Beyond Coolness
Unravelling Euro-American Perceptions of Contemporary Japan

LUKE FARRELLY-SPAIN

Japan has enthralled the world with its impressive manufacturing capacities and rich culture for many years, leading it to become somewhat of a fixation within Euro-American nations. Throughout its transition from Postwar ruin to industrial powerhouse, the nation has been the subject of a range of flattering and offensive orientalist depictions which have significantly shaped foreign perceptions. With its contemporary re-invention as an international trendsetter in the wake of devastating economic collapse, Japan has become a purveyor of all things cool and trendy, eliciting an unequivocal attraction to its more quirky and uniquely different cultural attributes. However, this latest obsession with coolness represents an attraction which grossly simplifies the complex realities of modern Japanese culture and society, while exemplifying a superficial depiction fundamentally detached from the daily workings of the nation itself. What are the implications behind the promotion and consumption of a "cool Japan"? Is it an effective means to promote enduring and more meaningful connections with Japan's culture, or does it merely further contribute to the perpetuation of warped narratives and stereotypical orientalist depictions?

Keywords: Orientalism, Nihonjinron, popular culture, cool, othering

With its post-war economic miracle firmly in the past, Japan has become best known since the 1990s for its vibrant and decidedly cool cultural output. The immense popularity of Japanese media and aesthetics in Euro-American countries represents the latest evolution in a longstanding fascination with Japan's perceived differences (Abel, 2011). However, in recent years perceptions have shifted more towards highlighting the cool and overtly unusual aspects of Japanese culture (Wagenaar, 2016). This comes at a time when Japan has attempted to reaffirm its national identity amidst growing economic and demographic challenges by emphasising its uniqueness and placing its cultural assets at the forefront. As a result, Japan's perceived "coolness" has become a notable point of fixation, being seen as validation of the broad appeal of its culture and being enthusiastically embraced by the country as part of its national branding efforts (Hijiya-Kirschnereit, 2013; Tamaki, 2019). However, it could be argued that the emphasis on these superficial perceptions has reinforced the notion of Japan as an object of desire, reminiscent of Orientalist views from the late nineteenth century. The enduring appeal of Japanese pop culture, coupled with the increasing number of foreign visitors each year, raises questions about what aspects of Japanese culture or perceptions of the country individuals find intriguing.

This study examines the motivations behind individuals' interest in Japan, exploring the connection between the perceived coolness of aspects of its culture and the lived experiences of Euro-American international students. Through interviews conducted with native and non-natively English-speaking international students in Tokyo, the research questions the often-generalised notion of "coolness" and analyses the connection between individual interests and wider cultural perceptions. This exploration traces evolving perceptions since the Meiji period, their interactions with Orientalism, and the history of Japanese Popular Culture's wider appeal, underscoring their potential influence on individuals' motivations to move to Japan.

What is "Cool"?

Despite its widespread contemporary usage, cool does not have a universally accepted definition, which makes it difficult to identify how phenomena come to be regarded as such. The term can be loosely traced to the Afro-American Jazz scene in the 1930s, where it described a relaxed and mysterious style of music or performance which deviated from established social norms (Abel, 2011). This association with subversion became more pronounced in the 1960s, as its usage became more prevalent within youth subcultures and anti-establishment movements. The term represented a form of escapism where alternative interests and lifestyles could develop away from the harsh judgements of wider society (Raz, 2013). Cool's largely disinterested attitude towards external influences significantly heightened its mainstream desirability, and its gradual commercialisation subsequently allowed more individuals to shape their identities around these once elusive phenomena (Valaskivi, 2013). However, this broader accessibility underscores the precarious nature of cool phenomena, given that their allure stems from their enigmatic and unpredictable nature, making them highly susceptible to interference, mainstream acknowledgement, or widespread dissemination. Cool phenomena must therefore straddle a line between being countercultural

and broadly self-sustaining. Therefore, since their attractiveness depends on the perceptions of individuals within specific cultural and temporal contexts, predicting or manufacturing a genuine sense of coolness becomes effectively impossible.

Orientalism, Othering, and Japan

Orientalism is a process centred around maintaining the constructed superiority of a dominant culture, establishing a sense of normalcy based on its own norms which other "inferior" cultures are judged against. These comparisons are often contextualised within the timeline of colonial pursuits by Euro-American nations, with the "modernity" of the colonised Orient being gauged by its receptiveness to the imposition of foreign customs and culture (Robins & Morley, 1995; Said, 1979). While initially associated with interactions between former colonial European nations and the Middle East, Orientalism has evolved to encompass broader interactions, including those with nations in East Asia (Inokuchi & Nozaki, 2005). Through a process known as othering, Orientalist ideas seek to justify a perceived sense of supremacy and fundamentally shape the narrative of the Orient and its culture. This is often achieved by invoking excessively romanticised imagery, which occasionally manifests as a projection of sexual desires onto a culture considered unconstrained by the more conservative conventions of Euro-American nations (Hinton, 2014; Inokuchi & Nozaki, 2005; Miller, 2018).

Japan has been the subject of various forms of Orientalism since the Meiji restoration, the earliest of which being the "Japonisme" movement in Europe at the turn of the 20th century, which portrayed a beautified version of Japanese lifestyle through art and literature (Koníček, 2019). The perpetuation of this "mysterious Orient" imagery cemented the notion that Japan was a desirable entity beyond the conventional understanding of Euro-American culture, while also being distinct from other Asian countries (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005, p. 166). Japan's later imperialist endeavours and rapid post-war industrialisation subsequently challenged its positioning within the Orientalist hierarchy, sparking debates about whether it was following a more Euro-American development path or beginning to influence the rest of the world with its own autonomous progress (Iwabuchi, 2002; Robins & Morley, 1995). Efforts were made, particularly within the Anglosphere, to quantify a consolidated "Japanese character", where ascribed perceptions of Japanese culture could then be used to understand broader societal behaviours and actions (Hammond, 1999; Hinton, 2014).

Foreign perspectives became a dominant force in shaping and defining Japan's characteristics, serving as a form of self-validation that further emphasised the perceived differences of Japanese culture. This contributed to the later emergence of techno-orientalism, which departed from traditional exoticized portrayals to focus more on the nation's rapid advancement and its increasing integration of technology into society, at the expense of what were considered intrinsic human values (Robins & Morley, 1995; Roh et al., 2015; Wagenaar, 2016). Although techno-orientalism became less prevalent as Japan's economy declined throughout the 1990s, it remains prevalent in contemporary perspectives of Japan, through pop culture and depictions in Euro-American media (Hinton, 2014).

Evolving Perceptions

Perceptions of Japan have been influenced significantly by a combination of both domestic and foreign processes. Domestically, a form of exceptionalist nationalism known as Nihonjinron has sought to base Japan's cultural heritage on a perceived sense of cultural superiority, rooted its history and cultural homogeny (Hijiya-Kirschnereit, 2013; Robins & Morley, 1995). Through its emphasis on cultural distinctiveness and the selective acceptance or rejection of foreign influences, Nihonjinron indicates a fundamental desire to preserve an inherent sense of

"Japaneseness" through a process of self-othering away from both Asian and Euro-American cultures (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005; Iwabuchi, 1998). While flattering, Nihonjinron's portrayal of Japan is not an accurate representation as it presents an idealised image rooted in self-ascribed essentialism, further perpetuating Orientalist perceptions of Japan as being beyond conventional Euro-American understanding (Tamaki, 2019). The promotion of these emblematic aspects of its culture provided the country with an opportunity for self-promotion to foreign observers, capitalising on its self-ascribed uniqueness and perpetuating Orientalist depictions of the "Exotic East" (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005; Iyer, 1988; Wagenaar, 2016).

Perspectives underwent a dramatic shift as Japan evolved into a symbol of technological progressiveness and commercial success during the post-war era. (Hinton, 2014; Wagenaar, 2016). The country's rapid industrialisation provoked widespread concerns about Japan's potential impact on the global order, leading to a resurgence in anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Raz, 2013; Robins & Morley, 1995). However, on a less political level, Japan continued to be highly regarded for its ingenuity and design, particularly in the emerging entertainment and video game industries. Increasing global interest in its popular culture further cemented the notion of Japaneseness to creativity and innovative aesthetics (Iwabuchi, 2002; McLelland, 2018). Perceptions once again shifted towards a more selective exemplification of Japan's apparent deviations from Euro-American conventions, with elements of its popular culture being considered indicative of the country's broader culture and mindset (Hinton, 2014). Perceptions of Japan as "weird" became increasingly prevalent into the 21st century, primarily fuelled by Anglophone media and wider access to Japanese content online (Kelts, 2006; Wagenaar, 2016). The omission of cultural context, intentional or not, further heightens these perceptions by emphasising cultural elements unfamiliar to Euro-American culture. This underscores the interchangeability between perceptions of Japan as "weird" or "unusual" and "different" or "unique", all of which play into Japan's assertion of its own uniqueness (Inokuchi & Nozaki, 2005).

The Appeal of Japanese Popular Culture

Japanese pop culture primarily remained within the confines of a domestic audience for much of the post-war era, only spreading further afield in recent decades. Even as the country gained prominence as a dominant exporter of low-cost consumer electronics in the 1970s and 1980s, it remained in what Kelts (2006) describes as the "cultural backwater" of the mainstream international consciousness. The rise in "Japan bashing" and resistance against Japanese economic and cultural influences in the 1980s, particularly in the United States, further hindered the wider expansion of Japanese popular culture (McLelland, 2018). The growing number of localised anime series which started appearing on children's television throughout the 1990s marked the beginning of a significant underground fascination with Japan's emerging cultural potential (Ito, 2012; Koníček, 2019). In the absence of official distribution, devoted fan communities began translating and sharing anime and manga on online forums, significantly boosting the accessibility of this media within youth subcultures. (Eng, 2012; McLelland, 2018). The largely unrestricted and explicit nature of this content further strengthened the link between Japanese popular culture and the prevailing perception of perversion at the time (Galbraith, 2019)games, and comics-- conducted in Akihabara, the electronics-turned-pop-culture neighborhood of Tokyo, author Patrick Galbraith traces the evolving relationships of mostly male-fans with imagined female characters. The term otaku, he argues, is frequently pathologized, to mean alienated or introverted persons - usually male - who have difficulty having real relationships and thus retreat into a

world of their own imagination and control. Galbraith wonders why the form of a relationship that focuses on an animated character is more problematic than other kinds of fan attachments - crushes on pop music stars or a deep investment in Star Wars or Harry Potter. Through his engaged ethnography at the height of the interest in maid cafés and animated female characters in the early 2000s, he is able to historicize this fandom in an empathetic and detailed way, showing that what many have taken to be a single and peculiar psychological phenomenon was actually a complex, quickly evolving pop culture phenomenon. The affective relationships of the fans (seen as 3D Japanese pop culture remained popular within youth subcultures and crossed the threshold into wider global awareness by the end of the 1990s, through the immense success of shows like Pokémon and video games from companies like Nintendo (Kelts, 2006). This interest continued to evolve into the 21st century, fuelled by the proliferation of fan communities that amplified the prominence of Japanese pop cultural exports, evoking a strong emotional response among Euro-American consumers (McLelland, 2018).

Since McGray's (2002) seminal piece outlining Japan's "gross national cool", there has been a growing association between the popularity of Japanese pop culture and its perceived coolness. However, this association, while recognised as a key driver of its widespread appeal, is often not fully articulated. One suggestion is that the Euro-American mainstream's rejection and framing of content like anime and manga as being radically different indicates a degree of higher disapproval, underscoring its subversive nature and thus boosting its cool appeal (McLelland, 2018; Valaskivi, 2013). The strong community involvement and distribution of edgier content further indicate a desire to seek out content not deemed morally acceptable for mainstream consumption, while also solidifying the perception of Japan as the originator of inherently cool cultural products. This association between coolness and Japaneseness becomes so profound that it can be perceived without the need to explicitly evoke Japanese imagery or depictions, or even without an active acknowledgment that such content originated from Japan (Allison, 2008). Another suggestion is that Japan's essentialised projection of its culture abroad further reinforces the perception of its popular culture as subversive and inherently attractive, often without a conscious examination of the underlying processes contributing to its appeal (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005). This can result in individuals solely interested in Japan's pop culture being attracted to highly fetishised depictions of the nation, without the desire to engage with the culture beyond their chosen media (Abel, 2011). The ambiguous positioning of Japan as an almost imaginary entity further reinforces inaccurate representations of its culture, and makes it easier downplay problematic aspects which could make it lose its coolness (Miller, 2018; Robins & Morley, 1995).

Japan's attempt to capitalise on this unwavering attraction to its pop culture has yielded mixed results. In 2010, the government launched the Cool Japan initiative, a national branding strategy aimed at consolidating the most popular elements of Japanese popular culture into a single, marketable entity. However, its effectiveness has been repeatedly questioned, with Japanese critics arguing that the initiative's vague objectives and lack of vision have made it a poor attempt at public diplomacy and a waste of public money (Tamaki, 2019). Given the inherent attractiveness of cool phenomena lies in their subversion of mainstream conventions and rebellious stance towards higher authority, the active promotion of Japan's coolness would always be a fruitless endeavour. This is further complicated by the subversive, and often problematic nature of the pop cultural products which initially spurred this association, making them fundamentally impossible to promote in a dignified manner (Valaskivi, 2013). The initiative also had the misfortune of coinciding with period of general decline in interest in Japanese culture, worsened by the mainstream saturation of Japanese pop cultural products and increased

competition from neighbouring countries, such as South Korea (Alt in Kelts, 2006; Koníček, 2019).

Discussion

Tsutomu (2004) describes a surge of interest in Japanese pop culture among those who grew up through the late 1980s into the early 2000s, with Alt (in Kelts, 2006) further stating that this phenomenon appeared to have run its course by the end of the 2000s. This provides a demographic aged between 20 and 35, which may have been more exposed to cool perceptions of Japan that could have influenced their decision to subsequently relocate to the country. This demographic framework sets the contextual backdrop for subsequent interviews, conducted over the course of a month, with seven international students from the United States, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and the Netherlands while studying in Japan. These interviews were supported by a guide that included several broad topics which were expanded into a wider selection of points for further elaboration. While efforts were made to achieve a balanced group for interviews, constraints in the selection and interviewing process, primarily due to timing, resulted in a predominantly male participant group.

The respondents noted that their initial interest in Japan stemmed from exposure to pop culture, primarily anime, music, and film, but stated this early influence didn't significantly shape later interests. For most, Japanese culture was a latent presence until a defining moment brought it to the forefront, prompted by specific events or interests. Regarding their lives in Japan, the participants held a mostly positive and balanced perception, finding similarities with their home countries that normalised their views, which were further enhanced by regular interactions with Japanese peers. The interviews underscored the substantial impact of anglophone perceptions in perpetuating the notion of Japan as weird or unusual, reaching beyond natively English-speaking countries. Despite only three participants having native anglophone backgrounds, all described negative perceptions of Japan portrayed in English language media and online. These depictions often omitted context and highlighted stereotypically unusual aspects of the country, which the respondents perceived as a dismissal based on a preconceived sense of weirdness justified by perceived cultural and linguistic distinctions from Euro-American norms.

Nevertheless, the respondents admitted to being susceptible to these perceptions, with one participant acknowledging that their image of Japan had been shaped by stereotypical views, while others admitted being more receptive to negative perspectives before their initial arrival as a means of tempering expectations. Despite this, the interviewees largely dismissed prevalent stereotypical depictions, opting instead for more meaningful and personal encounters with the nation and its culture.

Participants' perceptions of Japan

The respondents outlined various aspects of Japan as a country or its culture that they either personally considered cool or were more widely recognised as such. Several participants found the perceived divergence of Japan from Euro-American culture and daily life cool, particularly its convenience culture, urban nightlife, and the absence of a Euro-American presence in mainstream media. They also felt that Japan was more socially accepting of individuals openly expressing hobbies or interests in public when compared to their home countries. Other participants considered Japan's perceived technological advancement and the integration of technology into daily life cool, citing examples such as the rapid development of consumer electronics, the Shinkansen, and Japan's advanced manufacturing capabilities. While acknowledging technological gaps, such as the prevalence of cash and slow adoption of digital services, and recognising these perceptions were slightly outdated, they believed progress has quietly continued behind the scenes,

despite not being overtly present in daily life.

Japan's enigmatic and relatively secluded nature, both culturally and geographically, was also considered cool by some interviewees. They highlighted that the country's self-imposed distance from Euro-American culture, coupled with the limited accessibility of Japanese content abroad, reinforced its cool appeal. One respondent had observed that individuals with a deep interest in Japanese pop culture often came from lower income backgrounds and suggested that the perceived unattainability of visiting Japan due to its high cost likely made the country more appealing. Two participants additionally noted that the more weird and overtly sexualised aspects of Japanese culture were often seen as cool. They emphasised how a focus on the sexually explicit aspects of Japanese culture and media within stereotypical perceptions not only reinforces the fetishisation of the country, but also leads to implicit assumptions that these elements are more widespread than they truly are. One respondent proposed that these cultural outliers might be intentionally emphasised to attract foreigners who specifically seek out these more unusual elements.

Japaneseness and cool

The interviews overwhelmingly highlighted the strong association between coolness and the inherent Japanese properties of the country's cultural exports. The respondents stated they were attracted to the Japaneseness of certain cultural products and the way the country adapted foreign cultural elements, but struggled to articulate why these processes were cool. They suggested that the close link between Japan's cultural output and national identity reinforced the perception that the country and its culture are inherently cool, encompassing non-native Japanese cultural outputs such as cars, technology, animation, and food. They emphasised that the strong presence of Japanese values was a key factor in in both their recognition and quality, further strengthening the link between Japaneseness and desirability. The respondents strongly criticised Iwabuchi's (2002) claim that the "cultural odour" of Japanese products and media is intentionally removed for international appeal, noting the negative connotations of the term "odour", and arguing that it portrayed Japaneseness as something detrimental that required removal. These sentiments indicate that the exclusivity and distinctiveness of Japanese cultural exports reinforces a sense of coolness which sets Japan apart from the rest of the world.

Despite these convictions, the interviewees expressed strong criticism towards the Japanese government's promotion of "Cool Japan". They described negative associations in their home countries regarding an intense attraction to Japanese pop culture and questioned whether this amounted to a "genuine interest" in Japanese culture. While some asserted that pop culture is a valid aspect of contemporary Japan on par with its traditional culture, others viewed the fixation on pop culture as a superficial interest in an idealised version of the country which lacked deeper understanding. The participants largely felt that the Japanese government's attempt to broaden the appeal of its pop culture resulted in a shift from niche and desirable to commercialised and decidedly uncool. They criticised the government's approach, particularly in response to the Korean Wave, as sluggish and focused excessively on promoting a superficial image, rather than actively supporting the export and distribution of Japanese pop culture. Instead, they argued the government should have encouraged the organic growth of the pop culture industry through increased funding, distribution, and accessibility, prompting more meaningful engagements with the country through its pop culture.

Motivations for moving to Japan

The participants were passionate about many diverse aspects of Japanese culture but emphasised

that their motivation to move to the country driven by a desire to engage comprehensively with its culture. Learning or perfecting the Japanese language was a key motivator, with the respondents viewing proficiency as essential for adapting to daily life in Japan and a means of deepening their existing interests in Japanese culture, such as history, politics, and literature. Some interviewees admitted they were initially attracted to Japan's perceived differences, considering it an escape from their usual environments, but later recognised the inaccuracy of these perceptions and did not consider them motivating factors.

While popular culture played a role in their initial exposure to Japanese culture, the respondents did not feel it affected their later decisions to move to Japan, nor did it remain prominent in their continued interest in the country. Rather, they appeared more interested in experiencing the lived reality of Japan through what they personally considered cool about the country, rather than being influenced by prevailing perceptions in their home countries or pop culture.

Their deeper understanding of daily life in Japan was most evident while discussing their future intentions to live and work in the country, expressing a hesitant interest in moving only if they were confident it aligned with their long-term career goals. The participants saw no value in pursuing jobs aimed at foreigners, such as English teaching, or which were unrelated to their skill set, solely to stay in Japan. They also found Japan's strict work culture highly discouraging, preferring instead to either work in a foreign company operating in Japan, or be based in their home countries with the ability to travel regularly for business.

Conclusion

Despite the continued dissemination of Orientalist depictions, through the recent focus on cool and unusual aspects of Japanese culture, this study suggests that prevailing notions of Japan's coolness had minimal effect on the participants' perceptions, which were more shaped by personal interests and experiences in Japan. It should be noted that this attraction is not entirely free from the historical influences of Orientalism and othering that have traditionally shaped Euro-American perceptions of the country. Individuals with a deeper understanding and more practical exposure to Japanese culture still linked its perceived coolness and broader appeal to these perspectives but refrained from actively embracing or perpetuating them. However, their primary motivation stemmed from a desire to enrich their experiences, particularly through language learning, enabling more meaningful engagement with Japan's culture and people, which played a pivotal role in their decision to live and study in the country. Popular culture, including anime, manga, and other cool aspects of Japanese culture, might have spurred the participants' initial interest in Japan, but did not have a significant impact on their desires to move to the country. Indeed, they strongly criticised the constructed concept of "Cool Japan" and the focus placed on superficial aspects of its culture, which they believed deepened the disconnect between the imagined and lived realities of the country.

This study has attempted to navigate challenges presented by orientalist perceptions, by paying attention to personal motivations, biases, and avoiding terminology that oversimplified cultural nuances. Its scope and limitations, including the preference for a more balanced gender distribution and a deeper exploration of individuals immersed in Japanese pop culture, present opportunities for future research to further explore the relationship between perceptions, motivations, and the evolving perceptions of Japanese culture.

Luke Farrelly-Spain holds a master's degree in Asian Studies from Lund University and is currently working with English-Japanese translation.
E-mail: lukefarrellyspain@gmail.com

References

Abel, J. E. (2011). Can Cool Japan save Post-Disaster Japan? On the Possibilities and Impossibilities of a Cool Japanology: Can Cool Japan Save Post-Disaster Japan? *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, *20*(1), 59–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6781.2011.01148.x

Allison, A. (2008). The Attractions of the J-Wave for American Youth. In Y. Watanabe & D. L. McConnell (Eds.), *Soft power superpowers: Cultural and national assets of Japan and the United States*. M.E. Sharpe.

Eng, L. (2012). Anime and Manga Fandom as Networked Culture. In I. Tsuji (Ed.), *Fandom Unbound*. Yale University Press; JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npk9q

Galbraith, P. W. (2019). *Otaku and the struggle for imagination in Japan*. Duke University Press.

Goldstein-Gidoni, O. (2005). The Production and Consumption of 'Japanese Culture' in the Global Cultural Market. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, *5*(2), 155–179. https://doi.org/10.1177/1469540505053092

Hammond, P. (1999). The Mystification of Culture: Western Perceptions of Japan. *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)*, *61*(3–4), 311–325. https://doi.org/10.1177/0016549299061003008

Hijiya-Kirschnereit, I. (2013). Is Japan Cool? In U. Haselstein, C. Gersdorf, & E. Giannoulis (Eds.), *The cultural career of coolness: Discourses and practices of affect control in European antiquity, the United States, and Japan*. Lexington Books.

Hinton, P. (2014, June 12). *Necsus | Representation or misrepresentation?: British media and Japanese popular culture*. Necsus. https://necsus-ejms.org/representation-misrepresentation-british-media-japanese-popular-culture/

Inokuchi, H., & Nozaki, Y. (2005). "Different than Us": Othering, Orientalism, and US middle school students' discourses on Japan. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, *25*(1), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/02188790500032533

Ito, M. (2012). *Fandom Unbound* (D. Okabe, Ed.). Yale University Press; JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npk9q

Iwabuchi, K. (1998). Marketing 'Japan': Japanese cultural presence under a global gaze. *Japanese Studies*, *18*(2), 165–180. https://doi.org/10.1080/10371399808727650

Iwabuchi, K. (2002). *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*. Duke University Press.

Iyer, P. (1988). *Video Night in Kathmandu and Other Reports from the Not-So-Far-East* (Vol. 18). Pico Iye. https://academic.oup.com/melus/article-lookup/doi/10.2307/468126

Kelts, R. (2006). *Japanamerica: How Japanese pop culture has invaded the U.S* (1st ed). Palgrave Macmillan.

Koníček, M. (2019). Japanophilia: Becoming the Other. *Theory and Practice in English Studies*, *8*(2).

McGray, D. (2002). Japan's Gross National Cool. *Foreign Policy*, *130*, 44–54. https://doi.org/10.2307/3183487

McLelland, M. (2018). Introduction. In M. McLelland (Ed.), *The End of Cool Japan—Ethical, Legal, and Cultural Challenges to Japanese Popular Culture* (pp. 1–30). Routledge.

Miller, L. (2018). Scholar girl meets manga maniac, media specialist, and cultural gatekeeper. In M. McLelland (Ed.), *The End of Cool Japan—Ethical, Legal, and Cultural Challenges to Japanese Popular Culture* (pp. 51–69). Routledge.

Raz, A. E. (2013). Marketing National and Self Appearances: Cool and Cute in J-Culture. In U. Haselstein, I. Hijiya-Kirschnereit, C. Gersdorf, & E. Giannoulis (Eds.), *The cultural career of coolness: Discourses and practices of affect control in European antiquity, the United States, and Japan*. Lexington Books.

Robins, K., & Morley, D. (1995). *Spaces of Identity*. Routledge; Supplemental Index. https://ludwig.lub.lu.se/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=edo&AN=17369169&site=eds-live&scope=site

Roh, D. S., Huang, B., & Niu, G. A. (Eds.). (2015). *Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in speculative fiction, history, and media*. Rutgers University Press.

Said, E. W. (1979). *Orientalism* (1st Vintage Books ed). Vintage Books.

Tamaki, T. (2019). Repackaging national identity: Cool Japan and the resilience of Japanese identity narratives. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *27*(1), 108–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1594323

Tsutomu, S. (2004). Japanese Culture on the World Stage. *Japan Economic Foundation, March/April 2004 Issue*.

Valaskivi, K. (2013). A brand new future? Cool Japan and the social imaginary of the branded nation. *Japan Forum*, *25*(4), 485–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2012.756538

Wagenaar, W. (2016). Wacky Japan: A new face of orientalism. *Asia in Focus*, *3*, 46–56.