Early uses of the term *chinjutsu*

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Introduction

This paper focuses on the early indigenous Japanese works on *chinjutsu*. *Chinjutsu* is an important key term within the indigenous grammatical tradition, even though it seems as if the label 'modality' has taken over almost completely in recent works. In particular, the notion is central to any discussion of the history of theories of modality in Japan.

In its ordinary sense, *chinjutsu* means 'statement' and in combination with the verb *suru* 'do' it means 'to state' or 'to make a statement'. The meaning of the word when used as a grammatical term, however, is much more elusive and difficult to define, due to the fact that it has been used differently by different authors. A usual translation is 'predication', but there are other possible alternatives as well, for example 'modality' or 'illocutionary force', depending on which work is being referred to. A standard definition, if it is possible to give one, is found in Koike 1997:288, who says that *chinjutsu* is "a sign of completing a sentence, which expresses the speaker's or writer's attitude, judgment, emotion, etc."

Further, Komatsu 2001:467 usefully distinguishes between two main themes that have been central in the scholarly debate. Firstly, it has been discussed what the function of *chinjutsu* is within the sentence; and secondly, scholars differ amongst themselves as to where in the sentence the expression of *chinjutsu* is located. As for the functional side, one position is that *chinjutsu* has to do with sentence formation, that is, it has a unifying or synthesizing function which has the force of completing or finishing a sentence. On the other hand, some scholars point to an addressee-oriented transmissional function, and yet others use the term in a sense which refers to modality or subjectivity. There is no unity regarding the location of the *chinjutsu* expression either; for example, on one view the verbals have 'chinjutsu-force', while on another it is the final particles that carry the *chinjutsu* function.
In this paper I shall confine the discussion to how the term was used when it was still in its infancy. Since it was Yoshio Yamada 1908, 1931, 1936, 1942 who first used chinjutsu as a linguistic term, I start by outlining some aspects of his theory. I then go on to survey the central ideas of Miyake, Tokieda, and Mio.

**Yamada: chinjutsu and apperception**

It was the works by Yamada that sparked off the debates on chinjutsu. A key expression in Yamada’s theory is tookakusayoo (統覚作用) which might be translated as ‘a mental operation of unification’. The first part of the word, tookaku, is the Japanese translation of ‘apperception’ and sayoo means ‘action’, ‘operation’, or ‘function’. The word ‘apperception’ was earlier used by Leibniz, and then later on by Kant, but it seems to be generally accepted in the literature that Yamada took his cue from Wundt in his use of the term. According to Wundt, apperception is crucial to human beings since it is the cognitive function that unifies elements of our thoughts into a coherent whole. In his discussion of the ‘Apperception centre’, Wundt 1904 [1902]: 318 notes that “We thus regard apperception as the one elementary process indispensable to any sort of ‘manifestation of intelligence’ and, indeed, to the higher mental functions at large”. This can be compared to Yamada’s view that for each idea or thought there is one mental act of unification, and that “this tookakusayoo is the life of thought” (1942:425, my trans.). The synthesizing function plays an important role in Yamada’s view of sentence formation; the linguistic unit of a sentence is viewed as the linguistic expression of a unified thought. In his own wording (1942:425, my trans.):

> A sentence consists of words, but if we only look at its outward appearance there is nothing but a mere collection of words. The reason that we can call it a sentence is the internally existing power of the thought.

Let us now go further and take a look at the notion of chinjutsu. In order to fully understand the meaning of this key term, it is once again necessary to move beyond Yamada’s own theory and examine what influenced him. Yamada was knowledgeable in pre-Fregean European logic; and in this connection there is one point of particular importance. A feature of classical logic, before Frege entered the stage, is that a proposition is viewed as consisting logically of three parts: the subject, the predicate, and the copula. For example, in the sentence:

(1) The rose is red.

the terms ‘rose’ and ‘red’ are complete terms and when they are joined together by the copula ‘be’ a complete proposition is formed. Thus, the copula can be seen as a verb which is specialized for this coupling function and has no semantic content above that. Of course, this is how the logical structure of sentences is viewed, and the surface structure is a different matter since not all sentences contain a copula. In this connection it is also worth drawing attention to the approach that verbs with lexical content have a copulative function in addition to the function of expressing lexical meaning. For instance, the verb ‘run’ has the function of synthesizing the proposition in addition to the function of expressing the lexical meaning of an activity performed by the subject. On this view, verbal (including the copula) hold a unique position within the parts of speech, since they are the coupling devices needed for predication. Lenci 1998:246-47 notes that predication is “verb-based” in the theories of Aristotle, Abelard, and the Port Royal grammarians. In the passage below he discusses Abelard’s standpoint (Lenci 1998:243):

> [...] it is clear that verbs and only verbs are responsible for the formation of the predication connection inside statements. Only verbs are able to express the fact that a certain term is affirmed of an individual. The verb be is for Abelard the verb par excellence, exactly because it signifies in a pure and absolute way the copulative function that distinguishes verbs from other linguistic expressions.

We are now in a position to discuss what Yamada said about the role of verbal expressions and the copula in predication. Yamada introduces two terms: shuikannen (主位概念) ‘primary concepts’ and hinikannen (賓位概念) ‘secondary concepts’, and I shall here use a modern example of my own in order to illustrate these notions. In the following sentence we have the subject

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1For a more complete review of the literature, including a discussion of later developments and their theoretical implications, the reader is referred to my doctoral thesis (Larm 2006).

2I have not been able to consult Yamada’s earliest book (1908). I found it, but it was in a poor condition and difficult to use.

3Yamada’s theory of grammar, Yamadabunpoo, is still held in high esteem among Japanese linguists. Yamada was influenced by indigenous scholars such as Fujitani, but he was also well versed in German and English works on language, logic, and psychology (e.g., works by Henry Sweet, Johann Christian Heyse, and Wilhelm Wundt).

4This tradition dates back to Aristotle, but the copula went out of fashion when Frege introduced functions. A predicate, in Frege’s view, is “unsaturated” and must combine with an argument in order to produce a proposition (Frege 1997 [1891]:139).
‘Ken’ as the primary concept followed by the secondary concept sensei ‘teacher’: 5

(2) Ken wa sensei da.
   Ken TOP teacher COP
   ‘Ken is a teacher.’

These two concepts are then linked together by the copula da. Hence, what we have here is an analysis identical to that in traditional European logic, but applied to the Japanese language. Yamada 1936:677 explicitly says that in logic the copula is the linguistic expression which as its only function has this predicative capacity.

This brings us to Yamada’s notion of chinjutsu: the copula is said to have chinjutsu-force, which can be best translated simply as ‘predicative force’. What Yamada seems to mean is that chinjutsu is the linguistic encoding of the synthesizing activity of the mind, that is, it represents the unification of primary and secondary concepts. In other words, the notion of chinjutsu in the sentence is the ‘surface’ representation of the ‘deep’ underlying notion of tookaku ‘apperception’.

The next important point to address is Yamada’s view on yoogen ‘verbals.’ In discussing the European tradition above, it was mentioned that verbs with lexical content can be regarded as having a copulative function in addition to the function of expressing the lexical meaning. The same position is adopted by Yamada, who states that it is the chinjutsu-force that is the essential characteristic of the verbals, even if it is often the case that the verbals express the attribute of the subject as well. The fact that the verbals also contain the lexical meaning referring to an attribute of the subject is not seen as very important; it is not a verbal-specific feature since, for example, nouns also have this content.

The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion so far is that Yamada’s notion of the chinjutsu function is strongly influenced by the pre-Fregean tradition of logic. In fact, it seems to be a rather standard view of predication, possibly with the addition of Wundt’s notion of apperception to the theory.

However, one important point remains to be addressed. The term chinjutsu has been used by several scholars after Yamada in various senses, and in more recent works it refers to modality or illocutionary force. How come the use of Yamada’s term, which has to do with predication, has changed so much during the decades? One possible answer is that the step from predication and unification to modality is not far. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that Yamada in one place (1942:49) defines the function of the verbals as that of a unification judgment, and in another place he even talks about “special kinds” of chinjutsu such as: meirei ‘order’, kinsei ‘prohibition’, gimon ‘question’, kando ‘impression’, and kakui ‘confirmation’. Therefore, modals are possible carriers of the chinjutsu-function as well.

**Miyake and early Tokieda**

In the previous section we saw that the term chinjutsu, as used by Yamada, referred to the linguistic coding of apperception, and that he regarded chinjutsu force as the crucial characteristic of verbals. It will also be remembered that the copula was considered to be the purpose-made linguistic sign for expressing this synthesizing activity of the mind; and that ordinary verbs were seen as hosts of both lexical meaning and chinjutsu force. However, it was also pointed out that Yamada talked about chinjutsu as a unification judgment, and that this notion of a ‘judgment’ to some extent blurs the picture. Moreover, an additional source of confusion, which was also touched upon in the previous section, is that Yamada in one passage mentions several kinds of chinjutsu (for example meirei ‘order’ and kakui ‘confirmation’). In addition to these issues, there is one more problematic point. In one place Yamada 1936:691 remarks that the chinjutsu is insufficiently expressed when the verb occurs in an adnominal position, that is, in a relative clause. This statement can also be misleading, since it might lead us to believe that what he actually means by the term chinjutsu is some kind of illocutionary force or modality, rather than a unifying function. This last point has caused scholarly debate.

The discussions following Yamada start with Miyake 1934, who at this stage expresses a favourable view of the notion of chinjutsu. Under Miyake’s analysis the lexical meaning of the verb resides in the stem, and the chinjutsu function is located in the inflections. This is not a revolutionary suggestion, however, since Yamada seems to be aware of this, though it is not explicitly stated in his writings. In fact, when explaining one example sentence, Yamada points out that the attributive meaning is encoded in the word utsukushi ‘beautiful’ (which here has no nonpast inflection) and that the fully inflected form utsukushi-i ‘beautiful’ (nonpast form) expresses both lexical

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5The abbreviations used in this paper are: COMP = complementizer, COP = copula, EXEV = external evidence, GEN = genitive, INFIN = infinitive, NEG = negation, NOM = nominative, NPAST = non-past tense, PAST = past tense, QP = question particle, TOP = topic marker.
meaning and the activity of a judgment (Yamada 1931:58). Nevertheless, Miyake’s contribution is significant, and he suggests a new category of jutsushi which appears to correspond not only to inflections but also to auxiliaries and the copula. Final particles are included in this category as well. Interestingly, he also argues that the markers ‘!’, ‘?’, and ‘.’ can also fulfill the task of expressing chinjutsu. It is most likely that by this he means that the concluding judgment can be expressed by intonation, but a notion of something similar to indirect speech acts is possibly implied as well. His three examples have been simplified to the one below (Miyake 1934:23):

(3) Yuki ga fiir-u./!/?
   snow NOM fall-NPAST
   ‘It will snow!’/ ‘It will snow?’/ ‘It will snow!’

Thus, in this example, the same sentence is used to form three different utterances.

Miyake interprets Yamada’s notion of chinjutsu as having the function of a concluding judgment. It is clear that he also considers affirmation, negation, and the imperative to be chinjutsu expressions, which is in line with his view that the location of chinjutsu is in inflections and auxiliaries. Judging from his examples, the provisional suffix -eba and the politeness marker -masu are bearers of chinjutsu as well.

Some years later, Miyake 1937 discusses Yamada’s explanation of the insufficient chinjutsu function in relative clauses, which was mentioned above, and he now adopts a more sceptical attitude. Consider one of the examples he presents, which is taken from Yamada (Miyake 1937:76):

(4) Hito no sumanu ie
   person GEN live-NEG house
   ‘A house in which nobody lives’

In this noun phrase, the relative clause hito no sumanu modifies the head noun ie ‘house’. Yamada’s position here is that the primary concept hito ‘person’ and the secondary concept, which is the lexical meaning of the verb sumu ‘live’, have been unified. The chinjutsu function, however, is not complete since the verb is used to modify the noun. Now, since Yamada defined chinjutsu force as the linguistic expression of apperception, this is somewhat confusing. Miyake 1937:77 claims that there is no chinjutsu function whatsoever in examples like these, which is a natural position for him to take since chinjutsu, in his conception, is a notion similar to modality or illocutionary force. However, and this is slightly peculiar, he also questions the unification of the primary and secondary concepts in relative clauses. Consequently, this leads him to doubt Yamada’s notion of chinjutsu.

Miyake’s remarks do not, however, invalidate Yamada’s theory. What Yamada seems to have meant is that verbals have chinjutsu force in the sense that they unify the proposition, and he probably did not intend the term to refer to assertion, illocutionary force, or modality. However, illocutionary force and modality do indeed take scope over other elements in the clause, which is clearly seen in the overt structure of the predicate in Japanese, and it can therefore be expected that there is some overlap in the discussions, even in the writings of Yamada himself. Probably, he used the expression as a technical term in some cases and more loosely to mean ‘statement’ in others.

At exactly the same time as Miyake’s latest article, and in the same journal, an article by Tokieda on the concept of the sentence appeared. Tokieda rejects the view that the defining feature of verbals is that they express chinjutsu force in addition to the lexical content (Tokieda 1937a:13). His argument goes as follows. Firstly, Tokieda agrees that the copula can unify the sentence, but he also argues that if the copula has chinjutsu force then the same should also apply to the final particle in (5) and also to the marker of external evidence, rashii, in (6) (Tokieda 1937a:13):

(5) Yama wa yuki ka.
   mountain TOP snow QU
   ‘Is it snowing in the mountains?’

(6) Soto wa ame rashi-i.
   outside TOP rain EXEV-NPAST
   ‘It seems that it is raining outside.’

Tokieda says that the chinjutsu force in these two examples, similarly to sentences with a copula, is overtly expressed and separated from the secondary concept.

Secondly, as for verbs and adjectives, Tokieda takes the position that they are similar to other parts of speech, such as nouns, in that they do not overtly encode chinjutsu force. For example, a list of nouns can be meaningful even if there is no linguistic sign of unification, and a copula can sometimes be omitted after a noun. On these grounds Tokieda argues that the unifying force can tacitly reside in nouns as well, and that it is therefore wrong to assume the chinjutsu force to be a defining property of the verbals.

*I owe this observation to Onoe 1990:283, who also offers some textual support for this interpretation.*
However, Tokieda’s remarks do not seem to undermine Yamada’s theory. Let us first consider his two examples. In (5), which lacks a verbal expression, the question particle ka does take scope over the rest of the sentence and it attaches directly to the noun, and, it is indeed the case, as we shall also see later, that final particles conclude sentences. But to agree to this is not the same thing as saying that they have the unifying function that Yamada had in mind. Recall that Yamada took the position of pre-Fregean logicians, and that a proposition in his view logically consists of a primary and a secondary term which are joined together by the copula. We are thus talking about propositions, not actual utterances, and Yamada is well aware of the fact that the coupling device may or may not be linguistically expressed.

We can probably solve this problem simply by appealing to the competence and performance distinction. That is, a native speaker of Japanese tacitly knows that the verbal expression is missing in example (5), and we can therefore claim that it is the verbal expression that unifies the proposition in the underlying structure.

As for example (6), with the adjectival predicate extension rashii, Tokieda is right in saying that it has chinjutsu force in the sense Yamada used the term. However, this by no means contradicts Yamada’s theory, since rashii is adjectival and therefore could be considered a verbal expression.

Tokieda’s argument that the chinjutsu force resides in nouns as well as in verbs is also odd. Although a list of nouns can be interpreted meaningfully this does not entail that the nouns in themselves carry the chinjutsu function. The fact that the unification takes place anyway, without any verbal expression, can also be explained by appealing to the underlying linguistic system. That is, we can yet again say that it is the verbal expression that logically carries the chinjutsu force. It seems that Tokieda, at least in this case, is restricted since he only considers the performative surface structure of language.

It should be stressed, however, that despite these shortcomings Tokieda also provides a valuable insight. In part two of the article, he notes that if we consider the structure of Japanese, the function of the copula can be described as “wrapping up” the proposition rather than linking the primary and secondary terms (1937b:69). I shall return to this point in the penultimate section when considering Tokieda’s later works.

Mio: the separation of chinjutsu and unification

In the previous section we noted some unclarities in Yamada’s theory. Mio 1939 attempts to solve these problems, and demonstrates a profound understanding of Yamada’s writings. He notes that in Yamada’s theory chinjutsu is seen as the overt linguistic expression of apperception, or, put differently, that “the process of unification is the content of chinjutsu” (1939:168, my trans.). The major contribution by Mio is that he established that two different concepts are intermingled in Yamada’s usage of the term chinjutsu-sayoo ‘process of chinjutsu’ (or ‘chinjutsu operation’). This observation solves the issues raised by Miyake and Tokieda. In order to see what Mio means, let us return to (4) from the previous section, here repeated as (7):

(7) Hito no suma-nu ie
   person NOM live-NEG house
   ‘A house in which nobody lives’

As explained earlier, in this noun phrase the relative clause modifies the head noun ie ‘house’. Mio points out that the primary concept (the subject) hito ‘person’ and the secondary concept suma ‘live’ in this clause indeed are unified by the process of apperception, and on his interpretation this is also the position held by Yamada. Still, Mio states that he is also in line with the position taken by Miyake that the chinjutsu force is non-existent, and not just insufficient as Yamada said, when the verbal is in an adnominalized position. Thus, the problem here is that in the above example the operation of unification has been at work, but there is still no chinjutsu force. Therefore, the concept of chinjutsu cannot be the same as the mental process of unification. These two concepts are essentially different and must be kept apart. To express this in more modern terminology, what Mio makes explicit here is that Yamada’s term chinjutsu should be divided into two separate functions: ‘unification’ and ‘judgment’.

Let us now look at the details of Mio’s theory. In what follows I shall first present his view on the process of unification and then go on and describe his view of chinjutsu. This also follows the structure of his article.

Mio shares Yamada’s view that the mental operation of unification is the “most fundamental operation in thought formation” and furthermore that “there can be no concluded thoughts without the mental act of unification” (Mio 1939:170, my trans.). He furthermore suggests that this process can be seen from two alternative perspectives: the expression point of view (production) or the understanding viewpoint (interpretation). Let us start with the former and consider Mio’s view on how a thought is built up and unified.

Mio states that the unification process is crucial for thought formation, and it thus takes place before a sentence is formed. This operation results in a complete thought which can lay the foundation of a sentence. He notes that
“there are no sentence expressions without the preceding unification process” (Mio 1939:171, my trans.). Furthermore, he argues that concepts like subject and object are already included at the stage of the unification process, but only in a rudimentary form. They are differentiated later at the sentence stage. The theoretical claim that the unification process is at work on the ‘thought level’ rather than at the ‘sentence level’ suggests that Mio has an idea about something that resembles the Fodorian language of thought, or maybe alternatively a Chomskyan type of deep structure or logical form.

Matters are different when the unification process is considered from an interpretive and understanding point of view. Then there is no underlying thought as the starting point, but rather an already-produced sentence. The process of unification in this case operates on the level of the sentence, and Mio notes that “it is an active, dynamic operation” and also that “at the same time as the progression of this operation we gradually get the content” (Mio 1939:172, my trans.). In Mio’s view, the object of the study of grammar is the sentence level, that is, grammar is concerned with the interpretive side.

We now turn to the question of where the unification process takes place. Mio questions Yamada’s view that the unification process is restricted to the verbal and argues that the words preceding the verb must also be connected in some way. Thus, the unification process is at work throughout the sentence. In support of this view, Mio argues that a list of nouns can be understood as a unified whole even without a verbal expression. It should be pointed out that he is aware of the fact that it might be claimed that we covertly add the verbal expression in such cases, but on his view the unification process must still take place before we add the verbal expression.

In this connection Mio also considers the role of the copula. He compares the German proposition

(8) S ist P.

with its Japanese counterpart

(9) S wa P da.

and observes that what is expressed by the copula in the former example is represented in the latter sentence by both the marker wa and the copula da. Therefore, the proposition in Japanese contains something in addition to the primary and the secondary concepts, and the copula. Or, alternatively, the role of the copula is fulfilled by the combination of wa and da. Mio draws the conclusion that da on its own, without the marker wa, does not function like the German copula ist. According to Mio this is further evidence for his claim that the unification operation is not restricted to verbal; sometimes the verbal expression fulfil the copular function on its own but sometimes the marker wa occurs as well, and in such cases the unifying function is not limited to the verbal expression. Mio explains (1939:175, my trans.):

That is to say, in a proposition like “S wa P da” the process of unification is at work from the beginning to the end, and it is not the case that the process of unification is restricted to da.

Again, Mio anticipates how his argumentation could be criticised in saying that one might argue that the function of wa is to contrast the subject and the predicate, and that it is, after all, the copula da that does the work of unification. However, he counters this argument by explaining that to say that there is a contrastive function is tantamount to saying that there is unification.

Mio then goes on to provide a fine-grained exposition of his chinjutsu theory. He refers to Yamada’s expression tooitsuhantei ‘unification judgment’, and proposes that the term chinjutsusayoo ‘chinjutsu operation’ should only be used in this sense, i.e., to express the notion of a ‘judgmental operation’. As an illustration, he uses the following example (Mio 1939:177):

(10) Nihongun wa yuukan da.

Japanese troops TOP courage COP

‘The Japanese troops are courageous.’

The primary concept Nihongun ‘Japanese troops’ is here connected with the secondary concept yuukan ‘courage’, and the wa-da construction unifies the whole. The process here, which constructs the complete thought, is a lower level unification process. Mio then provides a theoretically appealing suggestion: when the lower level unification has taken place then the thought is unified, but in addition to this a higher level of unification needs to take place in order to connect the thought to a state of affairs in the real world.

Both the lower level and the higher level unification processes are seen as relational operations, so we have not yet reached the notion of chinjutsu. However, when the relation between the thought and a state of affairs in the real world has been established, then the speaker can make the judgment that the statement is true. This judgment is the chinjutsu operation, and it operates on a higher level than the process of unification.

And, yet again, Mio anticipates criticism for his position. He notes that it might be argued that we do not need to differentiate between the higher level unification process and the process of a judgment. But he maintains that the
two are different. The former process is relational, while the latter is ‘intuitive’ and works at a higher level.

We can summarise Mio’s views in the following manner. The unification of concepts takes place in some kind of language of thought. This complete thought in turn needs to be unified with a state of affairs in the real world. When this connection has been established a judgment can be made. This judgmental chinjutsu operation is different from the unification processes and it operates on a higher level. The process of building up an assertive statement, from the pre-sentence stage to a complete utterance with illocutionary force, can therefore be described as follows:

Lower level unification process (relational): works on all parts of the sentence and creates a unified thought.

Higher-level unification process (relational): connects the unified thought with some state of affairs in the real world.

The chinjutsu process (judgmental): the speaker asserts that the thought matches reality.

It is also worth mentioning that Mio hints at the possibility of other processes operating at the same level as the judgment, for example questions.

Later Tokieda

Before looking at Tokieda’s use of the term chinjutsu, let us consider some general aspects of his theory of grammar. Tokieda was influenced by two schools of thought: the indigenous Japanese tradition and the European philosophical school of phenomenology.7 His theory of language is called gengokateisetsu ‘the language as a process hypothesis’, which he describes as follows (Tokieda 1961:18, my trans.):

The language as a process theory stipulates that language is the act of expressing ideas or the act of understanding. It says that it is the expression process itself, or the process of understanding itself, that is language.

Tokieda divides words into the categories ofshi andji. The former category consists of words that undergo a conceptual process while the latter represents words that reflect the linguistic activity of the speaker. That is, shi are objective words with lexical content and ji are subjective grammatical words. A sentence is then gradually built up, in layers as it were, by the successive combination of these two categories. Let us illustrate this with Tokieda’s famous example (Tokieda 1950:248-250):

(11) Ume no hana ga sai-ta.
    umetree GEN flower NOM bloom-PAST
    ‘The ume trees have bloomed.’

Each shi element combines with a ji element to produce yet a larger unit, which then in turn is embedded within the following shi element, and so on. In the example above ume ‘ume tree’ (shi) merges with the genitive marker no (ji), and the newly established unit is then embedded by hana ‘flower’ (ji). This process goes on until the sentence finally is wrapped up by a constituent belonging to the ji category, in this case the past tense marker ta.8 Tokieda labels this design of the sentence ku no irekogatakoozo ‘the nesting-type-structure of the clause’, and he illustrates the previous example as below (1950:250):

Recall from the section before last that Tokieda 1937b:69 provided a different analysis of the copula than that of Yamada. The observations we have just made explain why Tokieda argues that the function of the copula, which he classifies as a ji element, is to wrap up the proposition rather than to link the primary and the secondary terms.

Another characteristic of Tokieda’s theory is the use of empty categories. In the above sentence the need for a zero marker does not arise, since Tokieda recognizes the past tense marker ta in the example above as a ji element. However, somewhat inconsistently, the nonpast tense morpheme is not given the same treatment, and the sentence:

7I first became aware of Tokieda’s strong affinity to phenomenology thanks to an informative paper by Imai 2002 which is devoted to this topic.

8The iterative process that Tokieda describes here resembles the Chomskyan concept of ‘merge’ within the minimalist framework; functional heads merge with lexical categories and form larger units. Kinoshita 1997:145-146 also observes the resemblance with generative grammar, and draws attention to the notions of ‘projection’ and ‘adjunction’.
(12) Inu ga hashi-ru.
dog NOM run-NPAST
'The dog runs.'

is therefore represented as (1950:258):

\[ \text{Inu ga hashiru} \]

where the dark area stands for the non-overt \textit{ji} marker. Furthermore, non-overt \textit{ji} elements appear in attributive positions as well, as in the sentence:

(13) Haya-ku nagare-ru.
fast-INFIN flow-NPAST
'(It) flows fast.'

where the zero marker is placed between the adverb and the verb (1950:273):

\[ \text{Hayaku мnagareru} \]

Tokieda got the idea about \textit{shi} and \textit{ji} from traditional Japanese grammar, where the category corresponding to \textit{ji} (subjective words) goes under the labels \textit{teniha} てには or \textit{teniwoha} てにをは. The work that particularly influenced Tokieda was Akira Suzuki’s book \textit{Gengyoshishuron} (1824). In this work, Suzuki proposes four parts of speech of which the grammatical subjective words \textit{teniwoha} constitutes one category. Suzuki observed that the \textit{teniwoha} group behaves differently from the other three parts of speech (the \textit{shi} words) and he says, for example, that the \textit{ji} words are ‘the voice of the mind’, and that they do not have any reference. A grammatical \textit{ji} word is also metaphorically seen as the hand that operates the tool, while the \textit{shi} word is the tool itself. Suzuki also noted that the content words, \textit{shi}, cannot function without the grammatical \textit{ji} words, and conversely that the \textit{ji} words cannot stand alone.

Thus, we see that the \textit{shi} and \textit{ji} distinction used by Tokieda has its base in traditional Japanese grammar. However, this should be seen in connection to another important aspect of Tokieda’s view of language. In a lecture held in Nagoya 1967, Tokieda (1968:11-12) said that at first he did not understand what Suzuki meant and what the grounds for the classification of word classes were. Then the phenomenological school of philosophy came to his rescue, and in particular it was Husserl who caught Tokieda’s attention. Of particular interest here are the Husserlian terms \textit{noesis} and \textit{noema}, which pertain to subjectivity and objectivity respectively. As Moore puts it (1942:81, emphasis in original):

The ‘intentional experiences’ themselves are further distinguished into \textit{noesis} and \textit{noema}, the subjective and objective aspects of the experience, act and content, experiencing and that which is experienced.

Tokieda talks about \textit{ji} words and \textit{shi} words in terms of \textit{noesis} and \textit{noema} expressions, where \textit{noesis} stands for the intentional act and \textit{noema} for the objective side (Tokieda 1968:23). Thus, Tokieda’s theory of subjective and objective elements in the sentence is an application of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. \textit{Shi} elements stand for the objects of our intentions, and the intentional act of the speaker manifests itself overtly in \textit{ji} elements.

Let us now ask the question why Tokieda’s theory is significant. If we see the \textit{shi–ji} dichotomy as a distinction between function words and content words then it is of course not a novel idea. The Aristotelian labels ‘syncategoremata’ and ‘categoremata’ were widely used in medieval European logic, and we have seen that the same theoretical distinction has long been noted in the indigenous tradition as well. What is important, however, is Tokieda’s semantic description of the difference between these two groups of words. It was mentioned above that \textit{shi} elements undergo a conceptual process while \textit{ji} elements reflect the linguistic activity of the speaker. In this connection, we once again need to consult Husserl. In fact, even if nowhere explicitly stated, it is not unreasonable to presume that Tokieda was inspired by Husserl’s ideas of ‘independent meanings’ and ‘dependent meanings’ which are described in volume two of his \textit{Logical investigations} (Husserl 2001 [1901]). Husserl says (2001 [1901]:55):

\[ \text{We must not merely distinguish between categorematic and syncate-} \]
\[ \text{gorematic expressions but also between categorematic and syncate-} \]
\[ \text{gorematic meanings. It is more significant to speak of independent and} \]
\[ \text{non-independent meanings.} \]

The point here is that Tokieda is doing exactly what Husserl considered important, namely, he analyses the \textit{shi} and \textit{ji} in terms of meaning.

This brings us to Tokieda’s view of \textit{chinjutsu}. The key point here is that Tokieda uses the term \textit{chinjutsu} to refer to the function of the \textit{ji} elements in a sentence (1941:334). It follows that he uses the term not only when referring to the function of the final \textit{ji} elements that concludes the sentence, but also

\[ \footnotesize{9} \text{I have not been able to get hold of Suzuki’s book. My remarks on his work are solely based on Tokieda’s explanations.} \]
for other elements, for example the genitive marker *no* as in (Tokieda 1941: 244):

(14) Haru no ame
spring GEN rain

‘The rain of spring’

The function of the genitive marker in this example is referred to as *sooteiteki chinjutsu*, which can be contrasted with the notion of *jutsugoteki chinjutsu* of the *ji* element concluding a sentence.

An attractive side of this theory is the use of one general principle of merging to explain both the unification of the various parts of the sentence and the wrapping up of the sentence as a whole. If we take the *shi* and *ji* distinction to represent the difference between functional (relational) and lexical categories, and if we assume that the continuing merging of these two is the basic principle in sentence formation, then Tokieda’s minimal approach is useful. Nothing hinders us from using the term *chinjutsu* in this way, if our aim is restricted to explain the unification process. Of course, the theory may have some problems, for instance the inconsistency I mentioned earlier when discussing the empty categories, but this is only to be expected of a framework still in its infancy.

But, the weak point of Tokieda’s theory is the sweeping assumption that *ji* words encode the activity of the speaker. This overgeneralisation fails to take into account that there are different kinds of functional categories. We do not want a theory where, for example, case markers are analysed as being subjective.

Tokieda’s grammar is not a theory about *chinjutsu* in the sense Yamada used the term. Nevertheless, Tokieda is important because, as Nitta 1988:156 also points out, with him the *chinjutsu* debate came to be concerned with subjectivity. In addition, his idea about the layered structure of the clause was well before its time. The scholarly discussions following Tokieda provide much useful insight into the nature of subjective modality.

**Conclusion**

We have seen that the *chinjutsu* debate was started by Yamada. He drew his inspiration partly from traditional logic, where a proposition is viewed as consisting of a primary and a secondary concept, which are being linked together by the copula, and partly from Wundt’s psychology. Thus, *chinjutsu* is defined as the overt linguistic expression of the synthesizing activity of the mind (*tookakusayoo* ‘apperception’).

A source of confusion, however, is that Yamada seems to be ambiguous in his use of the word *chinjutsu*. The term is sometimes used in a technical sense, as it was defined above, and at times in a looser, non-technical way, meaning ‘statement’. This can probably explain why he also talks about *chinjutsu* in terms of ‘judgments’ and other modal notions such as ‘orders’ and ‘prohibitions’. And, in view of this, it is understandable that Yamada said that the *chinjutsu-force* is insufficient in relative clauses. What he probably meant was that there is no assertive force in such examples, which is indeed correct.

Miyake, Tokieda, and Mio defined their positions in relation to Yamada. Miyake’s analysis concentrates on the latter aspect of Yamada’s theory, and accordingly he views *chinjutsu* as illocutionary force or assertion. However, he sees a problem in Yamada’s seemingly contradictory statement about the insufficient *chinjutsu-force* in relative clauses.

Both the earlier and the later writings of Tokieda convey a somewhat confused understanding of what Yamada meant by *chinjutsu*, but it should also be recognised that he puts forward some powerful ideas. His main insight is that the structure of the clause is layered. Another appealing aspect of his theory is that one general principle of merging is used to explain both the unification of elements within the sentence and the wrapping up of the sentence as a whole. Furthermore, Tokieda has had a profound and lasting influence since he directed the attention to subjectivity.

Although the works of Yamada, Miyake, and Tokieda are still worth reading (in particular Yamada), they are not entirely satisfactory. Mio, on the other hand, provides a persuasive alternative. While demonstrating a thorough understanding of Yamada’s work, he illuminates the situation by drawing a clear and well-motivated distinction between ‘unification’ and ‘judgment’. The word *chinjutsu*, then, is confined to the latter notion.

Mio anticipated ideas such as ‘the language of thought’ (or ‘logical form’), and his explanation of *chinjutsu* as a judgmental operation seems to resonate well with truth-conditional semantics.

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