’s enemies were close to the frontier, but was “immediately withdrawn on the approach of the French army”; Rist’s note was characterized by “uniformly excusing and palliating [the Berlin Decree], and ... heightening and aggravating the supposed tendency and consequences of [the Orders in Council]”. Britain would have been perfectly entitled to retaliate against the Berlin Decree by declaring all the ports from which the British flag was excluded to be in a state of blockade. Instead, Britain had restricted herself to preventing “the enemy for carrying on his coasting trade in neutral bottoms”. In short, Britain’s “forbearance and magnanimity” had been “eminently conspicuous”\textsuperscript{107}.

Rist was taken aback by what he called “the dry or rather bitter tone” (le ton sec ou plutôt aigre) of Howick’s note\textsuperscript{108}. A month later, Rist reported that Howick had in March “developed a marked ill humour towards us” (avoir pris une humeur marquée contre nous) and had spoken “bitterly” (avec amertume) to several foreign envoys in London about the Danish protest against the Orders in Council\textsuperscript{109}. Howick certainly complained about the Danish protest to Rehausen, who drew the conclusion that “In general the system of moderation hitherto pursued by the British government towards the Danish court seems to be at an end” (I allmänhet lärer det Moderations Système emot Danska Hofvet som hiitintils af Engelska Ministéren blifvit följt, vara till ända). Rehausen added that a considerable squadron was being armed “to oppose the intentions of the Danish court if they should prove to be in conflict with the interests of the allies” (att motsätta sig Danska
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Hofiets afgifter om de skulle vara stridande emot de Allierades Intresse\textsuperscript{110}. All this was doubtless music to Gustav Adolf’s ears, but was it true?

Rehausen was wrong in thinking that a squadron was already being fitted out in mid-March, but it was certainly in the aftermath of the exchange of notes between Rist and Howick that concrete steps, beyond recalling Duckworth from the Mediterranean, were taken to collect a British naval force for the Baltic. The Grenville administration fell in late March, and most ministers were replaced on 25 and 26 March, but the new first lord of the Admiralty, Lord Mulgrave, did not take office until 4 April. Thomas Grenville was still therefore in office on 1 April when the Admiralty ordered Commodore Keats to proceed to Yarmouth to take command of a squadron of 16 warships which was assembling in that anchorage and “to hold yourself, and the said ships, in constant readiness to put to sea at a moment’s notice” until he was joined by Duckworth, who would command the squadron in the Baltic\textsuperscript{111}.

It would be easy to conclude from these developments and observations that by the time the Grenville administration left office, the quarrel over the Orders in Council had produced a marked change in the attitude of Howick and the government as a whole towards Denmark and that the arrival of a British squadron in the Baltic might well have produced a serious crisis in Anglo-Danish relations. That conclusion would be premature. It is pretty clear that Howick was extremely irritated by the formal Danish protest at the Orders in Council and that the government had decided to send a squadron to the Baltic to oppose Danish designs if they proved hostile to the anti-French coalition. More than that cannot be said, especially when Howick’s conciliatory approach to Denmark in another area of policy during his last days in office is taken into account.

Britain had blockaded the Elbe from 1803 to 1805 and again from April to September 1806. On both occasions, the Danes were able to obtain a series of relaxations in the application of the blockade for ships from the two Danish ports on the Elbe, Altona and Glückstadt. When Britain once again declared the Elbe to be under blockade on 11 March 1807, Rist protested formally at the principle of the blockade, but concentrated on obtaining a renewal of the relaxations granted by the British during the two previous blockades. His representations were successful. On 21 March, Howick sent Rist a note agreeing to a number of concessions in the enforcement of the Elbe blockade for vessels from Altona and Glückstadt\textsuperscript{112}.

These were perhaps secondary questions, but Howick’s handling of them hardly lends credibility to the impression of a gathering storm in Anglo-Danish relations when he left office. Nor does the conduct of his successor at the foreign office, George Canning, who granted further concessions to Danish navigation on the Elbe in the course of April and May\textsuperscript{113}. These measures between March and May 1807 suggest that both Howick and Canning wished at that stage to main-
tain tolerable relations with Denmark. However, one of the concessions, namely the permission given to small boats to sail close inshore down the west coast of Holstein from Tönning to the Danish ports on the Elbe, was equally beneficial to Britain in that it facilitated Britain's clandestine exports through Tönning to Hamburg. The Berlin Decree and the French occupation of Hamburg in November ought, in principle, to have put an end to British trade with north-western Germany, but it soon became apparent that the French authorities in Hamburg could be bribed to turn a blind eye, and British exports via Tönningen between March and July 1807 were higher than ever before.

In reality, apart from pursuing a conciliatory line over the Elbe blockade, Canning failed to take much interest in Denmark during his first six or seven weeks in office. His first despatch to Garlike was sent on 17 April. It merely transmitted, for Garlike's information, copies of Canning's letters to the admiralty concerning “the various relaxations His Majesty has been graciously pleased to extend to the Danish commerce as connected with the blockade of the Elbe.” As late as 22 May he was writing to Garlike about further concessions made in relation to the Elbe blockade. It was only after Joachim Bernstorff instructed Rist to protest vigorously at the principle behind the blockade that Canning had his first acrimonious interview with Rist in late May and, as a result, wrote to Garlike in much lengthier and sharper terms about Denmark on 26 May. As for the Baltic squadron, it did not sail until late July. Just as there had been a lull in Anglo-Danish relations between late January and early March 1807, so there was now another between late March and late May.

Conclusion
Howick's Danish policy during his first two-and-a-half months at the foreign office was characterized, on the surface at least, by a marked lack of realism. His efforts to persuade the Danes to enter the war during the Jena campaign and then, in early December 1806, to admit a Swedish army into Holstein self-evidently lacked any prospect of success. They amounted to little more than gestures, to placing on record that he had attempted to do the right thing by Britain's allies. In the course of December 1806 and January 1807, he stumbled upon a policy towards Denmark which possessed a greater semblance of coherence. Danish neutrality was to be supported for as long as it could be preserved, but at the same time the Danish government was to be encouraged to think in terms of co-operating with Britain and above all Sweden in the event of a French attack on Denmark. It was an approach which offered a chance of protecting both Sweden from French invasion and the free navigation of the Sound – with British involvement, if there were any at all, limited to naval assistance. In the short run, it was an unrealistic approach in that it paid insufficient attention to the suspicion which divided the Danish and Swedish governments and to Danish fears that their neu-
trality might be compromised, but it was not absurd to suppose that in the longer term French actions might have obliged Denmark to accept co-operation with Sweden and Britain for a last stand on Zealand.

It was also a policy which rested on the assumption that, if forced to abandon neutrality, the Danish government would have chosen alliance with the anti-French coalition. Howick clung to this assumption at the very least until he received Rist’s note of 9 March 1807 about the British Orders in Council. On 13 January 1807, Rist expressed his belief that Howick was “personally well-intentioned” (personellement bien intentionné) towards Denmark and that he shared in this respect the sentiments of his predecessor and friend, Fox. This seems an accurate assessment: virtually every word Howick wrote in December 1806 and January 1807 about Denmark was characterized by restraint and a willingness to accept that Denmark was well-disposed towards Britain and the anti-Napoleonic cause.

Howick was clearly angered and embittered by Rist’s note of 9 March 1807, but that does not prove that it led to a fundamental alteration in his attitude to Denmark. The exchange of notes between the two men was unaccompanied by concrete action on either side and was followed, on Howick’s part, by concrete concessions over the application of the Elbe blockade. The Grenville administration’s ideas about sending a squadron to the Baltic were a precautionary measure and did not amount to a decision to attack Denmark. The point is illustrated by certain remarks of Lord Grenville in December 1807, long after the fall of his government and the subsequent British attack on Copenhagen.

That the general dispositions of Denmark were hostile to us we had abundant proof before we quitted office – We had actually taken measures for sending a fleet into the Baltic to counteract her possible hostility ... Certainly these suspicions, however strongly grounded, are not of themselves just causes for bringing upon a people the most horrible of the calamities of war. These observations suggest that Grenville was less friendly to Denmark than Howick, but they only demonstrate suspicion and anxiety, not a presumption that war with Denmark was unavoidable.

Howick’s words and deeds in office do not lend support to the suggestion that he, and Lord Grenville for that matter, were hypocritical in their criticism of the attack on Denmark during the parliamentary debates on 1808. Whenever Howick spoke of action against Denmark in the winter of 1806–1807, it was always a case of measures that would be taken after Denmark had yielded to French demands, and he firmly rejected Swedish ideas of a pre-emptive strike against Zealand. Howick’s Danish policy did not lead logically and necessarily to support for the Portland administration’s decision in July 1807 to launch such a pre-emptive strike.

However, this statement does not resolve the problem of the continuity of
British policy towards Denmark between 1803 and July 1807. The six months of Howick’s foreign secretaryship were certainly a troubled period in Anglo-Danish relations when compared with the previous three-and-a-half years, and in this sense it is possible to speak of a growing crisis between the two countries. This was a natural consequence of Denmark’s more exposed and vulnerable position after the collapse of Prussia and the arrival of the French on the shores of the Baltic. However, what is more important is that the decision in July 1807 to act against Denmark was made against the background of a far more fundamental change in international relations. That decision was taken at a time when the potential consequences of the battle of Friedland and the emergence of a Franco-Russian alliance at Tilsit were transforming the whole situation in the Baltic region. Even if some of Canning’s anxieties in July 1807 echoed those of Howick the previous winter, it is not meaningful to analyse his thinking outside the context of that transformation.

When Rist met Canning for the first time on 28 March 1807, he was favourably impressed by him and thought that his “experience, enlightened spirit and obliging manners” (l’expérience, l’esprit éclairé and les manières prévenantes) boded well for the future. In late April, Rist observed that the Grenville government had never been able to shed its “unwarranted prejudices” (préventions gratuites) towards Denmark. Rist’s irritation with Howick over the sharp language in his note of 17 March doubtless had something to do with both these assessments. At all events, they represented a misjudgement. The following months would prove that, as far as Rist and Denmark were concerned, if Howick had been the frying pan, Canning was most definitely the fire.

Notes
1 I am grateful to the Carlsberg Foundation, the Dean’s Travel Fund and the Faculty Research Fund of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at University College London and the Scouloudi Foundation at the Institute of Historical Research, London, for generous financial support of the research involved in writing this article.
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7 Holm 1912, pp. 120–1, 128–9, 150–1, 173–4.
10 Holm 1912, pp. 162–3.
13 Lindvald, pp. 183–5.
16 See, for example, PRO, desp. 13, Garlike to Mulgrave, 1 July 1805; desp. 6, Hill to Mulgrave, 1 Oct. 1805; desp. 3, Garlike to Mulgrave, 5 Dec. 1805, FO 22/47; and desp. 2 Garlike to Mulgrave, 7 Jan. 1806, FO 22/48.
17 PRO, desp. 1, Hawkesbury to Liston, 23 June 1803, FO 22/43.
18 Crouzet, pp. 127–9.
19 PRO, desp. 13, Garlike to Fox, 18 March 1806, FO 22/48.
20 PRO, desp. 5, Fox to Garlike, 13 April 1806, FO 22/48.
21 PRO, desp. 4, Fox to Garlike, 8 April 1806, FO 22/48.
22 Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (Danish National Archive), Foreign Ministry Archives [cited as DNA], desp. 29, Jarlsberg to Bernstorff, 16 April 1806, DFUA/1988.
23 PRO, desps. 17 & 18, Garlike to Fox, both 5 April 1806; unnumbered Garlike to Fox, 16 April 1806; desps. 23 & 25, Garlike to Fox, both 25 April 1806; desps. 27 & 28, Garlike to Fox, both 1 & 7 May 1806, FO 22/48.
24 PRO, desp. 7, Fox to Garlike, 6 May 1806, FO 22/48.
26 Søby, p 70.
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28 PRO, desp. 1, Howick to Garlike, 9 Oct. 1806, FO 22/49.
29 *Holm* 1875, pp. 121–5.
30 PRO, desp. 77, Garlike to Howick, 14 Nov. 1806, FO 22/49; extract printed in *Parl. Deb. 10*, pp. 762–5.
31 PRO, desp. 5, Howick to Garlike, 11 Nov. 1806, FO 22/49.
34 Björlin, p. 137.
35 PRO, desp. 1 & 3, Howick to Pierrepoint, 10 Oct. & 11 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36.
36 PRO, desp. 92, Pierrepoint to Howick, 10 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36.
37 PRO, desp. 95, Pierrepoint to Howick, 18 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36; Björlin, p. 137.
38 PRO, desp. 95 & 101 (quotation), Pierrepoint to Howick, 18 & 27 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36.
39 Riksarkivet, Stockholm (Swedish National Archives), Foreign Ministry Archive [cited as SNA], desp. 69, Rehausen to Gustav, 31 Oct. 1806, Anglica/489; K. V. Key-Åberg, *De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och Storbritannien under Gustaf IV Adolfs krig emot Napoleon intill Konventionen i Stralsund den 7 sept. 1807* (Uppsala, 1890) [cited as Key], p. 82.
40 Durham University Library, the second Earl Grey papers [cited as DUL], Howick to Pierrepoint, 2 Dec. 1806, B47/2/9.
41 PRO, desp. 95, Pierrepoint to Howick, 18 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36.
42 SNA, Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 18 Nov. 1806, Anglica/493; Key, pp. 83–4.
43 SNA, Apostille to desp. 76, Rehausen to Gustav, 2 Dec. 1806, Anglica/489.
44 PRO, desp. 6, Howick to Garlike, 3 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49; printed in *Parl. Deb. 10*, pp. 765–8; see also DUL, Howick to Pierrepoint, 2 December 1806 (2 letters), B47/2/9 & 10.
45 PRO, desp. 67, Garlike to Howick, 25 Oct. 1806, FO 22/49.
47 PRO, Garlike to Pierrepoint, 13 Dec. 1806, FO 334/20, bundle I.
49 *Holm* 1875, pp. 131–4.
50 PRO, desp. 146 & 147, Thornton to Howick, 21 & 23 Nov. 1806, FO 33/35.
51 PRO, desp. 100, Pierrepoint to Howick, 24 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36; see also SNA, Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 24 Nov. 1806, Anglica/493.
52 PRO, desp. 102 (quotation) & 105, Pierrepoint to Howick, both 27 Nov. 1806, FO 73/36; see also SNA, Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 27 Nov. 1806, Anglica/493.
53 SNA, desp. 78 & apostille to desp. 78, Rehausen to Gustav, 9 Dec. 1806, Anglica/489.
55 PRO, desp. 7, Howick to Garlike, 9 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49; printed in *Parl. Deb. 10*, p. 768.
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56 PRO, desp. 5, Garlike to Pierrepoint, 9 Dec. 1806, FO 73/36.
57 PRO, desp. 87, Garlike to Howick, 9 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49.
58 PRO, desp. 109, Pierrepoint to Howick, 12 Dec. 1806, FO 73/36.
59 These exchanges can be followed in PRO, FO 22/49 & 51 and FO 73/36 & 38.
60 PRO, desps. 148 & 149, Thornton to Howick, both 26 Nov. 1806, FO 33/35.
61 PRO, desp. 154, Thornton to Howick, 6 Dec. 1806, FO 33/35; see also desps. 250 & 251,
Gordon to foreign office, 1 & 5 Dec. 1806, FO 38/9.
62 PRO, desp. 81, Garlike to Howick, 24 Nov. 1806, FO 22/49; printed in Parl. Deb. 10, pp.
768–71.
63 PRO, desp. 84, Garlike to Howick, 29 Nov. 1806, FO 22/49; extract printed in Parl. Deb.
65 PRO, desp. 8, Howick to Pierrepoint, 26 Dec. 1806, FO 73/36.
66 PRO, desp. 8, Howick to Garlike, 26 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49; printed in Parl. Deb. 10, p.
774.
67 PRO, private letter, Howick to Garlike, 26 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49.
68 C. T. Sørensen, Meddelelser fra Krigsarkiverne. Udgifte af Generalstaben, vol. 2 (Copenhagen,
1885) [cited as Meddelelser], p. 366.
69 Bjoerlin, p. 159.
71 PRO, desp. 160, Thornton to Howick, 18 Dec. 1806, FO 33/35.
72 PRO, desp. 9, Howick to Garlike, 30 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49.
73 DUL, Howick to Thornton, 31 Dec. 1806, GRE B54/12/27.
775–7.
75 DUL, Garlike to Howick, 26 Jan. 1807, GRE B15/11/18.
76 PRO, desp. 85, Garlike to Howick, 2 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49.
77 PRO, desp. 93, Garlike to Howick, 20 Dec. 1806, FO 22/49.
78 PRO, desp. 1, Howick to Garlike, 9 Jan. 1807, FO 22/51; extract printed in Parl. Deb. 10,
80 DUL, undated & unsigned note concerning the Baltic squadron, B1/5/22.
82 PRO, desp. 161, Thornton to Howick, 20 Dec. 1806, FO 33/35.
84 National Maritime Museum, Greenwich – Duckworth Papers, T. Grenville to Duckworth,
86 SNA, desp. 3, Rehausen to Gustav, 13 Jan. 1807, Anglica/490.
87 PRO, desp. 2, Howick to Garlike, 22 Jan. 1807, FO 22/51; extract printed in Parl. Deb.
88 DUL, Howick to Garlike, 22, Jan. 1807, GRE B15/11/17.
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90 PRO, desp. 31, Garlike to Howick, 23 March 1807, FO 22/51.
92 SNA, desp. 10, Rehausen to Gustav, 13 Feb. 1807, Anglica/490.
95 DUL, Garlike to Howick, 21 Jan. 1807, GRE B15/11/16.
96 PRO, desps. 9 & 12 (quotation), Garlike to Howick, 24 & 26 Jan. 1807, FO 22/51.
100 PRO, desp. 14, Garlike to Howick, 30 Jan. 1807, FO 22/51.
102 Lindvald, pp. 219–20.
103 Note from Rist to Howick, 9 March 1807, printed in Parl. Deb. 10, pp. 397–402.
104 SNA, apostille to desp. 16, Rehausen to Gustav, 10 March 1807, Anglica/490.
105 SNA, desp. 18, Rehausen to Gustav, 17 March 1807, Anglica/490.
106 PRO, desp. 34, Garlike to Howick, 2 April 1807, FO 22/51.
110 As for note 105.
111 PRO, Instructions from the admiralty to Keats, 1 April 1807, ADM 3/160, ff. 7–8.
115 PRO, desp. 1, Canning to Garlike, 17 April 1807, FO 22/52.
116 PRO, desp. 3, Canning to Garlike, 22 May 1807, FO 22/52.
117 PRO, desp. 4, Canning to Garlike, 26 May 1807, FO 22/52.
119 DUL, Grenville to Grey, 29 Dec. 1807, GRE B21/2/98.
120 DNA, desp. 27, Rist to Bernstorff, 28 March 1807, DFUA/1988.
121 DNA, desp. 34, Rist to Bernstorff, 21 April 1807, DFUA/1988.