Rudbeckius, Hägglund’s Codex, and the Problem of Authorship Ascription

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Introduction

In 1992, Bengt Hägglund (1920–2015) published an article in which he describes a certain codex and ascribes its authorship to Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646), who was professor of loci theologici at Uppsala University during the years 1611–1613.1 The codex has Matthias Hafenreffer’s (1561–1619) Loci as an explicit point of reference.2 Hägglund takes the manuscript to be a transcript of material that Rudbeckius would have authored and used for delivering lectures on dogmatics, but maintains that the manuscript itself was written by others – either by copying a written original or by taking notes of an oral presentation.3

In the following account, I will denote by “C” the codex Hägglund had in his possession, by “W” the work of which C would be a transcript, and by

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2. Matthias Hafenreffer, Loci theologici certa methodo ac ratione in tres libros tributi, Wittenberg 1607.
“H” the critical edition of C that Hägglund published in 2001. It is an empirical fact that C exists, but a mere hypothesis that there is a single source, W, of which C is a transcript. In my discussion I will mainly rely on H.

Hägglund defends the following quadripartite claim that I will call Hägglund’s thesis:

1. C is based on an earlier work, W, to the content of which we have access via C.
2. W was produced by Rudbeckius in 1611.
3. C gives us information about the content of Rudbeckius’s lectures during 1611–1613.
4. Notably the introduction and the conclusion of C reveal to us certain characteristic features of Rudbeckius’s thinking about dogmatics during 1611–1613 and show that his thinking was independent of his contemporaries.

I criticize Hägglund’s thesis on three levels. First, I point out weaknesses in his argumentation. Second, I present indirect evidence against his thesis employing the two series of Rudbeckius’s published dissertations on dogmatics from years 1611–1613 and 1620–1644 as well as his own comments about his lectures in dogmatics. Third, I present direct evidence against Hägglund’s thesis by identifying three chapters of C that are written after 1613 and not authored by Rudbeckius: (a) the introduction, (b) the conclusion, and (c) the chapter about locus de ecclesia. Actually, (a) and (c) have their origin in a work of the Danish theologian and bishop Jesper Brochmand (1585–1652) from 1633, and (b) stems from a dissertation of the German theologian Balthasar Meisner (1587–1626) published in 1614.

Hägglund’s Codex
Hägglund’s argumentation is based on studying the codex C, which had been given to him around 1960 by Urban Forell (1930–2021), professor of ethics and philosophy of religion at the University of Copenhagen. The latter had inherited it from his father Birger Forell (1893–1958), pastor of the Swedish Victoria Parish in Berlin. Hägglund donated C to Lund University

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6. 6r–13r, 319r–321v, 176v–192v in C (34–40, 350–353, 207–225 in H). I do not mean to suggest that only these three chapters stem from someone else than Rudbeckius.
Library in 2008; it can be consulted at its Department of Collections. C is a bound codex with 322 leaves in octavo format. Hägglund had the physical aspects of C’s cover examined; it turned out that material produced in Sweden had been used in manufacturing it, including 27 leaves from the Swedish Mass Order of 1548. Five leaves from the beginning appear to be missing, but the main body of the text is intact.

The manuscript contains a discussion of all loci found in Hafenreffer’s Loci theologici, in the same order and following almost the same division as Hafenreffer. It refers to Hafenreffer as “our author”. The idea is to offer a deepened discussion of the themes of Hafenreffer’s book.

From the different handwriting styles occurring in C, Hägglund concludes that it is a joint effort of several writers. On the inside of C’s back cover it is written: “the book was written in 1611 by Pür krch” (“1611 blev boken skrifven af Pür krch”). At the end of locus de ecclesia, the date 25 March 1611 is mentioned. Hägglund says the former indication is written by “someone from later times” and the latter “with later handwriting”. By inspecting C, it is observed that the two indications seem not to be written down by the same person and that the mention of 25 March 1611 is indeed a later addition, as it is not in the same handwriting as the body of the text concerning the locus. It is important to realize that if these time indications are later additions, they are more dubious than the codex C itself as sources of information about the hypothetical work of origin W.

Hägglund’s Argumentation

Let us consider the four items of Hägglund’s thesis in turn.

**Item 1: C Is a Transcript That Gives Access to an Earlier Work W**

Hägglund notes that on a certain page, those writing down C have skipped a paragraph but have then started over. He surmises that certain misspellings in C depend on its being based on lecture notes. From such observations he concludes that C is a transcript of an earlier work W. If so, it is

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9. Hägglund, “Rudbeckius som teolog”, 3–4. See also Hägglund’s notes in H, 354. However, the text beginning on the first line of p. 87r in C is interrupted and the pages up to 98v are empty.
10. Hägglund, “Rudbeckius som teolog”, 5, says the division is exactly the same. Yet C treats the two parts of Hafenreffer’s locus de diversis vitae ordibus as two distinct loci.
11. See, for example, 33v, 43r, 193r, 296v (64, 74, 225, 324 in H).
12. 192v (225 in H).
reasonable to assume that it gives access to the work whose transcript it is. And C forms a coherent whole – which could be explicable by the coherence of the work of origin. However, even if each single chapter of C was a transcript of an earlier text, distinct chapters of C could be transcribed from distinct works. In that case C would not be coherent due to any feature of a single earlier work, but because people creating C would have chosen a coherent collection of texts to transcribe.

**Item 2: Rudbeckius Authored W in 1611**

Hägglund’s argument for Item 2 has three premises: (1) W was brought into existence in Sweden; (2) a major part of W’s content was produced around 1611; and (3) the originator of W is the *author* of W in the strong sense that W is a record of the originator’s thinking about dogmatics – not a compilation of texts copied from various authors.

Regarding (1), Hägglund notes that C contains some Swedish citations while otherwise written in Latin, and that its cover is manufactured using material produced in Sweden. These are good grounds for believing that those who gave rise to C were Swedes, but not quite as good grounds for believing the same about W. Namely, it turns out that Hägglund must postulate that adjustments were made in the text during the process that yielded C from W. This might have involved relativizing the text to the Swedish context, which is compatible with the originator of W being a non-Swede. At this point I am not claiming that so was the case, but wish to stress that facts about C cannot be automatically extrapolated to W.

Concerning (2), Hägglund notes that C contains two later additions mentioning the year 1611. The reference at the end of *locus* of the church to 25 March 1611 (in fact, the second day of Easter in 1611) is the more noteworthy of them. What is its role? No other *locus* carries a date. Perhaps the person “with later handwriting” saw a connection between something he knew had been discussed that day in some relevant context and the issues taken up in the chapter (for example, the question of whether priests should have equal salaries). But why should such third-hand information (notes added later in the second-hand source C supposedly yielding access to the first-hand source W) allow us to date W or even C? And what justifies Hägglund in isolating this time indication among all later additions that can be found on page 192v of the codex? (After the mention of the date,
and at end of the page, there are further later additions.) Two third-hand remarks are Hägglund’s only ground for thinking that W was produced in 1611. Objectively, this justification is extremely weak.

As for (3), Hägglund takes it for granted that W has an author. Yet, if the transcript C had multiple mutually independent sources, this assumption would be erroneous. It may be difficult to say where precisely to draw the line between an author quoting from multiple sources and a compiler putting together various texts, but if a text contains entire chapters borrowed from others, it is clearly a work of a compiler.

If (1), (2), and (3) were true, we could rather confidently infer Item 2. Rudbeckius was the Swede with the best motivation to prepare extensive material on dogmatics in 1611, given that he became professor of loci theologici at Uppsala University during the first months of 1611. Whether (1), (2), and (3) are true or not, Hägglund has not given us good reasons to believe that they are all true. Especially his motivation for (2) is very weak.

**Items 3 and 4: Via C We Gain Insights into Rudbeckius’s Lectures and His Approach to Dogmatics**

Given the content of C, it is reasonable to think that if Items 1 and 2 are true, then Rudbeckius produced W as material for his lectures in 1611–1613, whence C informs us about the content of these lectures and about Rudbeckius’s way of thinking about dogmatics. On the other hand, if (a) Rudbeckius did not author W in the first place, or (b) did not do so around 1611 but only later, or (c) if C contains too many later additions to allow us to know which parts of C stem from W, then at least one of the Items 1 and 2 is false, and both Items 3 and 4 are false as well. For, in cases (a)–(c), either C cannot be used as a source of information about W at all, or it can but it does not tell us about Rudbeckius’s thoughts around 1611.

**Relation between C and W**

Hägglund assumes that C was written after W was authored, and that it was completed in 1639.\(^{19}\) In *locus de creatione*, the year 1639 is referred to as the “current year” (*hic labens Christi annus*).\(^{20}\) Hägglund explains the discrepancy between the dates 1611 and 1639 by taking them to be respectively the times of production of W and C. Without the preconception that W was written in 1611, we might assume that W itself was completed in 1639. Hägglund is forced to assume that people producing C have modified the

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20. 36r (67 in H).
text of W. However, if C does not reproduce W, on what basis can we decide which parts of C correspond to W? If the only modification consists of replacing the numeral “1611” supposedly occurring in W by “1639”, the possibility of using C to access W is of course not jeopardized. Difficulties arise if it becomes untenable to assume that differences between W and C are minimal.

Hägglund hypothesizes that “experienced writers” were recruited in Västerås to produce C.21 Yet he notes that in C, some Hebrew words have been left out and that there are misspellings in many Latin words.22 Historian of ideas Erland Sellberg says that those who wrote down C must have lacked deep knowledge of Latin or been rather careless.23 Why would Rudbeckius have trusted the preparation of his book to people with such defects?

Addressing the professors of Uppsala University, Rudbeckius writes in 1638:24

You are not unaware of the fact that my current tasks are of such a kind that they do not allow me to devote attention to producing learned writings (since all my efforts are dedicated to my public duties and the administration of the church and all kinds of other things).

How could he, in these conditions, have supervised the production of a treatise on loci theologici? And why would he not have wanted to do so? Otherwise he closely monitored virtually everything that went on in the diocese.

Rudbeckius’s Published Writings on Dogmatics

Rudbeckius’s dissertations on loci theologici were published on two occasions. There are, first, dissertations debated in Uppsala during the years 1611–1613 and, second, synodal dissertations from the years 1620–1644. Let us take a look at the two series of dissertations.

Disputations at the Private Collegium

In March 1610, Rudbeckius opened a collegium privatum in connection with Uppsala University. Its goal was to help all willing and sufficiently gifted

students in their study of academic disciplines. Hägglund assumes that the collegium’s pedagogical activities were of an elementary character. In point of fact, given the scarce teaching resources in Uppsala, the collegium importantly complemented the students’ access to teaching with academic content. Many had enrolled at the university four or five years before enrolling at the collegium. Hägglund argues unconvincingly that dissertations on *loci theologici* debated in the collegium could not be directly related to Rudbeckius’s university teaching. He explains that the Swedish School Regulations of 1611 became effective in 1613, and parts of Hafenreffer’s *Compendium* – an abridged version of his *Loci* published in Sweden in 1612 – became obligatory teaching material in cathedral schools. Hägglund presents this as a reason for thinking that students came to the university with a solid background in theology. This may apply to those who began their studies some years after 1613, but not to the students who enrolled at Rudbeckius’s collegium between 1610 and 1613.

During the years 1611–1613, Rudbeckius wrote 24 dissertations based on Hafenreffer’s *Loci*. They were published individually, and later even compiled into a book – *Articuli christianae religionis*. Of these dissertations, 23 were debated privately in the collegium. Hägglund estimates that the dissertations were written by Rudbeckius’s students as an exercise in paraphrasing Hafenreffer’s text. This is incorrect. Rudbeckius himself says in the *Articuli* that he wrote them, though he admits he had no time to elaborate them. Also, while some dissertations indeed essentially paraphrase Hafenreffer or even directly copy passages from him, in others Rudbeckius

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30. According to its title page, Dissertation 10 (*De peccato et servo arbitrio*) was debated publicly.


clearly deviates from Hafenreffer – notably when stressing the importance of philosophy (logic) in the study of theology, analyzing language-use, assessing logical inferences, and offering a philosophical discussion of certain theologically relevant issues.\footnote{See Rudbeckius, \textit{Articuli christianae religionis}, especially diss. 2–4, 7–8, 12. Issues discussed: predications whose meaning depends on \textit{unio personalis} and on \textit{communicatio idiomatum}; reason-based arguments for the finiteness of the world, providence, traducianism, and immortality of the soul; and philosophical remarks on the existence of God and God's undefinability.} How, then, were the dissertations related to Rudbeckius’s university teaching? Hägglund thinks Rudbeckius must have taught considerably more profound issues than those revealed by the dissertations.\footnote{Hägglund, “Rudbeckius som teolog”, 3.}

That Rudbeckius lectured on dogmatics is evident already from his job description (\textit{locorum theologicorum professor}). The report on the activities of the collegium for 1611–1612 confirms that he gave public lectures on \textit{loci theologici}, and Johannes Matthiae Gothus (1592–1670) recalls that Rudbeckius lectured publicly on Hafenreffer’s \textit{Loci}.\footnote{Rudbeckius, \textit{Acta hoc est Lectiones, declamationes, disputationes et alia exercitia anni MDCXI: In collegio privato ... M. Johannis Rudbeckii}, Stockholm 1613, 9; Nicolaus Rudbeckius, \textit{Confessio b. Johannis Matthiae [1670]}, in \textit{Acta literaria et scientiarum Sveciae}, vol. 4, Uppsala 1742, 504.} His lectures were attended by all university students – irrespective of how far they had proceeded in their studies: the lectures could not presuppose knowledge acquired at the university.\footnote{Andersson, Carlsson & Sandström (eds.), \textit{Uppsala universitets matrikel}, 19: “Locorum theologicorum professorem M[agistrum] Johannem Rudbech[ium] [...] omnes audient.” See Hägglund’s foreword in H, 7.} In his \textit{Oratio valedictoria} (1613), Rudbeckius mentions having taught \textit{loci theologici} when being professor of theology, but says nothing suggesting he would have written a book on dogmatics.\footnote{Rudbeckius, \textit{Oratio valedictoria}, Västerås 1638, 9–10.}

In the \textit{Articuli}, Rudbeckius comments on the relationship between the theological disputations at the \textit{collegium privatum} and his university lectures. He says that when he was entrusted with the professorship of theology, he considered it preferable to include, among the exercises he organized, frequent disputations – both public and private – between himself and his students.\footnote{Rudbeckius, \textit{Articuli christianae religionis}, 5: “Cum mihi in Academia Patriae ante aliquot annos professio esset demandata [...] nihil prius habui, quam ut inter reliqua exercititia [...] disputationes inter me meosque discipulos cum publice tum privatim frequentissimae haberentur.”} He tells that when he had publicly – that is as part of his university teaching – explained a given \textit{locus}, he soon afterwards subjected it to a debate in a private disputation so that he could conveniently clarify and further develop issues that had not been sufficiently explained during
the lectures or that the students had not sufficiently understood. It could hardly be expressed more clearly that the dissertations of the collegium were directly related to the university lectures.

**Synodal Disputations in Västerås**

There are seventeen synodal dissertations with Rudbeckius as praeses (1620–1639) and three more presented under his direction (1642–1644). Each synodal dissertation is a slightly improved version of the corresponding private collegium dissertation. Typically, some issues are discussed in a bit more detail and references to the literature are added. The only significant exception is the dissertation about *locus de providentia* (1622), which contains a much more extensive discussion of the relationship between divine foreknowledge and providence than the private collegium dissertation of June 1611. Here, the additional parts are borrowed from Rudbeckius’s earlier theological dissertation debated publicly in February 1611. Since the synodal dissertations do not differ much from the private collegium dissertations, and the former cannot be dismissed as students’ exercises, there is no reason to think that the latter would be too simplistic to reflect the content of basic university teaching.

There is no trace of W having been employed in the synodal dissertations – nor in published dissertations debated in the Gymnasium of Västerås. Further, Simon Benedicti Arbogensis (1601–1649) mentions in 1638 that at Collegium pietatis in Västerås, disputations were held about Chemnitz’s, Hutter’s, and Gerhard’s dogmatic works. If Rudbeckius had produced an

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41. From 1639 on Rudbeckius’s health started to deteriorate.

42. Starting from 1633, there are many references to Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Martin Chemnitz (1522–1586), and Leonhard Hutter (1563–1616).

43. This dissertation was published together with a philosophical dissertation on the same topic. See Johannes Rudbeckius, *Disputationes duae de providentia, prior theologica, posterior philosophica*, Stockholm 1611. The two dissertations are written in a much more sophisticated manner than the private collegium dissertations.


entire work on dogmatics in 1611, and if its final version was being completed in Västerås around 1639, its insights would surely have been debated at synods and in connection with teaching in the Diocese of Västerås.

**Hägglund’s Codex vs. Rudbeckius’s Works**

Any major differences of exposition between C and Rudbeckius’s dissertations raise doubts about C being a transcript of a work authored by Rudbeckius. I take up one such difference.

A great number of chapters in C begin with a discussion on definitions. First, an *onomatologia* of a word is presented; this is supposed to yield a *nominal definition*, accomplished by providing three types of information about the word: its *etymology* (origin), its *homonymy* (whether and how it is ambiguous), and its *synonymy* (which other words there may be signifying the same). Second, a *pragmatologia* is offered, which is meant to give a *real definition* of the extramental thing the word stands for. This involves indicating the (proximate) *genus* of the thing, as well as its *differentia* distinguishing it from other things falling under the same *genus*. This *differentia*, again, is given by specifying determinants such as the *efficient* cause of the thing (what has brought it into existence) and its *final* cause (the goal towards which it is directed).46

Rudbeckius uses the expressions “definitio nominis” and “definitio rei” where C employs the words “definitio nominalis” and “definitio realis”.47 He often comments on questions of language-use with the goal of clarifying the meaning of an expression. Yet in his published writings there just is no trace of a practice to fix a nominal definition by providing the onomatologia of a word.

**Does the Codex C Yield Access to Rudbeckius’s Thinking?**

I believe the indirect evidence I have provided against Hägglund’s thesis is much stronger than Hägglund’s evidence for his thesis. Still, a definite refutation of the thesis would be preferable. To this end, I show in detail that there are two entire chapters in C that do not inform us of Rudbeckius’s original thinking and do not stem from 1611: the introduction on the nature of theology (*Prolegomena de constitutione theologiae universaliter
genere prima de scriptura sacra*, Västerås 1638, 2).

46. The terms “definitio nominis”, “definitio realis”, “etymologia”, “homonymia”, and “synonymia” appear in C; see 6r–7r, 131r (34–35, 161 in H). For the terms “onomatologia” and “pragmatologia” (not used in C), see for example Johann Gerhard, *Exegesis* (*Loci theologici*, vol. 1), Jena 1625, 1, 3 (*Prooemium*, theses 2, 7).

consideratae) and the conclusion (Coronis summitatem seu caput et summam absoluti hujus operis breviter ostendens). Further, I remark that the same holds true even of the chapter about locus de ecclesia.

The introduction is borrowed from Dissertatio de theologia universe considerata, Article 1 of Universe theologie systema – Jesper Brochmand’s principal dogmatic work from 1633. The chapter about locus of the church stems from Article 26 of the same work. It should be noted that Brochmand began to write on theology only in 1615. Prior to 1633, he wrote on christology, sacraments, papacy, and the role of scriptures – neither on the nature of theology nor on ecclesiology. The conclusion is borrowed from Balthasar Meisner’s dissertation De numero et certitudine electorum, debated and published in 1614. I am not saying that merely some isolated sentences from these works are used in C, nor even that C has just adopted their structure of exposition or mode of reasoning. Practically every paragraph in these chapters of C, and almost every sentence in each paragraph, has its origin in the corresponding parts of Brochmand’s and Meisner’s works, sometimes using exactly the same words, sometimes adapting the words. I will comment on the introduction and the conclusion in detail. By comparing the chapter about locus de ecclesia of C and Brochmand’s articulus 26 (De ecclesia), the reader can ascertain notable resemblances even between these two texts.

Prolegomena

The introductory part of C starts off by stating a real definition of theology. Then an onomatology of the word “theologia” is provided, whereafter the components of the real definition are explained. Two consequences of the definition are observed: (1) theology cannot be identified with any of the five mental habitus (acquired stable aptitudes of the mind) that Aristotle (384–322 BCE) lists in Ethica Nicomachea VI:3; and (2) theology is the “most eminent” discipline. At the end, two questions about the nature of theology are taken up, and responses of Roman Catholics,

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48. “Introduction pertaining to the nature of theology examined as a whole.”; “Conclusion that briefly indicates the essence or the principal part and chief point of this completed work.”


50. Aristotle’s five acquired aptitudes of the mind (Gr. ἕξις, Lat. habitus) are: intuitive understanding (intelligentia), demonstrative knowledge (scientia), theoretical wisdom (sapientia), practical wisdom (prudentia), and skill (ars). In this sense, for example, scientia is a certain type of quality of an individual mind. The words “discipline” and “doctrine” are ambiguous: either of them can mean an aptitude an individual mind has acquired or a meaning-content objectified in written texts.
Calvinists, Socianists, Anabaptists, and Weigelians are critically discussed. In his *Dissertatio*, Brochmand provides a real definition of theology with exactly the same structure as the one given in C.\(^5\) He offers an onomatological analysis with which C has remarkable overlappings.\(^5\) He calls attention to the same consequences of the definition of theology as C.\(^5\) And most comments on controversies in C overlap with those of Brochmand.\(^5\)

It is beyond reasonable doubt that Brochmand’s *Dissertatio* is the source of the *Prolegomena*; regarding almost all issues, what is said in C is obtained by selecting passages from B. The theoretically possible rival hypotheses are: (a) Brochmand had around 1633 access to Rudbeckius’s unpublished lecture notes from 1611 or (b) there is a source, produced prior to 1611, from which Rudbeckius borrowed in 1611 and Brochmand in 1633. In both cases this would mean that the best Brochmand could do in 1633 to discuss the nature of theology was to borrow from a text produced more than twenty years earlier: not only would he have lacked a personal view on the matter, but he would have judged that he can entirely ignore more recent discussions on the topic, such as Gerhard’s discussion in his *Exegesis* from 1625. These hypotheses are too far-fetched to be taken seriously. Let us take a closer look at the two texts.

**Onomatology:** About etymology, C says that “theologia” means “eloquium Dei” (God’s speech). As one of the sources of the word, B mentions “eloquia Dei” (God’s utterances). All biblical references in C are included in those of B. Regarding homonymy, a distinction is made between *theologia archetypos* (knowledge that God has of himself) and *ektypos* (understanding that created beings have of God). B mentions the distinction with the same explications. In C, it is further noted that “theologia ektypos” is ambiguous between the three readings *theologia unionis*, *visionis*, and *revelationis* (knowledge that Christ in his human nature has through the hypostatic union; knowledge that good angels and blessed men have about God in their eternal life; wisdom that men in their earthly life obtain regarding God and divine things on the basis of God’s word). B makes the same division with the same explications. All references to the Bible made in C when discussing the tripartite division are found in B. Concerning synonymy, both C and B say that the word “theology” does not appear in scriptures. Examples of synonyms are given, of which the first two in both texts are “doctrina secundum pietatem” (doctrine which is according to godliness) and “sapientia

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54. B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 2; B, vol. 1, art. 2 (*De sacra scriptura*), chs. 2–4.
in mysterio abscondita” (wisdom in a mystery, a hidden mystery), with the same biblical references.

**Real definition:** C and B agree that the **genus** of theology is **doctrine,** and that in order to express the **differentia** of theology, we must indicate its efficient cause (**causa efficiens**), principle (**principium**), object (**obiectum**), and goal (**finis**). B says the **efficient cause** is God who has revealed the doctrine to us, and expresses this by stating that theology is a doctrine “hausta e revelatione” (derived from revelation); C does the same by the words “divinitus patefacta” (divinely revealed). B affirms that the holy scripture is the **principle** of theology, and adds to the description of the **differentia** the words “literis sacrí comprehensa” (expressed by holy writings); C uses exactly the same words. B says that God and all that is necessary for salvation constitute the **object** of theology."

C states that the object of theology is God insofar as he has manifested himself in Christ for the salvation of those who believe but are sinners; B uses the same formulation in a more detailed discussion of the object. B includes in the description of the **differentia** the words “qua de Deo et rebus cognitu, creditu, et factu ad saltem necessarijs erudimur” (by means of which we are taught about God and things that must be known, believed, and done for salvation). In C, the same is captured by the words “ex illa [= doctrina] de vera Dei cognitione et cultu erudiamur” (from which we are taught true knowledge and worship of God). Both B and C identify as the ultimate **goal** of theology the eternal life. C adds the words “ad vitam aeternam” in the description of the **differentia,** in order to express that the goal of being taught in accordance with the object of theology is eternal life. B says a bit more, adding the words “ut transformati in imaginem Dei, vita beemur aeterna” (when transformed in the image of God, we are blessed with an eternal life).

**Consequences:** (1) C formulates three reasons why theology differs from philosophical disciplines. These coincide verbatim or almost verbatim with three of the four reasons that B gives for the claim that theology is not any of the Aristotelian **habitus:** such philosophical aptitudes are learned by human effort without any special aid of the holy spirit; their principle is reason, while that of theology is divine revelation; and their goal is earthly happiness, that of theology eternal blessedness. (2) To motivate why theology is the most eminent discipline, B indicates three features used for judging the value of a discipline and argues that theology has them to the

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55. For two readings of “doctrine”, see footnote 50.
57. 7v (35–36 in H); B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 4.
58. For C, see p. 8r (in H p. 36). For B, see vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 3.
maximum degree. C uses the same features. In both cases, (1) and (2), all Bible-citations of C are among those of B.

Controversies: In C, two questions of controversial theology are raised: (Q1) whether God’s word revealed in scriptures is the only principle of theology, and (Q2) whether the theology-doctrine is speculative (that is, theoretical), practical, or both speculative and practical. Also B takes up these questions. For each question and every type of opponent, both works first provide a description of the opponent’s position and then respond to what the opponent says.

Regarding (Q1), B and C describe the position of the Roman Catholics in exactly the same way (the authority of the Church and non-written traditions as further principles of theology). They both refer to counterarguments to be found in later parts of their works. They describe Calvinists’ and Socianists’ position (human reason admitted as a principle of theological inferences beside scriptures) by the same words. In B, five arguments attributed to Calvinists and Socianists are criticized. C discusses four of them, employing B’s responses. The descriptions of the positions of Anabaptists (postulation of further sources of revelation in addition to the scriptures) and Weigelians (taking there to be such additional principles of theology as the discourse of angels) are the same in the two texts up to insignificant modifications. C’s response to Anabaptist argument is adapted from B.

As for (Q2), C states that theology is both theoretical and practical; B says theology is partly theoretical and partly practical. In C, theology being theoretical is motivated by Bible-quotes according to which believers have requested that God gave them understanding that is in accordance with his word (ut Deus det illi intellectum secundum eloquium suum). B offers systematic reasons. First, certain parts of theology concern necessary things (whence it resembles a scientia), these things not being results of production (so it does not resemble an ars); examples are doctrines of God, angels, and creation. Second, after the fall the minds of men are obscured, which necessitates bestowing some theoretical understanding of theology on them. C argues for the practical nature of theology by saying that the Holy Spirit denies that theology amounts to pure knowledge and shows that

59. B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 2, q. 3; B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 3.
60. B, vol. 1, art. 2; B, vol. 2, art. 26 (De ecclesia); lib. 1, ch. 4: membri II, III (De scriptura sacra) in C and in H.
63. C’s statement is “cum limitatione”: theology is not an Aristotelian habitus. See 11v–12r (39 in H). Brochmand’s affirmation relies on the same premise. B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 3.
64. B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 3.
the most important part of theology teaches how to worship God and love one’s neighbour. The reasoning employs two out of four arguments that B gives for the same conclusion.65

Both in B and in C, Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) is said to argue that theology is a scientia. Further, B maintains explicitly – and C implicitly – that Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) classifies it as sapientia. In C (but not explicitly in B), this is taken to mean that according to these thinkers, theology is exclusively a theoretical discipline.66 In B (but not in C) it is remarked that the reformed theologian Bartholomäus Keckermann (c. 1572–1609) categorizes theology as prudentia, therefore viewing it as a practical discipline. Both C and B maintain that theology has resemblances to all three habitus. B argues (using an abundance of Bible-quotes) that theology is at once a scientia, a sapientia, and a prudentia – but in a distinctly theological sense, not in the sense of Aristotle.67

In C (but not explicitly in B) it is said that according to Aquinas, theology cannot be classified as sapientia. In order to explain Aquinas’s motivation for this negative view, C reproduces Brochmand’s explanation as to why theology is not a form of sapientia in the sense of Aristotle: theoretical wisdom concerns the most general truths and has its fulfillment in the contemplation of pure knowledge, while this is not so for theology.68 To reply to the claim that theology does not constitute sapientia, B stresses that the sense in which theology indeed amounts to sapientia is not the sense Aristotle discusses. Here the reply of C is more extensive: theology does not concern merely the most general truths but singular facts (singularea); does not content itself with theoretical contemplation but has good practical consequences; and is not an acquired aptitude but received from above.69

C affirms that according to Scotus, theology cannot be classified as scientia. The reasons that Scotus had, according to C, for this negative view coincide with the reasons Brochmand gives for not taking theology to be a scientia. First, we do not regain the image of God by pure contemplation; second, while scientia draws conclusions from self-evident principles, theology amounts to wisdom in a mystery; and third, scientia does not pertain to

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65  11v in C (39 in H); B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 3.
66  Actually, Aquinas’s view was more nuanced: for him the question was whether theology can also be classified as scientia in Aristotle’s sense, while he maintained that theology is in addition a form of intelligencia, a form of sapientia, and a form of prudentia. See, for example, Geoffrey Turner, “St Thomas Aquinas on the ‘Scientific’ Nature of Theology”, New Blackfriars 78/921 (1997), 467–468.
68  B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 2, q. 1.
69  12r–v (40 in H).
singular facts (singularia), while theology considers such facts. Both C and B reply that they easily concede theology not to be exclusively a speculative discipline. The two add that in a certain sense, theology does not concern singular facts as such, but as exemplifying a certain universality.

According to both C and B, those who claim theology not to be a prudentia, motivate this negative view by saying that prudentia concerns our corporeal good, whereas theology pertains to what is good for us spiritually. Both C and B reply that theology can be categorized as prudentia in a theological sense (“prudentia filiorum lucis”), but not in Aristotle’s sense.

**Conclusion of the Codex**

The conclusion begins with the statement that the goal of theology is that we believe that Jesus is Christ and that by believing we may have our life in his name. Brochmand concludes the section about fines theologiae in his Dissertatio by the same words. In C, it is then said that we learn, by the standard provided by the loci theologici, to test ourselves and to find out whether we can be certain of our faith. The discussion that follows concerns the conditions (praecognita) and the way of establishing (modus probandi) this certainty. The text stems, with only very minor modifications, from Question 4 in Meisner’s 1614 dissertation De numero et certitudine electorum.

In Thesis 25, Meisner enumerates eight “axioms” that according to him are needed for proving that one need not doubt one’s faith. The first five are reproduced in C as the requisite praecognita: (1) election and eternal salvation do not depend on our merits, but exclusively on divine promises; (2) God seriously desires the salvation of every man; (3) Christ came to this world for the salvation of all sinners, not merely the elected; (4) the fruits of Christ’s suffering are offered to every man; and (5) in order to benefit from these fruits, all that is required of us is the use of the means of salvation. Then, C reproduces Meisner’s Thesis 26, stating that there are two ways to prove that one can be certain of one’s faith: a priori (with reference to the causes of faith) and a posteriori (reasoning from the effects and signs of faith). To elaborate what an a priori demonstration involves, C utilizes Meisner’s Theses 27–29. The idea is that if we assume the grace of God, we observe that it is a cause of faith and salvation, and may therefore consider ourselves to be justified in not doubting our faith. To discuss the notion of a posteriori demonstration, C uses Meisner’s Theses 30–35. Here, from the presence of signs of faith we infer to the reality of faith itself. Towards the

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70. B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 2, q. 1.
71. 319r in C (350 in H); B, vol. 1, art. 1, ch. 1, sect. 6.
72. 319r–v (350–351 in H).
end, C mentions doubt (*dubitatio*) and prejudice (*praesumptio*) as the main difficulties about being certain of one’s faith, and attributes them respectively to Roman Catholics and to Calvinists. These remarks are taken from Meisner’s Thesis 39, and so is the affirmation that faith requires finding a middle position between the Charybdis of constant doubt and the Scylla of absolute safety.\(^\text{73}\)

**Conclusion**

Two chapters of C borrow from Brochmand’s *Universe theologiae systema*, and one chapter is copied from a dissertation of Meisner (1614). Since the introduction and the conclusion of C are among these chapters, they do not tell us anything about Rudbeckius’s characteristic way of thinking about dogmatics. Thus, Item 4 of Hägglund’s thesis is false and the thesis is refuted.

Even if C were based on a work W that Rudbeckius wrote in 1611, C would not allow us to access W, because we have no way of knowing which parts of C possibly yield us information about W. For, at least three chapters have been included in C that are not based on what Rudbeckius did in 1611. Thus:

- if Item 1 of Hägglund’s thesis is true and we can access an earlier work via C, then this work is not produced by Rudbeckius in 1611: Item 2 is false (among the chapters we access, several are not authored by him); and
- if Item 2 is true and C is dependent on a work produced by Rudbeckius in 1611, then too many changes have been subsequently effected to allow us using C to access this work: Item 1 is false.

Thus, at least one of Items 1 and 2 is false, while it is essential for Hägglund’s reasoning that they both are true.

I have definitely refuted Item 4 and the conjunction of Items 1 and 2. Individually the Items 1 and 2 have not been categorically refuted. Regarding Items 2 and 3 it can be observed that Hägglund has not offered us good grounds to believe them: a third-hand remark mentioning the year 1611 in a transcript of Brochmand’s *locus*, even granted that the transcript was produced by a Swede, hardly ties the codex to Rudbeckius.

Identifying the origin and the role of the codex C is a task for future research. Perhaps C is based on material prepared for synodal dissertations in

some Swedish diocese; in that case the chapters could have been composed over a relatively long time span (easily a quarter century).

The aim of my article was to discuss whether C tells us something about Rudbeckius’s lectures in dogmatics. To this question I believe to have given a motivated negative answer.

**SUMMARY**

In 1992, Bengt Hägglund put forward a thesis according to which a codex in his possession is based on material Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) authored in 1611, maintaining that the codex gives us information about Rudbeckius’s lectures on *loci theologi* ci in Uppsala during the years 1611–1613 and that it reveals to us characteristic features of Rudbeckius’s thinking about dogmatics. Hägglund published the codex in 2001. I point out, first, weaknesses in Hägglund’s argumentation. Second, I present indirect evidence against his thesis employing the two series of Rudbeckius’s published dissertations on dogmatics (1611–1613, 1620–1644) and his own comments about his lectures. Third, I indicate that three parts of the codex that are particularly important for Hägglund’s argumentation stem from other authors: the introductory part on the nature of theology, as well as the chapter on *locus de ecclesia*, have their origin in Jesper Brochmand’s *Universæ theologiæ systema* (1633), while the conclusion is taken from a dissertation that Balthasar Meisner published in 1614. The codex does not allow us to access a work Rudbeckius would have authored in 1611: it contains too many parts he cannot have authored then. In particular, the introduction and the conclusion of the codex do not tell us anything about Rudbeckius’s characteristic thoughts on dogmatics. Hägglund’s main reason for thinking that the codex is a transcript of Rudbeckius’s work from 1611 is a date mentioned at the end of *locus* of the church. As it happens, this *locus* is borrowed from Brochmand, not from Rudbeckius.